Which Future for South-East Queensland? (2006)

Professor Sohail Inayatullah

October 2006

The SEQ 2026 plan intends to: “protect biodiversity, contain urban development, build and maintain community identity, make travel more efficient, and support a prosperous economy. At the same time, the Regional Plan proposes that communities be built and managed using the most up-to-date and effective measures to conserve water and energy and for the design and siting of buildings to take advantage of the subtropical climate.”[1]

This is certainly a step in the right direction. SEQ provides a vision, direction so as to deal with expected demographic change and the resultant problems and opportunities.

Reflecting on lost opportunties, John Minnery writes that in 1944,” planners proposed a one mile wide ‘green belt’ of rural land encircling Brisbane’s developed suburbs, together with future satellite towns linked by road. Supporters argued that cities were spreading ‘like spilled treacle, engulfing everything in its path’. Such treacle cities city covered good agricultural land. They led to the overloading of water and sewerage mains and to insurmountable traffic problems.”[2]

However, this proposal was not implemented.

Asks Minnery:

“But just think how different South East Queensland would look today of the idea had been implemented. Clear breaks in the continuous suburban landscape now stretching from Noosa to the Tweed and beyond Ipswich. Public effort put into towns beyond the green belt with a better distribution of jobs and the infrastructure to serve them. And no public concern about the looming sprawling ‘200 kilometre city’.”

SEQ 2026 has learned from this lesson in setting out a vision and new directions for the future.

But what might 2026 actually look like? While we cannot know the future, we can reduce uncertainty; we gain a better sense of the possibilities through scenarios.[3]

I offer four futures for the SEQ region.

SEQ STILL LIVABLE

SEQ 2026 goals achieved. It is 2026 and there is plenty of opportunity in SE Queensland. The population has dramatically increased but through good governance, community consultation and foresight, negative possibilities (crime, congestion, pollution) have been mitigated and positive possibilities (job growth, green belt protection, water and energy management, travel choices) enhanced. People still want to move to SEQ even with higher housing prices. A two class society has not resulted as government has intervened to deal with inequity. Green spaces are plenty and urban design is far more sensitive to local conditions.

A fair, green and healthy go is still possible. Queenslanders still look to government to solve their problems but they are less dependent on the State. They are also more globalized, looking to live, work, travel, learn from, import and export to the broader world. Using dramatic new technologies, Queenslanders are planning for 2046.

SEQ HOT AND PAVED

SEQ 2026 goals failed as growth was too dramatic. Looking back, the plan needed far more teeth. While it was an admirable effort to take power away from local shires and put the region first, that is not how things turned out. Market pressures kept housing prices going up (demand from other parts of Australia and overseas) continued. Developers gave lip service to green and social concerns. A two class society has started to emerge. Traffic problems did not decrease, rather, every effort to widen highways, in a matter of years, led to more congestion. The vicious cycle continued. SEQ is a long highway between Coolangatta and Noosa. Global warming has only made life worse – temperature continues to rise, water shortages increase. SEQ is full of hot cities – paved cities with higher than normal temperatures. Many have made money but the quality has life for others have gone down. Health indicators continue to worsen – citizens look to local government to solve problems. Local government looks to State government which looks to the Federal. The Federal seeks to stay in power. Capacity continues to shrink.

SEQ WIRED AND MISERABLE

The last twenty years have been a series of confrontations between local authorities and regional government; between developers and environmentalists; between individual freedom and security; between councilors and state governments; between young and old; between rural areas and the beach; and between new migrants (many environmental refugees) and old migrants. Endless sprawl, congested highways, gang warfare have made SEQ a miserable place to live in. There are many gated communities – high gate, big dog – that give some peace to the elderly. But outside these communities social tensions fester. Peace is also kept via surveillance – live Google – and tough regulation. Air has been digitalized and citizens are monitored in every possible way. Discipline is the buzz word – SEQ returns to the political climate of the 1980s. The attempts to plan for the future, while admirable, were met with resistance at every level. Local concerns took precedence over regional – and it is all a mess now. Technology and power is used to keep collective peace.

SEQ TRANSFORMED

The concern for the long term future was ignored by some but became the passion for many. The SEQ vision enhanced the capacity of shires all over Queensland to develop their own visions (Logan 2026, Gold Coast 2046, Maroochy 2020, Brisbane 2026, for example). Community capacity to innovate resulted. The cultural creatives – less than 20% of the population in the early 2000’s – has grown dramatically in the last twenty years. The values of sustainability, spirituality, innovation, global governance have become the official values. These values have been reinforced through systemic (legislation, city design, tax regimes) changes.

Instead of suburbs, work-home-community electronically linked hubs have grown. Working in these hubs has led to dramatic jumps in productivity (less time lost on the road, more control of one’s work life). Travel choices – walking, bikeways, car, and light rain – have increased. Organic gardens have sprouted everywhere. Smart green technologies exist all over Queensland. Indeed, not only has this transformed Queensland, but exports of these technologies are slowly but surely changing Asian cities. SEQ is known has not just the smart centre for Australia but also the shanti centre. Yoga, for example, a three billion dollar business in the USA 20 years ago, has now become a trillion dollar business and SEQ has done well from it. Healthy eating and living were once a dream but the obesity crisis of the first ten years of this century led to a dramatic turn around. Systems became smarter and individuals took personal responsibility for their health. The invention of the personal carbon credit system[4] also led to reconfiguration of energy use. SEQ is a world leader. There are still conflicts but neighborhood mediation centres (not to mention peer mediation in schools) are used to resolve many of them. While population has increased, energy consumption has maintained steady. Innovation continues to breed technological and social innovation. While there are many global changes, SEQ can meet them as citizens do not see themselves at the mercy of large institutions, their capacity to influence their lives continues to increase.

WHICH FUTURE?

Which of these futures is the plausible one? It is certainly too soon to tell. But decisive factors will be (1) A shared vision of the desired future. (2) Good governance through enhanced community consultation and anticipatory democracy. (3) Use of smart, social and sustainable technologies to solve problems and enhance community capacity). (4) Moving away from quick fixes to the deeper issues (for example, not just expanding highways but increasing travel choices; not just speeding up all processes but exploring the slow city; not just training more doctors but changing the hierarchical structure of modern medicine). (5) Ensuring performance indicators are linked to the direction SEQ seeks to move toward and (6) Creating transitional strategies and cultures to move from the industrial era to the digital/sustainable era.

Which future do you want for SEQ 2026?

[1] http://www.oum.qld.gov.au/?id=468

[2] Full article available from John Minnery j.minnery@uq.edu.au, University of Queensland.

[3] For additional scenarios, see the work of Phillip Daffara at www.futuresense.org.au. Also see Steve Gould – <steve.gould@optusnet.com.au> who focuses on: divided seq; developmentalist seq; outlier seq and green villages seq.

[4] First thought of by social planner and Brisbane resident Jennifer Bartlett in 2004.

An Alternative View of the Futures of South Asia (2003)

Steps to a Confederation

Sohail Inayatullah

Professor, Tamkang University, Taiwan and Sunshine Coast University, Australia

www.metafuture.org

October 11, 2003

While we are all aware why we do not have peace in south asia, there is a paucity of explorations on how to create a better future.  The lack of peace defined as both individual peace (inner contentment), social-psychological peace (how we see the Other), structural peace (issues of justice, particularly territorial justice) and epistemological peace (toward a plurality of ways of knowing) are among the major factors contributing to poverty in south asia. Government expenditures in each nation, especially India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka go for military purposes and not for education or health.  Every time a positive economic cycle begins, yet one more confrontation sends military expenditures higher.  Few, except military leaders and a few corporations (mostly foreign), benefit from this escalation. Indeed, the entire system is now war based, from the military-industrial complex to the worldview of citizens and leaders.

Lack of Visions

Part of the reason for this vicious cycle of confrontation and poverty is because South Asia has been unable to move outside of colonial and partition (or liberation) categories.  Conceptual travel outside of British influence is difficult and cultural, economic, military and psychological colonialism and categories of thought remain in south asian internal structures and representations of the self.

Intellectuals in south asia also do not help matters, in fact, we are often part of the problem.  Focused on historical investigations and mired in feudal social relations, academic discourse, in general, and the future, in particular, has become fugitive and, when apprehended, made trivial.  This is largely because of the style, content and structure of south asian intellectual/State relations.  By and large administered by the civil service, appeasing the chief minister (as evidenced by the center stage of the minister at book launchings and public lectures) is far more important than independent intellectual inquiry. It is the State that gives academic discourse legitimacy, since it is the State that has captured civil society.  The paucity of economic, social and political resources for the Academy exacerbates, if not causes, this situation. Social sciences remain undeveloped.

Nation, State and Real Politics

Colonial history has produced an overarching paradigm that even the interpreters of the hadith and Vedanta must relinquish their authority to.  This is the neo-realist model of International Relations and National Development. Caught in a battle of ego expansion, of self-interest, nations function like self-interested egoistic individuals. Economic development can only take place at the national level with communities absent from participation. Thus making peace at local levels impossible.  Security is defined in terms of safety from the aggressor neighboring nation, not in terms of local access to water, technology and justice. Only real politics with hidden motives behind every actor and action makes sense in this neo-realist discourse. The task then for most is explaining the actions of a nation or of functionaries of the State.  Envisioning other possibilities for “nation” or “state” and their interrelationships, that is, the assumptions that define what is considered eligible for academic discourse remains unattempted, thus the absence of communities, non-governmental organizations, class and other transnational categories such as gender from the realm of what is considered important.  Moreover, structural analysis such as center/periphery theory (a step beyond conspiracy theory) is intelligible but only with respect to the West not with respect to internal structures.  Finally, visions of the future, attempts to recreate the paradigm of international relations, strategic studies and development theory through women studies, world system research, historical social change analysis, peace studies, participatory action research or the social movements are considered naive and too idealistic.   Worse, it is believed that this naivete and idealism threatens security on the home front. Thus it is fine if class and gender are issues that challenge mainstream politics in the neighboring nation but not in “our perfect country.”  What results thus is at best static peace – that is the diplomatic accomodation of official differences and not what Prout founder, P.R. Sarkar calls, sentient peace, or the creation of a mutual ecology of destiny based on shared moral principles.

However even with the dominance of real-politics, idealism does exist, but, in the quest for modernity it has been marginalized.  Visions remain limited to evening prayer or meditation, for personal peace, but they have no place in politics or structural peace, except at the level of the State which uses religious practices to buttress its own power and control over competing classes, that is, it appropriates vision into its own strategic discourse.

Again, the dominance of neo-realism and the loss of mutual trust can be explained by many variables. The most important of them is the event of partition – the alleged break from colonialism -that has dominated intellectual efforts. With more than a generation of mistrust, hate and fear, creating alternative futures, not dominated by the partition discourse is indeed challenging. The disappointment of post-colonial society has worn heavy on the south asian psyche – betrayals by leaders and calls for more sacrifices from the people for yet another promised plan is unlikely to transform the weight of the past and the abyss of the present.  The future that we have arrived at to is not the final destination for south asia, it is a dystopia.  As Faiz has written[i], “The time for the liberation of heart and mind has not come yet. Continue your arduous journey. This is not your destination.”

Possible Strategies

Given this history, what are some possible strategies outside of the partition and nation-state discourse.  And how can social movements and others desiring a different future help in these strategies, in creating new visions and realities for south asia.

The short run strategy social movements would be to attempt to encourage peaceful citizen to citizen meetings between Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, Pakistanis and Indians. Their effort in creating links between intellectuals, writers and artists across national boundaries would be critical in such efforts.  Unfortunately south asian intellectuals are often beholden to the bureaucracy. Rarely are they independent.  Moreover, in general, intellectuals tend to adopt nationalistic lines seeing history only from a nationalistic perspective, thinking that the other nation’s history is propaganda and one’s own nation’s historiography is the real objective truth. This has worsened in recent times with the rise of the BJP in India and of rightist Islamic parties.

Intellectuals who have left the “homeland” for the West are not immune from this intellectual cancer. While south asians may unite in critique of the West, when it comes to the homefront, they remain attached to nation. Religion as well has increasingly become a weapon of identity, used not to create a higher level of consciousness but to distance from the other.  In this sense, the neo-humanist mind and paradigm has yet to emerge. Instead, identity is based on geographical sentiments, national sentiments and religious sentiments.

The recent war in Afghanistan has further hardened identity, forcing individuals to be either, especially in Pakistan, strict muslims or western oriented. Layered identity, that is, we are primarily human beings, and secondary national citizens or members of a particular religion, is more difficult to achieve. Indeed, as Marcus Bussey (www.metafuture.org) has argued, neo-humanism should not be seen solely as a theory but as a practice. We must live day to day through neo-humanism, asking ourselves, how in our conversations, our views, our teaching of children do we recreate historical identities, or help create inclusive identities.

Nonetheless, it is imperative that we find ways to encourage citizen to citizen interaction through sports, arts, music and literature, to begin with. To do this, of course, there needs to be travel between the various south asian nations.  However given the intervention of each nation in the Other: Pakistan in India; India in Sri Lanka; and given secession movements in each country, suspicion is natural and travel difficult.  Normalization of borders when the nation-state is under threat appears unlikely especially as violence has become routine in local and national politics.

One way out of this is to begin to focus on ideal futures instead of dis-unifying pasts; that is, instead of asking who actually attacked who or should Kashmir be part of Pakistan or India or independent we need to practice compassion and forgiveness towards the other, to not see the gaining of territory as central to the national and personal ego.  What is needed are meetings among artists, intellectuals, and even bureaucrats to stress areas and points of unity–sufis who are hindu; yogis who are sufi, for example. We need to remember stories of how difference has led to mutual benefit, to glorify how intimacy with the other can create sources of cultural vitality. The usefulness in this citizen to citizen contact is that it will build amity among people who feel the other is distant, who fear the Other.  While citizen to citizen contact did not markedly change US or Soviet policy towards each other, it did create peace forces in each nation, that created dissension when governments insisted on arguing that the other nation was the evil empire.  Citizen to citizen contact ideally will develop into contact between non-governmental organizations that are committed to same ideals: serving the poor, empowering women, caring for the environment, for example.

The nuclear tests in Pakistan and India have led to numerous exchanges between Indians and Pakistanis, largely through the medium of the internet–a dynamic loose association called south asians against nukes has taken off. It intends to lobby governments in both countries to take steps to develop conversations of peace, of shared futures, as well as to set in place fail safe measures to avoid nuclear accidents and provocation by nationalists on all sides.

But most important is not specific issues but the hope that these NGOs may be able to strengthen civil society in each nation thus putting some pressure on politicians to choose more rational strategies, strategies that place humans and the environment ahead of geo-sentiments and geo-politics.  Currently the politician who wants to negotiate with the leader of the other nation is forced to take hard-line aggressive policies (“we will never give up Kashmir or we will never give up nuclear power”) lest he or she lose power to the Opposition. By having a transnational peace, ecological, service movement pressuring each nation’ leaders they will have more room to negotiate and pursue policies that benefit the collective good and security of the region.

Of course, NGOs can as well distort local civil society, as they are financed by external sources. Trade associations, professional groups and other forms of community need as well to be activated along these neo-humanist lines.

While it would be ideal to reduce the likelihood of local leaders to pursue aggressive/nationalistic strategies most likely positive change, paradoxically enough, will come from the globalizing forces of privatization.  Irrespective of how privatization harms labor and small business, it does create a wave of faith in the emerging bourgeois, who in their search for profits are transnational.  The rational ceases to be the nation but the profit motivation.  Profit motivation might begin the process of increased trade, and commercial contacts between the various nations of the south asian region. For Capital, mobility, the free flow of borders is the key to its expansion.  Historical feuds only limit its accumulation. For south asia, unless there are increased economic ties then the capital that accumulates because of privatization will largely go to overseas destinations, Tokyo and New York.  Beginning the process of developing a south asian economic sphere, even it is created by those who have little concern for the environment and for social justice, in the long run will help create more peaceful futures for the region. At the level of the person, business men and women who have to make deals will have to face each other, will have to see that they have common interests. Moreover, they will not be branded as spies by opportunistic political leaders since business can always claim they are only working for national productivity. Of course, , creating economic and cultural vitality through social/peoples’ movements, particularly the cooperative movement, or increasing the rights of labor throughout south asia is even more important – it is creating a more fair society, not the rise of the bourgois that is crucial.

In the meantime, labor, unfortunately, has far less mobility than capital.  Labor leaders who are transnational will certainly be branded as unpatriotic, in fact, in contrast to business leaders, labor leaders will be seen as spies who are attempting to stifle national growth.  Arguing for local economic democracy by contesting the power of the federal bureaucracy and outside economic interests will also not beholden social movements to the power of government and capital. Indeed, decentralization will be misconstrued for secession, in some cases.

However, we can hope that at the regional level as the Other becomes less distant or because of the pressure of external forces, we can envision a time when national policy leaders meet to create a south asian confederation of sorts.  To develop such a larger south asian trade association or confederation, there needs to be agreement or negotiation in the following areas.

Areas of Negotiation

1.         Water regime. The problems here are associated with the use of water for the short term instead of the long term, for the benefit of the few at the expense of the many.  Should water become a joint resource then?

2.         Human rights regime.  The problems in reaching agreement in this area should be obvious since each will claim that the other violates human rights while it has a perfect record.  Action from global human rights associations can help create pressure on local levels. Human rights will need to focus not just on individual rights but the right to purchasing capacity. The right to religion and language will also have to be central in any human rights regime.  We must remember that the debate on human rights in Asia is about expanding the Western notion of liberal individual rights to include economic rights and collective rights. It is not about the restriction of rights but their augmentation.

3.         Nuclear non-proliferation.  This is problematic since India believes that it has to fear China as well as Pakistan.  China sees itself as a global power and thus will not agree to any nuclear agreement, especially given the inequitable structure of the present global nuclear and arms regime.  However, nuclear proliferation promises, as with the US-USSR case, to bankrupt first one nation and then the other – Pakistan is already on the verge of financial calamity.  Given the lack of safety of nuclear installations, it might take a meltdown before some agreement is reached.  Pakistan believes that it must have a dramatic deterrent since it believes most Indians have yet to truly accept partition, independence. Indeed, Indians generally see Pakistanis as double traitors, first for having converted from hinduism to Islam and second for having carved Pakistan from India.

4.         UN peacekeeping forces in troubled areas.  This step while impinging on national sovereignty could ease tensions throughout south asia.  For one, it recognizes that there is a crisis that the leaders of each nation, particularly Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and India, have failed to resolve.  Will we see blue helmets throughout south asia in the near future?  However, peacekeeping should be not restricted to weaponed officers but rather should include community builders–therapists and healers. Recent breakthroughs in Sri Lanka have partly come about through intervention of mediators from Norway. This external peace building as been essential in moving Sri Lanka from its abyss.

5.         Regional conferences at Cabinet level.  While governments often obscure truth, more meetings might begin a thawing process and, unfortunately, if not properly structured, they might further reinscribe half-truths and vicious stereotypes of the Other.  Still, meetings on specific points where there is a great chance of agreement are a great place to begin. Start slow, reach agreement, and build from there, would be a place to begin.

6.         Regional conferences of ngos (environmental groups, feminist groups, peace movement, universal spiritual groups, artists, human rights activists).  This is even more important as it helps build relationships among like-minded individuals who are tired of the symbolic efforts of their own governments, who crave a different south asia.

While all these steps begin the process, the long run strategy would be to encourage a rethinking of identity and an alternate economic and political structure.

Long Term Steps

The long terms steps would be:

1.                  Denationalize self, economy and identity.  This the larger project of delinking the idea of the nation, whether India or Pakistan, from our mental landscape and replacing it with more local–community–and global concepts, that of the planet itself.

2.                  Essentially this means a rewriting of textbooks in south asia. Moving away from the neo-realist real politics paradigm and toward the neo-humanist educational perspective. This means rewriting history as well rethinking the future.

3.         Create Peoples’ movements centered on bioregions and linguistic and cultural zones, that is, begin the process of rethinking the boundaries of south asia along lines other than those that were hammered out by Indian political parties and the British in the early half of this century. This is Sarkar’s notion of samaj movements.

4.         Encourage self-reliance and localism in each zone.  While trade is central between nations and the economic zones, it should not be done at the expense of the local economy.  This is not say that poor quality products should be encouraged, rather on non-essential items there should be competition. The State should not give preferential treatment to a few businesses at the expense of others.

5.         Barter trade between zones is one way to stop inflation.  In addition, it leads to a productive cycle between zones, especially helping poorer zones increase wealth.  These will especially be useful given the upcoming world recession or depression.

6.         Encourage universal dimensions of the many religions and cultures of the area. While this is much easier said than done, it means that individuals have a right to religious expression with the role of the State that of ensuring non-interference from local, national and regional leaders who desire to use religion and its strong emotive content to gain votes.

7.         Develop legal structures that can ensure the respect of the rights of women, children, the aged and the environment. The latter is especially important given that environmental issues are transnational. Indeed, the disastrous climatic after effects of recent nuclear explosions show that the environment is a genuine global rights issue. Eventually, while this is a long way off, we need to consider the creation of an Asian International Court.

8.         Transparency.  Governmental decisions need to be open. Ideally meetings should be televised. Promises made by politicians need to become legal documents so that citizens groups can initiate litigation against corruption and mis-information. The same level of transparency should be expected for corporations as well as ngos.

What this means is that we need visions of the future of south asia that are not based on communal violence but are based on the possibility of dynamic peaceful coexistence – what P.R. Sarkar has called, prama.  The task while seemingly impossible must begin with a few small steps, of Indians and Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Sri Lankans, Nepalese and Bhutanese and other historical groups in south asia finding ways to realize some unity amongst all our differences.

The challenge is to use local categories but not within traditional frames, ie to move through the traditional and the modern to a transmodern.

Future generations will remember that there were those that did not accede to narrow sentiments, that kept alive the idea of south asia as an historical civilization, and thus managed to transcend its Indian birth to become a true universal movement.  Let us begin together to create a new history for future generations.

Certainly with the day-to-day violence through south asia, whether Gujrat or Kashmir, it is difficult to imagine a better future. But by staying within current identities and politics, we doom future generations to poverty. When will we choose otherwise?

[i].          Quoted in Syed Abidi, Social Change and the Politics of Religion in Pakistan. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1988, 239.

A Proutist View of the Futures of South Asia: Steps to a Confederation (2003)

By Sohail Inayatullah

While we are all aware why we do not have peace in south asia, there is a paucity of explorations on how to create a better future. The lack of peace defined as both individual peace (inner contentment), social-psychological peace (how we see the Other), structural peace (issues of justice, particularly territorial justice) and epistemological peace (toward a plurality of ways of knowing) are among the major factors contributing to poverty in south asia. Government expenditures in each nation, especially India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka go for military purposes and not for education or health. Every time a positive economic cycle begins, yet one more confrontation sends military expenditures higher. Few, except military leaders and a few corporations (mostly foreign), benefit from this escalation.

LACK OF VISIONS

Part of the reason for this vicious cycle of confrontation and poverty is because South Asia has been unable to move outside of colonial and partition (or liberation) categories. Conceptual travel outside of British influence is difficult and cultural, economic, military and psychological colonialism and categories of thought remain in south asian internal structures and representations of the self.

Intellectuals in south asia also do not help matters, in fact, we are often part of the problem. Focused on historical investigations and mired in feudal social relations, academic discourse, in general, and the future, in particular, has become fugitive and, when apprehended, made trivial. This is largely because of the style, content and structure of south asian intellectual/State relations. By and large administered by the civil service, appeasing the chief minister (as evidenced by the center stage of the minister at book launchings and public lectures) is far more important than independent intellectual inquiry. It is the State that gives academic discourse legitimacy, since it is the State that has captured civil society. The paucity of economic, social and political resources for the Academy exacerbates, if not causes, this situation.

NATION, STATE AND REAL POLITICS

Colonial history has produced an overarching paradigm that even the interpreters of the hadith and Vedanta must relinquish their authority to. This is the neo-realist model of International Relations and National Development. Caught in a battle of ego expansion, of self-interest, nations function like self-interested egoistic individuals. Economic development can only take place at the national level with communities absent from participation. Thus making peace at local levels impossible. Security is defined in terms of safety from the aggressor neighboring nation, not in terms of local access to water, technology and justice. Only real politics with hidden motives behind every actor and action makes sense in this neo-realist discourse. The task then for most is explaining the actions of a nation or of functionaries of the State. Envisioning other possibilities for “nation” or “state” and their interrelationships, that is, the assumptions that define what is considered eligible for academic discourse remains unattempted, thus the absence of communities, non-governmental organizations, class and other transnational categories such as gender from the realm of what is considered important.

Moreover, structural analysis such as center/periphery theory (a step beyond conspiracy theory) is intelligible but only with respect to the West not with respect to internal structures. Finally, visions of the future, attempts to recreate the paradigm of international relations, strategic studies and development theory through women studies, world system research, historical social change analysis, peace studies, participatory action research or the social movements are considered naive and too idealistic. Worse, it is believed that this naivete and idealism threatens security on the home front. Thus it is fine if class and gender are issues that challenge mainstream politics in the neighboring nation but not in “our perfect country.” What results thus is at best static peace – that is the diplomatic accomodation of official differences and not what Prout founder, P.R. Sarkar calls, sentient peace, or the creation of a mutual ecology of destiny based on shared moral principles.

However even with the dominance of real-politics, idealism does exist, but, in the quest for modernity it has been marginalized. Visions remain limited to evening prayer or meditation, for personal peace, but they have no place in politics or structural peace, except at the level of the State which uses religious practices to buttress its own power and control over competing classes, that is, it appropriates vision into its own strategic discourse.

Again, the dominance of neo-realism and the loss of mutual trust can be explained by many variables. The most important of them is the event of partition – the alleged break from colonialism -that has dominated intellectual efforts. With more than a generation of mistrust, hate and fear, creating alternative futures, not dominated by the partition discourse is indeed challenging. The disappointment of post-colonial society has worn heavy on the south asian psyche – betrayals by leaders and calls for more sacrifices from the people for yet another promised plan is unlikely to transform the weight of the past and the abyss of the present. The future that we have arrived at to is not the final destination for south asia, it is a dystopia. As Faiz has written , “The time for the liberation of heart and mind has not come yet. Continue your arduous journey. This is not your destination.”

POSSIBLE STRATEGIES

Given this history, what are some possible strategies outside of the partition and nation-state discourse. And how can Prout and associated organizations help in these strategies, in creating new visions and realities for South Asia.

The short run strategy for Prout and other social movements would be to attempt to encourage peaceful citizen to citizen meetings between Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, Pakistanis and Indians. These types of associations are very much part of the project of Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team, which provides relief from suffering for all humans, animals and plants. Renaissance Universal Clubs and the organization of Renaissance Writers and Artists Association are other organizations whose mission is transnational. Their effort in creating links between intellectuals, writers and artists across national boundaries would be critical in such efforts. Unfortunately south asian intellectuals are often beholden to the bureaucracy. Rarely are they independent. Moreover, in general, intellectuals tend to adopt nationalistic lines seeing history only from a nationalistic perspective, thinking that the other nation’s history is propaganda and one’s own nation’s historiography is the real objective truth. This has worsened in recent times with the rise of the BJP in India and of rightist Islamic parties.

Intellectuals who have left the “homeland” for the West are not immune from this intellectual cancer. While south asians may unite in critique of the West, when it comes to the homefront, they remain attached to nation. Religion as well has increasingly become a weapon of identity, used not to create a higher level of consciousness but to distance from the other. In this sense, the neo-humanist mind and paradigm has yet to emerge. Instead, identity is based on geographical sentiments, national sentiments and religious sentiments.

The recent war in Afghanistan has further hardened identity, forcing individuals to be either, especially in Pakistan, strict muslims or western oriented. Layered identity, that is, we are primarily human beings, and secondary national citizens or members of a particular religion, is more difficult to achieve. Indeed, as Marcus Bussey (www.metafuture.org) has argued, neo-humanism should not be seen solely as a theory but as a practice. We must live day to day through neo-humanism, asking ourselves, how in our conversations, our views, our teaching of children do we recreate historical identities, or help create inclusive identities.

Nonetheless, it is imperative that we find ways to encourage citizen to citizen interaction through sports, arts, music and literature, to begin with. To do this, of course, there needs to be travel between the various south asian nations. However given the intervention of each nation in the Other: Pakistan in India; India in Sri Lanka; and given secession movements in each country, suspicion is natural and travel difficult. Normalization of borders when the nation-state is under threat appears unlikely especially as violence has become routine in local and national politics.

One way out of this is to begin to focus on ideal futures instead of dis-unifying pasts; that is, instead of asking who actually attacked who or should Kashmir be part of Pakistan or India or independent we need to practice compassion and forgiveness towards the other, to not see the gaining of territory as central to the national and personal ego. What is needed are meetings among artists, intellectuals, and even bureaucrats to stress areas and points of unity–sufis who are hindu; yogis who are sufi, for example. We need to remember stories of how difference has led to mutual benefit, to glorify how intimacy with the other can create sources of cultural vitality.

The usefulness in this citizen to citizen contact is that it will build amity among people who feel the other is distant, who fear the Other. While citizen to citizen contact did not markedly change US or Soviet policy towards each other, it did create peace forces in each nation, that created dissension when governments insisted on arguing that the other nation was the evil empire. Citizen to citizen contact ideally will develop into contact between non-governmental organizations that are committed to same ideals: serving the poor, empowering women, caring for the environment, for example.

The nuclear tests in Pakistan and India have led to numerous exchanges between Indians and Pakistanis, largely through the medium of the internet–a dynamic loose association called south asians against nukes has taken off. It intends to lobby governments in both countries to take steps to develop conversations of peace, of shared futures, as well as to set in place fail safe measures to avoid nuclear accidents and provocation by nationalists on all sides.

But most important is not specific issues but the hope that these NGOs may be able to strengthen civil society in each nation thus putting some pressure on politicians to choose more rational strategies, strategies that place humans and the environment ahead of geo-sentiments and geo-politics. Currently the politician who wants to negotiate with the leader of the other nation is forced to take hard-line aggressive policies (“we will never give up Kashmir or we will never give up nuclear power”) lest he or she lose power to the Opposition. By having a transnational peace, ecological, service movement pressuring each nation’ leaders they will have more room to negotiate and pursue policies that benefit the collective good and security of the region.

Of course, NGOs can as well distort local civil society, as they are financed by external sources. Trade associations, professional groups and other forms of community need as well to be activated along these neo-humanist lines.

While it would be ideal to reduce the likelihood of local leaders to pursue aggressive/nationalistic strategies most likely positive change, paradoxically enough, will come from the globalizing forces of privatization. Irrespective of how privatization harms labor and small business, it does create a wave of faith in the emerging bourgeois, who in their search for profits are transnational. The rational ceases to be the nation but the profit motivation. Profit motivation might begin the process of increased trade, and commercial contacts between the various nations of the south asian region. For Capital, mobility, the free flow of borders is the key to its expansion. Historical feuds only limit its accumulation. For south asia, unless there are increased economic ties then the capital that accumulates because of privatization will largely go to overseas destinations, Tokyo and New York.

Beginning the process of developing a south asian economic sphere, even it is created by those who have little concern for the environment and for social justice, in the long run will help create more peaceful futures for the region. At the level of the person, business men and women who have to make deals will have to face each other, will have to see that they have common interests. Moreover, they will not be branded as spies by opportunistic political leaders since business can always claim they are only working for national productivity. Of course, from a Proutist view, creating economic and cultural vitality through social/peoples’ movements, particularly the cooperative movement, or increasing the rights of labor throughout south asia is even more important – it is shudra viplava, not the rise of the bourgois that is crucial.

In the meantime, labor, unfortunately, has far less mobility than capital. Labor leaders who are transnational will certainly be branded as unpatriotic, in fact, in contrast to business leaders, labor leaders will be seen as spies who are attempting to stifle national growth. Arguing for local economic democracy by contesting the power of the federal bureaucracy and outside economic interests will also not beholden social movements to the power of government and capital. Indeed, decentralization will be misconstrued for secession, in some cases.

However, we can hope that at the regional level as the Other becomes less distant or because of the pressure of external forces, we can envision a time when national policy leaders meet to create a south asian confederation of sorts. To develop such a larger south asian trade association or confederation, there needs to be agreement or negotiation in the following areas.

AREAS OF NEGOTIATION

1. Water regime. The problems here are associated with the use of water for the short term instead of the long term, for the benefit of the few at the expense of the many. Should water become a joint resource then?

2. Human rights regime. The problems in reaching agreement in this area should be obvious since each will claim that the other violates human rights while it has a perfect record. Action from global human rights associations can help create pressure on local levels. Human rights will need to focus not just on individual rights but the following Sarkar, the right to purchasing capacity. The right to religion and language will also have to be central in any human rights regime. We must remember that the debate on human rights in Asia is about expanding the Western notion of liberal individual rights to include economic rights and collective rights. It is not about the restriction of rights but their augmentation.

3. Nuclear non-proliferation. This is problematic since India believes that it has to fear China as well as Pakistan. China sees itself as a global power and thus will not agree to any nuclear agreement, especially given the inequitable structure of the present global nuclear and arms regime. However, nuclear proliferation promises, as with the US-USSR case, to bankrupt first one nation and then the other – Pakistan is already on the verge of financial calamity. Given the lack of safety of nuclear installations, it might take a meltdown before some agreement is reached. Pakistan believes that it must have a dramatic deterrent since it believes most Indians have yet to truly accept partition, independence. Indeed, Indians generally see Pakistanis as double traitors, first for having converted from hinduism to Islam and second for having carved Pakistan from India.

4. UN peacekeeping forces in troubled areas. This step while impinging on national sovereignty could ease tensions throughout south asia. For one, it recognizes that there is a crisis that the leaders of each nation, particularly Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and India, have failed to resolve. Will we see blue helmets throughout south asia in the near future? However, peacekeeping should be not restricted to weaponed officers but rather should include community builders–therapists and healers. Recent breakthroughs in Sri Lanka have partly come about through intervention of mediators from Norway. This external peace building as been essential in moving Sri Lanka from its abyss.

5. Regional conferences at Cabinet level. While governments often obscure truth, more meetings might begin a thawing process and, unfortunately, if not properly structured, they might further reinscribe half-truths and vicious stereotypes of the Other. Still, meetings on specific points where there is a great chance of agreement are a great place to begin. Start slow, reach agreement, and build from there, would be a place to begin.

6. Regional conferences of ngos (environmental groups, feminist groups, peace movement, universal spiritual groups, artists, human rights activists). This is even more important as it helps build relationships among like-minded individuals who are tired of the symbolic efforts of their own governments, who crave a different south asia.

While all these steps begin the process, the long run strategy would be to encourage a rethinking of identity and an alternate economic and political structure.

LONG TERM STEPS

The long terms steps would be:

1. Denationalize self, economy and identity. This the larger project of delinking the idea of the nation, whether India or Pakistan, from our mental landscape and replacing it with more local–community–and global concepts, that of the planet itself.

2. Essentially this means a rewriting of textbooks in south asia. Moving away from the neo-realist real politics paradigm and toward the neo-humanist educational perspective. This means rewriting history as well rethinking the future.

3. Create Peoples’ movements centered on bioregions and linguistic and cultural zones, that is, begin the process of rethinking the boundaries of south asia along lines other than those that were hammered out by Indian political parties and the British in the early half of this century. This is Sarkar’s notion of samaj movements.

4. Encourage self-reliance and localism in each zone. While trade is central between nations and the economic zones, it should not be done at the expense of the local economy. This is not say that poor quality products should be encouraged, rather on non-essential items there should be competition. The State should not give preferential treatment to a few businesses at the expense of others.

5. Barter trade between zones is one way to stop inflation. In addition, it leads to a productive cycle between zones, especially helping poorer zones increase wealth. These will especially be useful given the upcoming world recession or depression.

6. Encourage universal dimensions of the many religions and cultures of the area. While this is much easier said than done, it means that individuals have a right to religious expression with the role of the State that of ensuring non-interference from local, national and regional leaders who desire to use religion and its strong emotive content to gain votes.

7. Develop legal structures that can ensure the respect of the rights of women, children, the aged and the environment. The latter is especially important given that environmental issues are transnational. Indeed, the disastrous climatic after effects of recent nuclear explosions show that the environment is a genuine global rights issue. Eventually, while this is a long way off, we need to consider the creation of an Asian International Court.

8. Transparency. Governmental decisions need to be open. Ideally meetings should be televised. Promises made by politicians need to become legal documents so that citizens groups can initiate litigation against corruption and mis-information. The same level of transparency should be expected for corporations as well as ngos.

What this means is that we need visions of the future of south asia that are not based on communal violence but are based on the possibility of dynamic peaceful coexistence – what P.R. Sarkar has called, prama. The task while seemingly impossible must begin with a few small steps, of Indians and Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Sri Lankans, Nepalese and Bhutanese and other historical groups in south asia finding ways to realize some unity amongst all our differences.

The challenge for the Proutist movement is to use its foundational analytic categories – the social cycle, neo-humanism, prama, maxi-mini wage structures, sentient peace (and not peace based on short term religious or nationalist goals, that is, static peace) to help understand south asia’s present predicament, and offer ways out. To do, Prout needs to ensure that it does not enter short term strategic partnerships with various governments but rather continues to work at creating a strong civil society, what Sarkar has called “uniting the moralists”. Prout must continue to oppose communism, liberalism as well as their metaphysical foundation, that of, neo-realism.

Future generations will remember that there was least one social movement that did not accede to narrow sentiments, that kept alive the idea of south asia as an historical civilization, and thus managed to transcend its Indian birth to become a true universal movement. Let us begin together to create a new history for future generations.

Certainly with the day-to-day violence through south asia, whether Gujrat or Kashmir, it is difficult to imagine a better future. But by staying within current identities and politics, we doom future generations to poverty. When will we choose otherwise?

Alternative Futures of Korea: Beyond the Litany (1996)

By Sohail Inayatullah[1]

Final days but hedge your bets

In Papua New Guinea, farmers are refusing to plant numerous crops, convinced that the world will end in two years. In the year 2000, when the world will not end, not only will they face humiliation, they will face starvation.

Lee Jan-Rim, 44, leader of Mission for Coming Days, was sentenced to two years for swindling $4.4 million form his followers.  It was one of several sects to predict that the world would end in October, 1992.  Lee, however, had bought large amounts of bonds and maturities that extended beyond the October 28 date which was to mark the end of civilisation.

Either Lee was practicing alternative futures or hedging his bets. 20,000 Koreans were caught up in this doomsday craze. Several killed themselves and others deserted their homes, schools and jobs.

The future matters

The future does matter, we constantly act on our views of the future.

Another obvious example is the world economy, our explicit and implicit belief in progress, in the upward rise of economies leads us to invest in certain ways.  When things do not quite turn out the way we envision, fear results.

While few believe they can predict the future, there is general agreement that

(1)        One can often discern emerging issues or trends;

(2)        One can predict the future by creating it, by colonising it;

(3)        Unless one interrogates the future, unless one decolonises the future, others will control and create it;

(4)        A range of alternative futures, scenarios can be posited, which can (a) bound and reduce uncertainty, (b) provide a distance from the present and thus allow for the creation of a new present.

Future generations

In recent times, the study of the future has undergone a tremendous transformation through the paradigm of future generations studies. Instead of predictive-technical concerns, the approach is focused on the

  1. (1)        Family, particularly the extended family,
  2. (2)        Time is seen as repeatable, as cyclical – taking care of ancestors is thus considered critical seen they have ensured that present generations are alive – the future in this sense is very much past based, and not linear as in conventional Western futures
  3. (3)        As important as ancestors are futurecestors or future generations
  4. (4)        The moral/ethical basis of what the future can or might be like are crucial.
  5. (5)        Moral leadership is seen as central in creating a different future

This type of futures studies I believe will be far closer to the East Asian sensibility. Part of the lack of the growth of thinking about the future has been that it has been located in narrow economistic readings and power based international relations perspectives – ie only state configured futures and scenarios are real, issues of culture, gender, myth are avoided.

But future generations thinking allows us to consider the future of the family, the role of cyclicity in human and social systems, the role of the wise leader, and the role of ethics/morality in creating desired futures.

Research on the future of Korea

The literature on the futures of Korea is surprisingly not immense. Whereas a web search  (through yahoo, hotbot and excite) normally lead to dozens to thousands of findings, entering the phrase “the futures of korea” leads to nothing.

A search in the literature in futures studies leads to similar results.

The type of articles that do appear only use the 21st century as an inspiring signifier or forecast narrow and short term economic trends.

There is a UNESCO report titled Korea 2000 but that too is mostly concerned with immediate trends.

Papers on south korea in general focus on economic trends, pointing to growth in its economy, its rise from underdeveloped nation to industrialised nation, all in one generation, with Japan’s present as South Korea’s likely future.

There exists an implicit view of the future of Korea. It is based on the belief that the following: Unification will occur; Korea will continue to development economically, becoming a fully developed nation in not to distant future.  The key to creating a bright future is hard word, strong family ties, sacrifice for the nation or collectivity and han – both as beauty and as resentment against the other. Finally, there is a belief that the future can be modern without being western – there can be an asian way to progress.

Scenarios of Korea’s Futures

Of peculiar interest is a paper by international relations writer Susmit Kumar[2] – quoting the director of the CIA, Kumar argues for three scenarios for the future of North Korea. (1) Peaceful existence, (2) Explosion and (3) Implosion.

The first scenario is the most hopeful and the dream of South Koreans and possibly many North Koreans. The issues in this scenario that are to be resolved are largely economic. They include the following questions: Will the south be willing to allow economic investment in the north if it became too obviously exploitative of wage differentials?  Can the south live with the enslavement of relatives for 10‑20 years `while living standards approach those in the south’?

In the second scenario, North Korea explodes onto South Korea, leading to a full scale war, the devastation of Seoul, and concluding with the total annihilation of North Korea – its removal from the world geographical map.

In the third implosion scenario, the current crisis expands to the degree where the state breaks down and South Korea takes over. The costs to south korea will be high.  Kumar write that it will not follow the West Germany/East germany model since North Koreans have no knowledge of the outside world, or even other parts of their own country. But while many believe, the costs will be too difficult for the south korean, the Confucian “nature” and idea of extended family will make sacrificing for the long term more bearable.

Keun Lee, professor of Seoul National University writes that unification will have to be a slow process – partial unification (some type of federation), economic integration and then complete unification. He calls this the soft landing scenario. He believes this will take about 15 years or so.[3]

Other shorter editorial pieces point to the changing nature of the Korean political- economy – more transparency, more democracy, less corruption, to mention the more obvious trends, and the problems associated with moving to a more western culture. However, these perspectives, more than say anything about the future, say more about the present.

Indeed, the entire unification discourse is very much about the present.  There is already a growing army of political scientists and government officials trying to deal with the nuts and bolts of unification, however, what is not asked is: what will Koreans from the south do when their distant cousins from Pyongyang appear on their doorstep one morning, unannounced.

World futures

Part of the problem in thinking about “out of the box” scenarios is being overly focused on trends.  I argue that we need to take a grander historical perspectives. We need to take  a step back and (1) locate this speculation within a model of forecasting and (2) locate korea’s futures within broader world futures.

At the World Futures level, the most important trend or scenario is that of an asian renaissance led partly through the economic miracle but also through the leadership of ecumenical thinkers as Anwar Ibrahim.[4] He and many others take a perspective of critical traditionalism. They imagine an Asian Century but are not committed to modernism, rather they see religious tradition as the centre point for a postmodern non-european world.  They also do not have an emotional gut reaction against the West or indeed, against any particular civilisation as they have not undergone any personal trauma.  They remain committed to creating a new future that is not a simplistic reaction to the West nor do they play identity politics with dogmatic traditionalists/nationalists.

The counter to this scenario is deep social maldevelopment – as in the case of Thailand, leading to an asian schizophrenia.[5] In this scenario, the costs of hyperdevelopment – loss of tradition, move from traditional society to postmodern society – are internalised.  Identity is no longer anchored, there is nothing to hold on to, only inferiority towards the West and towards others. The result is violence towards others and when that is difficult, violence towards the self and weaker societal members, nature, women and children.

Some questions that can be derived from this scenario include the following.  They are offered by Professor Jay Lewis.[6] What are the costs of the antidote offered by excessive narcissistic nationalism?  Does an over emphasis on `Korea first and best’ lead to distortions in relations with other nations?  Can we expect that the Korean identity is already so strong that we need not worry about schizophrenia, but rather, free people to engage with the emerging world cultures and give them creative license to develop new contributions that are not strictly Korean but hybrid, such as we’re seeing already in fashion?  Is that where the future Korean Nobel Prizes are to be found?

A third scenario is based on the rise of China, not just another market player, but the biggest player in human history. Jay Lewis,[7] asks the following. How will Korea’s world view, its security position, its manufacturing (including sources of leading, value-added technologies) and trading strategies change when China is the largest manufacturing and consuming market in the world?  Will Korea (say, reunified) be willing to `offer tribute’ to China?  Will sadae (`serving the greater’ or paying ostensible tribute to a hegemonic power to pacify it and keep it out of your domestic affairs) re-emerge as Korean policy towards China?  What will that mean for Korea’s relationship with the rest of the world?  Will China’s economic hegemony produce a cultural hegemony?  What would that look like and what would be Korea’s role in that hegemony?  Would it be similar to its traditional role of taking Chinese culture and fashioning something even better or at least purer? Where is the Korean identity then?

In contrast, Professor of Urban Planning, Karl Kim argues that the road to peace, to peaceful reform is through China – the north-south border is too militarized and in a cold war vise – through projects such as the Tumen River project. Unfortunately the US needs a militarized North Korea so that it can keep its own military there.

The fourth scenario is perhaps overly influenced by the current crisis – it is the collapse and the transformation of the world capitalist system and a return to more localised economies where growth is more nature based, more local based, more concerned with meeting basic rights – housing, food, identity and less with the dazzle of bigger is better.  This is a localised world at the economic level and a globalized world at the political level – at the level of governance.  Given this possibility, what will happen to Korea Inc. then?

Beyond the litany

While scenarios reveal horizontal space, they do not give us insight into levels of reality. To do so, we need to move outside of the litany of forecasts. My own method is less to forecast the future and more to create spaces within current discourse to open up the future to alternatives.[8]

(1)        Litany – economic trends and in Korea’s case the vision of surpassing Japan as well as unification.

(2)        Social levels – social and cultural development – issues of social cohesion, education, health (diet, alcohol, cigarettes)

(3)        Worldview – will the idea of Korea change – ie how will it redefine itself – also what is the role of confucianism, shamanism, buddhism and christianity.

(4)        Myth and Metaphor. What is the significance of Han and other central metaphors[9] Will `han’ be used as a reactionary concept that might lead to exclusivism and xenophobia just when Koreans need more contact, openness, and interaction?  What are some other metaphors that differently define Korea’s futures.

Another very important point here is to remind ourselves of how an absurd future can quickly become an obvious one (the fall of communism being the obvious overused one) and how a desired future can become a nightmare.  Dator writes in his work on the futures of Korea that since the unification of Germany, Korean unification is seen more fearfully now ie since North Korea is far poorer.

And even more significantly, what is not thought of, is after unification – what then, what will and should be the desired image propelling us forward. To move forward, we need to go deeper, into worldview and myth and metaphor.

Deep transformations

Tae-chang Kim,[10] a leading korean futurist, believe that the most important way to understand the futures of korea is to not focus on the surface level, but at the deep transition Korea and other asian nations are part of – this is the post-postmodern shift.

This includes a questioning of:

1. Westernism (and favoring the non-West)

2. Monism (and favoring an ecology of faiths)

3. Rationalism (and favoring humanism)

4. Centrism (and favoring the peripheries)

5. Logicism (and favoring values)

6. Anthropocentrism (and favoring the environment)

7. Patriarchy (and favoring gender balance and cooperation)

8. Technologism (and favoring human creativity and innovation).

While Kim sees Confucianism as the wave of the future – ie as the vision of the future he favors, he is quick to point out that the treatment of women is its achilles heal. Lewis argues that equally damaging is its conservatism and willingness to sacrifice present and future generations to preserve the past.  A living sage is not nearly as important as a dead one.

In my own work on dramatic trends changing the future, I focus on four epistemic changes.[11] These are (1) changes in reality (with the drivers being advances in virtual reality,  and postmodernism), (2) changes in nature (with the drivers being advances in genetics and poststructural thought critical of essentialism), (3) changes in truth (with the drivers being deep civilizational multiculturalism, feminism, and the discovery of the other) and (4) changes in sovereignty (with the drivers being global capitalism and cultural capitalism).

These interrelated epistemic changes, I believe, are more important than global demographic changes in favor of the Third World; globalism in favor of capital; and environmental destruction created by presentism; the delinking of the financial economy with the real economy; among other megetrends.  The obvious question is how will these trends impact the futures of Korea? What will Korea look like in a postmodern world? Or can Korea leapfrog this end stage of modernity and offer a non-exploitive Confucian/global ethics?  These and other similar questions remain pivotal if we are to gain any understanding the complexity of the future ahead of us.

Macrohistory and macrofutures

Lastly and most importantly, we need to look at the deep waves of the past, the patterns of history.[12]  They can help structure the trends we see creating the future ie the contour what is possible.

(1)        World systems perspectives would see East Asia as the new centre with the new technologies creating the next long wave of growth (through genetic, nano and other technologies)

(2)        Sarkar sees history as the rise and fall of particular ways of knowing – these include the worker, the warrior, the intellectual and the merchant. History moves through each era, and then the cycle ends when there is a worker revolution at the end of the merchant era.  But instead of leading to a classless society, the cycle keeps on moving.  In Korean history, this is evidenced by the ancient era of communal living, when wealth accumulation was difficult.  The ksattriyan era came about with the rise of the first states and their unification in the 7th century when dynamic and authoritarian leadership was the only way to achieve military success. The vipra domnation was from the 7th-19th centuries when unification was not in question. The warrior classes were diaparaged and buddhism and then neo-confucianism were central. In this century, this has led to the merchant worldview which while bringing untold riches have also barbarized the other classes.

Next then for Sarkar is the shudra era, with a return to collective/cooperative     ownership.  Most likely this will come about through a global depression and      linked environmental disastors. In contrast to this historical dynamic, Eisler             focuses on gender and power.

(3)        Eisler sees history as a pendulum of dominatorship and partnership. For her, Asian cultures are now moving out of their dominator mode and entering a world where women and men work in partnership together. There is of course just a nascent movement, but within 50 years, it should be the main wave.

The importance of these perspectives is they give us a much broader brush to imagine and think about the future – they give us new variables and a new shape of the future instead of just the linear arrow of progress.  They give us the cycle and the pendulum.  They also do not reinforce the hierarchy of nations worldview.  For example, part of current Korean future thinking is the goal of surpassing Japan.  However, this reinforces the idea that the future of another country represents one’s own present, either it has to be followed as in development thinking or somehow surpassed, in either case, the future is fixed – nation-centred and without authentic creativity.

Thus in thinking about the future, we need to not only create alternative scenarios in horizontal space but as well vertical scenarios, that move from the litany to the myth level.

Conclusion

Essentially these tools are to help us not just forecast the future but to imagine a different future.

Certainly if Lee Jan-Rim took such an eclectic view of time and the future, he would not be in prison today. He might argue instead that the world will not come to end, even if we are in the final days of the modern world.

What is needed:

Primary research on: images Koreans have of the future; empirical forecasts/expert forecasts of the future; group visioning exercises – empirical and interpretive research on Korea’s futures.


Notes

[1].         Sohail Inayatullah is senior research fellow at the Communication Centre, Box 2434, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, 4001. Tel: 617-3864-2192. Fax: 617-3864-1813. Email: S.inayatullah@qut.edu.au.  This speech was prepared for the conference, Understanding Korea Society and Culture, Korea Studies Centre, University of Auckland, November 18-19, 1997.

[2].         Susmit Kumar, “North Korea’s Fragile State,” Global Times (July/August, 1987), 27-33.

[3].         Keun Lee, “South and North Economic Integration and New Economic System for the Unified Korea,” in National Development Strategies Toward the 21st Century and Choices for Korea (Seoul, NDI, 1997).

[4].         See Anwar Ibrahim, The Asian Renaissance. Singapore, Time Books, 1997.

[5].         For more on this, see Sohail Inayatullah, “Frames of Reference, The Breakdown of the Self, and the Search for Reintegration” in Eleonora Masini and Yogesh Atal, eds., The Futures of Asian Cultures. Bangkok, Unesco, 1993.

[6].         Email Transmission, October 29, 1997 from Jay Lewis, Oriental Institute, Oxford.

[7].         Email transmission, November, 1, 1997.

[8].         See, Sohail Inayatullah, “Methods and Epistemologies in Futures Studies,” The Knowledge Base of Futures Studies, Vol. 1. Melbourne, Futures Study Centre, 1996, 187-203.

[9].         Han is a difficult term to translate into English as its meaning has not undergone extensive analysis.  Its definition is continuously evolving and the meaning of han remains controversial.  Nevertheless, han has been translated in numerous ways: for example, it has been seen as resentment, lamentation, hatred, and regret.  According to the noted professor of Women’s Studies and Korean Literature, Kim Yong-suk, the fundamental factors that contribute to han can be grouped into five: (1) predominance of men over women and the way of samjong ; (2) inequality of education; (3) emphasis on virtue in women and prohibition of remarriage; (4) concubinage; and (5) the kisaeng system.

Han is more than merely the lack of fulfillment in an unhappy situation.  Han can also bring delight or joy in an unhappy situation.  Han is like an instrument which transcends grief, which comforts oneself.

[10].       Tae-Chang Kim, “Toward a New Theory of Value for the Global Age,” in Tae-Chang Kim and Jim Dator, eds., Creating a New History for Future Generations. Kyoto, Institute for the Integrated Study of Future Generations, 1995, 319-342.

[11].       See, for example, Sohail Inayatullah, “Islamic Responses to Emerging Scientific, Technological and Epistemological Transformations,” Social Epistemologies (Vol. 10, No. 3/4, 1996), 331-349

[12].       See Johan Galtung and Sohail Inayatullah, Macrohistory and Macrohistorians. Westport, Praeger, 1997.

Handcuffed to History and Chained to the Future (1995)

Distant Futures and Alternative Presents for South Asia

By Sohail Inayatullah

In Search of Truths

A saffron robed monk trudges up the mountains of Nepal in search of a great guru.[i] He finally reaches the enlightened One only to find the room full of other seekers.  He patiently waits his turn until he is invited up to the rostrum. There the guru tells him about the future.  India’s future is bright but there will be a period of great difficulty.  First, Pakistan will attack India, possibly with nuclear weapons. China, seeing its opportunity, will follow suit.  To the rescue will be first, Russia, and then, the United States.

The lesson is not that we have been given privileged information–the future is far more mysterious than what mystics or technocrats can imagine–but how the dominant model of international relations, neo-realism, can shape our understanding of current and future events.  Not only are we handcuffed to the past, but we are also chained to the future. Breaking free of these temporal boundaries is not an easy task.  Our language, our theories of the real, our understanding of daily events constantly force us into a fabricated present.  To begin to undo this tapestry of reality, we first develop a working model of the South Asian theory of knowledge and then by moving into the future –through preferred and probable scenarios of South Asia-— we make the present remarkable, that is, we allow it to be seen as a functioning discourse instead of an essentialized reality.[ii] We develop visions and scenarios, not with the concern of predicting the future but with creating the possibility of another space, and thus to open up the present.

The future then becomes a tool to rethink the present.  The future also allows discussion since our identification with a possible future is less intense; we are less likely to hold onto positions and will be more concerned with negotiating possible realities. Finally, in this quest to distance ourselves from the present –that is, to see ourselves from an epistemological site outside of the immediate– we analyze South Asia using the exemplar of present day Yugoslavia, particularly focusing on the problematique of Kashmir.  By moving into the future and moving comparatively in international space, our intention is to undo the chains that create our configurations of South Asia today; chains that, we argue, are complicit in creating war, poverty, and stultifying bureaucracy: state and military.

The Epistemological Boundaries

To begin with, we need to deconstruct the eyes from which we see South Asia, the knowledge frame of reference, the modern episteme from which South Asia makes sense to us today.

As shown by the above allegedly divinely-inspired intuitive forecast, our arena of reference creates the categories from which we know reality.  Thus, even as the mystic is far above reality, his upbringing represents conventional views of international relations in India with Pakistan and China as enemies, Russia as a lifetime friend, and the US –now that India is potentially moving into semi-periphery status– as the new friend to be.  Moreover, the future is not given to us through spiritual categories of reality (categories focused on service, justice, consciousness and compassion), but from a vision which reinforces States and the territories they occupy.  What is important then is what States do (security and economic development) and not how humans act or how ideas can transform history.

Within this State-oriented framework, the essential category is power, framed as a zero-sum game, that is essentially coercive.  Reality is the battle between States, and it exists in the relationships between States.  Strategy is defined in technical rationalist terms with the future seen as a useful arena of study if it can help predict the behavior of other States, and if it can lead to instrumental advantage for a particular State. The future as a site for transformation, for reconceptualizing who we are, how we live, and what we can be is rarely investigated.

The dominance of neo-realism and the loss of mutual trust can be explained by external variables as well. The most important of them is the event of partition –the alleged break from colonialism– that has dominated intellectual efforts. With more than a generation of mistrust, hate and fear, creating alternative futures, new utopias and eutopias not dominated by the partition discourse has been nearly impossible[iii].  The trauma of partition is both used as justification for the strength of this particular accounting of reality but also used as revisionist history; for example, to argue that Pakistan, Kashmir, Bangladesh or even India have existed eternally as nation-states.  States then occupy real territory not imagined social spaces. This territory is metaphorically related to the body. Thus for Pakistanis, losing Kashmir is like death, and for Indians, it is only amputation.

Central to discussions of partition are colonial categories of thought (again, largely nation-state, bureaucracy oriented, with power as essentially administrative and military). Conceptual travel outside of British influence is difficult and cultural, economic, military and psychological colonialism and categories of thought remain in South Asian internal structures and representations of the self.  Knowledge from this perspective is then expert knowledge; it is not critical, rather it is based on the famous five year plan.  Knowledge practices that are more critical of historical categories appear by and large as unnatural acts as they remove the control of knowledge from experts and make problematic the official “one nation, one leader, one path” view of the future. Neither feudal lords, civil service administrators, military strategists nor religious leaders find alternative critical renderings of history, present or future, of great utility since they do not help maintain a coherent center, and have little instrumentalist value.

Being handcuffed to the future means that one ascribes to a view that is expert-based (bureaucracy-driven) in terms of knowledge, state-oriented in terms of the parameters of what is real, and realpolitik-driven in terms of the possibilities of what can happen.  Alternative rendering of the real by peoples and organizations that exist outside State formations (local, national, regional and global), different accounts of power –spiritual, women’s, critical, visionary, for example– are all seen as escapist, idealist, and impractical since they do not conform to the vision of the state planner or his academic counterpart, the Harvard or Oxford-trained economist. Of course, the viewpoint of groups outside of the State nexus is that State power and epistemology imprisons us in a limited view of the world, while those at the periphery –by understanding the dominant view and their own view– have a broader as well as emancipatory view of knowledge.[iv] Statecraft then from a women’s view is merely Mancraft, creating a world where only functionaries and bureaucrats matter, where the value of women and future generations are diminished if not erased.

The South Asian academic discourse has thus remained focused on historical investigations and mired in feudal social relations.  The future, in particular, has become fugitive and, when apprehended, it is made trivial as in the case with the five year plan.  Again, this is largely because of the style, content and structure of South Asian colonial and post-colonial intellectual/State relations.  This has been by and large administered by the civil service wherein appeasing the chief minister is far more important than independent intellectual inquiry. It is the State that gives academic discourse legitimacy since it is the State that has captured civil society.  The paucity of socioeconomic and political resources for the Academy exacerbates, if not causes, this situation.

The South Asian intellectual style is strong on philosophical inquiry (debates over the various schools of Indian philosophy, for example), on history (the dynastic rise and fall of leaders) and commentary (on religious texts and the works of others) but weak at social sciences (hypothesis development, correlation, causation and critical debate) and futures studies (as well as peace studies, ecological studies and women studies). Creativity, as might be expected, is also a non-process in educational sites; memorization of facts (with little attention paid to the social, historical and epistemological context which creates these “facts”), and memorization of particular texts (The Quran or the Vedas) is more important than the meaning that these facts and texts embody.  Their literal memorization does not allow their internalization, thus keeping power in the hands of authority, traditionally the mullah or Brahmin and more recently, the bureaucrat or technocrat.

While most believe that it is the myths of religion that bind the creative and independent mind, the mythology of Statecraft and dynastic oriented colonial history are equally damaging.  This colonial history has produced an overarching paradigm –of neo-realism and developmentalism–that even the interpreters of the hadith and Vedanta must relinquish their authority to.  Caught in a battle of ego expansion and self-interest, nations function like self-interested egoistic individuals. Economic development can only take place at the national level with communities (and thus the traditional ecology of ethnic and religious groups) absent from participation.  Only real politics with hidden motives behind every actor and action makes sense in this neo-realist discourse. The task then is explaining the actions of a nation or of functionaries of the State.

Envisioning other possibilities for “nation” or “state” and their interrelationships, that is, the assumptions that define what is considered eligible for academic discourse, remains unattempted.  Structural analysis such as center/periphery theory (a step beyond conspiracy theory) is intelligible but only with respect to the West not with respect to internal structures or with respect to how minorities within each South Asian nation are brutally suppressed. Attempts to recreate the paradigm of international relations, strategic studies and development theory through women studies, world system research, historical social change analysis, peace studies, participatory action research or the social movements are considered naive and too idealistic.   We are truly chained to the past, present and future. Our categories of the real and their representation in the world of politics make sure of our imprisonment.

Yet idealism does exist, but, in the quest for modernity it has been marginalized.  Visions remain limited to evening prayer or meditation or personal peace, and they have no place in politics or structural peace, except at the level of the State which uses religious practices to buttress its own power and control over competing classes.  The State appropriates visions into its own strategic discourse.  When non-modernist visions do enter politics, they enter in modernist frameworks creating “mullahism” and syndicated “hinduism,” thereby once again reducing the plurality of thought and action.

Finally, because of the dominance of the international relations and national development models of the social, only two types of legitimate texts are possible in the South Asian discourse. The first is the definitive history that explains partition or independence (in India, texts of India’s ancient history are also acceptable); the second is the text that explains the causes of economic underdevelopment.  In Pakistan, doctoral dissertations must travel along the path of national integration, asking the same tired questions: Is Pakistan an eternal state or is it recent? Why has national integration been so problematic? It is the text that defines Pakistani politics and academic life; all other texts remain within its contours.  Those writing in a more technical manner (economics or development) must write on the causes of underdevelopment.  A book on the future, unless it is framed by realist strategic politics or development policies, would be unfamiliar.  To break out of our handcuffs, among other exercises we need to disturb power relations and official representations (and loyal critiques) of the real as reinforced in official and educational texts.  An epistemic change is needed.

The disappointment of post-colonial society has already worn heavy on the South Asian psyche.  Betrayals by leaders and calls for more sacrifices from the people for yet another promised plan are unlikely to transform the weight of the past and the abyss of the present.  But to unchain the future from past and present, visions must not only be able to reconcile the past with the future, but they must also be able to point out the structural limits of change while allowing for the possibility of radical transformation.  Visions must be contextual even as they challenge the context they emerge from; they must spring from metaphor and deconstruct their metaphorical basis. The future, that is liberated, must be a continuous process; it must neither give into cynicism nor succumb to simplistic positive thinking.

Visions of the Future

Fortunately, there are alternative visions for South Asia[v] outside of conventional categories as we show by summarizing the perspectives of various South Asian futurists.

Q. K. Ahmed[vi], for instance, envisions a South Asia based on sustainable development model with economic equity and people’s participation –especially, women, youth and NGOs– in creating indigenous knowledge and action models.  This vision includes increased power for communities and villages as well as basic rights: a right to peace, to work, to education, to housing, to technology, to health services, to information, and to a clean and safe environment.  For Ahmed, political and economic power must be democratized.  If not, we can anticipate continued violence from the unemployed and from ethnic minorities whose voices are not heard, who must be forcibly integrated into the nation-state.  Rights, Ahmed argues, should not be given in “a patronizing sense of providing ordinary income earning opportunities through certain governmental and non-governmental programs, leaving aside the question that they are in reality the source of all power.”[vii]

Other writers have continued this vein but focused primarily on the environment. For example, Barun Gurung[viii] believes that the Himalayan region’s already fragile ecosystem will be ruined by commercialization, development interventions and the resultant population growth.  This will in turn lead to further destruction of Bangladesh as well as northern India. However, Gurung believes that through a radical Buddhism an ecological ethic could develop. The future is not pre-determined and individuals can transform the trends.  For Gurung and others such as Ashis Nandy, it is not religion that is the problem; in fact, it is the secular state in its commitment to develop individuals and regions that has created a violent State.[ix]  What is needed then is a critical traditionalism; a new balance between the secular and the religious, one where the State is fair to all parties and does not privilege the Secular.

Sri Lankan community activist A. T. Ariyaratne[x] envisions a future that links the spiritual and the material.  Ariyaratne sees development as an awakening process that takes place in socioeconomic and individual realms. Individuals remain caught in the State and Developmentalist paradigm and become cynical of what is possible because power remains in the hands of the national and international elites. Ariyaratne’s way out of the present is through social movements focused on community development, self-reliance, and cultural strength. “A simple lifestyle is particularly relevant when the limits to the planet’s capacity to sustain an extravagant materially affluence lifestyle has become clear.”[xi] As with Gandhi, Ariyaratne’s vision of the future then is a global community of villages marked by full participation and the welfare of all.  “Millions of self-governing communities will emerge and to a large extent they will be self-sustaining.”[xii] In this context of awakening, the need for coercive governments will disappear.  Political parties will not attempt to use violence to stay in power and reduce the electoral territory of others.

In Pakistan, for example, there are at least five possibilities.[xiii] The first is a “Disciplined Capitalist Society” in which the military and a strong centrist civil service create the conditions for the development of a national bourgeoisie.[xiv]  The second scenario is “Islamic Socialism” in which basic needs are met through State control of the economy but not State control of cultural and religious life–these remain syncretic and personal.  While populist and egalitarian, this view is still industrial, demanding sacrifices from the people so as to create rich developed nation.

The third scenario is the “Return of the Ideal,” the original intention of Pakistan as a land of the pure and the search for the ideal Islamic polity that existed at the time of the Prophet. While this has remained the ideal, the cognitive dissonance between the Ideal and the reality of vicious politics, ethnic violence, and political corruption has led to a deep cynicism.  Part of the problem has been the nature of the Islamic State. The search for perfection and its unattainability is of course the central problem of Islamic political theory.  Muslims believe that they did have a perfect State and society, and to recover just that becomes the present task. Instead of rethinking the impossible ideal, or developing structures to balance one-man power, advice is given on how to tolerate tyranny.  The result has been an overdeveloped (too much power) State and an underdeveloped civil society (not enough public participation).  Modernity has added to this duality by making the cynicism even more pervasive.

The fourth scenario is the “End of Sovereignty” through military intervention by India, cultural intervention from the U.S., and internal breakdown of the nation into many states.  This fearful perception often leads to extremist renderings of reality, where local culture is saved at the expense of basic human freedoms. The fifth scenario is “No Change” or the continuation of the grand disillusionment, the general malaise, with escape from South Asia as the only rational response.  The poor and middle class travel to the Middle-East while the rich flee to the United States.  The problem is fundamentally moral: how to live with one’s own moral failure when morality is central to personal and social valuation?

Ways out of these particular chains in Pakistan and South Asia might revolve around three vectors; (1) an acceptance of differences instead of a forced unity, (2) decentralization of power and economy, and (3) social design of the future, that is futures where identity and social purpose are reimagined.  The challenge is to create a culture of tolerance, where politics is about negotiating desired futures instead of efforts to paint the Other as the national enemy, as less than pure.  Once the Other becomes the enemy, then the chains of history, of difference, become a noose that daily tightens until all others are the enemy, until no one is quite Muslim or Hindu or Buddhist enough.

But even as we create new visions, the day to day reality is structural constraints imposed by external world authorities.  World Bank enforced privatization, for example, argues B.M. Sinha[xv] only make the chaos of India’s present worse. What is needed are futures focused on social movements that are committed to developing cooperatives, women’s rights, animal rights, and protection for the environment. Without dramatic changes such as limits to land and wealth ownership, new models of growth and distribution, and a balance between spiritual and material life, India will plunge into a massive chaotic and violent revolution.  Sinha looks to new social movements and ideologies, such as P.R. Sarkar’s Progressive Utilization Theory and his samaj (or cultural and bioregional) movements for the answers to the future.  He argues that the city Ananda Nagar, designed by Sarkar, is one example of appropriate ecological and social development, of economic democracy.

However, while these visions offer us hope and inspiration, we need to remember that more than other group it is women who are handcuffed, often by governmental power. Most visions of the future do not recognize how women know the world, their categories of reality, their particular histories, or their alternative visions of the future.  For example, activist Nandini Joshi[xvi] reminds us that it is women who have suffered the most in South Asia.  While changing social attitudes are important it is productive employment for them that would lead to their liberation–to economic security, social status and individual dignity. Without empowering South Asian women, South Asia’s future is bleak.  Joshi’s particular future is Gandhian, specifically she calls for the local manufacturing of cloth in small scale hut industries.  By remaining in the village and recovering traditional local economies, the family can be maintained and women seen as Goddesses not as commodities.

But we do not need to be committed to her particular view of women, which some might argue is Orientalist.  Womanist writer Shivani Banerjee Chakravorty[xvii] believes that a return to a village economy is too simple a solution as it denies the pervasiveness of modernity.  Moreover, the village community does not necessarily guarantee a better future for women as it too is male dominated and vertically structured.  Merely weaving cloth will not create a new future for India or South Asia, more dramatic steps are necessary.  Among them, a reconstitution of women in South Asian thought outside of the nationalist discourse (as in “Mother” India) is a necessary first step. For Chakravorty, women must confront modernity and in collaboration with men create new social structures where women are neither commodified nor deified.  “This is a society where women have not lost the depth and strength of their cultural heritage, but have been able to acquire new strengths from the process of development and are able effectively to transform their quest for gender justice into establishing gender justice with the cooperation … of men.”[xviii] This means seeing women as real people not as archetypes existing primarily in myth.  At the same time, this requires men to find their own place. However, given that South Asia is in a disadvantaged position in the world capitalist economy, meaning unemployment is rampant, it is often easier to blame and abuse those that are the most defenseless–women and children. Gender and power must be reconceptualized in neither modernist nor traditional frames of meaning.

Sensitive to postmodern articulations of power/knowledge, men/women, secular/religious, Sankaran Krishna[xix] has argued for an alternative approach to the task of imaging the future of South Asia, particularly India.  For him, we need to imagine other structural possibilities rather than the peculiar nation-state divisions that presently exist.  However, Krishna does not call for a particular vision rather he seeks to open up conceptual space for a range of new South Asias.  He does however criticize the nationalist discourse. For Krishna continued efforts to protect national sovereignty at the cost of endless human lives is clearly not a preferred future. In the name of national security and identity–most recently in Kashmir–all sorts of violence are committed.  We thus need to radically redefine security and sovereignty and create a world where dissidents can safely walk the streets.  However, this effort is often literally laughed out of course since “national security is serious business … best left to the hard headed, amoral, rational and ever-watchful realists.[xx] Being called idealist is one thing, but often the charge against those who create a counter discourse to national security is that they are traitorous.  Charged such, the debate ends and the discourse of nationalism continues.

But while postmodern visions provide us with theoretical comfort, we cannot forget the visions of war ahead, as in the Yugoslavia exemplar we develop below.  For example, peace researcher, Johan Galtung[xxi] has compared South Asia, particularly India, to the emerging European Community.  This intriguing perspective gives some distance and allows unexpected similarities to emerge.  Both have a memory of past glories, both have a social structure that can carry this mantle and both have a national culture which can provide legitimacy for leadership. Galtung thus sees the future of South Asia as strongly India dominated with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal as peripheries.  Galtung however does not stay in the International Relations discourse as he reminds us that as with all rises to superpower status, the decline is not too far way either.  The cost of the rise, however, will be untold suffering for many and glory for the few as territorial or economic expansion always comes at a cost. While the structural and cosmological reasons for this scenario are evident, certainly this projection of South Asia’s future is one that only center elites would prefer.  Galtung asks, “Does that drama … that prison … have to be enacted again? Why don’t we ever learn?”[xxii]

For Zia Sardar,[xxiii] South Asia is trapped by its past.  Its imagination fitted into an imitative mould.   But equally dangerous is an active and instrumental modernity. South Asia “does not know which way to turn: all roads to the future, it appears, pass through the valley of death … the Indian subcontinent is in the imminent danger of being killed by its own progeny.”[xxiv] Both traditional ideology as well as modernist rationalist fabrications of identity and State must be dealt with. Doing so would unleash the creative imagination that sustains the mythologies of the culture that is South Asia.  The first step in doing needs to be some sort of partnership between South Asian nations and traditions. They must find a place to meet, to transform their recent past and recreate their present. Sardar’s concludes his essay with two words: “come together.”[xxv]

Scenarios

To break out of the past and present, we first need to rid ourselves the socialist state/collective centered model and the market nation/individual centered model as well as the ideologization of religion and tradition.  In terms of alternatives, we have a range of possibilities, as described in the nine scenarios below.  These scenarios should be seen not as predictions but as points of discussion, as reflections on what might happen given various historical trends, and as calls for transformation. They serve as points of possibility and points of warning.

The first is continued chaos and collapse–ethnic violence (and possible fission into many small nations), war, poverty, and powerlessness. This is the Yugoslav situation with ethnicities finding themselves in intractable wars.  Kashmir, for example, has been constructed by all parties as necessary for their national survival, without which national identity is at stake.

The second is hegemony by one actor (India) or by one gender (men) or by one model of economy (market industrialization), and one form of politics (bureaucracy-led with various levels of military intervention).

The third is a return to a communitarian form of life: based on universal spiritual values; local knowledge and endogenous models of development; local forms of economic exchange, and the safeguarding of the environment.   Each culture is able to find spiritual values from their own traditions and use it to recover an ecology of tolerance, of meeting basic needs.

The fourth is some type of dramatic transformation or rupture, whether through a new confederation of South Asia, a new identity, or a new theory of growth/distribution, knowledge/science, and history/future. In this scenario, it is not merely a return to an imagined past, but a creation of a new future. This means that both realism and history must be challenged.

The above visions above are different from the present optimistic mood held by governments, which believe that South Asia will become one the new tigers.  In this fifth scenario, through free trade, smaller more efficient governments, exports will rise and a new South Asian middle class will emerge.[xxvi] This growth leads to an economic confederation (an expanded SAARC), the only way South Asia can survive economically (against the EC, Nafta, APEC) and forth.  It is business with its economic incentives that reduces the power of national identity, thus weakening the link between self, nation and territory.  This could lead to the peripheralization of the smaller nations or could lead to positive lock-ins and increasing returns and growth for all areas: a positive cycle of growth.  Thus a bourgeois revolution would help create a new class more committed material comforts and educational opportunities than tired historical mythologies.  At the same time, such a revolution, while creating a middle class, would further erode the conditions of peasants and proletariat.  Environmental degradation would worsen, and as in the West, the future would be robbed from future generations.

A sixth scenario is that of nuclear war.  This is given great attention to in Western texts[xxvii], although far less in South Asian texts since nuclear weapons occupy privileged nationalistic space.  But to argue against nuclear weapons is to locate oneself as a traitor; one who has betrayed independence, even if going nuclear is certainly the road to economic bankruptcy[xxviii] (As Zulfikar Ali Bhutto promised and accurately predicted: Pakistanis will eat grass to gain nuclear power).

A seventh scenario that is perhaps more creative, certainly less bounded to historical experience, is a Village high-tech model.  In this model, modernity is bypassed and South Asia enters the post-industrial society through computer intelligence, genetic engineering and other sorts of dazzling but miniature new “appropriate” technologies.  Further negative affects of modern industrialism are then minimized.  Not only does a bourgeois revolution occur but it does so without the traditional costs of development–the loss of community.

A related but not as dramatic eighth scenario is focused less on economic or political factors and more on the ability of culture to both destroy and recreate the traditional.[xxix] In this scenario, cultural intertwining through television, videos, connections of South Asian overseas, a type of cultural renaissance from Hong Kong to Abu Dubai led perhaps by Asian VTV and Star Television all create a fundamentally new Asian culture.  This might mean a loss of cultural uniqueness, a loss of cultural integrity, and the commodification of religious and tribal culture but it also might lead to innovativeness and new types of cultural forms such as Bangra Rap, leading to intensified economic activity (for example, new wave, punk, rock and rap are billion dollar industries for the US and England).

In our final ninth scenario, we anticipate a breakdown of South Asia from its present national structures into numerous states.  Each nation within itself would become more of a federation, allowing more rights for minorities.  This is different than the first scenario in that the tension between the local and global is peacefully resolved; economy, culture and polity becoming decentralized but rights becoming more universal.  An independent Kashmir or Khalistan or the division of Sri Lanka might begin such a trend, forcing nations to address the concerns of minorities.

Unfortunately while visions help us out of the present, we are often too soon returned to the national.  The emphasis on mutual hate and fear of the Other continues to dominate discourses on the future and make efforts at critical thought to merely appear as idealistic words, fine for poets and philosophers but inappropriate for the important task of politics.

But our concern is not so much in creating scenarios for their theoretical or aesthetic elegance but in finding ways in which South Asians can increase intimacy among themselves, that is, to create a personal ecology wherein many histories and many futures can co-exist (and thus challenge the nationalist “monology” of unity and fear as the co-drivers of South Asian personal and community identity).  Scenarios are neither true nor false but points of departure which should help us reframe the present.[xxx] The first step in creating an Other is in imagining its possibility. Can we imagine an alternative South Asia where we do not live in such a situation of heightened epistemological distance?  The tragedy remains that Pakistanis and Indians continue to ask each other what does the other look like?

Our effort above has been suggestive, in creating possible pathways out of the present.  To return to intimacy, we can either unlock the handcuffs in history, that is return back in time, or we can go forward in time, to an alternative future.

The question to ask is what might each scenario mean across different variables–how would it affect the State’s coercive power, how would family relations change, how would tradition and culture be transformed?  And more importantly if we believed in a particular vision, if we believed that a scenario could transform reality, we could ask how would that change one’s policy prescriptions, one’s day to day actions? Finally, we could assume a particular scenario had occurred and then backcast into the present, conjecturing on what trends, events, and movements allowed for the victory of one particular discourse.  Backcasting, while useful, in filling events and trends that shape the future, also has an empowering utility, as it helps individuals see that the impossible is often possible.

Spatial Distance

Another way out of the straitjacket of historical and realist discourse is to not move temporally but to move spatially.  We can ask, for example, what can South Asian learn from the breakup of Yugoslavia?  In many ways, Yugoslavia’s present is South Asia’s past: ethnic cleansing, the break-up of a larger State, continued violence between segments of the former State, and extensive outside interference were realities and continue to be concerns for most South Asians since independence from the British.  Yugoslavia can perhaps best learn from the failure–as evidenced by continued violence, poverty cycles, and betrayal of the peoples by the leadership–of South Asian political structures.  But there are important lessons for South Asia as well, particularly with respect to Kashmir, which remains contested cultural, geographical and identity terrain for Pakistan and India as well as Kashmir itself.  To draw out these lessons, we need to first examine the similarities between the two.

Both nations were constructed by outside forces, Western Europeans.  Both regions are cultural diverse, multi-civilizational, multi-religious.  Both have an ancient sense of history but many of their ethnic problems are recent, created by political parties in search of nations rather than nations in search of a State, as the case with indigenous movements such as the Hawaiian sovereignty movement.  While certainly one can take a historical view to understand primordial ethnic urges, often is local political leaders who use the politics of ethnicity, of difference, most easily noticeable in ethnicity, to gain their own political power.  In underdeveloped polities gaining State power means gaining economic power, military power and identity power.  Creating ethnic consciousness then is the first step towards political victory (and eventual suicide) as Milosovic in Yugoslavia and untold many in South Asia have found out.  Ethnic consciousness is further conflated with religion, once again with easily recognizable difference. History is used to create a pure mythology of greatness that others cannot enter: the myth of the Orthodox Serbian people (who resisted the Other of Turkey) or of Pakistan as the purest land of Muslims.

If we examine the present crises in both areas, we see a loose structural correlation. Croatia, it can be argued, is similar to Pakistan, as both are carved out from the larger and more powerful nation, India and Serbia.  Both have sordid pasts: Croatia’s collusion with the Nazis during the second world war and Pakistan’s despicable actions against Bangladesh during the 1971 war.

Using this analogy, Kashmir and Bosnia are both isomorphic. In both cases, the majority are Muslim but there are real minorities.  The Croation bosnians are similar to Kashmiris who want to join with the Pakistanis and the Kashmiri hindus are like the Bosnian serbs who want to join with the mother land, India and Serbia.  That these similarities emerge is not accidental: the politics of nation-state formation, the artificial boundaries created among ethnicities, the playing of religious groups for power by politicians, the interference by external powers, all join to create isomorphisms. The brutality of the Serbs towards the Bosnian muslims and the Indians towards the Kashmiri muslims is similar.  And as can be expected, both justify their actions by arguing that they are merely trying to keep their rightful boundaries in tact; they do not want to lose their land, their nation-state, their sovereign state.  Serbian leader Milosevic did not want a confederation because he feared a breakdown of Yugoslavia.  The Indian argument is the same as was Pakistan’s when East Pakistan wanted more provincial autonomy.  And yet, paradoxically and perhaps causally, each group is intimate with the other (Bosnian muslims with Serb orthodox and Croat catholics in the former Yugoslavia and Muslims with Hindus in India) and each has lived for periods in a peaceful and thriving local ecology. The enemy is both intimate and distant: love and violence stand in proximity to each other–with often only the fragility of civil society, of cultural power, of an ethos of a larger humanity allowing the former to remain.

Finally, many of the problems of these two regions have been externally created by centuries of colonialism, of the external creation of difference.  Turkish rule over Yugoslavia and British rule over South Asia helped create many of these ethnic and religious differences.  Yugoslavia at its independence, however, attempted to create a federation of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians while India’s independence immediately led to the breakdown of the Indian State into the new State of Pakistan (and then Bangladesh).

Each group as well has a history of believing it is oppressed. Serbs believe they were oppressed by Turkish muslims and now by the world community.  Hindus believe they were oppressed by Mogul muslims and then by the British. Both Serbs and Hindus have looked to outside powers for safety: Serbs and Hindus with Russia (and the breakaway states have forged alliances with the traditional rivals of these powers; Pakistan with the USA and Croatia with Germany).

There are fundamental differences as well and thus we should not push this analysis too far. For example, Pakistan is far more similar to Bosnia, as both are intended states, whose identity has been recently invented, unlike Croatia, Serbia, and India, who have much longer “national” histories.

Clearly, these are different regions, with different histories, and much of the similarity is correlation not causation based, albeit given the history of nation-state and the suppression of ethnicities in this development, and given both nations location in an asymmetrical world-economy, we should not be surprised to see so many isomorphisms. In any case, the purpose of this analysis is to open up possibilities of new frameworks not become bogged down in a search for similitude nor to develop a comparative theory of nation building and nation failing.

Futures and Kashmir

Given these structural similarities what can we deduce about possible policies with respect to the peace in the regions’ future? That is, what can we learn from the breakdown of the Yugoslav state in understanding and potentially diffusing the current crisis in Kashmir.  Kashmir is important, particularly for Pakistan and India, in that it is the symptom of perpetual crisis, the rallying cry used to gain weapons of horror, of diverting funds from education to war, of creating a syndicated Hinduism and an extremist, hard Islam.  Solving the problem of Kashmir would then begin a process of reconciliation, of peace, and thus the creation of positive cycles of trust, cultural exchange, and economic interdependence.  What follows are a series of policy prescriptions that might aid in minimizing the loss of human life and help in keeping the future open in Kashmir in particular and in the region in general.

(1)        Early recognition without peacekeeping forces is a mistake. The world community should not recognize an independent Kashmir without strategically located peace forces. Recognition will invite a free-for-all far worse than the present battle between Pakistan and India.  As with the Yugoslav case, it will increase violence and almost certainly lead to a prolonged three or four nation war.  However, if there are enough reasons for recognition then peace forces must be first activated.

(2)        But before peace forces can be activated one needs peace building.  Much of the violence in Yugoslavia could have been averted if people’s organizations, women’s groups, and other social movements were stronger. We need to encourage transnational peace groups, women’s groups, human rights groups, spiritual groups and others outside the nation-state fabric to build bridges, to create possibilities for intimacy within Kashmir and between India and Pakistan. Doing so would allow for alternative futures then present. However, one might argue that it is already too late given the escalation of violence. Certainly this is largely the case, but the question remains: is it possible to build peace through people’s organizations not wedded to state-centered solutions that deny women, labor, child and human rights as an explanatory framework and as a basis for policy formulation in Kashmir? Certainly Statist solutions merely expand the crisis: from Kashmir to Sindh, for example in Pakistan. Military solutions merely strengthen the military bureaucracy creating a discourse from which escapeways continue to narrow.[xxxi]

(3)        At the level of theory development, we need to remember that ethnicity and religion are not Platonic categories but categories used by political parties to gain electoral power. In this sense they are recent.  Milosevic was victorious because he promised that Serbs would never again be oppressed.  He used ancient Serb identity–suppressed by Tito’s communism–to increase his own power (as with the BJP, for example).  These efforts must be intellectually resisted and we must create alternative renderings of history that see ethnicity as politically and socially created. Localism in the form of economic incentives for local groups to, for example, resist international capital and the drainage of wealth and ideas that follow needs to be encouraged. But localism must be based on a larger universalism, committed to enhancing material benefits.

(4)        Finally, U.N. economic sanctions against any of the parties is a mistake. In case Indian brutality increases, sanctions should not occur. They only reproduce nation (uniting India against the outside Other and hardening positions that might previously have been negotiable) and ethnicity and succeed in only destroying the power base of the local opposition Party (since it is now seen as counter to national interest).  The main economic result is the impoverishment of the elderly, women and the middle class and the creation of a new class of international smugglers. Sanctions represent a failure in developing creative solutions to the problem of aggression against minorities and against other States.  We need to find other forms of “sticks” and “carrots” examining not only military and economic power but people’s and cultural power. We also need to understand that leadership in most states is not representative of the “will” of the people.  Elections are often fraudulent and coercive measures are used by the ruling Party so it can stay in power–Milosevic and Saddam Hussain are prime examples. Sanctions do not create help in dislodging an unpopular ruler; they merely lead to more extreme positions, creating a psychosis of fear.

The policy and theoretical task is both to keep the past and future open and be cognizant how both can be used by various political forces for their own gain.  Opening up past, present and future allow for a more negotiable future, however, it also allows for fictions of natural superiority to pollute the discourse. The opening of temporality must be done in the context of a humanistic ethics, of understanding the categories and reality of the Other.

We thus need to find ways to keep the future open in Kashmir and South Asia in general.  Part of this is a struggle of             developing competing understandings of the real: of the problematic nature of ethnicity, representation and democracy, and of finding ways of legitimating alternative histories and futures into popular discourse.

Conclusion

Given the visions, scenarios, and comparative analysis above, can we narrow our prognosis? Are there chances for positive peace ahead?

For South Asia, economic and cultural confederation based on sustainable development and rights for all minorities is preferred–since it promises peace and cultural interaction–but given the present paradigm: how national identity is structured, how history is taught, and the dominance of the language of statecraft, it is unlikely.

At the same time, cultural history (an agreed upon origin) and cultural authenticity is far more problematic with sovereignty threatened from above and below. Thus, while there are strong reasons for the continuation of the present, the breakdown of history and culture, from the globalizing forces of technology (modern technologies and postmodern ones such as genetics, virtual reality, and robotics) and capitalist development make the present problematic, indeed, unlikely.

Globalization can lead to another possibility for the entire region: a fundamentalist future.[xxxii] Fundamentalism occurs when change is too quick, when religious authorities lose their traditional place in society, when knowledge is no longer hierarchical, that is, when the place of traditional experts in society is dislodged.  However we have had twenty years of this in Pakistan and few years of this process in India.  In Pakistan’s case, the bourgeois forces may prove much stronger than fundamentalist or feudal forces as the brief success of Moin Querishi hinted at.  While India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh have not been as fortunate to have a South Asian leader who had a career outside national political power, who was in power to leave official power, similar forces are operating there. However, this is not to argue that these States will continue along a simplistic Western modeled secular path, rather a new configuration of the religious and the secular has to be forged–this will be an indigenous good that has some transcendental appeal much as Western democracy, i.e. the separation of the civil and the religious, has had in the last few hundred years.  Creative futures for South Asia will depend on that type of alternative political and social theory.  Without these visions, with the present unlikely and the trends towards peace difficult, if we are not careful then continued war will be our future.

Our purpose has been to make past and present more porous, to use the future to rethink the past and the present. There are always many pasts, many presents and many futures.  We need to find ways in which we can peacefully negotiate them. But it will be difficult to break from history and conventional images of the future.  Deep animosities exist among South Asians.  Just as the Serbs feel that Bosnian muslims are double traitors, since they converted to Islam and now to a new State, Indians have the same perception of Pakistanis.  At some time in history, muslims left some hindu sect and then finally left the nation itself.  This feeling of betrayal takes time to heal and understand.

For Pakistanis, far more important than national integration is the need to place faith on human rights, economic justice, on differences between themselves instead of using India as an enemy to create national unity. This type of unifying strategy is only successful for the short run.  In the long run it creates an inner enemy, an inner demon, that destroys one’s mind and heart leading to the deep betrayal of civil society; a betrayal India and Sri Lanka are now discovering.  Hopefully by looking forward and by looking around we can avoid this type of future and instead create one based on difference and unity, on creative renderings of history and of the local and the universal.

This means committing ourselves to the needs and concerns of future generations, of taking policy steps, of finding theoretical frames that allow for more open pluralistic futures; futures that can then be enjoyed by our children and their children, whether Pakistani, Indian, Sri Lankan, Bangladeshi, Nepalese, or Bhutanese. Whatever the local identity of future generations, let us hope that they are first of all humans who happen to live in South Asia and act in ways to preserve and expand our essential humanity.

Notes

[i] This story was told to me through e-mail by Acharya Prasidananda Avadhuta, who has with all such stories, heard it from another monk.  E-mail transmission, 1993.

[ii] See Sohail Inayatullah, “Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Future,” Futures (March 1990).

[iii] As one Pakistani professor born in the 1930’s commented: “We are the lost generation, with no hope or vision, only the inhumanity of a world war, the bitterness of partition and the mockery of post-colonial society. We cannot create the future.”

[iv] Joyce McCarl Nielsen, “Introduction” in Joyce McCarl Nielsen, ed. Feminist Research Methods.  Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990.  P. 10.

[v] These are based on a special issue of Futures (November 1992) guest edited by Sohail Inayatullah. See, Sohail Inayatullah, “Introducing the Futures of South Asia,” Futures (November 1992).

[vi] Q.K. Ahmed, “Policies and Strategies for sustainable development in Bangladesh,” Futures (November 1992).

[vii] Q.K. Ahmad, “South Asia: Economic Growth and Human Development with Equity, Security and Sustainability–National and Regional Perspectives,” 15 in Sohail Inayatullah, Alternative Futures for South Asia (forthcoming).

[viii] Barun Gurung, “Towards Sustainable Development: A Case in the Eastern Himalayas,” Futures (November 1992).

[ix] Ashis Nandy, ed., Science, Hegemony and Violence. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990.

[x] A. T. Ariyaratne, “A Society Based on Eternal Laws,” in Sohail Inayatullah, ed., Alternative Futures for South Asia (forthcoming).

[xi] Ibid., p. 21.

[xii] ibid., p. 26.

[xiii] Sohail Inayatullah, “Images of Pakistan’s Future,” Futures (November 1992).

[xiv] “Born to Rule,” The Herald (June 1991), pp. 31-33.

[xv] B.M. Sinha, “India Towards a Social Revolution,” Futures (November 1992).

[xvi] Nandini Joshi, “Women Can Change the Future” Futures (November 1992).

[xvii] Shivani Banerjee Chakravorty, “Can Women Change the Future?” Futures (November 1992).

[xviii] Ibid., p. 941.

[xix] Sankaran Krishna, “Oppressive Pasts and Desired Futures: Re-Imagining India,” Futures (November 1992).

[xx] Ibid., p. 865.

[xxi] Johan Galtung, “On The Way to Superpower Status: India and the EC Compared,” Futures (November 1992).

[xxii] ibid., p. 928.

[xxiii] Zia Sardar, “On Serpents, Inevitability and the South Asian Imagination,” Futures 24/9 (1992).  pp. 942-949.

[xxiv] Ibid,. p. 942.

[xxv] Ibid., p. 949.

[xxvi] Lee Kuan Yew has made a case for this possibility.  But to achieve this vision there needs to be land reform, and then technology and investment from an external dynamo (perhaps south-east asia), complimented with a long term focus on technical education (and not the hereafter), as well as consensus politics.  See Lee Kuan Yew, “The Vision for Asia,” The Muslim, 20 March 1992, p. 2.

[xxvii] See, for example, Richard Lamm, Mega-Traumas. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1985.

[xxviii] See Dr. Inayatullah, “The Nuclear Arms Race Between Super Powers: Some Lessons for Pakistan and India,”(Paper Prepared for Pakistan Social Science Forum, 1993).

[xxix] For a series of essays that develop this perspective by authors such as Zia Sardar, Ashis Nandy, and Susantha Goonatilake, see Yogesh Atal and Eleonora Masini, eds., The Futures of Asian Cultures. Bangkok: UNESCO, 1994.

[xxx] For further analysis of this position, see Sohail Inayatullah, “From Who am I to When am I” Futures (May 1990).

[xxxi] Dr. Inayatullah, “Creating Order Without Law and Justice: An Elusive Chase,” (Paper Prepared for the Pakistan Social Science Forum, 1992).

[xxxii] For more on this, see Sohail Inayatullah, “Why Khomeni Wants Rushdie Dead: Understanding the Postmodern World,” Third Text (Summer 1992).

An Introduction to Futures Studies Alternative Global and South Asian Futures (1994)

By Sohail Inayatullah

Introduction

The task of this article is to introduce futures studies methods using as data, alternative global and regional futures.  I will first touch upon the history of futures studies, compare futures studies to planning and policymaking, propose a typology of futures studies, present a range of methodologies and then conclude with scenarios for the futures of the world and South Asia.

In most cultures humans have had a deep interest in what will happen. Glossing over human history, we can identify three types of attempts to understand the future.

(1)  Astrology: In this view, life has patterns as evidenced in the stars.  The basic ontological position was: as above, as below; heaven and earth should match.  Not only could the world within be predicted but so could the world without.  By and large, astrology helped individuals avoid dangerous circumstances by providing an early warning system.  However, it helped to believe in the system since warnings and forecast as well as psychological analysis were of a general nature.

(2)  Prophecy: Prophecy assumes that certain individuals have access to deeper levels of mind, thus allowing them to see the future–to give glimpses of not only might be but more importantly, the seer as social change activist, of what can be. The world for the few, those with higher, or more complete mind, can be predicted. Unlike astrology, prophecy was not based on the relationships between stars or other criteria, rather it was visionary in nature, used to create new systems, new worlds, rather than predict specific events. Prophecy was often located in one individual or a group of individuals.

(3)  Forecasting:  While astrology and prophecy are given less credence by the moderns, it is forecasting that has become the technique par excellence of planners, economists and social scientists.  Behind this is a perspective that desires to make the world more stable, to control the future.  The assumption behind forecasting is that with more information particularly more timely information decisionmakers can make wiser decisions.  Having more information is especially important now since technology has broken with or cultural life; since the rate of change has increased; and since the world is controlled by powers that seem larger than us. Because of these factors, we need to determine what might be, the strategic future environment.

In recent times, futures studies has particularly grown. It has been modernised and adopted by corporate planners, policy institutes and government planning bureaus.  Futures studies has become linked with short and long range planning. But there are some real differences between futures studies and planning.

Planning and Futures

When compared to planning, in general, the futures approach is (1) longer term, from five to fifty instead of one to five (2) more concerned with creating the future instead of predicting the future, (3), committed to authentic alternative futures where each scenario is fundamentally different from the other while planning uses the language of alternatives but scenarios are often mere deviations from each other, (4) is less located in a particular bureaucracy, for example, in the Ministry of Economic Development; (5) committed to multiple interpretations of reality (role of unconscious, of national mythology, of the spiritual, for example, instead of only views of reality for which empirical data exists); (6) futures is more participatory attempting to bring in all types of stakeholders instead of only powerbrokers; (7) futures is more concerned with working together with different stakeholders so as to build legitimacy in a plan and the planning process, which is, if not more so, as important as the elegance of the plan itself; (8) is less instrumentalist, concerned with more than just profit or power; and, (9) while a technique, like planning, futures studies is also very much action oriented. It is as much an academic field as it is a social movement.

From the planning discourse, futures studies is merely one approach among many in creating a good plan. Planning can have many dimensions of which four are critical: Problem Orientation (challenges ahead), Goal Orientation (what we want, objectives), political orientation (to assuage the administration or leader) and futures orientation (long term). Futures studies is useful as long as it aids in planning for the future and not in making problematic the politics of planning and policymaking.

Policy Analysis, Planning and Futures Research

The growth of futures studies is also a result of the desire of government to find information that can aid in making better policy, specifically toward the long term and toward projects that might have second or third order affects.  For many, futures research is merely long term policy analysis or research.  But from our perspective, there are real and important distinctions between futures research and policy research/analysis. Some of these are: (1) While policy analysis is short range, futures studies is long range in its theoretical and action orientation; (2) Instead of choosing one policy, examining the range of futures is the focus of futures studies.  However, as with policy research, the goal is not only to create new organisational directions but clarify current management decisions.  While we may not know the future, we can determine what we want; (3) Futures studies is much more concerned with making basic assumptions problematic. Through what-if questions and scenarios, the intention is to move us out of the present and create the possibility for new futures. Policy analysis is concerned with analysing the viability of particular policies not calling the entire discussion or the framework of decisionmaking into question.  Like planning, policy analysis is more technical in its orientation; (4) Futures studies is more vision oriented than goal oriented (which is central to policy analysis and planning). Futures studies attempts to move from goals to visions.  Visions work by pulling people along. They give individuals and collectivities a sense of the possible. They also inspire the noble within each of us by calling individuals to sacrifice the short term for the longer term, for the greater good.  Finally, they help align individual goals with institutional goals. Moreover, while goals or objectives can be operationalized, visions cannot. An organisation or nation or civilisational will decline without a vision as Fred Polak as argued in his The Image of the Future.  A vision thus must be extra-rational, must include a leadership dimension, a spiritual dimension and a material dimension. This clearly is more than the traditional planner or policy analyst is willing to consider in his or her planning process. (5) The role of the policy analyst/planner and futurist in an organisation often differs. Within most planning exercises, plans are written so that the nation or organisation can appear modern, so it can give the appearance that the future is under control.  The futurist might want actual fundamental transformation while the planner might want to fulfil economic targets that the Leader or Chief Executive Officer has set out to reach. (6) While futures studies attempts to acknowledge the different ways individuals construct the world, policy analysis often takes a limited view of knowledge approaches. For example, individuals behave quite differently in learning situations, whether at conferences or boardroom meetings. Some are creative; some are critical; some are practical; and others are passive.  Different strategies mean different things to different people.  There are different knowing styles and different leadership styles.  To gain consensus in any policymaking process it is crucial to acknowledge these differences.  This is especially important when placed together in one room are those who want to get something done today; those who want create a new future; those who want to criticise past, present and future; and those who want to do nothing.  Good planning, policy analysis and futures research needs to acknowledge contributions from all these sorts of people.

In general, in planning and policy analysis, the future is often used to enhance the probability of achieving a certain policy, the task is to make the future less certain.  The future becomes an arena of conquest, time becomes the most recent dimension to colonise, to institutionalise and domesticate.  Futures research, however, intends to liberate time for strict technique, from instrumental rationality.  It asks what are the different ways one can “time” the world?  How, for example do different cultures, groups, organisations imagine time?

Of course policy analysis itself is a dynamic field.  For example, new models of policy development have attempted to go beyond muddling through (as needs or problems come up), rational-economic decisionmaking (material goals) and satisficing (do what you can given limitations), arguing primarily that these strategies are not useful during times of rapid change and dramatic crisis.  Muddling through, in particular, is not useful during times of rapid change since incremental policy change does not help the organisation or nation transform to meet dramatic new conditions.  The rational-economic model is useful at setting and achieving objectives but it does not into account extrarational efforts. It is overly dependent on quantitative factors, reinscribes self-interest and national self-interest (balance of powers). Satisficing, while getting the job done, does not ask was the job worth doing?  Interest in finding ways to include the possibility of discontinuous change, of forecasting trends before they emerge, has been a natural progression in the evolution of the policy sciences.  Futures studies fits well into the effort of finding better ways for government and business to incorporate the unknown within dicisionmaking.

Policy researchers and planners believe that the forecasts and visions of futurists are often not useable.  Among other suggestions, the following are given to make forecasts more useful.

(1)  The forecast must be credible, the policy must be achievable or if apparently unachievable, research into what shifts might increase the probability of the event occurring need to be determined.

(2)  Forecasts need to give adequate time for the desired      outcome to be achieved or the undesired event to be avoided–enough lead time is a crucial criteria for a useful forecast.

(3)  Feedback and monitoring need to be including in the policy impact cycle so as to be able to judge the accuracy of forecasts as well as to determine if organisational responses to emerging issue were effective.

(4)  The forecaster needs to be aware of the limitation of the methodology employed.

(5)  Forecasts must be clear and in language that the policymaker can understand.  The language should be accessible to the policymaker.

(6)  The structure of the forecast should be compatible with the politics and the culture of the organisation.

(7)  The forecast must create an image that will inspire and challenge the organisation or nation if it is to be of use to more than those in the Planning Office.

However, by and large, futures research is often less concerned with predicting the future than with attempting to envision novel ways of organising how decisions are reached and who participates in these decisions.  It does this by asking participants to envision their ideal organisational world, and then aid in creating strategies to realise that world.

The Politics of Forecasting

Moreover from a critical view, to suggest that policy futures statements must be clear to the policymaker is at some level, just banal.  Institutions create obscure language because that language serves particular interests.  It is the analysis of those interests (and the mechanisms which they employ to seek and maintain power) which becomes the vehicle for investigating what images of the future are possible and which likely to achieve reality.  In this sense, how to make better policy or more future oriented policy without investigating the political interests of certain policies is equal banal.  Organisations stay focused in the present as bureaucrats and others are served by the present structure.  Attempts to create new futures can undermine present power structures.  Administrators agree to consider the future only to gain new political alliances or to achieve modernity (gain funding or prestige)  but rarely to make structural or consciousness changes.

Furthermore to assume that better forecasts, or more information, will lead to better decision and policymaking forgets that policies are often made irrespective of the “facts.”  Often what is needed is a will to decisionmaking not a ingenious plan or forecast.  When decisions need to be made, a consultant, provides the legitimacy or the information to make that decision because of lack of legitimacy, courage or for local political reasons.  Thus futures studies and policy analysis needs to be located in a discourse that makes problematic information and its distribution and not in one that posits that information is neutral or that its circulation in institutional settings is apolitical.

To summarise the above positions, it is useful to envision policymaking, planning and futures process as having three dimensions or types.  The first is predictive, the second is cultural/interpretive and the third critical.[ii]

In the predictive, language is assumed to be neutral, that is, it does not participate in constituting the real, it merely describes reality serving as an invisible link between theory and data.  Prediction assumes that the universe is deterministic, that is, the future can be known.  By and large this view privileges experts (planner and policy analysts as well as futurists who forecast), economists and astrologers.  The future becomes a site of expertise and a place to colonise.  In general, the strategic discourse is most prevalent in this framework with information valued because it provides lead time and a range of responses to deal with the enemy (a competing nation or corporation).  Linear forecasting is the technique used most.  Scenarios are used more as minor deviations from the norm instead of alternative worldviews.

In the cultural, the goal is not prediction but insight.  Truth is considered relative with language and culture both intimately involved in creating the real.  Through comparison, through examining different national or gender or ethnic images of the future, we gain insight into the human condition.  This type of futures studies is less technical with mythology as important as mathematics.  Learning from each model–in the context of the search for universal narratives that can ensure basic human values–is the central mission for this epistemological approach.  While visions often occupy centre stage in this interpretive view, the role of structures is also important, whether class, gender, or other categories of social relations. Planning and policy analysis rarely practice an interpretive cultural form of goal setting or impact analysis.

In the critical, futures studies aims not at prediction or at comparison but seeks to make the units of analysis problematic.  We are concerned not with population forecasts but with how the category of population has become valorised in discourse, for example, why population instead of community or people, we might ask?  The role of the State and other forms of power in creating authoritative discourses is central to understanding how a particular future has become hegemonic.  Critical future studies asserts that the present is fragile, merely the victory of one particular discourse, way of knowing, over the other.  The goal of critical research is to disturb present power relations through making problematic our categories and evoking other places, scenarios of the future.  Through this distance, the present becomes less rigid, indeed, remarkable.  The spaces of reality loosen, the grip of neo-realism, of the bottom line, of the predictive approach widen, and the new is possible.  Language is not symbolic but constitutive of reality.  While structures are useful, they are seen not as universal but particular to history and episteme (the knowledge boundaries that frame our knowing).

Ideally, one should try and use all three types of futures studies.  If one makes a population forecast, for example, one should then ask how different civilisations approach the issue of population and finally one should deconstruct the idea of population itself, relating it, for example, to First World consumption patterns.  Empirical research then must be contextualised within the civilisation’s science of which it emerges and then historically deconstructed to show what the particular approach is missing and silencing.

In the first type of futures studies (most comfortable to planners and policy analysts), by and large techniques such as linear regression, multiple regression, factor analysis and econometrics are used.    All these assume that the future is based on the linearity of the past.  They all assume that the empirical world can be known and that the universe is fundamentally stable, with reality primarily sensate.     But given that specific events can throw off a forecast, futurists re-invented Delphi, or expert forecasting (done in many rounds so as to gain consensus and done anonymously so as to reduce the influence of a particular opinion maker).[iii]      To link events and trends, futurists developed cross-impact and policy impact analysis, to see how trends might change the probability of particular events. These are run numerous times.  Policy impact examines how the legislation of a new policy, special economic advantages for certain groups, for example, might impact other social or economic trends.

Values

While these models can be useful, they do not include values.  They also assume research is conducted in an isolated setting, that is, research is divorced from the institutional and epistemic framework all of us exist in.  Researcher disinterest becomes critical.  However, what questions one asks, how one asks them, as well as the larger issue of what one considers of value are much more important in understanding the future.  Moreover, as participatory action research informs us, subject and object, theory and data, should be interactive, dynamic. We cannot and should not remove ourselves from the research environment.

Chaos

As general agreement has been reached that the empirical is not stable, chaos theory has become paramount as an attempt to manage disorder as well. The goal is to create a stable world, with the hope to transform social structures by a precise effort, by acting upon a few attractors, a few variables. Even though chaos theory appears to be a break from traditional social sciences, in fact, chaos is a version of ordered empiricism. Chaos has become important not because its metaphors make more intuitive sense or because it validates classic myths, Siva dancing, for example, but because it can be used as a forecasting tool to predict the future.[iv]

Thus, most forecasting remains technically rich not meaning rich. It continues the vision of instrumental rationality, the metaphors of modernity, of the West but not only the West as provider of wealth, but also as owner of time itself.

Using the cultural framework, to expand our vision of how we can think about the future, we need to try some other avenues.  To begin with, if we assume that how we think can influence how we act, then we need to investigate what our basic concepts of space, time, self and value are.

Guiding Metaphors of the Future

One way to open up the future, to investigate preferred and possible futures is to examine the metaphors cultures and individuals use to describe the future.  In this method, one begins with conventional Western (because they are “universal”) metaphors of individual choice and rationality.

The first image is that of the dice.  It represents randomness but misses the role of the transcendental. The second is the river leading to a fork.  It represents choice but misses the role of the group in making decisions. The third image represents the ocean. It is unbounded but misses the role of history, deep social structures, and direction. The fourth image is that of a rapid emersed with dangerous rocks.  It represents the need for information and rapid decisionmaking.  It does not provide for guidance from others: leadership, family, or God. Less tied to Western images, other useful metaphors (from Fiji, the Philippines, India. among other sites) include the coconut tree (hard work to gain rewards); coconut (useful in many ways and having many purposes); onion (layers of reality with the truth invisible); snakes and ladders game (life’s ups and downs are based on chance, the capitalist vision); and being a passenger in a car where the driver is blind (sense of helplessness).

What is important in this method is to find relevant metaphors based on the policy community’s own cultural and historical experience and use these metaphors to construct an authentic vision of desirable and dystopic futures.

Emerging Issues Analysis

While metaphors help create an indigenous futures, they are less useful in predicting what might be ahead and in disturbing conventional views of what is likely.  Most futures researchers use trend analysis to determine what issues are about to become public.  However, prior to becoming a trend, is it possible to identify a nascent issue, an emerging issue?  According to James Dator,[v] emerging issues are those that have a low probability of occurring but if they emerge, will have a dramatic impact on society.  However, since these issues are often undeveloped, Dator argues that one indicator of knowing that an issue is really an emerging issue instead of a trend or problem, is that it should appear ridiculous.  Issues should thus be disturbing, provocative, forcing one to change how one thinks, especially in challenging assumptions about the nature of the future.  Besides searching for emerging issues among those individuals and groups outside of conventional knowledge boundaries (the periphery, for example), to identify emerging issues it is first important to scan the available literature.

Scanning

In scanning one has to digest vast amounts of literature and be able to determine what is within the paradigm, and what is outside, and what can transform the paradigm.  Where are the leakages? What doesn’t it make sense?  Issues that straddle these boundaries, that are outside conventional categories often have the potential of becoming emerging issues.  Some examples of emerging issues are:  Rights of Robots; genetic engineering ending sexual reproduction rights; denial of sovereignty to certain nations; a new UN (house of nations, house of NGOs, direct citizen election, house of world corporations and a world militia); the end of capitalism. All these issue are generally seen as unlikely but if they occur they will have a dramatic impact on society.  But merely being unlikely or having a high impact are not sufficient conditions, there also must be seeds, drivers, reasons as to why one thinks the issue is emerging.  Emerging issues analysis is different from fantasy production, it is searching for small ripples that might one day become grand waves, tsunamis.

What-if Questions

Equally useful in breaking out of conventional categories are “What-if” Questions.  These questions ask one to develop implications of an issue that most would currently think is unlikely or absurd.  It is useful that there is some element of possibility for the issue especially if one is concerned in its predictive value.  Even so, the most useful issues are those that create new categories of thought.  For example, what-if Genetic engineering developments led to the banning of sexual reproduction?   What-if South Africa became a world economic and cultural centre? What-if Pakistan became a world intellectual centre? But more important then the actual possibility of becoming a centre is that it begins to call into question the universality of the West as the educational base for the rest of the world. In addition, the implications of this possible event force one to examine issues of culture, travel, and self-understanding.  They also force one to think of alternatives to traditional models of education.  Should Pakistan be a centre in all fields or only in Islamic education, for example?

Age-Cohort and Age Grade Analysis

Equally useful in forecasting the near term future is age-cohort analysis.  This method begins to touch upon the idea that the future is cyclical, not linear, that is, more like a pendulum, than a race track or a highway with offshoots.  One asks what are the main age grades that constitute a business, organisation or nation?  How might institutions change as a particular age group matures and gains status and power?  How will the volume and type of crime change as a group matures. Like class, age grades serve as an organising concept.  For example, we know that Japanese and Western populations are mostly aging while third world populations are much younger.  By 2050 some estimate that less than 10% will be “white” in the world.  Clearly that will have an influence on world culture, politics. Will current Western institutions continue their domination?  Has the rest of the world internalised their categories?

Layered Causal Analysis

However, the methods above do not adequately explore the levels or layers of an issue.  Layered causal analysis asserts that how you frame problem changes the policy solution and the actors responsible for creating transformation.  Borrowing from the work of Rick Slaughter[vi], we argue that futures studies should be seen wholistically and not just at the level of trends.

The first level is the Litany (trends, problems, often exaggerated, often used for political purposes) usually presented by the news media. In the case of global politics it might be news on the Failure of UN  (the UN’s financial problems and its failures in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda).  Events, issues and trends are not connected and appear discontinuous. The result is often either a feeling of helplessness (what can I do?) or apathy (nothing can be done!) or projected action (why don’t they do something about it?).

The second level is concerned with social causes, including economic, cultural, political factors (and short term historical).  It is usually articulated by policy institutes and published as op-ed pieces or in not-quite academic journals.  Causes in the UN example include lack of supranational authority; no united military, and the perspective that UN is only as good as its member nations.  The solutions that results from this level of analysis are often those that call for more funding or more power.  In this case, the UN needs more money and power. Often, deeper historical reasons such as the creation of the UN by the victors of WW II are often articulated. If one is fortunate then the precipitating action is sometimes analysed.  At this stage, taking a critical view one could explore how different discourses (the economic, the social, the cultural) do more than cause the issue but constitute it, that the discourse we use to understand is complicit in our framing of the issue.  This adds a horizontal dimension to our layered analysis.

The third level is deeper concerned with structure and the discourse/cosmology that supports and legitimates it.  The task is to find deeper social, linguistic, cultural structures that are actor-invariant, such as centre-periphery relations and the anarchic inter-state system.  The analysis of current UN problems shifts to not the unequal structure of power between UN member states but to the fact that eligibility for membership in the UN is based on acquiring national status. An NGO, an individual, a culture cannot join the National Assembly or the Security Council.   The solution that emerges from this level of analysis is to rethink the values and the structure of the UN, to revision it. One could at this level, develop a horizontal discursive dimension investigating how different paradigms or worldview would frame the problem or issue. How would a pre-modern world approach the issue of global governance (consensus, for example)? How might a post-modern?

The fourth layer of analysis is at the level of metaphor or myth.  These are the deep stories, the collective archetypes, the unconscious dimensions of the problem or the paradoxes.  In the case of the UN, it is the issue of control vs. freedom, of the role of individual and collective, of family and self, of the overall governance of evolution, of humanity’s place on the Earth. Are we meant to be separate races and nations (as ordained by the myths of the Western religions) or is a united humanity (as Hopis and others have prophesied).

Layered causal analysis asks us to go beyond conventional framings of issues.  However, it does not privilege a particular level.  Moving up and down layers, and horizontally across discourses and worldviews, increasing the richness of the analysis.  In addition, what often results are differences that can be easily captures in alternative scenarios.

Grand Theories of Social Change

This dimension begins to touch upon the grander issues of social change.  Among the most useful approaches to futures studies are grand theories of social change. Of interest is how macrohistorians from different civilisations have attempted to answer the question: what changes? what is constant? As well as questions that ask if the drivers of change are internal or external to the system? And, what are the stages of change? What is the shape of history? Is it cyclical or linear or a combination of both?[vii] Of particular use are the following writers.[viii]

Pitirim Sorokin, for example, believes we are in-between historical stages and about to enter an integrated phase of human history where both the spiritual and material co-exist.

From Ibn Khaldun we are reminded that over four generations power declines. Those in power lose the sense of unity they gained from the struggle to enter into leadership positions. Over time, leadership degenerates and new groups, often in the periphery make a claim to power.

From P.R. Sarkar we are reminded that there are four types of power: worker’s, military, intellectual and economic. Each power represents different types of social classes and stages in each history. From a worker’s era, follows a martial, and then an intellectual, concluding with a capitalist. Each era has a rise and fall. Each class exploits the others which leads to its downfall. During the capitalist era, exploitation is at its worse. This eventually leads to a worker’s revolution or evolution followed once again by a centralisation of power in military elites.  But more than power, these phases represent our “collective psychology” the dominant mental wave (to use non-empiricist language).

For Toynbee, the most important variable is how the creative minority responds to civilisational challenges. Are they met? Moreover, are we about to re-enter a world State or a world church or is there some other global configuration of power ahead.

From Comte we are lead to believe that modernity is the final stage in history. That science will solve all the problems, ideology is a premodern idea that hinders the creation of a good society.

Spencer as well confirms this and believes that it is world corporations that will bring on the next ladder of human evolution.

And finally from Marx, what is important is how new technologies change social and power relationships.  Clearly these grand thinkers change the locus of discussion, away from trend analysis or five year plans to grand civilisational patterns. The project is not to determine if there work is  empirically true but to ask how they can lead us in the right direction for social research.

The Politics of Time

As we can see forecasting has political and value oriented dimensions, particularly in terms of the politics of time.  What images are valorised? Who owns it?  How it circulates in society?  Central to cultural colonisation is adopting the time of another culture?  Different visions of time lead to alternative types of society.  Classical Hindu thought, for example, is focused on billion year cycles. Within this model, society degenerates from a golden era to an iron age. At this juncture, there is spiritual leader who revitalises society.  Classical Chinese time is focused on the degeneration of the Tao and its regeneration through the sage-king.

Much of current debates is how about the ownership of visual space and temporal space.  One important futures method is to ask how different individuals and cultures “time” the world.  For example, women’s time is often seasonal and lunar. Bureaucratic time is based on the ability to make others wait. Educational time is divided into a nine month and three month pattern. There is also the stages of life time: from birth to death, with in-between stages devoted to the accumulation of knowledge, wealth, enlightenment, or pleasure depending on one’s cultural location. For example, the Indian vision of student, householder, social service, and  sanyassi is considerably richer than the vision of study, work and die or retire in Florida that represents mainstream American culture.

In Corporate time, the higher the one is in an organisation, the grander the vision of time. For example, the CEO is responsible for 25-50 years; the VP for 25 years, the branch president for the next year; the branch manager for monthly quotas, the plant or office manager for weekly projects, the clerk for daily activities and the secretary for hour to hour projects.  The level of activity is also more precise the lower one goes down in the pay scale.  Many misunderstandings occur among individuals and groups when they have different temporal expectations of each other.  At the global political level, power is about convincing the other to adopt one’s notions of time, whether this is AD or BC or GMT. Time then is not universal but largely particular.  Futures research attempts to investigate different visions of time, asking how they are constructed and politicised and what is the organisation’s or group’s preferred view of time.

Futures and Deconstruction

Continuing to make the future less universal are techniques drawn from poststructuralism. As alluded to earlier, the task in critical futures studies is to make the universal particular, show that it has come about for fragile political reasons, merely the victory of one discourse over another, not a Platonic universal.  To do that one needs discursive genealogies which attempt to show the discontinuities in a history of an idea, social formation or value. Through genealogy and deconstruction, the future that once seemed impenetrable is now shown to be one among many. As such it is replaceable by other discourses.  Deconstruction then becomes a method of unpacking a text (broadly defined) and showing  the discourses that inhabit it. Genealogy historically traces how a particular discourse has become dominant at the expense of other discourses. The shape and type of future (instrumental vs. emancipatory for example) is often different in each type of discourse.

Scenarios

To help in this process, scenarios are the favourite tool in futures studies.  For some they help predict the future. For others, the clarify alternatives. For us, scenarios are useful in that they give us distance from the present, allowing the present to become remarkable, problematic.  They thus open up the present and allow the creation of alternative futures.  Genealogy and deconstruction not only open up the future and present, they also open up the past, showing history to be interpretation. The task then is to create alternative histories, to show histories that did not come about, that could have come about if a certain factor had changed.

Scenarios also have an important visionary task, allowing us to gain insight into what people want the future to be like–the desired future. These are important in that instead of merely forecasting the future, individuals create the future.

Often scenarios have four dimensions. The first is the Status-Quo. This assumes that the present will continue into the future. More of the same, then.  The second is the Collapse scenario.  The results when the system cannot sustain continued growth, when the contradictions of the first model lead to internal collapse.  The third scenario is a Return or Steady State.  This is a return to some previous time, either imagined or real.  It is often framed as a less industrial, quieter, slower, and less populated society–the good old days, if you will.  The fourth scenario is Transformation, or fundamental change.  This can be spiritual, technological, or political and economic.

For Third World nations, in contrast to the First World, Continued growth usually means a dual society, where one part grows and the other stagnates. Collapse refers to either natural disasters, or wars with neighbouring nations, or from too quick modernisation.  Ultimately, the collapse scenario is the failure of nation-building.  The Return scenario means  going back to a simpler village, communitarian, religious, life-style, often before technocracy and imperialism destroyed the local. Transformation means true sovereignty or nationhood, joining the world’s wealthy on one’s own terms.

But we can also devise scenarios with different assumptions. For example, we can create scenarios of world politics based on alternative structures of power. The first would be a unipolar world, a continuation of the present.  The second would be a collapse of the inter-state system, leading to anarchy within States and between states. The third would be the creation of a multi-polar system, with numerous hegemons, such as the US, Europe, Japan, China, India, Turkey or Indonesia.  A corollary would be a return to a bio-polar world but with different actors.  A fourth would be a world government structure.  Policies would be created at the global level while implementation would be local.

We can choose other drivers as well. In the following scenarios for South Asia we look at levels of integration, at the tension between the local, regional and global.

(1) South Asia becomes an integrated regional economy.  Privatization leads to a flourishing of corporate and small scale capitalism.  This bourgois revolution weakens the power of the feudal class.  The Other ceases to be less frightful as friendship between NGOs and businesses develop.  NGOs continue to work on softening the contradictions of export-led growth. (2)    South Asia continues wasting wealth on military expenditures. Politics continues to become criminalized.  Not only Kashmir but Sindh and Kalistan vie for independence.  The nation-state project totally breaks down. Poverty and extremism remain.

(3)  Power and economy move to the village throughout South Asia.  Traditional models of problem-solving, of health, of argiculture begin to flourish.  The feudal class becomes more enlightened in its policies towards the landless, but still remains in power.

There are thus a range of ways in which one can construct scenarios. Besides having clarity in consistency of actors, one should ensure that contradictions within scenarios are not left out. Scenarios are not meant to be perfect places but possible places.

Scenarios should not only focus on nations but on individuals, communities and peoples associations. Using the ideas of layers of reality, what is missing are the role of ideas, of the Earth itself, of women, of alternative ways of seeing the world, of non-statist nominations of reality.  Scenarios then should not only find alternative routes out of the present, they need to configure the present differently, using radically foreign and unfamiliar notions of the future.  This is what makes future research different from routine social science or policy research.  The task is not only, for example, to imagine alternative futures for the United Nations but rethink governance, power and structure, to call into question current notions of how we organise our social and political life.

From this perspective we can imagine an alternative model that is (1) Sensitive to the role of the transcendental (in terms of inspiration and in providing a direction); (2) Includes a range of economic organisations (coops, small businesses, and large state/private run efforts); (3) is committed to a layered theory of representation, a third world vision of democracy, that has vertical (authority) and horizontal (participatory) elements; (4) has a different balance between the individual and group; (5) creates a culture that locates the environment as nested within human consciousness; and (6) attempts to balance spiritual and material factors believing both are basic factors in creating a good society including as social change drivers.

To conclude, futures research should then only ask what is missing from a particular analysis and it should–through metaphors, emerging issues analysis, layered causal analysis, deconstruction and genealogy–create the possibility of alternative worlds.

Notes

[i].   Dr. Sohail Inayatullah, The Communication Centre, Queensland University of Technology.

[ii].  For an elaboration of this theme, see Sohail Inayatullah, “Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Future,” Futures (March 1990) and Richard Slaughter, Recovering the Future (Clayton, Australia, Monash, 1985). For the more conservative position, see Roy Amara, “The Futures Field,” The Futurist (February, April and June 1981).

[iii]. For an excellent delphi study (in the South-East Asian context), including its limitations, see Pacita Habana article “Building Scenarios for Education in South-East Asia,” Futures (Vol. 25, Number 9, 1993).

[iv].  For more on this see, Mika Mannermaa, Sohail Inayatullah, and Rick Slaughter, eds. Chaos and Coherence in Our Uncommon Futures, Turku, Finland Society for Futures Research, 1994.

[v].   Jim Dator, Emerging Issues Analysis in the Hawaii Judiciary. Report published by the Hawaii Judiciary, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1980.

[vi].  Richard Slaughter, “Probing Beneath the Surface,” Futures (October 1989), p. 454.

[vii]. Sohail Inayatullah, “From Whom am I to When Am I: Framing the Shape and Time of the Future,” Futures (April 1993).

[viii]. See, for example, Johan Galtung and Sohail Inayatullah, Macrohistory and Macrohistorians. Forthcoming, 1995.

Frames of Reference, the Breakdown of the Self and the Search for Reintegration (1993)

By Sohail Inayatullah

Some Perspectives on the Futures of Asian Cultures

Published in Eleonora Masini and Yogesh Atal, eds., The Futures of Asian Cultures (Bangkok, UNESCO, 1993

March 15, 1993

ABSTRACT

Using culture in a variety of ways–culture in opposition to neo-realist views of economism and power; culture as essentially alive, always more than our definition of it; culture as fundamentally an essence, the original state of affairs; culture as an original state of affairs that declines over time and culture as a social practice–we explore a variety of cultural futures: (1) The unravelling of the traditional Asian self, (2) The breakdown of the self and culture, the schizophrenic model of reality, (3) Women’s cultural futures particularly the role of resentment as the emotion of future; (4) A new cultural renaissance from the periphery; (5) the rise of East Asian sensate culture; (6) Technological cultures from virtual reality, genetic engineering, and robotics; and, (7) Conflicts between types of time and a search for a cultural frames that incorporate a diversity of “times.”

Introduction:
Now considered the last unified discourse, culture is believed to be the voice of community, of a coherent set of meanings and relationships, the core of the Good Society, of humanity. Culture appears to be the last hope standing in counter point to the inequity of the market and the obtrusive power of the State. Through the language of civil society–globally and locally–culture presents us with the ideals of love and tolerance; peace and beauty; hope and vision. In this humanist model of society, culture is the last remnant of the past not infiltrated by technocratic capitalist market relations. Culture is then the voice of the past and the hope of the future.

Living cultures put on the way side of the linear march of history are now studied and celebrated (from Ladakh to Indian tribals) because we believe them to have a coherent voice and vision, to exist in a society where social relations stand before instrumental relations, where the transcendental is placed before the secular, and where the body has yet to have been placed in the surveillance grid of modern society. Asian cultures (south, east and south-east) in particular are believed to represent this traditional or ancient relationship with earth and heaven. But this may no longer be the case, for the Asian voice has begun to unravel. Travel, television, video, Westernization, modernity, and independence–as well as the reaction to the oppressive strength of feudal and hierarchical forces of the past, whether Confucianist, Hindu or Muslim–all have made problematic a unified Asian self. New technologies, forms of music, patterns of resistance and post-Asian visions of the future may make Asia’s contribution to the future of culture far more unexpected in form and content, more like a novel (a text of many voices) than a serious piece of non-fiction (a consolidated text, often a sermon, with a clear author). To begin our analysis we need to first distinguish between local, Center and pseudo culture. Local culture is often strong at providing identity but weak at intellectual, social, capital and physical mobility. Center culture (the culture of the dominant power) in contrast is weak at identity but strong on capital and individual mobility, that is economic growth. Local culture has survived because of its relationship to the land, in helping members meet basic needs. However, local culture has not been able to compete with modernity’s promise of providing economic rewards, of the glitter of city life, where one always hears of someone winning the lottery. Communism provided basic needs but not identity and mobility. Modernity, however, provides unity and identity in the idea of Man–Man as consumer and producer. Instead of the logos of God standing benevolently above the skies, it is the new symbols of Coco-Cola and McDonalds that provide global participation.
Modernity succeeds largely by creating a bridgehead based on pseudo-culture between Core and local culture, leaving local culture ridiculed, weak, and most importantly–inferior. Local’s judge their beauty, mind, history from the eyes of the foreign culture. Bengali activist and social philosopher Sarkar says it like this (1982: 53-54).
The subtler and sweeter expressions of human life are generally termed “culture.” Human culture is one, but there are some local variations in its expression. That particular community which is motivated by socio-sentiment (race, groupism, nationalism) to exploit others tries to destroy the local cultural expressions of other communities. It forcibly imposes its language, dress and ideas on other communities, and thus paves the way for exploitation by paralysing those people psychologically. So if some people by virtue of their wealth impose (their culture) on others, this will break their backs, they will become paralysed … If the cultural backbone is broken then all their struggles will end in nothing.

This is pseudo-culture. However–and this is where we differ from traditional humanists–efforts to transform pseudo-culture or to criticize colonial culture are often based on an idealized past not an ideal or alternative future. These are attempts to resurrect myths before the changes wrought by colonialism. But rarely are there efforts to envision alternative futures (that take dimensions of traditional and modern yet yearn for a different voice, a post-Asian voice, if you will), except, of course, for more recent efforts by the peace movements, the ecological groups, the women’s groups and a few spiritual movements–the anti-systemic movements.

Culture then as the voice of humanity against the technocratic State machine of late capitalism may tell us more about a particular idealized past then the futures ahead. While culture as a coherent voice of sanity–the voice of humanity against the technocratic State machine of late capitalism–may be the illuminated side of the darkness of the present, reflecting the bold vision of the renaissance humanists, of the moral philosophers, it tells us very little of the chaos ahead, of the new forms of cultures emerging, of transformations ahead. As Frantz Fanon (1967) has written, culture often deteriorates into custom losing its critical innovative edge, its spiritual vision and inspiration. Paradoxically, it is after culture has lost its edge that it is glorified and then “museumized.” However, even as a particular form of culture may lose its critical edge, there are always new forms of culture challenging dominant models of reality, of political-economy, of State power. Living culture then is often a step ahead of our mapping abilities, our attempts to rationalize and locate it.

In discussing the futures of Asian cultures, we take a variety of approaches. Beginning with an epistemological approach in which we look at how the “cultural” is constituted, particularly official culture, we move to an analysis of culture, gender and structure. We then examine the futures of cultures from the model of schizophrenia, using it as a way to comment on peripheral challenges to center and pseudo-culture. We also examine the impact of new technologies on traditional images of culture. We conclude with an analysis of the cultural construction of time.

Towards a Critical Futures Studies:

Before we can enter into a discussion of the futures of cultures, we need to ask as a preliminary, what are the frames of reference, the meaning boundaries from which this question, this investigation gains eligibility into our discourse? How is it that we can ask that question: what is the futures of cultures, specifically in a socially imagined place called Asia?

Futures studies itself, to begin with, can be understood in many ways. Roy Amara, for example, uses the division of preferable, probable and possible (1981). We take an alternative route and use the division of: predictive, interpretive and critical (Inayatullah, 1990).

The first aims at controlling and taming the future and thus making uncertainty less fearful. Finding empirical–accurate, valid and repeatable–indicators of culture and cultural futures is the task in this approach. Culture in this perspective is segmented, merely one more variable in a complex cross-impact scenario analysis, that is, culture along with economy and polity. The second is not concerned with predicting the future but with understanding the meanings we give to the future. This view assumes that the future is constructed in distinct ways by different cultures; cultural comparison and diversity in interpretations is the key here. The task for research is not to know one particular future but to explore a range of alternative futures–to expand the discourse on what can be and what has been! The third view goes perhaps a step further and asks, what are the knowing boundaries of what can be? From this view, futures research aids not in shedding more light, in giving more answers, but in making events, trends, scenarios and others tools of the future problematic, by asking how is that we accept conventional categories of analysis in the first place. Michel Foucault (1984), for example, did not seek to predict the future of societies but instead asked how is that we have become a population instead of a subject or a community or a people. The task is not so much to compare or predict, that is to conduct an analysis based on a prior agreed upon definition, but to bring into the discourse different possible meanings. Culture then ceases to be an essentialized reified category but becomes a particular way of knowing that has historically come about at the expense of other possible cultures. Even though we may construct culture in humanist terms as our possible savior, no culture is innocent, every reality displaces another possibility.

This third view then looks for the social costs, the politics of a particular culture. In exploring the futures of cultures, we could then ask what knowledge interests does a particular social formation serve? How does one vision of the future or one view of the future privilege a particular episteme (historical boundaries of knowledge) and favor a particular interest group or particular class.
Most important even while most discussions of the future of cultures rightly attempt to move culture outside of economistic categories, “culture”–within this critical framework–exists centrally in the “political,” the ability to define what is important and what is insignificant; what is real. This takes culture out of frivolous discussions of eating, dress, and smell (although these too can tell us a great deal) or even values and habits, to culture as resistance.

Defining culture as resistance leads to a more critical analysis of the location of culture in social change. In Hawaii, for example, local people have developed a language of resistance called pidgin-English. While ridiculed by U.S. Mainland Americans as poor English, more than anything else, pidgin-English serves to differentiate outsiders and insiders and to help insiders gain some advantage in an Island that has increasingly lost control of its own future through integration into the world capitalist system (particularly US Mainland culture). Through local resistance efforts–language, music and dance, as well as efforts to regain lost land–Hawaiian culture intends to return to its traditional cosmology, and thereby cease to represent a romanticized Orientalist narrative of cultural harmony, the land of swaying coconut trees and hula girls. The recovery of Hawaiian cosmology then becomes the best defense against modernity’s commodification of the native (Agard and Dudley, 1990).

Within the critical framework, we do not abandon scenarios, focusing only critical analysis. Rather, scenarios become textual strategic tools to distance us from the present, to gain a fresh perspective on cultures. This is important for as Franz Kafka has warned us, our consciousness may be more our enemy than our ally, since there is no world out there waiting for us to apprehend. Rather, we are complicit in creating the reality that is us. In Kafka’s story “The Burrow,” the creature digging the burrow cannot tell to what extent the danger it experiences is created by outside enemies or by its own digging.

Eventually, the creature becomes aware that the sole evidence of the existence of its enemies is noise. Beginning in a romanticized state of silence and tranquility, as its efforts to create an impregnable burrow proceed, the creature draws disparate conclusions about the whistling it begins to hear in the walls. Its inability to determine whether noises are produced by its own burrowing or by a predator can be read allegorically as pertaining to interpretation in general (Shapiro, 1992: 123).

How then to distinguish the act of knowing from that which is to be known? One cannot simply look up culture to find its definition. There is no transparent encyclopedia in which the real is cataloged for us. Indeed, the catalog, the index, in itself frames that which we are in search for; the index is complicit in our definition of culture. Ultimately there is no culture existing out there for us to discover, we are part of the process of discovering, even though we are often ignorant of our own site of understanding.

The humanistic response to this has been a plea for creating the conditions for enhancing cultural diversity, for situations wherein the Other culture can reveal things in us that have remained hidden. While this is important, two additional perspectives are needed. One is that “we” ourselves within this plea for cultural diversity exist in a larger (unknowable to us even as we self-deconstruct) matrix of the real–the historical boundaries of knowledge, the societal constructs of intelligibility that frame our questioning and knowing. At the same time, we need to find an anchor from which to interpret, from which to focus our gaze lest we become lost in a sea of endless relativities with no knowing or positive action at all possible. The futures of Asian cultures, for this essay, will be our ground, the landscape in which we hope to create some cultural fruits.

Within this critical framework, we can then attempt to imagine alternative societies (and create) not merely to predict or forecast the future but to gain distance from the present, so as to see it anew. We can ask a range of what-if questions to loosen the bounds of the present, to shift through our terrain and find different spaces of intelligibility. For example, what would a society look like that had no culture? What would a society look like if it was entirely cultural ? Or entirely acultural? What would a culturally rich society look like? Culturally poor? We could also more specifically ask: what would world culture be like if Manila instead of Paris was the cultural capital of the world? These types of questions could lead to a range of dialogues and useful scenario building. At the same time, the empirical view is important in that we have a context from which to enter the future lest scenarios be idiosyncratic reflections of the future. History and structure should guide but not bind our explorations into the future.

State/Airport Culture: Korea’s Intangible Asset Program

In our attempts to examine the futures of cultures, we often assume that culture is discernable through our rational mind. But if we assume culture has unconscious mythological/epistemic aspects, that is, culture is an unconscious process–less visible to official Power and more evasive the closer we seek to define it–then we need to find other avenues of inquiry into the futures of cultures.
As an important case study, both North and South Korea are conscious of the possibility of losing their culture. Japanese imperialism and Westernization (pseudo-culture) have made it imperative to save culture, to collect it for the future.

Culture has become a central strategy in moving forward and competing on the world stage, the Seoul Olympics as the most obvious example. As with other third world nations (conscious of becoming significant actors on the world field) culture has been given official status, sponsored much as in the feudal era when a wealthy merchant would sponsor an artist. But in Korea this is more than merely creating an Institute for the Arts, to spur creativity, rather culture is seen as a national asset, part of the drive towards full sovereignty.

South Korea has gone even further having established an Office of Cultural Assets which designates certain individuals as Intangible Cultural Assets. Upon designation a numeral is assigned to them. Upon death of the asset, the senior most student is given intangible asset status (Howard, 1986).

If we examine a brochure from a recent performance in Hawaii, we gain insight into one dimension of the future of Asian culture. For example, Ms. Yang studied with the grand master Kim Juk-Pa, who was recognized as the Intangible Cultural Asset No. 23 by the government of Korea. After the death of her teacher, Ms. Yang was assigned by the Korean government in 1988 as the Exclusive Candidate for Intangible Cultural Asset No. 23. She is expected to be officially named an Intangible Cultural Asset when she turns 50″ (Center for Korean Studies). Also from the same performance brochure, we learn of Mr. Bark who is designated as “the preserver of the Important Intangible Cultural Asset No. 5” (Center for Korean Studies).

It is the State then that bears the onus of cultural preservation. Of course South Korea believes that it is only in North Korea where culture has been “officialized;” in the South it has tradition that is being kept alive. Yet the contradictions are obvious. Pansori, for example, or story telling cannot be preserved through State power. It is a living form of entertainment–community culture–based on ridiculing authority, uncovering duplicity in morality, and of frank sexual talk. Attempts to make it eternal do so at the risk of losing the edge, the creative innovativeness, of the art. Art and culture as vehicles of limiting power or enhancing cultural resistance become resituated in the context of the State. In addition, while traditional Confucian culture was community based, in the Intangible Asset Program culture has become individual based, the group dimension of the art having been re-represented as the Korean State. Ultimately, this is not that different from North Korean efforts to develop an art and culture based on the glorification of Kim Il Sung.

In defense of South Korean preservation efforts, without State support there is fear that culture will become modernized–fast music and commodified culture–and local dress, food, and music marginalized.

Even if official recognition preserves the past it does so at a cost for it forces artists to endear themselves to the special board that decides who will become a cultural asset. Art becomes technical, patterned itself after recent successes, not creative but imitative. Thus, intangible assets remove themselves for that which they claim to represent, the history of the people. Culture becomes museumized even as individual artists gain recognition. Culture then is seen either as Western or traditional Korean, efforts to develop other forms of art have no space in this binary opposition–moreover if a Post-Asian art or culture developed would we be able to recognize it as art or culture?

The logical extension of State art is what is commonly seen as Airport Culture: a few icons representing past, present and future, to be consumed quickly before one’s flight is called. Hawaii has excelled at this with hula girls, leis and music to greet disembarking passengers (far more indicative of actual culture would be not the hula but immigration warnings, custom’s procedures, dogs in search of contraband, as well as other entry requirements).

Commodification and officialization then are the two main trends in the future of Asian culture. In the first recent Western categories of beauty and culture are imported and Asian categories of thought denied. In the second, culture is controlled by official boards, art is necessary to unify a nation, to use to cast a distance, a measure of sovereignty from other cultures. Extrapolating we can imagine a scenario in which all the world’s cultural assets are lined up and numbered. With instant access video technologies, we will then be able to easily locate a nation and call for Intangible cultural asset number 4500 and have it played for us. But then by that time, real culture will again have spontaneously developed outside of conventional discourse, in other places. Culture then is not State owned or State run, it is resistance, constantly slithering out of attempts to capture it and escaping the Official discourse. The Korean word for that is “chôki.” It means somewhere else, a place we don’t quite know where, but somewhere else. Intangible. Not realizable nor quantifiable. Quite different from the State Intangible program which in its attempt to preserve that which is considered intangible–art, beauty–has left the world of metaphor and interpretation and entered the economic and political discourse. Even dissidence might find itself being allocated an cultural asset number. Of course, the positive side is that culture is protected from the commodification of capitalism, from the market–a market which would prefer electric guitars to kagyam. But which cultural period, which Korea, should be protected. Korea, for example, was matriarchal (shamanistic), then Buddhist, then Confucian and finally modern. During the Japanese occupation, traditional Korean ways were sloganized but these were of the medieval Chôson period, a time of considerable oppression of women. Nationalist leaders did not choose to recover the social relations of the shamanistic or Buddhist period, rather they took the more State oriented and hierarchically rigid Chôson period to use as a defense against Japanese imperialism. Each nation or collectivity then has many pasts, many cultural histories which can be appropriated in the creation of a future. While through the recovery of the Confucian Chôson, a strong nation based on “Korean ways” was created, the cost was the suppression of women’s rights and labor participation in the political-economy: the championing of one cultural history meant the suppression of another.

Dorothy and the Return to Oz:

We learn more about the problematic nature of culture from the American movie Return to Oz. In this movie Dorothy of Kansas returns to Oz finding it captured by the Gnome King (who is made of solid rock, indeed, is a mountain). To rescue her friends she must go through a range of hazards. In one scene she tries to escape the wicked witch. To do that, her friend the pumpkinhead tells her of a mysterious life creating potent he has seen the witch use. By using a moosehead, some palm leaves, a old couch, she creates a flying mooseplane. To bring it to life she sprinkles the magic potent on the moosehead. Nothing happens. She asks the scarecrow what has gone wrong. He says there must be a word that enlivens the potent. She asks what is it. He responds how could he know since he wasn’t alive at the time that it was used on him. And that is the problem, much of what we want to know, the secrets of life, the grand philosophical questions, the nature of God, the structure of the superconscious are outside of our knowing boundaries (or answers to them are bounded by the episteme that formulates the rule of eligibility). Dorothy’s resolution of the problem of Being and Knowing (We are always more than we know ) is simple. She reads the ingredients and says the magic word. The mooseplane takes off. For us as well, the answer to our desire to transcend our problems, to remove our fears is obvious. We read the magic words of Text and the world is made right. Evil disappears and Truth stands firm. Whether Bible, Talmud, Quran, Sayings of Mao-tse Tung or Mantra, reading re-represents the world to us, we enter the flight of the metaphor and reality no longer appears as concrete. We can fly! We have entered cultural space.

After Dorothy defeats the witch, she travels to the mountain of the Gnome king. It is he who holds the others in captivity, in concrete. Again, she uses the mantra, the magic word of “OZ” to bring the kingdom to life. The Gnome king is defeated when he accidentally swallows a chicken egg. As biological life enters him, he falls apart and the world comes alive again. The word represents her Being and when uttered the battle is won and the earlier conditions, the earlier romantic biological–indeed women’s culture–is regained. All is fine. Culture has defeated evil, metaphor has defeated literalism, and women’s biological power has defeated male power.

Structure, Gender and Culture:

While Dorothy raises issues of Being and Knowing, metaphor and literalism, providing us with a way out of our quandaries, in a recent Chinese movie it is structure (patriarchy) that overwhelms culture. In Raising the Red Lantern, we gain further insight into the interrelationships between culture, gender and structure. Sold by her poor countryside father, the newly married wife finds herself as mistress number four. During the first nine days of marriage she has the husband all to herself, but on the tenth day, like the other wives she must stand outside in the courtyard to find out who will receive the red lantern. Not only does the red lantern mean a night with the husband as well as a foot massage but the right to choose the menu for the next day as well. When she asks why things are done in this way, the new mistress is told by the elderly first wife that these are the family traditions, the family culture. In the span of two hours we see how the architecture of the house and the structure of four vying for one creates competition between the women. Hysteria results. The husband keeps all the women in line by switching the red lantern to whomever is most obedient. But above the visible household structure is another invisible room. Located on the side of the roof, near where the women can meet away from the man, is hidden a small room, where other women who attempted to reverse the patriarchal structure have met their violent death. The new wife tries to look inside but the door is padlocked. Access to this reality is denied. Meanwhile, wife number three having understood the male structure develops a secret lover. This is her only way out of the competitive world the husband has created (she increases the supply of men). Wife number two–who has gained the confidence of the other wives by pretending to be sweet and nice–discovers the affair and tells the husband, hoping to gain some leverage. Wife number three is immediately hanged. The newly married mistress upon seeing this cannot keep her self together and she breaks down, unable to explode outwardly (to change patriarchal relations) and unable to violate morality by finding her own lover (as she is the from the traditional village), she implodes spending the rest of her life aloof from her previous self, the self created by the male structure. She is now free in the misery of her madness. We are vividly shown the points where culture and structure meet. Culture ceases to be self-evident and is shown to be mediating through various social forces, in this movie, male social and architectural structures. The movie ends with wife number five arriving asking who is that mad women there. We should not be surprised at this ending as in male culture there is an endless supply of vessels of pleasure. More rooms can always be built, although only room is needed far above to keep the entire structure concrete. Resistance then is impossible; cooption to patriarchy is the only possible future. But in the long run, the costs of cooption is the breakdown of the self.

Schizophrenia as the Model of the Future:

This movie then gives us insight into the most important trend of the future: the rise of cultures of schizophrenia, of madness. This the breakdown of any coherent self, leading to a variety of selves that are not integrated by any sense of culture, history or any imposed structural self, the self of the modern world, for example. As a metaphor, schizophrenia helps in deconstructing the real and opening up spaces that the modern world has closed. However, while romanticized by movies and by postmodernists, as a disease it remains one of the most painful human conditions known to humanity, AIDS appears like a relief when compared to schizophrenia. An epistemologically open pluralist self or system with some level of integration is still distant.

An example of a movie that romanticizes mental illness (while making some very important points about work and play, violence and peace) is The King of Hearts. In the opening scene a French town is abandoned by the retreating Germans. The townspeople rush out as well when they find out that the Germans have left behind a bomb that will explode at midnight. A Scottish officer is sent by the liberating allied forces to remove the bomb. When he gets there, the lunatic asylum has been opened and now the schizophrenics have taken the roles of the townspeople (showing again that it is structure that creates selves). One is a duchess, the other a Madame, the third the General, the fourth a barber. Life to them is a game. Time is immediate. Play is central. The Scottish officer desperately tries to warn them of the impending danger, their death. They respond by showing him the whimsical nature of life, its fleeting nature. Finally, when the British and Germans march back into the town, discovering each other, they immediately open fire and all the soldiers are killed. At that point, one of the schizophrenics comments: “They seem to be overacting”– taking their roles too seriously forgetting that the Self is liminal not solid. It is only when the townspeople return, that the lunatics rush back to the asylum understanding that they can no longer freely create time and space, the social construction of reality now has fallen back to normalcy, the rigidity of common sense has returned. The Scottish officer now must decide to stay with the army and continue fighting (have a fixed self) or enter himself into the asylum. He strips off his clothes leaving behind the self of society and joins the alternative self of the mad. While others have phrased this battle between the self of the desert and the self of the city, the self of the mystic versus the self of the institution, in King of Hearts it is the schizophrenic who has seen modernity and rejected it. The Scottish officer leaves the modern world, the modern self, to an earlier historically playful self (or indeed a post industrial self outside of the bondage of work). However, as he walks into the asylum we see him holding a bird in a cage, reminding us that the soul is still imprisoned even in the relative freedom of madness.

While apparently a European movie, the story told is equally valuable for understanding Asian culture. However in the Asian setting, the schizophrenic has been located less in the medical discourse and more in the mystical discourse. Like classical Hindu and Buddhist texts, the schizophrenic has understood that life is suffering but instead of transcending the suffering and creating a new self that is enlightened, the self breaks down neither normal nor enlightened. In the Asian version of the movie, there would be an enlightened soul pointing out the third alternative ; neither the world of madness nor the world of normalcy but a third supramental consciousness where reality is viewed as layered–shallow and deep–the deeper layers less gross, less material, more ideational and spiritual. The enlightened individual would not remark that killing was overacting but comment instead that death is temporary for the souls lives on with killing a result of ignorance, greed and fear. The schizophrenic unable to transcend ignorance and fear, yet critical of conventional models of Reality, opts out for an earlier time when life was simple (our mythological vision of traditional society) and everything was play acting. Thus the final scene in an Asian rendering–Taoist, Buddhist, Hindu, or Sufi–would have the Scottish officer suddenly realize the incompleteness of both worlds–the world of the insane and the world of the normal. Furthermore in the Asian view, more open to many ways of knowing, schizophrenia would be able to find a place to stand in the world with many possible paths, with the 99 names of Allah and a 1000 renderings of Brahman and the eternal return of the bodhisattva.

While this movie shows the contradictions of the neo-realist paradigm –of individuals and nations seeking to maximize self-interest–the mistake it makes is to believe that schizophrenics would be able to create a conflict-free community of the mentally ill. Like the humanist vision of culture, it is constructed with a coherent past based on a romantic voice of the Good. This perspective reiterates the image of the native or of traditional Asian culture where man lived in harmony with each other. Unfortunately, outside of the movie world there would be many kings (and sovereign nations) with no consensus creating so as to create a community of the mentally different. Each would make claims for leadership and fear the other, at least in the short run. In the long run with no concrete Self to provide a persistent and consistent Self, peace and non-violence would reassert itself. In any case, in romanticized renderings of mental illness (as with renderings of the traditional Asian self) while the pain of normal society is laid bare, the pain of mental difference, the pain of mental illness is not. The asylum then becomes our representation of culture outside of the instrumental and violent voices of the modern world.

Moving away from this treatment of schizophrenia, we can speculate on what the world would be like if schizophrenia was the dominant psychological model. To begin with, like the future, we are uncertain as to the nature of schizophrenia, but we know that it demands our attention. There are many discourses that are used to describe both schizophrenia and the future: the technocratic, the biological, the genetic, the spiritual, the social, the political and the economic (Torrey 1988, 1992).

Schizophrenia then can be seen in many ways. Most people view it as a brain disease, something that can be cured with the right drug, the technological discourse. Others see it as a dietary problem, previously many saw it from the psychological discourse–bad parenting, conflicts between parents and so forth. While there is a great deal of literature in this area it appears that the biological-chemical discourse has won out. But despite this victory, schizophrenia can also be viewed from a cultural perspective, helping us see what each culture thinks as normal and as abherent behavior. Schizophrenics, for example, confront us with our fears. Sensitive, misunderstood, with nothing to lose, they remind us that the king and queen are naked. Unfortunately for those of us in polite society, they show us by undressing themselves.

But while they show us our reality, they do some from a position of paranoia (an exaggeration of fear) not metanoia (a transcendence of fear). For example, they believe they are God and the rest of us are not. At the same time the breakdown in the self of the “mentally ill” is (as shown in the King of Hearts) is partly a response to the irrational self of the modernity or Westernization from the Asian perspective. The self breaks down for it cannot make sense of irrational paradoxes: why is there is so much wealth amidst so much hunger; why is there democracy within nations but not a world democracy; why do some people achieve so much wealth so quickly and others don’t; why is there is so much killing by those who claim the Good, the True and the Beautiful; why don’t the poor rise up and smite the rich? While most of us can find rational(ized) explanations to give meanings to these paradoxes, schizophrenics do not. They remain caught, trapped and instead of breaking apart the problem through logic, or living the sensate existence of “eat, drink and be merry,” many of them find their self breaking apart, thereby becoming many people. As Asia continues to modernizes and Westernizes we can but expect increased occurrences of this type of lunacy. And with traditional knowledge systems breaking down (or modernizing and adopting Western scientific models) thereby reducing epistemological pluralism and the family losing its strength, schizophrenia will become “medicalized” as in the West. Urbanization, unemployment, cultural penetration from the http://aic.org.uk/cialis-generic/ West will further unravel the Asian self creating the broken down mind; a mind that can be described by schizophrenia, as in the following quote from Louis Sass’ Madness and Civilization.

Schizophrenia results in detachment from the rational rhythms of the body and entrapment in a sort of morbid wakefulness or hyperawareness. Schizophrenic individuals often describe themselves as feeling dead yet hyperalert–a sort of corpse with insomnia; thus one such patient spoke of having been ‘translated’ into what he called a ‘death-mood’ yet he also experienced his thoughts as somehow electric–heated up and intensified (Sass, 1992: 7-8).

Colonialism has created the feeling of death while modernity has created intensity, and when put together has led to a culture of corpses with insomnia. Traditional time, cyclical time has broken down yet modernized time in Asia remains a caricature of the Westernized model. Few have attempted to create a post-Asian model of time, one that includes cyclical, spiritual (timeless), structural, linear, efficient, and women’s time (Inayatullah, 1993).
Like postmodernists, schizophrenics understand that the real world is one particular construction of the universe, having no order, fundamentally unintelligible. They contest the real world, the bottom line, the final cut, making reality much more mysterious, unclear, uncut and unfortunately for them frightening and horrifying. Like eskimos, who answer, “we do not believe, we fear”–that is, fear is not mediated by external forms such as a global media, pop futurists and other fear mongers (Shapiro, 1992: 126). Fear becomes an epistemological category not something one experiences on the news. For schizophrenics, as well, who might spend a week locked in a mortal combat with a cockroach, fear is not an indulgence, it crawls into one’s back, up the urethra, and into one’s eyes.

While historically schizophrenics had their space–existing in the cultural ecology of the Asian village–now in the city, we fear them. Their laughter is not in step with our humor. Often for long minutes they may break out into uncontrollable laughter. We can only withdraw our gaze, hoping that they will fall back into conventional behavior, before we are confronted with our own proximity to madness. If common sense is culture then their defiance illuminates the rational. Laughter is fine but only in reference to another’s comment. There is a regime or discipline to laughter that we unconsciously follow. As he or she does with other daily events, a schizophrenic makes that regime problematic, often leading for calls to have the mentally ill “policized,” to be removed from the premises. Those in any society, whether feudal or bourgeois, have rules of where we can stand, how we should act, what type of questions one should ask (questions must be coherent within an intellectual framework, for example). But schizophrenics do not exist in that regime of common sense and culture, they exist in alternative intellectual and social space. They might, for example, respond to “would you leave” by wood ewe leaf, thus speaking intelligently but from a different way of knowing.

Through colonialism and modernization, the historical Asian self has broken down, adopting a foreign self, foreign categories of reality. More than from the anthropologist or the philosopher it is from the schizophrenic that we can learn a great deal; we can learn about our cultural norms by watching how they disturb us. Among other insights, they show us the tightening grid of the State, of the straitjacket of conventional reality.

But from the viewpoint of modernity, schizophrenics exist in a world of metaphor not burdened with day to day data. Living in a world without boundaries, they are postmodernists with a vengeance, moving in and out of metaphor until the metaphor ceases to relate to the empirical world or the ideational world, merely become an extravagance until itself.

If the battle between the future is between those that exist in metaphor and thus search for “better” (more peaceful or more enabling) not truer model of reality and those that exist in the literal world (living in the objective and true) then schizophrenics offer a third alternative outside of metaphor and literalism. They exist in both but with an extremism, outside the edges of our reality, living in and out of metaphorical relativity and literal truth.

Are we moving to such a global culture where there is no one model of reality but many individual models with no way to communicate, with inter-subjective reality terminally delinked? Schizophrenics when denied their reality, however, do not merely smile. They attack our reality often with anger and violence, at the same time, they create new versions of their own reality. If the schizophrenic is a king, after our denial, he becomes an emperor.

Like the international relations model of the nation-state, each denial leads to an escalation of demands, of desires for further power over reality and the territorial and epistemic expansion of our own particular reality (Shapiro and Der Derian, 1989; Walker and Mendlovitz, 1990). Imagine then the world if schizophrenia was the model of social relations. Or is it already? Don’t we already exist in common sense theories of this reality: realism, neo-realism, political science, economics, that makes sense of this world such that its extremism, its particularity, its utter madness is inaudible to us.

What voices are we hearing? What are our hallucinations? Leaders fear other Presidents, each thinking they should rule the world. The other nation becomes the enemy. It is the structure of the world system that creates a schizophrenia wherein one can be democratic inside ones borders but totalitarian outside. One can practice voting inside but war outside. The hallucinations of the schizophrenic become isomorphic with the desire of State leaders for power over others. Increasingly in this structure of power, it becomes difficult to distinguish what is cockroach, what is dragon. All is inflamed and nothing is left but terminal madness.

Within this world system the rational comes to be defined by the epistemological model of the dominant powers, as one goes down the scale from core to periphery, knowledge systems are increasingly seen as irrational. Just as in the present world economic system, where the periphery provides raw material to the core, in the world cultural system, the periphery provides the cultural, the exotic, to the Core. The Core uses culture then to devise theories of existence and humanity, to explain its sordid past to itself. Semi-peripheral regions are those then that have elements of the irrational and the modern, the rapidly developing East Asian nations, for example.

But most people do see through the ability of the powerful to define the rational (to see Asian cultures as irrational or in loyal opposition as the seat of all wisdom). The common response to international relations and world politics is, “It is all crazy.” Is the system to difficult to understand or does it defy common sense leaving only conventional theories of politics (or rationalizations) to buttress it? Or does the international system violate our basic sense of decency and human culture? Clearly it is crazy. We feel the chasm between the ideal and the world we live, between our theories and world they contend to explain.
Instead of a world capitalist system, we can also talk (loosely) about a world system based on schizophrenia. Each nation sees paranoia all around, delusions of fear and delusions of grander, voices of all around–the idea of an integrated self or an integrated world system without individual selves or nations, but a unity of humanity or even Gaia remains unreal, instead the real world remains the world of the schizophrenic, fragmented, filled with unintelligible voices and flooded with illusions and delusions.

One possible scenario for the future then is a world where we are all schizophrenic. Without any dominant model of the real, and in the midst of the end of the modern world, with the post-Asian yet shaping (ideally an integrated schizophrenic perspective), no coherent vision of self, culture or future exists. Unlike other eras where there was a authoritative discourse (a agreed upon worldview), there exists a plethora of discourses of selves, each vying for supremacy. At one level the end of Stalinism reduces the hallucinations, at the same time the global self is less focused as that which give unity–the binary structure of East-West relations-has disappeared. For the patient the villain has disappeared, either one can search for a new enemy or implode within–structural transformation, reintegration at a higher lever, is of course the preferred by elusive dream.

Crime and Self:

At the level of the individual, Richard Ball (1985) has argued in “Crimes Problems of the Future,” that the key trend of the future is the lack of a responsible self, the end of any integrated set of experiences and functions. For Ball there is a direct relationship between criminality and individuation. Early women and men lived in a condition where the group was more real than any self. Indeed according to Julian Jaynes in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, the brain in itself was not joined, early man located his or her thoughts not as internal voices but as external sounds of Gods and Goddesses. It is in modernity that the self has become integrated causing Michel Foucault (1971) to argue that we are more recent than we think. It was with Freud that criminality became biological with social constraint largely concerned with sexually deviant behavior. In the media dominated modern world, instant gratification has created people without any essential self. Without an essential self, any combinations of beliefs can be readily be abandoned for another are being created. The real self of antiquity (the communitarian self of the voice of culture) has been displaced by temporary selves of modernity. Communications becomes impression management, law and order cease to provide social limits since the self conducting the illegal act is disconnected with the other self–in one word: cultural schizophrenia. Within this context, with the breakdown of the self and no self to apprehend, the key problem for society in the future is that of criminality. Self anyone? The Asian self, as we have argued above, is particularly susceptible, as it is caught between conflicting cultural demands (tradition, colonialism, nationalism and globalism), between rapid economic growth and rapid impoverishment, between the breakdown of the traditional Asian self and the lack of a new self. Of course we would expect this to resolve itself differently in East Asia, China, South Asia, South East Asia, and West Asia as the cultural forces are varied in these regions.

But while Foucault (1971) argues that we are recent and like a sand castle likely to disappear with the next epistemological wave, grand social theorists like Sarkar or Khaldun or Sorokin or Ssu-Ma Chien remind us that a breakdown in the self (and a search for the self of the prior era) is a predictable occurrence when a society is in between eras–there is no reality to hang on to, total skepticism or agnosticism hardly being an integrated worldview (Galtung and Inayatullah, 1993). For Sarkar (1984) the world is at the end of the capitalist system and waiting for the next social cultural cycle. No authoritative discourse exists rather there is a struggle for the creation and acceptance of a new worldview. For Sorokin (1957) as well we are in-between his stages of ideational, sensate and idealistic, the break when the sensate world disintegrates, when the world is turned upside down, and the new synthetic era begins. For 14th century macrohistorian Khaldun (1967), unity among and within groups disappears and the world awaits a new authoritative discourse, usually from the periphery not from core political economic or social structures, or selves that are centered, rather from those outside the vortex of the immediate and of the powerful –the social movements, the women’s movement, in our interpretation. For ancient Chinese philosopher Ssu-Ma Chien (1958), this cultural decline is part of the natural decline in dynasties when learning and tao disengage and loose opinions spread, that is, when there no longer exists a unified theory of knowledge. Thus the future consists of breakdown at all levels: self, epistemology, economy and polity and the search for a new integrative model; whether this model will be the recovery of a particular past–ancient, classical or feudal–or the creation of a Post-Asian model remains to be seen.

Han and Resentment:

An alternative to the schizophrenic breakdown at the individual level or at the global level of humanity is internal repression, a path followed largely by women, especially Korean women. In Women and Han in the Chosôn Period, Young-hee Lee (1992) argues us that the rigidity of the neo-Confucian structure of male dominance did not give females an escape valve–what resulted was han, or deep resentment. This is the inability to transform present conditions leading to deep inner resentment towards Power, particularly male dominance. With further justification from Buddhism, women were told to accept their suffering and live with their karma, while men could escape the rigid family structure through kisaeng (dancing girls) and mistresses, women could not. Like the wives in Raising the Red Lantern they had no way to express their frustration. While Korea is known as the land of the morning calm, underneath this calm lies centuries of han. Men too enter the han discourse but not from the problems of daily life but from the shame of many defeats to the Chinese and Japanese; it is a territorial han based on lack of national sovereignty (now further exacerbated by the division of the Koreas).

Out of this han, this sustained suffering, came new fields of women literature and women’s expression. Because women had no way to stay in touch with their families they developed letter writing (also they were compelled to by their in-laws) and special literature and songs called naebang kasa (court songs) and minyo (popular songs). Because of han, a great albeit invisible cultural renaissance resulted.

Is this then the world future, not structural change or implosion but deep repression and resentment?. Even Shamanism (which has allowed for occasional individual transcendence) and Christianity (which has energized women into social groups but without changing the male neo-confucian social structure) has not succeeded in transforming han in the Korean context. The feminist women movement has often been sidetracked by nationalist efforts, as the case in Korea, where women’s resistance to the Japanese became far more important than the transformation of patriarchy (Bonnie Oh, 1982). Moreover in the larger Asian context, feminism has been seen as a Western force, the search for a women’s movement authentic to the history and categories of Asian women is still in its formative phase (Jayawardena, 1986). With further Westernization (in the form of East Asian capitalism) we should expect increased han, especially for women, unless an Asian women’s perspective (a post-feminist voice) combining ancient shamanistic principles and modern social organization can transform women’s condition.

From the Asian women’s perspective, han then is the dominant cultural formation of the future. Han could also be a precursor to the breakdown of the self especially as Westernization and travel intensify the resentment women experience. While a united Korea might lead to an attempt to undo thousands of years of han for male Koreans, a transformation of patriarchy still seems far off.
In any case the main point is that any discussion of the futures of Asian cultures must deal with women’s experience of their social reality and their efforts to negotiate patriarchal social relations. In addition, Asian strategies in dealing with power–whether colonialism and developmentalism–have a strong han component: the face shown, for example, to the colonialist (the lazy worker image in the Philippines) is markedly different than the face shown to one’s same class and ethnicity.

Part of the return to the shamanistic past will be a recovery of not spirituality (the search for unity of the self with the cosmos) but of spiritualism, a search for connectedness with the dead. This alternative then is the search for new forms of association. With the breakdown of modern society and with the inability of modern spaces and categories of thought to give answers, it is then too other worlds where we will flock. Whether these are ancestral spirits, souls claiming to represent the Anointed One Him or Herself, or nature spirits is unclear, but as the self breaks down and as answers to change and transformation and our world problems become increasingly immediate and pressing–channeling (not changing channels as in the modern response) will be one of the waves and the ways of the future. While this has begun in California and throughout Asia, we should expect new sources of self-sustenance, primarily those from the spirit world. At the same time, we should anticipate increased and more potent women’s movements working alone and tied into ecological, cooperative, and consumer associations. A new Asian women’s culture might emerge from these efforts.

Culture as Resistance:

If it is through resistance that new cultural forms will rise, then we need to look at the periphery to better understand the future of cultures. These are the anti-systemic movements, the counter civilizational projects, the spiritual, ecological and social movements that hold the keys for our potential futures. One former periphery is East Asia. While previously Western culture was paraded before the rest of humanity as the standard, oriental culture has received high marks in recent years. Considered closer to the Nature, less rigid then Western epistemology–more open to contradictions existing in an ecology of truth statements–and closer to traditional culture when the cosmos, society and individual were in harmony, before commodification, developmentalism and center-periphery structures were not the universal drivers.

But what aspects of Oriental culture might become universal in the next century? Vegetarianism (most likely because of the politics of health and food production), taking shoes off at the door (again likely as ceremonialized politeness), complex social relations in which discourse is understood not by what is uttered but by who utters it and when it is uttered (far less likely, too difficult for others cultures to gain entry into this social network), spiritual practices (from zen to yoga, again likely, since they can be easily appropriated). Finally, what type of icons might become universal? Most likely stories from the village, the Indian cow (instead of the American mouse), the village well (instead of the shopping mall), and the bodhi tree (instead of the highway). One can imagine a drama with all these symbols coming to life, interacting with each other, creating an East Asian form of universal cultural representation. How quick Disney will buy these Asian experiences out is easy to guess.

But what are some less likely scenarios? One can easily imagine a Manila-Calcutta-Bombay-Dubai link as a next major center of culture in the next century. Besides having been oppressed (and thus creating the possibility for the return of cultural pendulum), factors such as sophisticated and deep mysticism, a rich artistic heritage, an advanced intellectual climate providing the high culture; in addition there is Bombay, as the center of movie audiences, providing the mass culture. For instance, on one side there is someone like the late P.R. Sarkar–developing on Gandhi and Tagore–with his thousands of spiritual songs, a range of new indigenous theories of science, society and culture, numerous social movements as well ecological centers to create a new society, and artists and writers associations to legitimize and enliven in and on the other side the filmi mass culture that provides a voice counter to the “pop” of the West. All these combine to provide the necessary ingredients for cultural revival.

The other contender would by Hong Kong and Star TV, basically some level of Asian creativity but still developed within the overarching cultural categories of the West. The question then is: Hong Kong or Calcutta?

A resurgent Philippines also is a possible scenario. Centuries of resistance, of failed revolutions, of cultural eclecticism, of mysticism and pseudo-culture make it a potential cultural center. This is more likely than the present rich Asian states, where modernity and the victory of the official discourse has produced wealth but at the expense of trimming of deviance–Singapore as the obvious example. Islam as a cultural force is possible but again since politically it is in a decline, this may force a rigidification of culture, a straightening of diversity so as to uphold the State and the Text. Conversely, if decline leads to inner reflection and self-criticism then cultural renewal and creativity is possible. Islam then would have to reconstruct itself as a cultural epistemological force and not as a political Statist force. With the breakdown of the USSR and the potential breakdown of China, we could then easily see a cultural renaissance in three areas: an Islamic south-west, a Westernized Hong Kong (or Taiwan after 1997) and a Manila-Calcutta-Bombay-Dubai crescent.

Fitting into the Hong Kong Star TV scenario, is the rise of a sensate Asia. Lee Kuan Yew wondered if there was any solution to the rampant sexuality of East Asians. With a new Hong Kong Chinese MTV (music television) developing, we can assume that sex is the future of East-Asia. This is possible with Confucianism providing the commodification of women, (women as servers of men), Buddhism removing any guilt related to sex. Instead of 1 billion consumers of coke, we can well imagine one billion sexually repressed Chinese waiting for a modernist China with fast time, fast sex, and fast music. East Asia then would be the center of modernist music, art, and sexuality for the next century, taking over the exhausted West. Only AIDS and virtual sex stand in the way. With developments in the latter, we could see dramatic transformations in both Bangkok and Manila, sex having moved to the virtual mind instead of the bodies of young village girls.

Technology:

So far we have focused on social and political forces, but how mights advances in technology transform asian cultures? Developments in Virtual Reality, Genetic Engineering and Robotics all promise to dramatically alter our perceptions of culture and the cultural. These new technologies will have far wider impact then television and video. In some ways they will intensify Westernization and in other ways they will transform it. These technologies to begin will transform our understanding of social reality, Nature (or mother nature) and human culture, displacing all three. New forms of resistance against the technologies will also result. As with electronic culture where faxes, videos and electronic viruses can be used again official government sponsored reality, these technologies will lead to attacks on the “artificial” world they have created and of the way that life will be managed through genetic engineering, for example. At the same time, just as television and the video bring us the new electronic family hearth, united not by conversation but by viewerism, but at least still united, these new technologies will create their own paradoxes. We will first review these potential transformations and then discuss the cultural implications resulting from them and embedded in them.

Through Virtual reality we can don a helmet and practice safe travel, safe sex (indeed it is this that will bring computers in our homes in the next century, not banking, nor games, but virtual reality sex). Technology will have finally captured nature–making it obsolete. The problem of the original text especially for fundamentalists will be further complicated since distinctions between types of reality will be blurred. Will religions then offer virtual reality experiences of their image of God? Perhaps the redeemer, whether Jesus, the Mahdi, the taraka brahma, is returning and will be available to all, at all times. Will culture then become miniaturized and available to us all in our virtual reality cassettes–Travelog but with the sensual experience of the place we are traveling to. It would be real since we would (could) not distinguish between the two. Of course, the important job will be creating the miniaturized culture. And the most important question for futures researchers is: what will be the resistance to “virtualized” cultures–a return to natural cultures? But how? And will virtual reality centers be the next museums, the final effort to carry the seeds of the past into our journey to strange new world ahead?

While experiments in genetic engineering will start out quite harmless since all of us want to avoid abnormalities, or various genetic diseases, we will soon all want to be checked by our family genetic engineer. This will soon lead not only to disease prevention but to capacity enhancement. Intelligence, memory, body type and beauty will all be open for discussion and interpretation. Birthing will eventually be managed by State factories and we will be the last generation to produce children the old fashioned way. It will be the final victory of the feminists and their final defeat. The biological cycle will have been terminated by technology and women will essentially be not any different than men once their reproductive capabilities become unnecessary. The causes of alarm are there (and the negative scenarios almost infinite: increasing inequity between north-south, between rich-poor and the tightening grid of the surveillance State and the managed genetically engineered self) but perhaps when everyone can be beautiful it will be moral and spiritual potential that will matter the most. With fewer genetic diseases our differences will become once again charming instead of attributes that keep us from uniting as humans. Perhaps genetic engineering will paradoxically lead not to sameness but to difference and to a greater humanity. Of course, as developed within the present regime of science and center-periphery nations, genetic engineering means only one thing–the final end of peripheral culture–and the reversal of demographic patterns that are seeing the rise of Asian and African population and a decrease in American and European populations.

But cultures need not be human, they can also be robotic, robots can be sentient creatures potentially living with humans and potentially displacing humans. Japanese society, for example, already has glorified Mr. Roboto. Often seen as friendly, a helper, it would not be too long before we are engaged in discussions of the rites and rights of robots. Concomitant with ways of thinking that see everything as alive (quantum physics, Hawaiian cosmology, Buddhism, animism and Indian thought) and with advances in artificial intelligence, we can envisage a time when robots will be seen as alive. Their utility value will be surpassed by their existential value. While a robot uprising is unlikely, the move from robots as represented as machines, to be seen as dumb but lovable animals and then to gaining similar rights as children is quite easy to believe. Conversely, it may be that the robot mind will become the metaphor for our brain, and thus the despiritualization of the self. While it is doubtful if robots will pray five times a day, facing Mecca will be easy but will they feel the unity that this act implies?
For capitalists these new technologies promise a renewal, a rejuvenation from the exhaustion that has set in. They promise to revive the idea of progress and push back cultural revival, ethnic history, and local knowledge. Thus, it is not cultural humanists who will provide the vitality to the dying modern world but the new technologies and the cultural codes embedded in them. These new technologies pose the most dramatic problems for those who consider the natural as fixed instead of as constantly changing and in the process of recreation. Fundamentalists, in particular, will find the next twenty or thirty years the best and worst times for their movements. The best because the forces of tradition will flock to them; worst because the technological imperative and humanity’s struggle to constantly recreate itself (and thus nature) will not be easily reversed. Even biological spills will most likely not be controlled by State regulations but by new technologies themselves. However, the answer to these type of problems may be in newer advanced–physically, mentally and spiritually–technologies. It is important to remember that technologies in themselves will be redefined in this process as not merely material processes but mental and spiritual processes embedded in particular cultures. This redefinition will come about from non-Western renderings of science (Inayatullah, 1991; Rudreshananda, 1993; Sardar 1984; Sheldrake, 1992).

Genetic technology or biological technology could yield new viruses, new types of life that end our life. The planet itself, however, might not care, Gaia, argues James Lovelock (1988) is a self-regulating mechanism that keeps life alive, humans might not be needed, just an experiment that went wrong. She might “choose” rabbits instead of monkeys this time, thus ending human culture as we know it or removing the supremacy of humans, making us just one more sentient life form that quietly inhabits the planet with all other creation (Jones, 1989). But this fate is unlikely, as “humanity” then will be caught in a battle against its new creations, the West now competing not only with its own social periphery, but with its own created periphery.

But while the values behind genetic engineering and robotics are based on competition–on linear models of evolution and time–we can hope for models of the future coming from cooperation. Scientist Lynn Margulis writes that while competition might be natural at the level of mammals, at the microlevel of the cell, an ecology of cooperation where differences lead to higher unity is normal. The cells need each other, through each other they can transform. The success of our cellular system might be a far better model for giving us cultural hope than the failure of the war and competition model. In her words: “Destructive species come and go but cooperation increases through time. Mitochondria peacefully inhabit our cells, providing us with energy in return for a place to stay. Evolution either evokes challenge or cooperation” (Margulis, 1992: 27). Once again, while the model of cooperation provides an alternative more hopeful vision of Asia, new technologies promise to continue the process of the unraveling of the Asian self and Asian society and to create the conditions for a Post-Asian culture as well as new forms of cultural resistance. Among the forms or resistance we can expect is a return to the classical life-cycle or seasonal aspects of Asian time. Part of the recovery of culture project is regaining the traditional sense of time–time as friendship, of sitting around a tree and placing relationships ahead of economic gain or personal ambition, of living in the way God meant the world to be. New technologies, however, enter traditional time disrupting local culture. The automobile is an excellent example. Pakistanis drive as fast as they can to reach a place–even as far as driving on the sidewalk–where they then wait for hours for friends to show up or for a bureaucrat to arrive. Or one rushes to get to tea time where one ritually relaxes. In the car then modernity becomes pervasive, the signifier of miles per hour stares at the driver (there is no sun dial or images of the seasons or other historical symbols), the car is a an imported technology with no local meanings to it.

With modernization we should expect decreased emphasis of the classical model of time, of the degeneration of time from the golden era to the iron age. In this model society degenerates with differentiation (as opposed to modernity wherein differentiation leads to evolution) eventually resulting in the iron age of materialism. Time then decreases in value from the golden era characterized by unity and spiritual development to the iron age characterized by materialism, chaos and confusion. At the end of the dark iron age, the redeemer sets the world right and the golden era begins again. The search then is for a redeemer to end the darkness of the present, to create a new future. Decolonization and political independence was to be the beginning of the golden age with the national founders the redeemers. But this has not turned out, leaving the individual unto him or herself.

In recent news, Jesus was to return on October 1992, according to Bank-ik Ha, one of the young prophets allegedly predicted by the Bible (Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 1992: A-39). The mark of evil is the computer bar code for it mathematically represents the Beast (666) with the unification of Europe as the final sign before Judgement Day. In Korea, the State in itself attempted to intervene as households left the work force in preparation for the final days. While these might be the final days of the modern world, claims that this is the end of the world are far more problematic. In any case, we still have until 1999 before Judgement day. As it turns out the Prophet was arrested for even though he claimed that the world was to end in October 1992, he had recently purchased bonds that would expire in the year 2000.

Modernity then emphasizes quantitative, linear time. Instead of the appearance of the redeemer to bring on the golden age, it is Confucian capitalism that will herald the new era. Time then in this model cannot be repeated or reversed otherwise we could remember the future. Instead of degeneration there is forward development. Culture as a response to the economism of modernity is precisely about time pluralism, about living in many types of time without allowing any one to dominate, particularly linear time. Others see cultural revival as part of a return to a more natural type of time cognizant that all societies rise and fall, all economies go up and down, what is most important then is one’s relationship to nature, community and the transcendental.

When thinking about the futures of cultures, particularly Asian cultures, we should expect increased diversity in the models of time. For the schizophrenic, modern linear time ceases to be important, seasonal and timeless time are far more central to his or her worldview. We should also expect increased conflicts between types of time and efforts to synthesize different constructions of time. Clearly an ideal society would be able to find ways to negotiate the many types of time: seasonal, rise and fall, dramatic, mythological, expansion/contraction, cosmic, linear/efficient, social-cyclical as well as the intervention of the timeless in the world of time. These must be associated with notions of social structure: individual and transcendental agency. In what ways is time personal, in what ways do macrostructures give us time, and how does the role of the transcendental reshape time? The ancient cycle alone leads to a culture of fatalism and the linear pattern alone leads to cultural imperialism wherein particular collectivities can be placed along the ladder of economic success. Transcendental time alone leads to focus on the cosmos and neglect of economic progress and social development. While it is joyous, the bills must still be paid. For an empowering theory of the future, all three are needed.
But few manage to include all these characteristics ; rather, we privilege certain types of time and avoid or marginalize others. Developing a theory of society that coherently integrates the many types of time alluded to above is not any easy task and would be an important task in a global emerging culture. Having an enriched theory of time would be a necessary criteria in an alternative theory of cultural development.

If we wish to understand the futures of cultures than among the most important areas of investigation is conflicts and contradictions between types of time. Modern time versus traditional time; spiritual time versus deadline time; cosmic time versus linear time, for example. We also need to imagine new forms of time as well.

Conclusion:

Finally to conclude we have used culture in many different ways: (1) Culture in opposition to neo-realist view of economism and power (competing individuals and states);
(2) Culture as always changing, creating new forms of society and technology, as essentially alive, always more than our definition of it;
(3) Culture as fundamentally an essence, the original state of affairs;
(4) Culture as on original state of affairs that declines over time (whether because of internal reasons, creativity to imitation or external reasons, conquest by colonial forms); and,
(5) Culture as a social practice, we “culture” the real; there is not intrinsic “culture” to be found.

We have also discussed many possible cultural futures, to list the important: (1) The unravelling of the traditional Asian self, (2) The breakdown of the self and culture, the schizophrenic model of unending differences, (3) Women’s cultural futures particularly the role of resentment as the emotion of future, (4) A new cultural Renaissance from the periphery; (5) The rise of East Asian sensate culture; (6) Technological cultures from virtual reality, genetic engineering and robotics; (7) Conflicts between types of time and a search for a cultural frames that incorporate a diversity of “times.”

But when we move away from our critical analysis, what is important is a vision of new cultures, not visions that take away the possibility of new cultures, but visions like the Renaissance which created ever new visions. In this sense finding unity within our differences still remains crucial: the imagery of roses in a bouquet (with some of the roses virtual, some genetically grown, and others grown through the soil) symbolizing individual cultures and planetary culture still remains an important integrative dream–a Post-Asian dream perhaps.


 

[i]. Sohail Inayatullah is an independent political scientist. Recent articles on the futures of cultures include, “Why I Hate Visas and Passports,” and “Sex, Mullahs, and Bureaucrats.” Among others, I would like to thank Noman Inayatullah for the observations contained in this paper.

[ii]. For more on this, see Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” Journal of Peace Research (Vol. 27, No. 3, 1990) and Development: Goals and Processes (forthcoming).

[iii]. I have benefitted greatly from conversations with Peter Miller of the University of Hawaii on this subject.

[iv]. I am indebted to Ashis Nandy for this insight. Certainly it makes readings of culture far more interesting than the Orientalist anthropological discourse they have traditionally inhabited.

[v]. American culture is believed to be non-existent according to the rest of the world, but it could also be argued that American culture–food, efficiency, language, music icons and, in general, a sensate worldview–has become universal such that we are all American now. Americans are believed to have culture-less because their culture is ubiquitous.

[vi]. Perhaps the Balinese saying best describes this formation: “We have not art; We do everything the best we can.”

[vii]. Perhaps, modernity.

[viii]. Unfortunately, in their efforts to become important they are forced into a situation where they adopt the categories of the Core cultural power, defining importance not within their own tradition or creating new forms of significance but staying within the structural boundaries of Core definitions.

[ix]. Indeed, in one American television show, Cheers, one of the main characters spends his week of vacation at the airport since that is the hub of cultural interaction.

[x]. From these we can learn how a nation sees the Other and discover who can enter freely and who is searched.

[xi]. I am indebted to Marshall Pihl of the University of Hawaii for this term.

[xii]. I am indebted to Ashis Nandy for this intriguing point.

[xiii]. Traditional Korean instrument–a zither.

[xiv]. Cultural historian, William Irwin Thompson’s works have developed this. His titles give us a sense of the direction of his work: At the Edge of History, Evil and World Order, and The Time Falling Bodies Take to Light.

[xv]. Ashis Nandy in his “Shamans, Savages, and the Wilderness: On the Audibility of Dissent and the Future of Civilization,” Alternatives (Vol. 14, No. 3, 1989) points un in the direction of the shaman. The shaman exists on the fringe of respectable society and respectable models of knowledge. His or her existence itself is subversive to institutionalized power.

[xvi]. Neo-realism assumes that we are self-interested individuals and nations seek to maximize our interests at the expense of others. Real hard headed economics and politics is the only possible result. The voices of the spirit, of the future, of peace, of the movements outside of the nation-state are immediately silenced–they have no space in this hegemonic paradigm. See Sohail Inayatullah, “Subverting the Hegemony of the International Relations Paradigm in Pakistan,” (forthcoming, 1992).

[xvii]. The symbols of modern time might be there, for example, an airline office claiming to open at a specific time yet rarely doing so. Or a post office having special windows for electronic mail but few employees to handle the postage window even though most of the business is for stamps. Both these cases are explained by the traditional feudal structure for it is only office clerks that have to wait and their time is not highly valued, so why be efficient. The “saabs” do not do such menial tasks.

[xviii]. As one schizophrenic put it: “All I see is the verisimilitude of reality, not reality itself. I’ve lost access to reality … my memories are just memories of themselves … memories of memories of memories … I no longer have the original (Sass, 192: 336). And another: “My gaze is fixed like a corpse, my mind has become vague and general; like a nothing or the absolute; I am floating, I am as if I were not (Sass, 1992, 68). Or as stated more theoretically by Jean Baudrillard, “Illusion is no longer possible, because the real is not longer possible (Sass, 1992: 291).

[xix]. Confucianism providing the basis for modernization and taoism/shamanism providing the irrational.

[xx]. As the case with the counter-culture.

[xxi]. The bedouins in his social history.

[xxii]. Conversely, William Irwin Thompson has argued that it is from the secular that the spiritual takes birth. It is from discoveries of scientists such as Margulis and others that the bases of a new cooperative transcendental civilization is possible. See William Irwin Thompson and David Spangler, Reimagination of the World. Sante Fe. New Mexico, Bear and Company, 1991.

[xxiii]. Of course neo-Confucianism and its oppression of women might have something to do with this. The exact quote is “the libido of the sex crazed yellow races.” I am indebted to John Cole for providing this surprisingly racist quote, although the source has yet to be confirmed. But for more on Lee Kuan Yew, see his speech, “The Vision for Asia,” The Muslim (20 March 1992).

[xxiv]. Susantha Goonatilake (1992) argues that these technologies are now merging becoming one evolving whole and thus, “the historical sequence of biology giving rise to culture, giving rise to artefact (information associate with machines) … becomes changed. The artefact now reaches back and changes culture or gene, the glove turns back and changes the hand. Instead of a unilinear sequence, a recursive loop is established. … An entirely new history begins (11-12).

[xxv]. See James Dator, “Its Only A Paper Moon,” Futures (December 1990). He writes, “We must understand that we already live in a largely, and increasingly, irreversibly, artificial world. “Nature” and the “natural world” (in the sense of an environment, or parts of an environment, uninfluenced by human activity) scarcely exist anywhere and cannot possibly be “preserved” or “restored” (indeed, to attempt to do so would of course itself be to render “nature” artificial), (1086).

The title of this very important article is from “an old 1940s song which went something like this:

It’s only a paper moon

Floating over a cardboard sea.

But it wouldn’t be make-believe

If you believed in me,” (1096).

[xxvi]. For Jean Houston, the cell membrane is a metaphor for how we differentiate the world, the basic binary distinction between me and the other. In her hopeful model this is breaking down and “we are about to join into one collective organism, planetary humankind … We have allowed our complexity to create another form of culture.” Jean Houston, “Stretched Tight to Breaking,” Edges (Vol. 4, No. 3, 1992), 23.

[xxvii]. Historian Sarkar (1987-1991) is useful in that he uses many types of time in his theory. There is the cosmic cycle at one level, the generation, degeneration and regeneration of time; and at another level, there is the individual escape from time and entrance into no time or infinite time. Finally there is social time (his spiral) where the time of exploitation can be reduced through social transformation thus in the long run allowing for the increased possibility of individual escape from time. Sarkar is on the right track attempting to build a model of time that has multiple avenues, that gives meaning at different levels.

[xxviii]. Other criteria would be: (1) a growth dimension (2) a distribution dimension (3) gender balance, (4) ecology balance (5) epistemological diversity (6) a cooperative organizational structures and the (7) central role of social and civil movements.

Images of Pakistan’s Future: Possible Scenarios (1992)

By Sohail Inayatullah*

Introduction

Exploring current images of Pakistan’s futures is the task for this essay.  Based on a literature review of Pakistani magazines, newspapers and journals as well as conversations with Pakistani scholars and interviews with members of the general public, we develop and evaluate five images or scenarios of the future.  This essay concludes with suggestions for designing alternative futures for Pakistan.

Before we articulate these images of the future, let us first examine the “futures approach” to the study of social reality.  A futures view focuses primarily on temporality.  Where are we going?  What are the possibilities ahead? What strategies can we use to realize our goals?   How can the image of the future help us better understand and change today?  Who are the losers and winners in any particular articulation of time?  The futures perspective is initially similar to traditional political analysis in that it begins with an exploration of economic, international and social events and the choices made by actors that make these events possible.  However, the futures view also attempts to place events and choices within an historical dimension; that is, the larger and deeper structures that make these discrete events intelligible, such as core-periphery, urban-rural, gender, caste, and macro patterns of social change.  Also important in the futures view is the post-structural dimension; the larger meaning system or the epistemological ground plan of the real as embedded in language that constitutes events and structures.

Unfortunately, most efforts to understand the future remain in the predictive mode.  It is often asked, what and when will a particular event occur and how can we profit or increase our power from a specific prediction?  Economists and strategic analysts claim to excell at this task.  Our efforts here–sensitive to the richness of reality and the need to decolonize the study of the future from narrow models of reality–is to explore images or scenarios of the future.  Our task is not to predict and thereby make this essay political fodder for technocrats but to use the future to create real possibilities for change.  We thus do not intend to give a familiar reading of Pakistan’s future, as might be available in a five year plan, rather we enter into a discussion of alternative futures, of the many choices ahead as contoured by the structure of history and the modern boundaries of knowledge that frame our identity.

In the images or scenarios that follow it should be remembered that  these images are meant as tools for discussion and dialog; they are intended to clarify the futures ahead not to reify social reality. Our goal is insight not prediction.  As an initial caveat, an important failing of this essay is that the textual sources and conversations were entirely in english–one might get different images with local Pakistani languages.

Disciplined Capitalistic Society  

The first image of Pakistan’s future has many anchors, the  most version recent uses S. Korea as a compelling image of the future.  Both countries were underdeveloped thirty years ago but now S. Korea has joined the ranks of the developed, it is become an integral part of the “Pacific Shift.”  Through state managed industrialization with strong private spin-offs (and the economic activity caused by the Vietnam war) Korea has dramatically raised its standard of living. Along with a strong confucian ethic (respect for hierarchy, family, hard work, and an emphasis on education) Korea was a strong national ethic.  However, given Pakistan’s social structure perhaps North Korea is a better example of  Pakistan’s possible future as both have strong militaries.  However, while North Korea has a strong totalitarian ideology, Pakistan does not.  Islam is in many ways a legal/social doctrine and in that sense that it defies any particular  authoritative interpretation rather it is up for grabs by a variety of ideologies. While a theocratic military state is possible so far this mixture has not occurred nor has a one-man state managed to succeed. The best way of stating this model of the future is the “disciplined capitalistic society.”   The military rules directly or indirectly under the guise of “law and  order.”  Not only is civil society disciplined but so is labor.  Labor exists to aid capital in its national and  transnational accumulation.  The Islam that is used is one  that aids in societal discipline at the individual and social level. The head of the nation is then the strict father who knows what is best for the children.  The mother is in this image is apolitical, remaining at home to take care of the nation’s children so they can work for the larger good of capitalist development.

However there is an important contradiction here.  Among the reasons of the rise of East Asia was women labor.  Females are thus essential for for export oriented strategies that lead to capital accumulation; at the same time the Islamic  dimension of this model demands their continued “home-ization.”  They are to provide care to labor.  This is the semi-proletarian  existence which in the long run cheapens the cost of labor for capital since the informal sector helps support the formal “monied” capitalistic sector.  Females are integral to this semi-proleterian structure.

The other obvious contradiction is the role of the military.  Besides the role of women, confucianism, the historical particular juncture in the worldeconomy, East Asia developed because of low military expenditures and high social expenditures.  Is Pakistan ready to put health and education before military expansion, that is, to redefine security?  We have yet to see.  In the meantime, the hope is that through discipline and privatization Pakistan can join the ranks of the rich.

Islamic Socialism

This image is partially influenced by interpretations of Islam that give weight to the syncretic personal dimension of Islam; that is, an Islam that does not the become the facilitator of the mullah’s rise–not rote discipline but revelation.  The rendering of Islam is populist as for example in the view that the land is perceived as belonging to the tillers not the landlords.  This image is also partially influenced by the third world movement which has attempted to follow an alternative development path not based on multinational West run capitalism or on soviet party/military run communism.  This view was  made famous by  Z.A. Bhutto in Pakistan.  But let us be clear:  this view is still industrial and growth oriented like the previous model, however, it has a strong emphasis on “roti, capra, makan,” on basic needs and distributive justice.  Nehru attempted a similar model but without the Islamic overtones as have numerous other third world leaders.  In this model, the state softens the impact of local and transational capital on individuals.  At the macro level, import substitution and nationalization become key strategies.  However, the larger problem of the world economic system as essentially capitalistic and politics nation-state oriented with Pakistan near the bottom of the global division of labor remains.

The meaning of this image, however, does not come only from the economic as central is the religious.  It is Islam that unites, it is Islam that gives direction, it is Islam that integrates individual, family and nation.  And although Islam is pervasive, it remains open and committed to distributive justice and individual spiritual growth–a soft Islam, if you will.  National allies in this image come from other third world countries with collective self-reliance the long run goal–south/south cooperation on economic, cultural and political levels.

Among other writers, Syed Abidi’s writes that these two images take turns dominating Pakistan’s politics.   Exaggeration of one leads to individual and social frustration and then the rise of the other and visa versa.  However, revisionist historians, such as Ayesha Jalal, argue that both are unsuccessful because of the nature of the Pakistani state, molded along authoriatarian lines due to the circumstances of partition.

A third image, based on individual and national identity attempts to transcend the earlier two, using the past as its gateway into the future.

The Return of the Ideal and the Search for Identity

The original image of Pakistan was that of a safe heaven and haven for muslims: safe from both the hindus of the east and  later on from the  jews of the west (in Israeli and  American forms).  It was derived–at least in its popular  myth–as the territory wherein muslims would not be  oppressed by the hindus of India.   While Jinnah’s intent may have been political power (a share in the action when  India was to be divided) for the Muslim League and later the  creation of a secular state, it quickly became a state for  muslims of muslims.   Pakistan’s self image was to a large degree defined by India.  India has been the enemy that gives unity.  Even after three  devastating wars, military strategists still believe that Pakistan can defeat India.   In this view, India has  many gods, is bent on destroying Pakistan (the empirical  evidence of the Bangladesh war), has nuclear weapons and is  allied with godless Russia.  But would Pakistan retain any sense of its identity without India since Pakistan knows itself through the other of India? Indeed, is Pakistan but not-India. India has survived thousands of years  with and without muslim domination, but Pakistan is still struggling  to complete a half-century, to imagine itself as a nation, to find a coherent self.

This image exists in many ways outside our earlier  dimensions in that internal identity is more important than external reality.  The image is that we reside in the land of the Pure, the  place where there is no threat from the outside, wherein the  purity of Islam can flourish.  Other variables such as the type  of political-economy, culture and geo-politics are less important.  The moral dimension of Islam is central.

Questions that arise from this view is: has Pakistan achieved this  level of purity?  Some muslim scholars argue that each Islamic nation attempts to recover the polity of the initial Islamic state, the ideal of the  original promise of the time of the Prophet–the revolution  had occurred, prophecy had been delivered, the rightly guided  caliphs ruled, and there was social justice and economic  growth in Arabia.  This ideal is then the image of the  future for Pakistan; this is the time of partition when there was  promise in the air, a great deal had been achieved through  sacrifice, the British and the hindus had been thrown back, and the Quaid lived.    The image of the future then is a return to a time of hope  and dreams; of victory over struggles and of purity, before the politicians in the form of the military and the  landlords coopted the future.  In this sense this image of the future is a search for an ideal past, a mythic past.

But while this image may be glorious, revisionist historians point out that the birth of Pakistan was already steeped in power politics, in feudal domination: there was never any purity to speak of, to begin with.  If this is true then perhaps what is needed is a reimagination of Pakistan.  A  search for a new vision, a new purpose that makes sense of the last forty years of frustration and creates real visions of the future not dreams based on a past that is but a lie.  This reimagination task could occur through a democratic process of collective future envisioning or it could come from the words or images of great artists or others marginal to the present established power structure.  But while we await this reimagination of the future, in the meantime the present disintegrates.

The End of Sovereignty

This images is the most pervasive and has many variants and levels.  The first is conquest by India leading to a greater India.   This is possible through military conquest or through  economic imperialism if the doors of trade are left wide open.

The second is more sophisticated and deals not with military  or economic imperialism but with cultural domination.  The  main villain is  the West, especially the United  States.  Irrespective of US AID and other ties to Pakistan, religion and their distant locations in the world economy make Pakistan and the USA naturally antagonistic.   Recent desires of the US to inspect Pakistan’s nuclear development exacerbate this tension.  But cultural domination comes in  many forms: technology transfer from the green revolution to  the microcomputer revolution–technology is not neutral but  has many cultural codes and messages embedded in its  hardware (the actual physical technology) and software (the  rules that make it sensible).  For example, certain  technologies might promote individualism and the expense of  family.  Others might promote mobility.  Education transfer  also leads to cultural penetration, the widespread  emigration to the USA for education and then for work is the  obvious example.  Electronic technology even in the  ostensibly neutral form of CNN can but spread foreign views  of what is significant and what is unimportant; that  Pakistan is rarely covered is not inconsequential to  cultural self-images.  Travel to the West for tourism,  conferences, and medical reasons is another example.   While  certainly there is a bit of cultural transfer mostly it is but one-way communication.  Sovereignty then is clearly  violated; the idea that a nation can exist given this level  of cultural penetration is highly problematic.  For instance, just as  there is a world division of labor there is a world division  of culture and news with some supplying modern culture others  providing exotic or traditional culture.  We provide the data for their theories of the traditional.  The responses to this form of penetration are obvious:  fundamentalism in its strongest forms–a return to the historic text, a denial of physical and mental mobility, and a critique of all things foreign even those which increase the freedom and life chances of individual and family.   This is the famous  call by the ruling elite for a local form of “democracy” in  which basic “universal” freedoms are denied so as to save traditional local culture.  Liberals, thus, argue that the defense of cultural sovereignty of the  nation is but the denial of the sovereignty of the  individual and the reaffirmation of the  power of the State.  In the name of tradition, all sorts of injustices can be committed and rationalized.  Other responses to Western penetration could be further  Islamic penetration, for example, by Iran.  This could lead  to a Pakistan-Iran partnership with an increased Shia influence in Pakistan.  It would increase the power of ulema  in that they would have the power to define and narrate  legitimate cultural and political activities. Conversely the end of sovereignty could become a positive image in that Pakistan could be forced to become an international blend of many cultures and technologies: a place where the future resides, a place where sovereignty finds itself renewed at a higher plantery or spiritual or cultural levels not at a myopic national or local level.  This is then a reaffirmation of the idea of the ummah but extended to the entire world in the form of a global community.  Pakistan could then become a compelling image for other places to emulate. A receiver and sender of social technology and a creator of postmodern culture. But this direction would take a great deal of daring and courage as there are no models to follow only vague possibilities to explore.

As problematic as cultural sovereignty is the loss of the sovereignty of the self.  The self was previously constructed around familiar lines: heaven was above, hell below, and God all around.  One knew what one was to do with one’s life: class and caste were clear.  But with the world continuously being recreated by the science and technology revolution and with the problem of West continuously staring at the Pakistani “self,” there no longer exists any clear cut self.  Am I Sindhi first?  A woman first? A Pakistani first? A wife first?  A muslim first?  A feudal first?  Where do my loyalties lie?  Can I integrate these often contradictory fragments of identity?  And where do these categories stand in the larger scheme of things?  Moreover, the problem of the self can but become increasingly problematic with the feminist movement, increased exposure to the outside world through travel and the development of an overseas Pakistani community.  Instead of one mutually agreed upon authoritative construction of self we may see many Pakistani selves all vying for individual and national dominance.

The next layer of sovereignty that is made problematic is internal territorial sovereignty, that is, the provinces increasingly  wanting more autonomy and in some cases secession.  The  calls for an independent Sindh is the latest case in point.   The image of this future is of all the provinces going their separate ways with Pakistan finally only being Punjab. The north-west might join with Afghanistan or the Phaktoons might form  their own country.  In addition, Baluchistan might join Iran, become its  own nation, or join a loose confederation with Sindh.  And in this image, Azad Kashmir would either join Punjab or unite  with the rest of Kashmir to form its own nation.  While  this might lead to conquest by India most likely the same forces that would lead to end of national integration in Pakistan would also lead to the disintegration of India, from one India to many Indias. Also possible after a period of disintegration is reintegration into a united states of south asia with Punjab as the most likely center of this loose regional federation.

No Change: the Continuation of the Grand Disillusionment

The last and we would argue most pervasive image of the  future is that of the present continued or “no change.”   This is a general malaise, a grand disillusionment with the  ideal of Pakistan, with the promises of the rulers, with the  intentions of politicians.  In this view, the power structure–so obviously unjust–appears unchangeable to individuals and groups.

Given this malaise, there are then a range of strategies available. The first is individual  spiritual development, an escape from the social and material worlds.  The second is to flee the  country to brighter horizons outside: “Dubai Chalo” or the  fabled green card.  The poor and middle class go to the Middle East and the rich and the upper middle class leave for the United States.  Within the country the strategy is to  find a job and then use one’s personal influence to help  others find work thus allowing the family as a whole to  move up the economic ladder.  Of course this is more  difficult in times of contraction.  During economic expansion, movement is easier.  Another tactic is politicization in the  form of joining political parties for the purpose of social transformation.  However, this strategy is often quickly abandoned  once the enormous weight of the  historical structures at hand are made obvious (the military, the landlords, and the interpretive power  of the ulema, mentioned earlier).  What remains is politics as patronage.

This regression from politics as social transformation to politics as patronage has a devastating influence on the national psyche.  Individuals  are forced into corruption and dishonesty (within their definitions of these two terms) and must live with their own moral  failures in a land where morality is central to personal and social valuation.   Violence–individual, institutional and state–becomes routine and acceptable.  Cities disaggregate; the rich secure themselves and the rest either form separate communities or create their own armies.  What emerges is cynicism and pessimism, a breakdown in the immune system of the political and social body–a world ending with a whimper not a bang.

For those in the position of leadership or responsibility  the contradictions are even stronger and inasmuch as the local, national and international structures are too difficult to transform others are blamed: the  foreign elements, the bad local elements, or the undisciplined youth, to name a few enemies. The oppression of the present bares down on leader and follower alike; both lose their humanity, both lose hope in any collective image of the future.  Worse, there is no savior ahead: all models have failed; leaders have failed; religion has failed; capitalism has failed; socialism has failed; political parties have failed.

Conclusion: Designing the Future

The need for reimagination of purpose, of identity, of vision from this dismal final vision is glaring.  Part of revisioning is creating alternative structures.  Among the points of departure for these new structures should be the centrality of difference. Pakistan has placed its strength on unity; a unity that has proved elusive.  Perhaps we need to create institutions and models of change that use difference to create strength, that celebrate our uniqueness among each other and in the world. From an embracing of difference, a unity of self, family and a larger group identity then might be possible.  As important as difference is decentralization, the creation of local practices to solve local problems, that is, endogenous development.  Finally, we should not forget democracy, not in the trivial sense of voting–which has historically but strengthened statist politics–but in the more important sense of individual empowerment and community participation in the creation of preferred futures as contextualized by the social designs of others. In any case, designing the future at local and community and broader levels (through local and nternational social movements, for example) might be a more promising task than waiting for a politician or some other central authority to solve the problems ahead.  Imagination does not mean, however, a forgetting of the material world and the real interests–structural, institutional and individual–that impede attempts to transform the present.  The future must then be a sight that one moves toward as well as a site wherein the material and the creative meet. The future–like politics, economics and culture–must be decolonized and reappropriated by each one of us.  Today.  While the above represents an initial exploration of Pakistan’s  images of the future, dimensions within these images have  yet to be explored: the role of the environment, structural and direct violence, the role of children, images of health, the possibilities of growth and distribution, and the relative powers of various actors, such as nation-states, political parties and social movements.   To conclude, one might ask: what is my image of the future for myself?  for my family? for my community? for my nation? for the planet?  And what am I doing to realize my personal and social image of the future?

*(Dr. Sohail Inayatullah is a member of the executive council of the World Futures Studies Federation and is currently editing a book on the Futures of South Asia.  In the preparation of this essay, Dr. Inayatullah, the author’s father, provided a wealth of insights and made helpful editorial comments)

Cultural Categories and Sovereignty: Futures and Pasts of Hawaii (1988)

By Sohail Inayatullah

Cultures are often cannibalized when they adopt the categories of the foreign dominating culture. While colonialism is often seen as the capturing of lands and political power, far more intrusive is the imposition of epistemological categories–what is considered rational or real, for example.

The historical stages of colonialism are well known: economic exploitation (gaining monopoly rights of raw materials), imperialistic exploitation (using political and economic power to transform the local economy), political oppression (transforming
ethnic relations), and finally fascist exploitation (transforming traditional collectivities into nation states where then the foreign is constructed as the advanced and developed and the local the backward underdeveloped). It is the last phase that creates the context for cultural exploitation, creating the conditions for a cultural inferiority complex–the long term result is the shattering of the spine of the local culture.

Western colonialism has become universal through a three part process: (1) transforming traditional accounts of time (into linear developmentalist time), commodifying everything (transforming traditional social relations into exchange relations) and imposing a foreign language or culture.

To counter these forms of exploitation there are a range of appropriate strategies. First, economic democracy, where ownership is vested in those who provide labor, ideas and capital in the form of cooperatives for example (not just to those who provide capital). Second, revitalization of language. Third, the recovery of epistemological categories in which the local culture has historically known itself. Fourth, the creation of links with other oppressed movements and peoples, so as to create a local/global link. Fifth, a neo-humanistic ecological approach that is not based on geo-politics, race politics, or species politics but includes all that is.

While all these might be preferred strategies, most often cultural interaction between foreign and local are based on the categories of the dominant culture. Clearly, the historical and present interaction between Hawaiians and Westerners is based on the cultural and historical categories of the West. Interaction has come on their terms.

In the present sovereignty debate, for example, the contours of the debate are based on Western political theory. The idea of a constitutional convention (while perhaps appropriately participatory) forgets that it is a particular American invention divorced from Hawaiian history or from the unique blend of “local” culture. This form of representation based on election might not be the best way for Hawaiians to design their (constitutional) future. The idea as well that Hawaiian should collectively sit down and rationally develop policy statements as to what they want to do or be again forgets that many peoples do not choose (in the Western sense of the term) their epistemology or their constructions of the other–they live in a given historical relationship to the land or the transcendental. While Westerners may rationally choose their relations, it is not the same with other cultures. Who choose might indeed include the land and the transcendental, for instance. The idea of choice in this case itself becomes an imperialistic concept used to impose one’s own view of rationality, or knowledge.

What then are some Hawaiian, local or more appropriate ways to structure the debate, to create the future. If ho’oponopono, for example, is in fact a way to reach consensual agreement, to heal personal and social illness, to discern where the relationship has gone wrong, and who needs to be forgiven and what needs to be made right, then perhaps this model can be used to structure interaction with the various parties linked to sovereignty or independence. Or ho’oponopono could be revised to meet present social and political needs.

Even while cognizant of the dominance of neo-realist politics (self-interest at the individual and nation-state levels), we can still ask what traditional categories of governance can be reinvented to create an Hawaiian future. Besides ho’oponopono what other categories exist that can be used to attain freedom? What local forms of social and economic organization can revitalize Hawaii as the US core culture looses its legitimacy?

While sovereignty and independence are both laudable ideas, is sovereignty even possible in a world dominated by a Core, the West in present history? Moreover, is the idea of a sovereign nation-state in itself an imposition, useful only from a Westernized view. Should Hawaii and Hawaiians be seeking support from non-American institutions and agencies instead of debating with American institutions, that is attempting to find ways to link with the global community, even a world governance structure in the very long run. This is especially important for sovereignty, when achieved, will still be in the context of an unequal global division of labor where the opportunities for the recently sovereign (Africa and Asia) are far less then those that have been sovereign for hundreds of years. Thus, even if, or when, Hawaii does secede it will still exist in an international system that sees only states as real, denying the visions of social movements, of women, of the aina. Again as the experience of sovereignty for African and Asian nations has shown, gaining sovereignty is only the beginning of the battle, especially if the terms of sovereignty are framed in the language and categories of the dominant.

Finally, after centuries of subjugation, the periphery often has internalized the brutality of the oppressor. Once sovereign these same categories are used on one’s own people. Local culture colludes with the dominant Center power (the West or Japan) long after the colonialists have left we continue using their visions of the future, their ideas of history. Colonialism after all is a state of mind, that remains long after the colonialists have left.

To survive–epistemologically, culturally, economically–we have to use our own categories of thought. Western culture must struggle through these categories just as the Non-West has had to struggle through the categories of the West. We have to create our own forms of interaction recognizing that we have been made Other. We have to make links with others who have been colonized. We must also be careful that this duality not become internally oppressive.

In creating a future based on authentic ways of knowing, which categories should be used? Which are truly authentic? From which period of history can these be derived from? No culture is static (accept again in the context of imperialism when culture becomes custom, museumised or airportized), cultures are living, even reinventing themselves by resisting the dominant culture. Indeed,  instead of defining culture in the traditional Western sense of values and habits, perhaps culture is resistance. Resistance creates culture.

However, this collusion with the dominant cultures makes one multi-cultural since every moment is an encounter with a foreign culture and a remembrance of one own’s culture. Rethinking the relationship between local and global, these moments can eventually become the creation of a new planetary culture–one based on local understandings but planetary in the sense of an expanded we: living in Our home, for you and I and everybody else.