Framing the Shapes and Times of the Future: Towards a Post-Development Vision of Futures (1996)

By Dr. Sohail Inayatullah

Like the geographer who charts physical space or the sociologist who structures social space, the futurist creates maps of time. These maps can then be used to better understand who we are or more appropriately when we are. They can also be used to make better decisions, create new maps, or use the maps for social transformation. This essay will analyze modes of thinking about the future, chart the shape and time of the future, and conclude with the needed dimensions for a post-development vision for the next century.

DEVELOPING AN INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITY

One purpose of this essay is to aid in the task of developing an interpretive community. According to David Harvey,

‘interpretive communities’ [are] made up of both producers and consumers of particular kinds of knowledge, of texts, often operating within a particular institutional context, within particular divisions of labor, within particular places. Individuals and groups are held to control mutually within these domains what they consider to be valid knowledge.

For researchers concerned with creating new futures, new models of society, polity and economy, our interpretive community has yet to create a consensual model of what constitutes valid or reliable knowledge and how this knowledge can be known, who can participate in this knowledge creation, and what the appropriate sites for knowledge creation are.

At present, futures studies largely straddles between two dominant modes of knowing–the technical concerned with predicting or forecasting the future and the humanist concerned with developing a good society, with visions of what can be. While there are numerous ways to constitute the field, I use a perspective which argues that there are three frames of reference from which to view the future and futures studies. These frames overlap and should be seen more as a continuum then as three exclusive perspectives, with many thinkers and studies simultaneously exhibiting more than one perspective. The first, the predictive, attempts to forecast and control the future, the second, the interpretive, examines how different cultures, cosmologies, discourses approach and create the future, and the third, the critical, makes problematic the categories used to construct the future, asking what are the particular social costs for any approach or view of the future. Deciding which approach one takes is not a philosophical issue in terms of arriving at some view of Truth but a political issue in terms of deciding what should be nominated as legitimate social theory in terms of the approach one takes and the relative importance of actors and structures, of the State and social movements, or the individual and the transcendental, for example.

The type of futures activity one takes is based on these epistemological perspectives. If one forecasts, then convincing policymakers to take into account the second and third order effects of new technologies or providing corporate decisionmakers early warning indicators so as to gain competitive advantage over others would be a likely action. If one is concerned with interpreting the future then working with social movements and others in envisioning desired futures and in understanding the cultural categories of other civilizations would be a likely action. From the critical approach, action is defined as deconstructing text so as to create spaces for other types of policies and understandings.

Each of these views also has a perspective of the world “out there” in which the future can be known (independent of the observer or constituted by the observer, for example). Each of these views also places the act of meaning in different sites (in the speaker or in the episteme that frames discourse, for example) as well as the role of the transcendental (as an emperical cause of social change of the future or as that which inspires agency, for example). The role of language (as neutral or as opaque, for example), what is an appropriate science (focused on the relationship between theory and data or between values and data, for example) and what constitutes the truth (as exclusive and universal or as layered, deep and shallow instead of right or wrong, for example) is also considerably different in each approach.

THE SHAPE OF THE FUTURE

As important as frames of reference and archetypical images of the future is the shape of the trajectory of the future . Derived largely from historical patterns of social change, three are basic shapes ; the linear evolutionary shape of progress (the dominant paradigm of development, the cyclical shape of the life-cycle and the natural world, and the spiral shape that combines progress and tradition. These three shapes are again loosely related to the predictive orientation (linear), the cyclical (cultural) and spiral (a combination of both). The critical view is not so much concerned with a theory of social change but with articulating the assumptions and social costs associated with a particular grand theory, with questioning all unifying and generalizing narratives, and thus in privileging local knowledge.

Traditionally social change theories have been categorized into dialectical and equilibrium theories. In dialectical theories, change is normal and opposites exist in dynamic tension in every stage. Power and domination are often central to dialectical theories. Dialectical theories can be materialistic (Marx) or idealistic (Hegel) in their orientation or some combination of both (Shrii Sarkar). In equilibrium theories stasis is natural and change is incremental. A third dimension is transcendental theories, where the pull of the “God” moves civilization forward.
The linear shape promises more of the same, a “Continued Growth” scenario, but when unabated can lead to a “Catastrophe” scenario. Cyclical shapes promise a return to a prior time, a “Return to the Past” type scenario. The spiral shape has dimensions of both linear and cyclical but promises some other society, a “Transformation” scenario. Epistemologically, linear theories base themselves on the empirical/predictive model of the social sciences whereas as cyclical theories are closer to the interpretive/structural model. The spiral attempts to link the empirical with deep human values. It is this latter pattern that intends to remove the future from the confines of pre-determined history, from the cycle, and to create the possibility for the spiral–an acceptance of structure, but a willingness to transform the suffering associated with history, and to find previous pockets of darkness and illuminate them, to pierce through silences.

A cyclical theory privileges perpetual change while a linear theory privileges equilibrium although it could be an evolutionary equilibrium as in the case of Herbert Spencer. In cyclical theories change is endemic to the system; for example, variously through dialectics, through the principle of limits, through the Chinese yin/yang principle, or through the Indian Tantric vidya/avidya (introversion and extroversion) principle.

In contrast, in linear theories change is often because of external causes. Cyclical historians examine the rise and fall of civilizations while linear historians believe the fall problem to apply to other civilizations (Oriental civilization, for example) while their own civilization (the West) is destined for eternal rise and progress. The formula for progress has been found; the problem now is merely staying the course.
While cyclical theorists do have linear dimensions (they move up or they move down), it is the return to a previous stage–however modified–that does not allow for an unbridled theory of progress, of development. In contrast, within the narrative of linear stages, linear theorists might postulate ups and downs of a lesser unit of analysis (for example, within human evolution or the accumulation of capital, there might be the rise and fall of nation or firms or dynasties) but in general the larger pattern is progress.

However, in a model of progress there can be phases of speed and pause, where a civilization or movement consolidates its power, regains its momentum before the next stage is reached. The metaphor offered by Shrii Sarkar for this is the breathing cycle. Combining this with the organic metaphors of hills, of movement up and down, we have a powerful metaphor of social change. This combination (of the rhythm of the breath and shape of rolling hills) adds a richer dimension to mere upward linearity. For cyclical theorists, however, these two metaphors show that there is no change, each breath is the same as the other breath, the climb up the hill is always followed by the climb down. One model has direction, the other does not.
However, for linear thinkers, society marches on either through technology, capital accumulation, innovation, or the pull of God even if individuals humans might themselves have contradictions (for example, based on the Western good/evil pattern). Recent efforts such as general evolution theory now include information as the key variable that keeps evolution marching onwards. Of course, from the cyclical view, increased information does not lead to attempts to control the pattern of change, but humility in the face of the eternal cycle of history.

Linear thinkers are often seen as optimists (as with Herman Kahn) especially from the viewpoint of the Center civilization. In contrast, cyclical theories are seen as pessimistic by the elite of the Center nation. From the view of the individual, cyclical theorists are seen as disempowering since structure and process prevail over agency. Transcendental theories are empowering in that they inspire individuals to act but they also lead to fatalism since all is in the hands of the transcendental.
Along with a theory of progress, linear perspectives include clear stages of ascension with even clearer theories of how to pull up the backward classes or leave them to die as would Spencer. Cyclical theories of the future focus on structures that do not change or structures keep on rising up. In this view, we cannot escape our history, we cannot escape the past, we cannot create our future.

Of course the basic question in terms of a theory of the future is: Is it possible to have a model that combines linear (evolution and progress, the irreversibility of time) with cyclical (there is a season for everything, ancient ways are important, and the strong shall fall and the weak shall rise) along with a transcendental dimension (superagency, timeless time with teleology) that includes individual agency (humans create the future) with structure (there deep patterns of change, whether class, episteme, or gender that place limits on change)? Spiral theorists attempt to include both, having certain dimensions which move forward and certain dimensions that repeat. This is the most difficult and certainly the most important dimension of developing theories of the future–continuity with change. For Shrii
Sarkar, it is understanding that while certain patterns will always be repeated, that at the level of the physical, there is no fundamental change, there can be progressive change, movement towards the spiritual. The slippery slope down from the mountain top (because of exploitation or imperial overextension) can be reduced, half-way down, there can be movement upwards again if the basic strucuture of society is transformed. Through appropriate social transformation, particularly leadership, the cycle can be modified, but not destroyed.

To have an adequate theory of a spiral shape of the future, one must have a theory of exploitation, to show for example, as Shrii Sarkar does how imperialistic warriors, cunning intellectuals, and clever merchants have historically denied rights to females, peasants, and children, indeed, to the future. Exploitation has occurred through the extraction of labor, ideas and wealth to the center from the periphery.
But one must also have a theory of progress. Economic progress is critical albeit for the purpose of the third dimension: the mystical, the transcendental. That is, if not progress per se, at least economic conditions are progressive, creating the possibility for cultural and spiritual evolution. Evolution can be based on struggle with the environment (the materialist position) struggle between ideas (the idealistic position) and the attraction of the Great (the mystical position) or some mixture of all three, as Shrii Sarkar has asserted.

But just as there is a role for structure, individuals also must play a role. Through struggle, it is individuals who can transform the cycle. The transcendental can have numerous functions–it can be located in the State thus serving to develop a God that plays favorites or it can function as a consciousness that serves to liberate our minds from our own fixations. It creates a new way of knowing, love or devotion, that attempts to break the bonds of family, race and nation.

Most thinkers have remained at the individual level forgetting class and gender relations and merely focused on individual enlightenment. Or they have only focused on structural dimensions forgetting the importance of individual efforts. Those who have had space for both structure and individual have missed the transcendental dimension, the spiritual aspect of humans. What is then needed is a multiple theory of time and space; efficient time, cyclical time, and spiritual timeless time, along with the possibility of Kairos, that is, the right time, the time, the moment in which there is a bifurcation of past and present and the world is made anew–in which, individual and history join together to create the future. A post-development, linear progressive and cyclical return vision of the future is required to resolve the classic antinomies of structure/agency, individual/collective and material/spiritual. In the concluding part of this essay, criteria for such a vision is developed.

THE METAPHORS OF TIME

Along with the shape of the future, the way time is constructed by different cosmologies is of central importance. Within the empirical perspective, time is the unexpressed variable that remains hidden, untouched and unexplained, like language, used to describe the real world but not appropriate for critical examination. Time is considered a universal outside of language and culture. But time is constructed differently by various cultures.

From the cultural view time is constructed differently by various cultures and in historical epistemes. Traditional culture, to be sure, is based on the cycle. These are the seasons, the lunar cycle, and the life cycle. For example, the traditional Chinese perspective of time is considered astronomical, For the classical Chinese thinker there is no recognizable date to human history. Heavenly and worldly time are interrelated. They are endless. By using the model of the stars, Chinese history easily lend itself to a science of society that is not distinct from a science of the stars or a science of the self. History that is based on the stars can never have any real beginning or end, for the stars appear eternal, continuously moving, forward and backward. Society too must follow this pattern: everything has its place and there is a place for everything. In this model, the tao is the unseen force that provides the cohesiveness for the natural and human universes. With the universe knowable, the task for the scholar is merely to fit history and future into this larger pattern. In this regard, the Chinese view is closer to the empirical perspective. However from the modern scientific perspective, the traditional Chinese view does not reflect the data thus it is not true, indeed, merely elegant and ultimately useless.
Indian time also has a cosmic dimension consisting of yugas containing millions of years. Besides the size of the numbers, cosmic time is distinct from historical time in that certain numbers have magical properties. Numbers participate in the real, they are not mere representations: they have an ontological existence. Thus from the classical worldview, time had to relate to Consciousness and the natural/social worlds since the entire universe was mathematically perfect. In this sense, the idea of the future meant something quite different then modern idea of “the future,” as the site of change and innovation. Rather “the future” was integrated into classical cosmology.

In the classical model of time, there is a degeneration of time from the golden era, to the silver, to the copper to the iron. In the golden era, food is shared and all live as Gods. Society degenerates with differentiation (as opposed to modernity wherein differentiation leads to evolution and progress) eventually resulting in the iron age of materialism. Time then decreases in value from the golden era characterized by unity and spiritual development to the iron age characterized by materialism, chaos and confusion. We begin with progress and then degenerate.

But the degeneration does end. At the nadir of the dark iron age, the redeemer sets the world right and the golden era begins again, the cycle continues. Within this view, the goal is not transformation or conscious evolution but the search for a redeemer to end the darkness of the present, to recreate the perfection of the past.

Few visions of futurists, however, focus on the return of the Great leader, the redemption is gained through participation in the conscious evolution of society (or the creation of social and political structures to facilitate community values as with the Green view). Understanding the pattern in itself becomes the way out of the cycle of history. But in the traditional cyclical view, understanding only allows a nominal degree of maneuvering, eventually, over time, there will be degeneration, such is the nature of the universe we live in. Of course, the why of degeneration differs. One exemplary theory of decline comes from Ibn Khaldun. For him there are four stages and four generations in which creativity degenerates into imitation, in which a family’s or a civilization’s fortunes fade. The first generation creates, the second produces by watching the first, the third produces merely through rote (as it does not have access to the original creator) and the fourth does nothing believing that wealth–inheritance–is owed to them. This generation decays losing its wealth and creativity as it does not build strength and marketable skills. Thus, we should always expect culture to degenerate into custom over time and expect cultural revival to come from the periphery, from outside of the official culture.

Similar to the seasonalcyclical model is the biological and sexual model. In this view, the rise and fall of nations, dynasties and families can be related to the rise and fall of the phallus, the fundamental sexual event known to men and women. The phallic movement is dramatic and has a clear beginning and a clear end. However, men, it can be argued (using the linear model), prefer the first part of the cycle, the progressive linear phase, and perhaps imagine a utopia where the phallus never declines. The populist Muslim vision of heaven is a particular example. The historical empirical data suggests, however, that endless rise does not occur. In contrast, the female experience is wavelike with multiple motions. Time slows and expands. Instead of a rise and fall model what emerges is an expansion/contraction model. This model can be used to describe Western cosmology.

Biological time can also be used to understand the future. Instead of using the Earth’s resources for present generations, we should think of future generations, argue ecologists. Policymakers should base decisions on the needs of future outcomes, on the needs of future generations. Contemporary writers, in particular, use this metaphor. Culture then should be forward looking not past oriented, concerned with grand children, not with grandparents.

In contrast to these traditional cyclical views, modernity emphasizes quantitative, linear time. This is the similar to the “time as an arrow” metaphor. It cannot be repeated nor reversed otherwise we could remember the future. Instead of degeneration there is forward development. Time in this well researched model is largely reductionist with efficiency as the primary goal.

Time then has many perspectives. We list a few of these as divided by our earlier structure:

Linear:

1. Quantitative (time as precious, something not to waste)
2. Technical time (efficient, quantitative and scientific)
3. Electric time (linear time of the city, reducing the night)
4. Institutional time (the institutional power context by which an event is bounded)
5. Generational time (saving the future for one’s children)
6. Leisure time (time as abundance)
7. Bureaucratic time (scheduled but delayed)

Cyclical:

8. Death (time as bounded by the awareness of death, running out of time)
9. Lunar/solar time (day/night, menstrual cycle, full to new moon)
10. Biological time (nine month cycle)
11. Sexual time (rise and fall, expansion and contraction)
12. Geological time (stability, shocks then stability)
13. Cosmic time (astronomical)
14. Cultural time (being on time, being late, norms of socially shared reality)
15. Mythological time (fall of time from golden to silver, to copper to iron)
16. Religious time (the birth and return of the Prophet, Messiah)
17. Life cycle (birth to death and for some rebirth)
18. Sociological time (the societal patterns)

In addition there is (1) Spiral time (return of the past but onward into the future)
and (2) Spiritual time (no sense of individual consciousness, only a sense of the transcendent, or infinite)

What time we live in is based on our assumptions of the nature of the world we believe exists and how we believe we know what this world is like. Any adequate theory of the future must be able to problematize time and negotiate the many meanings of time even as it might be committed to a particular construction of time. It must be able to “time” the world in different ways. An ideal theory of the future, besides articulating a rich theory of time, must simultaneously be able use predictive, interpretive and critical perspectives and have linear and cyclical and thus spiral dimensions to it. It must also be able find complimentary roles for the individual, for structure and for the transcendental.

RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT

As important as new or recycled visions of space and time are new or post-development models that integrate a range of futures characteristics. Development has been the dominant paradigm of the sciences and social sciences for the past few centuries. To develop is natural, inevitable and good. The issue has been how do nations and societies economically, culturally and politically develop, why are some rich and some poor or for Marxists why do the poor not stand up and smite the rich. Traditional visions of development can be divided into the following.
The first is the linear evolutionary model. Nations are rich because their citizens work hard, save and invest, develop new technologies, are born with the correct genes, believe that virtue is rewarded now and in the afterlife.

The second is the institutional model which believes that wealth comes from efficient organizations that reward individuals for their ingenuity and provide disincentives for inefficient behavior (social welfare or corruption). This view is weak on social structure and like the first strong on individual initiative, but individuals now become aggregated as institutions or nations.

The third is that development comes from getting materials cheap (through force or cunning) and selling them dear, that is, trade. It also assumes that making goods is even better than digging them since manufacturing leads to social development while raw materials extraction leads to a hole in the ground. Manufacturing uses physical and mental (the ability to transform nature) resources while mere exporting of commodities does not develop the local region. The linear temporal model and the empirical predictive model correlate strongly with these theories of development.

Underdevelopment then is caused by (1) bad genes, (2) bad institutions, (3) bleeding of wealth and (4) inappropriate cultural norms, depending one which theory one buys into.

Development, however, continues the linear shape of the future. Those behind the current stage are judged as inferior, those ahead as models to base economic, cultural and institutional strategies on. Most attempts to envision the future remain tied to the pervasive model of development–often framed as one vision of the future (Continued Growth); one vision of politics (democracy within nations and anarchy in the interstate system, that is, nation-state sovereignty); one vision of self (the scientific, technocratic self); with one vision of community (the chosen nation of God); and one vision of economics (neo-classical). Even alternative futures scenarios must base their structure on the boundaries of development theory calling for a cyclical return to pre-development communitarian visions of the good.

Development frames much of our thinking largely because of the dominance of economism. Economism privileges “rational” individuals; a world where individuals (and nations in the neo-realist model of International Relations) compete for scarce goods: food, power and love.

The first alternative to capitalist development was more concerned with distribution than with growth. However, distribution practices led to the growth of the State sector, and as socialist nations had few options within a sea of capitalist development, they too pursued similar models of growth, of progress, of linearity. Moreover, they emerged as well from Darwinian theories of social evolution: the only issue was who would be the carriers of progress, capital or labor. Linear progress was not contested.

The second alternative has been communitarian models, that have attempted to contest official knowledge and technocracy. This has been anti-development, an attempt to create social conditions where the village, the home, the local were placed ahead of the large Capital. The most recent model of this has been the sustainable development movement, which incorporates an ecological perspective to development as well.

Marxist and communitarian models of development have also been sensitive to how wealth was historically extracted from the periphery, thus shaping the development options of the periphery. Resultant development strategies were thus initially national (to combat the leakage of wealth) and then later local (since the State of peripheral nations extracted wealth from local areas). Both national and local suffer from the globalization of wealth, politics and culture. While national strategies in the periphery have remained entirely in the linear development paradigm, hoping to join the West, local strategies have been cyclical based, hoping to return to conditions prior to contact. However, even though villages might have had a local ecology, there were severe penalties for challenging local power, particularly feudal landowners. The linear model continues technocracy and is unable to deal with issues of spiritual identity and economic well being in the periphery. However, development and technology does allow for mobility. This mobility is nearly unlimited for capital, partly limited by Westernization for ideas and serverly limited by nations for labor). This mobility is not the intimacy of the global village but the anomie of the global city. Local solutions while providing identity and survival are unable to deal with the need for mobility, with challenging patriarchy, fedualism and the tyranny of the collective.

What is needed then are new visions of development that contest both linear and cyclical visions of the future, creating the possibility of an other society. These must be eclectic drawing from many traditions, expand our view of knowledge, and our definition of what it means to be human. They must also find escapeways out of the straitjacket of the dominant paradigm of development.

Among other characteristics, a post-development vision of the future would have the following:

(1) The spiral (progress with history) as its key metaphor, thus some things return but there is a conception of an improvement of living conditions, however, these should not just be material, but intellectual and spiritual as well.
Instead of the linear language of progress, the softer term progressive might be better. While it would be difficult to maintain that we have had progress over the last few thousand years given the world poverty, we cna argue that certain technologies, cultures, economic policies are progressive, creating conditions for the possibility of a better–physical, mental and spiritual–life.

(2) Ecologically sensitive. We can no longer continue to export our problems, our waste, to others. We must find ways to internalize what we don’t like and thus reverse the thousand year strategy of exporting from centre to periphery, from male to women, adult to child, rich to poor, powerful to weak, conscious to unconscious. Ecologically sensitivity means that we need a new ethic of life that gives respect to plants, animals and the cultures of technology. This does not mean we should not have a hiearchy of living but it does mean that we must walk softly on the Earth, recognizing that, like us, is living.

(3) Gender Cooperation. Any vision of the future must find ways in which genders can cooperate. A world with women empowered would be a dramatic different world, where symptoms of the world crisis like overpopulation would not exist. This means finding ways to include women’s ways of knowing the world in science, polity and economy. It also means a post-patriarchical world where women can finally end the many centuries of abuse from all sorts of men and male structures at local and civilizational levels.

(4) Growth and Distribution. We need to implement theoretical models that have found ways to both create economic growth and to distribute this growth. These would be models that encourage incentives but provide for social welfare, and models that create fluid yet integrated forms of; that allow for mobility (for capital, ideas and labor) so that individuals and collectivities can more effectivley choose their paths into alternative futures; that create more wealth (and expand the definition of wealth beyond the merely economic) and ensure basic needs for all. Resources thus must be stewarded and expanded to include material and non-material. It is the use of resources not their overaccumulation or stagnation that would be a central principal.

(5) Epistemologically pluralistic. We need to end the last five hundred years of monoculture and imagine a world where many civilizations co-exist, where there is a grand dialog between cultures, where we live in a world of many possibilities, of many cultures including post-human cultures, such as plants, animals, angels and robots. We must find ways to include the many ways humans know the world: reason, authority, intuition, sense-inference and love, as well as the many ways in which humans learn: scentia (empirical understanding), techne (knoweldge that creates and expands on nature), praxis (action) and gnosis (self-knowledge).

(6) A Range of Organizational Structures. We need to rethink how we organize ourselves. We need to expand our thinking beyond mere vertical organizational structures or only participatory structures to collaborative and tensgrity structures that use tensions and dialectics to enhance creativity. Cooperative structures, for example, where there is efficient management and economic democracy, promise to solve the problems of worker alienation and loss of local control.

(7) Transcendental. We need to return the transcendental to social and economic theory but base it in the individual not the State or group (where it can be used for cultural imperialism). We need to include the idea of the transcendental, the mysterious force, presence in the universe but not in the territorial sense of the nation but in the individual and cosmic sense as the intimate force that gives meaning and is given meaning to.

(8) The individual in the context of collective, we need to envision worlds in which both are balanced, where both cooperate and are needed for each other. This would differn from both market and methodological individuals or State and collectivism. Both must be balanced, seeing, perhaps, the society as a family on a journey, then competing and maximizing individuals.

(9) A balance between agency and structure in the context of a vision of the future. We need to recognize what can be changed and what is more resistant to change, whether because of history or deep structures. Theories that priviledge agency, as in conspiracy theories (for good and bad) make structures (that is, actor and culture invariance) invisible. Structural theories while showing us how episteme, class, gender limit our futures do so at the expense of transformation. While massive social transformation is not always possible, there are periods in history, moments of chaos, where new forms of complexity are possible, where evolutionary struggle resolve themselves in new social, transcendental and individual arrangements. At these times what is needed is not one vision that ends the creative project but visions that promise still more visions.

These nine points provide the basis for a new vision of the next century. There are three organizing concepts in the seeds of the future mentioned above. The first is prama or dynamic balance: balance between regions, balance between the spiritual, material and the intellectual within ourselves and in society; balance between genders, between epistemological styles. And of course this balance must be ever transforming, chaotic. The second is neo-humanism. What is needed is a post-human model of society where rights are given to all, thus flattening centre-periphery distinctions, creating a world where the self is no longer located strictly in religion, territorial nation, or historical race but as part of a co-evolutionary mix of plants, animals, other life forms and technologies. The third is a progressive use of resources and capabilities, individual and group, of material, intellectual and spiritual potentials and their just distribution among each and every one of us.

Central to these points is an overarching concern to find new ways to resolve the classic tensions of the individual and collective; agency and structure; mind and body; science and culture; progress and equilibrium; the material and the spiritual; and ethical, critical and technical thought.

Having begun with a search for an interpretive community, and then deconstructed time and space showing the differences and similarities between and among cultures and individuals, this essay concluded with a will to an alternative model and vision of the future: a vision of dynamic balance for all of us. We close with these inspiring words from Shrii Sarkar, someone who has inspired my understandings of the future. “The body, mind, and self of every individual have the potential for limitless expansion and development. This potentiality has to be harnessed and brought to fruition.”?

An Introduction to Futures Studies Alternative Global and South Asian Futures (1994)

By Sohail Inayatullah

Introduction

The task of this article is to introduce futures studies methods using as data, alternative global and regional futures.  I will first touch upon the history of futures studies, compare futures studies to planning and policymaking, propose a typology of futures studies, present a range of methodologies and then conclude with scenarios for the futures of the world and South Asia.

In most cultures humans have had a deep interest in what will happen. Glossing over human history, we can identify three types of attempts to understand the future.

(1)  Astrology: In this view, life has patterns as evidenced in the stars.  The basic ontological position was: as above, as below; heaven and earth should match.  Not only could the world within be predicted but so could the world without.  By and large, astrology helped individuals avoid dangerous circumstances by providing an early warning system.  However, it helped to believe in the system since warnings and forecast as well as psychological analysis were of a general nature.

(2)  Prophecy: Prophecy assumes that certain individuals have access to deeper levels of mind, thus allowing them to see the future–to give glimpses of not only might be but more importantly, the seer as social change activist, of what can be. The world for the few, those with higher, or more complete mind, can be predicted. Unlike astrology, prophecy was not based on the relationships between stars or other criteria, rather it was visionary in nature, used to create new systems, new worlds, rather than predict specific events. Prophecy was often located in one individual or a group of individuals.

(3)  Forecasting:  While astrology and prophecy are given less credence by the moderns, it is forecasting that has become the technique par excellence of planners, economists and social scientists.  Behind this is a perspective that desires to make the world more stable, to control the future.  The assumption behind forecasting is that with more information particularly more timely information decisionmakers can make wiser decisions.  Having more information is especially important now since technology has broken with or cultural life; since the rate of change has increased; and since the world is controlled by powers that seem larger than us. Because of these factors, we need to determine what might be, the strategic future environment.

In recent times, futures studies has particularly grown. It has been modernised and adopted by corporate planners, policy institutes and government planning bureaus.  Futures studies has become linked with short and long range planning. But there are some real differences between futures studies and planning.

Planning and Futures

When compared to planning, in general, the futures approach is (1) longer term, from five to fifty instead of one to five (2) more concerned with creating the future instead of predicting the future, (3), committed to authentic alternative futures where each scenario is fundamentally different from the other while planning uses the language of alternatives but scenarios are often mere deviations from each other, (4) is less located in a particular bureaucracy, for example, in the Ministry of Economic Development; (5) committed to multiple interpretations of reality (role of unconscious, of national mythology, of the spiritual, for example, instead of only views of reality for which empirical data exists); (6) futures is more participatory attempting to bring in all types of stakeholders instead of only powerbrokers; (7) futures is more concerned with working together with different stakeholders so as to build legitimacy in a plan and the planning process, which is, if not more so, as important as the elegance of the plan itself; (8) is less instrumentalist, concerned with more than just profit or power; and, (9) while a technique, like planning, futures studies is also very much action oriented. It is as much an academic field as it is a social movement.

From the planning discourse, futures studies is merely one approach among many in creating a good plan. Planning can have many dimensions of which four are critical: Problem Orientation (challenges ahead), Goal Orientation (what we want, objectives), political orientation (to assuage the administration or leader) and futures orientation (long term). Futures studies is useful as long as it aids in planning for the future and not in making problematic the politics of planning and policymaking.

Policy Analysis, Planning and Futures Research

The growth of futures studies is also a result of the desire of government to find information that can aid in making better policy, specifically toward the long term and toward projects that might have second or third order affects.  For many, futures research is merely long term policy analysis or research.  But from our perspective, there are real and important distinctions between futures research and policy research/analysis. Some of these are: (1) While policy analysis is short range, futures studies is long range in its theoretical and action orientation; (2) Instead of choosing one policy, examining the range of futures is the focus of futures studies.  However, as with policy research, the goal is not only to create new organisational directions but clarify current management decisions.  While we may not know the future, we can determine what we want; (3) Futures studies is much more concerned with making basic assumptions problematic. Through what-if questions and scenarios, the intention is to move us out of the present and create the possibility for new futures. Policy analysis is concerned with analysing the viability of particular policies not calling the entire discussion or the framework of decisionmaking into question.  Like planning, policy analysis is more technical in its orientation; (4) Futures studies is more vision oriented than goal oriented (which is central to policy analysis and planning). Futures studies attempts to move from goals to visions.  Visions work by pulling people along. They give individuals and collectivities a sense of the possible. They also inspire the noble within each of us by calling individuals to sacrifice the short term for the longer term, for the greater good.  Finally, they help align individual goals with institutional goals. Moreover, while goals or objectives can be operationalized, visions cannot. An organisation or nation or civilisational will decline without a vision as Fred Polak as argued in his The Image of the Future.  A vision thus must be extra-rational, must include a leadership dimension, a spiritual dimension and a material dimension. This clearly is more than the traditional planner or policy analyst is willing to consider in his or her planning process. (5) The role of the policy analyst/planner and futurist in an organisation often differs. Within most planning exercises, plans are written so that the nation or organisation can appear modern, so it can give the appearance that the future is under control.  The futurist might want actual fundamental transformation while the planner might want to fulfil economic targets that the Leader or Chief Executive Officer has set out to reach. (6) While futures studies attempts to acknowledge the different ways individuals construct the world, policy analysis often takes a limited view of knowledge approaches. For example, individuals behave quite differently in learning situations, whether at conferences or boardroom meetings. Some are creative; some are critical; some are practical; and others are passive.  Different strategies mean different things to different people.  There are different knowing styles and different leadership styles.  To gain consensus in any policymaking process it is crucial to acknowledge these differences.  This is especially important when placed together in one room are those who want to get something done today; those who want create a new future; those who want to criticise past, present and future; and those who want to do nothing.  Good planning, policy analysis and futures research needs to acknowledge contributions from all these sorts of people.

In general, in planning and policy analysis, the future is often used to enhance the probability of achieving a certain policy, the task is to make the future less certain.  The future becomes an arena of conquest, time becomes the most recent dimension to colonise, to institutionalise and domesticate.  Futures research, however, intends to liberate time for strict technique, from instrumental rationality.  It asks what are the different ways one can “time” the world?  How, for example do different cultures, groups, organisations imagine time?

Of course policy analysis itself is a dynamic field.  For example, new models of policy development have attempted to go beyond muddling through (as needs or problems come up), rational-economic decisionmaking (material goals) and satisficing (do what you can given limitations), arguing primarily that these strategies are not useful during times of rapid change and dramatic crisis.  Muddling through, in particular, is not useful during times of rapid change since incremental policy change does not help the organisation or nation transform to meet dramatic new conditions.  The rational-economic model is useful at setting and achieving objectives but it does not into account extrarational efforts. It is overly dependent on quantitative factors, reinscribes self-interest and national self-interest (balance of powers). Satisficing, while getting the job done, does not ask was the job worth doing?  Interest in finding ways to include the possibility of discontinuous change, of forecasting trends before they emerge, has been a natural progression in the evolution of the policy sciences.  Futures studies fits well into the effort of finding better ways for government and business to incorporate the unknown within dicisionmaking.

Policy researchers and planners believe that the forecasts and visions of futurists are often not useable.  Among other suggestions, the following are given to make forecasts more useful.

(1)  The forecast must be credible, the policy must be achievable or if apparently unachievable, research into what shifts might increase the probability of the event occurring need to be determined.

(2)  Forecasts need to give adequate time for the desired      outcome to be achieved or the undesired event to be avoided–enough lead time is a crucial criteria for a useful forecast.

(3)  Feedback and monitoring need to be including in the policy impact cycle so as to be able to judge the accuracy of forecasts as well as to determine if organisational responses to emerging issue were effective.

(4)  The forecaster needs to be aware of the limitation of the methodology employed.

(5)  Forecasts must be clear and in language that the policymaker can understand.  The language should be accessible to the policymaker.

(6)  The structure of the forecast should be compatible with the politics and the culture of the organisation.

(7)  The forecast must create an image that will inspire and challenge the organisation or nation if it is to be of use to more than those in the Planning Office.

However, by and large, futures research is often less concerned with predicting the future than with attempting to envision novel ways of organising how decisions are reached and who participates in these decisions.  It does this by asking participants to envision their ideal organisational world, and then aid in creating strategies to realise that world.

The Politics of Forecasting

Moreover from a critical view, to suggest that policy futures statements must be clear to the policymaker is at some level, just banal.  Institutions create obscure language because that language serves particular interests.  It is the analysis of those interests (and the mechanisms which they employ to seek and maintain power) which becomes the vehicle for investigating what images of the future are possible and which likely to achieve reality.  In this sense, how to make better policy or more future oriented policy without investigating the political interests of certain policies is equal banal.  Organisations stay focused in the present as bureaucrats and others are served by the present structure.  Attempts to create new futures can undermine present power structures.  Administrators agree to consider the future only to gain new political alliances or to achieve modernity (gain funding or prestige)  but rarely to make structural or consciousness changes.

Furthermore to assume that better forecasts, or more information, will lead to better decision and policymaking forgets that policies are often made irrespective of the “facts.”  Often what is needed is a will to decisionmaking not a ingenious plan or forecast.  When decisions need to be made, a consultant, provides the legitimacy or the information to make that decision because of lack of legitimacy, courage or for local political reasons.  Thus futures studies and policy analysis needs to be located in a discourse that makes problematic information and its distribution and not in one that posits that information is neutral or that its circulation in institutional settings is apolitical.

To summarise the above positions, it is useful to envision policymaking, planning and futures process as having three dimensions or types.  The first is predictive, the second is cultural/interpretive and the third critical.[ii]

In the predictive, language is assumed to be neutral, that is, it does not participate in constituting the real, it merely describes reality serving as an invisible link between theory and data.  Prediction assumes that the universe is deterministic, that is, the future can be known.  By and large this view privileges experts (planner and policy analysts as well as futurists who forecast), economists and astrologers.  The future becomes a site of expertise and a place to colonise.  In general, the strategic discourse is most prevalent in this framework with information valued because it provides lead time and a range of responses to deal with the enemy (a competing nation or corporation).  Linear forecasting is the technique used most.  Scenarios are used more as minor deviations from the norm instead of alternative worldviews.

In the cultural, the goal is not prediction but insight.  Truth is considered relative with language and culture both intimately involved in creating the real.  Through comparison, through examining different national or gender or ethnic images of the future, we gain insight into the human condition.  This type of futures studies is less technical with mythology as important as mathematics.  Learning from each model–in the context of the search for universal narratives that can ensure basic human values–is the central mission for this epistemological approach.  While visions often occupy centre stage in this interpretive view, the role of structures is also important, whether class, gender, or other categories of social relations. Planning and policy analysis rarely practice an interpretive cultural form of goal setting or impact analysis.

In the critical, futures studies aims not at prediction or at comparison but seeks to make the units of analysis problematic.  We are concerned not with population forecasts but with how the category of population has become valorised in discourse, for example, why population instead of community or people, we might ask?  The role of the State and other forms of power in creating authoritative discourses is central to understanding how a particular future has become hegemonic.  Critical future studies asserts that the present is fragile, merely the victory of one particular discourse, way of knowing, over the other.  The goal of critical research is to disturb present power relations through making problematic our categories and evoking other places, scenarios of the future.  Through this distance, the present becomes less rigid, indeed, remarkable.  The spaces of reality loosen, the grip of neo-realism, of the bottom line, of the predictive approach widen, and the new is possible.  Language is not symbolic but constitutive of reality.  While structures are useful, they are seen not as universal but particular to history and episteme (the knowledge boundaries that frame our knowing).

Ideally, one should try and use all three types of futures studies.  If one makes a population forecast, for example, one should then ask how different civilisations approach the issue of population and finally one should deconstruct the idea of population itself, relating it, for example, to First World consumption patterns.  Empirical research then must be contextualised within the civilisation’s science of which it emerges and then historically deconstructed to show what the particular approach is missing and silencing.

In the first type of futures studies (most comfortable to planners and policy analysts), by and large techniques such as linear regression, multiple regression, factor analysis and econometrics are used.    All these assume that the future is based on the linearity of the past.  They all assume that the empirical world can be known and that the universe is fundamentally stable, with reality primarily sensate.     But given that specific events can throw off a forecast, futurists re-invented Delphi, or expert forecasting (done in many rounds so as to gain consensus and done anonymously so as to reduce the influence of a particular opinion maker).[iii]      To link events and trends, futurists developed cross-impact and policy impact analysis, to see how trends might change the probability of particular events. These are run numerous times.  Policy impact examines how the legislation of a new policy, special economic advantages for certain groups, for example, might impact other social or economic trends.

Values

While these models can be useful, they do not include values.  They also assume research is conducted in an isolated setting, that is, research is divorced from the institutional and epistemic framework all of us exist in.  Researcher disinterest becomes critical.  However, what questions one asks, how one asks them, as well as the larger issue of what one considers of value are much more important in understanding the future.  Moreover, as participatory action research informs us, subject and object, theory and data, should be interactive, dynamic. We cannot and should not remove ourselves from the research environment.

Chaos

As general agreement has been reached that the empirical is not stable, chaos theory has become paramount as an attempt to manage disorder as well. The goal is to create a stable world, with the hope to transform social structures by a precise effort, by acting upon a few attractors, a few variables. Even though chaos theory appears to be a break from traditional social sciences, in fact, chaos is a version of ordered empiricism. Chaos has become important not because its metaphors make more intuitive sense or because it validates classic myths, Siva dancing, for example, but because it can be used as a forecasting tool to predict the future.[iv]

Thus, most forecasting remains technically rich not meaning rich. It continues the vision of instrumental rationality, the metaphors of modernity, of the West but not only the West as provider of wealth, but also as owner of time itself.

Using the cultural framework, to expand our vision of how we can think about the future, we need to try some other avenues.  To begin with, if we assume that how we think can influence how we act, then we need to investigate what our basic concepts of space, time, self and value are.

Guiding Metaphors of the Future

One way to open up the future, to investigate preferred and possible futures is to examine the metaphors cultures and individuals use to describe the future.  In this method, one begins with conventional Western (because they are “universal”) metaphors of individual choice and rationality.

The first image is that of the dice.  It represents randomness but misses the role of the transcendental. The second is the river leading to a fork.  It represents choice but misses the role of the group in making decisions. The third image represents the ocean. It is unbounded but misses the role of history, deep social structures, and direction. The fourth image is that of a rapid emersed with dangerous rocks.  It represents the need for information and rapid decisionmaking.  It does not provide for guidance from others: leadership, family, or God. Less tied to Western images, other useful metaphors (from Fiji, the Philippines, India. among other sites) include the coconut tree (hard work to gain rewards); coconut (useful in many ways and having many purposes); onion (layers of reality with the truth invisible); snakes and ladders game (life’s ups and downs are based on chance, the capitalist vision); and being a passenger in a car where the driver is blind (sense of helplessness).

What is important in this method is to find relevant metaphors based on the policy community’s own cultural and historical experience and use these metaphors to construct an authentic vision of desirable and dystopic futures.

Emerging Issues Analysis

While metaphors help create an indigenous futures, they are less useful in predicting what might be ahead and in disturbing conventional views of what is likely.  Most futures researchers use trend analysis to determine what issues are about to become public.  However, prior to becoming a trend, is it possible to identify a nascent issue, an emerging issue?  According to James Dator,[v] emerging issues are those that have a low probability of occurring but if they emerge, will have a dramatic impact on society.  However, since these issues are often undeveloped, Dator argues that one indicator of knowing that an issue is really an emerging issue instead of a trend or problem, is that it should appear ridiculous.  Issues should thus be disturbing, provocative, forcing one to change how one thinks, especially in challenging assumptions about the nature of the future.  Besides searching for emerging issues among those individuals and groups outside of conventional knowledge boundaries (the periphery, for example), to identify emerging issues it is first important to scan the available literature.

Scanning

In scanning one has to digest vast amounts of literature and be able to determine what is within the paradigm, and what is outside, and what can transform the paradigm.  Where are the leakages? What doesn’t it make sense?  Issues that straddle these boundaries, that are outside conventional categories often have the potential of becoming emerging issues.  Some examples of emerging issues are:  Rights of Robots; genetic engineering ending sexual reproduction rights; denial of sovereignty to certain nations; a new UN (house of nations, house of NGOs, direct citizen election, house of world corporations and a world militia); the end of capitalism. All these issue are generally seen as unlikely but if they occur they will have a dramatic impact on society.  But merely being unlikely or having a high impact are not sufficient conditions, there also must be seeds, drivers, reasons as to why one thinks the issue is emerging.  Emerging issues analysis is different from fantasy production, it is searching for small ripples that might one day become grand waves, tsunamis.

What-if Questions

Equally useful in breaking out of conventional categories are “What-if” Questions.  These questions ask one to develop implications of an issue that most would currently think is unlikely or absurd.  It is useful that there is some element of possibility for the issue especially if one is concerned in its predictive value.  Even so, the most useful issues are those that create new categories of thought.  For example, what-if Genetic engineering developments led to the banning of sexual reproduction?   What-if South Africa became a world economic and cultural centre? What-if Pakistan became a world intellectual centre? But more important then the actual possibility of becoming a centre is that it begins to call into question the universality of the West as the educational base for the rest of the world. In addition, the implications of this possible event force one to examine issues of culture, travel, and self-understanding.  They also force one to think of alternatives to traditional models of education.  Should Pakistan be a centre in all fields or only in Islamic education, for example?

Age-Cohort and Age Grade Analysis

Equally useful in forecasting the near term future is age-cohort analysis.  This method begins to touch upon the idea that the future is cyclical, not linear, that is, more like a pendulum, than a race track or a highway with offshoots.  One asks what are the main age grades that constitute a business, organisation or nation?  How might institutions change as a particular age group matures and gains status and power?  How will the volume and type of crime change as a group matures. Like class, age grades serve as an organising concept.  For example, we know that Japanese and Western populations are mostly aging while third world populations are much younger.  By 2050 some estimate that less than 10% will be “white” in the world.  Clearly that will have an influence on world culture, politics. Will current Western institutions continue their domination?  Has the rest of the world internalised their categories?

Layered Causal Analysis

However, the methods above do not adequately explore the levels or layers of an issue.  Layered causal analysis asserts that how you frame problem changes the policy solution and the actors responsible for creating transformation.  Borrowing from the work of Rick Slaughter[vi], we argue that futures studies should be seen wholistically and not just at the level of trends.

The first level is the Litany (trends, problems, often exaggerated, often used for political purposes) usually presented by the news media. In the case of global politics it might be news on the Failure of UN  (the UN’s financial problems and its failures in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda).  Events, issues and trends are not connected and appear discontinuous. The result is often either a feeling of helplessness (what can I do?) or apathy (nothing can be done!) or projected action (why don’t they do something about it?).

The second level is concerned with social causes, including economic, cultural, political factors (and short term historical).  It is usually articulated by policy institutes and published as op-ed pieces or in not-quite academic journals.  Causes in the UN example include lack of supranational authority; no united military, and the perspective that UN is only as good as its member nations.  The solutions that results from this level of analysis are often those that call for more funding or more power.  In this case, the UN needs more money and power. Often, deeper historical reasons such as the creation of the UN by the victors of WW II are often articulated. If one is fortunate then the precipitating action is sometimes analysed.  At this stage, taking a critical view one could explore how different discourses (the economic, the social, the cultural) do more than cause the issue but constitute it, that the discourse we use to understand is complicit in our framing of the issue.  This adds a horizontal dimension to our layered analysis.

The third level is deeper concerned with structure and the discourse/cosmology that supports and legitimates it.  The task is to find deeper social, linguistic, cultural structures that are actor-invariant, such as centre-periphery relations and the anarchic inter-state system.  The analysis of current UN problems shifts to not the unequal structure of power between UN member states but to the fact that eligibility for membership in the UN is based on acquiring national status. An NGO, an individual, a culture cannot join the National Assembly or the Security Council.   The solution that emerges from this level of analysis is to rethink the values and the structure of the UN, to revision it. One could at this level, develop a horizontal discursive dimension investigating how different paradigms or worldview would frame the problem or issue. How would a pre-modern world approach the issue of global governance (consensus, for example)? How might a post-modern?

The fourth layer of analysis is at the level of metaphor or myth.  These are the deep stories, the collective archetypes, the unconscious dimensions of the problem or the paradoxes.  In the case of the UN, it is the issue of control vs. freedom, of the role of individual and collective, of family and self, of the overall governance of evolution, of humanity’s place on the Earth. Are we meant to be separate races and nations (as ordained by the myths of the Western religions) or is a united humanity (as Hopis and others have prophesied).

Layered causal analysis asks us to go beyond conventional framings of issues.  However, it does not privilege a particular level.  Moving up and down layers, and horizontally across discourses and worldviews, increasing the richness of the analysis.  In addition, what often results are differences that can be easily captures in alternative scenarios.

Grand Theories of Social Change

This dimension begins to touch upon the grander issues of social change.  Among the most useful approaches to futures studies are grand theories of social change. Of interest is how macrohistorians from different civilisations have attempted to answer the question: what changes? what is constant? As well as questions that ask if the drivers of change are internal or external to the system? And, what are the stages of change? What is the shape of history? Is it cyclical or linear or a combination of both?[vii] Of particular use are the following writers.[viii]

Pitirim Sorokin, for example, believes we are in-between historical stages and about to enter an integrated phase of human history where both the spiritual and material co-exist.

From Ibn Khaldun we are reminded that over four generations power declines. Those in power lose the sense of unity they gained from the struggle to enter into leadership positions. Over time, leadership degenerates and new groups, often in the periphery make a claim to power.

From P.R. Sarkar we are reminded that there are four types of power: worker’s, military, intellectual and economic. Each power represents different types of social classes and stages in each history. From a worker’s era, follows a martial, and then an intellectual, concluding with a capitalist. Each era has a rise and fall. Each class exploits the others which leads to its downfall. During the capitalist era, exploitation is at its worse. This eventually leads to a worker’s revolution or evolution followed once again by a centralisation of power in military elites.  But more than power, these phases represent our “collective psychology” the dominant mental wave (to use non-empiricist language).

For Toynbee, the most important variable is how the creative minority responds to civilisational challenges. Are they met? Moreover, are we about to re-enter a world State or a world church or is there some other global configuration of power ahead.

From Comte we are lead to believe that modernity is the final stage in history. That science will solve all the problems, ideology is a premodern idea that hinders the creation of a good society.

Spencer as well confirms this and believes that it is world corporations that will bring on the next ladder of human evolution.

And finally from Marx, what is important is how new technologies change social and power relationships.  Clearly these grand thinkers change the locus of discussion, away from trend analysis or five year plans to grand civilisational patterns. The project is not to determine if there work is  empirically true but to ask how they can lead us in the right direction for social research.

The Politics of Time

As we can see forecasting has political and value oriented dimensions, particularly in terms of the politics of time.  What images are valorised? Who owns it?  How it circulates in society?  Central to cultural colonisation is adopting the time of another culture?  Different visions of time lead to alternative types of society.  Classical Hindu thought, for example, is focused on billion year cycles. Within this model, society degenerates from a golden era to an iron age. At this juncture, there is spiritual leader who revitalises society.  Classical Chinese time is focused on the degeneration of the Tao and its regeneration through the sage-king.

Much of current debates is how about the ownership of visual space and temporal space.  One important futures method is to ask how different individuals and cultures “time” the world.  For example, women’s time is often seasonal and lunar. Bureaucratic time is based on the ability to make others wait. Educational time is divided into a nine month and three month pattern. There is also the stages of life time: from birth to death, with in-between stages devoted to the accumulation of knowledge, wealth, enlightenment, or pleasure depending on one’s cultural location. For example, the Indian vision of student, householder, social service, and  sanyassi is considerably richer than the vision of study, work and die or retire in Florida that represents mainstream American culture.

In Corporate time, the higher the one is in an organisation, the grander the vision of time. For example, the CEO is responsible for 25-50 years; the VP for 25 years, the branch president for the next year; the branch manager for monthly quotas, the plant or office manager for weekly projects, the clerk for daily activities and the secretary for hour to hour projects.  The level of activity is also more precise the lower one goes down in the pay scale.  Many misunderstandings occur among individuals and groups when they have different temporal expectations of each other.  At the global political level, power is about convincing the other to adopt one’s notions of time, whether this is AD or BC or GMT. Time then is not universal but largely particular.  Futures research attempts to investigate different visions of time, asking how they are constructed and politicised and what is the organisation’s or group’s preferred view of time.

Futures and Deconstruction

Continuing to make the future less universal are techniques drawn from poststructuralism. As alluded to earlier, the task in critical futures studies is to make the universal particular, show that it has come about for fragile political reasons, merely the victory of one discourse over another, not a Platonic universal.  To do that one needs discursive genealogies which attempt to show the discontinuities in a history of an idea, social formation or value. Through genealogy and deconstruction, the future that once seemed impenetrable is now shown to be one among many. As such it is replaceable by other discourses.  Deconstruction then becomes a method of unpacking a text (broadly defined) and showing  the discourses that inhabit it. Genealogy historically traces how a particular discourse has become dominant at the expense of other discourses. The shape and type of future (instrumental vs. emancipatory for example) is often different in each type of discourse.

Scenarios

To help in this process, scenarios are the favourite tool in futures studies.  For some they help predict the future. For others, the clarify alternatives. For us, scenarios are useful in that they give us distance from the present, allowing the present to become remarkable, problematic.  They thus open up the present and allow the creation of alternative futures.  Genealogy and deconstruction not only open up the future and present, they also open up the past, showing history to be interpretation. The task then is to create alternative histories, to show histories that did not come about, that could have come about if a certain factor had changed.

Scenarios also have an important visionary task, allowing us to gain insight into what people want the future to be like–the desired future. These are important in that instead of merely forecasting the future, individuals create the future.

Often scenarios have four dimensions. The first is the Status-Quo. This assumes that the present will continue into the future. More of the same, then.  The second is the Collapse scenario.  The results when the system cannot sustain continued growth, when the contradictions of the first model lead to internal collapse.  The third scenario is a Return or Steady State.  This is a return to some previous time, either imagined or real.  It is often framed as a less industrial, quieter, slower, and less populated society–the good old days, if you will.  The fourth scenario is Transformation, or fundamental change.  This can be spiritual, technological, or political and economic.

For Third World nations, in contrast to the First World, Continued growth usually means a dual society, where one part grows and the other stagnates. Collapse refers to either natural disasters, or wars with neighbouring nations, or from too quick modernisation.  Ultimately, the collapse scenario is the failure of nation-building.  The Return scenario means  going back to a simpler village, communitarian, religious, life-style, often before technocracy and imperialism destroyed the local. Transformation means true sovereignty or nationhood, joining the world’s wealthy on one’s own terms.

But we can also devise scenarios with different assumptions. For example, we can create scenarios of world politics based on alternative structures of power. The first would be a unipolar world, a continuation of the present.  The second would be a collapse of the inter-state system, leading to anarchy within States and between states. The third would be the creation of a multi-polar system, with numerous hegemons, such as the US, Europe, Japan, China, India, Turkey or Indonesia.  A corollary would be a return to a bio-polar world but with different actors.  A fourth would be a world government structure.  Policies would be created at the global level while implementation would be local.

We can choose other drivers as well. In the following scenarios for South Asia we look at levels of integration, at the tension between the local, regional and global.

(1) South Asia becomes an integrated regional economy.  Privatization leads to a flourishing of corporate and small scale capitalism.  This bourgois revolution weakens the power of the feudal class.  The Other ceases to be less frightful as friendship between NGOs and businesses develop.  NGOs continue to work on softening the contradictions of export-led growth. (2)    South Asia continues wasting wealth on military expenditures. Politics continues to become criminalized.  Not only Kashmir but Sindh and Kalistan vie for independence.  The nation-state project totally breaks down. Poverty and extremism remain.

(3)  Power and economy move to the village throughout South Asia.  Traditional models of problem-solving, of health, of argiculture begin to flourish.  The feudal class becomes more enlightened in its policies towards the landless, but still remains in power.

There are thus a range of ways in which one can construct scenarios. Besides having clarity in consistency of actors, one should ensure that contradictions within scenarios are not left out. Scenarios are not meant to be perfect places but possible places.

Scenarios should not only focus on nations but on individuals, communities and peoples associations. Using the ideas of layers of reality, what is missing are the role of ideas, of the Earth itself, of women, of alternative ways of seeing the world, of non-statist nominations of reality.  Scenarios then should not only find alternative routes out of the present, they need to configure the present differently, using radically foreign and unfamiliar notions of the future.  This is what makes future research different from routine social science or policy research.  The task is not only, for example, to imagine alternative futures for the United Nations but rethink governance, power and structure, to call into question current notions of how we organise our social and political life.

From this perspective we can imagine an alternative model that is (1) Sensitive to the role of the transcendental (in terms of inspiration and in providing a direction); (2) Includes a range of economic organisations (coops, small businesses, and large state/private run efforts); (3) is committed to a layered theory of representation, a third world vision of democracy, that has vertical (authority) and horizontal (participatory) elements; (4) has a different balance between the individual and group; (5) creates a culture that locates the environment as nested within human consciousness; and (6) attempts to balance spiritual and material factors believing both are basic factors in creating a good society including as social change drivers.

To conclude, futures research should then only ask what is missing from a particular analysis and it should–through metaphors, emerging issues analysis, layered causal analysis, deconstruction and genealogy–create the possibility of alternative worlds.

Notes

[i].   Dr. Sohail Inayatullah, The Communication Centre, Queensland University of Technology.

[ii].  For an elaboration of this theme, see Sohail Inayatullah, “Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Future,” Futures (March 1990) and Richard Slaughter, Recovering the Future (Clayton, Australia, Monash, 1985). For the more conservative position, see Roy Amara, “The Futures Field,” The Futurist (February, April and June 1981).

[iii]. For an excellent delphi study (in the South-East Asian context), including its limitations, see Pacita Habana article “Building Scenarios for Education in South-East Asia,” Futures (Vol. 25, Number 9, 1993).

[iv].  For more on this see, Mika Mannermaa, Sohail Inayatullah, and Rick Slaughter, eds. Chaos and Coherence in Our Uncommon Futures, Turku, Finland Society for Futures Research, 1994.

[v].   Jim Dator, Emerging Issues Analysis in the Hawaii Judiciary. Report published by the Hawaii Judiciary, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1980.

[vi].  Richard Slaughter, “Probing Beneath the Surface,” Futures (October 1989), p. 454.

[vii]. Sohail Inayatullah, “From Whom am I to When Am I: Framing the Shape and Time of the Future,” Futures (April 1993).

[viii]. See, for example, Johan Galtung and Sohail Inayatullah, Macrohistory and Macrohistorians. Forthcoming, 1995.

Evolution and Complexity (1994)

Sohail Inayatullah

Originally published as a review “Life, the Universe and Emergence,” Futures (August 1994), 683-696.

EVOLUTION AND COMPLEXITY

Biochemist and former deputy editor of New Scientist and Research News Editor of Science Roger Lewin gives a tour of theories of complexity based on interviews with leading exponents of this new theory of everything.  Primarily focused on biological and evolutionary theories, Lewin interviews such leading scientists as theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman, biologist James Lovelock, Artificial Life expert Chris Langton, sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson, geologist Stephan Jay Gould, biologist Brian Godwin, philosopher Daniel Dennett, physicist Murray Gell-Mann, mathematician Norman Packard, and ecologist Tom Ray.

Complexity theory claims to resolve the classic conflict between vitalists who believe evolution is externally caused by spirit or other vital forces and mechanists who believe evolution is bottom up based with survival of the fittest or adaption as the key variable.  In contrast, complexity theory argues that evolution occurs through emergence. New variables naturally develop over time. Organisms, individuals and societies self-organize, that is, they do not need an outside force to guide their growth.  Thus from simple conditions emerge complex conditions.

Complexity takes a dynamic view of life. Indeed, dynamism comes from life itself.  “Biological systems are dynamical, not easily predicted, and are creative in many ways,” argues Chris Langton.[i] “In the old equilibrium worldview, ideas about change were dominated by the action-reaction formula. It was a clockwork world, ultimately predictable in boring ways,” says Langton.[ii]  While boring, such predictability did allow humans to land on the moon.  If these where non-linear systems, Lewin warns us, we would clearly be still on the Earth unable to leave it since our trajectories could not be predicted.

But this does not mean that complexity throws us in a world where prediction is impossible? Not at all. Rather, since all complex systems are based on simple origins, or all simple systems generate complex patters, we can understand these deep patterns and thus better understand biological, environmental and even social change.  While this is obvious to physicists, it is not so obvious to biologists. The thrust of Complexity is a dialogue with the leaders in the field on how complexity theory is changing our understanding of traditional evolutionary theory.

Up to now, through computer modeling complexity theorists have managed to show that emergence can naturally occur, that from a few simple species, a host of evolutionary possibilities can occur.  But for those biologists less enthused with computer simulation, Darwin still reigns supreme.

While some believe that Complexity theory moves towards a theory of everything, others are rightfully more cautious since within different systems–from cellular automata to Gaia itself–there might be different types of complex relationships.

While Lewin attempts to remain objective, it is clear that the one variable that scientists fear is the mystical–that is, an external source that is fuzzy, that cannot be operationalized.  And this many see is the problem with vitalism, the belief that an elan vital somehow plays a role in our biological and social development. The response to this position has been reductionism, as per the work of ant theorist and sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson, who believe that genetic causes are primary in understanding human behavior.

Complexity theory, however, borrows more from ecological theory and the view of the interrelatedness of life as developed by James Lovelock.  The view, for example, that there are links between tropical forests and climate. “No rain, no trees, but equally, no trees, no rain,” argues Lovelock.[iii]  It is this interrelated view that Norman Packard speaks to.  When asked what the implications of complexity theory would be, he answers: “We would see the world as having more unity.”[iv]

Complexity theory attempts to make links between evolutionary systems and social systems as well, albeit in a simplistic way.  Nonetheless they are instructive.  It primarily supports the view like species, societies rise and fall.  There are periods of stasis and then periods of rapid change, or punctuated equilibrium.  In reference to the fall of the Soviet Union, Chris Langton tells us to expect a period of global instability.  “You can see these two species coexisting in a long period of stability; then on of the them drops out and all hell breaks loose. Tremendous instability.  That’s the Soviet Union.”[v] He adds, “I am no fan of the Cold War, but my bet is that we’re going to see a long of instability in the real world now that it’s over.”[vi]   Moreover, what happened to the Soviet Union will happen to liberal capitalism as well, unless of course, one believes that different organizing principles are at work or that the US and USSR were different species.

Complexity theory’s great contribution is showing that the Second Law of Thermodynamics is only part of the story, since some systems tend toward order, not disorder. Within nature, then, there is a deep order. But this order is not caused by the hand of God, complexity theorists are quick to point out.   For physicists this is quite natural but for biologists self-organization still appears mystical, a return to pre-Darwinian theories.

But even as Complexity theory develops its new science, modern molecular biology might make Complexity theory useless, since they believe that with the ability to manipulate and analyze DNA, the process of evolution will be finally completely understood.  In Lewin’s words: “Simply read the messages in the genes, and all would be revealed. …No nod in the direction of the complexities of development. No indication that population biology may play a role in the fate of a species. No suggestion that species are part of ecosystems, which themselves are components of evolutionary history. And, of course, nothing at all about the immanent creativity of dynamical systems.”[vii] Through genetic research our history will be available to us, the causes of the rise and fall of nations will be obvious, right there in our genetic structure.  But while we wait for these remarkable developments in genetics, complexity theorists believe that it is the science of complexity that will lay bare history and the Mind of God. Physicist Heinz Pagels writes: “I am convinced that the nations and people who master the new science of Complexity will become the economic, cultural and political superpowers of the next century.”[viii] Quite a claim and a clear indication that science is not merely about research but about power and control, about comparative advantage.

These grand claims have been made before by Catastrophe theory, developed by Rene Thom, which is now no longer seriously investigated, and by chaos theorists.  Chaos, for complexity theorists, is focused on order and disorder and merely one dimension of complexity since Chaos theory does not explain the mechanisms of change.  Complexity theory is concerned with systems that produce order. However, it is similar to chaos in that both are concerned with non-linear systems, both focus on interrelatedness, both seek for an underlying pattern to all physical and social phenomena.  But the key to understanding Complexity theory is emergence.  Lewin writes, “For an ecosystem, the interaction of species within the community might confer a degree of stability on it; for instance, a resistance to the ravages of a hurricane, or invasion by an alien species. Stability in this context would be an emergent property.”[ix] That is, it arises naturally from the conditions present.  It is not there in the realm of ideas nor can it be merely understood from a part thereof (the platonic and aristotelian positions), rather it emerges.  This is true for economic systems, biological systems, cultural systems, and so forth.  For example, according to physicist Gell-Mann, “In biological evolution, experience of the past is compressed in the genetic message encoded in DNA … in the case of human societies, the schemata are institutions, customs, traditions, and myths.”[x]  Complex systems thus learn from their environment, coding this information in different ways.

Is there Progress?

Complex systems exhibit organizing factors, structures in which the system is drawn to. In cultural evolution these might be bands, tribes, states, and empires, and now nation-states.  Within this model, structures would move towards these various . Sociality is also an attractor, for humans as well as insects. But for ants, for example, the biological attractor of sociality is not dynamic as it is for humans, which have a range of social structures (tribe to nations).    History then has patterns.  But then is it purposeful, is there progress?

For complexity theorists, more complex, more ordered does not necessarily mean the same thing, however.  A complex system might be more likely to collapse, for example. A watch is more complex than a sun dial but less likely to break down. This then counters the Spencerian and Darwinian of the great chain of being, from the simplist to the most complex with humans at the head.  The problem becomes how to measure complexity, by the number of vertebral column among species, perhaps? By this measure, according to biologist Dan McShea, there has been no change at all.[xi]

Are there then better measures of complexity? There is some agreement in the field that computational ability is a measure of complexity.  “There has been a general increase in information processing over the last 550 million years, and particularly in the last 150 million years.”[xii]  Computational ability, where survival is contested, gives the species an advantage.  But then isn’t this progress? Those societies that have a higher intelligence, more information, are not they higher up on the chain of evolution, one could ask.  Normam Packard sidesteps this return of social Darwinism by arguing that “people don’t believe it for sociological, not scientific, reasons. …I don’t impute a value judgement to computational superiority.”[xiii]

But for others, progress is a noxious idea that is not operationalizable and thus not testable.  Progress is noxious not only in the sense of a hierarchy of societies but also in the sense of a hierarchy of species.  For current biologists, the idea of progress brings back racism, the 19th century Western view of life.  At the same time, Lewin argues that “just because a scientific idea is imported into social values–however improperly used–doesn’t invalidate the original idea.”[xiv]

Thus if computational ability does mean progress than Complexity theory might be returning the idea of progress in Western society and science. Indeed, Spencer is believed to be a proponent of Complexity theory. While Spencer had an internal theory of complexity, that is, emergence, he was missing the external factors, such as natural selection, which provide the external variable.  In this sense, Complexity theory unites both Spencer and Darwin, Lewin argues. “The pure Spencerian view of the world, therefore, is that increased complexity is an inevitable manifestation of the system and is driven by the internal dynamics of complex systems: heterogeneity from homogeneity, order out of chaos.”[xv]   This, of course, is the classical position, that history is linear and rational and progressive. It is Man who has the ability to transform nature.  Lewin continues.  “The pure Darwinian view is that complexity is built solely by natural selection, a blind, non-directional force; and there is no inevitable rise in complexity.”[xvi]  Natural selection removes teleology from the scheme of history. However, while biologists may cling to this perspective, most have adopted a neo-Darwinian view, merging Spencer and Darwin.  Complexity theory takes a third approach, however.  According to Lewin, “the new science of Complexity combines elements of both: internal and external forces apply, and increased complexity is to be exacted as a fundamental property of complex dynamical systems.”[xvii]  Through natural selection, adaption and evolution occur. Computational ability increases as species become more complex.  Consciousness then becomes a bottom-emergent phenomena.

This, of course, should be obvious is good dialectical materialism as well.  As Marx reminded us in his laws of dialectics, the complex arises out of the simple.  Consciousness emerges from the material factors of history. There is no God arranging the world nor does consciousness exist hidden in evolution. It is an emergent property.

But from the perspective of Complexity theory, while derived from matter, Consciousness is not central.  Complexity theory does not argue for a brain-centric view of history.  There are degrees of consciousness, of computational ability. In Norman Packard’s words. “The way I see the science is that it’s concerned with information processing throughout the entire biosphere; information processing is central to the way the biosphere evolves and operates. Consciousness is just one part of that larger puzzle, and it’s important to remember that.  Most studies of consciousness focus just on the phenomenon itself, and that’s solipsistic.”[xviii] What then is the unique contribution of Complexity to the study of Consciousness. Again according to Packard, “it is to place consciousness into the larger puzzle of information processing in the biosphere.”[xix]

Gaia:

But what of the planet itself, isn’t it conscious as some proponents of the Gaian theory argue? According to James Lovelock,  the earth itself is a dynamic, self-regulating complex mechanism.  To attempt to prove this Lovelock invented computer models such as Daisyworld which show that there are homeostatic regulating principles at work in the Earth’s evolution–that is that Life, or the biosphere, regulates or maintains the climate and the atmospheric composition at an optimum for itself.”[xx]  The stability of the system, however, does not emerge from Consciousness or some other teleological principle but from the system itself, from its ability to adapt and survive.

While most believe Gaia to be a stable system, from Complexity theory, we learn that given certain conditions (changes in solar radiation for example) there are periods of rapid change, of punctuated equilibrium.  This is in contrast to conventional evolutionary theory which would predict gradual change. In this sense Gaia while its maintain Life at the global level, at the level of particular species, there is stasis and rapid change.  There is dynamic change.  But most important this change is emergent not based on a goddess but emergent properties which act as though they are moving towards fitness or survival.

But then is emergence always the same or are there an infinite number of species and societal possibilities? Simon Conway Morris asks what if the Cambrian explosion  (the beginning of complexity after three billion years of simplicity in which in a matter of a few millions years life exploded on the scene) was rerun? How would creatures look like this time around. According to Morris, the same development would occur and herbivores, carnivores and insectivores would result.[xxi]  But they would not look anything we have experienced.  In this view, our present world is simply one of an infinite number of possible worlds.  For others such as Brian Godwin, the mechanics of embryological development are constrained.[xxii]  Writes Lewin, ” In the language of complex dynamical systems, the space of morphological possibilities is thinly populated by C.”[xxiii] There are only certain possibilities. There are not an infinite range of C.  In this sense if one reran the Cambrian explosion, the world today would not look that different. In this sense there are not an infinite number of possible pasts or possible futures. These are constrained by C, by structures.

THE GRAND UNIFICATION AND THE SEARCH FOR THE NEW LAW

Stuart Kauffman goes far more into scientific and mathematical detail than Lewin’s story. The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution is Stuart Kauffman’s life work; a work he hopes will unify self-organization with Darwinian evolutionary theory.  It is the search for the new second law of thermodynamics, one that takes into account the ability of life to self-organize and now move towards entropy. “It is the search for a general law of pattern formation in non-equilibrium systems throughout the universe.”[xxiv] It is the belief that woven into the very fabric of nature is a deep undeniable creative order.  It is a journey  for Kauffman that is based on love, on the Einsteinian view of science–“that science was a search for the secrets of the Old One.”[xxv]  Indeed, as N. Katherine Hayles her nearly brilliant Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science argues we cannot separate the metaphysics of scientists from their physics.[xxvi]  In this sense both complexity and chaos continue classical physics as the world remains orderly, even chaos now has deep patterns.  It remains a fundamental classical and religious view of the world, a world where God has given us the secrets, we just need to go explore. And at every step of the way, we are given directions. Yet this God is no longer active, he is the blind watchman. Truth is found through connections, serendipity, but the task remains the same, to discover the beauty and elegance of the universe.

Written very much for the scientist and not for the layman, still Kauffman does his best to be communicable by providing succinct intelligible summaries of chapters. In addition, The Origin of Order does attempt to find links to the social and policy sciences.  His goal is simple. “Simple and complex systems can exhibit powerful self-organization. Such spontaneous order is available to natural selection and random drift for the further selective crafting of well-wrought designs or the stumbling fortuity of historical accident.”[xxvii]  And yet self-organization has not yet been incorporated into evolutionary theory. For Kauffman, self-organization is the flip side of natural selection.

But while Kauffman is ever the rigorous scientist, as the case with other complexity theorists who are constantly on the search for new metaphors, for allies in other fields, for lessons learned from other disciplines, he does not suffer from scientism.  Nor he is afraid of sounding mystical.  Indeed the task for his book is to answer the question, “what are the sources of the overwhelming and beautiful order which graces the living world?” [xxviii] Kauffman believes that if his autocatalytic set story is true then he would have a plausible explanation of life.  Life could have emerged through self-organization, life was not an accident.  But it is the aesthetics of it that is the theoretical clincher. Writes Mitchell Waldrop, “The whole story was just too beautiful, Kauffman felt. It had to be true.”[xxix]

But Kauffman is not here to bury Darwin merely to expand upon him, to include the rise of spontaneous order within biological theory.  To do so Kauffman attempts to delineate the sources of order that evolution has to work with, to show how “self-ordered properties, permit, enable, and limit the efficacy of natural selection.”[xxx]

But while the individual scientist may have a moment of awe, theories that evoke non-material factors governing evolution remain inappropriate ala Rupert Sheldrake[xxxi] who postulates morphogenic fields or P.R. Sarkar[xxxii] who believes that our larger Mind, or Cosmic Mind plays almost a Lamarckian role, as species desire themselves into new forms.  Less Sheldrake, more Sarkar, in either case, these theories are problematic not only because they are extra paradigmatic but because they are not testable, that is, operationalizable.  Moreover these theories imply order and structure, something Darwinists cannot understand.  The rise of Darwin has been the rise of a view of organisms as ultimately accidental and historically contingent. More for Sheldrake than Sarkar, while there is emergence, it is Consciousness that is still the key–It is consciousness that communicates not the social organization of species.

The  way out for traditional scientists has been time.  Anything is possible, that is, in terms of questions of the origin of life, if we have two billion years. In traditional theory, time is then the hero, that allows anything to happen.  This allows the variable Consciousness to be controlled for.    Self-organization, while being holistic, does not sponsor non-material approaches to evolution, but it does search for universal laws.  Complex systems are selected because they harbor behavior which is the most flexible and adaptable.  Poised between the boundary of chaos and order, they can best respond to changes in the environment.  Kauffman puts this in the form of a hypothesis, and hopefully for complexity theorists, a law:  “Living systems exist in the solid regime near the edge of chaos, and natural selection achieves and sustains such a poised state.”[xxxiii]  In contrast, writes Kauffman, “systems deep in either the ordered regime or in the chaotic regime are probably neither capable of complex behavior nor highly evolvable.”[xxxiv]  In the ordered regime, mutations cause only slight changes. Conversely in the chaotic regime, slight changes cause dramatic changes in behavior.  It is on the edge of chaos that evolution then is possible.

But for this to happen, organisms at the edge of chaos, they must “Know their worlds. Whether we consider E. coli swimming upstream in a glucose gradient … or a hawk diving to catch a chick, organisms sense, classify, and act up their worlds.”[xxxv]  But how do they know their worlds.  Here Kauffman takes an expanded definition of the word, classify. “The capacity to know a world requires that sufficiently similar states of that world be able to be classified as ‘the same.'”[xxxvi] It is this definition that allows Kauffman to generalize his argument to Boolean networks and even business firms. E. Coli it knows its world because a wealth of molecular signals pass between a bacterium and its environment.  In this, Kauffman and other complexity theorists are looking at systems and structures, attempting to find similar classification schemes, much as Parsons has done for sociology.  We see this clearly in his jump from bacteria to the economic sphere. Just as

a colony of E. coli integrates its behavior … the organisms of a stable ecosystem for a functional whole.. The niches occupied by each organism jointly add up to a meshwork in which all fundamental requirements for joint persistence are met. Similar features are found in an economic system. The set of goods and services making up an economy form a linked meshwork of transformations. The economic niches occupied by each set allow the producers of that set to earn a living and jointly add to a web in which all mutually defined requirements are jointly met. Both biological and technological evolution consist in the invention of slightly or profoundly novel organisms, goods and services which integrate into the ecological or economic mesh and thereby transform it.  Yet at almost all stages, the web retains a functional coherence.”[xxxvii]

At this point we can be mislead into thinking that this is Spencerian evolutionism or Parsonian structural-functionalism, but as well shall see, it is the ecological metaphor where the individual is nested in the larger environment that provides the framework to Complexity theory.  Self-organization allows for a dynamism that is missing from traditional evolutionary thought.  The metaphors and policy implications of complexity theory are not those that favor equilibrium oriented politics; rather, they favor transformation and change, they favor variety and diversity, they favor interconnectedness not reductionist isolationism.

It can thus be argued that changing one part of the system can radically transform the entire system. While this is used to understand the fall of communism, in Waldrop’s Complexity, the same argument is used to predict that the US system might transform itself as well, since one of the functions of Americanism was to stem the Soviet tide.  With the fear of the enemy gone, either Americanism must transform or find a new enemy. Clearly, however, Iraq and South Korea have functioned as a way to keep the equilibrium of the US going.  But we should expect disequilibrium since the world itself is in chaos.  After chaos then what. Complexity and evolutionary transformation, what else.

The Social and the Biological:

Instead of moving to poststructural thought and the larger framing category of episteme, Kauffman use the term regimes of grammar.   To answer the question, what is a functional whole and how does it transform when its components are altered, Kauffman develops this alternative metaframework. In grammar regimes, “the objects of the theory are strings of symbols which may stand for chemical, goods and services, or roles in a cultural setting.”[xxxviii] Remember, we are searching for an overall language for a theory of everything from the smallest to the largest, from the biological to the societal to the astronomical. Using this model, Kauffman hopes to lay down a theory of that is appropriate for the biological and social sciences.

Among the features we shall find are phase transitions between finite and potentially infinite growth in the diversity  of symbol strings in such systems.  As we have seen, the phase transitions may well underlie the origin of life as a phase transition in sufficiently complex set of catalytic polymers. Similar phase transitions may underlie “takeoff” in economic systems, such as the Industrial revolution, once the systems attain a critical complexity of goods and services that allows the set of new economic niches to explode supracritically, and may provide models for the conceptual explosion wrought by the redevelopment of science three centuries.[xxxix]

The critique should be obvious, and this is not only because of the obsessive search for links between the biological and the social–again we saw this earlier in Spencer–but the problem is obvious.  How to explain the necessary exploitation that was needed for the industrial revolution? How to explain the slave trade, the massive appropriate of wealth from India, the extensive plundering of the colonies; in two words: brutal exploitation.  But while complexity theorists are concerned about the environment, exploitation and of the colonies of the other does not enter their dialogue. But within the evolutionary framework they can explain take-off.  That is England was poised at the edge of chaos while India was either too chaotic or too stable–too many regions vying for power after the weakening of the Delhi Sultanate or too stable after centuries of fatalistic Hinduism.  In either case the conditions that were ripe for self-organization were not there.  But perhaps more accurately, they already lived in ecological communities that were locked into positive cycles.  It was military and cultural power that destroyed them, and thus allowed for the Industrial revolution.  But this is merely survival of the fittest. India deserved to lose because she could not adapt but now not only could she not adapt she could not self-organize and lock into positive cycles of increasing returns.  Again this is the central problem of all evolutionary through that has progress immanent in it. Progress forces one to create a great chain of being from the lowest to the Highest.  While the scientific bases for this great chain of being is no longer valid, the image maintains its mythic influence on us. But instead of species we have nations.  This is what those committed to the Complexity model cannot understand;  That information does not always lead to the best possible result, that there is a qualitative difference between information and wisdom, between knowing what is possible and doing the right thing, that is, ethics.  Fortunately, as we see from Waldrop’s Complexity when one is less focused on evolution, we can make arguments for diversity and not linear progress, not selection and adaption.  Kauffman while brilliant at biology and mathematics, does not consider the politics of his epistemology, and of theory building.

Planning:

However, He does give us some useful insights into planning He shows that since the risk for planning far into future is greater than the risk for short term planning (since there is a greater chance one can be wrong). And yet the planner needs to think into the future, “the further she thinks ahead, the more an optimal plan can take account of the highly valuable goods and services which can be constructed from the renewable resources.”[xl]  Thus, rather than thinking too far into the future, it pays to only plan so far ahead where risks and rewards are met. This is what he calls bounded rationality.

For forecasting what this means is having overly complicated models does not allow for generalization while overly simple models with too few variables and data points overgeneralizes.  Kauffman also includes the idea of self-fulfilling prophecies.  He writes “adaptive agents may persistently alter their models of one another’s behavior. Once an agent adopts a changed model of another agent, then his own decision rules, and hence behavior, will change.” [xli]  Now comes the key: “it follows that such agents much coevolve with one another using changing models of one another’s behavior.” [xlii] What this means is that evolution, research, indeed, all activities are done in an holistic integrated sense. This coevolution can be orderly, chaotic or at the edge of chaos, that is, self-organizing.  The site of emergence is at the edge of chaos.  The edge of chaos is more than a simple boundary become disordered and ordered system, indeed it is  a special region to itself.  It was Chris Langton through his computer simulation programs that convinced Kauffman of this.  This realization allowed Kauffman to say that “living system are not entrenched in order systems but are in the area of phase transition, where things are looser and fluid.”[xliii] Natural selection then pushes systems to the edge of chaos, forcing them to adapt, to emerge, to find new solutions as they move around in their fitness landscape.

But forecasting, adaption, transformation is different at the three phases.  As the amount of data increases of other agents (again: political systems, economic agents, or organisms), models of the behavior of other agents becomes more complex.   In evolutionary language, they live on more rugged fitness landscapes.  These models drive agents into more chaotic regimes. More complex models are better able to predict small alterations in behavior.  But in chaotic regimes, models are less complex because change is prevalent, thus moving agents into more ordered regimes. Thus instead of the invisible hand or rational expectation models of behavior, Kauffman posits a model based on coevolution. Agents coordinate their behavior based on the phase they are in and in turn move to other system phases.  “If correct, [this model] may help us understand that E. coli and corporate executives build optimally complex, boundedly rational, models of the other agents constituting their worlds.”[xliv]  Thus Kauffman’s grammar models allow the study of linked processes, he believes, thus turning biology into a science that is law-like.  In his words: “Coevolving adaptive agents attempting to predict one another’s behavior as well as possible may coordinate their mutual behavior through optimally complex, but persistently shifting models of one another. Again, we suspect, the deluge of chaos will be obtained. we may find that E.coli and IBM do indeed know their world in much the same way.”[xlv]

As it has turned out IBM did not know its world well.  It did not move towards a chaotic phase nor to a complex phase.  New revolutions in technology merely forced IBM into an ordered stable organization, that did not lock into changes in computer technology. Instead of increasing returns as the case with Microsoft, it had diminishing returns. It stayed as the large hierarchical organization that did not lock into the future, it did not know its environment.

But Kauffman is not arrogant in his attempt to create a physics of biology, yet his wanderings into a sociology of biology are often trite and overly burdened by the system paradigm. By removing values and ethics at one level but keeping the linear, progress, equilibrium base values of Spencerian systems theory, Kauffman does not add to discussions in the sociology of knowledge or grand system building. His contribution is his effort to develop grammar regimes, to show how self-organizing systems can mathematically emerge, and to expand the discourse of Darwinian biology.

But Kauffman’s main thrust is to show that one can have self-organization without Creationism. We do not need a divine watchmaker.  His effort is to find the laws of biology, “to suspect with quiet passion that below the particular teeming molecular traffic in each cell lie fundamental principles of order any life would reexpress.”[xlvi] But again this does not mean that Kauffman ia religious. Indeed, once his computer model showed the possibility of emergence, he knew he had come “face to face with the secret of the Old One.[xlvii]  In Kauffman’s words, “I had a holy sense of a knowing universe, a universe unfolding, a universe of which we are privileged to be a part….I felt that God would reveal how the world works to anyone who cared to listen..I knew that God had revealed to me a part of how his universe works.”[xlviii]

INCREASING RETURNS AND SYSTEM DYNAMICS

Unlike Kauffman’s detailed accounts, Waldrop’s narrative is similar to Lewin’s in that it is a story of a group of male scientists (with an occasional female colleague but usually wife) discovering the world.  As with Lewin the story is written like a detective novel, where we see how initial assumptions and expectations change over time. We read about the personal frustrations of these men in their search for legitimacy, fame, and acceptance.

In between long discussions of economics, biology, and computer simulation, Waldrop follows the careers of Brian Arthur, Stuart Kauffman, John Holland and others telling stories of academic life, as for example the case of Warren McCulloch, Kauffman’s mentor.  “Former students who had lived with McCulloch told stories of leaving the house through the upper bedroom window to avoid being trapped. McCulloch would habitually follow Kauffman into the bathroom while he was taking a shower, flip down the toilet seat, and sit there happily discussing networks and logical functions of various kinds while Kauffman was trying to get the soap out of his ear.”[xlix]  A men’s club indeed.  But Waldrop does not a paint a picture of emotionally imbalanced scientists or only of happy times. Waldrop shows Kauffman’s suffering when he loses his daughter through an accident.  He also devotes considerable time to Chris Langton’s accident and how through it he suddenly understood that the universe was alive, that self-organization did exist.

Unlike Gleick’s Chaos [l] where discoveries are made in solitary settings, Complexity is a story of an institute, the Sante Fe Institute.  Waldrop traces how it began as a dream of multidisciplinarian institute with the aim putting complexity on the map, its struggles to obtain funding, to keep its research agenda open from any one person’s  politics. The goal was to create “a kind of 21st Century Renaissance Man … starting in science but able to deal with the real messy world, which is not elegant, which science doesn’t really deal with.”[li]  But as we might expect, the goal was not a universal renaissance–even if founders believed it to be–as we can tell by the fact that they wished to call it a new Athens, or par with the city state that gave the world Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.  The problematic nature of that old Athens (the role of females, slaves, young boys) would be something one would hope a holistic perspective like complexity could account before, but these are, after Western scientists, deeply entrenched in their own mythology even as they attempt to deny it.  Nevertheless, the story is exciting as ideas from economists, geneticists, biologists, information specialists all bounce off each other, and from the simple emerged the complex.

While Lewin, like Kauffman, is more concerned with biology, Waldrop follows more closely the life of the Institute, the lives of George Cowan, the long time president of the Sante Fe Institute, Murray Gell-Mann, and John Holland.  But the central figure in this tale is Brian Arthur, an economist who brings back into economic discourse the idea of increasing returns.  Of course those of us in the social sciences or students of political economy are struck by the idiocy of most economists, especially the ones who have won noble awards. But increasing returns does not make sense if one lives in conservative economistic world where the market does work, where monopolies do not emerge. But if the economist were merely to leave his office, he would see how new firms create new goods and ideas–often inefficient–and how these become locked in structures.  But for Arthur finding colleagues who knew something about the real world, instead of merely about that which could be mathematized was nearly impossible.  It was at the Sante Fe Institute however where he found his home.  It is here that Arthur eventually finds himself moving into philosophy and metaphysics. Indeed, in the final section of Waldrop’s Complexity, Arthur concludes comparing complexity to taoist thought in contrast to traditional science and economics which he compares to Newtonian Christian thought.

But while the end of the book is impressive for its metaphysics, the first hundred pages is stunning for its naivety.  Waldrop describes a major revolution in thought when Arthur and colleagues discover on a trip to Bangladesh that women have many children to increase their life chances, that is, that there are social and cultural reasons to population growth and control. Fortunately, he was not awarded a noble for this miraculous discovery.   He also discovers the politics to his and his field’s approach to modeling, that is, let us make the world less messy and use science and mathematics to run the world more rationally.  “Most people in development economics … believe that they are missionaries of this century. But instead of bringing Christianity to the heathen, they’re trying to bring economic development to the Third World,” says Arthur.[lii]  The trip to Bangladesh confirmed Arthur’s view that neo-classical economics had nothing to say to the real world most women and men live in.  The obvious truth that economics is intertwined with history and culture was not made available to Arthur.  But he is humble enough to say that even though the lesson is obvious, “I had to learn it the hard way.”[liii] Arthur, like futurists, began to understand the importance of models that bring in variables from many perspectives yet have deep underlying patterns.  Indeed after reading the struggles of those within classical disciplines one develops a deep appreciation for futures studies–its temporal focus, its attempt to be multidisciplinarian, to find patterns in social, cultural and evolutionary processes and systems.  But what is so obvious to the futurist is not so for the economist or the systems engineer.  Culture is soft, it cannot be mathematized and is thus not real.  Fortunately for Arthur, he went to Bangladesh to meet real people, who do not live in the computer simulations of scientists or the rational irrationality of economists.

The Economy as a Self-Organizing System:

After reading Prigogine, Arthur understands that the economy is a self-organizing system.  While neo-classical theory assumes that there is a negative feedback, the tendency for small effects to die away, system dynamics theory, Chaos, assumes that small effects get magnified under certain conditions.  Diminishing returns means that no monopoly can result, that market conditions can lead to the ideal system, to equilibrium (and if there are problems the State can always step in and fix things).  But increasing returns is based on the idea that a slight chance, a random occurrence, allows a particular product to get more buyers, which then locks in self-producing cycles, until the product has huge advantages over other products.  The VHS versus Beta for vcrs is one example. This was also the case with the QWERTY typewriter. It was designed to reduce type speed but eventually became the standard. As it was mass produced, more people learned it, and thus more were sold and produced–until the industry became locked in.  Microsoft’s operating system is another example.  New software may not be better but if by chance results, or  a few people see a commercial and buy (clever marketing), soon it becomes the standard.

In Arthur’s vision, the new economics would be based on biology, the system would be constantly unfolding, there would be no externalities since all would be part of the system, and the economy would be constantly dynamic, with structures constantly coalescing, decaying an changing. Individuals in this new economics would be part of the economic ecology, where they were complex.

But this type of economics would not be able to accurately predict the future, since one variable could through the equations off. In this sense the legacy of Chaos theory is that although their are deep patterns, these are in effect unknowable, the world is more unpredictable.  But we can understand the world. Good theory helps us explain how we act, how ideas relate to each other, helping us search for similarities in structures and fields.

But as might expect in the Reagan years, these view were not popular and Arthur was challenged to show examples of technologies that humans are locked into. That the question was even asked is part of the problem.  The example that best showed this is the gasoline engine. In its infancy, gasoline was considered the least promising source of energy, with steam the most likely, it was safer and familiar. But as it turned out, gasoline won largely by accident.  Because of the breakout of hoof-and-mouth disease in North America, which led to the withdrawal of horse troughs, where steam cars could refill, gasoline power became locked in, and we lost the chance to have a world with considerably less pollution, argues Arthur.[liv]  Of course, when Arthur gave talks in Russia, economists there countered that this would be impossible in communist countries.

Where Waldrop is useful to the social scientist–if one can still read on and not be amazed at the simple mindedness of biologists, economists and physicists–it is his policy implications, which are full of insight.  For example, according to standard economics theory,  Japan has been successful because of it low cost of capital, powerful cartels, the need to use technology in the absence of commodities.  However, low cost of capital means a low rate of return, and thus no reason to invent, cartels are inefficient, and most economies are weakened when raw materials are scarce. At the same time theories that look at culture and social structure also do not suffice, collective decisionmaking can slow action down, for example.  Japan has been successful because, “increasing returns make high tech markets  unstable, lucrative and possible to corner, and Japan understood this better and earlier than other nations.”[lv] Unfortunately, for the US high tech industries were treated like low-tech industries and thus no industrial policy was articulated.

The next step for Arthur was to develop computer programs to show dynamical economic systems, to show how different set of historical accidents can cause radically different outcomes to emerge.  However, even with this information increasing returns remained antithetical to the politics of the free market since saying that maximizing individual freedom might not lead to the best possible result but to monopolies and inefficient systems was unacceptable for non-Marxists economists since it made problematic the entire neo-classical framework.

From Arthur, Waldrop moves to many of the themes that Lewin discusses, focusing on proofs of emergence at the level of cellular automata. Initial workshops at the Sante Fe institute were full of excitement and the beginnings of a shared language.

In particular, the founding workshops made it clear that every topic of interest had at its heart a system composed of many, many’ “agents.” These agents might be molecules or neurons or species or consumers or even corporations. But whatever their nature, the agents were constantly organizing and reorganizing themselves into larger structures through the clash of mutual accommodation and mutual rivalry. Thus molecules would form cells, neurons would form brains, species would form eco-systems, consumers and corporations would form economies, and so on. At each level, new emergent structures would form and engage in new emergent behaviors.[lvi]

The challenge, of course, as we see from Kauffman’s The Origin of Order, was to find the fundamental laws of emergence. To do this one could not have just physicists or biologists or economists, one needed experts in many fields. Bringing them together was the purpose of the Sante Fe Institute.  For futures studies the lesson is obvious, we need agreement on some larger project of futures studies. Thus while conferences are wonderfully multidisciplinarian they have no focus, no problem to solve, no vision to make law-like.

But it is this multidisciplinarian perspective that makes the writing of complexity rich. We learn how Kauffman is stunned at how static the neo-classical world is. We see how when physicists and economists meet at the Sante Fe Institute, it is hard for physicists to take the dismal science seriously, how so little of what they do relates to reality.  But we also learn about how similar technological systems are to ecological systems.

Moreover, these technological webs can undergo bursts of evolutionary creativity and massive extinction events, just like biological ecosystems. Say a new technology comes in and replaces and older technology, the horse. Along with the horse go the smithy, the pony express, the watering troughs, the stables, the people who curried horses, and so on. The whole subnetwork of technologies that depended upon the horse suddenly collapse … But along with the car come paved roads, gas stations, fast-food restaurants, motels, traffic courts and traffic cops, and traffic lights. A whole new network of goods and services begins to grow, each one filling a niche opened up by the goods and services that came before it.[lvii]

Unfortunately instead of seeing these as isomorphisms among different metaphorical systems, Complexity theorists often fall into the trap of misplaced concretism and confusing metaphor with objectivity.  They forget to take the language of one theory within its own complex context.  The larger cultural context for each theory, each discipline is inaccessible to them.  As is culture in general.  Complexity theorists do not understand that cultures too are destroyed by new technological systems. And like the horse which become ceremonialized in weddings and coronations or reduced to leisure, cultures become museumized. But some cultures do fight back. Fundamentalism is one cultural form that sees its niche being taken away. Its agents–mullahs and priests–attempt to find ways to battle these new technologies.  National sovereignty too can be seen in this light, as a system which, while on the verge of disappearance is trying to find ways to reassert itself. But this part of the problem, for both physics and neo-classical economics have agents that do not make decisions, do not suffer, one is merely following universal laws, the other rational greed, neither exists in a web of cultural complexity, as complexity theory suggests. It is culture that then that is the variable that remains silent in the language of Complexity theory; and paradoxically, it is Complexity theory that show how culture emerges.  Indeed, emergence is about the creation of culture.  The numerous systems that theorists hope to find a general law–evolution, economy, physics–for are all culturally nested within each other. And as Arthur astutely points, the method of investigation is founded on a cultural metaphysic as well as a psychological type of scientist.

Still there are useful policy implications.  With respect to global economic policy, Complexity theory does not restate liberal economics but it does not throw out the idea of growth either.  Indeed, innovation leads to innovation, and after a certain level of complexity, a new economy emerges that is autocatalytic.  The policy prescription is diversity, manufacturing and not dependent on the selling of raw materials.  Trade then between economies can leader to higher complexity but not if one system is undeveloped and the other developed. In the latter case, the developed or more complex nation will merely feed of the former. The former will go extinct, it will not be able to move up the fitness landscape.  But the problem of exploitation is not one that Waldrop discusses rather the issue for them is transformation. For example, how “injecting one new molecule into the soup could often transform the [system] utterly in much the same way that the economy was transformed  when horse was replaced by the automobile.”[lviii]

But John Holland does have a place for exploitation in his theory of complex adaptive systems. For him, complex adaptive systems–the brain, the economy, the ecology, computer programs, firms, individuals, nations–have more than one niche, which can be exploited by other agents. Thus the economic world has a place for programmers and plumbers and the rain forest has a place for crocodiles and butterflies. “The act of filling up one niche opens up more niches–for new parasites, for new predators and prey, for new symbiotic partners,” writes Holland.[lix]   Each change creates new opportunities and failures.  Complex adaptive systems are always in a state of flux, equilibrium is death.  Agents can never optimize a system, they cannot optimize their utility, their fitness. Finding an optimum is impossible, all one can do is change, and one cannot predict this change since agent is part of a larger ecology, a web of interrelationships.

It is this type of talk that has led Arthur to write that the metaphysics of Complexity theory is based on Taoism. God is not the watchmaker, there is no inherent order–as postmodernists as well argue–what is, is always in a state of flux–as Marxists would tell us.  In Arthur’s words, The world “is like a kaleidoscope: the world is a matter of patterns that change, that partly repeat, but never quite repeat, that are always new and different.”[lx] The neo-classical world view is a world of ordered order, fundamentally Christian.

What results then is a worldview based on accommodation and coadaption. There is no duality between humans and nature since human are part of nature.  We are part of the system, although an arrogant part. Optimization assumes that humans are first, as in the case of environmental cost-benefit studies.  They assume that we are outside nature, and nature is inside a store–the shopping center model.   More productive are institutional-policy analysis, where the actors are interactive and where culture, environment and intrinsic to the system not externalities.   In this sense typically phrases like “the optimization of policy decisions concerning environmental resources” become absurd.  They assume a static hierarchical world.

Amazingly, this type of think leads traditional economist Arthur as well as others of the Sante Fe Institute into the realm of much of what is current in futures studies: the politics of metaphor.   They argue that bad policymaking usually involved a poverty of metaphors, of ways of constituting reality.  For example, it may not be appropriate to think of a drug war, with assaults and guns, since each nation is complicit in drug use, drug production, drug culture, and the definitions of drugs themselves.

For Arthur, while one way to understand the new science of complexity is to look at metaphysics, the other is to look at psychological types. One type of scientist needs order and stasis, the other is comfortable with messiness and process.  The first spend their effort trying to make systems go back to equilibrium, the second are less Platonic and Newtonian and more influenced by Heraclitus who argued that the world is in a constant flux. What complexity adds to Heraclitus, is that this flux can become self-organized, allowing consciousness to emerge.

For biologist and artificial intelligence specialist Chris Langton, the metaphor is not the clock but the growth of a plant form a tiny seed or, more specifically the unfolding of a computer program from a few lines of code (indeed, much of this book is about  the effort to create such a program where life is not deigned in the program but emerges spontaneously).  It is the emergence of lifelike behavior from a simple rules.   This is the realization that reality cannot be captures by simple minded logic, that messiness–or metaphor–is intrinsic to the system, this is what Kurt Godel, Alan Turing in computer programming, chaos theoreticians, and postmodernists with respect to language have managed to suggest, if not show.

Thus instead of optimal solutions or utopias are viable solutions or eutopias, good places.  The task is to focus on robustness in the face of an ill-defined future.  That, believes Arthur, “puts a premium on becoming aware of non-linear relationships and causal pathways the best we can.”[lxi]  It is thus attempting to bring economics from the 18th century of Darwin and Newton to the 20th century.

What is needed then for Holland, is to understand how to adapt in conditions of constant change and unpredictable, conditions at the edge of chaos.  In this the debate about sustainability is a mistake from the view of complexity theory. A sustainable society can become a dystopia where our lives are controlled, with few freedoms, and a loss of cultural diversity. What is needed. believes Murray Gel-Mann, is a “society that is adaptable, robust and resilient to lesser disasters, that can learn from mistakes, that isn’t static, but that allows for growth in the quality of human life instead of just the quantity of it.”[lxii] But this then is the paradox, what is needed are general principles on a world solution to pressing problems, that allows for mistakes and cultural tolerance.  We have to find ways to avoid the large avalanches of change (to use the language of Chaos theory), such as nuclear disaster, world war 111 or environmental or economic disasters.

Specifically, Complexity theory allows us to understand and explain (not predict, and in this sense it is a departure from traditional sciences and social sciences) why the Soviet Union collapsed.  The system was not flexible enough and got locked into negative cycles, not positive lock ins. It was too ordered. Anarchy on the other hand is to chaotic, too fluid. But unlike Alex Argyro’s, A Blessed Rage for Order: Deconstruction, Evolution, and Chaos[lxiii] in which he concludes that the American system of checks and balances, of liberal economics of individualism, is the best of all worlds (since it is self-regulating and self-learning system that combines chaos and order), theorist Farmer argues that laissez faire systems also fail as they are too chaotic.  “Like a living cell, they have to regulate themselves with a dense web of feedbacks and regulation, at the same time they need to leave plenty of room for creativity, change, and response to new conditions.”[lxiv]  Evolution thrives at the edge of chaos, where neither chaos or order are dominant, this allows for gradual controlled change, where flexibility can emerge. It is learning and evolution that pushes a system to the edge of chaos, into complexity.  Perpetual novelty is about moving around at the edge of chaos.  For many this might be too much, what is needed is periods of transformation, and then new levels of organization and order.  Stasis and transformation not just continuous revolution.

Clearly then complexity is a slippery concept with some general agreement but with theorists using it in different ways, some from a Spencerian-Darwinian background, some from a more Taoist perspective, and some from an artificial intelligence background.  They come at from different areas as well: from computer simulation models, through years spent studying a fruit fly, and through economic analysis.  What is missing are perspectives from the humanities, from myth.  Arthur begins to make these connections as he investigates the metaphysics of complexity and the scientific enterprise they are caught in. But in their effort to make the analysis of emergence less focused on the divine hand of God, they forget that their efforts to are part of a political-historical web. That is not an accident that chaos and complexity are central topics in the late 20th century, as modernity has exploded from within and without. Indeed, they too are part of the pattern of evolution, a natural emergence from previous scientific enterprises.

But all said and done, the problem of Consciousness remains.  All self-organization gives us is a free lunch, from nothing, again something arrives. Even Spencer had his absolute principle, the end of evolution.   It is this that perhaps they miss. The attraction of the Great, or the divine, or the idea of paradise, the idea of perfection.  Their contribution of complexity theory is to show that life no longer is in the material nor in the spiritual but in the social organization of organisms. If one posits a prior principal, whether consciousness or an initial programmer, one has not explained anything, merely pushed the analysis elsewhere. “This is Darwin’s …insight, that an agent can improve its internal models without an paranormal guidance whatsoever.”[lxv] Clearly elegant, clearly part of the story, an important part of it. But the key is that complexity does not require a strict theory of progress, new systems are not necessarily better since this definition is problematic. And given the fluid nature of the real, we can go back in past and pick up past forms, and adapt them to novel conditions.  Politically, it gives up to those battling the status quo, those hoping for change. The task for them is to move the system they inhabit to the edge of chaos, where new social structures can emerge.

At the same time, complexity is also about understanding the future of life on the planet. While much of research into emergent systems is based on computer simulations, wherein one can argue that computer virus may indeed be alive (they can reproduce, they can store a representation of themselves onto another computer, “they can command the metabolism of their host to carry out their own functions”[lxvi] (such as real viruses), it is the creation of artificial human life that the new sciences must address.  Chris Langton writes that “Not only the specific kinds of living things that will exist, but the very course of evolution itself will come more and more under our control.”[lxvii]  Of course, since changes in initial conditions may dramatically change outcomes, as Chaos theory would assert, what new life forms might emerge at the edge of Chaos is not clear.  As other Complexity theorists, Langton believes that these issues must be publically, and globally, debated. Yet he remains positive.  “With the advent of artificial life, we may be the first creatures to create our own successors…. It is quite possible that, when the conscious beings of the future look back on this era, we will be most noteworthy not in and of ourselves but rather of what we gave rise to. Artificial life is potentially the most beautiful creation of humanity.”[lxviii] A new type of emergence, a new level of complexity that emerges from the present chaos.

But as we might expect, this new open world where new life is being created is fundamental Western. Even as it approaches integrated Taoist perspective–Arthur’s vision but clearly not Langton’s–it is linear.  The Sante Fe Institute would gain by opening up their definition of science and asking what isomorphic theories might emerge from alternative conceptions of science.  Examine an alternative Indian view which also attempts to reconcile emergence with evolution.  In this view, evolution is cyclical beginning with infinite Consciousness to Cosmic Mind and then to matter. We quote extensively from psychologist and physicist Rudreshananda. “From matter, individual mind emerges, evolves and finally merges back into Cosmic Mind and the Consciousness, completing and “cosmic cycle of creation.”[lxix]

But exactly how is matter formed from Cosmic Mind, and how does individual life and mind emerge from matter? In this perspective, there is an intelligence that links Cosmic intelligence to the world of relativity of time, space, and form.  Microvita are responsible for the creation of matter, life and individual minds in the universe.  They are conscious, living entities, so small that millions of microvita form a single electron, while billions form a carbon atom. Microvita move throughout the universe creating bodies and minds. Microvita are responsible for organizing energy to create matter with mass and its other properties.  Energy requires intelligence to become organized and that intelligence is supplied by microvita. Microvita are responsible for the origin and evolution of life as well. Evolution is not random but guided by desires, the environment and cosmic intelligence, which guides any changes desired collectively by a group of organisms. Microvita provide the genetic information to create species evolution by organizing new genetic chemicals such as DNA and RNA required for evolutionary transformations. The emergence of mind from matter (composed of microvita originated from cosmic intelligence) is also guided by microvita which help organisms express greater physio‑psychic potentialities during their evolutionary development.[lxx]

Merits aside of the truth of these statements, they are clearly contentious and problematic–for example how are created? To assert that the Infinite creates them merely pushes back the problem–is that here is another attempt to rethink evolution that does not lead to simple Creationism, nor does it attempt to maintain a secular view of the world, in fact, one can see how dialectics, emergence, and microvita can combine together.  However, as science it is not acceptable since its hypothesis can not be presently tested.  But what is important is that from an Indian thinker we gain a cyclical view of the universe and evolution.  Metaphysics gives us our physics.  But the task for those involved in microvita research is to develop some type of tests, proofs, arguments that move microvita from mere cosmological speculation to a theory with some agreement among a community of scientists.

Still Waldrop’s Complexity should be lauded even though it is myopic in its inability to understand the cultural and political, and for its naivete in taking seriously the neo-classical economic discourse.  Nonetheless there is an attempt to examine the metaphysics of complexity. There is an attempt to examine the lives of the men who have founded this new field.  And as we see from Kauffman’s The Origins of Order this effort is one based on humility.  Lewin shows us the exactness, the rigor, the grand debates within this area. At the same time, he attempts to tackle the problem of progress, as well as the links between Complexity theory and Gaia theory.  All writers also attempt to develop the policy implications of this new science, they understand that science exists with an policy environment, a policy community.  What makes both Waldrop and Lewin especially interesting is that they tell a story, and succeed in making science a story as well.

Notes

[i].   Roger Lewin, Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos (New York, Macmillan, 1992) page 190.

[ii].  Ibid.

[iii]. Ibid, page 118.

[iv].  Ibid, page 192.

[v].   Ibid, page 196.

[vi].  Ibid.

[vii]. Ibid, page 180.

[viii].     Ibid, page 10.

[ix].  Ibid, page 13.

[x].   Ibid, page 15.

[xi].  Ibid, page 135.

[xii]. Ibid, page 138.

[xiii].     Ibid, page 139.

[xiv]. Ibid, page 143.

[xv].  Ibid, page 148.

[xvi]. Ibid, page 148.

[xvii].     Ibid, page 148.

[xviii].    Ibid, page 171.

[xix]. Ibid, page 170.

[xx].  Ibid, page 114.

[xxi]. Ibid, page 72.

[xxii].     Ibid.

[xxiii].    Ibid.

[xxiv].     M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Chaos and Order (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1992) page 299.

[xxv]. Ibid, page 103.

[xxvi].     N. Katherine Hayles, Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1990), pages 91-102.

[xxvii].    Stuart A. Kauffman, The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993) page v11.

[xxviii].   Ibid, page xiv.

[xxix].     Waldrop, op cit, reference 24, page 125.

[xxx]. Kauffman, op cit, reference 27, page xiv.

[xxxi].     Rupert Sheldrake, The Presence of the Past: Morphic Resonance and the Habits of Nature (New York, Times Book, 1988).

[xxxii].    P.R. Sarkar, Microvita in a Nutshell (Calcutta, Ananda Marga Publications, 1993).

[xxxiii].   Ibid, page 232.

[xxxiv].    Ibid.

[xxxv].     Ibid.

[xxxvi].    Ibid, page 233.

[xxxvii].   Ibid, page 370.

[xxxviii].  Ibid.

[xxxix].    Ibid, page 371.

[xl].  Ibid, page 399.

[xli]. Ibid, page 401.

[xlii].     Ibid.

[xliii].    Waldrop, op cit, reference 24, page, 303.

[xliv].     Kauffman, op cit, reference 27, page 402.

[xlv]. Kauffman, op cit, reference 24, page 404.

[xlvi].     Ibid, page 645.

[xlvii].    Waldrop, op cit, reference 24,  page, 133.

[xlviii].   Ibid, page 133.

[xlix].     Ibid, page 115.

[l].   James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York, Viking, 1987).

[li].  Waldrop, op cit, reference 24, page 68.

[lii]. Ibid, page 26.

[liii].     Ibid, page 27.

[liv]. Ibid, pages 40-41.

[lv].  Ibid, page 43.

[lvi]. Waldrop, 88.

[lvii].     Ibid, page 119.

[lviii].    Ibid, page 126.

[lix]. Ibid, page 147.

[lx].  Ibid, page 330.

[lxi]. Ibid, page 334.

[lxii].     Ibid, page 351.

[lxiii].    Alex Argyro, A Blessed Rage for Order: Deconstruction, Evolution, and Chaos (Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 1991).  Also see Sohail Inayatullah, “Chaos in Myth, Science and Politics,” in Mika Mannermaa, Sohail Inayatullah and Rick Slaughter, eds., Chaos and Coherence (Turku, Finland, Finnish Society for Futures Studies, 1994).

[lxiv].     Waldrop, op cit, reference 24, page 294.

[lxv]. Ibid, page 198.

[lxvi].     Ibid, page 283.

[lxvii].    Ibid, page 283.

[lxviii].   Ibid, page 285.

[lxix].     E-mail transmission. Based on Rudreshananda, Ac., Microvita: Cosmic Seeds of Life (Mainz, Germany, Microvita Research Institute, 1988).

[lxx]. Ibid.

Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos

by Roger Lewin. New York, Macmillan, 1992, 208 pages.

The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution

by Stuart A. Kauffman.  New York, Oxford University Press, 1993. 709.

Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos by M. Mitchell Waldrop. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1992. 380 pages.

The Politics of the Dusty Plan (1986)

By Sohail Inayatullah

Futures Research Quarterly (Vol. 20, No. 4, 1986), 63-68

 

INTRODUCTION

Planning for the future in government or in business has never been a gratifying task. Planners are constantly frustrated in realizing their goals. Among other complaints, perhaps the most debilitating frustration is that plans are written and then simply discarded to lie on a shelf and gather dust. While the obvious reasons may be that the plan was poorly done, was too long, was weak in quantitative analysis, or was overly quantitative, the real reasons may in fact be the power relationships between the planner and the Chief Executive Officer and differences in how the plan and the planning process are perceived by the planner and the CEO.

Arnold Brown has argued in his article appropriately titled, “Everywhere Planners are in Pain.1” that the single most important determinate of a successful planning endeavor is not budget, method, or equipment but the relationship between the planner and the CEO. In the planning cycle, difficulties arise in the organizational relationship between the CEO and the planner, that is, there exists a difference in views between the planner’s perception and the CEO’s hope. Brown argues that there must be better lines of communication between the planner and the CEO.

THE POLITICS OF PLANNING

For Brown, the planner can reduce his pain by remembering that: “the planner’s role is to provide the means whereby the CEO can plan effectively,” that is, the planner as translator.2   To achieve this translation, most articles in the planning and futures literature present technical strategies: that is, they argue for the integration of the left and right brain, the use of common sense intuitive forecasts and strategies; for increased information through modeling or novel methodologies such as Delphi or Emerging Issues Analysis3.   While these may help the planner in writing a better plan–as judged the elegance of the plan itself–these methods have very little to do with the politics of planning, the implementation of the plan or the orga­nizational self-awareness that can emerge from a participatory planning process. It is often the case that “the Boss loved the plan, but nothing came out of it.” Planners remain unaware that the objectives of their plan may be ultimately different from that of the CEO or the organization itself.

However differences in objectives between planners and the CEO is not necessarily an idiosyncratic problem that planners have; rather, it is part of the politics of the planning process, part of the structure of organizations. It is this process that I wish to discuss and elabo­rate. Concretely, I wish to discuss the politics of the “dusty” plan.

For the planner, the plan is an expression of his or her vision. Although it includes ideas and suggestions of line personnel as well as top management, it is still the planner’s work. The planner hopes that through the plan his relationship will change from researcher (techni­cian) or implementer to advisor or co-decision-maker. Walter Blass has developed similar categories that describe this relationship. He talks of “planner as frustrated mechanic” and “planner as ever the bridesmaid,” and finally “planner as meddler or would be king.”

However, just as intellectuals and priests took away power from the monarchy, top executives fear planners will take away their power. And justifiably so. The planner certainly understands the organization at an operational and philosophical level. The planner also through the plan writing process learns about the organization’s history. Through this historical understanding, the planner is equipped to develop the orga­nization’s alternative futures. Writing of the plan gives power. In industrial culture, the written word is power. Words and language not only define the world, they create the world and given ownership of this creation to the writer. The planner thus can create history and future. This emphasis of the written word is especially true for planners trained in law.

Blass writes that “proximity to the seat of power must be handled with humility and reserve.4” However, even if this is done, the poli­tics of institutional and organizational relationships will force the CEO to make it clear that he is the planner, and the planner simply an articulator of his ideas. This is not an easy real-politik lesson to acknowledge. Nor is the realization that the best ways to see one’s ideas furthered is to gently include them in conversation such that the CEO thinks that they are his for such an act acknowledges the vertical structure of organizational power and the planners lowly place in this structure.

SYMBOLIC POLITICS

Beyond organizational power relationships, often the real purpose of the plan as perceived by the CEO and the planner may be quite differ­ent. The plan is a symbolic document. This is especially so in govern­mental agencies. The CEO may simply want to have a document to show a particular body–the state legislature, or a Federal funding agency, such as the LEAA in the criminal justice field, or even to stockholders in the private sector–that the institution has entered the world of modern management. A plan is symbolic of the effective use of resources. It is a way of saying, “yes we are doing something about x problem.” Agencies use plans to diffuse criticism: that is, “we are working on it.” Even in the private sector, where there is a clear motive for operations – profit – and a clear result if targets are not met (loss of market share) similar problems exist. Lack of relevance to immediate business problems is an excuse often used for a shelved plan. However, the intention of the plan from the view of the CEO may have been simply to impress the board of directors that modernity had been achieved. In both sectors, plans and planning are used to obscure deeper organizational problems.

POST-PLAN DEPRESSION

Thus for the organization, the plan itself, not its content, and especially not its implementation, is what is important. The planner, however, often sees the plan as an expression of his vision of the institution’s future, the plan becomes an extension of him or herself.   From the planner’s perspective, the plan is a vehicle of change, or organizational revitalization. For the CEO, it may be simply an ex­pression of prestige. Thus, when the plan is put on the shelf the planner is dismayed and enters “post-plan depression” . The CEO, of course, proudly displays the plan on his shelf. Where else should it go? His goal has been accomplished. Praise has been lavished. Funds received. Criticism diffused. The knighthood of modern management bestowed.

The CEO already has a way to do business, to make decisions, to understand the future. He already has a worldview, a set of priorities, and although he asked for the plan in the first place, it is certainly not because he wants his world restructured, reorganized or reprior­itized. He may simply want to decrease the uncertainty of the external socio-economic environment as well as manage various difficult to control internal programs and individuals.

Plans are symbolic. They evoke the future. They accomplish political motives. The Hawaii Judiciary, for example, has developed a reputation for excellence in planning largely due to its innovative comprehensive planning documents. However, while these are used by court planners all over the USA, the Hawaii Judiciary still has not implemented its plans, nor has it adopted a strategic plan. They purpose of the planning process, was, in retrospect, simple to further unify and centralize the courts and to justify future judicial growth.

Plans are also used within organizations by programs to increase their power or to articulate their vision. However, this too can be problematic. A plan developed for a local YMCA, although accurate, elegant and practical turned out to be useless. Since the Central YMCA was not interested in examining a plan from a lower level branch, it could not be operationalized at the local level, nor was the larger purpose of convincing the Central YMCA–that the YMCA’s market share and prestige as a premiere national and international volunteer association would continue to decline–realized. Thus, another dusty plan was added to the garbage heap of unused plans. Other experiences by colleagues in various state agencies have followed the same pattern. To gain Federal funding or assuage Legislative auditors a plan is written. Once writ­ten, it is shelved.

UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS

However, a plan gathering dust does not mean that the plan failed, or that the planning process is worthless. Mere gesturing. Simply planners must see their work in the overall institutional, organization­al sense. Of course, occasionally, ideas and recommendations are followed through and implemented. But, even here, the language of implementation rarely acknowledges the source of the ideas, nor does it follow the logic of the plan. The planner does not become bride or chief advisor, he or she remains the frustrated technician.

For the planner to avoid post plan depression, he should understand the politics of the planning process, that is the motives of the orga­nization and the CEO and the respective role at the face and symbolic level of the key actors. However, to confront the CEO and argue that he or she simply wants the plan for symbolic reasons will not produce the desired results for the planner. The CEO will simply argue – and will believe it – that the plan is being written to be implemented. However, his definition of what constitutes implementation may differ from the planner’s. For the CEO, it is he who solves problems, the planner simply points to future problems to solve.

A WAY OUT?

To begin with, the planner must also see the writing of the plan and the political consensus building necessary for a plan to gain acceptance, as a process of organizational self-learning. The purpose of the plan, then becomes a vehicle for individuals to discover their role–or lack thereof–in the organization; for CEO’s to discern what really is going on in the organization. This process, however, often uncovers the organization’s dark side–the desire for empire building among lower level bureaucrats and the desire for organizational growth even when public–citizens and consumers–demand does not warrant such growth. Thus CEO’s, aware of the chaos and change that might occur when an organization is aware of its dark side, usually attempt to tightly control the planning process by only defining the goal of the planner as the production of a written plan or in a some similar technical and apolitical fashion.

Is there then a way out? Given the politics of organizations and their vertical power structures and the desire of humans to control others, to use plans and planning to expand the power and worldview of their own egos, probably not. The best the planner can do is understand the politics of who wants what and why on the conscious personal level and the unconscious institutional level. He could also simply leave the planner role, start his own business or government, and become King. Then he would have free reign to impose his or her vision or as the case often is, ego.

However, if living in the world of power, wealth, and ego is the central problem, then the planner in the fashion of the urban guerrilla can attempt to redesign the organization by creating more horizontal participatory structures. He or she could also, knowing that real people are suffering in bureaucracies or “in hell holes known as insti­tutions,”5 as in the case of the criminal justice or mental health system, become not a writer of plans but a political actor–a social activist or lobbyist. The planner then must redefine his or her role, organize and then convince decision-makers through information, confron­tation, debate, and compromise of his or her perspective hoping that the planning process will force organizational and individual self-awareness.

If this is not enough or too much, then the planner should work at political and spiritual transformation on a global and individual levels hitherto unheard of in human history. In the mean time, the planner can write the plan, and then, as he receives praise from top management and as the plan is shelved, he can in a yogic zen-like fashion watch the dust gather and smile. If none of these alternatives suffice then it may be wise to switch professions. However patho-bureaucracies and egos in search of power appear to be the rule in this world, not the excep­tion.

 

Notes

*        Sohail Inayatullah is senior policy analyst/futurist at the Office of the Administrative Director, the Hawaii Judiciary, PO Box 2560, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822. He also is planning consultant to Mid-Pacific Institute, a private school in Hawaii. The opinions expressed in this article are not necessarily shared by any organizations that the author is affiliated with.

  1. Arnold Brown, “Everywhere Planners are in Pain,” Long Range Planning, (Vol. 16, No. 3, 1983), p. 18-21.
  1. ibid. p. 19.
  1. See Geoffrey Fletcher, “Key Concepts in the Futures Perspective” World Future Society Bulletin (January-February, 1979), pp. 25-31.
  1. Walter Blass, “Ten Years of Business Planners,” Long Range Planning, (Vol. 16. No. 3, 1983), p. 21-24.
  1. Wayne Yasutomi, Development Disabilities planner. Personal communications sent to the author.