Making Peace: Kosovo/a and Serbia: conflict
resolution scenarios
by Dr. Ivana Milojević,
This essay explores the futures of Kosovo/a and Serbia. It uses
methods from scenarios and peace theory to articulate a different
possible future for the region. The current trajectory promises
hardship for all parties especially in the medium and long term.
Keywords: International conflict resolution, peace futures,
transcend method, scenarios, Serbia, Kosovo/a
When there is a conflict between two ethnic groups, be it over
territory, resources or values, there is also always a one sided take
on the past and present. The one sided perspective Kosovars and Serbs
have been using for decades, if not centuries, is akin to two deaf
persons talking, without the ability to hear each other or lip read.
It also reminds one of the ancient tale of blind men who attempted to
describe an elephant via touching different parts of its body. The
elephant is like a pot! asserts the one touching the head. No, like a,
winnowing basket! says the one who touches the ear. Ploughshare! Says
one touching the tusk. And so they went, describing the elephant as a
plough (trunk), granary (body), pillar (foot), mortar (back), pestle
(tail), or brush (tip of the tail). In a similar vain, Serbs exclaim:
Kosovo is ours! This is where our nation was born, where our ancestral
bones are buried and where our churches were built. No, Kosova is
ours! exclaim Albanian Kosovars. We’ve lived here even longer and are
now a vast majority. Oh well, they are all irrational barbarians,
Balkan cavemen, exclaim the ‘civilised’. If it was not in Europe, no
one would care, exclaim the postcolonial theorists. It is a result of
a militaristic warrior culture, so assert peace theorists. No, a
result of patriarchy, say the feminists. Unfinished nation state
building process, is the discourse of the nationalists. One must
respect international laws of national sovereignty, say the legalists.
But the laws change when reality on the ground changes, say the
realists. Change is the only constant, remind social change theorists.
The examples in the previous paragraph suggest that it is possible to
theorise conflicts within and around Kosovo/a and Serbia in many
different ways and via using many different discourses. Yet only some
of the discourses are seen as legitimate and dominate. Both locally
and internationally it is discourses of nationalism, realism and
legalism that are most commonly used. Some are virtually unknown to
the majority of the population, such as the feminist, postcolonial or
peace movement ones. Some are stated explicitly (i.e. legalist
discourse) and some are hidden, existing more at the myth/metaphor
level (i.e. ‘Balkan’ identity discourse).
Another set of extremely powerful discourses are those of history,
justice and righteousness. Most commonly it is these discourses that
are used to propose ‘a solution’ to the current and long-term conflict
over Kosova/o. And yet, paradoxically it is these very discourses that
are also part of the problem.
History
History can be a fantastic resource to understand the present but when
it comes to conflict situations it is too often used for further
entrenchment. Coupled with discourse of nationalism, history can not
be but about ‘cherry picking’ – i.e. selective use of dates that
confirm ‘our’ victimisation and ‘their’
viciousness/violence/unfairness. Prior to the 1999 NATO bombing of
both Kosova and Serbia there was a debate open to BBC listeners in
terms of potential NATO intervention and also wider issues in relation
to the conflict between Serbs and Albanians. One does not need to be a
futurist to predict which dates which side was going to pick from
history. Participants only talked about their own victimisation and
only of some periods from history and not the others. To simplify, the
debate went like this:
Albanian side
1999: 90% Albanians in Kosova. Serbs care “about mines not the
shrines”.
1988: Revoked autonomous status. All rights abolished, police state
introduced.
1945-1948:
Albanians sought refuge in Turkey, during the reign of Vasa
Čubrilović, the head of Serbian Regime that prosecuted them.
1912-1941: expulsion of Albanians and Colonisation of Kosova took
place by Serbian monarchy/army/government.
Expulsion of Albanians in the 19th century (e.g. 1877-1878).
Albanians originally Illyrians, lived in Balkan since ancient times,
more then
2 000 years before Serbs “even set a foot in the Balkans”.
Serbian side
1999: Albanians represent 20% in Serbia; used to be 16% in former
Yugoslavia.
Autonomous status only given in 1974. Demonstration for independence
in 1981.
1968-1988: Expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo and ‘demographic warfare’
(emigration of Serbs + illegal immigration + high birth rate of
Albanian population).
1941-1945: Italian occupation of Kosovo and creation of Greater
Albania, expulsion of Serbian population.
1389: Battle of Kosovo, the beginning of 500 years of colonisation by
Ottoman Empire.
Historical evidence that Albanians lived in Kosovo for only the last
600 years.
Serbs came many centuries before that.
Thus the question of ‘whom does the Kosovo righteously and
historically belong to’ cannot possibly be answered using this type of
discourse. For a solution that is fair to all sides involved, for an
outcome that is acceptable and sustainable a range of futures rather
than history oriented discourses needs to be applied. So instead of
only asking ‘who was there first’, ‘who is the rightful owner’ and
‘what are the legal issues and implications’ questions themselves need
to be reframed. But before doing so lets look at some possible futures
scenarios.
Conflict resolution scenarios
In this section I employ four main approaches: power based methods,
rights based methods, randomness/chance based methods and
interest-based methods.
1. Power based methods ask the question of “who is the most
powerful?”. It uses the rule of man, that is ‘fight it out, might is
right’, overt violence (war, terrorism, individual and group attacks),
and non-physical sanctions (alternative systems of governing,
ultimatums, sanctions, psychological abuse, boycott and so on).
2. Rights based methods ask the question of “who has the best case?”.
It relies on the rule of law, religious code or community norms. The
resolution ultimately is through authority’s order, course of law or
arbitrations.
3. Randomness/chance based methods asks the question of “who is ‘the
luckiest’?”. These methods rely on the rule of chance, are random and
ad hoc.
4. Interest-based methods ask the question of “what are the needs and
concerns?”. It thus focuses on problem solving approaches, on ‘our
way’ (collaboration) instead of ‘my way’ (forcing), ‘your way’
(accommodating), ‘no way’ (avoiding) or ‘half way’ (compromising).
Many of these conflict resolution methods have already been tried. In
particular, power and rights based methods, by all sides involved, and
also by the international community. This part of the world has had
its share of wars, sanctions and group directed abuses, that is, its
share of direct, structural and psychological violence. In 1999, power
based methods were taken to a new high, with Milošević’s government
attempt to the ‘ultimate solution’ of ‘not giving Kosovo away’.
So the world witnessed the expulsion of ethnic
Albanians from their homes by Serbian military and para-military
forces. Since in power based methods the game is not over ‘until the
fat lady sings’ [“I nad popom ima pop”] the next stage involved NATO
bombing of both Serbia and Kosova, effectively changing Serbian ‘my
way’ to the ‘my way’ of ethnic Albanians. While this is difficult for
Serbian nationalists to hear Kosovo has since 1999 effectively and de
factol not been part of the Serbian territory. And yet, no long term,
sustainable and acceptable solutions to all parties involved has been
created either.
While Currently, in 2008, there is a push for
complete Independence by Kosovars (ethnic Albanians) have been
successful in becoming independent, this independence is and a
complete non acceptance of this solution by the minority of Serbs
still living in Kosovo and also by the Serbian state. Most likely, if
power based politics prevails, Serbs will eventually be forced to de
facto accept a one-sided, one way solution that favours ethnic
Albanians even if Russia and China continue to support the Serbian
perspective.. But the negative consequences of this enforced solution
may be too many, including the potential for nationalist,
pro-militaristic and conservative Radical party to eventually seize
the power in Serbia, even though they were unsuccessful in the recent
election. . Its current leader Tomislav Nikolić explicitly stated that
military intervention in Kosovo – if he is to have his way – would be
a desired outcome should Kosovars proclaim full Independence. While
this has not occurred, it is too soon to judge how history will play
itself out, given the last decades or so of war. As stated by one Serb
in a blog debating Independence of Kosovo: “Serbs waited for 500 years
to free Kosovo and Metohija from Turks, we can wait again”. As well,
even without military intervention and new war in the region
consequences to both Serbian and Kosovar society will be many – from
further focus on ‘ethnic cleansing’ to the creation of closed,
conservative, xenophobic and totalitarian societies.
Another potential solution is of a compromise or a ‘half way’
approach. This approach involves some sort of a division and is
currently (and after secession) preferred option of Serbians living in
the northern part of Kosovo. This too is possible, although at this
stage very unlikely. As well, this outcome too albeit it would fall
short of the most desirable solution that focuses on the needs and
concerns of all involved, that is future oriented and that has the
potential to bring outcomes that are sustainable in the long term.
The following table summarises five possible scenarios: of one side
prevailing (A1 or A2), gaining exclusive right to the territory
through the rule of man, law or chance, or via being compensated for
the loss (my way, your way); of no-one winning (sides taking turns to
block the positive outcome for the other, ‘freezing of the issue’ as
in during the last decade or via occurrence of various destructive
violent based realities, killings, war, non-violent sanctions, or any
other ‘no way’); of a compromise (some sort of a division of a
territory, ‘half way’) and of a ‘win-win’ solution for all involved
(collaborative, ‘transcendence’, ‘our way’ scenario).
Styles of Conflict Management
(based on Ron Kraybill’s work, Thomas-Kilman and Conflict Mode
Instrument, David Ausburger’s and also Johan Galtung’s Transcend
method)
In terms of these five potential scenarios for conflict management
there is currently a formidable focus on ‘my way’ and power and rights
based approaches. History in this context is not used as a ‘teacher’
but an additional tool to state one’s case.
Randomness/chance based methods, ‘no way’ and ‘your way’ approaches
are, on the other hand, most commonly not seen as a solution and
indeed, they are very unlikely to create one. This is because there is
a high concern for goals (‘my’ Kosova/o) and ideals (it is ‘ours’) by
both (all) sides involved. In addition to this goals and ideals axis,
relationship axis can also be used to provide some explanations,
specifically to also help explain overwhelming focus on ‘my way’
approaches. The sad reality is that neither the majority of ethnic
Albanians living in Kosova and elsewhere nor the majority of Serbs
(living in Kosovo, Serbia and elsewhere) currently care much about
establishing quality relationships with the other group. Rather, the
full on process of ‘othering’ has been going on for many years now,
and also periodically throughout the history. This means that ‘the
other’ is portrayed as ‘less’, ‘violent’, ‘wrong’, ‘evil’, ‘wild’,
even ‘dirty’ and ‘disgusting’. And it doesn’t matter which side is
using it, either explicitly or implicitly when talking and thinking
about the other, the outcome is always the same: “‘We’ really do not
want to deal with the other and it is the unfortunate fact that they
live in our close proximity”.
To summarise these are the potential outcomes:
• Scenario 1 (My way, A1 wins) Kosovars proclaim secession. Most if
not all states recognise independent Kosova. EU EU and the UN Security
Council eventually recognised Kosova as a new state. Serbia in the end
eventually accepts the defeat.
• Scenario 2 (Half way, compromise) Kosovo gets somehow divided, i.e.
between North and South or between Serbian controlled enclaves where
Serbian ‘minority’ lives and where Serbian monasteries are situated
and the rest of Kosova.
• Scenario 3 (No way, withdrawal) The issue is frozen for another
several decades. Kosova’s full ars decide to wait or they proclaim
independence but this is stalled by international legal processes.
Serbia uses its limited power to make life difficult for Kosovars, so
that they too do not fully ‘win’. China and Russia continue to veto
attempts by others to grant Kosovo full international recognition.
• Scenario 4 (Your way, A2 wins) Countries like Russia and, China and
Spain pressure UN Security Council and EU Union proclaim to reject
secession. International legal processes end up in ruling that
Independence was an illegal act. that Kosovo officially becomes again
a part of Serbian state and confirms and the full national sovereignty
of Serbia and its territories is confirmed.
• Scenario 5 (Our way, transcendence) Kosovo/a and Serbia join a
larger political entity i.e. European Union simultaneously. In this
scenario Kosovo would officially remain part of Serbia but yet would
be given de facto autonomy of a state. Whether certain territories are
officially in Serbia or Kosovo becomes less important than good
quality relations and high standard of living. Municipalities are also
allowed self-determination rights. This is thus simultaneously
globalising/unifying and localising/self-determination based scenario.
Both Kosovo and Serbia agree to the treatment of minorities to be of
highest standard and allow for the free movement of people, goods and
services between these two territories, again based on EU standards.
Kosovo/a becomes ‘an independent’ region within a broader association,
a Truth and Reconciliation type process begins, refuges are brought
back, local groups engage in various peace building processes, peace
education initiatives are applied, psychological trauma counselling
workshops take place, ecumenical peace work gets intensified and a
sense of a common future based on positive neighbourly relationships
starts to develop.
The most preferred scenario for Kosova Albanians is Scenario 1. The
most preferred scenario for Serbian (identity, state) side overall is
Scenario 4. For Serbian (now) left as minority in Independent Kosova
scenario that is currently vocalised as the most preferred is Scenario
2. The most likely scenario at this stage is Scenario 3, or some
version of it. This would mean that Scenario 1 has already partially
occurred, that is, there is recognition by some states but certainly
not by the UN security council. The most likely scenario is currently
Scenario 1 or some version of it, i.e. However, Serbia and some other
countries continued to not recognize an independent Kosova and to
freeze relationships (through, for example, boycotts, sanctions, legal
initiatives). This likely scenario may turn very costly in the end as
the potential ground for further conflict(s) develops. These may
include further and potentially violent conflicts between two
political options in Serbia, between Serbian minority and Albanian
majority in independent Kosova, between Kosova and Serbia and between
other secessionist movements within states across Europe. As well, as
further conflicts and division between members of the UN Security
Council may also occur.
Futures
The purpose of designing futures scenarios is to make more informed
choices in the present. Futures thinking is ultimately about inquiry
into probable, possible and preferable futures, which we are creating
today. For example, had various former Yugoslav ethnic, religious and
ideological communities as well as politicians, journalists and other
professionals gone through a process of envisioning different
scenarios and its many intended and unintended consequences, would
they still had made the same decisions they did back in the 1980s and
1990s? Had the international community anticipated how much the war in
the former Yugoslavia was to eventually cost them (not to mention the
human and environmental cost to the region itself) could things have
been different? Most pre and post conflict nations do not engage in
this process and thus behave reactively rather then proactively and
constructively. We can see similar occurrences happening at the global
level also – thus the short-sightedness, destructiveness and even
plain stupidity of all sides involved in so call ‘war against terror’.
And yet this short-sightedness and reactive ness has nothing to do
with ‘human nature’ or inevitability of action-reaction-reaction… or
trauma-further trauma-further trauma… mechanisms. This is because even
though most societies do not currently engage in the long term
thinking – non-action at the global level in regard to the climate
change is but one example – some have done and continue to do so.
History teaches us that it could be otherwise and that different
choices with very different future outcomes could be made. While the
former Yugoslav ethnic groups haven’t learned alternative lessons from
history (such as that ‘violence breads violence’, ‘unjust solutions do
not last’) South Africans it seems did. Thus the former Yugoslavia
collapsed and in the process created hundreds of thousands dead
people, millions of exiles, damaged the psychological makeup of those
that remained and militarily polluted environment, to name but a few
negative outcomes. South Africans who used the scenario planning
process, on the other hand, created a Truth and Reconciliation
commission. This is but one example. There would be many others,
beyond the scope of this paper. The literature on peaceful societies,
social movement and communication practices (i.e.research by B. Bonta,
E. Boulding, G. Kemp, D. Fry, P. Ackerman, J. DuVall, D. Barash, J.
Galtung, G. Paige, E.Jones, R. Haenfler, B. Johnson, M. Rosenberg, W.
Glasser and many many others …) gives multitude of concrete examples
of how historical and contemporary peaceful societies, groups and
individuals dealt/deal with conflict in a positive and constructive
manner. The whole field of Peace and conflict studies does the same.
Other various individuals and groups engaged in the nonviolent social
and political efforts also.
Crucial in these efforts is to move away from ‘the problem’
(detrimental historical stories, unmet expectations, violence that
happened in the past) and to future alternatives that are positive,
imaginative, creative and doable. The main questions should be: how to
respond to the crisis/conflict in a way that is honest (acknowledges
what is going on for all involved, beyond delusions and
misconceptions) and compassionate (cares about all involved, about
relationships with the other and about ‘our way’, ‘win-win’
solutions)? (For this approach see: www.transcend.com). What are some
of the basic needs of all involved? What do Kosovars need? What do
Serbs? What does the international community? How many future based
solutions accommodating to those needs (rather than ‘wants’ and
‘shoulds’) can be created? Out of the multitude of these creative,
positive and doable alternatives which ones are the most preferable
for all involved? Who are the actors that are to be involved in this
planning and visioning process? How many stakeholders beyond
government officials, politicians and bureaucrats can be found? Who
are the most marginalised groups – can they provide out of box
thinking and solutions? Can representatives of various yet
marginalised discourses, including peace oriented ones, feminist,
futurists and representative of other ethnic groups also be included?
Why leave it only to nationalists, lawyers and governments? Why not
engage in truly democratic practice wherein voices of all involved are
to be heard and given space?
For some of these questions to be engaged with, extensive community
collaborative processes of envisioning desired, preferable futures are
needed. Given the financial difficulties of both Serbia and Kosovo
financial support by international community is also needed. Even
though such processes would be by far the least costly than any other
alternative there needs to be a will to start these processes + the
means to achieve them. And while all that seems like a hard work it is
necessary if future generations in this area are to live harmoniously,
fruitfully and optimistically. Even if (or when) after Kosovo does
secede, ethnic Albanians, Serbs and others still will need to continue
living there, next to each other. Put simply, the neighbours are not
going to go away, miraculously disappear or somehow get completely
silenced. So it is the best bet for all involved to learn how to live
together without hate, resentment and ‘othering’. Those living today
do have a responsibility at the very least to leave to their children
and grandchildren a world somewhat better to the one they inherited.
So why not inquiry of both sides into:
1. The positive aspects of the other group. Is their something,
anything positive about the other? As there must be, no matter how
small, lets build on that. How do we do so?
2. What do I (we) really want? What are our needs here? How do we
distinguish those needs from what we were told our needs have to be or
from the “unrealistic, wishful thinking”?
3. Can my trauma be heard by others? Can they recognise it without
going into blaming and shaming?
4. What are some of the commonalities in our futures visions? Living
in peace, harmony and abundance perhaps? How is this best to be
achieved? Is the conflict between us helping our vision or hindering
it?
5. What are some best strategies that we can implement here and now to
bring forward preferable futures for all involved?
If not only the long-term but also immediate future are to be better
than the past and present, different strategies, different thoughts,
different discourses and different futures visions need to be chosen.
For, as the saying goes, if one usually does what one has usually
done; one is going to get what one has usually so far got. It would be
nice if, for a change, things did change and positive, safe, healthy,
inclusive, purposeful, imaginative, fun and abundant presents and
futures were created. And even though at this stage this does not seem
very likely such alternative futures too are possible.
Article by Ivana Milojević, Research Director
www.metafuture.org, Lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies, University
of the Sunshine Coast, Australia. Emails: info@metafuture.org and
imilojev@usc.edu.au
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