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A Methodological Analysis of Forecasting the Long-Term Futures of Humanity


Sohail Inayatullah

Final Report to the Foundation for the Future, 2001

Preface

The research has focused on the methodological context of forecasting the long- term future.  This is thus not an analysis of the particular content of Year 3000 forecasts (as for example, provided in a recent special issue of the journal Futures titled Humanity 3000) but an analysis of the approaches and methodologies utilized in long-range  forecasting.  

It is part one of research into methodology and the long term future. A subsequent project intends to explore devising forecasts of the 1000 year future based on the conclusions of this study. 

Executive Summary 

Six methodological approaches are offered, with strengths and weaknesses to each approach discussed.  

These are:

(1)   methodology as leading to accurate forecasts by focusing on current scientific fact; 

(2)   methodology as focused on the identification of critical factors (and not forecasts per se);

(3)   the post-structural approach in which epistemology constitutes ontology;

(4)   the eclectic methodological approach that factors in multiple methods;

(5)   the layered methodological concerned not with multiplicity but with depth; and,

(6)   the historical consciousness approached focused on understanding the nature of the future by returning to history 

Four approaches to forecasting are discussed.  

(1)   The future, especially the long-term future, cannot be predicted.

(2)   The future can be generally predicted, either because reality is patterned and thus leaves traces or that there are grand macrohistorical and evolutionary processes.

(3)   The future is epistemic. The future can be understood by focusing on foundational changes in how we know, on the boundaries of knowledge.

(4)   A preferred forecasting model would be one that organically combines the epistemic with the patterned perspective. 

The next section provides a review of selected literature in give categories: general literature; A FFF trajectory workshop; content of FFF meetings and other forums; historical readings; and, macrohistorical readings. 

The following section reproduces nine research findings as developed in the mid-term Grant report. 

These are:

(1)   As statements about the future move from the short-term to the long-term futures, values play a far more important role in the forecast or analysis of the critical factors.

(2)   There exists a tension between continuity versus discontinuity. That is, certain methodologies are more prone to forecast novelty while other more prone to conclude, plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose

(3)   As important as type of  method is what one does with the methodology.

(4)   The type of future one forecasts or the factors one chooses to analyze are foundationally determined by how one sees the nature and shape of  space-time-person.

(5)   The type of future one sees is determined by what values one

ascribes to the present.

(6)   The forecasts one develops and the critical factors that are explored tend

 to be those that privilege or mirror one's own standing in the world.

(7) Critical factors and forecasts expressed tend fall into two categories – growth and technology/distribution and communication with the other.

(8) No single methodology is adequate.

(9) The most rewarding forecasting approach is likely to be one that is  eclectic, interactive, a mix of long term forecasts and contextualised by macrohistorical factors in the overall framework of epistemic transformations. 

The overall recommendation is that:  

Methodologies that forecast the long-term future are likely to more rewarding – quality, insight, accuracy and validity – if (1) they are eclectic and layered, (2) go back in time as far as they go in the future, (3) and that contextualize critical factors and long-term projection by macrohistory and epistemic transformations. And the methodology itself should have the seeds of its own transformation, that is, be able to produce results not intended by it. 

Table of Contents 

1.0   Methodological Positions

2.0   Approaches to the Long-Term Future

3.0   A Map of Studies of  the long-term future reveal the following

4.0   Summary of Key Findings

5.0   References 

1.0 METHODOLOGICAL POSITIONS 

There are at least six positions as to the role of methodology to the knowledge derived. 

1.     Methodology as Accurate 

Methodology can lead to a valid and accurate assessment of the current state of science so as to understand the trajectory of the future. Given that, at question is the future – where there are no empirical facts. The future remains problematic to predict. This is the empiricist perspective, wherein a good method is largely about the value neutrality of the observer. Biases must be factored out. Most important are accurate statements of current achievements in science, their likely trajectories and then limited speculation on what these trajectories mean for the long-term future. Perhaps the best example of this type of work is Michio Kaku's Visions: How Science Will Revolutionize the 21st Century and Beyond

The strength of this approach is that extrapolations are based on real scientific discoveries as assessed by scientists and technologists and not by generalists or by lay persons. In addition, since the forecasts start out with a fact basis, there is less room for error or meandering.  

Writes Kaku: "Predictions about the future made by professional scientists tend to be based much more substantially on the realities of scientific knowledge than those made by social critics [as the former] shape and create it" (Kaku, 1998, 5) This does not mean, however, that disruptions are impossible.  

As Kaku confesses,  

there  undoubtedly will be some astonishing surprises, twists of fate and embarrassing gaps … but by focusing on the interrelations between the three great scientific revolutions [biomolecular, computer and quantum], and by consulting with the scientists who are actively bringing about this revolution and examining their discoveries, it is my hope that we can see the direction of science in the future with considerable insight and accuracy (Kaku, 1998, 6). 

The weakness in this approach is that since the discourse created is framed in the paradigm of the time (the epistemic knowledge boundaries that constitute what is knowable and comprehensible), novel approaches could be lost. For example, Kaku argues that because of globalization and cultural intermingling, human evolution will now cease. While this certainly makes sense within current notions of Darwinian evolution, alternative perspectives as developed by Elisabet Sahtouris, Rupert Sheldrake or P.R Sarkar (all to some extent focused on post-Darwinian positions) would offer us scientific avenues that may lead to new avenues of discovery. Moreover, by focusing on experts in one area, without interaction with experts in another area, large packages of knowledge are not delved into. Other significant revolutions (spiritual, multiculturalism, global governance, world law) are lost sight of. Rigour thus has its price. 

2.     Methodology as Identifying Current Factors 

No method has utility in long term forecasting since the future is evolutionary, our research and insights become complicit in the future created. The long-term is too distant for either valid, accurate or precise forecasts (and especially not forecasts that fit all three criteria). Thus, the crucial task is clarity on the critical factors necessary for human and environmental survival and, indeed, thrival.  Much of the work by the Foundation for the Future is toward that direction. The concern then is not forecasting or visioning but an identification of the key issues necessary to bring about a rational discussion of the long-term future. See, in particular, Sesh Velamoor and Paige Heydon, Humanity 3000, Special Issue of Futures

The strength of this approach is that it avoids often fruitless discussion as to what will happen (how can and do we know, how to judge, under which criteria) and focuses directly on what issues are most important to leading thinkers. The weakness to this approach is that the future is discounted. By focusing on current issue, emerging issues are left out of the discussion. Moreover, the hidden assumption that the present will proceed onto an unproblematic future is not contested. 

3.     Methodology qua Post-structuralism 

Methodology is complicit in creating the data; that is, reality is constituted by the lenses we use. This position does not argue that social reality is maya or ontological illusion (as per the classical Indian Vedic position) but that epistemology is complicit in ontology. This is the post-structural perspective.  One example of this is in futures studies is developed by Sohail Inayatullah, Questioning the Future and in Sohail Inayatullah and Paul Wildman, Futures Studies: Methods, Emerging Issues and Civilizational Visions

The strength of this approach is that it forces a foundational examination of the methodology in use.  The data delivered are understood to be partly constituted by the methodology used. Thus the future offered is seen with more suspicion than in the strict scientific empiricist perspective. A dialogue of epistemology and ontology can then ensue leading to clarity about fundamental assumptions. The future constructed can thus be based on different assumptions. Authentic probabalistic scenarios can result.  

The weakness is that discussion will enter a virtual stasis with no resolution possible, since each "objective" position is contextualized by methodology. No future or forecasts per se is possible is possible since one is always engaged in a process of deconstruction. 

4.     Eclectic Methodology 

An eclectic mix of methods – scenarios, emerging issues, quantitative forecasting, for example – may lead to the best results. This is so since each method can only capture a part of social reality. Moreover, by using multiple methods, forecastor bias is factored out. A mix of methods better explains the variation.

The strength of this methodology is that different perspectives are brought in and a higher quality forecast is possible. The weakness is determining the relative efficacy in explaining variation by each particular methodology. Moreover, it may that different methodologies are capturing dramatic different dimensions of reality – that is, the variations explained are at different epistemic levels.

5.     Layered Methodology

A layered approach leads to the highest quality of forecast. Layers are important in that there are multiple dimensions to social reality operating at different epistemological levels. Some of these levels are shallow, and some are deep.  Perhaps the best example of this is the classical work by Oswald Spengler as well as a forthcoming issue of the journal Futures on Layered Methodology.

The main strength of the layered methodological approach is that qualitatively different levels of reality are addressed.  The weakness is in the precision of determining what data (meaning, worldview, myth) is at which layer or the relative contribution to explaining reality by each level and metholodology.

6.     Methodology as History

The future itself cannot be accurately known, but we can gain insight into the future by understanding the past. Thus, instead of forecasting forward, it is more productive to, if we seek to understand the year 3000, return to the year 1000.  By seeing the future and the 2000 through the conditions of the year 1000, we can better appreciate the problematic nature of understanding the very long term. In the European context, exemplary is: Robert Lacey and Danny Danziger,  The Year 1000: What life was like at the turn of the first Millennium.

2.0 APPROACHES TO THE LONG TERM FUTURE

There are generally three current approaches to the long term future, and a fourth suggested approach based on this research.

The Year 3000 is unimaginable. It is impossible to predict. Indeed, a mistake. One need only go back a 1000 years and see how things turned out so different (for example, the rise of Europe instead of China or India). The long-term future cannot be anticipated. Indeed, underlying this perspective is that the future itself cannot be known (patterns discovered are merely researcher bias, and even using scenarios merely contours the unknown instead of illuminating the known).

The Year 3000 is generally predictable. One needs courage (as well as rigorous training) and an understanding that change has a long shadow, that traces of change follow patterns.

These traces are of two types.

The first are data level, for example, that concerns for over- taxation is not recent but goes back to the Roman days.

Graham Molitor, the long term forecastor par excellence, in his speech "Millennial Perspectives" essentially arguing that there is nothing new under the sun, gives us an extensive list of these,

Taxes that plague us today, date back to 3000 BC. Codification of written laws that grow longer and more complex with each passing day. [This can be plotted back to 21000 BC]. Price regulation to 1300 BC. Illegal parking (chariots, carts) to 45BC. Free food for the poor to 58BC.  Smoke abatement laws to 1273 AD. Air pollution controls to 1280 AD. Asbestos worker "lung sickness" to 79 AD. State control of education to 500 BC. Teacher licensing to 362 AD. Systematized civil service to 221 BC. Competitive written civil service exams to 200 BC. Divorce laws to 1800 BC. Prostitution controls to 1950 BC. Compensation for bodily injuries to 2100 BC. (Molitor, 1998, 664).

Essentially, this means that there is a certain timelessness to that which is significant in that these issues are touching deeper archetypal concerns. This does not mean that there has not been nor will be dramatic technological change, but that at foundation issues remains the same. For example, communication is still about expression to self/other irrespective if done through language, type, digitally or as Molitor argues, ESP (from 2500-3000).  Or, while the Internet is different from traditional modes of communication, communication still remains defining.

A further example is offered by Mortan Kaplan in his article, "The emergence of a global society." In China in 1000 AD, writes Mortan Kaplan (1998):

For the emperor to communicate effectively with government representatives in the empire's outlying areas, an elaborate web of roads, bridges and canals had been developed. An empire wide system of courier stations was set up, each with fresh horses and relay riders. (Kaplan, 1998, 18)

The second type of trace is macro, that there are grand historical patterns.  This is less concerned with finding evidence that taxation is universal and more with finding patterning in history. These are the grand waves. For example, historian Sarkar argues that history moves through four distinct patterns. These are based on our psycho-social sensibilities. The first is the worker, concerned with survival, dominated by the environment. The second is the warrior, concerned with dominating the environment, with expansion and conquest. The third is the intellectual, concerned with using the intellect to dominate the environment. The third develops from the second and the second from the first. They are evolutionary developments in terms of types of people as well as phases of  human history. The age of workers gives way to the age of warriors which gives way to the age of intellectuals. Or simply put in European history, from the pre-civilization to the era of empires to the feudal era. However, as intellectuals do not excel at managing the economy, a fourth type develops, the merchant. They seek power through the other three classes. However, while they expand the economy, they exploit the other classes. This leads to a workers' revolt and the cycle starts again. Each particular era can take a few hundred years. Human evolution generally is in the last phase of the merchant era.

Thus for Sarkar, what is likely to emerge is a workers' global revolution followed by a centralized world government structure. This will likely last a few hundred years from which a new world intellectual order (a science and technology revolution or a cultural-spiritual revolution). By the year 3000, we are likely to be where we are today, in the midst of the end of the merchant era. However, while cyclical each era of course does not go back to the previous, there are changes in culture, in science and technology. What does remain the same is the overall framework, the episteme. Thus, merely using linear forecasts to consider the future would be simplistic. The type of science and technology, the type of exploration – and the level and duration of both – change during the episteme, change depending in which psycho-social sensibility is on top. These are evolutionary structures and they deeply difficult to change.

However, Sarkar does believe that the cycle can be speeded up dramatically through proper moral global leadership. This done, the positives associated with each new era (capitalism first leading to innovation, new wealth but over time degenerating with ever higher inequities in wealth) can be accentuated and the negatives (for example in the intellectuals era, new theories of the universe leading to inner and outer understanding quickly degenerating into theories with no practical results). The cycle can become a progressive spiral.

Again, what is most important here that trajectories do not go straight up for ever, there are asymptotes, which then lead to bifurcation, to changes in what is possible.  Thus, linear forecasts or assessing current critical factors will only accentuate the present. They are unable to point to system transformations. The nature and type of system transformations can be understood from the macrohistory in question (in this case Sarkar's). This differs from Molitor's in that while Molitor focuses on foundational issues, Sarkar sees these as changing, and yet, similar to Molitor, there is a cyclical return (perhaps not to taxation in the Year 3000 Merchant Era but some other type of economic redistribution).

Pitirim Sorokin is perhaps most instructive when thinking of the long-term future. He bases his macrotheory on the simple question: what is the nature of reality? This is answered as: (1) Only the body/material world is real. (2) Only the mind/ideational world is real. (3) Both are real. (4) This question cannot be answered, as reality is unknowable, and, (5) Irrelevant question (here I've taken some liberty in reinterpreting Sorokin). 

The first response results in the sensate or materialistic civilization. The second in ideational civilization. The third in an integrated civilization. The last two responses create dissent but no culture is possible. He finds historical evidence for all three types of civilization. But what is most important is that no system can stay static, since as it expands, it ignores other aspects of what it means to be human. Thus, very real limits are reached and the pendulum shifts to another type of civilization.

Writes Sorokin in his Social and Cultural Dynamics:

When such a system of truth and reality ascends, grows, and becomes more and more monopolistically dominant, its false part tends to grow, while its valid part tends to decrease. Becoming monopolistic or dominant, it tends to drive out all the other systems of truth and reality, and with them the valid parts they contain. At the same time, like dictatorial human beings, becoming dominant, the system is likely to lose increasingly its validities and develop its falsities. The net result of such a trend is that as the domination of the system increases, it becomes more and more inadequate. As such, it becomes less and less capable of serving as an instrument of adaptation, as an experience for real satisfaction of the needs of its bearers; and as a foundation for the social and cultural life (Sorokin, 1957, 681).

Over time, as the falsity grows, the new system comes into play, until it too, corsi and recorsi, follows the same pattern.

As we are currently in the last days of the sensate civilization, we can well imagine the next 500 years being either an integrated civilization (technology focused not just on manipulating genes and computers but as well as on technologies of consciousness) focused on developing a global ethics.  But this  - and this is crucial – is not likely to remain as well. The integrated mind-body/science-ethics civilization is likely to move as well to an extreme, most likely an ideational era (the intellectual's system –  according to Sarkar). From this, perhaps early in the third millennium, there will be return to the sensate system.

Thus, while Molitor (2000, 507-513) boldly forecasts developments in energy, life sciences, communication, what is missing, from the macrohistorical view is a sensitivity to epistemic changes in which the nature of nature-truth-reality-sovereignty change.

These may be patterned as per the arguments of Sarkar and Sorokin, or a dramatic new episteme could emerge, perhaps through foundational changes in evolution brought about by the very technologies Molitor and Kaku forecast. That is, as McLuhan theorizes, humans shape technologies and thereafter they shape us.

The Year 3000 is Epistemic.  Understanding the trajectory of the future is based on understanding the epistemic context, that is, the lense in which the future is based, may differ from the present. Technology or social revolution creates a new episteme that then shapes the nature of scientific and social enterprise.

Two positions results from this. The first is similar to the earlier position that the long-term future is unimaginable since we cannot apriori know what the new episteme will be like.

The second is that one can through an epistemologically sensitive macrohistory forecast the future of epistemes. Based on these alternative forecasts, one can understand the contours of the long-term future.

Epistemic Macrohistory

Combining epistemologically sensitive macrohistory to the trace theory of the future could yield quite positive results.

This would mean combining the macrohistorical work of Sarkar and Sorokin, for example, with the trajectories in computing, life science, space exploration, as provided by Molitor, Kaku and others.  This means patterns reaching asymptotes, leading to bifurcation, with then a whole new set of concerns (for example, moving from exploring outer space to civilization focused on inventing virtual worlds or spiritual worlds).

It would also mean speculation as to how epistemes might change given current scientific developments as well as non-scientific developments (that is, epistemes are not necessarily rational orderings of knowledge).

Given these positions, how, in fact is the future predicted.

1.     Extrapolation. For example, Overpopulation is currently a problem. It will remain so. This is the typical litany approach as evidenced by expert panels.

2.     S-Curve- Traces of history. The Molitor method.

3.     Scientific Experts – Ask those who are creating the future, ie scientists and technologists. The Kaku method.

4.     Generalists experts – Ask those who know how to think about the future – futurists. And train individuals to think about the future. Coates.

5.     Macrohistory – History has patterns. There is, of course, agency but not full freedom. Sarkar, Sorokin

6.     Epistemological Macrohistory – The futures of epistemes. Undeveloped.

7.     World History – Going back in the past to understand the future, if not the patterns, at least the timeless human concerns. The year 1000. Robert Lacey and Danny Denziger.

4.0 A Brief Map of Studies of the long-term future

This section provides a brief map of how the long-term future is seen. As it is selective, conclusions should be seen as indicative.

1.     General Review  - There is of course very little research on the long-term future. Below are three indicative research efforts.

·                   Idiosyncratic, for example, Michael Hart's The Year 3000. No clear methodology, overly based on personal worldview, academic training.

·                   Long-term Trends. Excellent in terms of presenting critical pathways into the future. However, trends do not interact with macrohistorical structures, that is, events and trends, or deeper structures that might transform the direction of the trend line. Molitor and special issue of Futures on Humanity 3000, edited by Velamoor and Heydon.

·                   Coates survey on the future of futurists at a WFS meeting. Again, excellent questions, however, just because one is a futurist does not necessarily lead to quality insights. As one reviewer from Future Survey put it: great questions, banal answers (Michael Marien, 2000, 23)

2.     Visions Workshops (Based on Trajectory workshops conducted at Leavenworth, Washington, September 25-29th, 1999, as organized by the Foundation for the Future).

·                   Participants saw stages and dialects. That is, over-reliance on one factor, technology, could result in social revolts elsewhere. Social revolts lead to anti-technology movements that then give way to localism. The future was thus not linear but one where there were abrupt changes. For example, global warming leading to a world crisis, leading to the formation of strong world government structures.

·                   The most important factor was a clear division between what was considered the most important factors.  On one side was the scientific/technological  (germ line intervention, nano-technology, space travel) and on the other side were social, cultural and spiritual factors (technologies of consciousness, new ways of knowing, learning from the other).

These divisions again reflect certain assumptions about reality. (1) What is most important. (2) Methodological perspective.

3.     Content Analysis from Visions Workshops and other forums.

Generally when experts at Foundation for the Future meetings have been asked about critical factors shaping the future, respondents tend to focus on futures based on the present, such as overpopulation (See appendix). Thus, if we were to pattern the future as an S-Curve, with problems being at the top, trends at the middle, and emerging issues at the bottom, generally individuals focus on the top most level of the future. However, trends are unlikely to continue forward forever, and, indeed, research tends to show that new emerging issues might cause foundational change in the character of society and future. For example, population growth might dramatically reverse itself, leading to the main issue hundred years hence to be underpopulation, as argued by Paul Wallace in his book Agequake.

Thus, the critical factors tell us a great deal about the present and far less about future issues (which are likely to be far more important in determining the future).

Writes Gregory Stock in his Metaman: The Merging of Humans and Machines into a Global Superorganism:

The future is likely to be far stranger than generally imagined. When science-fiction writers look at the future they frequently conjecture fantastic, often improbable, new technologies and superimpose them on social frameworks not very different from those of today. Star Trek Episodes are filled with "transporter beams," "warp speeds," "intergalatic starships,: and "phasar" weapons, but the human relationships, motivations of the crew are familiar. (Stock, 1993, 30) 

He goes on to argue that the basic anchors of human experience – aging, the senses, the body, childbirth – are about to be dramatically altered to due revolutions in genetics and computing.

Machines likely will be intelligence participants in a closely knit global environment in which people's mental and physical capacities are enhanced by bio-machines, fetuses are nurtured in hospital incubation tanks, and humans are enjoying greatly extended life spans. (Stock, 1993, 30)

But the key issue for this methodological study (along with the nature of forecasts) is that: "Such possibilities … are almost inevitable extrapolation of the scientific and technological advances of recent decades." (Stock, 1993, 30)

Writes Coates on his workshop at the World Future Society Conference.

Scenario building was simultaneously disappointing and revealing. It was disappointing in that there was relatively little richness to the micro scenarios. They tended to reflect a future world in which the voguish or contemporary issues of the end of the second millennium are effectively dealt with and eliminated (Coates, 1999,48).

He argues that this is supported by other studies as well. For example, David Kristof and Todd W. Nickerson's Predictions for the Next Millennium as well respond to the urgent issues of today – population, war, peace, prejudice, and so on. 

Coates concludes that we tend to focus on the short term and do not appreciate how long a thousand years is (and thus it is crucial to go back a 1000 years) nor are we able to find language and imagery to forecast/speculate on a thousand years.

4.     Historical Readings

Historical readings, by going back a thousand years, hope to give us insight into our present and the long-term future. 

Write Morton A Kaplan and Robert Selle,

If an educated person of any culture in the year 1000 had received a miraculous vision of the world in the year 2000, he might as well have said:  You cannot get there from here. So much of what we take for granted would have been beyond his wildest imagination, let alone his comprehension

This does not mean looking back in the past has no utility. Precisely the opposite, as it gives us a context to appreciate the fantastic nature of human evolution, past and future.

Two issues are relevant here. (1) The future is unimaginable because of the compounded rate of change. (2) The categories in which we use to make sense of the world will have changed so much that the future is incomprehensible.

As well, looking back at thousand years, it would have been at one level impossible to have predicted the rise of Europe. As Kaplan and Selle write: At the start of the millennium, there was nothing to suggest that Europe would play this role. It was backward in relation to Chinese and Arabic Culture, and its future was in no way preordained. (Kaplan and Selle, 1998, 18)

And:

Based on the current data, all bets would have been on China and India, or the Arabic Islamic world. While the life expectancy in England was in the 30s, many youths in China could expect to live until 60. (18) A civil service, education, paper money, gun powder and numerous other inventions placed China ahead of other civilizations.

However, while this is true at the superficial level, at a macrohistorical level, we need not be surprised at the rise of Europe. For example, using Galtung's perspective of seeing the West as a civilization that undergoes expansion/contraction cycles (ego/alter-ego), then the year 1000 merely represented the contraction period. It was only natural that 500 years later, the rise of the West and capitalism would usher in a new era. Chinese civilization has been far more internal and Indian, concerned, primarily about the nature of the self. The battle then was between Islam and Christendom, with the Christian Crusades setting the tone for the Millennium.

There are thus two levels of analysis. At one level, it was inconceivable at year 1000 that by the year 2000, the West would be in supreme ascendancy and others following. At another level, if one can uncover general keys to how and why civilizations rise and fall, expand and contract, then the long-term future is no longer impossible to forecast. Of course, precision is impossible but general patterns and frameworks are possible.

5.     Macrohistorical Readings

This perhaps is the most useful in that the data of history are used to develop long term historical patterns, and as been developed above.  As mentioned earlier, thus, from Pitirim Sorokin, we understand that the current sensate era with its focus on materialistic technology and empirical science is only one way to organize the world. We are likely to endure a pendulum shift to either an integrated society (mind and body are real) or an ideational (religious, mind is real) society. These shifts, while difficult to ascribe time to, could take 500 or so years. Thus, strangely enough, the year 3000 could look very much like the present in that we are likely to move to an integrated society.

From Ibn Khaldun, we note that innovation is not perpetual but declines over generations as the new generation only seeks to implement what the older generation has accomplished. In addition, he argues that it is those on the periphery who are more likely than those in the center to transform the future. Not the elite as they can only see what they have created but the those outside of power, who scheme, vision, and work hard to create a different future. Thus, Khaldun is quite in reversal to Kaku's approach of assuming the best forecasts will come from elite scientists.

But the most important question from Khaldun would be: who then are the new carriers of the future once the current system winds down? In his language, who are the bedouins who will challenge authority and seek a new future?

From Riane Eisler, the key feature of the year 3000 would be gender partnership since she argues that history is phase like, moving from matriarchy to patriarchy and finally to a balanced civilization. Thus, gender cannot be factored out, as with traditional scientific perspectives. Rather, gender reveals and creates a new future. Thus, not only should forecasts of the future be gender based (that is, to say we need only holistic human forecasts, ignores real crucial differences that actually are useful in better understanding the future).

5.0 Summary of Key Findings

This section is based on the earlier mid-term report submitted to the Foundation is reproduced with minor changes.

1. Research Finding/Issue One

As statements about the future move from the short-term to the long-term futures, values play a far more important role in the forecast or analysis of the critical factors.

This is more complex than the obvious statement that as we move to the distant past and distant future our data becomes murkier. That is, data is less available. What is relevant is the corollary of  lack of data is that the data available is far more open to interpretation. With no or little knowledge base for the long-term future developed, individual (explicit and implicit) values toward science, philosophy, religion plays a far more important role.

Thus, as we move to the long-term future, the probable (or possible and plausible) tend to give way to the preferred.

However, insofar as those considering the long-term future use the language of science, that is, objectivity, these values are covered up.  They are done so in a variety of ways.

1.                 The future is so far away, nothing meaningful can be said

2.                 The future is so far away; all statements are best guesses.

3.                 The future is so far away, we need to use as the basis of our forecasts leading edge or emerging technologies, theories of change, images of the future and marginal perspectives – generally seeds of change that are currently available or intelligible.

However, with no solid empirical or knowledge base to rely on, behind these statements is the issue of values or paradigms.

This does not mean that methodological inquiry into the future is impossible. Rather, methodological inquiry into the long-term future is best served by:  (1) Acknowledging the implicit or unconscious roles of values in considering the long-term future (probable scenarios, likely trajectories, and critical factors);

(2) Research or conferencing or seminars that focus first on the preferred future. In this way, values are explicitly teased out. They are acknowledged. This done, a more scientific (that is, replicable by others, rigorous, logical and based on an explicit epistemological framework) view of the long-term future can emerge.  Thus, we should not abandon research into the long term; rather, by acknowledging the role of values, paradoxically, research can become more scientific. The result can be a range of scenarios and factors that honestly and authentically are derived from a range of explicit value positions about the nature of inquiry and the totality of reality.

2. Research Finding/Issue Two

The second methodological issue that emerges is tension between continuity versus discontinuity. That is, are certain methodologies more prone to forecast novelty while other more prone to conclude, plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.   Thus for example Jib Fowles in "The Future of the Internet: Forecasting by Analogy," as well as Peter Hartcher, "Internet is another 'boom and bust' speculative" argue that new technologies tend to follow old patterns such that a time-travelling Victorian arriving in the late twentieth century would no doubt be unimpressed by the Internet … they had one of their own" (in the telegraph) (Fowles, 9).  In this sense, the year 3000 will not be any different at a depth level. There might be new technologies but as Hartcher argues, the human psyche, will remain the same. For Fowles as well, patterns of invention, development, diffusion and then eventually normalcy form a possible pattern for the Internet. Might then genetic engineering, nano-technology, space travel and other inventions as well follow similar patterns?

There are two issues here. First, that forecasting the development of new technologies is possible. Second, the impacts of new technologies are in themselves not novel. Thus, for example, futurist, Graham Molitor can conclude that dysjunctive theories of the future are merely erroneous research. As he says: "Discontinuities simply indicate that people haven't done their homework."  (www. Closertotruth.com – Can we imagine the far future – year 3000, transcript. Site accessed August 30, 2000)

We can thus divide methodologies into those that engender novel forecasts and those that search for patterns, and thus, see the novel as the old. 

However, such a division is not so simple. While we would expect quantitative forecasts to generally be the least sensitive toward foundational transformation, this is not necessarily the case. For example, quantitative forecasts of population generally show increasing population with low-middle forecast that of 9-10 billion mark in the next fifty years or so. High-end forecasts, such as those in the 1970s by Herman Kahn, veer closer to the 20 billion.  However, while the main assumption of ceteris paribus is not at first blush challenged, what can result from such forecasts is not merely continued growth, but rather asymptotes leading to foundational transformation. For example, world population declining rapidly because of environmental crisis or a world leading to a return to 13th century feudalism (Thousands of nations with some minor regional groupings).  Quantitative forecasts while initially starting off from a point of continuity can show dramatic discontinuities.

3. Research Finding/Issue Three 

In this sense, of more importance is not so much the methodology but what one does with the methodology. That is, is one searching for discontinuities or continuities? If one chooses to take UN data which, for example, suggests that it would take another 900 or so years before there was gender equality globally, one could take this trend at face value or explore how lack of equality could lead to heightened movements to change this structural condition.  One could take as well developments in genetics and create scenarios where gender is no longer given but human-made, again from continuity to discontinuity. 

Thus, again, not the forecast per se but what meanings what gives to it and the possibilities one explores with the methodology. Thus: not the methodology per se, but how it is used, and the lenses one uses to explore the future. This relates to the next issue. 

4.  Research Finding/Issue Four 

The type of future one forecasts or the factors one chooses to analyze are foundationally determined by how one sees the shape of  space-time-person.  Historical methodologies that focus on epistemes – that knowledge and reality is influenced through the ideas of the time which define reality – focus on transformations in basic assumptions of reality, since reality is considered to be socially and politically constructed.  Thus linear forecasts of the future, for example, that the most critical factors are successive waves of genetic, nano and space technology are typical of a methodological framework that posits that foundational assumptions of the present will not change (except insofar as technology changes them).  

Alternatively, a macrohistorical epistemic approach that seeks waves or cycles would forecast as probable futures the development of technologies based on levels or layers of consciousness. Thus an epistemic or macrohistorical approach would focus not on the technology per se but that we may be moving from a sensate era to an ideational or integrated era where body-mind and matter-consciousness is the basis for scientific and knowledge development.  Thus, with a phase change in the nature of civilization, the questions asked, the technologies developed change. Thus, merely forecasting patterns in technological development without noting transformations in episteme is severely misleading since the entire way the human project is constructed can dramatically change. 

Tony Judge refers to this when he writes that: "what is considered factual now will not necessarily be considered factual in the future. And the future … is liable to judge the levels of intelligence and stupidity within humanity quite differently from way in which facts are interpreted today." (sentence clarified for grammar – email, 29 August 2000, fff-h3000@bridgemeida.net) 

Alternatively, there is the linear perspective. In this, science is progressive, moving closer to truth and that ideational eras are part of the past and not the future. The present then is the fulfillment of history, with science and technology providing the vehicle for transformation. 

Thus, a methodological approach in which space-time is seen as linear leads to one type of forecasts. A methodological approach which considers space-time as episteme based (and thus possibly cyclical or pendulum based) yields an entirely different range of critical factors. 

Finally, a perspective in which the person (in terms of values) is to be factored out leads to futures far more concerned about objective reality (again, issues of science and technology and institutional change) while one that presupposes that the person needs to be increasingly factored in leads to issues of ethics, personal transformation and evolutionary consciousness change as far more critical.   

Again, the methodological point is that: what one starts out with, one ends up. Said in other words: How and where one stands determines what and how one sees. However, even this point must be seen in cautionary terms. One methodological perspective is that this point is a problem and to be rooted out of good science, another is that this is a positive insight and to be used and embedded in forecasts of the future. 

The isue then, once again,  is the methodological context. However, and this is crucial, a layered methodological approach could be inclusive of the continuity of forecasts as well as the discontinuities of epistemes. 

5. Research Finding/Issue Five.  

The type of future one sees is determined by what values one ascribes to the present. 

This finding follows from the above. If one believes the present, however, defined is fair and positive, than the future one sees tends to continue that thrust. One looks for evidence in the future to reaffirm that. Negative scenarios are articulated only to highlight the reverse, that unless we are careful, all that is good will end. 

Alternatively, if one believes the present is bad, unjust, intolerable, then futures tend to focus on the transformation of the present and the creation of a new society in which injustice is undone. Or, linear forecasts are developed such that there is no foundational change, thus, highlighting the opposite, that change is needed. 

6. Research Finding/Issue Six 

The forecasts one develops and the critical factors that are explored tend to be those that privilege or mirror one's own standing in the world. Thus, if one comes from a particular ethnic, gender, wealth background then genetic or hard work are the types of attributes one believes will be crucial in the future. Genetics thus becomes a structural force for explaining how to increase more of one's own. 

Alternatively, if one comes from a less privileged background then issues of social structure, politics, alternative value systems become far important. Genetic or other factors that do not allow change (such as karma even) become factors that are either considered less important or as factors to be resisted. 

7.Research Finding/Issue Seven   

Critical factors expressed tend fall into two foundational categories. The first is concerned with growth, either, economic or technological, with finding ways to enhance excellence. This is either through new genetic or artificial technologies or even through space travel. It is essentially extensive evolution to use Laszlo's terminology. The second is concerned with distribution, issues of access to genetic enhancement, technology, with justice and fairness.  This may be explained by the modern struggle between capitalism and socialism or it may be more foundational, part of our evolutionary struggle. 

Related to this is the issue of which is the most critical factor. Again, the variable appears to be dichotomous, favoring either technology or human contact (encounters with the other). The classic division between the sciences and the humanities may explain this, or it may be more foundational, again as part of our evolutionary nature. 

Transforming the present to a preferred future again takes two directions. The first is institutional change, that is, rewriting the rules that govern society, either through new and better laws, or through consciousness change, that is, a change of heart, of values, of perception, of paradigm. 

If we create a map, then clearly growth, technology and institutional express one side of the critical factors affecting the future of humanity and distribution, communication with the other and change in consciousness express the other. 

7.Research Finding/Issue Seven.   

Perspectives on the future are overwhelmingly influenced by current events, trends, paradigms and epistemes that organize or support them.  

While with some effort one can know one's framework of knowing, generally, the episteme operates outside of our knowing borders. That is, the tongue cannot taste itself. In long-range forecasting this becomes especially perilous as initial errors are compounded. Thus, either the forecasts or factors entertained are banal or they will be totally off the mark. Scenario development is one way of contouring the unknown. For example, see Jerry Glenn's Report, "Scenarios on the Year 3000." However, scenarios, as Glenn's scenarios show, can as always be entirely misleading (that is, they are generally single driver-led, focused on genetic and nano-technology, missing other crucial variables, including consciousness technologies, and futures from the non-west).  By appearing to engage in alternatives, diversity is lost, authentic alternatives are not explored. The hidden and not-so-hidden assumptions behind each probable future need to be unearthed.  

8. Research Finding/Issue Eight 

Given the issues raised above, it is clear that determining critical factors and projecting trajectories must be done in the context of a range of methodologies. No single methodology is adequate.  By using limited methods, one risks not being able move research or dialogue beyond official superficial positions. Thus, forecasts will remain based on the present, as parochial. They will not contest the paradigm the expert/participant enters the discourse in. 

However, a multi-methodological framework risks being fragmented, especially in as arduous a task as forecasting the nature of humanity in the year 3000. Methodologies that are not complex or layered will tend to miss these opposites, or see them as irreconcilable, instead of two sides of the same coin or piece of paper.   

In this sense, a methodological approach needs to be (1) historical so that patterns of continuity and discontinuity are apparent (2) layered, so that assumptions and values can be teased out. At the same time, as suggested earlier, methodologies such as quantitative analysis remain useful in that they have the seeds for unexpected results. Thus, of great utility are methodologies that have seeds for their own transformation within them.  

In this sense we can make a preliminary divide of hard and soft methodologies. Soft methodologies, such as epistemic/macrohistorical analysis, may paradoxically be less useful since by allowing layers of analysis, they do not result in specific forecasts. By being open to many perspectives, they may not necessarily lead to novel results.  By being closed, hard methodologies may lead to unexpected findings.  

9. Research Finding/Issue Nine 

The most rewarding forecasting approach is likely to be on that is an eclectic, interactive, mix of long term forecasts and contextualised by macrohistorical factors in the overall framework of epistemic transformations. This then is a multiple layered approach. In itself each approach is lacking but taken together, they form a powerful forecasting approach. But to begin this task, it would be necessary to be historical. That is, understanding the future can often best begin by understanding the past. Thus, if we desire to understand the world in the year 3000, it is perhaps best to analyse contending descriptions of the year 1000. It is crucial that these be contending descriptions. That is, just as the future must be understand from a variety of perspectives (Sorokin's typologies, for example), the past as well must be examined from more than one civilizational or methodological perspective. By returning a 1000 years, a sense of the how far away a 1000 years can be is likely to emerge. As well, by going back a 1000 years, an understanding that at a deep level, whether the Molitor detail of taxation or the Sarkar macrohistorical pattern, tout ca change, tout c'est la meme chose

FINAL RECOMMENATION 

Methodologies that forecast the long-term future are likely to more rewarding – quality, insight, accuracy and validity – if (1) they are eclectic and layered, (2) go back in time as far as they go in the future, (3) and that contextualize critical factors and long-term projection by macrohistory and epistemic transformations. And the methodology itself should have the seeds of its own transformation, that is, be able to produce results not intended by it. 

5.0 References: 

Joseph Coates, "Thinking about Humanity in the Yer 3000," Futures Research Quarterly (Winter 1999), 37-49. 

Riane Eisler, Sacred Pleasure. San Francisco, HarperCollins, 1996. 

Riane Eisler, "Dominator and Partnership Shifts," in Johan Galtung and Sohail Inayatullah, eds., Macrohistory and Macrohistorians. Westport, Ct. Praeger, 1997. 

Michel Foucault, The Order of Things. New York, Vintage Books, 1971. 

Foundation for the Future. Humanity 3000 Seminar No. 2 Proceedings. Bellevue, Foundation for the Future, 1999. 

Jib Fowles in "The Future of the Internet: Forecasting by Analogy," Futures Research Quarterly, 1996. 

Johan Galtung, Tore Heiestad and Eric Ruge, "On the Decline and Fall of Empires: The Roman Empire and Western Imperialism Compared." Geneve, United Nations Goals Processes and Indicators of Development Project, United Nations University, 1979. 

Johan Galtung and Sohail Inayatullah, Macrohistory and Macrohistorians. Westport, Ct. Praeger, 1997. 

Jerry Glenn, "Millennium Project's draft scenarios for the next 1000 years", Futures (Vol. 32, No. 6, 2000, 603-612). 

Michael Hart, The Year 3000. Poseiden Press, 1999. 

Peter Hartcher, "Internet is another 'boom and bust' speculative," Australian Financial Review (February 13-14, 1999). 

Sohail Inayatullah, Questioning the Future. Taipei, Tamkang University Press, 2001. 

Sohail Inayatullah, Guest Editor, Layered Methodology. Futures (August, 2001).  

Sohail Inayatullah, Situating Sarkar:Tantra, Macrohistory and Alternative Futures. Maleny and Ananda Nagar, India, Gurukul, 1999. 

Sohail Inayatullah and Paul Wildman, Futures Studies: Methods, Emerging Issues and Civilizational Visions (CD-ROM). Brisbane, Prosperity Press, 1998. 

Michio Kaku,  Visions: How Science Will Revolutionize the 21st Century and Beyond. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998. 

Morton Kaplan, "The Emergence of a Global Society," World and I (Vol. 13, No. 9, 1998), 18. 

Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History . Trans. Franz Rosenthal. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967. 

Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962 

Robert Lacy and Danny Danziger, The Year 1000: What Life was like at the turn of the first Millennium.  London, Little Brown and Company, 1999. 

Michael Marien, Future Survey (Vol. 22, No. 9, September 2000, items 401-450). 

Graham Molitor, Millennial Perspectives: Strengths and Limitations of Long-Term Forecasts," Vital Speeches of the Day (August 15, 1998), 661-665. 

Graham Molitor, "Emerging economic sectors in the third millennium: introduction and overview of the 'big five'. Foresight (Vol. 2, No. 3, June 2000), 323-330. 

Graham Molitor, "Emerging economic sectors in the third millennium: life sciences to dominated US economy in 2100," Foresight (Vol. 2, No. 5, October, 2000), 507-514. 

Peter Peterson, "Gray Dawn: The Global Aging Crisis," Foreign Affairs, (January/February 1999), 42-55. 

Elisabet, Sahtouris. EarthDance: Living Systems in Evolution. New York: iuniverse.com, 2000.  

P.R. Sarkar, PROUT in a Nutshell, Vols. 1-25. Calcutta, Ananda Marga Publications, 1988-1994. 

Rupert Sheldrake, A New Science of Life. London, Blong and Briggs, 1981. 

Pitirim Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics. Boston, Porter Sargant, 1957. 

Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West. Translated by Charles Atkinson. New York, Alfred Knopf, 1962. 

Gregory Stock, Metaman: The Merging of Humans and Machines into a Global Superorganism. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1993.  

Jay Tolson, "Of Kings and Commoners," Special Report on the Year 1000. US News (August 16, 1999). Accessed at: www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/990816/tolson.htm 

Sesh Velamoor and Paige Heydon, Guest Editors, Special Issue, Humanity 3000. Futures. (Vol. 32, No. 6, August 2000). 

Paul Wallace, Agequake: Riding the Demographic Rollercoaster Shaking Business, Finance and Our World. London, Nicholas Brealey, 1999
 

 

 

 

 

 

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