Sohail Inayatullah, ed.
Futures (Vol. , 42, No. 2, April, 2010), 99–102.
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Category Archives: Main Topics
Global Transformations and World Futures (Book Info, 2009)
Global Transformations and World Futures: Knowledge, Economy and Society, Vol 1 and 2 | Edited by Sohail Inayatullah | Oxford, EOLSS Publishers, 2009 | ISBN: 978–1–84826–666–7 (hard copy) | ISBN: 978–1–84826–216–4 (Adobe e-book Reader)
The overall structure of this Book is divided into three areas: (1) Global transformations in Knowledge: Social and Cultural issues. Issues such as the nature of global science, the challenge of building real communities in a virtual world, and the transition from an information economy to a communicative economy are explored. (2) The Global Economy. In this area, alternative definitions of globalization are developed – globalization as if the entire globe mattered – and the role of large players such as multinational are explored. Furthermore, globalization and development are linked, and the prospects for development in the South are evaluated. (3) World Futures. In this area, the theories and methods of the emerging discourse of Futures Studies are explored, particularly as applied to issues of gender and world futures; sustainable education; and, the futures of the United Nations.
The purpose for the development of this book has not changed over the past few years. Indeed, continued global transformation have made the analysis and articulate of world futures even more important. Most of the authors in this Book make the argument that humanity is at a juncture. While there are macro patterns that define what is possible in the next fifty or so years – trends in technology, structure of world power, for example – through human agency, transformations can be steered. Agency is possible and desirable. To discern how and where to influence the world system most wisely, maps of the future are required. My introductory chapter essentially maps the futures of humanity. The map has four dimensions. The first dimension is globalization. The second dimension is focused on foundational transformations in nature, truth, reality and Man. The third dimension develops scenarios of the future. These include the Globalized Artificial Society; the Communicative-Inclusive; The Continued Growth Business as Usual, and the Societal Collapse. The fourth dimension is an exploration of a preferred future – a post-globalization future.
Chapters:
- Global transformations and world futures : knowledge, economy & society
- Global transformations in knowledge : social and cultural issues
- Global science
- Non-Western science : mining civilizational knowledge
- Global management of knowledge systems
- Tranformations of information society
- From the information era to the communicative era
- Building “real” and “virtual” human communities in the 21st century
- Navigating globalization through info-design, an alternative approach to understanding cyberculture
- The global economy
- Multinational corporations
- Global movement of labor
- The internet and political economy
- Economics of transition
- Global business ethics
- Globalization as if the entire globe mattered : the situation of minority groups
- Strategies to eradicate poverty : an integral approach to development
- North-North, North-South, and South-South relations
- World futures : trends and transformations in state, education and cultural ecology
- Epistemology and methodology in the study of the future
- The grand patterns of change and the future
- Multilayered scenarios, the scientific method and global models
- The futures of the United Nations and the world system
- Globalization and information society-increasing complexity and potential chaos
- Globalization, gender, and world futures
- Neo-humanism, globalization, and world futures
- Sustainable education : imperatives for a viable future
- Financial resources policy and management : world economic order
- International commodity policy : a new concept for sustainable development
- Global sustainability : rhetoric and reality, analysis and action : the need for removal of a knowledge-apartheid world
- Economic assistance to developing countries and sustainable world population
- Capacity development and sustainable human development.
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UNESCO in partnership with EOLSS [Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems]
From Experience to Relation: Lazslo and Inayatullah, Two Futurists Compared (2009)
By Seongwon Park, article in World Futures.
Park, Seongwon(2009) ‘From Experience to Relation: Laszlo and Inayatullah, Two Futurists Compared’,World Futures, 65: 7, 447 — 463.
To New Horizons with Sohail Inayatullah (2009)
By Brian Rickards, ECO online, December 19, 2009.
http://www.metafuture.org/To%20new%20horizons%20with%20Inayatullah%20Eco%20December%202009.pdf
CEOs, Cinderella and Xena (in Turkish) (2009)
Interview with Sohail Inayatullah by Sad Ozdemir, 17 december, 2009.
http://www.metafuture.org/Sohail%20Inayatullah,%20Te%20GFC%20and%20Images%20of%20the%20future%20in%20Turkish.pdf
Causal Layered Analysis: An Integrative and Transformative Theory and Method (2009)
By Sohail Inayatullah
In: Jerome Glenn and Theodore Gordon, Futures Research Methodology, Version 3.0. Washington D.C, The Millennium Project. 2009. Isbn-978-0-9818941-1-9
Access full PDF here: Causal Layered Analysis FRM version 3 2009
Making Peace: Kosovo/a and Serbia: Conflict Resolution Scenarios (2008)
By Dr. Ivana Milojević
This essay explores the futures of Kosovo/a and Serbia. It uses methods from scenarios and peace theory to articulate a different possible future for the region. The current trajectory promises hardship for all parties especially in the medium and long term.
Keywords: International conflict resolution, peace futures, transcend method, scenarios, Serbia, Kosovo/a
When there is a conflict between two ethnic groups, be it over territory, resources or values, there is also always a one sided take on the past and present. The one sided perspective Kosovars and Serbs have been using for decades, if not centuries, is akin to two deaf persons talking, without the ability to hear each other or lip read. It also reminds one of the ancient tale of blind men who attempted to describe an elephant via touching different parts of its body. The elephant is like a pot! asserts the one touching the head. No, like a, winnowing basket! says the one who touches the ear. Ploughshare! Says one touching the tusk. And so they went, describing the elephant as a plough (trunk), granary (body), pillar (foot), mortar (back), pestle (tail), or brush (tip of the tail). In a similar vain, Serbs exclaim: Kosovo is ours! This is where our nation was born, where our ancestral bones are buried and where our churches were built. No, Kosova is ours! exclaim Albanian Kosovars. We’ve lived here even longer and are now a vast majority. Oh well, they are all irrational barbarians, Balkan cavemen, exclaim the ‘civilised’. If it was not in Europe, no one would care, exclaim the postcolonial theorists. It is a result of a militaristic warrior culture, so assert peace theorists. No, a result of patriarchy, say the feminists. Unfinished nation state building process, is the discourse of the nationalists. One must respect international laws of national sovereignty, say the legalists. But the laws change when reality on the ground changes, say the realists. Change is the only constant, remind social change theorists.
The examples in the previous paragraph suggest that it is possible to theorise conflicts within and around Kosovo/a and Serbia in many different ways and via using many different discourses. Yet only some of the discourses are seen as legitimate and dominate. Both locally and internationally it is discourses of nationalism, realism and legalism that are most commonly used. Some are virtually unknown to the majority of the population, such as the feminist, postcolonial or peace movement ones. Some are stated explicitly (i.e. legalist discourse) and some are hidden, existing more at the myth/metaphor level (i.e. ‘Balkan’ identity discourse).
Another set of extremely powerful discourses are those of history, justice and righteousness. Most commonly it is these discourses that are used to propose ‘a solution’ to the current and long-term conflict over Kosova/o. And yet, paradoxically it is these very discourses that are also part of the problem.
History
History can be a fantastic resource to understand the present but when it comes to conflict situations it is too often used for further entrenchment. Coupled with discourse of nationalism, history can not be but about ‘cherry picking’ – i.e. selective use of dates that confirm ‘our’ victimisation and ‘their’ viciousness/violence/unfairness. Prior to the 1999 NATO bombing of both Kosova and Serbia there was a debate open to BBC listeners in terms of potential NATO intervention and also wider issues in relation to the conflict between Serbs and Albanians. One does not need to be a futurist to predict which dates which side was going to pick from history. Participants only talked about their own victimisation and only of some periods from history and not the others. To simplify, the debate went like this:
Albanian side
1999: 90% Albanians in Kosova. Serbs care “about mines not the shrines”.
1988: Revoked autonomous status. All rights abolished, police state introduced.
1945-1948:
Albanians sought refuge in Turkey, during the reign of Vasa Čubrilović, the head of Serbian Regime that prosecuted them.
1912-1941: expulsion of Albanians and Colonisation of Kosova took place by Serbian monarchy/army/government.
Expulsion of Albanians in the 19th century (e.g. 1877-1878).
Albanians originally Illyrians, lived in Balkan since ancient times, more then
2 000 years before Serbs “even set a foot in the Balkans”.
Serbian side
1999: Albanians represent 20% in Serbia; used to be 16% in former Yugoslavia.
Autonomous status only given in 1974. Demonstration for independence in 1981.
1968-1988: Expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo and ‘demographic warfare’ (emigration of Serbs + illegal immigration + high birth rate of Albanian population).
1941-1945: Italian occupation of Kosovo and creation of Greater Albania, expulsion of Serbian population.
1389: Battle of Kosovo, the beginning of 500 years of colonisation by Ottoman Empire.
Historical evidence that Albanians lived in Kosovo for only the last 600 years.
Serbs came many centuries before that.
Thus the question of ‘whom does the Kosovo righteously and historically belong to’ cannot possibly be answered using this type of discourse. For a solution that is fair to all sides involved, for an outcome that is acceptable and sustainable a range of futures rather than history oriented discourses needs to be applied. So instead of only asking ‘who was there first’, ‘who is the rightful owner’ and ‘what are the legal issues and implications’ questions themselves need to be reframed. But before doing so lets look at some possible futures scenarios.
Conflict resolution scenarios
In this section I employ four main approaches: power based methods, rights based methods, randomness/chance based methods and interest-based methods.
1. Power based methods ask the question of “who is the most powerful?”. It uses the rule of man, that is ‘fight it out, might is right’, overt violence (war, terrorism, individual and group attacks), and non-physical sanctions (alternative systems of governing, ultimatums, sanctions, psychological abuse, boycott and so on).
2. Rights based methods ask the question of “who has the best case?”. It relies on the rule of law, religious code or community norms. The resolution ultimately is through authority’s order, course of law or arbitrations.
3. Randomness/chance based methods asks the question of “who is ‘the luckiest’?”. These methods rely on the rule of chance, are random and ad hoc.
4. Interest-based methods ask the question of “what are the needs and concerns?”. It thus focuses on problem solving approaches, on ‘our way’ (collaboration) instead of ‘my way’ (forcing), ‘your way’ (accommodating), ‘no way’ (avoiding) or ‘half way’ (compromising).
Many of these conflict resolution methods have already been tried. In particular, power and rights based methods, by all sides involved, and also by the international community. This part of the world has had its share of wars, sanctions and group directed abuses, that is, its share of direct, structural and psychological violence. In 1999, power based methods were taken to a new high, with Milošević’s government attempt to the ‘ultimate solution’ of ‘not giving Kosovo away’.
So the world witnessed the expulsion of ethnic Albanians from their homes by Serbian military and para-military forces. Since in power based methods the game is not over ‘until the fat lady sings’ [“I nad popom ima pop”] the next stage involved NATO bombing of both Serbia and Kosova, effectively changing Serbian ‘my way’ to the ‘my way’ of ethnic Albanians. While this is difficult for Serbian nationalists to hear Kosovo has since 1999 effectively and de factol not been part of the Serbian territory. And yet, no long term, sustainable and acceptable solutions to all parties involved has been created either.
While currently, in 2008, there is a push for complete Independence by Kosovars (ethnic Albanians) have been successful in becoming independent, this independence is and a complete non acceptance of this solution by the minority of Serbs still living in Kosovo and also by the Serbian state. Most likely, if power based politics prevails, Serbs will eventually be forced to de facto accept a one-sided, one way solution that favours ethnic Albanians even if Russia and China continue to support the Serbian perspective.. But the negative consequences of this enforced solution may be too many, including the potential for nationalist, pro-militaristic and conservative Radical party to eventually seize the power in Serbia, even though they were unsuccessful in the recent election. . Its current leader Tomislav Nikolić explicitly stated that military intervention in Kosovo – if he is to have his way – would be a desired outcome should Kosovars proclaim full Independence. While this has not occurred, it is too soon to judge how history will play itself out, given the last decades or so of war. As stated by one Serb in a blog debating Independence of Kosovo: “Serbs waited for 500 years to free Kosovo and Metohija from Turks, we can wait again”. As well, even without military intervention and new war in the region consequences to both Serbian and Kosovar society will be many – from further focus on ‘ethnic cleansing’ to the creation of closed, conservative, xenophobic and totalitarian societies.
Another potential solution is of a compromise or a ‘half way’ approach. This approach involves some sort of a division and is currently (and after secession) preferred option of Serbians living in the northern part of Kosovo. This too is possible, although at this stage very unlikely. As well, this outcome too albeit it would fall short of the most desirable solution that focuses on the needs and concerns of all involved, that is future oriented and that has the potential to bring outcomes that are sustainable in the long term.
The following table summarises five possible scenarios: of one side prevailing (A1 or A2), gaining exclusive right to the territory through the rule of man, law or chance, or via being compensated for the loss (my way, your way); of no-one winning (sides taking turns to block the positive outcome for the other, ‘freezing of the issue’ as in during the last decade or via occurrence of various destructive violent based realities, killings, war, non-violent sanctions, or any other ‘no way’); of a compromise (some sort of a division of a territory, ‘half way’) and of a ‘win-win’ solution for all involved (collaborative, ‘transcendence’, ‘our way’ scenario).
Styles of Conflict Management
(based on Ron Kraybill’s work, Thomas-Kilman and Conflict Mode Instrument, David Ausburger’s and also Johan Galtung’s Transcend method)
In terms of these five potential scenarios for conflict management there is currently a formidable focus on ‘my way’ and power and rights based approaches. History in this context is not used as a ‘teacher’ but an additional tool to state one’s case.
Randomness/chance based methods, ‘no way’ and ‘your way’ approaches are, on the other hand, most commonly not seen as a solution and indeed, they are very unlikely to create one. This is because there is a high concern for goals (‘my’ Kosova/o) and ideals (it is ‘ours’) by both (all) sides involved. In addition to this goals and ideals axis, relationship axis can also be used to provide some explanations, specifically to also help explain overwhelming focus on ‘my way’ approaches. The sad reality is that neither the majority of ethnic Albanians living in Kosova and elsewhere nor the majority of Serbs (living in Kosovo, Serbia and elsewhere) currently care much about establishing quality relationships with the other group. Rather, the full on process of ‘othering’ has been going on for many years now, and also periodically throughout the history. This means that ‘the other’ is portrayed as ‘less’, ‘violent’, ‘wrong’, ‘evil’, ‘wild’, even ‘dirty’ and ‘disgusting’. And it doesn’t matter which side is using it, either explicitly or implicitly when talking and thinking about the other, the outcome is always the same: “‘We’ really do not want to deal with the other and it is the unfortunate fact that they live in our close proximity”.
To summarise these are the potential outcomes:
• Scenario 1 (My way, A1 wins) Kosovars proclaim secession. Most if not all states recognise independent Kosova. EU EU and the UN Security Council eventually recognised Kosova as a new state. Serbia in the end eventually accepts the defeat.
• Scenario 2 (Half way, compromise) Kosovo gets somehow divided, i.e. between North and South or between Serbian controlled enclaves where Serbian ‘minority’ lives and where Serbian monasteries are situated and the rest of Kosova.
• Scenario 3 (No way, withdrawal) The issue is frozen for another several decades. Kosova’s full ars decide to wait or they proclaim independence but this is stalled by international legal processes. Serbia uses its limited power to make life difficult for Kosovars, so that they too do not fully ‘win’. China and Russia continue to veto attempts by others to grant Kosovo full international recognition.
• Scenario 4 (Your way, A2 wins) Countries like Russia and, China and Spain pressure UN Security Council and EU Union proclaim to reject secession. International legal processes end up in ruling that Independence was an illegal act. that Kosovo officially becomes again a part of Serbian state and confirms and the full national sovereignty of Serbia and its territories is confirmed.
• Scenario 5 (Our way, transcendence) Kosovo/a and Serbia join a larger political entity i.e. European Union simultaneously. In this scenario Kosovo would officially remain part of Serbia but yet would be given de facto autonomy of a state. Whether certain territories are officially in Serbia or Kosovo becomes less important than good quality relations and high standard of living. Municipalities are also allowed self-determination rights. This is thus simultaneously globalising/unifying and localising/self-determination based scenario. Both Kosovo and Serbia agree to the treatment of minorities to be of highest standard and allow for the free movement of people, goods and services between these two territories, again based on EU standards. Kosovo/a becomes ‘an independent’ region within a broader association, a Truth and Reconciliation type process begins, refuges are brought back, local groups engage in various peace building processes, peace education initiatives are applied, psychological trauma counselling workshops take place, ecumenical peace work gets intensified and a sense of a common future based on positive neighbourly relationships starts to develop.
The most preferred scenario for Kosova Albanians is Scenario 1. The most preferred scenario for Serbian (identity, state) side overall is Scenario 4. For Serbian (now) left as minority in Independent Kosova scenario that is currently vocalised as the most preferred is Scenario 2. The most likely scenario at this stage is Scenario 3, or some version of it. This would mean that Scenario 1 has already partially occurred, that is, there is recognition by some states but certainly not by the UN security council. The most likely scenario is currently Scenario 1 or some version of it, i.e. However, Serbia and some other countries continued to not recognize an independent Kosova and to freeze relationships (through, for example, boycotts, sanctions, legal initiatives). This likely scenario may turn very costly in the end as the potential ground for further conflict(s) develops. These may include further and potentially violent conflicts between two political options in Serbia, between Serbian minority and Albanian majority in independent Kosova, between Kosova and Serbia and between other secessionist movements within states across Europe. As well, as further conflicts and division between members of the UN Security Council may also occur.
Futures
The purpose of designing futures scenarios is to make more informed choices in the present. Futures thinking is ultimately about inquiry into probable, possible and preferable futures, which we are creating today. For example, had various former Yugoslav ethnic, religious and ideological communities as well as politicians, journalists and other professionals gone through a process of envisioning different scenarios and its many intended and unintended consequences, would they still had made the same decisions they did back in the 1980s and 1990s? Had the international community anticipated how much the war in the former Yugoslavia was to eventually cost them (not to mention the human and environmental cost to the region itself) could things have been different? Most pre and post conflict nations do not engage in this process and thus behave reactively rather then proactively and constructively. We can see similar occurrences happening at the global level also – thus the short-sightedness, destructiveness and even plain stupidity of all sides involved in so call ‘war against terror’. And yet this short-sightedness and reactive ness has nothing to do with ‘human nature’ or inevitability of action-reaction-reaction… or trauma-further trauma-further trauma… mechanisms. This is because even though most societies do not currently engage in the long term thinking – non-action at the global level in regard to the climate change is but one example – some have done and continue to do so. History teaches us that it could be otherwise and that different choices with very different future outcomes could be made. While the former Yugoslav ethnic groups haven’t learned alternative lessons from history (such as that ‘violence breads violence’, ‘unjust solutions do not last’) South Africans it seems did. Thus the former Yugoslavia collapsed and in the process created hundreds of thousands dead people, millions of exiles, damaged the psychological makeup of those that remained and militarily polluted environment, to name but a few negative outcomes. South Africans who used the scenario planning process, on the other hand, created a Truth and Reconciliation commission. This is but one example. There would be many others, beyond the scope of this paper. The literature on peaceful societies, social movement and communication practices (i.e.research by B. Bonta, E. Boulding, G. Kemp, D. Fry, P. Ackerman, J. DuVall, D. Barash, J. Galtung, G. Paige, E.Jones, R. Haenfler, B. Johnson, M. Rosenberg, W. Glasser and many many others …) gives multitude of concrete examples of how historical and contemporary peaceful societies, groups and individuals dealt/deal with conflict in a positive and constructive manner. The whole field of Peace and conflict studies does the same. Other various individuals and groups engaged in the nonviolent social and political efforts also.
Crucial in these efforts is to move away from ‘the problem’ (detrimental historical stories, unmet expectations, violence that happened in the past) and to future alternatives that are positive, imaginative, creative and doable. The main questions should be: how to respond to the crisis/conflict in a way that is honest (acknowledges what is going on for all involved, beyond delusions and misconceptions) and compassionate (cares about all involved, about relationships with the other and about ‘our way’, ‘win-win’ solutions)? (For this approach see: www.transcend.com). What are some of the basic needs of all involved? What do Kosovars need? What do Serbs? What does the international community? How many future based solutions accommodating to those needs (rather than ‘wants’ and ‘shoulds’) can be created? Out of the multitude of these creative, positive and doable alternatives which ones are the most preferable for all involved? Who are the actors that are to be involved in this planning and visioning process? How many stakeholders beyond government officials, politicians and bureaucrats can be found? Who are the most marginalised groups – can they provide out of box thinking and solutions? Can representatives of various yet marginalised discourses, including peace oriented ones, feminist, futurists and representative of other ethnic groups also be included? Why leave it only to nationalists, lawyers and governments? Why not engage in truly democratic practice wherein voices of all involved are to be heard and given space?
For some of these questions to be engaged with, extensive community collaborative processes of envisioning desired, preferable futures are needed. Given the financial difficulties of both Serbia and Kosovo financial support by international community is also needed. Even though such processes would be by far the least costly than any other alternative there needs to be a will to start these processes + the means to achieve them. And while all that seems like a hard work it is necessary if future generations in this area are to live harmoniously, fruitfully and optimistically. Even if (or when) after Kosovo does secede, ethnic Albanians, Serbs and others still will need to continue living there, next to each other. Put simply, the neighbours are not going to go away, miraculously disappear or somehow get completely silenced. So it is the best bet for all involved to learn how to live together without hate, resentment and ‘othering’. Those living today do have a responsibility at the very least to leave to their children and grandchildren a world somewhat better to the one they inherited.
So why not inquiry of both sides into:
1. The positive aspects of the other group. Is their something, anything positive about the other? As there must be, no matter how small, lets build on that. How do we do so?
2. What do I (we) really want? What are our needs here? How do we distinguish those needs from what we were told our needs have to be or from the “unrealistic, wishful thinking”?
3. Can my trauma be heard by others? Can they recognise it without going into blaming and shaming?
4. What are some of the commonalities in our futures visions? Living in peace, harmony and abundance perhaps? How is this best to be achieved? Is the conflict between us helping our vision or hindering it?
5. What are some best strategies that we can implement here and now to bring forward preferable futures for all involved?
If not only the long-term but also immediate future are to be better than the past and present, different strategies, different thoughts, different discourses and different futures visions need to be chosen. For, as the saying goes, if one usually does what one has usually done; one is going to get what one has usually so far got. It would be nice if, for a change, things did change and positive, safe, healthy, inclusive, purposeful, imaginative, fun and abundant presents and futures were created. And even though at this stage this does not seem very likely such alternative futures too are possible.
Article by Ivana Milojević, Research Director www.metafuture.org, Lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies, University of the Sunshine Coast, Australia. Emails: info@metafuture.org and imilojev@usc.edu.au
Published version: for the PDF click here
Futures of Pakistan (2008)
Essay on the Future of Pakistan: Possible Scenarios
Beyond the pendulum of the general and the landlord-politician: Understanding and creating alternative futures and scenarios for Pakistan
By Sohail Inayatullah
Professor, Tamkang University, University of the Sunshine Coast, and Prout College.
In this essay, I outline Five futures for Pakistan: (1) the Pendulum continues forever, (2) Collapse, (3) Joining Chindia, (4) the Great Game, and (5) a South Asian Confederation. The most familiar and likely are based on the pendulum of rule by the military and rule by landlord/politicians. However, what is needed is to move from the more likely and less desirable futures to a process of anticipatory democracy where the citizens of Pakistan consider, create and commit to building their preferred future.
DEEP STRUCTURES
While the assassination of Benazir Bhutto certainly plunged Pakistan into one of its works crisis in decades, the recent successful elections appear to have brought hope back again. The extremist parties did poorly, and even with a low turn out and election violence, it appears that the latest cycle of military rule is over.
Yes, much remains unresolved. Certainly as Nathan Gardels argues in his article, “Bhutto’s elimination a big boost for al-Qa’ida,” the West did lose track of the prize, focusing on Iraq instead of on Islamabad. It is in Pakistan where the future of the Islamic world lies. In addition to the Afghanistan Taliban, there is now a Pakistani Taliban. Nuclearization continues. Civil society is still vulnerable to internal and external shocks. Can politicians create a secular democratic Pakistan? Or will the politics of Jihadism continue, with Kashmir returning as the battle front?
While these issues are important in understanding Pakistan’s future, we often forget the deep archetypes and structures (inner symbols and external patterns) in Pakistani politics. These delimit what is possible.
Syed Abidi’s Doctoral dissertation at the University of Hawaii, titled Social change and the Politics of Religion in Pakistan made the observation that Pakistan’s political system can best be understood as a pendulum between civilian rule and military rule.
The first stage was from 1947-1958 and was characterized by the Parliamentary system with the dominant class interest being the feudal land owners. The second stage was from 1958-1968. This was martial law with an American presidential system and saw the rise of the capitalist class. The third stage – from 1968-1977 – saw the end of Martial law (with a presidential and parliamentary system) and the beginning of the Bhutto era and the return of feudalism.
With the coup by General Zia in 1977, military rule returned and the capitalist class was back in power. The fourth stage had begun. This ended with his assassination in 1988.
The fifth stage was characterized by civilian rule (Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Shariff) until Pervez Musharraf conducted his own coup in 1999 and began the sixth stage. With the events of 9/11, globalization and the rise of the internet, this phase has seen the return of the capitalist class.
In 2008 the seventh stage of Pakistan’s politics appears to have begun. The military era is about to end and the civilians will be back in power – either in the guise of Musharraf the democrat, the PPP, or Nawaz Shariff – or some power sharing formula. While the death of Benazir Bhutto is destabilizing, it does not challenge the deeper structure of Pakistan’s politics. Pakistan thus swings back and forth between military and civilian rule one side and feudal and capitalist economies on the other. The archetypes are the general and politician/landlord.
But why has Pakistan been dominated by the poles of military and civilian power – and why the pendulum between these two poles? Noted political scientist and human rights advocate, Dr. C. Inayatullah in his classic State and Democracy in Pakistan argues that one creates the conditions for the other: “As the military became more independent and powerful controlling national politics, its top brass developed an ideology and a set of perceptions to justify their political role. Politics was projected as an irrational, disorderly, inefficient and corrupt method of running the affairs of society compared with the rational, efficient, quick and clean way the military runs itself.” They believed they were morally bound to overthrow politicians if the politicians threatened the independence of the nation or if they meddled in the internal affairs of the military. As guardians of the nation, they believe they have the right to rule the nation. Once the civilians come into power, feeling threatened by the military, they attempt to control them. As well, with their feudal roots, a pattern of patronage and corruption sets in. This invites protests from other political parties, often leading to violence. Eventually to stop the violence and decay, – when there is weakness, public contempt of the political party – the military rises up and takes over. Weaknesses emerge from various factors – internal politics, feudal politics, corruption, external threats with the particular causes changing historically.
Following Pitirim Sorokin’s theory of social change, each system overreaches, becomes more corrupt, focuses on its own survival or makes long term decisions that may prove unpopular in domestic politics (peace in Kashmir, dismantling of extremist Islam), and then the other group comes in. Both have created a pendulum that only benefits their own strategies and worldview.
ARCHETYPES
Moving away from structural analysis and towards archetypes, these two poles represent different selves of Pakistan. The first is orderly, rational and in control – the general. The second is land-based, social and can be chaotic. While it challenges military rule, it has its own structure of authority, even as it claims the story of people’s power.
At the level of archetypes, the back and forth works because in this sense one is the British adult and the second is the “Indian” adolescent challenging British rule. However, and this is the key, once the political challenger takes over the mantle of power, he or she has been unable to escape the shadow of the general – thus, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became authoritarian himself, as have others. They move quickly from the teenager challenging power and authority to the feudal lord. The lord is also very male and foundationally hierarchical.
But there are two other roles in this field of power. What has stayed stable in Pakistan history is a third archetype – the bureaucrat in his suit and tie. The bureaucracy has remained strong throughout Pakistan’s history, as it is the trusted and stable servant of the powerful adult. Thus the executive has prospered while other political institutions – courts, for example – and the rest of civil society have remained weak. When politicians have ruled, the system has remained tied to its feudal past, i.e. strong lines of hierarchy, strong patronage to supporters. Thus, the citizen as archetype has remained out of power – or expressed himself via chaotic power- while other structures have taken their places in power. The bureaucrat has been tied to red tape, using rules to privilege himself, instead of green tape, using rules to create a better and innovative society.
There are thus four positions –military rule, chaotic people’s power that overthrows the ruler, the politician qua feudal lord, and the bureaucrat who ensures smooth transitions between all these types. Of course, it is arguable that political leaders have been far more democratic and the military creates the conditions for chaos (and thus justifies its dictatorial rule), since political rulers maintain their power through their feudal ties. Thus we see the dynastic nature of the PPP.
When the general stays too long, he invites the shadow self, equally violent. This is the mujheddin fighter, the jihadist, for example. They use military force but as power is asymmetrical, chaos works best for them. The jihadis do not need the bureaucrat; rather it is mullah who inspires them. Of course, if the extremists did come into power, then they, to implement their policies, would rely on the bureaucrats. The mullah, afraid that his story has become totally undervalued in the modernized and globalized world, instead of moving toward wisdom and creating a novel future, has returned to past caliphate glories. He links with the jihadist to take over the entire system.
Each one of these archetypes has two sides – the general can be protective and moral (the enlightened despot) or can be amoral, staying too long, clinging to power, assaulting human rights and using religion or strategy to stay in power. The feudal lord can equally be protective or can stay too long, and use his or her power for personal gain. The citizen can be chaotic or can bring social capital to the nation.
ALTERNATIVE FUTURES
What then are Pakistan’s alternative futures?
1. The pendulum continues forever. This would mean that after this particular civilian cycle, there will be another military coup in 7-10 years. Politicians will have some luck in ridding Pakistan of extremist fundamentalists, but old scores between the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League or between the PPP and the military will still need to be settled. Issues of justice and revenge will continue and just as Pakistan’s economy is about to take off, another crisis will set in. Citizens will rally but then when they see no real change will become despondent. “Nothing is possible here,” or a similar catch-phrase will be the inner story. Globalization will not go away but the politics would swing between growth and equity.
2. Collapse – this is the most feared scenario for all, particularly in the West. Civil war in Pakistan (the provinces going their own way), the inability to stop jihadism, Al Qa’ida or their friends finding some nukes, not to mention the global challenges of climate change, all lead to a slow decline destined for collapse. And if the challenge from the Pakistani and Afghani Taliban is resolved, the frontline will switch to half-century old war in. Capital flies away, economic development slows down and Pakistan becomes a nation of competing tribes. Women in this future are particularly vulnerable as the battle between religious and secularists throughout the Islamic (Arab influenced world) is fought over the “body” of the female. Is she a person unto herself or does the strong male (feudal lord, ruler, mullah) need to protect and control. In the collapse, chaos would reign. Over time, and perhaps even quite quickly, a strong military leader is likely to rise (the Napoleon scenario), but can the great leader unite all the tribes (the challenge facing Afghanistan today)?
3. Joining Chindia. With India likely to move into the ranks of the G-8 by 2020, gaining a permanent UN Security Council Position, Pakistan’s only hope is to link in every possible way with India and China – or Chindia. Certainly Pakistan will favor the China part of the amazing rise, but in any case, in this future, economic growth is far more important than ideological struggles. To move in this direction, the Singapore or Malaysian model may be adopted. This model is characterized by a clear vision of the future, transparency; break up of the feudal system, limited democracy (One party rule) and creatively finding a niche role in the global economy, and then using that to springboard to becoming a global player. However, the India example shows that economic rise is possible outside the East Asian model. In any case, this future is hopeful but requires investment in infrastructure and a favoring of globalized capitalism. Instead of lamenting the colonial past, in this Chindia future, Pakistan creates its own transnational corporations. Politics moves from focusing on old wrongs (Kashmir, for example) to desired futures. Instead of Chindia, Chindistan is created.
4. The fourth scenario is the Great Game. Pakistan remains a pawn, moved around for the strategic and ideological purposes of the great powers. Whether in proxy wars against the Russians or against 9/11 jihadis or whoever may be next, Pakistan’s capacity to influence its future is low or non-existent. At best, it can only rent out its military, or territory, for others’ battles. In this future (as in the current present), the rental receipts do not lead to even development –they merely enrich those getting the rent, generally the military. The national game becomes not how to transform the great game but how to get a piece of the action, legitimately or illegitimately. Those not part of the money game sing songs of grand conspiracies. These songs take away agency. While Pakistan has a dependency relationship with the rest of the world, citizens have a dependency – child/adult – relationship with the government, expecting it to solve each and every problem, without taking responsibility for their own actions and blaming the government when it fails. At the collective level, Pakistan remains rudderless, evoking the words of the founder, but unable to follow through with action.
5. A wiser South-Asian confederation. The challenges Pakistan faces are similar to what other countries in the region face – religious extremism, climate change, poverty, corruption, deep inequity, used futures and less than helpful archetypes – the only way forward is towards an EU model of slow but inevitable integration. While this may seem too positive and far away, it is not impossible. Each country needs the help of others to solve their problems. None can go it alone, and each can learn from the Other. This requires learning, peace and mediation skills in all schools; moving toward the sustainability development agenda; developing agreements in security, water, and energy to begin with; and a focus on the desired future and not on past injustices. Gender equity and systemic and deep cultural levels is foundational for this future. This future also requires an archetype that is neither the male general nor feudal lord nor the rebellious teenager, but the wise person, perhaps the Globo sapiens. Fortunately, the south Asian tradition is steeped with wisdom. Can this imagination be drawn on to create a different future? Already in Pakistan, there are hundreds of groups and thousands of individuals working on this vision. What is needed is systemic support for this future, and a move away from focusing on past injustices.
Moreover, can the mullah who is focused on religion for tribal power become the wise sage, the Sufi or pir focused on transformative power? Can other roles as well be transformed: can the consumer become the producer, the client the citizen, the child the adult? And perhaps, as in East Asia, can new myths be created through grounded realities such as the economic miracle, which has now created new stories of social capacity and new identities. Pakistan was on the verge of this future in the early 1960s, it is possible to rediscover this pathway.
THE PLANETARY CHALLENGE
If an alternative future for Pakistan is not created, the pendulum will continue with collapse always being in the background. Moreover, in the world we now live in, a weakness or pathology in any part of the planetary system threatens us all. Pakistan’s futures are part of the planet’s futures – we all need to transform.
This transformation in Pakistan needs to be part of a multi-leveled futures visioning process – true citizen anticipatory democracy. Given the illiteracy in the nation, using television, radio, DVDs would be best. Possible scenarios of Pakistan’s futures could be shown. Citizens could critique them and offer their own preferred futures (in some detail, not the grand ideas approach) as to how they wish their lives to look like in 2020 and what needs to be done today to move in that direction. Along with a citizen participatory process, a rigorous academic process needs to be undertaken. This would collect data; provide evidence of preferred, feared and alternative Pakistani futures. Finally, leaders would need to be consulted, helping provide inspiration. The process thus must move toward an anticipatory democracy that includes electoral and participatory democracy. If not, then foresight will be merely another activity of the planning commission or be part of military and political strategy. It will become part of the pendulum. Too much is at stake to allow the current trajectory to continue. An alternative future is needed, and, I believe, can be created.
Using the Future to Explore Visions of Globalization (2008)
By Sohail Inayatullah
This essay reviews globalization and its alternative futures. It does this drawing from the epistemological and methodological focus of futures studies. Thus the futures is visited in a disciplined fashion the hope of moving away from idiosyncratic “how I see the future” discourses. This means seeing the future not only in temporal space as forward time, that is, we are unable to remember the future, as we can the past, but to see the future as an asset, a resource.