Pedagogy, Culture and Futures Studies (1998)

By Sohail Inayatullah

Queensland University of Technology

Through case studies of futures workshops and courses, the importance of decolonising the future and creating authentic alternative futures is highlighted.  Futures studies, it is argued, is about understanding the human condition, what it has become, and how we can participate in changing it.  An ideal futures studies is multi-leveled, empirical, interpretive, and critical in its research focus. Offered in this article is causal layered analysis, a futures method which takes a multicultural and multidisciplinary approach to the future.

FUTURES STUDIES IN SEARCH OF A DOXA

In traditional disciplines, even as postmodernity undoes defining and organizing narratives, there is a doxa–certain classic texts that must be read and must be adhered to. Futures studies does not yet have these boundaries. It is trans-disciplinary, in search of an interpretive community, its knowledge base just being defined.[1] Who the futurists are is still in contention.[2] Is futures studies a science? An appendage to strategic planning? Should futures studies be technical, concerned with forecasting, or culture-based, concerned with recovering the futures from the instrumental rationality of modernity? Or is futures studies primarily a movement, an attempt to keep futures pluralistic, to keep the future open, less concerned with academic treatises, and more with social action? Or should futures studies be specific in its orientation, as in “future generations studies”, which seeks to sustain and transform social conditions on behalf of the rights of future generations (humans, animals, plants, as well as metaphors)? Or should futures studies primarily be concerned with deconstructing hegemonic images of the future held by the powerful, thereby creating the spaces for the emergence of authentic alternative visions and social designs? That is, should futures studies essentially be about decolonizing dominant views of time/space and perspective?

While there have been many attempts to map the field,[3] it still remains contentious with no hegemonic paradigm defining it. In earlier articles, among other mapping schemes by thinkers such as Linstone, Masini, Gillwald, Sardar, Amara and Bezold,[4] I have divided futures studies into three overlapping research dimensions: empirical, interpretive and critical.[5] Each dimension has different assumptions about the real, about truth, about the role of the subject, about the nature of the universe, and about the nature of the future.[6] My own preference has been approaches that use all three–that contextualize data (the predictive) with the meanings (interpretive) we give them–and then locate these in various historical structures of power/knowledge–class, gender, varna and episteme (the critical).

In the predictive/empirical, language is assumed to be neutral; that is, it does not participate in constituting the real. Language merely describes reality, serving as an invisible link between theory and data. Prediction assumes that the universe is deterministic so that the future can be known. By and large this view privileges experts (planners, policy futurists, economists and astrologers). The future becomes a site of expertise and a place to colonize. In general, the strategic discourse is most prevalent in this framework with information valued because it provides lead time and a range of responses to deal with the enemy (a competing nation or corporation). Linear forecasting is the technique used most. Scenarios are used more as minor deviations from the norm instead of alternative worldviews.

In the cultural/interpretive, the goal is not prediction but insight into difference with the hope of creating unity. Truth is considered relative, with language and culture both intimately involved in creating the real. Through comparison–through examining different national or gender or ethnic images of the future–we gain insight into the human condition. This type of futures studies is less technical, with mythology as important as mathematics. Learning from each model–in the context of the search for universal narratives that can ensure basic human values–is the central mission for this epistemological approach. While visions of the future often occupy center stage in this interpretive view, the role of identity is also important, whether based on class, gender, or other categories of social relations.

In the poststructural/critical, futures studies aims neither at prediction nor at comparison but seeks to make the units of analysis problematic, to undefine the future, to seek a distance from current understandings and epistemological agreements. Of concern in this perspective is not forecasting, say, the futures of population, but how the category of population has become valorized in discourse. “Why ‘population’ instead of ‘community’ or ‘people’?” we might ask. The role of the state and other forms of power in creating authoritative discourses is central to understanding how a particular future has become hegemonic. Critical futures studies asserts that the present is fragile, merely the victory of one particular discourse, way of knowing, over another. The goal of critical research is to disturb present power relations through making problematic our categories and evoking other places, other scenarios of the future. Through this distance, the present becomes less rigid, indeed, remarkable. The spaces of reality loosen, the grip of neo-realism (of the bottom line, of the predictive approach) widen, and the new is possible. Language is not symbolic but constitutive of reality. While structures are useful, they are seen not as universal but as particular to history and episteme (the knowledge boundaries that frame our knowing).

Ideally, one should try to use all three types of futures studies. If one makes a population forecast, one should then ask how different civilizations approach the issue of population. Then, one should deconstruct the idea of population itself, defining it, for example, not only as an ecological problem in the third world but relating it to first world consumption patterns as well. Empirical research then must be contextualized within the science of the civilization from which it emerges, and then historically deconstructed to show what particular approaches are missing and silencing.

TEACHING FUTURES STUDIES

My own pedagogy in the area of futures studies has focused on the interpretive and critical. I have been particularly concerned with decolonizing the future–examining how we buy other’s used futures; how we disempower ourselves by accepting the futures of others as ours. But once the purchased future is deconstructed, it is equally essential to offer alternatives. In my own work, I ask: what are alternative imaginations of the future? How can we learn from those who have suffered? What are the images of the future of those we consider outside history? What are other ways to “time” the world instead of the dominant scientific model, such as, women’s, spiritual, or cyclical time. Thus, crucial to a liberation pedagogy is a concerted effort to identify dissenting authentic images of the future.

My own inspiration to engage in alternative futures has come from classical Tantra as redefined by P. R. Sarkar; from indigenous Pacific islander’s visions of time and family; and from the range of social movements–the spiritual, the environmental, the womanist–all dedicated to creating a global ohana, being part of a global samaj, a planetary civilization.

Teaching and learning about the future then is centrally about understanding the human condition, what it has become, and how we can participate in changing it (and understanding the structural limitations of change, i. e., the deep cycles and trends of history that create our own subjectivities).

My own experience in the last fifteen years has been in conducting workshops for university administration and departments, non-governmental organizations, corporations, local governments, research institutes, international organizations and advocacy groups; participating in international courses in futures studies (usually sponsored by the World Futures Studies Federation [WFSF] and UNESCO) and more formal teaching at the University of Hawaii (wherein I used a futures perspective to frame the topic being taught, Hawaii Politics in this case), and public lectures at numerous universities and institutes throughout the world (Yugoslavia, Greece, Denmark, Pakistan, Hungary, India, Australia, to mention a few).

The style that I use in formal courses is to have students/participants search for alternative ways to define the past, present, and future. Not only is the future considered probable and makeable, but so is the past and present. The idea is to open up the present, to give different readings of political events and trends. In one course, a student developed scenarios of Hawaii’s future by rewriting history. He asked: “What if Captain Cook had never landed on the Hawaiian Islands? What if contact with the West had been on the terms of the Islanders?” This historical questioning led to the creation of scenarios in which Pacific islands–instead of a history of disunity and imperialism–unite, recognizing that they are a liquid continent, and creating something akin to the Federated Cultures/Regions of Oceania.

In conducting workshops–where I work with a specific group aiding in the development of their vision/strategy for the future–my own method has been to first create a shared identity, to explore why each person is at the workshop, and what history they bring with them, and then I seek to open up the workshop. The opening up process occurs through methods such as emerging issues analysis–which identifies areas of sudden transformation, of unexpected futures–and what-if questions, which again call into question the present and projected future.

This is followed by a sorting of positions in vertical layers, from the most obvious litany to the deeper metaphorical layers–the method of Causal Layered Analysis (CLA), which is explored more in depth later in this essay. Information from these methods is used to create alternative scenarios,[7] pictures of possible and probable futures. Of these scenarios, agreement is often reached on a vision of the future. This can occur through small working groups or strategic questioning, in which the elements of the group vision emerge. In strategic questioning I ask selected individuals to imagine–in detail–a day in their life in their desired or plausible future. I ask questions like: What do you see out the window? How do you get to work? Do you walk, use virtual technologies, or …? Do you work? What do you eat during the day?

These stories create shared meanings among participants and they legitimate the future since imaginations are owned by the individuals relating them. Detail is crucial here as this forces participants to select from a range of possibilities what they desire or believe will occur in the future. Thus, from individual scenarios of the future, a shared vision comes to be articulated.

The final stage is backcasting, of deriving strategy by going backwards from the future, and asking individuals to remember the historical events and trends that created the present. At this stage, with the contours of the future already agreed on, the issue is remembering the past, not engaging in debates about whether a particular future could or could not have occurred. Backcasting can result in a strategic plan or, even better, a range of organizational experiments with real funding and faces behind who does what, when, and with whom.

While this is a general model, there are, of course, many variations depending on the local culture of the participants, their worldview, and how they imagine the future. Being sensitive to local perspective on the future, I believe, is a crucial skill in teaching futures studies. Listening to the language others use to talk about the future is also essential. Finally, while it is important to honor others’ views of the future, thinking about the future, as Dator has argued, is an unnatural act –it requires years of training. The teacher should not be shy about prodding others towards more imaginative, creative, and plausible futures. Thinking about the future is more than fantasy fulfillment. There are real rigorous methods, from the most to the least mathematical, that can aid in this process.

Finally, as in all pedagogical situations, there is a process of politics. This includes conventional understandings of the politics of planning–the role of participation and hierarchy; of who gets to speak, and who listens; who is expert and who is lay–as well as more subtle issues as to the appropriateness of using futures studies for organizational learning and transformation.

What follows are case studies of workshops and courses selected to illustrate the above.

EXPERTISE AND UNCERTAINTY[8]

While one would normally expect expertise to be the most important criteria in determining the success of a workshop, in a day-long visioning workshop for an Australian university, we found that the most important determinant in the workshop’s success was our own uncertainty as to how to run the workshop. Deans, professors and administrators were initially resistant to participate in a visioning workshop. They feared that the workshop would be used by management to gain points over labor. They were also uncertain of the academic respectability of futures studies.

Our[9] first goal was to ensure commitment from top management. Our second goal was to locate futures within macrohistory, within the large patterns of social and civilizational change. This was important in that the future was seen less as fantasy and more as part of a knowledge base. Our third goal was to keep the workshop fluid, to constantly change directions as our perception of participants’ needs changed. This fluidity on our part was central to allaying fears that we had a hidden agenda (for management). The result was that since we were unsure of ourselves, the future ceased to be an authoritarian space. Rather, it became an open space that could be shared, where expert knowledge had not colonized alternatives.

Academics afterwards agreed to continue the visioning process in their own departments. Earlier, they had worried that we would be crystal ball gazers, but the issues we raised at some level fit their world views but also challenged them. For example, we asked them to explore the challenge of multiculturalism in the university (not just in terms of better and equal opportunity for minorities but of using non-western models of knowledge and of the university to define their future), to explore the end of the university because of the Web; to explore a more corporatized university (as current globalization trends suggest), and to explore a return to core values. These issues later emerged in scenarios and shared agreement was reached in the visioning part of the workshop–i. e., the desirability of a more mentoring role than a strict “I am smart and you are not” role–and of faculty having concurrent contracts with different universities. The ideas that came forth most likely would not have emerged if the day had been spent discussing current issues–matters of office space, of access to better computers, of labor contracts–all critically important, but all reinscribing the present instead of creating or even imagining alternative futures.

Thus, while technically the workshop was problematic (miscues, and, in general, a trial and error learning process), in terms of its outcomes–a shared vision, a shared backcast, and a shared strategy of transformation, as well as an openness towards the process of creating alternative futures–the workshop was highly successful. Besides our tentativeness, central to this success was an opening speech by the university president in which he showed his commitment to the process, as well as vigorous participation by hard-headed academics, once they saw that we were not there to “workshop” them, to con them. This latter point is crucial since futures studies, even while it has grown by leaps and bounds in academia, still remains for many a “pop” consulting tool i. e., as change management, as a manipulative device.

MULTICULTURAL FUTURES[10]

More satisfying and challenging than conducting workshops for specific organizations/institutes have been international futures courses sponsored by WFSF (often with seed money from UNESCO). Whether in Dubrovnik, Andorra, Thailand or the Philippines, these courses begin with cultural difference and conclude with cultural difference. While introducing futures studies, these courses usually also have specific themes, such as the futures of development, communication, ecology, and policymaking and education.

These courses are challenging to teach in that not only does one have to teach a new field of knowing–futures studies–but one has to do so in ways that make sense to how individuals from different cultures know the world. Not only is the future constructed differently, but there are a range of diverse expectations of pedagogical style. Some prefer more formal lectures, others prefer informal small group sessions. Some expect that information about the future should be given to them, while others believe that any fantasy about the future is an appropriate scenario. Some resist the idea that the future is at some level open. For example, they may be committed to religious worldviews in which the future is God-given. Others believe that the future should be explored only through statistical-modeling methods and not through “softer” metaphorical approaches.

Teaching futures is already challenging, more so is teaching futures in cross-cultural contexts, wherein the knowledge, style, and forms of presentation are all open (and not) for negotiation. What I have found most noteworthy is that futures studies must be localized in the language of participants, in their ways of knowing and experiences.

Some years ago, Draper Kauffman developed an exercise, since widely used by some futurists, which asks people to say whether they think the future is more like a roller coaster ride, paddling down a river in a canoe, sailing on an ocean, or throwing dice in a game of chance (as in the American board game, “Monopoly”). People who choose “roller coaster” or “game of chance” are considered to have restricted, fatalistic images of the future, while those who say “river” have a more open image, with “ocean” being the most optimistic and “can do” image of the future of the four.

During a presentation of these four images to students at a futures workshop held in Islamabad, Pakistan in March of 1995, one student responded: “But who would want to live in a future which was entirely open.” She added: “An ocean has no direction.” She proceeded to offer the daily Muslim prayer while facing toward Mecca as an appropriate metaphor for Islam and the future–united and facing in one direction.

Earlier in a UNESCO/WFSF sponsored workshop on the futures of education held in Suva, Fiji in 1993, Pacific islanders had offered two metaphors they believed more adequately represented their traditions. The first was a coconut tree. One had to work hard to climb up the tree, but at the top were ample rewards. This was clearly the influence of Protestant Christianity on the Islands, the participants agreed. The second imaged they offered was of being a passenger in a car driven by a man with a blindfold. This of course represented the Island’s interaction with modern Western capitalism, a perception that they were not in control of their own destiny.

In contrast to these metaphors, an Indian participant at the second WFSF Bangkok Asia-Pacific futures course in 1993 suggested the onion as a more appropriate image. Reality, in this view, has many layers. Our task as humans is to peel away the layers, discovering new levels of reality, until all is revealed, and the empty infinity of the atman is revealed to us. A Filipino participant suggested a less spiritual metaphor, the coconut. A coconut is hard on the outside (in response to the cruelty of the world) but soft on the inside (our inner tender spiritual selves). The coconut also has many uses: it can be eaten, its juice drunk, and its husk used and recycled for a variety of agricultural and industrial purposes. It was a metaphor for all seasons, all futures.

Staying within the ecological discourse, an Australian participant at a Southern Cross University/WFSF course in 1995 suggested the seed. For her, the seed was most appropriate for expressing future generations and the future since it embedded alternative futures within an organic unity. As with children, the seed needs nurturing but as it grows it can provide nourishment for others. Once a tree, there are many branches–alternative futures–all arising from our common humanity (the trunk). Finally, the seed privileges ontology over epistemology, being over knowing.

These and other examples have made it clear to me that our language, our metaphors of the future, are culture- and gender-bound. To only use the models found in western futures educational books is severely limiting.

At a 1994 futures visioning workshop in Penang, Malaysia,[11] these limitations were further exposed. The dice, while adequately representing randomness, misses entirely the role of the transcendental as a type of super-agency. The roller coaster, while appearing to represent predestination, does not capture the importance of the group or larger community Asians and Africans are embedded in. The ocean, while representing unbounded possibilities, misses the role of history and deep social structures, of fate and power. While the image of river with its dangerous submerged rocks well represents the need for information and swift decisionmaking so as to avoid risks and take advantage of opportunities, it does not provide metaphorical entry for guidance from others: leadership, family, or God. Surprisingly, the metaphor that did emerge from discussion with Malay Muslims was the “snakes and ladders” game, that is, life’s ups and downs are based on chance, and when one goes up, one should be ready to fall at any moment. While appearing to be fatalistic, the resolution of this metaphor of the future was faith in Allah, as the deeper reality on which one must rest one’s self.

In this workshop, participants had little interest in the future until we asked them to think of the future in their own cultural categories. Once this question had been asked, there was an abundance of discussion. Participants searched within their own civilizational history to imagine the future. They took their future-oriented metaphors from their recent agricultural past and sought to understand if these still made sense within Malaysia’s new role in the world economy. This led to the creation of new types of future imaging and a call for Malays/Muslims constructing futures and futures studies.

They thus sought to decolonize the future and make it their own. Myths and metaphors were the central tools of empowerment that they used in this process. However, not neglected were issues of social design, of articulating futures that dealt with the realities of the world economy; nonetheless, they did so in the context of Islamic economics, devising and creating new financial instruments that did not violate Islamic ethics.

As mentioned at the outset of this essay, my view of the best futures studies would ideally bring in all these different perspectives, being able to move in empirical, interpretive, and critical frames, all the time touching on theory, data and values, while being sensitive to the different ways we learn from each other and know the world.

One method that is exemplary in this regard, in moving in and out of different types of meaning, is causal layered analysis.

CAUSAL LAYERED ANALYSIS[12]

Causal layered analysis takes as its starting point the assumption that there are different levels of reality and ways of knowing. Individuals, organizations and civilizations see the world from different vantage points, horizontal and vertical.

The first level is the “litany”–quantitative trends, problems, often exaggerated, often used for political purposes–(overpopulation, for example) usually presented by the news media. Events, issues and trends are not connected and appear discontinuous. The result is often either a feeling of helplessness (what can I do?) or apathy (nothing can be done!) or projected action (why don’t they do something about it?). This is the conventional level of futures research which can readily create a politics of fear. This is the futurist as fearmonger who warns: “The end is near! But if you believe my prophecy and act as I tell you to, the end can be averted.”

The second level is concerned with social causes, including economic, cultural, political and historical factors (rising birthrates, lack of family planning, for example). Interpretation is given to quantitative data. This type of analysis is usually articulated by policy institutes and published as editorial pieces in newspapers or in not-quite academic journals. If one is fortunate, then the precipitating action is sometimes analyzed (population growth and advances in medicine/health, for example). This level excels at technical explanations as well as academic analysis. The role of the state and other actors and interests is often explored at this level.

The third deeper level is concerned with structure and the discourse/worldview that supports and legitimates it (population growth and civilizational perspectives of family; lack of women’s power; lack of social security; the population/consumption debate, for example.). The task is to find deeper social, linguistic, cultural structures that are actor-invariant. Discerning deeper assumptions behind the issue is crucial here as are efforts to revision the problem. At this stage, one can explore how different discourses (the economic, the social, the cultural) do more than cause or mediate the issue but constitute it, how the discourse we use to understand is complicit in our framing of the issue. Based on the varied discourses, discrete alternative scenarios can be derived here. These scenarios add a horizontal dimension to our layered analysis.

The fourth layer of analysis is at the level of metaphor or myth. These are the deep stories, the collective archetypes, the unconscious dimensions of the problem or the paradox (seeing population as non-statistical, as community; or seeing people as creative resources, as life, for example). This level provides a gut/emotional level experience to the worldview under inquiry. The language used is less specific, more concerned with evoking visual images, with touching the heart instead of reading the head.

Causal layered analysis asks us to go beyond conventional framings of issues. For instance, normal academic analysis tends to stay in the second layer with occasional forays into the third, seldom privileging the fourth layer (myth and metaphor). CLA, however, does not privilege any one particular level. Moving up and down layers, we can integrate analysis and synthesis, and horizontally we can integrate discourses, ways of knowing and worldviews, thereby increasing the richness of the analysis. What often results are differences that can be easily captured in alternative scenarios; each scenario in itself, to some extent, can represent a different way of knowing. However, CLA orders the scenarios in vertical space.

For example, taking the issue of parking spaces in urban centers can lead to a range of scenarios. A short term scenario of increasing parking spaces (building below or above) is of a different order from a scenario which examines telecommuting, or a scenario which distributes spaces by lottery (instead of by power or wealth), or one which questions the role of the car in modernity (a carless city?), or deconstructs the idea of a parking space, as in many third world settings where there are few spaces designated “parking”.[13]

Scenarios, thus, are different at each level. Litany-type scenarios are more instrumental. Social level scenarios are more policy-oriented, while discourse/worldview scenarios intend to capture fundamental differences. Myth/metaphor type scenarios are equally discrete but articulate this difference through a poem, a story, an image, or some other right-brain method.

Finally, who solves the problem/issue also changes at each level. At the litany level, it is usually others–the government or corporations. At the social level, it is often some partnership between different groups. At the worldview level, it is people or voluntary associations, and at the myth/metaphor it is visionaries or artists.

These four layers are indicative; that is, there is some overlap between the layers. Using CLA on CLA, we can see how the current litany (of what are the main trends and problems facing the world) in itself is the tip of the iceberg, an expression of a particular worldview.[14]

USING “CLA” AT A UNESCO/WFSF COURSE

I have used CLA in a variety of situations. One notable example was at the 1993 UNESCO/WFSF workshop in Thailand on the futures of ecology, where the issue of Bangkok’s traffic problem was explored. CLA was pivotal in breaking out of a conventional understanding of transportation futures.

At the litany level, the problem was seen to be Bangkok’s traffic and related pollution. The solution was to hire consultants, particularly transportation planners at local and international levels.

At the social cause level, the problem was seen as a lack of roads with the solution that of building more roads (and getting mobile phones in the meantime). If one were doing scenarios at this stage, these would be based on where to build alternative routes and which transportation modeling software to use.

At the worldview level, it was argued that the problem was not just lack of roads but the model of industrial growth Thailand had taken. It is the Big City Outlook that had come down through colonialism: the city is better, and rural people are idiots; wealth accumulation is only possible in the city, especially as population growth creates problems in the rural area. The solution then becomes not to build more roads but to decentralize the economy and create localism–where local people control their economy and feel they do not have to leave their life and lifestyle. Psychologically it means valuing local traditions and countering the ideology that West is Best and that Bigger is Better. New leadership and new metaphors on what it means to be Thai emerged as the solutions.

The key methodological utility is that CLA allows for research that brings in many perspectives. It has a fact basis, which is framed in history, which is then contextualized within a discourse or worldview, which then is located in pre- and post-rational ways of knowing, in myth and metaphor. The challenge is to bring in these many perspectives to a particular problem, to go up and down levels, and sideways through various scenarios.

Like all methods, CLA has its limits. For example, it does not forecast the future per se and is best used in conjunction with other methods such as emerging issues analysis–which even while it offers forecasts of nascent issues, disturbs the present through its exploration of the absurd–and visioning.

KNOWLEDGE AND WAYS OF KNOWING

Teaching futures studies or conducting futures workshops has numerous challenges. The process must be sensitive to each individual’s cultural framework, to skepticism about the appropriateness of studying the future, as well as to a failure of imagination in thinking about the future, not to mention the complex ways we know the world. For example, Paul Wildman[15] argues that there are at least five ways of knowing: (1) practical, technical knowledge, skills development; (2) scientific theoretical knowledge, knowledge to explain the world; (3) experiential knowledge to change myself or the world around me; (4) metaphorical knowledge or insight, deeper understanding of self and others (at heart and head level) and (5) relationship knowledge, knowledge so as to better relate to others, be they lovers, friends, God or the environment. A course or workshop thus must find methods and processes that meet these various ways of knowing. Those focused on relationship often prefer small group exercises, where they can share perspectives and directly learn from others. Those concerned with metaphorical knowledge might prefer personal stories about how one has done futures studies or what one has learned from years of experience or conversations with elders and children. An experiential knowledge type would be far more concerned with ensuring that the time spent at a workshop would help change the world–making a difference is far more important than the accumulation of information. Those focused on scientific knowledge might prefer technical descriptions of forecasting. Finally, individuals representative of the first knowledge cluster focused on practical knowledge might want to learn how to do the workshop themselves or would be engaged in a cognitive assessment to discern if these workshops could be applied to their day-to-day work.

For a presenter, the task then is certainly challenging. At issue is not just the particular academic text on the future, but how each human learns about others, how each person imagines her own role on the planet, and what she intend to do about the problems facing humanity. As Martha Rogers argues,[16] teaching and learning about the future raises issues of the heart, head and soul–all three combine to create powerful forces of discomfort, and individual and social transformation.

One of the great strengths of futures studies is its openness towards its self-definition. Futures studies fortunately has a rapidly evolving knowledge base, thus allying fears that it is merely about fantasy or steeped in non-rigorous discourses. It is trans-disciplinary, having a leg in scientific analysis and a leg in cultural studies. This perhaps gives it an advantage. Its lack of institutionalization allows it to remain undomesticated. One can both be expert and student; one can lecture and can create spaces for participatory workshops. Whereas a traditional academic would need to feel that the lecture was perfect, for the futurist, there is more space for making mistakes, for laughter, for play, for experimentation, and thus for authentic and successful pedagogy. Indeed, that the future is not immediate and thus less urgent allows creativity to be explored. That the future is about alternative futures and not fixed history allows different interpretations, thus opening futures studies to more participation.

Finally, those who actively participate in teaching the future exist in global educative space, as futures studies is one of the few global disciplines, living and flourishing outside of conventional national and international boundaries of state and knowledge. The “how” of teaching the future then forces one into many academic, cultural, and historical frameworks. This is enriching for practitioners–and problematic, since all certainties are undone by the varieties of frames that create the process of what it is that is taught and learned.

To conclude, engaging in futures-oriented pedagogy requires sensitivity to the different ways women and men, civilizations, class, people with disabilities and those without–among other conditions–know the world. While all teaching situations have these concerns as well, in futures studies, the question of what you (as individual or as representative of your civilization) desire the future to be like is pivotal. This is especially so if one wishes to explore layers of responses, decolonize dominant visions of the future, and create authentic alternative futures.

And if this is all too much, there is always statistics and other fantasies to fall back on.

I would like to thank Dr. Levi Obiifor of the Communication Center for his editorial assistance in the preparation of this article.

END NOTES

1. Through efforts such as R.Slaughter, ed., The knowledge base of futures studies-Vols. 1-3. Melbourne, Futures Study Centre, 1996. Volume 4 titled Futurists: Visions, methods and stories  is forthcoming in 1998. See, also, R.Slaughter, (November, 1996). The knowledge base of futures studies as an evolving process. Futures , 28(9), 799-812.

2. For one effort at identifying the full range of futurists and what they think, see the special issue of Futures  titled What futurists think. 6(7), August/September, 1997.

3. The most recent effort is May, G. (1996).The future is ours. London: Adamantine. (See, in particular, his section on futures workshops, pages 194-199). Also, Bell, W. (1997). The foundations of futures studies. Two volumes. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. And, Kurian, G. T. and Molitor, G. T. T. (1996). Encyclopedia of the future. Two volumes. New York: Macmillan Library Reference.

4. See, for example, Linstone, H. (Spring 1985). What I have learned: The need for multiple perspectives. Futures Research Quarterly, 47-61. He divides futures into the technical, organizational and personal. Also see, Masini, E. and Gillwald, K. (1990). On futures studies and their social context with particular focus on West Germany. Technological Forecasting and Social Change , 38, 187-199. They take Linstone’s model and apply it historically to Europe and the US, seeing futures as going through technical, organizational and personal phases. See also, Sardar, Z. (March 1993). Colonizing the future: the “other” dimension of futures studies. Futures , 25(2), 179-187. Sardar argues for a colonization/decolonization dialectic. The classic map of futures studies remains Roy Amara’s division into preferred, possible and probable. See Amara, R. (February, April and June 1981). The futures field. The Futurist . See also, Bezold, C. and Hancock, T. (1993). An overview of the health futures field. Washington, DC: Institute for Alternative Futures. Bezold adds the plausible to Amara’s three categories.

5. Inayatullah, S. (March 1990). Deconstructing and reconstructing the future: Predictive, cultural and critical epistemologies.Futures , 22(2), 115-141.

6. Inayatullah, S. (April 1993). From “who am I” to “when am I?”: Framing the time and shape of the future. Futures , 25(3), 235-253.

7. The method I use to make the scenario more real is called “nuts and bolts.” This is a strutural-functional analysis of the organization. If, for example, a current function of an organization, say, the courts, is to resolve disputes, I ask: what are some other ways to resolve disputes. What are some other sites instead of court buildings? If currently judges resolve disputes, what are other ways to resolve them? This method forces one into very specific structural-functional changes.

8 .Some of the following material is drawn from, “Teaching futures workshops: Leadership, ways of knowing and institutional politics,” Futures Research Quarterly (forthcoming, 1998).

9. Working with Dr. Paul Wildman, Fellow in Futures Studies, International Management Centres, Pacific Region. Email: pwildman@powerup.com.au

10. Some of this material is drawn from, Inayatullah, S. and Wildman, P. Communicating Futures in Cross-Cultural Pedagogical Environments. Paper presented at the Conference on Teaching and Learning about Future Generations, OISE, University of Toronto, October 1995.

11. See Inayatullah, S. (October 1995). Futures visions for southeast Asia: Some early warning signals. Futures , 27(6), 681-688.

12. The material on Causal Layered Analysis is drawn from, Causal Layered Analysis: Poststructuralism as method, Research Paper, The Communication Centre, Queensland University of Technology, 1998.

13. In Pakistan, for example, parking spaces are rare. Parking as a regulatory discourse is not active there.

14. Most policy thus merely reinscribes the modern capitalist worldview. However, by noticing how a particular litany is shaped by a particular worldview, this allows us to enter alternative worldviews and articulate different policy statements based on them. At the same time, CLA in itself is part of a worldview–one committed to methodological eclecticism but in the framework of a layered, post-postmodern view of reality. It thus not only challenges the “totalizing nature of the empirical paradigm” (to use Paul Wildman’s phrase) but as well the horizontal relativism of postmodernism.

15. See Wildman, P. and Inayatullah, S. (1997). Ways of knowing, culture, communication and the pedagogies of the future. Futures , 28(8), 723-740.

16. Rogers, M. (October 1997). Learning about the future. From the learner’s perspective. Futures , 29(8), 763-768.

[1]   Through efforts such as Rick Slaughter, ed., The Knowledge Base of Futures Studies-Vols. 1-3. Melbourne, Futures Study Centre, 1996. Volume 4 titled Futurists: Visions, Methods and Stories is forthcoming in 1998. See, also, Rick Slaughter, “The knowledge base of futures studies as an evolving process,” Futures (Vol. 28, No. 9, November, 1996), 799-812.

[2]   For one effort at identifying the full range of futurists and what they think, see the special issue of Futures titled “What Futurists Think.” (Vol. 6, No. 7, August/September, 1997).

[3]   The most recent effort is Graham H. May’s The Future is Ours. London, Adamantine, 1996 (See, in particular, his section on futures workshops, pages 194-199). Also, Wendell Bell’s The Foundations of Futures Studies. Two Volumes. New Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction Publishers, 1997. And, George Thomas Kurian and Graham T.T. Molitor, Encyclopedia of the Future. Two Volumes. New York, Macmillan Library Reference, 1996.

[4]   See, for example, Harold Linstone, “What I have Learned: The Need for Multiple Perspectives,” Futures Research Quarterly (Spring 1985), 47-61. He divides futures into the technical, organizational and personal. Also see, Eleonora Masini and Karin Gillwald, “On Futures Studies and Their Social Context with Particular Focus on West Germany,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change (Vol. 38, 1990), 187-199. They take Linstone’s model and apply it historically to Europe and the US, seeing futures as going through technical, organizational and personal phases. See also, Zia Sardar, “Colonizing the future: the ‘other’ dimension of futures studies,” Futures (Vol. 25, No. 2, March 1993), 179-187. Sardar argues for a colonization/decolonization dialectic. The classic map of futures studies remains Roy Amara’s division into preferred, possible and probable. See his, Roy Amara, “The Futures Field,” The Futurist (February, April and June 1981).  See also, Clement Bezold and Trevor Hancock, “An Overview of the Health Futures Field”. Institute for Alternative Futures, Washington DC, 1993. 29 pages. Bezold adds the plausible to Amara’s three categories.

[5]   Sohail Inayatullah, “Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Future: Predictive, Cultural and Critical Epistemologies,” Futures (Vol. 22, No. 2, March 1990), 115-141.

[6]   Sohail Inayatullah, “From Who am I to When am I?: Framing the Time and Shape of the Future,” Futures (Vol. 25, No. 3, April 1993), 235-253.

[7]   The method I use to make the scenario more real is called “nuts and bolts.” This is a strutural-functional analysis of the organization.  If, for example, a current function of an organization, say, the courts, is to resolve disputes, I ask: what are some other ways to resolve disputes. What are some other sites instead of court buildings? If currently judges resolve disputes, what are other ways to resolve them? This method forces one into very specific structural-functional changes.

[8]   Some of the following material is drawn from, “Teaching Futures Workshops: Leadership, Ways of Knowing and Institutional Politics,” Futures Research Quarterly (forthcoming, 1998).

[9]   Working with Dr. Paul Wildman, Fellow in Futures Studies, International Management Centres, Pacific Region. Email: pwildman@powerup.com.au

[10]  Some of this material is drawn from, Sohail Inayatullah and Paul Wildman, “Communicating Futures in Cross-Cultural Pedagogical Environments,” Paper presented at the Conference on Teaching and Learning about Future Generations, OISE, University of Toronto, October 1995.

[11]   See Sohail Inayatullah, “Futures Visions for Southeast Asia: Some Early Warning Signals,” Futures (Vol. 27, No. 6, October, 1995), 681-688.

[12]  The material on Causal Layered Analysis is drawn from, “Causal Layered Analysis: Poststructuralism as method,” Research Paper, The Communication Centre, Queensland University of Technology, 1998.

[13]  In Pakistan, for example, parking spaces are rare – parking as a regulatory discourse is not active there.

[14]  Most policy thus merely reinscribes the modern capitalist worldview. However, by noticing how a particularly litany is shaped by a particularly worldview, this allows us to enter alternative worldviews and articulate different policy statements based on them.  At the same time, CLA in itself is part of a worldview – one committed to methodological eclecticism but in the framework of a layered, post-postmodern view of reality. It thus not only challenges the “totalizing nature of the empirical paradigm” (to use Paul Wildman’s phrase) but as well the horizontal relativism of postmodernism.

[15]  See Paul Wildman and Sohail Inayatullah, “Ways of Knowing, Culture, Communication and the Pedagogies of the Future,” Futures (Vol. 28, No. 8, 1997), 723-740.

[16]  Martha Rogers, “Learning about the Future. From the learner’s Perspective.” Futures (Vol. 29, No. 8, October 1997), 763-768.

Macrohistory and the Future (1998)

By Sohail Inayatullah

History of social systems

Based on the book Macrohistory and Macrohistorians,[1] this essay links macrohistory with futures studies. It takes the views of twenty or so macrohistorians and asks what do they offer to the study of alternative futures.[2]

Macrohistory is the study of the histories of social systems, along separate trajectories, through space and time, in search of patterns, even laws of social change.  Macrohistory is thus nomothetic and diachronic.  Macrohistorians — those who write macrohistory — are to the the historian what an Einstein is to the run-of-the-mill physicist: in search of the totality of space and time, social or physical. Macrohistorians use the detailed data of historians for their grand theories of individual, social and civilizational change.

Macrohistorians and their macrohistories have much to offer futures studies. While strong at breaking humans out of the present, futures studies is often weak at contouring the parameters of the future possible. Macrohistory, through its delineation of the structures of history: of the causes and mechanisms of historical change; of inquiry into what changes and what stays stable; of an analysis of the units of history; and a presentation of the stages of history, provides a structure from which to forecast and gain insight into the future.

By gaining insight into what has not changed, scenarios of the future can be more plausible.  By understanding the stages of history, we can better understand the stages of the future.  Macrohistory gives us the weight of history balancing the pull of the image of the future.  It gives a historical distance to the many claims of paradigm shifts, allowing us to distinguish between what are mere preturbations and what are genuine historical transformations.  While giving us insights into the human condition, macrohistory also intends to explain past, present and future, and to a certain extent predict the movement of units through time.

Macrohistory, as with future studies, focuses less on details and more on the overall patterns and stages. By examining history and theories of history, it seeks to understand: the relationship between agency, structure and the transcendental; whether history is cyclical or linear or some combined version (spiral or having aspects of both); the metaphysics of time, the metaphorical basis for grand theory; what the future is likely to look like; and the relationship between leadership and historical structure.  While we will touch upon all these dimensions, the focus will be on the future.

Agency, structure and the transcendental

Most social theorists argue back and forth between agency and structure.  However, macrohistorians find escapeways out of these categories. For example, for Vico, history and future, although patterned, are not predetermined — there are laws but these are soft.  As Attila Faj writes:

The famous corsi and ricorsi are both rheological and chorological, that is, circling “softly,” round dancing.  The softness of the law means that the successive figures of this roundelay are not necessarily unavoidable and are not independent of any condition and circumstance.  Each historical stage streams into the following one and gets mixed with it, so we cannot distinguish them sharply. For a long stretch, the stages and everything that belongs to them are mingled like the sweet water of an estuary with the salt water of the sea.[3]

Individuals can exert influence over the future but they exist in larger fields that condition their choices: epistemological, ontological, economic and cultural or class, gender, varna, civilization type, dynasty, cultural personality or ways of knowing the real. Futurists, in general, tend to focus on the individual’s ability to create the future and the values that inform the good society, vision, in question.  But for the macrohistorian, these value preferences in themselves exist within certain structures: biological (the evolution of the species and the environment), epistemological (the historical possibilities of what is knowable and thinkable), social (one’s own culture and its history), technological (the material and social ways through which actions can be expressed), and the economic (basic needs and growth, the realities of the material world).

Cyclical and linear  

As important as tension between agency and structure is the debate between cyclical and linear schools of history. Cyclical theory privileges perpetual change while linear theory privileges equilibrium, although it could be an evolutionary equilibrium as in the case of Spencer.  In cyclical theories change is endemic to the system: through dialectics, the principle of limits (wherein a historical stage by exaggerating its own nature and denying others is surpassed by another), through the Chinese yin/yang principle, or through the Indian Tantric vidya/avidya (introversion and extroversion) principle.

While cyclical theorists have linear dimensions (the move up or the move down), it is the return to a previous stage — however modified — that does not allow for an unbridled theory of progress.

Linear theorists also have cyclical dimension to their theories.  Within the narrative of linear stages, linear theorists often postulate ups and downs of lesser unit of analysis (for example, within human evolution or the evolution of capital, there might be a rise and fall of nations, firms or dynasties), but in general the larger pattern is progress.  Humans might have contradictions (based on the Augustinian good/evil pattern) but society marches on either through technology, capital accumulation, innovation, the intervention or pull of God.

Spiral theorists attempt to include both, having certain dimensions which move forward and certain dimensions that repeat. Spiral theories are fundamentally about a dynamic balance.

Cyclical views of history privilege structure over human agency.  In contrast, revolutionary movements promise a break of structure, an escape from history.  It is this rupture that leads to individual dedication.  The practical implications of grand theories which relocate individual action to determinism is that they lead to a politics of cynicism. Thus the usefulness of theoretical approaches which attempt to acknowledge the cyclical and the linear.

Metaphors of time  

From the view of futures studies, it is the contribution of macrohistory to the study of society-through-time that is of great use. Within macrohistory, many metaphors of time are used. There is the million year time of the cosmos which is useful for spiritual theory but not for social macrohistory.  There is individual timelessness or spiritual time, useful for mental peace but not for social development.  There is also the classic degeneration of time model from heaven to hell, from the golden to the iron (the four stage pattern from Satya to Treta to Dvapara to Kali in classical Vedic thought).  There is the Chinese model wherein time is correlated with the stars, which thus has no beginning nor no end.  There is Occidental time which traditionally started with the birth or some other event related to the life of the Prophet.  It now relates to the birth of the nation-state.

In contrast to the linear model and the four stages model which implicitly use the metaphor of the seasons, there is the biological and sexual model. The rise and fall of nations, dynasties and families can be related to the rise and fall of the phallus.  The phallic movement is dramatic and has a clear beginning and a clear end.  However, men, it can be argued, (using the linear model) prefer the first part of the cycle imagining a utopia where the phallus never declines. The empirical data suggests, however, that endless rise does not occur.

In contrast, not as obvious to men (and those involved in statecraft and historiography), the female experience is wavelike with multiple motions.  Time slows and expands.  Instead of a rise and fall model, what emerges is an expansion/contraction model.  Galtung, for instance, uses the expansion/contraction metaphor to describe Western cosmology.  He also suggests that there might be a relationship between different cosmologies (for example, as Christian cosmology declines, Islamic cosmology might expand).

Expansion/contraction is important as well since the implications are that there are benefits in each phase of the cycle.  In the contraction, for example, the poor do not suffer as proportionally as the rich who have less speculative wealth available (although certainly the wealthy attempt to squeeze the middle class and the poor as much as possible, especially the poor in the periphery).  The expansion/contraction metaphor is also used by Kondratieff and Wallerstein, but for them key variables in the model are prices and the flow of goods, not individuals or social organisms.

Biological time can also be used to understand the future.  Ibn Khaldun uses the idea of generational time to show how unity and creativity decline over four generations (from creativity to imitation to blind following to indolence). For Sarkar each collective psychology has its own dominant temporal frame. The shudra – worker – lives in the present; the ksattriya – warrior – thinks of time as space to conquer; the vipra – intellectual/priest – theorises time and imagines transcendental time; while the vaeshya – merchant – commodifies time.

But the central metaphor used by all cyclical theorists is the lifecycle.  Spengler, in particular, uses this perspective arguing that each individual culture has a unique personality with various distinguishing characteristics.  But the cycle has a downward spiral.  First there is the stage of culture. This stage eventually degenerates into mass civilization wherein the force of the money spirit leads to imperialism and the eventual death of the culture.   For Toynbee, too, civilizations have particular cycles they must go through.  Some elites respond to challenges through their creative faculties and others do not meet these challenges.  The former expand mentally while the latter intellectually decline.  Civilizations that meet challenges expand in size and wealth.  Those that do not meet internal or external challenges slowly decline (unless there is rejuvenation from within, from desert Bedouins, those outside of power, as Ibn Khaldun argues).

The best or most complete macrohistory or history of the future must be able to negotiate the many types of time: seasonal, rise and fall, dramatic, mythological, expansion/contraction, cosmic, linear, social-cyclical as well as the intervention of the timeless in the world of time.  Each type of time could be used as a starting point for the creation of an alternative scenarios of the future.

The future from macrohistory  

What are the contributions of various macrohistorians to the study of the future? To answer this, we take selected macrohistorians and summarize the key variables they use to think about the future. This task can be initially be divided into linear and cyclical categories. From Ibn Khaldun we can use three ideas: asabiya (unity gained through collective struggle), the rise and fall of dynasties, and the theory of four generations .  Our questions then become: who are the new Bedouins?  Which collectivities currently building unity are ready to sacrifice the present for the future?  Which ones have struggled a great deal and still retain the warrior spirit? How long will they stay in power?  One answer to this question is that the new Bedouins are Japan and the tigers.  The Confucian culture provides the unity and hierarchical structure. Defeat in war (and financial crisis) provides the struggle.   How they respond to the current financial crisis will tell us a great deal about the next century.

But moving away from the nation-state analysis, it is the social movements who could be the new leaders: the environmental movements, the women’s movements and the various spiritual movements. Their unity may develop from struggle against the status quo.

Sorokin gives us a pattern for the future from which we can understand the formation of the next integrative phase.  He places this pattern not at the level of the supersystem  but at the level of civilization.  Since Western civilization so strongly corresponds with sensate civilization, that is, since the West has assumed the form of the universal system, Sorokin speaks directly to the future of the West.  The pattern he gives is crises, catharsis, charisma and resurrection.  At present, the West stands in the middle of sensate civilization, awaiting the final two stages of charisma and resurrection.  The West awaits new leadership that can inspire and lead it to a rebirth in spirit and society, mind and body, individual and collective. But then eventually, since each stage is temporary, the next stage (ideational) will emerge from the integrated stage and the pendulum will continue.  But can these categories themselves be transcended?  Given the empirical evidence of history and the structure of the real, for Sorokin the answer would be in the negative, at least at the level of the social system.  Individually one might adopt a view of the real that is neither ideational, integrated or sensate, but nihilistic. This latter view, however, does not lead to a social system.

Sarkar is particularly rich as a predictive and interpretive theory of the future.[4]  From Sarkar, we have his theory of social cycle; his theory of civilization; and, his vision of the future.  Appropriate questions to begin an analysis include?  Which varna will lead next?  Which stage are we in now?  Will the cycle move forward or will there be a reversal?  Which civilizations or ideology will continue and which will collapse or cause oppression?  Certainly from Sarkar’s view the communist (ksattriyan) nations are now moving into their Vipran era.  Will this era be dominated by the church or the university, and how long will it be before these new intellectuals become technocrats for the capitalist era to emerge?  For the nations or groups presently in the capitalist cycle where will the new workers’ evolution or revolution come from?  And what of the centralization of power that ensues?  What will a Ksattriyan (warrior/military) USA look like?  Batra reminds us that historically it is these ksattriyan eras that are often seen as the golden ages — at least for those in the centre of the empire — as they provide security and welfare for citizens and expand wealth.[5]  Ksattriyan nations also expand physically.  Is space the final frontier?

We can also use Sarkar’s theory of civilizations and movements to gauge their possible success.  Do these new movements — feminist, ecological, ethnic, regional, and consumer — have the necessary characteristics to create a new system?  Do they have an authoritative text, leadership, a theory of political-economy, spiritual practices, fraternal universal outlook, and theory of Being/Consciousness?  Are there any ideologies that fulfil this criteria for success? Answering these questions would aid in understanding the long term future of the new movements.

From Toynbee, we can ask which civilizations can meet the numerous technological and ecological survival challenges facing humanity?  Which civilizations will find their development arrested as they are unable to deal with the coming challenges?  Will there be a spiritual rebirth that revitalizes the present? Is a Universal State next?  Or is the next stage a Universal Church?  Who and where are the upcoming creative minority?  Will Western civilization survive or will it go the way of historical declines? If there is a spiritual rebirth, who will lead it and how will it come about?

From Ssu-Ma Ch’ien the economic is not an important variable; rather, questions of leadership and the balance of nature are. For example, who will be the sage leader that will return the tao and restore balance in China-West relations?  Can government and learning be restored so that there is social balance?  How can unity among schools of thought, in the nation and in the family become the dominant trend?  As important, how can we reorder our understanding of history and future so to more accurately to reflect the lessons of virtue and morality?

From Spengler the critical variable or tool for understanding the future is the lifecycle of culture.  Following Spengler we would attempt to locate cultures in the pattern of the lifecycle.  We would ask which cultures are in the final days and which cultures are renewing themselves through interaction with other cultures?  We could also ask which cultures are rising and which new cultures are emerging?  For example, is Islamic culture in its final stages because of the new religiosity, or is it still expanding because of the recent emergence of the money spirit?  Indeed, world fundamentalism could be seen from a Spenglarian view as the last breath of dying cultures.  Given that great souls create new cultures, we can survey the world landscape and speculate which thinkers/activists/leaders might potentially create a new culture.

To Pareto and Mosca the theory of elites is paramount.  What will be the level of elite circulation in the future?  Rapid or fixed? Representations of democracy and widespread participation, notwithstanding, who are the real functioning elites?  Who will the future elites be? Is elite rule the only possible governance design? Also of importance is Pareto’s different types of elites: the innovators and consolidators.  With respect to Mosca, we can ask whether we are moving from a society of the wealthy, to a society of warriors.

From Comte we can ask have we reached the end of the Positive stage?  Or, since only a few nations have completely entered the Positive stage, is there still a long wait until the rest of the world joins in and become developed?  Or, does the collapse of communism and decline of Islam (in political power if not in mass numbers) signify the continued movement of positivism?  Indeed, the present can be construed as a validation of Comte and Smith, among others.  Liberalism has become the dominant ideology; the scientific worldview remains the official global ideology.

From Hegel we search for the location of the Geist.  Which society has solved basic, historical contradictions?  Some argue that the Geist has shifted from the US to Japan as perhaps the Japanese conquered the contradictions of individual and family in the form of their state?  Who will the new world historical leaders be?  And if we follow Hegel’s conclusions, should not we see the ultimate resolution of the Geist in the form of a world state either through the victory of one state or through some type of consolidation?  In the Hegelian view, the variables that we should focus on are the dialectics of the spirit, the power of the state, and rare world leaders.

From Marx (with renewal from Wallerstein) we can ask has the end of communism mainly furthered commodification of the world (the proletarization of Eastern Europe)?  Will the dramatic and total success of capitalism and its eventual transformation lead to socialism?  Are we closer to global socialism than ever before?  Will the new electronic and genetic technologies change social relations, or will they merely further commodify workers?

From Adam Smith it is not only the future of the market as a hegemonic metaphor and a site of economic exchange that we should look for but Smith’s other key category as well: that of love for the other and love for self as the causal mechanism of social change.  Will the future see a society that combines love or self-love or will this combination fail to emerge and lead to civilizational decline?

Spencer’s theory and his biological metaphor predicts a world government which would function as the brain of civilization. This world government would also end the rebarbarization of civilization (the world wars).  Spencer also predicts a new societal stage neither barbarous, militant nor industrial.  He writes: But civilization does not end with the industrial.  A possible future type might emerge.

Different as much from the industrial as this does from the militant–a type which, having a sustaining system more fully developed than any we know at present, will use the products of industry neither for maintaining a militant organization not exclusively for material aggrandizement; but will devote them to the carrying on of higher activities.[6]

In this vision it would be the individual businessman that would lead society onwards.  According to economist Robert Nelson, “in social Darwinism, the successful businessman was among the chosen, now the central agent in the evolutionary progress of mankind.  Herbert Spencer believed that the end result of progress would be a world without government, marked by altruism in individual behavior.”[7]

From Eisler the relevant questions relate to gender.  What might the partnership society look like?  What are its contours and contradictions?  How will it come about?  What are the supporting trends?  What of the contradictory trends which show increased androgyny throughout the planet? Will the partnership society then revert to a cyclical or pendulum social formations or will it continue unabated through the future?

By calling attention to ancient Western goddess myths, the Gaia hypothesis, for example, as well as the softer partnership dimensions in all the world’s religions, Eisler hopes that humans can help create a new story.  Eisler gives us many examples of individuals telling a new story, but her main argument is, echoing Kenneth Boulding, if it exists, it can be.[8] That is, if there are examples of partnership societies either now or in history, we can create a global civilization based on such ethics and values. If it has existed, it can be. By returning to history, she reminds us that such cultures did exist. By foraging through the present and history, she tells us what went wrong, how our pedagogy, our daily actions, our children’s stories, our scholarship, our theories all reaffirm the dominator myth. By envisioning an alternative future she intends to create what can be.

Polak focuses specifically on the image of the future.  Those collectivities with no vision of the future decline: those with a positive image of the future — transcendental and immanent — advance.  Humanity especially now needs a positive image of the future so as to create a new tomorrow.  For Boulding, given the power of human agency, the future cannot be forecasted.  The image of the future cannot be predicted.  As with cultural historian William Irwin Thompson, the image emerges organically at an unconscious mythological level.  Mythology cannot be categorized nor rationally created — it is constantly changing always more than what we can know.  But although the future cannot be predicted we can assert that history follows a rise and fall related to the image of the future.

We can also ask: why do some societies develop compelling images of the future and others do not?  Answering this question would lead to a more complete theory of history.  Like Eisler, Boulding’s view of the future leads her to develop political strategies in which associations attempt to imagine and commit to their preferred future.  A central part of this imagination is faith in the realization of the preferred future.  To develop this faith — a concrete belief in a future possibility — Boulding advocates developing future histories in which individuals after imagining their vision develop strategies for how this vision came to be.  From these timelines, hope that tomorrow can be changed is gained. Agency thus overcomes structure.

Sarkar advocates global samaj (society, people) movements that challenge nationalism, capitalism and the dogma of traditional religions. Locally and globally active, these movements, Sarkar believes, will transform the inequities of the current world capitalist system.  Coupled with spiritual leadership, Sarkar is hopeful that a new phase in human history can begin.

These macrohistorians aid in transforming the discourse away from the litany of minor trends and events to a macro level of stages and grand causes.  While their stages do not provide concrete data for policy making, they provide an alternative way of thinking about the future. Most importantly, they tell us where to look if we seek to understand the future to be. The stages macrohistorians offer also provide the study of the future an anchor, a structure from which debate or dialog becomes possible.  Otherwise thinking about the future remains idiosyncratic, overly values based.

Leadership and structure  

Finally the link between leadership and historical structure is crucial to understanding the possibilities of the future, of the plausibility of creating a different society.  For Eisler, Sarkar, Marx, and Gramsci, leadership can transform historical structure. For others such as Khaldun and Ssu-Ma Ch’ien, even as leaders create the future they are bounded by the structures of history, of the rise and fall of virtue, asabiya, of the pendulum swings of materialism and idealism, as with Sorokin.  For Hegel, leaders appear to have agency but in fact are used by the cunning of Reason. Leaders merely continue the onward march of the spirit. But for Toynbee, leadership in the form of the creativity minority can keep a civilization from decline, moving it from strength to strength. By meeting internal and external challenges, they can avoid becoming a dominant imitative majority. But for others such as Spengler, once culture has degenerated into mass/mob civilization and the money-spirit has become dominant, there is little any leader can do – the lifecycle of the culture cannot be changed, death inevitably follows life.

Unlike futurists, who largely speak of disjunction, of bifurcation, of technology transforming the grand patterns of history, macrohistorians by using metaphors such as the birth and death of the individual and the natural world remind us of what does not change, what cannot change. They impose limits of what can be created in the future. While this might be troublesome to many who think anything is possible through the right mix of capital, technology and organization, for those from outside the Centre, from some of the world’s ancient civilizations, macrohistory is eminently sensible.  Still macrohistory is not static. Indeed, it is the macrohistorian’s theory of change that is often the insight needed to transform self and other.

As with futurists who do not locate their own work with an episteme, macrohistorians often speak from a view outside of history.  While leading to a certain arrogance this also gives the theory a certain legitimacy, a certain empirical finality.  Yet, history is spoken of in dramatic terms, as art, poetry, and as prophecy – not in terms of right or wrong, but in terms of creating a mythic distance from the present.[9] Without this prophetic dimension, this priviledged perspective of past, present and future, there works would be mere academic treatises that reflect upon history but do not recreate it.  Like futures studies, macrohistory is intended to recreate history and future.

[1].         Johan Galtung and Sohail Inayatullah, eds. Macrohistory and Macrohistorians (Westport, CT, London, Praeger, 1997) and a special issue of New Renaissance titled “Rethinking History.” (Vol. 7, No. 1, 1996). Much of this material is drawn from chapter 3, “Macrohistorians Compared: Towards a Theory of Macrohistory” and a longer version has appeared in Futures (Vol. 30, No. 5, 1998).

[2].         The macrohistorians used for this article include: Ssu-Ma Ch’ien, St. Augustine, Ibn Khaldun, Giambatista Vico, Adam Smith, G.W.F. Hegel, Auguste Comte, Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer, Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Max Weber, Oswald Spengler, Teilhard de Chardin, Pitirim Sorokin, Arnold Toynbee, Rudolf Steiner, Fernand Braudel, Fred Polak, Prabhat Rainjan Sarkar, Elise Boulding, Riane Eisler, Johan Galtung and Gaia herself.

[3].         Attila Faj, “Vico’s Basic Law of History in Finnegans Wake,” in Donald Phillip Verene, ed., Vico and Joyce (New York, State University of New York Press, 1987), 22-23.

[4].         See, for example, Sohail Inayatullah, “Sarkar’s Spiritual-Dialectics: An Unconventional View of the Future,” Futures (Vol. 20, No. 1, February, 1988), 54-65 and Sohail Inayatullah, Situating Sarkar (Singapore, AM Publications, 1998)

[5].         See Ravi Batra, The Downfall of Capitalism and Communism. 2nd Edition. (Dallas, Venus Books, 1990). See, his latest, The Stock Market Crash of 1998 and 1999 (Dallas, Venus Books, 1998).

[6].         Herbert Spencer, Structure, Function and Evolution (London, Michael Joseph, 1971), 169.

[7].         Robert Nelson, “Why Capitalism Hasn’t Won Yet,” Forbes (November 25, 1991), 106.

[8].         In conversation with Elise Boulding. Brisbane, July 9, 1996.

[9].         Ashis Nandy, “The Futures of Dissent,” Seminar (No. 460, December 1997), 45.

Futures Oriented Research and Writing (1998)

By Tony Stevenson and Sohail Inayatullah

The Communication Centre, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane Queensland, Australia. 1998

In the many years of being engaged in futures research, attending futures studies conferences, workshops and courses, we remain surprised and dismayed at the lack of “futures” in futures research.  Papers, while scholarly, often merely restate the present, with the last page or the final paragraph devoted to the future.  Thinking about the future appears to be an unnatural, but not impossible, act, unlike thinking about the past.

In editing the World Futures Studies Federation (WFSF) Futures Bulletin and in planning the 1997 WFSF Brisbane World conference, we devised a list of what we believe are the criteria for futures-oriented research and writing.  Writers, however, often commented that the list scared them off.  This is partly the effect we desired. Writing about the future should be novel and rigorous. There are established methods and theories about the future. These need to be understood.  Excellence in a particular field of knowledge does not necessarily mean one can say sensible things about the future or the study of the future.

At the same time, this list is written not to close the futures field/discourse or framework but to help evolve its knowledge base, to help create some semblance of shared views on what constitutes futures research, to distinguish it.

We invite surfers of metafuture.org to offer their own approaches as to what futures-oriented writing  and research should ideally be about.

In our view, futures-oriented writing and research should constitute:

(1)     visions/scenarios of the future, preferably more than a generation ahead, and preferably alternative visions/scenarios;

(2)     methodologies of futures studies, that is: (a) how to engage in a study of the future or alternative futures; (b) ways to research how people and civilizations (as well as other units of analysis) study or otherwise think about the future; or (c) analyses of procedures for forecasting and anticipating;

(3)     epistemological assumptions of studies of the future, for example, the layers of meaning hidden in various forecasts;

(4)     means for attaining a vision of the future, for example, backcasting (certainly going beyond strategic planning and strategy in general);

(5)     explicit consideration of the longer‑term (from 25 to 1000 years, from one to seven to 30 generations) consequences of today’s actions;

(6)     implications for the present and past of particular visions and scenarios;

(7)     theories of social, spiritual, economic and technological change that directly examine where and how society is moving and can move to, ie the shape of time, space and perception;

(8)     analysis of events and moments in human history where a different future could have been followed and why it was not, that is, historical or genealogical alternative futures;

(9)     deconstruction of texts explicitly on the future to show what is missing from a particular scenario, image of the future, that is, critical and value‑oriented analyses of a particular future or alternative futures;

(10)    novel social analysis or social innovation that can create different or     unconventional futures different from today;

(11)    differences and similarities in how civilizations, men and women imagine, create and know the future including historical changes in the idea and the practice of the future;

(12)    how ought the future be like and who should make such decisions including discussions of the ethics of forecasting.

Thus, in our minds, to be futures‑oriented does not involve a critique, analysis or other social commentary which dwells mainly on the past or present, merely making an oblique reference to the future. It should integrate into the very work itself an explicit consideration of the future (however defined), or how to get to the future, or a range of futures or visions. Traditional academic papers often conclude with a mention of the future; futures studies research should begin with the future.

Futures studies may examine such contexts and issues, preferably across civilizations, disciplines, fields and paradigms. It does not exclude history, but definitely includes foresight, preferably longer than the next financial year, the next election, or the next five‑year plan. Indeed, a central dimension to futures research is contesting traditional perspectives on temporality and exploring alternative futures of time.

Thus while we believe it is important to have a wide-ranging debate on theories and methods of futures studies, futures research in itself must be quite specific about what it is and what it is not. Futures research can certainly use history, and other disciplines, and it can borrow from the research perspectives of different perspectives – including action-research, feminist, empiricist, interpretive or poststructural – but it cannot and should not be reduced to a particular research tradition. It is, and has become, if not its own research tradition, at least, a research perspective or framework.

The Rights of Your Robots (1998)

Exclusion and Inclusion in History and Future

By Sohail Inayatullah

“The Rights of Your Robots: the Politics of Exclusion and Inclusion in History and Future”, in Edmund Ryden, ed., Human Rights and Values in East Asia (Taiwan, Fujen Catholic University, 1998), 143-162 (also at: http://www.fineartforum.org/Backissues/Vol_15/faf_v15_n08/index.html).

Many years ago in the folly of youth, I wrote an article with a colleague titled, “The Rights of Robots.” [1] It has been the piece of mine most ridiculed.  Pakistani colleagues have mocked me saying that Inayatullah is worried about robot rights while we have neither human rights, economic rights or rights to our own language and local culture – we have only the “right to be brutalized by our leaders” and Western powers.

Others have refused to enter in collegial discussions on the future with me as they have been concerned that I will once again bring up the trivial.  As noted thinker Hazel Henderson said, I am happy to join this group – an internet listserve – as long as the rights of robots is not discussed.

But why the ridicule and anger? Is it because as James Dator says: the only useful comments of the future should be ridiculous. That is, most statements about the future are tired and timid, reflections of staid academic thinkers who have no creativity, who are unable to grasp the grand technological and civilizations bolder souls are willing to speculate on?  Is the rights of robots a problematic issue because it strikes a deep discord about the world, that is, a world we know is fundamentally unjust, a world where technology will have rights but street children will not? A world where speculative capital is free to choose the most desirous nation but we as labor can at best only hope for a decent retirement account? Where labor can only hope that we will somehow make it and not become landless and laborless?

Or is it something else?

We wrote the piece not only because we believe robots will have legal rights one day – they will, to be sure! – but more so to show that rights are not decreed by nature but are reflections of legal conventions.  As Christopher Stone has argued: “throughout legal history, each successive extension of rights to some new entity has been theretofore, a bit unthinkable. We are inclined to suppose the rightlessness of rightless `things’ to be a decree of Nature, not a legal convention acting in support of the status quo.” [2]

Is it that we as humans are unwilling to consider giving rights to robots partly because we live in a zero-sum world. If robots have rights than others won’t. Our history of rights can be seen as a battle between inclusion and exclusion. The forces of exclusion have not been the same, they have changed through history – sometimes they have been centralized empires, other times centralized religious systems, and other times nation-states operating in a world-capitalist system. They have also been elders, brothers, bosses and all the other petty tyrants we must negotiate with day after day.

GLOBALISM AND RIGHTS

We have consistently defined others as less than ourselves: once done so, then every possible heinous crime can be committed against them. Globalism, is of course, the latest victory in defining others as somehow less – become more efficient, more productive, export more, be all that you can be. You are fundamentally a producer and consumer, and unless you do the former first, your ability to engage in the latter will be restricted. Globalism merely continues the language of colonialism and developmentalism – the same sense of inevitability is there, the same recourse to the grand masters of social evolution – Comte and Darwin – is there. And indeed responses to globalism follow the same simplistic pattern as well – a conspiracy of the powerful, of the West, of capital (instead of an understanding of the deeper structures of history).

The basic presumption of globalism is one of hierarchy, framed neutrally as comparative advantage but in fact a social-genetic-cultural model of who is civilized and who is barbaric.

But what if we were to take a different tack?  What if we took serious, for example, the Tantric Indian civilizational worldview wherein all of life, including technology, is alive. Or the American Indian, as developed by Jamake Highwater, who reminds us that it is the collective that is alive, existing in a relationship of sharing, caring and gratitude, not dominance.  Could the robot then enter as friend.

Again, this does not necessarily mean a totally horizontal world where all have equal rights as in the Western perspective nor a collectivized “Father knows best” vertical world. Rather it means a world where they are layers of reality, where mind is in all things from humans to animals to plants and, even, dare we say to robots.

This certainly does mean a world with some rights for plants and animals as well – a vegetarian world; one cannot love the collective if one eats the individual, the tantrica might tell us.  By vegetarian, we are not only situating the personal in the political but reminding that behind our collective foot habits is an anti-ecology regime, an anti-life regime, an anti-health regime, that is, our eco-system is at stake,[3] our health would all be better if we saw animals and plants as being not part of the Darwinian chain of life, the circle of life, but as part of an ecology of consciousness.

But you will say, this is an ethnocentric argument. We are meat-eaters.

Yes, rights then are ethnocentric and more often than not human-centric.  The extension of rights has always been unthinkable, the impossible, and yet we have not had any level of human progress without the extension of rights to those we previously considered not-worthy.

In an essay titled, “Visioning a Peaceful World,” Johan Galtung writes: “Abolition of war [can be seen as a similar goal to the fight against] slavery and colonialism, abject exploitation and patriarchy were and are up against. They won, or are winning. We live in their utopia, which then proved to be a realistic utopia. So is ours: a concrete utopia for peace.”[4]

INCLUSION AND RIGHTS

This is thus other side of the story, as much as history has been the exclusion of rights, it has also been the advancement of rights, about inclusion, about gentleness, about the struggle for love.  My reading is as follows:

Glossing human history, we argue that even while there are certainly cyclical dimensions to history (the rise and fall, the strengthening and weakening, the back and forth of class, civilization, varna, nation), there has been a linear movement towards more rights, towards laying bare power.

In the European context, for example, there have been a succession of revolutions, each one granting increased rights to a group which had been exploited by the dominant social class and limiting the powers of those at the top.

(1)        The revolt of the peasants against feudalism (the late middle ages, the 14th century). Increased rights for peasants.

(2)        The revolt of aristocrats against clergy (church/state) – wherein church power was contested (modernity). The breakdown of Church dogma and the development of scientific thinking.

(3)        The revolt of aristocrats against the king, a constitutional revolution as in the English Glorious Revolution of the 17th century, a process started much earlier with the Magna Carta in the 13th century.

(3)        The revolt of bourgeois against the aristocrats and clergy. This was the French revolution and created the Enlightenment – a victory for rational humanism and science against ideational church dogma.

(4)        More recently the revolt of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. This was the Russian socialist revolution of 1917. Increased rights, at least in the short run, for labor. In Nordic nations this was more of a gradual evolution of labor power, of the welfare state.

(5)        Elsewhere, there was the revolt of the peasants against the city. This was Mao Zedeng’s formula (the argument that the two opposing camps are the city and the rural). Pol Pot took this view to its tragic consequence. The city, however, appears it is winning although telecommunications might allow a return to the village, but at this stage it is more the Los Angelisation of the planet than the creation of a global village.

(6)        More recently (and of course, part of a long term trend) has been the revolt of women against men, against patriarchy in all its forms. This is the pivotal trend of increased rights for women.

(7)        The revolt of nature against industrialism. This has been the Green position calling for a limits of technocracy.

(8)        The revolt of the Third World against Europe, with calls for Third World solidarity. This decolonization process – The 18th American Revolution being a much earlier example of this – has eventually led to

(9)        The revolt of the indigenous against all foreign social formations, calling for the creation of special status for them as guardians of the planet

(10)      Finally is the revolt against the nation-state worldview, wherein social movements are aligning themselves to create a third space that beholden neither to the prince or merchant, nor to the interstate system or to global capitalism.[5]

DEFINE OR BE DEFINED

This last four have not only been about increased rights but about defining the rights discourse, deciding what constitutes a right, who defines it, and how rights are to be protected and implemented.  This is one of the crucial battles of the near term future, to define or be defined by others.

Globalisation is of course about defining the world of others – asserting that traditional systems of knowledge, local languages and self-reliant cannot lead to a modern society. As Ashis Nandy writes: “Few hydrologists are interested in what the natives think about their grand irrigation projects and megadams; health planners depend almost entirely on modern medicine; and agricultural innovations are not introduced in consultation with farmers.”[6] In Australia, the nomadic way of life of aborigines is to be rooted out if Aboriginal health is to improve – they have already been defined as out of the norm, health practices based on modern sedentary lifestyles are not seen as the problem, writes Michael Shapiro.[7] Of course, even multinational pharmaceutical companies now scourge the planet looking for the latest herb to patent but this process is done so within the modernist corporatist context and not within the cultural knowledge system of the local.  Defining what is real, what is important, what is beauty has become as important as ensuring that one is not periphery but centre in the world economy.

While the general trend at one level is progressive – more happiness for more people – at another level there are exaggerations of systems such that the victory of the Enlightenment over religious systems, over traditional society, has led to a pendulum shift back to traditional systems – localisms, ethnicity, and in many ways a pre-scientific world.  This tension is also leading to the possibility of a post-rational and post-scientific world, which integrates the sensate and the ideational.  Finally, at a third level, there has been little progress, each new technological improvements creates new side-affects, each new growth spurt in the world-economy creates new losers and vaster sites of impoverishment.

Certainly then, the advancement of rights, while progressive, does not got far enough.  Among others, including our robot friends, I think not.  They need to be expanded.

(1)        First, following Sarkar,[8] we need to expand humanism to neo-humanism, which struggles against the Enlightenment’s human centrism and argues for increased rights of plants and animals – towards global vegetarianism and for an global ecological regime.

(2)        Following, numerous third world activists and federalists, what is needed is to expand the concept of the magna carta (against the power of the king) into a neo-magna carta and develop a world government with basic human rights; rights of language, right of religion and right to purchasing power (related to this is maxi-mini wage structure wherein minimum economic rights are guaranteed).

The expansion of these rights, however, will not come about through polite conferences, but as we know, through epistemic (the language/worldview battle), cultural (through a renaissance in art, music, and thought) social (the organizations of values and institutions) and political (challenging state power) struggle.

THE PROCESS OF RIGHTS

At the level of rights, the process, according to Neal Milner is as follows.[9]

His first stage in this theory is imagery.  Here imagery stressing rationality of the potential rights‑holder is necessary. This has been part of the struggle for rights of nature, since nature is not considered a rational actor.

The next stage of rights emergence requires a justifying ideology.  Ideologies justifying changes in imagery develop.  These, according to Milner, include ideologies by agents of social control and those on the part of potential rights holders or their representatives.

The next stage is one of changing authority patterns.  Here authority patterns of the institutions governing the emerging rights holders begin to change.

Milner next sees the development of “social networks that reinforce the new ideology and that form ties among potential clients, attorneys and intermediaries.”[10]

The next stage involves access to legal representation.  This is followed by routinization, wherein legal representation is made routinely available.  Finally government uses its processes to represent the emerging rights‑holders.

Of course, for our discussion this is somewhat limiting, rights are more than legal expressions, they are nested in civilizational views of space, time and other.

Thus while for some civilizations rights become so when governmentalized, in other maps rights are part of a web of relationships between self, community and the larger collective, the state, this is especially so in collectivist societies. Rights are related to ones responsibilities, to one’s dharma.

However, rights when defined strictly in western individualistic terms often are unable to deal with issues of import from other civilizations. For example, indigenous access to land, ancestors, and gods/angels are all non-negotiable civilizational givens.

At the same time, these too should not be seen in essentialistic terms, that is, all civilizations are practice, they are potent life forces with operating mythologies.  These mythologies can be used by leaders, most recently in Yugoslavia with Milosovic, to deny the human rights of other cultures. Civilizational traumas are used then by politics not for transcendence but for further exclusion.  Trauma is piled on trauma and the linear progression of rights become lost – rights become not an asset for the oppressed but a stock of symbols for the state to use against others – rights are used in a zero-sum competitive world.

In contrast is the case of Taiwan where a traditional system, Confucianism, has been modernised to include the democratic impulse. Asian values are not seen as fixed but as dynamic, democracy can be reshaped to exist with non-Western values.[11]

INCLUSION

A rights discourse is essentially about inclusion and about built-in agreed upon  structures of peaceful mediation to resolve conflicting rights. By now it should be quite clear that what is under discussion is not the future of technology, but the future of power.

Denial of rights of robots – since they are considered other, as not sentient, and thus not part of our consideration – becomes of an exemplar of how we treat other humans, plants, animals and civilizations.  Like children, the environment and future generations, robots do not have adequate representation (and thus are considered rightless). Like children, the environment and future generations, robots are considered less alive, less important, and thus are considered rightless. Since they are so different, why should they be given rights?  This is made more so by a worldview which is rationalistic and reductionist, which resists emergence in technology. In contrast are Buddhist views, for example, which see all as persons, and not at things. Shamanistic perspectives as well can imagine the spirit entering technology, thus allowing it to become, while not more human, certainly  part of what it means to be human.

Robots call us to consider culture and civilization not as fixed but as dynamic, as growing in response to other cultures and civilizations, to technological dynamism.  Responses to dramatic changes in technologies and values can lead to societal disintegration, to a cultural schizophrenia, can be directly creative as with Toynbee’s minority, or can be resistance-based, and thus create a new culture.[12]

TRANSFORMATIONS IN EPISTEME[13]

The rights of robot is only one emerging issue that promises to change how we see ourselves and others. Genetics, multiculturalism, the women’s movement, postmodernism, information and communication technologies as well promise to alter how we see nature, truth, reality and self.   There are four levels to this epistemic transformation of the future of humanity, perhaps well summed up by the following poem:[14]

It’s only a paper moon

Floating over a cardboard sea.

But it wouldn’t be make-believe

If you believed in me.

The first is: transformations in what we think is the natural or Nature.[15]  This is occurring from the confluence of numerous trends, forces, and theories.  First, genetics and the possibility that with the advent of the artificial womb, women and men as biological beings will be secondary to the process of creation. The link between sexual behaviour and reproduction will be torn asunder.[16]  But it is not just genetics which changes how we see the natural, theoretical positions arguing for the social construction of nature also undo the primacy of the natural world. Nature is not seen as the uncontested category, rather humans create natures based on their own scientific, political and cultural dispositions. We “nature” the world. Nature is what you make it. There is no longer any state of nature. Feminists have certainly added to this debate, pointing out that they have been constructed by men as natural with men artifactual. By being conflated with nature, as innocent, they have had their humanity denied to them and tamed, exploited, and tortured just as nature has.

As nature changes its social meaning, so will the idea of natural rights. Arguments that rights are political not universal or natural, that is, that rights must be fought for also undo the idea of a basic nature. Thus, nature as eternal, as outside of human construct, has thus come under threat from a variety of places: genetics, the social construction argument, and the rights discourse.

Related to the end of nature are transformations in what we think is the Truth. Religious truth has focused on the one Truth. All other nominations of the real pale in front of the eternal. Modernity has transformed religious truth to allegiance to the nation-state with science and technology as its hand-maiden.  However, thinkers from Marx, Nietzsche, to Foucault from the West, as well as feminists and Third World scholars such as Edward Said have contested the unproblematic nature of truth. Truth is considered class-based, gender-based, culture-based, personality-based. Knowledge is now considered particular, its arrangement based on the guiding episteme.  We often do not communicate well since our worlds are so different, indeed, it is amazing we manage to understand each other at all.

Language is central in this shift, as it is seen not as a neutral mediator of ideas but as opaque, as participating, indeed, in constituting that which it refers to.[17]  It is not so much that we speak languages, but that languages create our identities. We language the world and language constitutes what it is that it is possible for us to see.

Multiculturalism has argued that our images of time, space, and history, of text are based on our linguistic dispositions. Even the library once considered a neutral institution is now seen as political. Certainly Muslims, Hawaiians, Aborigines, Tantrics, and many others, would not construct knowledge along the lines of science, social science, arts and humanities.  Aborigines might divide a library – if they were to accede to that built metaphor – as divided by sacred spaces, genealogy and dreamtime. Hawaiians prefer the model of aina (land), the Gods, and genealogy (links with the everpresent ancestors).  Not just is objectivity under threat, but we are increasingly living in a world where our subjectivity has been historicized and culturized. The search is for models that can include the multiciplicities that we are -layers of reality, spheres with cores and peripheries.

In any case, the belief in one truth held traditionally by religious fundamentalists and now by scientists is under assault. Can we moves towards an ecology of mind, where many ways of knowing, where truth as claimed by differing traditions is honoured, dialogued? That is, once truth has been decentred, and all perspectives are allowed, what then? Can we create a global project that unites yet respects multiplicities? Can we create a world in the context of an ecology of rights – interpenetrating rights, their expansion enhancing each other?[18] Or are there non-negotiable fundamentals that do not allow agreement but still might allow small practical steps taken together leading to a better world – many peace processes? [19]

Central to the end of the grand narratives is a rethinking of what we consider as Real.  Our view of the real is being shaped partly by technology, specifically virtual technology and its promise. Cyberspace has become a contender for the metaphor for the future of reality.  By donning a helmet, we can enter worlds wherein the link between traditional, or natural physical reality and cyber/virtual reality are blurred. Will you be you? Will I be me? As we travel these worlds, will we lose our sense of an integrated self? Where is the reality principle in these new technologies? What of human suffering and misery?  How will traditional Asian systems that are more collectivist in identity deal with the individuality of virtuality? Can virtuality become more group based, or will it destabilise Asian identities?

The real is what can be created by desire.  Whereas for Buddhists, the task has been to extinguish desire, for the West, the project is to totally fulfil desire, reality is what you want it to be. Desire is truth.

The environment as a place of rest, as beauty, as a source of inspiration, as a living entity of itself, then becomes secondary. Whereas philosophers have deconstructed it, cybernauts have captured and miniaturised it. Why do we still need to protect wildlife when it can be virtually rendered, we can now meaningfully ask? Since we will not be able to perceive the difference between the natural and the technological, wouldn’t it be better to use the environment for development then? The virtual environment, let us remember, comes without insect bites, without bush fires, without fear. It comes without imperfections.

The rights of minorities will likely become less important since all different perspectives can be kept alive virtually, thus not stopping progress.

Paradoxically, as the real becomes increasingly metered and sold, as reality ceases to be embedded in spiritual and sacred space, becoming instead commercial real estate space, others have began to argue that the ideational is returning, that the pendulum is shifting again.  Echoing Sorokin’s idea of the  need for a balance between the sensate and the ideational, Willis Harmon argues that the physical world is only one layer of reality. The spiritual world is another. What is needed is a balance, a move towards global mind change. Rupert Sheldrake with his idea of morphogenetic fields, Sarkar with his ideas of microvita (providing the conscious software to the hardware of the atom), De Chardin with his idea of a noosphere, all point to the notion that we are connected at a deeper layer, perhaps at the level of Gaia.  Lynn Margulis takes this to the cellular level reminding us that it is cooperation that succeeds at this minute level.

Materialism as the global organising principle is under threat from post-rational spiritual perspectives, the new physics, and macrohistorians[20] that believe the historical pendulum is about to shift again.

Reality is thus changing. The old view of reality as only religious or the modern view of the real as physical are under threat from the postmodern view that reality is technologically created and from the ecological view which sees the real as relational, an ecology of consciousness, where there is no one point, but all selves are interactively needed.

The final level of deep transformation is in what we think is Man.  Whether we are reminded of Foucault[21] arguing that man is a recent, a modern category, and that his image will disappear like an etching on sand, about to be wiped away by the tide, or if we focus on the emergence of the women’s movement as a nudge to man as centre, man as the centre of the world is universally contested.  While the enlightenment removed the male God, it kept the male man. The emerging worldview of robots -what Marvin Minsky of MIT calls “mind-children” – cyborgs, virtual realities, cellular automata, the worldwideweb, microvita as well as the dramatic number of individuals who believe in angels, all point to the end of Man as the central defining category.

We are thus witnessing transformations coming through the new technologies, through the worldviews of non-Western civilisations, through the women’s movement, and through spiritual and Gaian perspectives.  All these taken together point to the possibility but not certainty of a new world shaping.

Let us say this in different words. We are witnessing the end of modernity. What this means is that we are in the process of changes in Patriarchy (I am male); Individualism (I win therefore I am); Materialism (I shop therefore I am);  Dualism (I think therefore I am); scientific dogmatism (I experiment therefore I know better or I have no values thus I am right); Nationalism (I hate the other therefore I am); and humanism (humans are the measure of all things). This is however a long term process and part of the undoing of capitalism.  All these connect to create a new world, which is potentially the grandest shift in human history.  We are in the midst of galloping time, plastic time, in which the system is unstable and thus can dramatically transform.

What this means is many things. First, my friends the robots will probably be happy in this artificial world being created. Second, civilizations will survive especially those that can quickly adapt. Cultures, of course, will not be lost but miniaturized, virtualized. Third, that the struggles for human rights, environmental rights, refugee rights, to mention a few, will pale compared to the dislocations in front of us.  As important as fighting for the rainforest will be greening genetics.  As important as rights for children will be the right to sexually reproduce.  As important as rights for refugees will be rights for the identity-less. As important as struggles for allowing the voice of all, will be a struggle against postmodernism, which has embraced all, even evil, making all relativistic, and thus all the same, denying a layered approach to rights and values.

EAST ASIAN FUTURES

What will be the futures of East Asian cultures and systems of knowledge in this dramatically to be transformed world.  First, the East Asian responses to modernity, to the problem of the West, have been dynamic.  Japan, for example, has reinvented itself at the level of technology but managed to maintain its unique cultural heritage. Thus, it has at the surface level been transformed, and in many ways has become more Western than the West, that is, continuing the Western world-capitalist project. At the same time, Japan has held on to its Confucian/Buddhist and Zen/Daoist elements, having been able to selectively choose aspects of Westernisation that fits it cultural overlay.

Kinhide Mushakoji argues that the traditional two poles of Japanese society (and East Asian society as well)  of Confucianism (formal/hierarchal) and Daoist/Zen (informal, networks, mystical) are with postmodernism about to shift to the Daoist pole.[22] This model at essence will be self-organizing, that is, chaotic (ordered disorder). Indeed, the postmodern challenge of language as constituting the self is very much a zen perspective. The plastic nature of self that genetics and robotics create again fits well in the Zen overlay. However, while Zen has always maintained the natural/unnatural dichotomy[23] (with all other dichotomies open to transgression), it is the final structure of thought that postmodernism evaporates. Moreover, multiculturalism and the women’s movement pose challenges to Confucian societies that traditional “every person in their class” ideology will not be able to manage so easily.

The Singapore model, in particular, will be under question. Singapore has been equally keen to adopt western financial practices and technological impetus but has stalled cultural democracy keeping Singapore a managed state. It will resist chaotic tendencies with more management, with more control. Indeed, it could become a type of social museum, the perfect modernist site in a chaotic world of genetic, robotics, the internet and deep multiculturalism.

South Korea has added Christianity and Westernization to its triple heritage of Shamanism (Daoism), Confucianism and Buddhism. It has managed to keep its public sphere male and Confucian with its private sphere female and shamanistic. However, the changes to come challenge that division.

Fortunately, this future is not inevitable. These trends can play themselves out in varied ways. There is room to manoeuvre still.

Among others, Anwar Ibrahim in his The Asian Renaissance[24] believes that Asians can meet these challenges. He believes Asians and their leaders have developed the capacity to challenge the lure of jingoism, of culture being used for political capital, for immediately political gain.

Ibrahim argues that cultural jingoism, while understandably a reaction to Western dominance, cannot redeem, cannot liberate, rather it is the fodder of narrow tribalists, nationalists and fundamentalists.  A renaissance is about a reawakening of the universal and not about using the category of “Asian” for authoritarian and totalitarian means, for erasing the individual in the guise of the Asian collective.  Anwar Ibrahim reminds us that even in the family-oriented Confucian tradition, the self and community are seen as equally important – the wise person develops his moral self, articulating it for self-perfection and the greater good.

Economic productivity, he argues, can coexist with a cultural development. An Asian renaissance based on a true multiculturalism – unity in democratic diversity can provide a path to a new future for Asian and the world.

Importantly, he asserts that “As Asia gains wealth and power, it must search its deepest conscience. It should not assume the role of the new executioner to reply the old history of oppression and injustice.”[25]

In addition to Ibrahim’s vision of civilizations in dialogue, of a reborn Asia, I offer the following general scenarios as possibilities.

SCENARIOS OF THE FUTURE

The first scenario is the Artificial Society. This would be the end of environmentalism, humanism and the cultural view of rights. It would lead to the technologization of the self. The goal would be full unemployment with technology working so that humans could rest and play. But more than artificial it is about the end of the distinction of technology and artificial such that we would no longer have a category called Nature. It is with postmodernity that all is possible and history is packed in virtual museums, eternally available but never realisable.

In the first stage of this scenario, rights would be framed around the tensions between humans and technologies, between humans and their genetic offspring (with humans as the missing link[26]).  Concretely, these would include the right to procreate, the right to disconnect from the net, the right to not travel.  Eventually human/machine and technology/nature distinctions would disappear, as would the idea of rights.

The second scenario is The Communicative-Inclusive Society. This is deep spiritual ecology, with rights of all, and the self as cosmic. Technology is considered part of humanity’s expansion but at issue is power and control, who owns and what values are used to design technology. Equally central is the metaphysics of life: desire as channelled expression, as creativity, creating new forms of expression as opposed to filling a fundamental emptiness. Essentially this is a communicative society, where communication between humans, plants, trees, animals,, angels, and technology are all considered legitimate. The central project is a dialogue between civilisations, nature and the divine through which a good society (and not the perfect society of linear developmentalism) can be created. A good society embraces its contradictions, a liberal democracy in search of a perfect, contradiction-free society attempts to eliminate them.

Globalism would come to mean not just the right of capital mobility but labor mobility. It would also mean the creation of a planetary civilization with a world government consisting of houses for corporations, social movements, individuals and nations.

The third scenario is Business as Usual or Incrementalism – It is appropriation of the Other through the idea of the melting pot, or shallow multiculturalism. Dominant issues are daily power issues, for example, in Australia of the republic versus monarchy argument. New technologies provide impetus for the expansion of capital, giving capitalism fresh air. Technologies are considered culturally and gendered neutral tools. As the gun lobby says, people kill people, not guns. Communication is merely used for instrumental purposes not for reaching shared goals. The environment is a resource to be used for growth. Rights would remain individualistic with the structural causes of poverty and the cultural basis of reality ignored.

The last scenario is Societal Collapse. The position is that man has gone too far, that Earth will strike back with earthquakes and tsunamis. Globalism has created a system out of control, only stock market collapse through perhaps cybercurrency fraud leading to a softer slower pace of life can rend things in balance again. The most likely immediate future is a global depression and the timing will be myth related, that is, at the end of the millennium.

Rights would go the physically strongest and not just the richest or the mentally agile. Life would be “nasty, brutish, and short.”

MAKING THE RIGHTS DECISION

What the future will be like we cannot say.  We do know that grand macrohistorical forces cannot be easily changed, but bifurcation is possible. At the edge of chaos lies transformation, wherein by finding the strange attractors of change, concerted efforts by the few can dramatically change all our futures.

Let us imagine a different future than that which we are heading toward. Let us through our responses help create it.  Remembering the dilemma of Yang Chu, who weeping at the crossroads, said, “Isn’t it here that you take a half step wrong and wake up a thousand miles astray?”[27] Let us take a half a step in the right direction and be part of a global awakening, be part of the progressive expansion of rights.

As we do let us not forget our friends the robots – that is those who are so different than us, we automatically conclude they should be rightless – let us ensure that as we progress forward – given the limitations of macrohistorical forces – we take everyone with us.

Contact Sohail Inayatullah for the reference notes to this article.

From Silences to Global Conversations (1998)

From Billions Of Silences To Global Civilizational Conversations: Exclusion and communication in the information era

By Sohail Inayatullah and Ivana Milojevic

(A version of this appeared in Transforming Communication edited by Sohail Inayatullah and Susan Leggett. Westport, Ct, Praeger, 2002)

Many claim that with the advent of the web and internet, the future has arrived. The dream of an interconnected planet where physical labor becomes minimally important and knowledge creation becomes the source of value and wealth appears to be here.  For cyberenthusiasts, the new information and communication technologies increase our choices.  Bill Gates believes “it will affect the world seismically, rocking us in the same way the discovery of the scientific method, the invention of printing, and the arrival of the Information Age did.”[i] Author of Being Digital, Nicholas Negroponte writes that “while the politicians struggle with the baggage of history, a new generation is emerging from the digital landscape free of many of the old prejudices. These kids are released from the limitation of geographic proximity as the sole basis of friendship, collaboration, play, and neighborhood. Digital technology can be a natural force drawing people into greater world harmony.”[ii] Douglas Rushkoff[iii]believes that computers are creating a generation gap between the “screenagers” and others, with screenagers having the most important skill of all – multi-tasking, choosing and doing many things at the same time (of course, forgetting that women have always had to do many things at the same time – taking care of the home and children as well as other types of formal and informal work). In any case, ICTs are creating a new world, an interactive, truly democratic world.            For proponents, the new technologies reduce the power of Big business and Big State, creating a vast frontier for creative individuals to explore. “Cyberspace has the potential to be egalitarian, to bring everyone into a network arrangement. It has the capacity to create community; to provide untold opportunities for communication, exchange and keeping in touch.”[iv]  Cybertechnologies will allow more interaction creating a global ecumene. They create wealth, indeed, a jump in wealth.  The new technologies promise a transformational society where the future is always beckoning, a new discovery is yearly.[v]

Critics, however, argue it is not a communicative world that will transpire but a world of selves downloading their emotional confusion onto each other.  Writes Zia Sardar, “Far from creating a community based on consensus, the information technologies could easily create states of alienated and atomised individuals, glued to their computer terminal, terrorising and being terrorised by all those whose values conflict with their own.”[vi]

Social scientist Kevin Robbins is not convinced that our lives will be meaningfully changed by the information revolution; rather, he believes the information and communication technology (ICT) hype merely replaces the classical opiate of religion and the modernist idea of progress. Indeed, for Robbins, the new technologies impoverish our imagination of alternative futures, particularly our geographic imagination.  Focusing on distance, Robbins quoting Heidegger reminds us that the end of distance is not the creation of nearness, of intimacy, of community. “We are content to live in a world of `uniform distanceless,’ that is, in an information space rather than a space of vivacity and experience.”[vii] There is the illusion of community – in which we can create virtual communities far and away but still treat badly our neighbours, partners and children.

But writes Robbins, more than destroying the beauty of geography, techno-optimists such as Bill Gates, Nicholas Negroponte and others take away space for critical commentary (personalising the discourse by seeing critics as merely imbued with too much negativity), that is for the creation of futures that are different. Critical commentary, however, is not merely of being pessimistic or optimistic but a matter of survival. As Paul Virilio writes: “I work in the `resistance’ because there are now too many `collaborators’ once again telling us about salvation through progress, and emancipation, about man (sic) being freed from all constraints.”[viii]

Earlier it was Comte’s positive science that was to solve all the problems of religion, of difference and now with the end of the cold war, it is liberal democracy. Michael Tracey in his essay “Twilight: illusion and decline in the communication revolution” writes that it is not an accident that just at the precise moment “the planet is being constructed within the powerful, pervasive all consuming logic of the market, there is a second order language, a fairy tale … that suggests in Utopian terms new possibilities, in particular, those presented by the new alchemies of the `the Net.'” [ix] What was once the cant of progress is now the cant of cyberspace – from love to democracy, from evil to poverty, all will be delivered, all will be redeemed – virtuality is “here”.

Thus, while the internet helps connect many people (especially those in the North) and supplies much needed information (especially important in the South) it also represents a specific form of cultural violence.  While it intends to create a global community of equals, making identification based on age, looks, race, (dis)ability, class or gender becoming less relevant, it also, through promoting, enhancing and cementing current ways of communicating, silences billions of people.

EXCLUSION

Some of the excluded are non-english speaking nations, “irrelevant” nations and peoples, national, religious and ideological minorities, poor in poor countries and poor in rich countries, the majority of women, most old and disabled, and almost all children (although certainly not Western screenagers). In the 21st century most of the world’s population will still be silenced. Reality will still be that of the strongest and most powerful. The new communication technologies will further enhance differences between poor and rich, between women and men, and between the world and its narrow part defined as “the West”. And once poor, if the world and women catch up with the dominating forces, it will be on their terms and it will be in their language.

WOMEN AND GLOBAL CONVERSATIONS

Before crying for our lost battle, we (women, non-english speaking people, not so technically-oriented individuals) can start thinking in terms of what exactly is silenced, and what can we do about it. How can we engage in global conversations while not losing our own identities, our own understanding of reality, our ways of speaking, or our own language? How can we use the Net without being used by it?

Women and others do not necessarily have to be disempowered. Women have proved they can speak the language of their “enemy” (as has the South of the North).  Afterall that is what women learn in schools, gather from books and from all the other print media: someone else’s history, someone else’s perspective and someone else’s knowledge. Most feminists agree that in order to achieve this women had to either became bilingual (some successfully and many through the destructive process of othering their own selves) or to abandon their own traditional language. While it is not so clear what this traditional language might be, obvious differences between women’s and men’s ways of speaking are found to exist. Research, in general, shows that women ask questions while men make statements, that women talk about people and feelings while men talk about things, that women use more adjectives, more modal forms such as “perhaps”, “sort of”, “maybe”, and more tag questions and attention beginners.[x]

It is often stressed that language not only reflects but also perpetuates and contributes to gender inequality, and that through language hierarchy between genders is “routinely established and maintained”.[xi] Feminist researchers find that men are more likely than women to control conversation while women do “support work” being some sort of “co-operative conversationalists” who express frequent concern for other participants in talk.[xii] The main solution for the transformation of current conversational division of labour between sexes cannot be only in the area of language because even the most “neutral” terms can always be appropriated by the dominant culture (like the meaning of the word “no” can be at time constructed to mean “maybe” or “wait a while”).[xiii] Susan Ehrlich and Ruth King write: “Because linguistic meaning are, to a large extent, determined by the dominant culture’s social values and attitudes, terms initially introduced to be non-sexist and neutral may lose their neutrality in the “mouths” of a sexist speech community and/or culture”.[xiv] The organisation of words and ideas into knowledge was similarly done in a context of masculine power where women were made invisible, their existence either denied or distorted and their ways of knowing and issues of interest labelled irrelevant. While many feminist linguists are attemping to reinvent language and support women’s emancipation through linguistic interventions, it is clear that this has to be done simultaneously with political, economic and cultural transformations in the areas of knowledge, language and the written word. The question is: can the Net become a site for this reinvention? Can women’s and others’ ways of knowing and speaking find space and voice on the Net? Can we escape the toolcentric approach of the new information and communication technologies to create a softer, listening future in which we co-evolve with nature, technology, the spirit, and the many civilizations that are humanity?  Can the Net be communicative, in the widest sense of the word?

While it is obvious that women can and do use the most dominant language, it is also claimed that women would rather use “softer”, more intuitive and face-to-face approaches. In a future controlled by women, oral tradition, body language, sounds, dreams, intuitive and psychic ways of communicating possibly would be equal with the written text, or at least not so much suppressed. Maybe, in such a society where women would participate at all levels and in all spheres it wouldn’t be necessary to introduce “dressing Barbie” video games in order to make girls more interested in new computer technologies. Maybe new software would be more interactive and more user (women/other) friendly and maybe new communication technologies would look completely different. Maybe they would not be so individualised, and maybe, netweaving would be done in a context of community or friendly groups and not in a context of alienated individuals. Priorities would certainly be somewhere else: where the quality of life of majority of people would have the highest value.

A REAL INFORMATION SOCIETY

Thus, there are, and can be even moreso, progressive dimensions to the new technologies. As Fatma Aloo of the Tanzanian Media Women’s Association argues, “They are a necessarily evil.”[xv] Women and other marginalised groups must use and design them for their own empowerment or they will be further left out and behind. Without being part of the design (the “knowledge ware”) and use proecess, they will further have to other themselves when they use the ICTs.

What is needed then is the creation of a progressive information society. It would be a world system that was diverse in how it viewed knowledge, appreciating the different ways gender and civilization order the real.  It would not just be technical but emotional and spiritual as well and ultimately one that used knowledge to create better human conditions, to reduce dhukka (suffering) and realise moksa (spiritual liberation from the bonds of action and reaction). The challenge then is not just to increase our ability to produce and understand information but to enhance the capacity of the deeper layers of mind, particularly in developing what in Tantric philosophy is called the vijinanamaya kosa (where knowledge of what is eternal and temporal is touched).  Certainly, even though the web is less rigid than a library, it is not the liberating information technology some assume – spiritual energies and shamanistic dissenting spaces[xvi] cannot enter. Of course, underlying an alternative view of an information society is a commitment to prama or a dynamic equilibrium wherein internal/external, “male/female” and spiritual/material are balanced.

FROM GLOBAL CONVERSATIONS TO A GAIA OF CIVILIZATIONS

We thus need to imagine and help create social spaces so the new technologies participate in and allow for the coming of a real global civilization, a prama, a gaia of cultures; one where there is deep multi-culturalism; where not just political representation and economic wealth are enhanced but the basis of civilization: the epistemologies of varied cultures, women and men, how they see self and other, flourish.  To begin to realize this, we need to first critically examine the politics of information.  We need to ask if the information we receive is true; if it is important, what its implications are, and the who is sending us the information. We also need to determine if we can engage in a conversation with the information sent – to question it, reveal its cultural/gendered context, to discern if the information allows for dialogue, for communication. We thus need to search for ways to transform information to communication (going far beyond the “interactivity” the web promises us), creating not a knowledge economy (which silences differences of wealth) but a communicative economy (where differences are explored, some unveiled, others left to be).

To do so, in addition to engaging critically with the assumptions beyond the information discourse, we also need to expand the limited rationalist discourse in which “information” resides.  What we learn from other cultures such as the indigenous Indian Tantric is that the new electronic technologies are just one of the possible technologies creating world space. Indeed they just act at the most superficial materialistic levels. As important as cyberspace is microvita space[xvii] or the noosphere being created through our world imaginations, through our increasingly shared collective consciousness.

Certainly while the reality the information era is one of exclusion, the potential for shared communication futures remains. To do so will require far more communication – sharing of meaning – than we have ever known and at far greater levels, in light of the many ways we know and learn from each other.  While we have highlighted the structures of power that create colonization, we also need to acknowledge personal agency, we particularly need to be far more sensitive to how we project our individual and civilizational dark sides on others. The information era will further magnify our assumptions of self-innocence and other-as-guilty unless we begin to reveal our complicitness in soliloquy posing as conversation.

If information can be transformed to communication, the web then can  perhaps participate in the historical decolonization process giving power to communities and individuals in the overall context of global human, economic, environmental and culturally negotiated universals.

Dr. Sohail Inayatullah is the associate editor of New Renaissance and currently senior research fellow at the Communication Center, Queensland University of Technology. Box 2434, Brisbane, 4001, Australia. Tel: 61-7-3864-2192. Fax: 61-7-3864-1813.

Ivana Milojevic, previously Assistant/Associate Lecturer at the University of Novi Sad, Yugoslavia, is currently living in Brisbane, Australia.


[i].          Ibid., 199. Quoted from Gates, Bill (1995) The Road Ahead, Viking, London, p. 273.

[ii].         Ibid., 200. Quoted from Negroponte, Nicholas (1995) Being Digital, Hodder and Stoughton, London, p. 230.

[iii].        Rushkoff, Douglas (1997) Children of Chaos, HarperCollins, New York.

[iv].        Spender, Dale quoted in Carmel Shute (1996) `Women With Byte’ Australian Women’s Book Review, Vol. 8, No. 3, October, p. 9.

[v].         Serageldin, Ismail (1996) `Islam, Science and Values,’ International Journal of Science and Technology, Vol. 9, No. 2, Spring, pp. 100-114 compiles an impressive array of statistics.  “Items in the Library of Congress are doubling every 14 years and, at the rate things are going, will soon be developing every 7 years. …In the US, there are 55,000 trade books published annually. …The gap of scientists and engineers in North and South is vast with 3800 per million in the US and 200 per million in the South. … [Finally], currently a billion email messages pass between 35 million users, and the volume of traffic on the Internet is doubling every 10 months,” 100-101.  Of course, why anyone would want to count email messages is the key issue – as ridiculous would be to count the number of words said daily through talking, or perhaps even count the silence between words.

[vi].         Sardar, Zia (1996) `The future of democracy and human rights,’ Futures, Vol. 28, No. 9, November, p. 847.

[vii].        Robbins, Kevin (1997) `The new communications geography and the politics of optimism’ in Danielle Cliche, ed. Cultural Ecology: the changing nature of communications, International Institute of Communications, London, p. 208.

[viii].       Ibid., 210.  Quoted from Virilio, Paul (1996) Cybermonde, La Politique du Pire Textuel, Paris, p 78.

[ix].         Tracey, Michael, `Twilight: illusion and decline in the communication revolution’  in Danielle Cliche, ed. Cultural Ecology: the changing nature of communications, International Institute of Communications, London, p. 50.

[x].         Fishman, Pamela M (1990) `Interaction: The Work Women Do’, in Joyce McCarl Nielsen, ed., Feminist Research Methods, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.

[xi].        Ibid., p. 225.

[xii].       Cameron, Deborah,  Fiona McAlinden and Kathy O’Leary, (1993) `Lakoff in

Context: the social and linguistic functions of tag questions’, in Stevi

Jackson, Women’s Studies: Essential Readings, New York University Press, New York, p. 424.

[xiii].      Ehrlich, Susan and Ruth King (1993) `Gender-based Language Reform and the Social Construction of Meaning’, in Stevi Jackson, Women’s Studies: Essential Readings, New York University Press, New York, pp. 410-411.

[xiv].       Ibid., p. 411.

[xv].        Comments delivered at the “Women and Cyberspace Workshop,” Santiago de Compostelo, Spain, May 20, 1997.

[xvi].       Nandy, A (1996) `Bearing Witness to the Future’, Futures, Vol. 28, No. 6/7, September, 636-639.

[xvii].      For example, as mystic P.R. Sarkar reminds us that behind our wilful actions is the agency of microvita – the basic substance of existence, which is both mental and physical, mind and body. Microvita can be used by minds (the image of monks on the Himalayas sending out positive thoughts is the organising metaphor here, as is the Muslim prayer in unison throughout the world with direction and focus) to change the vibrational levels of humans, making them more sensitive to others, to nature and to the divine. And as Rupert Sheldrake and Elise Boulding remind, as images and beliefs of one diverse world become more common it will be easier to imagine one world and live as one world, as a blissful universal family. See Sheldrake, R. (1981) A New Science of Life, Blong and Briggs, London. See Boulding, E. (1990) Building a Glboal Civic Culture. Syracuse University Press.

Beyond the Postmodern: Any Futures Left for Muslims and Others? (1998)

By Sohail Inayatullah

(The Communication Centre, Queensland University of Technology. From: 1998, “Beyond the Postmodern: Any Futures Possible?” Periodica Islamica (Vol. 5, No. 1, 1995), 2-3.)

 While scholars, critical theorists, scientists debate the Islamization of knowledge/science project, this debate has all but been made trivial by new technologies and techniques creating a postmodern world where the future has arrived, making history and the idea of the future, as the space of another possibility, another culture, all but obsolete.  The larger context of this debate is now postmodernity, the derealization of the modern world for some, the final exaggeration for others, the last breath before a new global, ethical, integrated world comes to be for the idealistic few.

Postmodernity is primarily characterised as standing in opposition to the traditional and moral worldview.  Reality once considered stable is now virtual; truth once considered eternal and universal is now fleeting and local; the natural once defined by evolution and nature is now socially and technologically constructed; sovereignty once contoured by civilization and culture is now porous with global capitalism ubiquitous.  Finally, the self, once certain of its mission in life, is now merely a collage of impressions, created and recreated by the desire for hypertime and hyperspace.

This world comes to us in many forms and figures. Perhaps most prominent are the new global archetypes. They are Michael Jackson, the totally artificial person, created, designed by surgeons who well understood the call in the Movie, The Graduate, that plastics is the future.  They are Michael Jordan, the basketball player, whose coming out of retirement sent the world markets millions of dollars higher. Jordan can jump and never land, defying the moral utterance of “when one rises too far, one falls.” They are Mickey and Minnie Mouse, Disneyland, the friendly fascism of the future, where all sites and smells, entrances and exits are contrived, where one can but smile for one is in a different land, where nothing matters.  “It is a small world after all,” one leaves singing, as the billboard of American Express passes the gaze of one’s illuminated eyes.

But this is not the illumination the Prophet spoke of.  We are not seeing the veils of ignorance torn aside and a new world given to us. This is not even the existentialist veil, as presented in Sartre’s Nausea where man realises that his life is utterly meaningless.  Rather our eyes themselves are torn apart and our selves manufactured otherwise.

However, even as postmodernity continues the values of modernity–the empirical, the West, militarism–it contests them creating new forms of self and culture that are far more liminal, far more interactive and potentially participatory, two way, if not multiway, methods of dialogue.  As Asian VTV Bangra rap enters our television screens, attempts to recreate a fixed traditional culture become impossible.  But it is not cultural melange nor a “multi-identitied” self that we should fear, indeed, this promises a renaissance in the third world, possibly through the appropriation of the West within the categories of Asian culture; rather, it is the grander assault on the possibility of an alternative future different than the linearity of Western materialism that is our problematic.

While religious authorities and humanists have decried that science runs at a faster rate than culture, science now  is not only making culture obsolete but redesigning evolution itself.  Imagine a hand, wearing a glove, writing with a pen. The hand represents evolution, our body; the glove culture, our elegance, our protection; and the pen, technology. The pen has now turned back on the hand and redesigned it,[i] making culture obsolete, merely technique.

There is thus much to be feared.

While the Islamic world debates, developments in genetic engineering soon promise to transform the private space of our individual genes to public space, where they can be bought and sold:[ii] not only will plants and other resources be patented by the technologically advanced so will our very selves.

In recent news, California doctors have successfully corrected genetically inherited defects at birth, setting the stage for genetic control of the 3000 congenital disorders found in children worldwide.  Doctors have also perfected a growth hormone which can now add five to seven centimetres to the final adult height of short children. The worldwide market for this drug is expected to be in the billions.[iii] Simultaneously a recent critique of Western developmentalism argues that it is not just that the West uses all the world’s resources because of their consumerist lifestyle, but because they are taller.[iv] Shortness is better since shorter people consume less and use less space. Should we then engineer shorter people? But this latter argument will unlikely win out as parents, in their obvious self-interest, flock to genetic disease prevention and genetic enhancement of who we can be.

While the first step will be genetic prevention, it will be a quick and slippery slope to genetic advancement. The State will certainly monitor our genetic blueprints, controlling where and when we can travel.  However, genetic prevention will reduce diseases, but under the mantle of an objective, universal, theory of everything science, a mantle which claims perfect knowledge.  Perfection will be defined by conventional materialistic, fetish (Milan, Paris and Harvard) definitions. We will terminate life based on the possibility of future diseases with the State eventually stepping in to ensure equally access to genetic intervention.  Why should it stop there? It won’t!  Birthing will be done in hospitals.  But rest assured, we can watch the baby grow in one’s very own family birth cubicle, a womb of sorts. Instead of a thin layer of skin separating the foetus from “parents” it will be even a thinner more sensitive layer of organic plastic.

Developments in genetics when linked with virtual reality and artificial intelligence will make it to enter hospital turned design factories and visualise our baby’s future extrapolated through holography. We will be able to watch him, her, or it go through various life stages seeing crucial lifepoints where certain diseases might develop. But it will be a particular model of the life-cycle that will be given to us.

For Muslims, the postmodern world will not be familiar, making the estrangement of the modern world minor by comparison. For Statist Islam, there will be no easy West to use as a ruse against its own population as in modernity, postmodernity will not exist in such easy dualities. While power might be in the hands of a world government, most likely it will be more difficult to encircle, with large information-genetic corporations giving out passports for travel in their owned worlds.

As Muslims, and as individuals of different faiths, committed to the possibility of a global ethics, there is little to rejoice, except that these transformations might in themselves lead to new technologies that destroy modernity. However, most likely we will live in perpetual modernity–postmodernity always becoming modern–the idea of alternative futures (the future as a real space, a call for transformation) merely becoming part of an atemporal world, where all is allowed and thus nothing is possible.  Certainly not a global ethics based on values other than profit or the short term needs of the few.

However, we should not be seduced by humanism either and outright reject new technologies, otherwise we will be further silenced.  Humanists look at this artificial world in creation and recoil in horror. They long for a simpler, gentler world, when cricket lasted five days, when gentlemen were gentlemen, when time was slow—and–when the Other provided material comforts.  But the classical world many humanists long for existed because it could exploit the colonies, take away labor and ideas, and impose slavery and civilization. It was violently hierarchical.  Colonisation, of course, has moved away from such amateurish efforts. More sophisticated is the appropriation of cultural diversity, the appropriation of difference for the continuation of liberal capitalism.

In the movie Alladin, we learn how the servant of God is appropriated by Californian culture. By the last scene, he asks to be called just “Al.” This is the trivialisation of the Other, at one level, and at a deeper level, the secularisation of the holistic Islamic worldview, its appropriation, not for the synthetic and creative task of envisioning a new planetary culture, but the use of history for the rationality of Hollywood.

But if we dispense from the humanist reaction to postmodernity, where then is the reality check, the reality principle?  As trillions of dollars search the planet every second for a home to maximise their own profit, to fulfil their ontological needs for interest, work becomes increasingly passe’.  Virtual reality, genetics, telecommunications, and the world’s financial speculative markets have all created a world in which the real is no longer real. In fact, it may be that Disneyland exists as fantasy to shore up the actual unreality–that of the neorealist model of national identity, as Baudrillard and others argue. Disneyland is constructed as fantasy so we evade the conclusion that current models of governance, of nationalism, of wealth generation are in fact grand fantasies, existing only as real because we have official fantasies in which they can exist in contrast to.

Sovereignty too becomes passe’. Nations can no longer control pollution, national culture, capital, or the import/export of nuclear weapons. For nations which have had the chance to develop and prosper, the new globalism promises further cultural expansion; but for third world nations, who  search for a sovereignty impossible in an unequal global division of labor, the porousness of the nation-state is a further tragedy, especially as old dynastic dispute prevent the creation of an Islamic community, the creation of a moral, even virtual, community.  Instead, instrumental rationality prods us all into directions we choose not to go.

The message of the Quran while signalling the need for another space, where critical consciousness and submission to the Divine gives direction, but in a world where direction has been made meaningless, where we live in heterotopias–many contradictory spaces at the same time–direction is both evasive and a matter of life and death.  The loss of space as a refuge, as direction, destroys culture–sacredness is lost. For the modern, all space must be commodified and for the postmodern all space must be relativised, as one discourse among many.

But we can gain some strength in remembering that postmodernity in itself is merely the logic of late capitalism, a stage of chaos, merely an end game.   As Ibn Khaldun reminded us many years ago:

At the end of a dynasty, there often also appears some (show of) power that gives the impression that the senility of the dynasty has been made to disappear.  It lights up brilliantly just before it is extinguished, like a burning wick the flame of which leaps up brilliantly a moment before it goes out, giving the impression it is just starting to burn, when in fact it is going out.[v]

It might be then that the postmodern even as it extends the modern signals its end. As reality becomes uncomfortably decentred, an ethical worldview can provide a centre, a point of reflection, in which decisions can be made outside of instrumental rationality.  This becomes the reality principle.

We thus should not powerlessly accept the instrumental rational of the science and technology revolution, believing that it is just one more in the latest revolution that will change who we are, since, after all, that is what history is about.  Evolution is changing us, let us go for the ride, it can be to easily argued.

We can in defence of our identity investigate the cultural basis of that revolution, asking what are the values that inform it, that drive it, that govern its knowledge base? We can ask who participates, who does not?  Based on these questions we can begin to create an alternative voice in science that looks at how knowledge subjugates, that understands how the categories we use to see the world are borrowed, are not authentic to our histories.

But this then should not be an excuse to not deconstruct our own history, it is not an excuse for imperial power within our own culture, but an opening up of Islam and culture.  We thus need to deconstruct our own history, to see what has been romanticised, what used for dynastic or personal glorification. This will allow for the creation of futures more familiar to the needs of Muslims. An authentic culture must be open to transformation even as it commits to basic principles of what it is.

Thus as we recognise that the future is being created by Centre, Western culture at the expense of the Other, we argue for a guided evolution that brings in the values of other cultures in dialogue with technology, biology and civilisations. This vision reimagines the future based on the possibility of eradicating powerlessness, on the need for a larger unifying global project–that is, a science based on our physical, mental and spiritual potentials–of which science and technology can play a role in.

This is, however, not an argument for a new “story of stories” an ahistorical blend of various grand narratives.  We must remember that stories come into being because they represent long battles, deep histories, heroic sacrifices, and primal myths.  A story of stories, while potentially rewarding, if created in condition of an authentic meetings of cultures, is likely in the contemporary framework to merely be a victory for liberalism, for reductionist science.  While the story tellers weave, the geneticists and cybernauts will have already created the New Story.

Will Muslims, indigenous peoples, and others committed to an alternative spiritual (integrated) ethical worldview be part of this story, perhaps, but most likely, as caricature, like Alladin, ready to become just Al.

I hope however for a different story, what I have elsewhere called a post-Asian dream.[vi]  It is a vision of unity and of global dialogue, of multi-epistemological world–of angels, virtual worlds but still grounded in the fundamentals: dignity, basic needs, and the direction which a spiritual oriented worldview gives.  It does not reject genetics and virtual worlds in total but does call for the application of the reality principle, of human suffering and human transcendence. In my vision it is Alladin–the servant of Allah–who will frame the possibility and choice of Al, and not, not, the other way around. For when all is said and done, it is the Divine that is our strength, that can guide technique, nourish the heart and create a more just society.


 

[i].   I am indebted to Susantha Goonatilake for this metaphor.

[ii].  I am indebted to Astrid Gesche for this observation.

[iii]. Mike O’Connor, “Gene therapy beats defects,” The Sunday Mail (14 May 1995), 52.

[iv].  Thomas Samaras, “Short is Beautiful,” The Futurist (January-February, 1995), 26-30.

[v].   Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. Translated by Franz Rosenthal. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967, 246.

[vi].  Sohail Inayatullah, “Integration and Disintegration: the futures of asian culture,” coordinated by Eleonora Masini, The Futures of Cultures.  Paris, Unesco Publications, 1995.

From the Information Era to a Gaia Of Civilizations (1997)

By Sohail Inayatullah, 1997

Information theory, while claiming universality, ignores civilisational and spiritual perspectives of knowledge. Moreover, the information society heralded by many as the victory of humanity over darkness is merely capitalism disguised but now commodifying selves as well. This essay argues for a more communicative approach wherein futures can be created through authentic global conversations – a gaia of civilisations. Current trends, however, do not lie in that direction. Instead, we are moving towards temporal and cultural impoverishment. Is the Web then the iron cage or can a global ohana (family, civil society) be created through cybertechnologies? Answering these and other questions are possible only when we move to layers of analysis outside conventional understandings of information and the information era and to a paradigm where communication and culture are central.

Key words: Information, Communication, Gaia of Civilisations

“The time for the liberation of heart and mind has not come yet…This is not your final destination.”[i] Faiz Ahmed Faiz.

Has the future arrived?[ii] Ended? Cyberspace and cloning; postmodernity and globalism are creating worlds where the future as a place of possibility and as a site of critique of the present, no longer exists. With virtual reality, cyberworld and genetics having arrived, the future and, indeed, history has ended. Our imaginations have become real – the fantastic has become the real.

However, perhaps the “cyber/information era” view of the future is overly linear, exponentially so, and forgetful that two-thirds of the world does not have a phone and much of the world lives over two hours from a phone connection. While postmodernity has speeded up time for the elite West and the elite in the non-West, for the majority of the world there is no information era.  Moreover, in the hyperjump to starspace, we have forgotten that while ideas and the spirit can soar, there are cyclical processes, such as the life and death of individuals, nations and civilisations that cannot be so easily transformed. While certainly there are more people making their living by processing ideas,[iii] perhaps we are engaged in a non-productive financial/information pyramid scheme where we are getting further and further away from food production and manufacturing, building virtualities on virtualites until there is nothing there, as in advaita vedanta[iv] wherein the world is maya, an illusion.  But perhaps it is important to remember from the history of previous empires that decline is in order when the capitalist class grows only from financing and knowledge creation, giving up manufacturing and losing vital resource to insecure peripheries.[v]

The coming of the information era, ostensibly providing untold riches in bits of freedom for all, in fact limits the futures of others because it robs them of their future alternatives – it certainly does not create a communicative gaia of civilizations,[vi] a new planetary future. Reality has become constructed as the worldwideweb, but perhaps this web is Max Weber’s iron cage – the future with no exit, wherein there is an inverse relationship between data and wisdom, between quick bytes and long term commitment, between engagement to technology and engagement with humans, plants and animals. We know now from email culture that the twin dangers of immediacy and speed do not lead to greater community and friendship, rather they can lead to bitter misunderstandings.[vii] Email then becomes not the great connector leading to higher levels of information but the great disconnector that gives the mirage of connection and community.[viii]  Email without occasional face to face communication can transform friendships into antagonistic relationships. Just as words lose the informational depth of silence, email loses information embedded in silence and face to face gestures.  The assimilation and reflection as well as the intuition and the insight needed to make sense of intellectual and emotional data are lost as the urgent need to respond to others quickens. Slow time, lunar time, women’s time, spiritual timeless time, cyclical rise and fall time and circular seasonal time are among the victims, leading to temporal impoverishment, a loss of temporal diversity where “21C” is for all instead of peculiar to Western civilisation.[ix]

Cybertechnologies thus create not just rich and poor in terms of information, but a world of quick inattentive time and slow attentive time. One is committed to quick money and quick time, a world where data and information are far more important than knowledge and wisdom.  It is a world where history is exponential versus a world that is cyclical: that believes the only true information worth remembering is humility; that civilisations that attempt to touch the sky burn quickly down; that economies that become so far removed from the real economy of goods and services, of agriculture, of the informal women’s economy and that become utterly dependent on cybertransactions can easily melt down.

It is thus a mistake to argue that there will only be an information rich and poor, rather there will be information quick and slow. Time on the screen is different from time spent gazing at sand in the desert or wandering in the Himalayas. Screen time does not slow the heart beat down relaxing one into the superconscious, rather we become lost in many bits, creating perhaps an era of accelerating information but certainly not a knowledge future or a future where the subtle mysteries of the world, the spiritual everpresent is felt.

Dark Side Of The Earth

There are two clear positions. In the first, the information era provides humans with the missing technologies to connect all selves. In the other, “Cyberspace is the darkside of the West” to use Zia Sardar’s provocative language.[x] He argues that cyberspace is the West caving in on itself, leaving no light to see outside of its own vision.[xi] It is a Spenglarian collapse. While cyberspace claims community, there in fact is none, it is anonymous. There is no responsibility towards others since there is no longer term relationship – there are no authentic selves, all exist for immediate short term pleasure and not for the larger task of working together towards a shared goal. People are because they struggle through projects/missions together, not just because they exist in shared virtual worlds.

This quickening of the self was anticipated by McLuhan in 1980.  “Excessive speed of change isolates already fragmented individuals. At the speed [speech] of light man has neither goals, objectives or private identity. He is an item in the data bank – software only, easily forgotten – and deeply resentful.[xii]

Selves lose reflective space, jumping from one object to another, one Website to another, one email to another.  It is not a communicative world that will transpire but a world of selves downloading their emotional confusion onto each other.  Writes Sardar, “Far from creating a community based on consensus, the information technologies could easily create states of alienated and atomised individuals, glued to their computer terminal, terrorising and being terrorised by all those whose values conflict with their own.”[xiii] It is as if we have all become psychic with all thoughts interpenetrating creating a global schizophrenia.[xiv]

Virtual realities have and will prosper not for the glimpse they give to us of other worlds but because they detach us from this world. Among the main virtual projects is the continued silencing of women from the technological discourse. Virtual technologies are growing because of their ability to simulate sexual pleasure.  Once these technologies are fully developed, men will no longer need to connect emotionally or with commitment to women (and some women to men as well), rather they will simulate their relationships with virtual dolls, creating worlds where women exist only as male representation.  What Playboy has not yet accomplished because of the flat dimension of centrefold spreads, virtual full dimension will realise it. Men will then continue to locate women as pleasure objects and create them as standardised beauty forms. The first step is the reduction of women to the hormone maddened images of adolescent males. The next stage is the elimination of women through virtual simulcras. Through genetics (the first phase as cloning but more important is the artificial womb), they will not be needed for procreation as well.  While this perhaps might be too bold of a statement, certainly the new genetics cannot in anyway be seen as nature or women-oriented technologies. While Finland, for example, extends the metaphor of the home into a caring State, genetics will lead to the opposite: the total penetration of the State into the home and then the body of women.[xv]

The Great Leap Forward         

Virtual reality thus fulfils the homoerotic male fantasy of a world of just men. However, some argue that virtual reality is a new technology whose future development is up for grabs, that computing does not have to be male biased, that women can enjoy user groups dominated by men.  While the technology is certainly male-dominated,[xvi] Sherman and Judkins give the banal advice that women[xvii] should educate themselves on the positive and negative dimensions of this new technology and then make it into their own (of course, forgetting the reasons why it is male dominated).[xviii] Fatma Aloo, howoever, of the Tanzanian Media Women’s Association argues that the internet is a necessarily evil.[xix] Even though it is male-dominated and the technology in itself is male-cultures, women endanger themselves more by not using these new technologies. Her association and the numerous other ngo’s hope to empower women through the net. Through the net, they are able to tell their stories of suffering, of marginalisation as well as their victories to others – at the some level then, isolation can disappear.

But for cyber enthusiasts, these new technologies are not necessarily evils but grand positives that give do more than merely provide information, they give more choice. They reduce the power of Big business and Big State, creating a vast frontier for creative individuals to explore. “Cyberspace has the potential to be egalitarian, to bring everyone into a network arrangement. It has the capacity to create community; to provide untold opportunities for communication, exchange and keeping in touch.”[xx] Cybertechnologies will allow more interaction creating a global ecumene – authentic global communication. They create wealth, indeed, a jump in wealth.  The new technologies promise a transformational society where the future is always beckoning, a new discovery is yearly[xxi] – and as our memory of the past becomes increasingly distant, humans become important not for themselves but for the new genetic/cyber species they create. The evils of the past slowly disappear as we know each other more intimately. The oppressive dimensions of bounded identity – to nation, village, gender, culture – all disappear as we move in and out of identities and communities.  History is then exponential with visions of collapse, of the perpetual cycle, of the weight of history, merely fictions of the past.  Our children will live in a world without gravity, believes Nicholas Negroponte. In Being Digital he argues that, “Digital technology can be a natural force drawing people into greater world harmony,”[xxii] where historical social divisions will disappear.  Predictably Bill Gates writes that “we are watching something historical happen and it will affect the world seismically, rocking us in the same way the discovery of the scientific method, the invention of the printing, and the arrival of the industrial age did.” [xxiii]  Mark Pesce goes even further than Negroponte and Gates, believing the web to be “an innovation as important as the printing press – it may be as important as the birth of language itself … in its ability to completely refigure the structure of civilization.”[xxiv] This is the moment of kairos, the appropriate moment, for a planetary jump to a new level of consciousness and society. It is the end of scarcity as an operating myth and the beginning of abundance, of information that wants to be free. The late 20th century is the demarcation from the industrial to the information/knowledge era. Progress is occurring now. Forget the cycle. That was misinformation.

But while the growth data looks impressive and the stock of Microsoft continues upward, there are some hidden costs. For example, what of negative dimensions of the new technologies such as surveillance? Police in Brisbane, Australia use up to a 100 hidden cameras in malls to watch for criminal activities.[xxv] Hundreds more are anticipated creating an electronic grid in central Brisbane. While this might be possibly benign in Brisbane (Aborigines might have different views though), imagining a large grid over Milosevic’s Yugoslavia or Taliban’s Afghanistan (or under Zia-ul Haq’s Pakistan where every “immoral” gaze would have led to arrest) it is enough to frighten the most fanatical techno-optimist. Or is it? Many believe that privacy issues will be forgotten dimensions of the debate on cyberfutures once we each have our own self-encryptors so that no one can read or enter us (the 21st century chastity belt). Technology will tame technology. Over time, the benefits of the new technologies will become global with poverty, homelessness and anomie all wiped out. All will eventually have access – even the poorest – as the billions of brains that we are, once connected, will solve the many problems of oppression.[xxvi]  While we have always imagined such a future, it is only now that technology allows it so.

The new cybertechnologies will also change how we war each other.  “The world is in the early stages of a new military revolution. The technologies include digital communications, which allow data to be compressed; a “global positioning system” (GPS) of satellites, which makes more exact guidance and navigation possible; radar-evading “stealth”; and, of course, computer processing.”[xxvii]

But they will also create a world in perpetual war with itself.

The new warfare will be `multi-dimensional’, meaning not only that air, sea and land operations will be increasingly integrated, but also that information and outerspace will be part of modern war. `Information warfare’ could mean disabling an enemy by wrecking his computing, financial, telecoms or air-traffic control systems. The relevant weapons might be computer viruses, electro-magnetic pulses, microwave beams, well-placed bombs or anything that can smash a satellite.[xxviii]

Competitive advantage will go to those who are the most information dependent, thus creating information gaps between themselves and others. This dependence, however, is a weakness, both sapping innovation by leading to a closed surveillance society and allowing others not dependent on instant information to attack from non-information paradigms. It is enantiodromia in action – one’s excellent is one’s fatal flaw.

Access To Global Conversations

At the metalevel, at issue is not just the access of individuals to technologies but more how the new technologies have taken over the discourse of global conversations, how they have infected our deep social grammar. While certainly it is important to have a global language – a way of communicating – the internet not only privileges English, it englishes the world such that other languages lose their ability to participate in global futures. It continues global standardisation. Who needs cloning, writes Kiirana@unm.edu when you already have global standardisation in the form of global coca-colaisation.[xxix]

The web creates a voice, a rhetoric, a certain kind of rationality which is assumed to be communicative.  But while certainly web pages that provide information on airline flight arrivals and departures or on hard to find books are instrumentally useful, information retrieval is not communication.  Communication proceeds over time through trauma and transcendence.  In trauma, communication occurs when human suffering is shared with others. In transcendence, communication occurs when differences are understood and mutuality discovered, when beneath real differences in what it means to be human, similarities in how we suffer and love are realised. Merely having a web page does not mean one is communicating with others except at the banal level of an electronic business card.

A web page, like a Coca-Cola ad on the moon or on Mars for visiting aliens provides some information but certainly not at a level most civilisations in the world would find satisfactory. It amplifies a certain dimension of self, however, as with all such amplifications, far more interesting is to note what is not sent, what is not said, then what is officially represented in email or on a website.

While Marshall McLuhan was certainly correct in writing that we create technologies and thereafter they create us, he did not emphasise enough that technologies emerge within civilisational contexts (where politics are naturalised, considered absent).  Technology creates the possibility of a global village but in the context of the Los-angelisation of the planet. It is the global city of massive pollution, poverty and alienation that is the context. In addition, the more vicious dimension of the village – the history of landlords raping farmers, of exclusive ideologies and of feudal relations is often forgotten in the metaphor of the global village, indeed, a global colony would be a far more apt metaphor.  But new technologies do create differences in world wealth, access to power and access to the creation of alternative futures.

Cyber-enthusiasts rightfully point to the opportunities of the one world created by new technologies. But they need to remember that the one world of globalism remains fundamentally capitalistic with the local (local economy and power over one’s future) increasingly being attacked. The tiny Pacific Island of Niue recently discovered that 10% of its national revenue was being sucked out through international sex-line services.[xxx] The information era as P.R. Sarkar points out is late capitalism, a system in which all other varnas – psycho-social classes and ways of knowing (the intellectual, the worker and the warrior)  – become the “boot lickers of the merchants.”[xxxi]  And: “In order to accumulate more and more in their houses, they torture others to starvation … they suck the very living plasma of others to enrich the capabilities.”[xxxii] While intellectuals invent metaphors of postmodernity and post-industrialism, capital continues to accumulate unevenly, the poor become poorer and less powerful (however, they can now have a Website).  The information era still exists in the context of the world capitalist system – it is not an external development of it, and it will not create the contradictions that end it. The knowledge society or non-material society that many futurists imagine conveniently forgets humans’ very real suffering. But for virtual realities, we have virtual theories.  The words “I make friends” from the genetic engineer character in the movie Blade Runner take on a different meaning. Making friends becomes not an “exchange” of meanings but the manufacturing of like-minded life forms – friendly robots in this movie.  One can easily imagine scenarios with corporations making happiness, love and life (not to mention providing passports/passwords).  The advertising genius of the 20th century will pale in comparison to what is to come in the next.

THE POLITICS OF CONVERSATIONS

Current global conversations are not communicative spaces of equal partner but conversations wherein one party has privileged epistemological, economic and military space. Certainly the emerging Palestinian world can not have a meaningful conversation with the power of Israel – they do not enter the conversation as equals. Moreover the language of such conversations uses the categories and assumptions of those that have designed the metaconversation.  We do not enter conversations unencumbered, as Foucault, Heidegger and many others have pointed out. Trails of discourses precede our words.  We do not own words, indeed, it is not even so much that we speak but that discourse creates the categories of “we”. That is to so say, it is not that we speak English, but that we language the world in particular ways.

Remembering the Unesco MacBride Commission report, Majid Tehranian argues that the major problem in global communication is the lack of a meaningful dialogue between West and non-West.  Each cannot hear the other – their paradigms are too different, for one. Second, the West does not believe that as the losers in history Asia, Africa, the Pacific have the right to speak. Only Confucianist societies (who present an economic challenge) and Islamic societies (who do not accept their fate and challenge the positioning of the West) are problematic for the future of the West.

The West desires the non-West to procreate less; the non-West points out that the West argues for population limits only after it has robbed the future of the world’s resources and without contesting the structural relations of imperialism.  After all, Los Angeles uses the same amount of energy as India. As Gayatri Spivak writes: “A large part of this deplorable state of affairs is lodged between the legs of the poor women of the South. They’re having too many children. At Halloween, one day in the United States, more than 300 million dollars was spent on cards, 72 million dollars on costumes and more than 700 million on candy. More than a billion dollars. One of those children is 300 times [in terms of consumption] one of the children in the South. So what kind of body count is that.”[xxxiii] Spivak thus locates the problem in consumption-oriented capitalism and not in Indian women who do not need information on world population trends.

The West desires a free-flow of information, the non-West (and France) wants to protect its culture, arguing that the real flow is downward from Disneyland to Islamabad and rarely the other way around. This is not because Western culture is superior, because truth really did begin in Greece, but because the West has technological and financial advantages and because over the past 500 years they have defined what is beauty, truth and humour. Free flow can exist when lines of videos, television and music are, in fact, authentically based on market relations. Currently the West has structural advantages. However, the West believes that it is bringing faster, quicker and more exciting global culture, and that the non-West is using these excuses as a way to deny their citizens global culture, to protect their culture industries and to oppress dissent in their home countries. For example, East Asian nations have used Confucianism as an argument against liberal democracy. New technologies then will merely continue a dialogue that others cannot hear but they do so at many levels now – the space of nationalism becomes wider and thus sovereignty harder to maintain.  But while it might be argued that this is so for the US and European nations, that the Net limits their sovereignty, this forgets that the creators, the designers and the value adders are from the US largely.

Thus, before we enter global conversations we need to undo the basis of such conversations asking who gets to speak; what discourses are silenced; and, what institutional power points are privileged?  We need to ask how the language of conversation enables particular peoples and not others (peoples as well as animals[xxxiv] and nature). We need to see particular linguistic movements as fragile spaces – as the victory of one way of knowing over other ways of knowing.  Our utterances are political in that they hide culture, gender and civilisation.  Conversations come to us as neutral spaces for created shared agreement but they are trojan horses carrying worldviews with them. For example, centre nations often want to enter into political reconciliation conversations with indigenous peoples but the style and structure of such conversations almost always reinscribe European notions of self and governance instead of indigenous notions of community and spirituality. By entering, for example, a parliament house or a constitutional convention, the indigenous person immediately enters a terrain outside of his and her value considerations – in fact, outside his or her non-negotiable basis of civilisation. As traditional Hawaiians say, the aina (land) is not negotiable, cannot be sold – it is rooted to history, to the ancestors and cannot enter exchange relations.[xxxv]  Hawaiians have been prodded by the US Federal government to engage in a constitutional convention to articulate their ideal state, governance system. As with traditional American conventions, delegates are to run and lobby for election, each one to act as a delegate and thereby somehow representing their nation. During the convention, they are to follow discussions and enter in conversations as bounded by Robert’s Rules of Order. However, for many Hawaiians entering a constitutional convention already limits the political choices they have. Ho’pono’pono, for example, as a method of negotiation – wherein ancestors are called, where all others are forgiven, where a shared spiritual and social space is created – is far more meaningful than the power worlds of suits and ties.

As a Maori elder has argued: Westerners want us to have a governance system based on parliamentary democracy wherein electoral legitimacy is based on full representation and attendance of delegates. In this system, the Maori are often chided for not showing up to meetings. What Westerners do not recognise, is that “they” is not only constituted by “physical beings”. More important than particular individuals showing up is if the mana shows up. If the mana is not there then it does not matter if all voted in unanimity. Having or not having mana determines civilisational success. Merely voting, while perhaps a necessary condition, is not a sufficient condition. One’s relationship with the mana is. Representation by the Maori and the Hawaiians is made problematic – one person, one vote is part of the story but it misses the expanded communicative community of other cultures, including the special voices of elders (those who dream the past) and of angels (and other non-human beings who affect day to day life) as well as of the community as whole.  Finally it misses the mana, that there is more to a person or to a community than its human population.

Conversation then is more than being able to access different web pages of Others. A global village is not created by more information transfer.  Conversation is also more than about equals meeting around a table but also asking what type of table should we meet around? What type of food is served? Who is fasting? Should food be eaten on the ground? Who should serve? Is there prayer before eating? When should there be speech? When silence?[xxxvi] What constitutes information transfer? When is there communication? The meanings we give to common events must be civilisationally contextualised.  Libraries, for example, create knowledge categories that are political, that is, they reflect the history of Western knowledge. These divisions of knowledge – the floors of a library – bear little relationship to the orderings of other civilisations where reality does not consist of divisions between art, science, social science, government documents and other. The Web, however, does to some extent create a new global library, which allows for democracy in terms of what is put on the Web and in terms of how it is accessed. Categories are more fluid, allowing for many orderings of information. At the same time, the web flattens reality to such an extent where all information is seen as equal, the vertical gaze of hierarchical knowledge – of knowing what is most important, what is deeper, what is lasting – is lost. Immediacy of the present all categories being equal results with the richness of epistemological space lost.

A REAL INFORMATION SOCIETY

A real information society, an ilm (knowledge in the Islamic worldview) world system would thus be one that was diverse in how it viewed knowledge, appreciating the different ways civilisations ordered the real.  It would not just be technical but emotional and spiritual as well and ultimately one that used knowledge to create better human conditions, to reduce dhukka (suffering) and realise moksa (spiritual liberation from the bonds of action and reaction). The challenge then is not just to increase our ability to produce and understand information but to enhance the capacity of the deeper layers of mind, particularly in developing the vijinanamaya kosa (where knowledge of what is eternal and temporal is realised).  Certainly, even though the Web is less rigid than a library, it is not the total information technology some assume – spiritual energies and shamanistic dissenting spaces cannot enter. Of course, underlying an alternative view of an information society is a commitment to prama or a dynamic equilibrium wherein internal/external and spiritual/material are balanced.

The issue is more than equality but the illumination of difference – difference at the level of political-economy, at the level of epistemology, of worldview.  Information is not information and knowledge is not knowledge.

But for the moderns, these concepts are understood by characterising the other as existing in religious worldviews.  Following Comte and Spencer, as the intellect develops, philosophy and then later science flourishes – real knowledge, objective science, that can lead to commercial success arises. Other ways of knowing become characterised as backward, or in more generous terms as not having access to enough information. With full information, ignorance is reduced and the objective revealed. In contrast, for non-Western civilisations, it is the subjectivisation of information that is far more important (with Islam trying to balance the subjective and objective).[xxxvii] Moreover, the division between secular and religious is less strict.

But the techno-optimists of the information postmodern society believe that these differences between worldviews can be accommodated.  By decentralising power, the new technologies allow the spirit of the individual to thrive. Through the internet, we will all be wired one day happily communicating all day long – that difference will lead to a space of communicating equals all sharing a confidence in world connectivity.  The noosphere imagined by Teilhard de Chardin is just years away.  But what type of connectivity will it be? While certainly email helped the Belgrade student and opposition movement of 1997 gain world – Western – support, the Algerian Muslims equally deprived of electoral victory have received few hits on their Websites. What happened to our image of an objective information rich society where more information leads to wiser and fairer decisions?

POSTMODERN NETS

Time writer Julian Dibble believes that the Belgrade revolt was an internet revolution since it was the one media the fascist Milosevic regime did not manage to control. Certainly access to the rest of the world through email provided important emotional support and it provided an antidote to the pro-Milosovic government reporting, as evidenced in Australian TV newscoverage through the SBS channel.  However, the revolution “succeeded” because of other factors.  The US’s clear warning to Milosevic that violence to protesters would have severe repercussions (at the very least the reinstatement of sanctions), the creative non-violent tactics of students (the revolt tactician was a theatre director) and loss of right-wing nationalistic (fascist) support to Milosevic since he was now seen not as the father of a Serbian homeland but the one who sold out the Serbs in Krajina. The internet was neither a necessary nor a sufficient factor. Mass protest, a neutral Army, support from the powerful military nations, threat of UN sanctions and courage of individual women and men in the face of policy brutality were.  But the process of the mythification of the internet continues.

Information optimists remain convinced that more information about others leads automatically to a better world. For example, in an article by Anthony Spaeth at the recent Davos World Economic Forum, he writes that South African Thabmo Mbeiki, the Executive Deputy President, said that if South Africa had been connected, there would not have been apartheid.[xxxviii]  Somehow despots are undermined by the Web, racism disappears once we have more information about events.  However in the very same issue of Time we are told that the best predictor of one’s view of American football player OJ Simpson’s guilt or innocence was race.[xxxix] Irrespective of any evidence or objective information, black Americans were far more likely to believe in his innocence, white americans in his guilt.  Clearly being wired is only one factor in determining how one sees the world. The US is internet connected and yet two groups separated only by a bit of skin colour can see the world so differently. Information is obviously not so flat. For Blacks the trial was about history, about inequity in the US as well as about how they see themselves constructed by white Americans (as an inch removed from barbarism). For Whites it was more evidence that blacks are dangerous irrespective of their “white” credentials.  To assume that more information leads to insight into others, misses the point. We make decisions based on many factors – conceptual information is just one of them.  Our own personal history, the trauma each one us has faced. Our moments of transcendence when we have gone beyond the trauma and not othered others (ie as less or evil or as a reified social category).  Civilisational factors and of course institutional barriers are other variables that mediate both the introduction and dissemination of technology but as well as how technology is constituted.

But others believe the Net can be about transcendence. Sherry Turkle argues that the internet allows us to delink from our physical identity and gain some distance from our personal traumas.[xl] We can play at being female or male, human or animal, diseased or health. She describes stories of healing where women and men understand their own pathologies better through play with other identities.  However, she was not so thrilled when others created a character called Dr. Sherry, that is the foundational basis for her identity was suddenly questioned.  Of course, it is easier to play (assuming other identities in fun) when one has a sovereign coherent identity and when one is still making one’s historical identity.  Identity play as postmodern irony is a far more painful episode when one has had identity systematically removed. Among others, Asians and Africans are currently undergoing such a trauma, between imposed selves, a range of historical selves and desired future selves. Turkle forgets is that it is not just Websurfers who have many identities. Colonised people have always had an ability to be multi-selved, not for play, though, but for survival. For example, survival for Indians during British rule meant creating a British self, holding on to a historic self and a synthetic self. While multi-tasking might be the craze today and for Douglas Rushkoff[xli] the most important ingredient for success tomorrow, it is not just playing on computers that create multi-tasking, as any mother will tell, having children is the true teacher of multi-tasking.

Internet enthusiasts forget that the wiring of the globe means the wiring of the worst of ourselves and the best of ourselves. Evil and goodness can travel through broadband. Technology is political, constitutive of values and not merely a carrier. The information era remains described in apolitical terms forgetting the culture of technology creating it, forgetting the class (Marx) and varna (Sarkar) basis of these technologies, that is, they exist in the end days of capitalism, and it forgets that Net privileges certain values over others.  We need to remember that if there were 100 people with all existing ratios the same, 70 would be unable to read, 50 would suffer from malnutrition, 80 would live in sub-standard housing, and only one would have a college education.[xlii]

Also forgotten is that merely entering a cyberworld makes no promise of justice or global fairness.  And as South African Mikebe will find out, his nation will enter the world information system not on their terms, their categories, their view of history but on the views of those with the most definitional power.  Currently, the world guilt ratio favours South Africa. That will certainly change as it is currently with US anger at South Africa’s selling of arms to Syria (ethical arms trading, it is now called).

At the same time, even with the limits of Webspace, as the Zapatista have managed to do, a revolution of land and labor can, while not be won in cyberworld, certainly be kept alive there.[xliii]  Through numerous Web sites and quick access to international human rights organisations and other NGOs, the power of the Mexican state to obliterate the Zapatistas is dramatically reduced. When local power is not enough, movements can enter the global ecumene and find moral power from international society, speeding up the creation of a global ohana. Clearly the Web has changed the relationships between oppressor and oppressed, between national totalitarianism and movements of dissent. Indeed, Sardar writes that CD-ROM has the potential to change power relations between individuals and religious scholars (who served as human memory banks controlling the intrepretations of what one should or should not do as a Muslim). By making vast amounts of information easy to access and thus allowing Muslims to interpret themselves truth claims made by a particular class of people. “Islamic culture could be remade, refreshed and re-established by the imaginative use of a new communication technology.”[xliv] But perhaps this is too hopeful, expert information systems can be designed that reinforce the views of the mullah class, interpretations can be framed so that their power base and their view of Islam continues.

The ubiquitous power of the Web is such that one cannot escape it – there is no luddite[xlv] space available, one has to enter the technology and do one’s best to make it reflect one’s own values and culture. But technology more than a site of progress must be located as a site of contending politics.

We thus need to ask if the Web and the promised information world change the hegemony of the West (here now extending West outside of its geographical borders to cosmology, a way of knowing) – ie definitional power, deciding what is truth, reality and beauty; temporal power, deciding what historical landmarks calender the world, eg that 21C is arriving; spatial power, imagining space as urban, secular (without feng shui or local knowledge) and to be owned; and economic power (upward movement of wealth from the periphery to the centre). Clearly it does not. It does give more pockets of dissent and it has now once again packaged dissent as a Website – with the right graphics, name, format and sexy catch words (and payment to search engines to ensure one’s Website comes up first).

The challenge for cultures facing cyberworld ahead is to find ways to enter global conversations, that is, to protect local ways of knowing and at the same time enter the end of history with new ways of knowing – worlds beyond the information era. This is a far more daunting task than cross-cultural communication. It is a vision of a gaia of civilisations.  It is a deep global conversation that admits metaconversations.[xlvi]  To do so, one cannot be a luddite.  Historical change happens because of environmental clash and cohesion and because of the clash of ideas. But it also occurs because of a desire for something other – an attraction to the Great, in sanskrit, for ananda. Science and technology thus must be seen in cultural terms (what ways of knowing they privilege) but also in terms of their political economy (who owns them and how the benefits are distributed) but even as we evoke non-linear images of time, space and spirit, there is a crucial linear progressive dimension to history, of increasing rights for all, of some possibility of decreasing levels of exploitation (through social innovation). The enlightenment project, however, must be seen in the context of others – civilisations and worldview.  Moreover, it is not perfection of society that must be sought as in the Western project, since this means the elimination of all that is other, nor is it the perfection of the self as in the hindu tradition, since this avoids structural inequity. It is the creation of eutopias – good societies. Technology balanced with the finer dimensions of human culture can provide that upward movement in history and Antonio Gramsci warned, we must not be excited by rubbish – A gaia of civilisations cannot occur in the context of the deep inequity of the world capitalist system.

A Gaia Of Civilisations

We thus need to imagine and help create social spaces so the new technologies participate in and allow for the coming of a real planetary culture, a gaia of civilisations; one where there is deep multi-culturalism and where the epistemologies of varied cultures – how they see self and other are respected – flourish.  To realise this, open communication and travel are necessary factors but they are not sufficient. Interaction amongst equals and not merely information transfer, that is to say a right to communication is needed as well.

Finally, instead of seeing culture as rigid and fixed, we need to remember that cultures have more resilience than governments give them credit for.  For example, while India might be made problematic by Disneyland, Indic civilisation will not be since it has seen the rise and fall of claims to world empire repeated many times. Pax Americana will go the way of the British Empire, which went the way of the Moguls.  Indeed, the strength of Indian culture and other historical civilizations (especially the West and particularly the United States) is its ability to localise the foreign, to localise english, to localise western MTV, to create its own culture industries. Culture and identity then is fluid. When the powerless meet the powerful, confrontation need not be direct. It could be at different levels, wherein the powerful are seduced then changed – where, at least in the Indian tradition, all enter as foreigners but leave culturally transformed, as eclectic hindus.

What we also learn from other cultures is that the new electronic technologies are just one of the possible technologies creating world space. Indeed they just act at the most superficial levels. As important as cyberspace is microvita space or the noosphere being created through our world imaginations. Indian mystic P.R. Sarkar reminds us that behind our wilful actions is the agency of microvita – the basic substance of existence, which is both mental and physical, mind and body.  Microvita can be used by minds (the image of monks on the Himalayas sending out positive thoughts is the organising metaphor here, as is the Muslim prayer in unison throughout the world with direction and focus) to change the vibrational levels of humans, making them more sensitive to others, to nature and to the divine. And as Sheldrake reminds, as images and beliefs of one diverse world become more common it will be easier to imagine one world and live as one world, as a blissful universal family.  The Web then can participate in the historical decolonisation process giving power to communities and individuals in the overall context of global human, economic, environmental and cultural rights.

Or can it?

Notes

[i].          The words of Pakistani socialist poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz.

[ii].          Nearly every brochure on the benefits on the new communication technologies begins with that phrase. The future is seen solely in technological terms.

[iii].         See, for example, William E. Halal, “The Rise of the Knowledge Entrepreneur,” The Futurist (Vol. 20, No. 7, November-December 1996), pages 13-16. Halal writes that in the US “Blue-collar workers should dwindle from 20% of the US work force in 1995 to 10% or less within a decade or two. …non-professional white-collar workers [will be reduced] from 40% to 20%-30%. The remaining 60%-70% or so of the work force may then be composed of knowledge workers. …meanwhile, productivity, living standards and the quality of life will soar to unprecedented levels,” page 13.

Also see, The Think Tank Directory in which it is reported that the number of think tanks have exploded from 62 in 1945 to 1200 in 1996. For more information on this email: grs@cjnetworks.com or write 214 S.W. 6th Avenue, Suite 301, Topeka, KS 66603, USA.

[iv].         One of the six schools of classical Indian philosophy. Only Brahman, the supreme consciousness, is postulated as real. Everything else is but an illusion – maya.

[v].         Majid Tehranian, “Totems and Technologies,” Intermedia 14(3), 1986, page 24.

[vi].         I am indebted to Ashis Nandy for this term, although he calls it, “A gaia of cultures.” See Eleonora Masini and Yogesh Atal, eds., The Futures of Asian Cultures (Bangkok, UNESCO, 1993) for more on this theme.

[vii].        See, S.C Gwynne and John F. Dickerson, “Lost in the E-Mail,” Time (April 21, 1997), pages 64-66.  They report on the dangers in businesses when bosses use email to berate employees, creating considerable ill-will and inefficiencies. Email exports the anger of the sender to the receiver. Diane Morse Houghten writes that “E-mail leaves a lot of blank spaces in what we say, which the recipient tends to fill with the most negative interpretation” (page 65).

To avoid sending the wrong message, four rules are suggested: “(1) Never discuss bad news, never criticize and never discuss personal issues over email. And if there’s a chance that what you say could be taken the wrong way, wlakd down the hall to discuss it in person or pick up the phone” (page 66).

[viii].       Lyn Simpson, head of the School of Communications, Queensland University of Technology reports on a disastrous result of an email sent to school students. Asked if they were interested in greater liaison/representation of students in faculty committees, she was treated to a barage of obscenities. When reminded that email was a privilege and not a right of registered students, the obscenities did not subside.  Whether this was because of pent up frustration of students towards the university or a response to the formal tone of Professor Simpson’s message is not clear. Certainly, none of them would have expressed vulgarities in face to face communication. Moreover, they were not bothered by the fact that their messages had their return email addresses on them, that is to say, they could be easily identified.

[ix].         For more on the temporal hegemony, particularly in the construction of the 21st century as neutral universal timing instead of as particular to the West, see Sohail Inayatullah, “Listening to Non-Western Perspectives” in David Hicks and Richard Slaughter, eds, 1998 Education Yearbook (Kogan Page, 1998).

[x].         Zia Sardar, “alt.civilizations.fax Cyberspace as the darker side of the west,” Futures, 27(7), September 1995, pages 777-995.

[xi].         On one public newsgroup the following message on May 6, 1996 was posted to the question: what would you do with an unconscious womans body?  According to Walter Sharpless, he would: Well if it were a 8 year old boy’s body, i would … the rest is too pornographic (even from extreme libertarian positions) to report especially since it concludes with  … Thank you for all your time. it has been very satisfying knowing you will read this.

In response, was the equally stunning response from Max Normal: “Now here’s a guy that needs therapy .. the twelve gauge kind! a 44 mag would be more in line … with the brain that is.” What is not contested is the pornographic nature of the initial question ie “what would you do with an ….”

Internet as necessarily a progressive form of knowledge? Perhaps not.

[xii].        Marshall McLuhan quoted in New Internationalist special issue titled, “Seduced by Technology: The human costs of computers” New Internationalist, 286, December 1996, page 26.

[xiii].       Zia Sardar, “The future of democracy and human rights,” Futures, 28(9), November, 1996, page 847.

[xiv].       Sohail Inayatullah, “Frames of Reference, The Breakdown of the Self and the Search for Reintegration” in Eleonora Masini and Yogesh Atal, eds. The Futures of Cultures (Bangkok, Unesco, 1993).

[xv].        See Vuokko Jarva, “Feminst Research, Feminist Futures, Futures (forthcoming). Also see, Vuokka Jarva, “Towards Female Futures Studies,” Rick Slaughter, ed., The Knowledge Base of Futures Studies: Directions and Outlooks. Vol. 3 (Melbourne, DDM Media Group, 1996), pages 3-20. Women’s inner circle of reproduction and the home will thus be transformed but without entry into the male sphere of production and the public – they will lose their traditional source of power and history, and as they are not participating in the creating of the new technologies, they will enter a new unfamiliar world with few sites to locate their selves. Indeed, the new technologies are attempts, argues Jarva, to dismantle the women’s sphere dimensions of the welfare state.

[xvi].       See Dale Spender, Nattering on the Net: Women, Power and Cyberspace (North Melbourne, Spinifex Press, 1996)  and Lynn Cherny and Elizabeth Reba Weise, eds., Wired_Women: Gender and New Realities in Cyberspace (Seattle, Seal Press, 1996). For an excellent review, see Carmel Shute, “Women With Byte,” Australian Women’s Book Review 8(3), October, 1996, pages 8-10.

[xvii].      Some, of course, are already doing this in sophisticated ways. Margarat Grace, June Lennie, Leonie Daws, Lyn Simpson and Roy Lundin argue in Enhancing Rural Women’s Access to Interactive Communication Technologies (Interim Report, The Communication Centre, Queensland University of Technology, April 1997) that email is a soft technology, it can be led in appropriate directions given the appropriate context.  In their research, they have found that by guided moderation, by creating conditions in which community and connectedness can develop, email can be beneficial for all concerned.  Thus it is not just the technology but the cultural framework. In their case, they found that a community was created among rural women in Queensland, Australia.  While contentious issues where not swept away, they were raised in gentle ways, wherein women would “test the waters” to see if a certain behavior was ok with others. It was done in a way not to make others wrong but to learn from each other.  This is in contrast to many user groups, private email communication, wherein since the emotional, face-to-face dimensions are not visible, small issues lead to troublesome relationships, undoing rather than enhancing communication. The conclusion by Grace and others is that email, given appropriate moderation and an appropriate cultural contest (in this case a womanist framework) can be a medium that helps create a more communicative society, at least among rural women.

[xviii].     Barrie Sherman and Phil Judkins, Glimpses of Heaven, Visions of Hell: Virtual Reality and its Implications (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1992).  See chapter 14, “A New World for Women.”

[xix].       Comments given after the presentation of my paper on “Communication, information and the Net.” Paper presented at the “Women and the Net” UNESCO/SID meeting held in Santiago de Compostelo, Spain, May 20, 1997.  Wendy Harcourt is the principle organizer of this group. Lourdes Arzipe has provided the UNESCO leadership behing the women and the net project.

[xx].        Dale Spender quoted in Carmel Shute, “Women With Byte” page 9.

[xxi].       Ismail Serageldin in “Islam, Science and Values,” International Journal of Science and Technology, Spring 1996, 9(2), 1996, pages 100-114 compiles an impressive array of statistics.  “Items in the Library of Congress are doubling every 14 years and, at the rate things are going, will soon be developing every 7 years. …In the US, there are 55,000 trade books published annually. …The gap of scientists and engineers in North and South is vast with 3800 per million in the US and 200 per million in the South. … [Finally], currently a billion email messages pass between 35 million users, and the volume of traffic on the Internet is doubling every 10 months,” 100-101.  Of course, why anyone would want to count email messages is the key issue – as ridiculous would be to count the number of words said daily through talking, or perhaps even count the silence inbetween words.

[xxii].      Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1995), page 230. For a critical view of such claims, see the brilliant essay by Kevin Robins, “The new communications geography and the politics of optimism,” pages 199-210 in Danielle Cliche, ed., Cultural Ecology: the changing dynamics of communications (London, International Institute of Communications, 1997).

[xxiii].     Bill Gates, The Road Ahead (London, Viking, 1995), page 273 quoted in Kevin Robins, op cit. reference 22.

[xxiv].     Mark Pesche, “Proximal and Distal Unity.” Paper available at: http:www.hyperreal.com/~mpesce/pdu/html. Quoted in Duane Elgin and Coleen Drew, Global Consciousness Change: Indicators of an Emerging Paradigm (San Anselmo, California, The Millennium Project, 1997). See, in particular, pages 6-9 on the global consciousness and the Communications revolution. They are hopeful that the emerging global brain – signified by the ever increasing web of communication conducted through the internet – will achieve a critical mass and turn on (page 8). Writes Peter Russel, “Billions of messages continually shuttle back and forth, in an ever-growing web of communication, linking billions of minds of humanity into a single system,” page 8. See, Peter Russell, The Global Brain Awakens (Palo Alto, California, Global Brain, Inc, 1995).

[xxv].      Stated on the television show Sixty Minutes, Channel 9, Brisbane, Australia, March 16.

[xxvi].     While these are optimistic forecasts, Roar Bjonnes reports that according to The Nation Magazine “368 of the world’s richest pople own as much wealth as 40% of the world’s poor. In other words, 368 billionaires own as much as 2.5 billion poor people. Moreover, the trend is toward greater inequity with the “share of global income between the world’s rich and the world’s poor doubling from 30-1 in 1960 to 59 to 1, in 1989. The information revolution will have to be quite dramatic to reverse these figures. Email: Rbjonnes@igc.apc.org, 13 August 1995. Bjonnes is former editor of Commonfuture and Prout Journal.

[xxvii].    Staff, “The Future of Warfare,” The Economist (March 8, 1997), page 21.

[xxviii].    Ibid.

[xxix].     For more on this see: Sohail Inayatullah, “United We Drink: Inquiries into the Future of the World Economy and Society,” Papers De Prospectiva (April 1995), pages 4-31.

[xxx].      “Niue takes moral stand on sex lines,” The Courier-Mail (February 20, 1997), page 19.

[xxxi].     P.R. Sarkar, The Human Society (Calcutta, AM Publications, 1984), page 97.

[xxxii].    P.R. Sarkar, Problem of the Day (Ananda Nagar, India, AM Publications, 1959), page 3. The corporatist framework of the the new information technologies, of the information superhighway, removes them from state control and from people’s democratic control. “This technology legitimates the hegemony of corporate interests,” writes Kosta Gouliamos. See Kosta Gouliamos, “The information highway and the diminution of the nation-state,” page 182 in Danielle Cliche, Cultural Ecology, op cit.

[xxxiii].    Julie Stephens, “Running Interference: An Interview with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,”  Australian Women’s Books Review, 7(3/4), 1995, page 27.

[xxxiv].   For more on the silence of animals, that is how discourse silences them, see New Renaissance, 5(2), 1995. The focus of that issue is on the silence of the lambs.

[xxxv].    Of course, few Islanders have managed to maintain this level of purity. Rather, land has been sold to others for short term profits.  However, by selling land (and not using it to develop through agro-industries and manufacturing), Pacific Islands remain locked at the bottom of the world capitalist system.

[xxxvi].   For more on the communicative role of silence, see The Unesco Courier (May 1996). The issue focuses on the ontology of silence.

[xxxvii].   Email transmission from Acarya Abhidevananda Avadhuta. March 1997. On Ananda-net.

[xxxviii].  Anthony Spaeth, “@ the Web of Power,” Time (February 17, 1997), page 67.

[xxxix].   Christopher Darden, “Justice is in the Colour of the Beholder,” Time (February 17, 1997), pages 30-31.

[xl].         Sherry Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1996).

[xli].        Douglas Rushkoff, Children of Chaos (New York, HarperCollins, 1997).

[xlii].       “What’s happening in the global village,” Asian Mass Communication Bulletin 26(5), 1996, page 17. Also important is to note that “electricity is still not available for two billion people and many others have only intermittent access.” See, The Global Futures Bulletin, No. 38/39, July 1, 1997. Available on-line from the Institute of Global Futures Research, P.O. Box 683, NSW, 2022, Australia. igfr@peg.apc.org

[xliii].      Kathleen Grassel, “Mexico’s Zapatistas: Revolution on the Internet” New Renaissance (Vol. 7, No. 2, 1997, pages 22-23. They are just one example, hundreds of non-governmental organisation use the internet as a way to pressurize governments and corporations by making their policies more public. Email campaigns for world peace, to stop tortures of prisoners throughout the world or to save vegetarian orphanages as, for example, in Romania (on Ananda-net) where, for example, vegetarians sucessfully campaigned against a preliminary decision by a Romanian agency (Protection of Minors Agency) to close an award winning Ananda Marga school since it did not feed students dead/cooked animals ie meat. Inundated with faxes and letters from all around the world, including the entire gamut of vegetarian/health organisations, the Romanian agency relented. Whether this was because of the international nature of the pressure – because they did not want to be seen as parochial -or because of a change of heart towards dietary practices is not clear.

[xliv].      Zia Sardar, “Paper, printing and compact disks: the making and unmaking of Islamic culture,” Media, Culture and Society, 15, 1993, 56.

[xlv].       Although Kirpatrick Sale’s recent article makes this word now problematic. He argues that Ned Ludd’s effort were not simplistic attacks on technology but an understanding that the new technologies were increasing the power of the masters. “The Luddite idea has … flourished wherever technology has destroyed jobs, ruined lives and torn up communities.” Kirpatrick Sale, “Ned Ludd live!” New Internationalist, (286, December 1996), page 29. The entire issue is a must read. Ashis Nandy has taken a similar position in his essays sympathetic to the Gandhian critique of technology.

[xlvi].      For the problems and possibilities of this approach see, Ceees J. Hamelink, “Learning cultural pluralism: can the `Information Society’ help?” pages 24-43 in Danielle Cliche, Cultural Ecology.

Deconstructing the Information Era (1997)

By Sohail Inayatullah, 1997

Has The Future Arrived?

Many claim that with the advent of the web and internet, the future has arrived. The dream of an interconnected planet where physical labor becomes minimally important and knowledge creation becomes the source of value and wealth appears to now here. But perhaps the “cyber/information era” view of the future is overly linear, exponentially so, and forgetful that two-thirds of the world does not have a phone and much of the world lives over two hours from a phone connection.

While new technologies has speeded up time for the elite West and the elite in the non-West, for the majority of the world there is no information era.  Moreover, in the hyperjump to starspace, we have forgotten that while ideas and the spirit can soar, there are cyclical processes, such as the life and death of individuals, nations and civilisations that cannot be so easily transformed. There are more people making their living by processing ideas,[i]

Perhaps we are engaged in a non-productive pyramid scheme where we are getting further and further away from food production and manufacturing, building virtualities on virtualites until there is nothing there, as in advaita vedanta[ii] wherein the world is maya, an illusion.

The coming of the information era, ostensibly providing untold riches in bits of freedom for all, in fact limits the futures of others because it robs them of their future alternatives. Reality has become constructed as the worldwideweb, but perhaps this web is Max Weber’s iron cage – the future with no exit, wherein there is an inverse relationship between data and wisdom, between quick bytes and long term commitment, between engagement to technology and engagement with humans, plants and animals.  We know now from email culture that the twin dangers of immediacy and speed do not lead to greater community and friendship, rather they can lead to bitter misunderstandings.[iii]

Email then is perhaps not the great connector leading to higher levels of information but the great disconnector that gives the mirage of connection and community.  Email without occasional face to face communication can transform friendships into antagonistic relationships. Just as words lose the informational depth of silence, email loses information embedded in silence and face to face gestures.  The assimilation and reflection as well as the intuition and the insight needed to make sense of intellectual and emotional data are lost as the urgent need to respond to others quickens. Slow time, lunar time, women’s time, spiritual timeless time, cyclical rise and fall time and circular seasonal time are among the victims, leading to temporal impoverishment, a loss of temporal diversity where “21C” is for all instead of peculiar to Western civilisation.[iv]

Cybertechnologies thus create not just rich and poor in terms of information, but a world of quick inattentive time and slow attentive time. One is committed to quick money and quick time, a world where data and information are far more important than knowledge and wisdom.  Cybertechnologies not only create an information rich and poor but also an information quick and slow. Time on the screen is different from time spent gazing at sand in the desert or wandering in the Himalayas. Screen time does not slow the heart beat down relaxing one into the superconscious, rather we become lost in many bits, creating perhaps an era of accelerating information but certainly not a knowledge future or a future where the subtle mysteries of the world, the spiritual everpresent is felt.

This quickening of the self was anticipated by McLuhan in 1980.  “Excessive speed of change isolates already fragmented individuals. At the speed [speech] of light man has neither goals, objectives or private identity. He is an item in the data bank – software only, easily forgotten – and deeply resentful.[v]

Selves lose reflective space, jumping from one object to another, one Website to another, one email to another.  It is not a communicative world that will transpire but a world of selves downloading their emotional confusion onto each other.  Writes Zia Sardar, “Far from creating a community based on consensus, the information technologies could easily create states of alienated and atomised individuals, glued to their computer terminal, terrorising and being terrorised by all those whose values conflict with their own.”[vi] It is as if we have all become psychic with all thoughts interpenetrating creating a global schizophrenia.[vii]

THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD

But for cyber enthusiasts, new technologies give more choice. They reduce the power of Big business and Big State, creating a vast frontier for creative individuals to explore. “Cyberspace has the potential to be egalitarian, to bring everyone into a network arrangement. It has the capacity to create community; to provide untold opportunities for communication, exchange and keeping in touch.”[viii]

Cybertechnologies will allow more interaction creating a global ecumene. They create wealth, indeed, a jump in wealth.  The new technologies promise a transformational society where the future is always beckoning, a new discovery is yearly.[ix]

The oppressive dimensions of bounded identity – to nation, village, gender, culture – will all disappear as we move in and out of identities and communities.  It is the end of scarcity as an operating myth and the beginning of abundance, of information that wants to be free. The late 20th century is the demarcation from the industrial to the information/knowledge era. Progress is occurring now. Forget the cycle of rise and fall and life and death. That was but misinformation.

But while the growth data looks impressive and the stock of Microsoft continues upward, there are some hidden costs. For example, what of negative dimensions of the new technologies such as surveillance? Police in Brisbane, Australia use up to a 100 hidden cameras in malls to watch for criminal activities.[x]

Hundreds more are anticipated creating an electronic grid in central Brisbane. While this might be possibly benign in Brisbane (Aborigines might have different views though), imagining a large grid over Milosevic’s Yugoslavia or Taliban’s Afghanistan (or under Zia-ul Haq’s Pakistan where every “immoral” gaze would have led to arrest) it is enough to frighten the most fanatical techno-optimist. Or is it? Many believe that privacy issues will be forgotten dimensions of the debate on cyberfutures once we each have our own self-encryptors so that no one can read or enter us (the 21st century chastity belt). Technology will tame technology. Over time, the benefits of the new technologies will become global with poverty, homelessness and anomie all wiped out. All will eventually have access – even the poorest – as the billions of brains that we are, once connected, will solve the many problems of oppression.[xi]

While we have always imagined such a future, it is only now that technology allows it so.

While cyber-enthusiasts rightfully point to the opportunities of the one world created by new technologies. But they forget that the one world of globalism remains fundamentally capitalistic with the local (local economy and power over one’s future) increasingly being attacked. The tiny Pacific Island of Niue recently discovered that 10% of its national revenue was being sucked out through international sex-line services.[xii]

The information era as P.R. Sarkar points out is late capitalism, a system in which all other varnas – psycho-social classes and ways of knowing (the intellectual, the worker and the warrior)  – become the “boot lickers of the merchants.”[xiii]

And: “In order to accumulate more and more in their houses, they torture others to starvation … they suck the very living plasma of others to enrich the capabilities.”[xiv]

While intellectuals invent metaphors of postmodernity and post-industrialism, capital continues to accumulate unevenly, the poor become poorer and less powerful (however, they can now have a Website).  The information era still exists in the context of the world capitalist system – it is not an external development of it, and it will not create the contradictions that end it. The knowledge society or non-material society that many futurists imagine conveniently forgets humans’ very real suffering. But for virtual realities, we have virtual theories.

A REAL INFORMATION SOCIETY

Still, there are progressive dimensions to the new technologies. As Fatma Aloo of the Tanzanian Media Women’s Association argues, “They are a necessarily evil.”[xv]

Women and other marginalised groups must use and design them for their own empowerment or they will be further left out and behind.

What is needed then is the creation of a progressive information society. It would be a world sytem that was diverse in how it viewed knowledge, appreciating the different ways civilisations ordered the real.  It would not just be technical but emotional and spiritual as well and ultimately one that used knowledge to create better human conditions, to reduce dhukka (suffering) and realise moksa (spiritual liberation from the bonds of action and reaction). The challenge then is not just to increase our ability to produce and understand information but to enhance the capacity of the deeper layers of mind, particularly in developing the vijinanamaya kosa (where knowledge of what is eternal and temporal is realised).  Certainly, even though the Web is less rigid than a library, it is not the total information technology some assume – spiritual energies and shamanistic dissenting spaces cannot enter. Of course, underlying an alternative view of an information society is a commitment to prama or a dynamic equilibrium wherein internal/external and spiritual/material are balanced.

A GAIA OF CIVILISATIONS

We thus need to imagine and help create social spaces so the new technologies participate in and allow for the coming of a real global civilisation, a gaia of cultures. One where there is deep multi-culturalism, where the epistemologies of varied cultures – how they see self and other are respected – flourish.  To realise this, open communication and travel are necessary.  But certainly not enough.

What we also learn from other cultures is that the new electronic technologies are just one of the possible technologies creating world space. Indeed they just act at the most superficial levels. As important as cyberspace is microvita space or the noosphere being created through our world imaginations. Mystic P.R. Sarkar reminds us that behind our wilful actions is the agency of microvita – the basic substance of existence, which is both mental and physical, mind and body.  Microvita can be used by minds (the image of monks on the Himalayas sending out positive thoughts is the organising metaphor here, as is the Muslim prayer in unison throughout the world with direction and focus) to change the vibrational levels of humans, making them more sensitive to others, to nature and to the divine. And as Sheldrake reminds, as images and beliefs of one diverse world become more common it will be easier to imagine one world and live as one world, as a blissful universal family.  The Web then can participate in the historical decolonisation process giving power to communities and individuals in the overall context of global human, economic, environmental and cultural rights.

Or can it?

[i].          See, for example, William E. Halal, “The Rise of the Knowledge Entrepreneur,” The Futurist (November-December 1996), pages 13-16. Halal writes that in the US “Blue-collar workers should dwindle from 20% of the US work force in 1995 to 10% or less within a decade or two. …non-professional white-collar workers [will be reduced] from 40% to 20%-30%. The remaining 60%-70% or so of the work force may then be composed of knowledge workers. …meanwhile, productivity, living standards and the quality of life will soar to unprecedented levels,” page 13.

Also see, The Think Tank Directory in which it is reported that the number of think tanks have exploded from 62 in 1945 to 1200 in 1996. For more information on this email: grs@cjnetworks.com or write 214 S.W. 6th Avenue, Suite 301, Topeka, KS 66603, USA.

[ii].          One of the six schools of classical Indian philosophy. Only Brahman, the supreme consciousness, is postulated as real. Everything else is but an illusion – maya.

[iii].         See, S.C Gwynne and John F. Dickerson, “Lost in the E-Mail,” Time (April 21, 1997), pages 64-66.  They report on the dangers in businesses when bosses use email to berate employees, creating considerable ill-will and inefficiencies. Email exports the anger of the sender to the receiver. Diane Morse Houghten writes that “E-mail leaves a lot of blank spaces in what we say, which the recipient tends to fill with the most negative interpretation” (page 65).

To avoid sending the wrong message, four rules are suggested: “(1) Never discuss bad news, never criticize and never discuss personal issues over email. And if there’s a chance that what you say could be taken the wrong way, wlakd down the hall to discuss it in person or pick up the phone” (page 66).

[iv].         For more on the temporal hegemony, particularly in the construction of the 21st century as neutral universal timing instead of as particular to the West, see Sohail Inayatullah, “Listening to Non-Western Perspectives” in David Hicks and Richard Slaughter, eds, 1998 Education Yearbook (Kogan Page, 1998).

[v].         Marshall McLuhan quoted in New Internationalist special issue titled, “Seduced by Technology: The human costs of computers” New Internationalist, 286, December 1996, page 26.

[vi].         Zia Sardar, “The future of democracy and human rights,” Futures, 28(9), November, 1996, page 847.

[vii].        Sohail Inayatullah, “Frames of Reference, The Breakdown of the Self and the Search for Reintegration” in Eleonora Masini and Yogesh Atal, eds. The Futures of Cultures (Bangkok, Unesco, 1993).

[viii].       Dale Spender quoted in Carmel Shute, “Women With Byte” page 9.

[ix].         Ismail Serageldin in “Islam, Science and Values,” International Journal of Science and Technology, Spring 1996, 9(2), 1996, pages 100-114 compiles an impressive array of statistics.  “Items in the Library of Congress are doubling every 14 years and, at the rate things are going, will soon be developing every 7 years. …In the US, there are 55,000 trade books published annually. …The gap of scientists and engineers in North and South is vast with 3800 per million in the US and 200 per million in the South. … [Finally], currently a billion email messages pass between 35 million users, and the volume of traffic on the Internet is doubling every 10 months,” 100-101.  Of course, why anyone would want to count email messages is the key issue – as ridiculous would be to count the number of words said daily through talking, or perhaps even count the silence inbetween words.

[x].         Stated on the television show Sixty Minutes, Channel 9, Brisbane, Australia, March 16.

[xi].         While these are optimistic forecasts, Roar Bjonnes reports that according to The Nation Magazine “368 of the world’s richest pople own as much wealth as 40% of the world’s poor. In other words, 368 billionaires own as much as 2.5 billion poor people. Moreover, the trend is toward greater inequity with the “share of global income between the world’s rich and the world’s poor doubling from 30-1 in 1960 to 59 to 1, in 1989. The information revolution will have to be quite dramatic to reverse these figures. Email: Rbjonnes@igc.apc.org, 13 August 1995. Bjonnes is former editor of Commonfuture and Prout Journal.

[xii].        “Niue takes moral stand on sex lines,” The Courier-Mail (February 20, 1997), page 19.

[xiii].       P.R. Sarkar, The Human Society (Calcutta, AM Publications, 1984), page 97.

[xiv].       P.R. Sarkar, Problem of the Day (Ananda Nagar, India, AM Publications, 1959), page 3.

[xv].        Personal Comments to the author, Santiago de Compostelo, Spain, May 20, 1997.

Alternative Futures of Korea: Beyond the Litany (1996)

By Sohail Inayatullah[1]

Final days but hedge your bets

In Papua New Guinea, farmers are refusing to plant numerous crops, convinced that the world will end in two years. In the year 2000, when the world will not end, not only will they face humiliation, they will face starvation.

Lee Jan-Rim, 44, leader of Mission for Coming Days, was sentenced to two years for swindling $4.4 million form his followers.  It was one of several sects to predict that the world would end in October, 1992.  Lee, however, had bought large amounts of bonds and maturities that extended beyond the October 28 date which was to mark the end of civilisation.

Either Lee was practicing alternative futures or hedging his bets. 20,000 Koreans were caught up in this doomsday craze. Several killed themselves and others deserted their homes, schools and jobs.

The future matters

The future does matter, we constantly act on our views of the future.

Another obvious example is the world economy, our explicit and implicit belief in progress, in the upward rise of economies leads us to invest in certain ways.  When things do not quite turn out the way we envision, fear results.

While few believe they can predict the future, there is general agreement that

(1)        One can often discern emerging issues or trends;

(2)        One can predict the future by creating it, by colonising it;

(3)        Unless one interrogates the future, unless one decolonises the future, others will control and create it;

(4)        A range of alternative futures, scenarios can be posited, which can (a) bound and reduce uncertainty, (b) provide a distance from the present and thus allow for the creation of a new present.

Future generations

In recent times, the study of the future has undergone a tremendous transformation through the paradigm of future generations studies. Instead of predictive-technical concerns, the approach is focused on the

  1. (1)        Family, particularly the extended family,
  2. (2)        Time is seen as repeatable, as cyclical – taking care of ancestors is thus considered critical seen they have ensured that present generations are alive – the future in this sense is very much past based, and not linear as in conventional Western futures
  3. (3)        As important as ancestors are futurecestors or future generations
  4. (4)        The moral/ethical basis of what the future can or might be like are crucial.
  5. (5)        Moral leadership is seen as central in creating a different future

This type of futures studies I believe will be far closer to the East Asian sensibility. Part of the lack of the growth of thinking about the future has been that it has been located in narrow economistic readings and power based international relations perspectives – ie only state configured futures and scenarios are real, issues of culture, gender, myth are avoided.

But future generations thinking allows us to consider the future of the family, the role of cyclicity in human and social systems, the role of the wise leader, and the role of ethics/morality in creating desired futures.

Research on the future of Korea

The literature on the futures of Korea is surprisingly not immense. Whereas a web search  (through yahoo, hotbot and excite) normally lead to dozens to thousands of findings, entering the phrase “the futures of korea” leads to nothing.

A search in the literature in futures studies leads to similar results.

The type of articles that do appear only use the 21st century as an inspiring signifier or forecast narrow and short term economic trends.

There is a UNESCO report titled Korea 2000 but that too is mostly concerned with immediate trends.

Papers on south korea in general focus on economic trends, pointing to growth in its economy, its rise from underdeveloped nation to industrialised nation, all in one generation, with Japan’s present as South Korea’s likely future.

There exists an implicit view of the future of Korea. It is based on the belief that the following: Unification will occur; Korea will continue to development economically, becoming a fully developed nation in not to distant future.  The key to creating a bright future is hard word, strong family ties, sacrifice for the nation or collectivity and han – both as beauty and as resentment against the other. Finally, there is a belief that the future can be modern without being western – there can be an asian way to progress.

Scenarios of Korea’s Futures

Of peculiar interest is a paper by international relations writer Susmit Kumar[2] – quoting the director of the CIA, Kumar argues for three scenarios for the future of North Korea. (1) Peaceful existence, (2) Explosion and (3) Implosion.

The first scenario is the most hopeful and the dream of South Koreans and possibly many North Koreans. The issues in this scenario that are to be resolved are largely economic. They include the following questions: Will the south be willing to allow economic investment in the north if it became too obviously exploitative of wage differentials?  Can the south live with the enslavement of relatives for 10‑20 years `while living standards approach those in the south’?

In the second scenario, North Korea explodes onto South Korea, leading to a full scale war, the devastation of Seoul, and concluding with the total annihilation of North Korea – its removal from the world geographical map.

In the third implosion scenario, the current crisis expands to the degree where the state breaks down and South Korea takes over. The costs to south korea will be high.  Kumar write that it will not follow the West Germany/East germany model since North Koreans have no knowledge of the outside world, or even other parts of their own country. But while many believe, the costs will be too difficult for the south korean, the Confucian “nature” and idea of extended family will make sacrificing for the long term more bearable.

Keun Lee, professor of Seoul National University writes that unification will have to be a slow process – partial unification (some type of federation), economic integration and then complete unification. He calls this the soft landing scenario. He believes this will take about 15 years or so.[3]

Other shorter editorial pieces point to the changing nature of the Korean political- economy – more transparency, more democracy, less corruption, to mention the more obvious trends, and the problems associated with moving to a more western culture. However, these perspectives, more than say anything about the future, say more about the present.

Indeed, the entire unification discourse is very much about the present.  There is already a growing army of political scientists and government officials trying to deal with the nuts and bolts of unification, however, what is not asked is: what will Koreans from the south do when their distant cousins from Pyongyang appear on their doorstep one morning, unannounced.

World futures

Part of the problem in thinking about “out of the box” scenarios is being overly focused on trends.  I argue that we need to take a grander historical perspectives. We need to take  a step back and (1) locate this speculation within a model of forecasting and (2) locate korea’s futures within broader world futures.

At the World Futures level, the most important trend or scenario is that of an asian renaissance led partly through the economic miracle but also through the leadership of ecumenical thinkers as Anwar Ibrahim.[4] He and many others take a perspective of critical traditionalism. They imagine an Asian Century but are not committed to modernism, rather they see religious tradition as the centre point for a postmodern non-european world.  They also do not have an emotional gut reaction against the West or indeed, against any particular civilisation as they have not undergone any personal trauma.  They remain committed to creating a new future that is not a simplistic reaction to the West nor do they play identity politics with dogmatic traditionalists/nationalists.

The counter to this scenario is deep social maldevelopment – as in the case of Thailand, leading to an asian schizophrenia.[5] In this scenario, the costs of hyperdevelopment – loss of tradition, move from traditional society to postmodern society – are internalised.  Identity is no longer anchored, there is nothing to hold on to, only inferiority towards the West and towards others. The result is violence towards others and when that is difficult, violence towards the self and weaker societal members, nature, women and children.

Some questions that can be derived from this scenario include the following.  They are offered by Professor Jay Lewis.[6] What are the costs of the antidote offered by excessive narcissistic nationalism?  Does an over emphasis on `Korea first and best’ lead to distortions in relations with other nations?  Can we expect that the Korean identity is already so strong that we need not worry about schizophrenia, but rather, free people to engage with the emerging world cultures and give them creative license to develop new contributions that are not strictly Korean but hybrid, such as we’re seeing already in fashion?  Is that where the future Korean Nobel Prizes are to be found?

A third scenario is based on the rise of China, not just another market player, but the biggest player in human history. Jay Lewis,[7] asks the following. How will Korea’s world view, its security position, its manufacturing (including sources of leading, value-added technologies) and trading strategies change when China is the largest manufacturing and consuming market in the world?  Will Korea (say, reunified) be willing to `offer tribute’ to China?  Will sadae (`serving the greater’ or paying ostensible tribute to a hegemonic power to pacify it and keep it out of your domestic affairs) re-emerge as Korean policy towards China?  What will that mean for Korea’s relationship with the rest of the world?  Will China’s economic hegemony produce a cultural hegemony?  What would that look like and what would be Korea’s role in that hegemony?  Would it be similar to its traditional role of taking Chinese culture and fashioning something even better or at least purer? Where is the Korean identity then?

In contrast, Professor of Urban Planning, Karl Kim argues that the road to peace, to peaceful reform is through China – the north-south border is too militarized and in a cold war vise – through projects such as the Tumen River project. Unfortunately the US needs a militarized North Korea so that it can keep its own military there.

The fourth scenario is perhaps overly influenced by the current crisis – it is the collapse and the transformation of the world capitalist system and a return to more localised economies where growth is more nature based, more local based, more concerned with meeting basic rights – housing, food, identity and less with the dazzle of bigger is better.  This is a localised world at the economic level and a globalized world at the political level – at the level of governance.  Given this possibility, what will happen to Korea Inc. then?

Beyond the litany

While scenarios reveal horizontal space, they do not give us insight into levels of reality. To do so, we need to move outside of the litany of forecasts. My own method is less to forecast the future and more to create spaces within current discourse to open up the future to alternatives.[8]

(1)        Litany – economic trends and in Korea’s case the vision of surpassing Japan as well as unification.

(2)        Social levels – social and cultural development – issues of social cohesion, education, health (diet, alcohol, cigarettes)

(3)        Worldview – will the idea of Korea change – ie how will it redefine itself – also what is the role of confucianism, shamanism, buddhism and christianity.

(4)        Myth and Metaphor. What is the significance of Han and other central metaphors[9] Will `han’ be used as a reactionary concept that might lead to exclusivism and xenophobia just when Koreans need more contact, openness, and interaction?  What are some other metaphors that differently define Korea’s futures.

Another very important point here is to remind ourselves of how an absurd future can quickly become an obvious one (the fall of communism being the obvious overused one) and how a desired future can become a nightmare.  Dator writes in his work on the futures of Korea that since the unification of Germany, Korean unification is seen more fearfully now ie since North Korea is far poorer.

And even more significantly, what is not thought of, is after unification – what then, what will and should be the desired image propelling us forward. To move forward, we need to go deeper, into worldview and myth and metaphor.

Deep transformations

Tae-chang Kim,[10] a leading korean futurist, believe that the most important way to understand the futures of korea is to not focus on the surface level, but at the deep transition Korea and other asian nations are part of – this is the post-postmodern shift.

This includes a questioning of:

1. Westernism (and favoring the non-West)

2. Monism (and favoring an ecology of faiths)

3. Rationalism (and favoring humanism)

4. Centrism (and favoring the peripheries)

5. Logicism (and favoring values)

6. Anthropocentrism (and favoring the environment)

7. Patriarchy (and favoring gender balance and cooperation)

8. Technologism (and favoring human creativity and innovation).

While Kim sees Confucianism as the wave of the future – ie as the vision of the future he favors, he is quick to point out that the treatment of women is its achilles heal. Lewis argues that equally damaging is its conservatism and willingness to sacrifice present and future generations to preserve the past.  A living sage is not nearly as important as a dead one.

In my own work on dramatic trends changing the future, I focus on four epistemic changes.[11] These are (1) changes in reality (with the drivers being advances in virtual reality,  and postmodernism), (2) changes in nature (with the drivers being advances in genetics and poststructural thought critical of essentialism), (3) changes in truth (with the drivers being deep civilizational multiculturalism, feminism, and the discovery of the other) and (4) changes in sovereignty (with the drivers being global capitalism and cultural capitalism).

These interrelated epistemic changes, I believe, are more important than global demographic changes in favor of the Third World; globalism in favor of capital; and environmental destruction created by presentism; the delinking of the financial economy with the real economy; among other megetrends.  The obvious question is how will these trends impact the futures of Korea? What will Korea look like in a postmodern world? Or can Korea leapfrog this end stage of modernity and offer a non-exploitive Confucian/global ethics?  These and other similar questions remain pivotal if we are to gain any understanding the complexity of the future ahead of us.

Macrohistory and macrofutures

Lastly and most importantly, we need to look at the deep waves of the past, the patterns of history.[12]  They can help structure the trends we see creating the future ie the contour what is possible.

(1)        World systems perspectives would see East Asia as the new centre with the new technologies creating the next long wave of growth (through genetic, nano and other technologies)

(2)        Sarkar sees history as the rise and fall of particular ways of knowing – these include the worker, the warrior, the intellectual and the merchant. History moves through each era, and then the cycle ends when there is a worker revolution at the end of the merchant era.  But instead of leading to a classless society, the cycle keeps on moving.  In Korean history, this is evidenced by the ancient era of communal living, when wealth accumulation was difficult.  The ksattriyan era came about with the rise of the first states and their unification in the 7th century when dynamic and authoritarian leadership was the only way to achieve military success. The vipra domnation was from the 7th-19th centuries when unification was not in question. The warrior classes were diaparaged and buddhism and then neo-confucianism were central. In this century, this has led to the merchant worldview which while bringing untold riches have also barbarized the other classes.

Next then for Sarkar is the shudra era, with a return to collective/cooperative     ownership.  Most likely this will come about through a global depression and      linked environmental disastors. In contrast to this historical dynamic, Eisler             focuses on gender and power.

(3)        Eisler sees history as a pendulum of dominatorship and partnership. For her, Asian cultures are now moving out of their dominator mode and entering a world where women and men work in partnership together. There is of course just a nascent movement, but within 50 years, it should be the main wave.

The importance of these perspectives is they give us a much broader brush to imagine and think about the future – they give us new variables and a new shape of the future instead of just the linear arrow of progress.  They give us the cycle and the pendulum.  They also do not reinforce the hierarchy of nations worldview.  For example, part of current Korean future thinking is the goal of surpassing Japan.  However, this reinforces the idea that the future of another country represents one’s own present, either it has to be followed as in development thinking or somehow surpassed, in either case, the future is fixed – nation-centred and without authentic creativity.

Thus in thinking about the future, we need to not only create alternative scenarios in horizontal space but as well vertical scenarios, that move from the litany to the myth level.

Conclusion

Essentially these tools are to help us not just forecast the future but to imagine a different future.

Certainly if Lee Jan-Rim took such an eclectic view of time and the future, he would not be in prison today. He might argue instead that the world will not come to end, even if we are in the final days of the modern world.

What is needed:

Primary research on: images Koreans have of the future; empirical forecasts/expert forecasts of the future; group visioning exercises – empirical and interpretive research on Korea’s futures.


Notes

[1].         Sohail Inayatullah is senior research fellow at the Communication Centre, Box 2434, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, 4001. Tel: 617-3864-2192. Fax: 617-3864-1813. Email: S.inayatullah@qut.edu.au.  This speech was prepared for the conference, Understanding Korea Society and Culture, Korea Studies Centre, University of Auckland, November 18-19, 1997.

[2].         Susmit Kumar, “North Korea’s Fragile State,” Global Times (July/August, 1987), 27-33.

[3].         Keun Lee, “South and North Economic Integration and New Economic System for the Unified Korea,” in National Development Strategies Toward the 21st Century and Choices for Korea (Seoul, NDI, 1997).

[4].         See Anwar Ibrahim, The Asian Renaissance. Singapore, Time Books, 1997.

[5].         For more on this, see Sohail Inayatullah, “Frames of Reference, The Breakdown of the Self, and the Search for Reintegration” in Eleonora Masini and Yogesh Atal, eds., The Futures of Asian Cultures. Bangkok, Unesco, 1993.

[6].         Email Transmission, October 29, 1997 from Jay Lewis, Oriental Institute, Oxford.

[7].         Email transmission, November, 1, 1997.

[8].         See, Sohail Inayatullah, “Methods and Epistemologies in Futures Studies,” The Knowledge Base of Futures Studies, Vol. 1. Melbourne, Futures Study Centre, 1996, 187-203.

[9].         Han is a difficult term to translate into English as its meaning has not undergone extensive analysis.  Its definition is continuously evolving and the meaning of han remains controversial.  Nevertheless, han has been translated in numerous ways: for example, it has been seen as resentment, lamentation, hatred, and regret.  According to the noted professor of Women’s Studies and Korean Literature, Kim Yong-suk, the fundamental factors that contribute to han can be grouped into five: (1) predominance of men over women and the way of samjong ; (2) inequality of education; (3) emphasis on virtue in women and prohibition of remarriage; (4) concubinage; and (5) the kisaeng system.

Han is more than merely the lack of fulfillment in an unhappy situation.  Han can also bring delight or joy in an unhappy situation.  Han is like an instrument which transcends grief, which comforts oneself.

[10].       Tae-Chang Kim, “Toward a New Theory of Value for the Global Age,” in Tae-Chang Kim and Jim Dator, eds., Creating a New History for Future Generations. Kyoto, Institute for the Integrated Study of Future Generations, 1995, 319-342.

[11].       See, for example, Sohail Inayatullah, “Islamic Responses to Emerging Scientific, Technological and Epistemological Transformations,” Social Epistemologies (Vol. 10, No. 3/4, 1996), 331-349

[12].       See Johan Galtung and Sohail Inayatullah, Macrohistory and Macrohistorians. Westport, Praeger, 1997.

The Urban Imagination (1996)

By Sohail Inayatullah
May 1996
“The Urban Imagination,” Edges (Vol. 3, No. 4, 1991); expanded and reprinted in New Renaissance (Vol. 2, No, 3, 1991).

CONSTRUCTING THE CITY

The city is constructed in numerous ways. In the modern view, a city is defined by its civic culture; urban planners focus on the architecture and infrastructure of a city. Others believe a city must have an economic exchange system and a system of authority and governance to be called a city. Modern American cities are largely defined by energy systems and by consumption patterns: the car and the shopping mall. From the geographical view, cites emerge as the number of individuals on a given territory increase. They must find ways to negotiate food, power, wealth, and personal and impersonal relationships. How the city comes to be organized is based on these negotiations. Moreover, cities reflect and are constituted by the cultures and worldviews that create them. For example, American culture defines the city as a place one transports to for work or pleasure but one does not live there. American cities also exhibit expansion and decline unlike Asian cities which continue to expand and European cities which because of high energy costs have found ways to retain the old ancient city and new development. American cities emerged as part of America’s colonization of the frontier while Asian cities have historically been the foci of polity, economy and culture. In recent US history the construction of the city has gone through various stages, from the City Beautiful (designed around large government buildings), to the City Efficient (concern with sewage systems, water and other basic needs) to the City Radical (the city and its social and human consequences).

Another way to understand the city is by its relationship to its opposite, the rural. Historically the city is the center, the rural the periphery (the city consumes the rural produces). History is the history of the city for that is what remains, that is what archeologists find, moreover, history shows the future the grandness of past human efforts. But this grandness is based on finding ways to appropriate wealth from those that produce goods and grow food. This is done either through tributary coercive systems in military states, by ideological systems when power is concentrated in priests or through exchange systems such as capitalism. In either case, the city exists because of the rural and because of the ability of those in the city to appropriate this wealth from workers and peasants.

POSTMODERN VIEWS

In the emerging postmodern view, important not only is how the city appropriates wealth but also how the city obfuscates its location in our technocratic discourses. In this view the city is not constructed as a place that creates policy rather the city is in itself a policy, in itself a way of organizing the world, indeed of knowing the world. The city then more than anything is a space, a configurement of power, values and more importantly ways constructing the world. However, most often we see the city as a fixed place that produces politics (in places like city hall, in ghettos) instead of a place that is politics. The city then is a practice: a changing set of values, ways of organizing, and structures that emerge and disappear. For us this is difficult to see for we rarely see the city, its boundaries are wholly present to us and thus unable for analysis. Only when we distance ourselves from the city can we see our categories, our city spaces. We can do this by tracing the history of cities: to see how a particular city developed in one way rather than another (because of geographical factors, because of sackings from invaders, because of the local and regional economy or because of the religious culture). We can also do this be examining the structure of a city: what functions does it serve?

Honolulu, for example, is divided into recreation spaces (beaches and parks), an industrial zone that produces wealth (Waikiki), shopping consumer zones, a range of living zones broken down by affordability or class, government and business areas (downtown), natural reserves, and garbage spaces. One’s situation within the political economy of wealth is based on living either on the hills or on the beach (in a house not as a homeless beach person). Alternatively in a religious culture, the city is defined not by tourism (physical beauty and leisure activities) but by other places of congregation: shrines, temples and mosques. Again, in the emerging postmodern view of cities, the effort is not to see these categories as natural but to show how they have emerged, to ask how the categories we use to talk about the city have historically changed, and how cities are reflections of civilizational worldviews. For example, in medieval times, the emerging mercantilists existed outside the city–they were the traders–it is only later when capital accumulation took center stage that they moved inside the city. With the traders now inside, the military was forced outside of the city, as a kind of a modern day wall. Historically, security and sovereignty too have changed.

Once a city was defined by its wall, protecting against trade and ideas: the modern city no longer has these walls (electronic technology and the car have made this idea remote). Indeed the modern city is abstract: created by economic and media forces. By virtue of this abstraction, the modern city searches for an identity (the “I love New York” buttons or “I love Islamabad” t-shirts, and marketing slogans such as “the Gateway between North and South America” the “Crossroads of the Pacific” and “Most Liveable City”) is an attempt to regain community, a collective “we”. However, the reality is that there is no such community; indeed, the trend across large cities irrespective or culture is the remedievalization of the city with community defined by security systems, with private security agencies guarding plush areas and other areas identified through the color of the gangs that roam them. Security not abstract identity once again has become central in defining the city.

KHALDUN AND SPENGLER: THE MORAL DISCOURSE

But this is what the ancients predicted would happen with the city. For them the way to undertand the city is not by the political or the economic or the social ways of seeing the world but by the moral discourse. For Islamic philosopher Ibn Khaldun, there are two types of culture that are at near opposites; the nomadic and the city. One has values of bravery, morality, unity, strong kinship ties, and respect for parental authority, while the other has cowardice, fragmentation, economic ties and individuality. But once the nomadic gains power and wealth, once the size of the tribe increases then new relationships emerge; the values of the rural breakdown. Old loyalities disappear, there is fighting within the dyansty, and with each new crises, the legitimacy of the body that governs the city weakens and the nomadic spirit that created the city disintegrates. The culture then declines and the invaders march in.

For Oswald Spengler, in the beginning there is culture but as cities become megalopolises culture degenerates into “civilization”. Culture begins not with nomadic struggle but with the awakening of a great soul. As cities develop, power becomes concentrated into the hands of two classes the nobility and the priests. Eventually however a capitalist class emerges and urban values replace agricultural ones. Money emerges victorious over traditional values and landed property. In culture, democracy is controlled by the intellect, in the megalopolis, in “civilization”, it is money that buys votes. It is the money spirit that forces the civilization to expand, for cities to become bigger cities. Eventually the mass develops. At this stage, Spengler, who follows the classic model of birth, adolescence, adulthood, senility and death, concludes that death is but near, the culture has lost its conviviality and creativity its spirituality. Instead of folk, there is but mob. Power now becomes concentrated in rude force: the city is in its final days, only a few can remember the brilliance of the past, the city but now provides panems and circuses.

William Irwin Thompson finds these two visions of space as part of an unchanging historical pattern. “When one believes in an alternative
vision of history … he is stepping outside the city to see a pastoral vision in which the office building and the universities do not obscure the archaic stars … Those left behind in the city define themselves as responsible and sane and see the wanderer as a madman. The wanderer defines himself as the only sane person in a city of the insane and walks out in search of other possibilities. All history seems to pulse in this rhythm of urban view and pastoral visions.” (Thompson, 152-153, 1971)

If these visions of the city appear obvious to us now, it is because they have inflitrated our gazes making them folk wisdom. Moreover, they capture traditional dichotomies. They also point to the structurual difficultes in creating alternative futures for the city. While green activitists and efforts by Richard Register in Ecocity: Berkeley argue for creative cities where the communal and the spiritual is possible in the city properly designed, Leopold Kohr taking the structural view reminds us that it is size that engenders the problems of urbanization. Others such as Mark Satin, speaking for the American counter cultural movement, have based their entire theory of New Age Politics on this variable arguing against what he calls the “big city outlook” (patriarchy, centralization, bureaucratization, corporatization).

THE IMAGINED MODERN ASIAN CITY

But cities do attract people. In rural Asian villages, cities are places of necessity, once debt forces the selling of land or bad harvests force migration. They are also the places of imagination. Anything is possible in the city: wealth, sex, power; new relationships. The city person goes to the village in search of solace, in search of a past, of community, of an old rhythm. But those in the village yearn for the luxury of paved roads, of freedom from the oppressive family structure, of links with the global and release from the confines of the eyes of the neighbor.

For these in the megacity the community and stability of the village attracts, while those in the village long for the freedom of the city. For those in the village, the city represents wealth, bureaucracy and the official discourse of power. In the village morality is easier to control: one does not need police or laws, mere ostracism is enough. However, villages can become fiefdoms where there are no checks and balances for power: landlords have executive, legislative and judicial powers. In the city, this power stranglehold does breakdown with the emergence of the government bureaucracy and the entrepreneurial classes. At the same time, those in the village know that the city represents the breakdown of the natural order of “man” and environment; thus even as the city attracts it repulses.

Nonetheless, having a magnificent city is among the prerequisites of modernity. In the linear theory of social evolution, a city must have a sports stadium (to show that humans as producers of games have been transformed into consumers of sports, that is money is now involved and victory over other nation-states near and far is possible) fine roads (preferably without cow dung lining them), a university (where universal and hegemonic knowledge displaces shamanistic folk wisdom), and grand shopping centers (replacing the unmediated marketplace of sellers and buyers to the mediated shopping malls wherein city space becomes merchandizing space representing affluence and “choice”). The city is then the official tribute to the dominant materialist way of understanding the world: through exchange and capital at present, in other epochs through religion and priests, and through expansion and military power. However in all eras the city represents humans and their efforts to conquer and dominate the environment.

The city is a category in the march of time and in the city, time itself, changes. Cities speed up time; indeed they are designed so as to catch up with those who are ahead in time. Village time is slow time, seasonal time, mythological time and ancestral time (where ancestors are still alive, guiding our movements as with the Maori and Australian Aboriginal). Village time is also future generational time in that land is scarce and the livelihood of future generations must be planned for, thought about. Of course, the traditional plan has been to move to the city to a place where time is faster, where there are not only more people but more activities, where more wealth generation is possible. City time is also electric time, where the mythological power of the moon is reversed, and city lights enthrall our senses.

In the city, time is planned time, it is organized time; seasonal time, mythological time and generational time have less currency. To mobilize and organize and to laborize (the work day and the work hour) large amounts of people there must be agreement as to time, thus the clock not the moon or the sun or the leaves falling off the tree.

The city then is an apt metaphor for linear economic development. Just as in modernity the village must be transformed into the city (but parts of it miniaturized either in the museum, or in the fables of writers), Third World nations must be transformed into modern nations (and their exotic or primitive culture miniaturized for display).

Each Third World country aspires for this vision. Pakistan created Islamabad to be its modern city. Islamabad with the aid of the interventionists of history, the Ford Foundation and other liberal escort agencies, was entirely planned. There was a residental area, a university area, a diplomatic area, a bureaucratic area, and a retail area. However, no place was planned for the poorer classes, for they would not be needed in this technocratic enterprise: instead of sweepers (a central job in Pakistan’s hierarchy) there would be vacuum cleaners. But the enormous size of Islamabad’s houses, the dust that is Pakistan, and the cost of vaccum cleaners, added with inexpensive labor led to a high demand for sweepers. But with no place to live, sweepers built their own houses with dirt and mud. But these katchi abadis (soft residences) were an eyesore to city planners so remembering the medieval days of the fort, a pucka abadis (hard wall) was built around the sweepers. Even Islamabad which attempts to escape the poverty of Pakistan finds that the other as sweeper, its past, returns within its center.

Islamabad is also interesting for another reason. It has no culture, no history, no sense of place. There are no bazaars or Moghul architecture like in Lahore; there are no places to consume high art and fashion as in Karachi; there is no feeling of identity. And yet how can it have culture: created by technocrats, and midwifed by bureaucrats who desire to escape, to but reinscribe their walls of bureaucracy on to the city. But culture can be thought of as other then history or place or community; culture is also as Ashis Nandy writes: resistence. The village sweepers in this example are that resistence, the hidden culture that cannot be extinquished, the counter culture to the official culture of diplomats and bureaucrats. And yet, as the rest of Pakistan disintegrates from ethnic and geo political battles, it is Islamabad that remains secure and safe. For now. It is disconnected in time and place, thus the attraction to Islamabad and naturally the repulsion one might feel when there.

Singapore, too, is a city which has managed to claim entrance into the modern world, largely through its Pacific Rim generated wealth. Under the leadership of the stern father Lee Kwan Yew , it too has managed to domesticate culture, it too has managed to create a replica of the scrubbed clean house, one where diversity and wildness all but disappear. But this is too harsh. After a few weeks in South Asia where the wildness of warring ethnic groups, of water shortages of electric brownouts, of traffic anarchy, of roads not numbered sequentially, and of a life by bribery consume one’s rationality, Singapore appears like a modern haven. Confucian culture with its respect of authority and hierarchical relations are indeed welcome when compared to the democratic anarchy that is South Asia. South Asian cities have more freedom (driving on any side of the road is optional for while there are laws, there is no way to enforce them) but Singapore is more efficient.

Contrast this with rapidly developing Third World cities: Los Angeles or New York or London. Reversing traditional patterns, these cities have the core as low-wage labor intensive and the outskirts as high-finance intensive. These latter day cities remind us that cities like civilizations do decay and disaggregate; that history is not linear but full of reversals and betrayals, cycles and seasons; the linear model of modernity cannot explain the decline of the city except by blaming it as an infestation from the outside, from the barbaric. But cities can have many ethnicities and be rich, as Singapore shows us; and while race is a predictor of poverty it is not a cause of poverty or decline, rather these factors must be placed on the hierarchical structure of capitalism itself (real estate speculation and trickle down theories, for example). It is not immigrants that cause the decline of a city but rather the association of certain spaces with low-wage labor and the inability of government to provide these sites with necessary infrastructure. Part of this inability can be explained by the actual poverty cycle in these low-income areas (where community breaks down) and partly by their mental construction by city leaders as places of and for the poor.
But this decline of the city was not the vision of the modernists.

The 1964 World’s Fair did not imagine multicultural cities rather the city was the site of efficiency and technology. The American television series The Jetsons best exemplifies this vision. This is the high-tech/one culture model. The Fred Flinstone vision is remarkably similar although set in prehistoric times. Contrast this with Blade Runner (or more recently Strange Days) which extrapolates present Los Angeles and ends up with a unruly city, with multiple cultures (human and android) and high-technology. This vision is far more likely then the vision of the future as the electronic cottage, the electronic village; rather the future will more likely be the electronic city, the Los Angelization of the world.

THE SPIRITUAL/ECOLOGICAL CITY

Alternatively, there is the ecological vision. Here the city is designed for low energy use, the car is made problematic as it damages the enviornment. In addition, size and distance are critical. Ivan Illich, for example, has argued that after a certain velocity in transportation systems, social justice and equity decrease. Eco-cities are thus designed to create possibilities for closeness, wherein the group (kin or work) is the prime unit of identification. In terms of recent exemplary designs, there is Ananda Nagar, the abode of Endless Bliss. This city is designed by the late P.R. Sarkar on ancient sacred site wherein individuals gained enlightenment. Sarkar takes the ancient Tantric worldview (as modernized by his social movements Ananda Marga and PROUTist Universal) and constructs city spaces to reflect the values of spirituality, global/local community, economic democracy, and multi-culturalism.

Ananda Nagar is an ecological city intended to regenerate the rural economy. As other intended communities it is meant to be self-sufficient (through and interlinking of education and soft energy economic wealth creation projects). It also has sancutaries for animals and rare plants. Instead of a huge dams there are shallow ponds which restore the environment, thus anticipating the global water crisis. Streets are named after scientists and philosophers: Einstein, Gandhi, Tagore, Shakespeare to mention a few. This is an example of a city that is culture: it represents global spiritual culture. It is different from cities developed by other social movements in that is meant to revitalize an impoverished area by creating self-reliance and self-sufficiency, solving the problems of water and poverty as opposed to finding a home for a monoculture of those with a similar worldview (although certainly the city is a monument to its founder, Sarkar). Moreover, this city is connected to history even as it creates an alternative vision of the future for India and other peripherialized places.

Central to this rethinking of the city is the resituation of land from individual and state owndership to cooperative means. Historically Indian village were ecological sound as the local village government controlled the environment (community management), when this responsibility was transferred to the British, to government, the bureaucracy developed centralized rules to control the common areas taking away power from the community and granting it to those far away. The example of Ananda Nagar is among the strategies to recover the rural and to develop methods of community development management and is translatable to Detroit, Amsterdam or Calcutta. Critical is the development of a community spirit, of local pride, of one’s surroundings. For example, voted the best in the world, Calcutta’s subway system–in a city where nothing else runs–can but be explained, if at all, by the pride and the sense of collective ownership citizens have of it.

GLOBAL AND LOCAL CITY SPACES

While efforts to create new cities built on history and based on community self-reliance are laudable the city still exists in a larger cultural and political economy. When localized, capitalism might be protected against, but the juggernaut of modernity is difficult to vanquish until the city itself become an alternative policy and becomes part of a larger civilization. This, of course, is Sarkar’s project: the creation of a new civilizational ethos with an alternative spiritual–around pillars of economic democracy, inclusion of the Other, better use of our physical, intellectual and creative resources, and dynamic balance between technology and nature.
Placing the city in the global is the classic tension between globalism and localism. Localism creates community but also ossifies narrow and dogmatic practices. Globalism opens up to the Other but currently it is only capital that is truly global, labor and ideas still are resisted at national borders.

Cities, however, manifest this tension and have the possibility of creating a new space wherein they are locally managed within a context of a global design. But we should not forget that this was Pol Pot’s brutal design as well. The history of creating intended cities as a response from modernity or as an attempt to transcend modernity are ripe with failures as well. While necessary, planning and design often place the “city” in the policy arena of technocracy and bureaucracy (like land zoning planners) not in the hands of culture or spiritual consciousness.
Finally, even as part of our selves might wish for cities like Islamabad–clean and efficient–they are only possible with the removal of certain classes. For one can not escape history and one can not escape those that the city displaces: the other classes and more importantly the spiritual and ethical discourse that the city attempts to remove from our creations and understandings of the world. While we all want the City Efficient, the social and economic consequences of city design force us to remember the City Ecological and the City Spiritual. The city might attempt to wall what the dominant culture fears but in its creation of physical and intellectual security, it robs itself of the Other; an Other that eventually finds some way of reentering the minds of those in the City, often through various forms of cultural resistance.

But the City Ecological and Spiritual, community managed and ecological sound, are faced with the larger forces of modern capitalism and with the lure of city lights. The new form that contests all these city images, is the cyber city: the node of networks and relationships created through the internet. However, at on level these but continue the Los Angelization of the planet; they create community without face-to-face meetings, they allow individual expression without responsibility to the Other. At another level, however, the continue the process of the creation of a planetary culture, albeit a materialistic one. But once the the idea of the planet supercedes other identities then the spiritual unity that is humanity can hopefully not be too far behind.

Cities then are representations of various theories (theories of modernity, or Tantra, e.g.) and they themselves are the creators of theories. City do not create culture or public policy rather they are culture and policy. City spaces are but the concrete manifestations of our paradigms or our imaginations of the real. We need to imagine alternatives spaces for the city and create cities that help transform us.

REFERENCES

Ivan Illich, Energy and Equity (Harper and Row, 1974)
Karl Kim and Kem Lowry, “Honolulu,” Cities (November 1990)
Leopold Kohr, Overdeveloped Nations: The Diseconomies of Scale (Schocken
Books, 1978)
Ray Lenzi, “Ananda Nagar: Building a Sustainable Society,” Prout
Journal, (Vol. 5, No. 1, 1989)
Nikos Papastergiadis, “Ashis Nandy: Dialogue and the Diaspora–A
Conversation,” Third Text (Summer 1990).
Kevin Robins and Mark Hepworth, “Electronic Spaces: new technologies and
the future of cities,” Futures (April 1988)
Richard Register, Ecocity: Berkeley (North Atlantic Books 1987)
Mark Satin, editor, New Options. Box 19324. Wash. D.C. 20036
Strategies (No. 3, 1990). Special Issue: In the City
Michael Shapiro and Deane Neubauer, “Spatiality and Policy Discourse:
Reading the Global City.” Alternatives (July 1989)
William Irwin Thompson, At the Edge of History (Harper and Row 1971)
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Dr. Sohail Inayatullah is a political scientist/futurist and judicial planner. Phil McNally provided useful comments to an earlier draft.