

The background of the cover is a photograph of a pond. Several pink lotus flowers are in various stages of bloom, some on tall stems and others floating on the water. Green lily pads are scattered across the surface, some showing signs of decay. The water is calm, creating clear reflections of the flowers and leaves. The overall tone is peaceful and natural.

CLA 2.0

Transformative Research in Theory and Practice

Edited by

Sohail Inayatullah and Ivana Milojević

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Tamkang University

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Additional information on the editors may be found at:
www.meta-future.org and www.metafuture.org

Introduction

Ivana Milojević

Causal layered analysis is a method and theory of knowledge that continues to be refined and expanded into new domains of theory and practice. Developed in the early 1990s, the first published description of CLA was in 1995 in an article in *Futures* by Sohail Inayatullah, Samar Ihsan and Levi Obijiofor titled ‘The Futures of Communication’.¹ The article contained a report on an international World Futures Studies Federation Course of the same title held in Andorra in October 1994. It summarises a session conducted by Sohail Inayatullah wherein “the group collectively explored a new futures method, causal layered analysis” described then as follows:

Causal layered analysis attempts to deconstruct problems, to make problematic ‘events’, ‘trends’ and ‘issues’ ... how one frames the problem changes the solution. Causal layered analysis looks at the many dimensions of a problem: its official cause as presented in the media, social science analysis, worldview or discourse analysis, and as myth/metaphor. The challenge is to move up and down the layers of analysis, bringing in as many levels as possible.²

A more detailed description of CLA was published in *Futures* in 1998 by Inayatullah and was titled ‘Causal layered analysis: Post-structuralism as method’.³ That article opened with the following:

Causal layered analysis is offered as a new futures research method. It[s] utility is not in predicting the future but in creating transformative spaces for the creation of alternative futures. Causal layered analysis consists of four levels: the litany, social causes, discourse/worldview and myth/metaphor.⁴

Whilst the basic structure—the four levels and the key application of CLA in creating transformative spaces for alternative futures—has not changed, some twenty years of use—from initial inception and trials to the present day—has resulted in a multiplicity of discourses, adaptations and applications by Inayatullah and many others.

These multiple CLA-related articles and essays were collected and published by Tamkang University Press in 2004 as the first *Causal Layered Analysis Reader*. The *CLA Reader* had four main sections. The ‘Introduction to the Reader’ featured a 52-page chapter by Inayatullah in which he explained causal layered analysis in detail through theoretical discussions, historical context and case studies. This was followed by methodological comparisons, case studies, discussions of causal layered analysis as an evolving methodology, and the appendices.

There were seventeen case studies which applied CLA, with topics including genetic engineering in agriculture, poverty, sustainability, cities, racism, globalisation, education, global media, post-bubble Japan, scientism, intelligence and aviation.

CLA 2.0, the second *Reader* now in front of you, presents a continuation of the theoretical and methodological developments, as well as practical uses of the method since the publication of the first *Reader*. In addition to the introductory chapters and the conclusion, by the editors of this volume (Inayatullah and Milojević), *CLA 2.0* has 34 chapters grouped into six main sections. Its structure is similar to the 2004 *CLA Reader* in that it begins with theoretical and methodological discussions (five chapters) and then presents 29 varied case studies. In all, 42 authors contributed to the 2015 *CLA Reader* (*CLA 2.0*), covering topics such as the environment, conflict and security, national aspirations, finance, education, health and well-being, the workforce, community, film and art. These are described in more detail below.

Section I: History, Context and Comparisons

The first section of *CLA 2.0*, *Theorising CLA: History, Context and Comparisons*, presents five chapters that focus predominantly on the theoretical and methodological issues relevant to applying CLA. Chapter 1, ‘Transcendence of a Method: The story of causal layered analysis’ by Jose M. Ramos, is the updated (substantially expanded and amended) version of the chapter ‘A Bibliographic narrative of CLA’, which was published in the 2004 *CLA Reader*. Ramos weaves Inayatullah’s personal history and its influence on the development of the method with theoretical and educative influences on Inayatullah (for example, Oswald Spengler, Michel Foucault, William Irvin Thompson, Joseph Campbell, P. R. Sarkar, Johan Galtung, Michael Shapiro, Jim Dator and Tony Stevenson) to demonstrate the development of CLA “through a narrative... as an example of intuitive action research”, based on “cycles of theory and experimentation”.

Chapter 2, ‘From Problem-space to Solution-space: Causal layered analysis and context-space mapping’ by Tom Graves, combines CLA with other methodological frameworks to provide further insights into a range of problems existing in social, business and other contexts. Graves reframes the four CLA levels as simple, complicated, complex and chaotic, intending to reveal ways to address high-stress social settings and insights into related interventions.

Chapter 3, ‘Roads Less Travelled: Different methods, different futures’ by Andrew Curry and Wendy Schultz, provides a methodological comparison between CLA and three other scenario generation methods: the 2x2 matrix approach, the Manoa approach, and scenario archetypes. It uses data from the Carnegie UK Trust’s project on the *Future of Civil Society in Britain and*

Ireland to 2025 to question whether different scenario generation methods provide distinctive outputs. Specifically, the authors investigate the capacity of each of the methods to create a clear narrative of how each scenario emerged and to compare the degree to which these methods were participatory. Curry and Schultz reveal strengths and challenges in the workshop setting of all four methods and reach multiple conclusions about the value and potential applications of CLA.

Chapters 4 and 5 further investigate narrative applications of CLA. Chapter 4, ‘Creating Stories of Change: Reframing causal layered analysis as narrative transformation’ by Frank W. Spencer IV and Yvette Montero Salvatico, discusses the importance of stories in general and in futures work in particular. The authors focus on CLA’s metaphorical strength, reframing it as Narrative Transformation, which, they argue, has “already been proven to be a popular format for addressing large change management, culture assessment, and organisational transformation efforts”. They discuss the use and adaptation of CLA for the process of Narrative Transformation in working with multiple clients from diverse industries.

In the concluding chapter of the first section, Chapter 5, ‘Metaphor and Causal Layered Analysis’, Saliv Bin Larif explains the ubiquity of metaphor and its power in creating reality. The chapter explains how metaphors, if they stay at the unconscious level, become literal ways of interpreting and conceptualising the world as well as ways of naturalising a particular (dominant) worldview. On the other hand, the author argues that by making metaphors explicit, CLA increases the transparency of personal and organisational narratives and helps to make participants more receptive to alternative ideas, change and dialogue. Metaphors can not only help to give insight into the reality but can become vehicles of transformation.

Section II: Environmental and Resource Futures

In the opening chapter of Section II: Environmental and Resource Futures, Ian Lowe tackles the question of why the public and politicians have so far been un-receptive to the fundamental issues of our time, despite the overwhelming evidence that alternative ideas and approaches are urgently required. Lowe’s chapter, titled ‘Causal Layered Analysis, Climate Change and Limits to Growth’, provides a comprehensive overview of more than fifty years of substantiated research on climate change, limits to growth, environmental decline and other crucial environmental issues. He then exposes unconscious but deep seated myths which inform national and global decision-makers, arguing that CLA provides a convincing explanation for resistance to change. Lowe proposes that alternative narratives and templates are needed to shift towards viable long-term-oriented solutions based on environmental–human healing. The next chapter discusses another critical environmental issue: water futures.

Chapter 7, 'The Future of Water Resource Management in the Muslim World' by Syeda Mariya Absar, provides a "water map", analysing water availability and usage in six distinct socio-economic and hydro-geological zones of the Muslim world. She then applies CLA to each of these six regions, examining ways in which water has been valued and managed (litany and system) and the worldviews and myths that underpin them. The author explains that although Islam is a common factor in each of the six zones, their value systems, cultures and lifestyles are diverse. She then investigates global and local challenges in water management and provides an alternative CLA with policy outcomes more likely to succeed given the diversity of the six regions, the common Islamic worldview and the current global/local challenges each faces. The author's overall argument is that by looking for solutions beyond the litany level and by incorporating Islamic principles into water management policies, alternative, more efficacious solutions for future water management can be found.

Chapter 8, 'Causal Layered Analysis: Case study of Nipah virus emergence', reports on the introduction of CLA to epidemiology to examine proposed solutions in terms of the likely effects on future generations and in light of current and future environmental and health difficulties. Peter Black shows how CLA assisted epidemiologists to broaden their thinking about emerging infectious diseases in general and about the emergence of Nipah virus in Malaysia in particular. CLA, argues Black, provides an action-oriented framework which helps us to better understand the dynamics of infectious diseases within complex multi-host communities. Black concludes that critical futures thinking is crucially important if global challenges such as emerging infectious diseases are to be successfully addressed.

Chapter 9, 'Complementing Causal Layered Analysis with Scenario Art: To develop a national vision and strategy for Australia's minerals industry' by Aleta Lederwasch, explores and analyses plausible futures scenarios in order for Australia's mineral industry to deliver long-term national benefit. The chapter is based on insights from a 2010 futures workshop: *Vision 2040: Innovation in Mining and Minerals*. The chapter describes the workshop process in detail and the outcomes of the various futures methods used (i.e. the futures wheel, scenario art, scenario drama, the futures triangle, backcasting, and CLA). Lederwasch highlights issues identified through the application of CLA, and suggests alternative strategies and solutions at each level. The chapter concludes with a summary of the key outputs of *Vision 2040*, a detailed vision statement and national strategy for Australian mineral production and use.

Chapter 10, 'Causal Layered Analysis as a Tool for Policy: The case study of Australian agricultural policy' by Brian J. Bishop, Peta L. Dzidic and Lauren J. Breen, considers the implementation of sustainable agriculture policy in Australia in the face of climate change. The chapter investigates "the general endorsement of sustainable policy" and the "cultural impediments to its

adoption” that yet remain. The conclusions reached are based on a workshop conducted with 17 participants and facilitated by three staff members of Australia’s CSIRO (the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation). The authors identify key themes at the four levels of CLA and investigate ways in which the method can be used as a tool for transformation and for more comprehensive policy development.

Chapter 11, ‘Deep Futures and China’s Environment’ by Marcus Anthony, intends to disrupt the dominant discourse on China’s future and specifically the relationship between Chinese people and the environment. The author discusses three key scenarios for China’s future: Brave New World/Brave New China, the Harmonious Society and Big Brother. CLA is used to differentiate between “shallow” and “deep” futures and a discussion of Inayatullah’s core concepts of “used futures” and “disowned futures” is also included. Finally, Anthony shows why solutions to the real problems the Chinese people and indeed all humans currently face need to “[plumb] the full depth of the litany, systems, worldview and mythical dimensions”.

Chapter 12, the final chapter in this section, ‘Avatar: Higher education and sustainability’ by Patricia Kelly, uses CLA to unpack the dominant narratives of our time which directly or indirectly promote “business as usual” futures as exemplified in James Cameron’s 2009 film *Avatar*. The author draws parallels between Colonel Quaritch’s rabid rejection of reverence for nature, angry conservative responses to the film and some harsh criticism of the concept of “re-enchantment” in sustainability in higher education. Kelly argues that unless a shift at the myth/worldview level is made—towards integrating feeling and rationality and towards nurturing the imagination needed to find equitable alternatives—we will collectively find ourselves at a civilisational “dead end”. The CLA process, however, can play a critical role in more effectively dealing with “competing ethics of the future” and for utilising educational processes to move towards more equitable and sustainable futures.

Section III: Conflict, Peace and Security

Section III: Conflict, Peace and Security presents six articles, starting with Sohail Inayatullah’s ‘Defeating the Taliban: One joke at a time’. This chapter shows the ways in which CLA can provide insights that result in a dramatically different narrative and reframed strategy. From the deepest layer of CLA—myth/metaphor—a strategy of de-legitimation of the Taliban through humour is offered. Inayatullah explains the rationale behind this approach and gives historical examples where humour has been used to achieve political goals. He also reminds us that even with humour as a central tenet of any long-term successful strategy of de-legitimation, multiple workable solutions are needed and that these should also include interventions at the level of the system and the worldview.

Chapter 14, ‘Transforming Global Governance’ by Anita Sykes-Kelleher, uses CLA to rethink the future of a reformed United Nations. CLA is applied to the current global governance system as well as to two images of reformed global governance futures. The author compares and contrasts Assertive Multilateralism—the UN’s preferred future model for the Commission on Global Governance—with a model constructed from the input of twenty-five international delegations participating in the General Assembly of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation. Sykes-Kelleher concludes by adding non-state actors’ views (voices rarely heard and acknowledged) to the UN perspectives to create a “synthesis[;] a reformed, more inclusive UN guided by the worldview of Ubuntuism”.

Chapter 15, ‘Terrorism Futures: Constructing and deconstructing using causal layered analysis’ by Noni Kenny, demonstrates that academic literature on terrorism has largely failed to identify the governing metaphors of terrorism but instead has stayed predominantly at the litany and system levels of analysis. Governing metaphors such as “us versus them”, “the West versus the rest” and “society must be defended” continue to govern terrorism knowledge systems. As a result, there is an unquestioned reliance by theorists and decision-makers on “worst case scenarios”, including “the accepted wisdom” that terrorism is an ever-present and expanding threat; a view which, in turn, sets the direction of counter-terrorism policy. By applying futures studies theories and methods, specifically scenarios and CLA, the author “opens up the future” and by introducing “transformative spaces”—offers a wider range of terrorism futures, including the preferred.

Chapter 16, ‘The Common Futures of India and Pakistan: A new approach’ by Gautam Wahi, is critical of the existing literature on the India-Pakistan relationship and argues that even when ways forward from the conflict are sought, the commonly used approaches are past-orientated and litany-based. Therefore, they “condemn the existing conflict between the two nations to permanent, inevitable finality”. Wahi applies CLA to Pakistan-based and India-based scenarios to uncover defining myths and metaphors. The final section of the chapter uncovers an alternative, common future based on shared aims and characteristics and proposes a new metaphor of the kind needed to support its emergence.

Chapter 17, ‘Unpacking Images of the Futures of China Using Causal Layered Analysis’ by Jeanne Hoffman, counterpoises the realist International Relations paradigm and its “China threat theory” with the liberal “Peaceful rise/development” vision of China’s future. CLA is used to investigate the underlying, often simplistic, beliefs and drivers at play in order to offer “a more nuanced understanding of the differing political perspectives”.

The final chapter in this section, Chapter 18, ‘The Vulnerable Body: Using causal layered analysis to analyse a scene of violence’ by Joonas Vola, contextually examines two images which portray a body violated by various

acts of violence. Concretely, Vola analyses two Pulitzer Prize-winning photographs taken in Mogadishu portraying a mob dragging and attacking the body of a killed US soldier. The photographs have been credited as being instrumental in the withdrawal of US forces from Mogadishu. Vola asks: why were the images so powerful? He applies the four levels of CLA to unpack the constitutive worldviews and metaphors behind the representative power of the images.

Section IV: Financial and Work Futures

Section IV: Financial and Work Futures consists of six chapters, starting with Sohail Inayatullah's 'World Futures and the Global Financial Crisis: Narratives that define'. In this chapter Inayatullah deconstructs seven foundational stories of the global financial crisis: (1) a mortgage crisis, (2) a global banking crisis, (3) creative destruction, part of natural cycles, (4) geopolitical shift, (5) God's plan, (6) symptom of capitalism, and (7) a window of opportunity to a different, greener world. Inayatullah uses CLA to provide a framework for organising thinking about the past/present and future, deconstructing "the problem" as defined within each of these seven foundational narratives to provide alternative readings and solutions. Based on this analysis he offers five scenario sketches for the futures of the world system: (1) business as usual, (2) the rise of 'Chindia', (3) the quick and long road to sustainability, (4) the end game of capitalism, and (5) a new era.

Chapter 20, 'Exploring the Socio-Economic Aspirations of Singaporeans' by Adrian W. J. Kuah, April Chin and Bai Huifen, provides a detailed description and analysis of the use of CLA within a project conducted by the Singaporean Centre for Strategic Futures in 2013. The project focused on preferred futures and strategies for Singapore's society and economy. In the chapter, the authors explain their understanding of CLA, and then detail four stages of the project spread across four months, before focusing on insights related to the socio-economic aspirations of Singaporeans. The final section of the chapter evaluates the effectiveness of CLA as a foresight methodology and its potential as a public policy foresight tool.

Chapter 21, 'Demystifying the Hawala System using Causal Layered Analysis' by Umar Sheraz and Nauman Farooqi, use the CLA lens to better understand one of the primary forms of the informal economy—the Hawala money transfer system. CLA is applied to six different stakeholders' perspectives. Then, using P. R. Sarkar's macrohistorical approach, the perspectives of four socio-economic classes are also presented: workers/*shudra* (beneficiaries of Hawala), warriors/*ksattriya* (international and local policing systems), intellectuals/*vipra* (the economists and policy-makers) and the merchants or accumulators of capital/*vaeshyan* (Hawaladars as well as formal value transfer systems like banks and money changers). The chapter concludes with a discussion of the changing nature of the

Hawala system and the challenges it faces, whilst simultaneously outlining a preferable policy solution for value transfer systems.

Chapter 22, 'The Role CLA Played for Change in a Large Global Financial Institution' by Robert Burke, presents a case study of a financial institution that used CLA as part of a Strategic Leadership Program conducted by Mt Eliza Executive Education, University of Melbourne. CLA clarified how a particular worldview limited the opportunities of the financial institution. By revealing the impeding worldview, the purpose of the organisation was broadened. The organisation moved from delivering quality financial advice to delivering quality "living" investment advice.

Chapter 23, 'Uncovering Deeper Issues in Social Workers' Alliance with their Professional Association' by Gilbert Fan, discusses the challenges the Singapore Association of Social Workers (SASW) faces in representing social workers in the country. The chapter applies CLA to the social workers' overall view on their level of alliance with SASW. Fan unpacks underlying ideologies, uncovers deep narratives and then offers possible solutions.

In Chapter 24, the final chapter in this section, 'Causal Layered Analysis in Action: Case studies from an HR practitioner's perspective', Debbie Terranova presents two case studies where CLA was used in a Human Relations strategy workshop in Brisbane, Australia. Two key issues were analysed in these workshops: the ageing workforce and changes in organisational direction. The chapter provides a meta-level analysis of CLA: the rationale for using CLA, the key lessons learned in running the workshops, and the ways in which futures methodologies made the workshops successful.

Section V: Health, Community and Well-Being

Section V: Health, Community and Well-being begins with a chapter by Sohail Inayatullah on 'Ageing Futures: Using causal layered analysis to develop scenarios'. Based on workshops and a project conducted for the Queensland Government Department of Families, this chapter focuses on the probable futures of ageing in Queensland. In this chapter, Inayatullah first discusses futures-oriented policy-making and contrasts it with traditional policy approaches. He argues that there are multiple purposes of the future within the policy-making context, such as: development of futures literacy, better informed strategy based on robust citizen input and participation, and capacity enhancement enabling system and memetic organisational transformation. The chapter then presents four maps of CLA based on a literature review of four different images of ageing: the dominant model, the emerging technological model, the emerging integrated model and the worst case. Based on this application of CLA, four alternative future scenarios are developed: Society for All Ages, Society Divided by Ages, Virtual Worlds,

and Governmentalised. The chapter concludes with a range of policy recommendations for Queensland by 2020.

Chapter 26 by Linda Shevellar, 'Hope and Cake: The contribution of causal layered analysis to community development practice' discusses the application of CLA in the field of community development in Australia and in the organisational context of bureaucracy. It tackles the difficult issue of the current disconnect between community workers' vision within which their work takes place (i.e. a just and caring society) and the "reality" on the ground (i.e. a vision not shared by political leaders or by the majority of the Australian people and the difficulties in conducting community development work within a bureaucracy). CLA is applied to 22 semi-structured interviews conducted with community development practitioners to identify three major themes within the litany and then to conduct social, discursive and metaphorical analysis. This in-depth analysis reveals an idealised view of community development amongst workers, as an "heroic quest", which they can "never truly live up to". The chapter concludes with a discussion of the insights gained from applying CLA and of the usefulness of this approach in practice—for "real transformation of our empirical and ideational worlds".

Chapter 27, 'A Layered Approach to Horizon Scanning: Identifying future issues in military and veterans' health' by Jane Palmer and Niki Ellis, uses critical futures to identify content areas affecting military and veterans' health. The findings are based on a two year program initiated by the Think Tank at the Centre for Military and Veterans' Health, Australia, in 2007. The process identified a table of factors related to future challenges to military and veteran's health. These have been ordered into a matrix, creatively merging CLA with the futures triangle in order to identify "a set of clearly emerging futures issues". The process also identified numerous possible future issues which arose from the horizon scanning process as well as "critical issues requiring consideration". The chapter concludes with a discussion of lessons learned (i.e. the framework for data analysis and the question of the repeatability of the process) in regard to the application of futures methodologies, including CLA.

Section V concludes with Chapter 28, by Peta L. Dzidic and Brian J. Bishop, 'Applying Cusal Layered Analysis in Substantive Psychology'. The authors apply CLA to "complex social psychological issues using qualitative data". They conduct CLA within a structured, five step process: research question consideration, familiarisation, coding between the layers, coding within the layers, and, finally, reconstruction of the issue/proposition of alternative futures. The authors apply this approach to an interview transcript which represents "a vignette of a woman roller derby player reflecting on her experiences of playing the sport". The interview is then "coded" by reference to the CLA approach. The chapter concludes with a report on the authors' findings related to the utility and applicability of CLA in the context of their psychological research.

Section VI: Educational, Learning and Youth Futures

The final part, Section VI: Educational, Learning and Youth Futures consists of six chapters starting with: 'Futures Narratives, Possible Worlds: Causal layered analysis and the problems of youth' by Cate Watson. Watson uses the four levels of CLA as "an analytical toolbox to consider constructions of 'youth', in order to explore what the method may have to offer as a subversive tactic in the futures field". The aim of her investigation was to "disrupt received wisdoms and the appeal to 'common sense'", in order to "produce different ways of knowing", and investigate the construction of "other possible worlds". Watson begins by investigating the litany—the spectacle of "Wasted Youth", young people seen as increasingly a danger to others and themselves. This "very real construction of unreality" is challenged through the application of alternative discourses, diverse scenarios and in-depth analysis of the worldviews and myths/metaphors beneath the litany. The chapter concludes by probing into a new possible future in which young people have taken control of their own social construction.

Chapter 30, 'Using Causal Layered Analysis to Explore the Relationship between Academics and Administrators in Universities' by Maree Conway, uses CLA to explore the nature of tense "divide" between two key groups of university staff and to propose solutions to ameliorate it. Conway summarises key changes to universities during the last quarter of the 20th Century and the implication of these changes for the relationship between academics and administrators. The chapter then reports the findings of a research project undertaken in 2008, which utilised CLA to investigate what lies beneath litany indicators of the existing conflict and the (perceived or real) divide between the two groups. Conway investigates how this divide is perceived by key stakeholders, and some of the worldview and myth/metaphor narratives that underpin it. The analysis in the chapter is based on the interactions between some 150 participants in a series of workshops, focus groups and interviews which took place in the UK, New Zealand and Australia, and on the results of a follow-up online survey with 23 respondents. The author applies CLA to discourses that emerged in these interactions and then focuses on ways in which existing myths and metaphors can be reframed in order to open up spaces for alternative futures beyond the conflict and "the divide".

Chapter 31, 'Learning English in Taiwan's Elementary Schools' by Tzu-Ying Wu, gives an overview of English-learning development in Taiwan and asks if the current national language policy can help students create a better communication future. It then "maps the future" of the issue by using the futures landscape method. This is followed by a discussion of digital natives and digital immigrants and then by the development of five scenarios: Black hole, Gaming English, Number one, Test machine and Stop learning English. CLA is used to unpack and deepen these five scenarios before the Transcend

conflict resolution method is applied to negotiate between the visions and create a win-win situation. The final section of Wu's chapter investigates the implications of the foregoing analysis for the current language learning policy.

Chapter 32, 'Exploring Barriers Hindering Vietnamese Teachers from Adopting Learner-Centred Pedagogies' by Pham Thi Hong Thanh, investigates some tensions, contradictions and invisible drivers of education reforms in Vietnam. Thanh presents and outlines several education reforms carried out in Vietnam since the late 1980s and early 1990s. Many of those reforms have not succeeded in their main tasks. The application of CLA suggests that particular obstacles at the worldview and myth/metaphor level have been instrumental in creating barriers. The chapter concludes with suggested alternative policy solutions.

Chapter 33, 'Applying Causal Layered Analysis in Order to Rethink Work/Play' by Marcus Bussey, Åse E. Bjurström and Miriam Sannum, explores possible futures for intercultural work integrated learning (WIL). Learning and cultural encounters are seen in terms of Deleuze and Guattari's rhizome—an organic analogue for how these encounters “unfold, fold and pattern in the most creative and unpredictable ways”. The chapter reports on the application of CLA and scenario planning at a course on intercultural entrepreneurship for sustainable development, which took place in 2009 at University West, Trollhättan, Sweden. The authors describe the context of the process and then provide four scenarios for WIL: Utilitarian, Idealist, Egalitarian-Structuralist and Rhizomic Playground. CLA is applied to all four scenarios in order to give further depth to the analysis, and to map some of the rhizomic relationships available when thinking about WIL.

The final chapter in Section VI and of this second CLA Reader is 'Futures Theatre and Causal Layered Analysis' by Sabina Head. In this chapter, Head discusses activities of Futures Theatre, “a genre dedicated to presenting performances offering scenes from scenarios on stage” for audiences to “stretch the mind” and “to consider and debate as they ask the question ‘how are we to live?’” CLA is suggested as a method which enables understanding of such “mind stretching”. Three theatrical performances are then examined through the lens of CLA. Storytelling techniques are also examined, as well as the performative capabilities of those techniques in achieving “temporary realism”. Each of the three theatrical performances—A Doll's House, A Number and Socks Go in the Bottom Drawer—are seen as “future scenario[s] in action”, existing “in real time, with real people, in a concrete, functioning world, if a temporary one”. As the chapter investigates the role of power and status in these plays, the CLA matrix is used to reveal power struggles and imbalances. Finally, distance and bridging in the plays are discussed to find a balance between audience involvement and their interpretation of the performance.

To conclude, more than twenty five years since it was first practiced and twenty years since it was described and formalised as a theory of knowledge and as a futures method, CLA has demonstrated that it is a versatile tool applicable to a whole range of social issues and contexts. The chapters in this second volume of the CLA Reader attest to the multiple uses, applications and utilities of this evolving theory and practice.

From our point of view as the editors, each chapter is a unique contribution and invaluable to the analysis of its own particular issue or question. At the same time, taken together, they also demonstrate the breadth of the knowledge base available to researchers and theorists wishing to explore the method in the future. Key findings and themes are summarised in the concluding chapter of the book. What follows this Introduction are 34 new or updated contributions which enliven as well as safeguard the continuation and evolution of causal layered analysis.

¹ S. Inayatullah, S. Ihas & L. Obijiofor, 'The futures of communciation', *Futures*, Vol 27, No 8, 1995, 897–903.

² *Ibid.*, 900.

³ S. Inayatullah, 'Causal layered analysis: Poststructuralism as method', *Futures*, Vol 30, No 8, 1998, 815–829.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 815.

The Continued Evolution of the Use of CLA: Using practice to transform

Sohail Inayatullah

The changes in the practice of CLA since the publication of the *CLA Reader* in 2004, while incremental, have been significant. The 1980s was the pre-formative phase, the mapping of theories—post-structuralism, macrohistory, the sociology of change, chaos, complexity and mythology—that would become the structure within which to create CLA. The 1990s was the invention stage, when the principles of the theory and practice of CLA—the four layers and the post-structural toolbox—were developed. The 2000s have essentially been about practice both in the doing of CLA in anticipatory action learning workshops and in Masters/Doctoral research. As in the development of other research paradigms, the last ten years of methodological innovation have stemmed from critique and inventive practice.

This book consolidates the best of the practice and research on CLA from the past decade or so. I am thankful to colleagues, to former and current students and to others for the sharing of their research in this volume. I am especially thankful to Ivana Milojević—who did her PhD using CLA over 10 years ago—for co-editing this volume with me. Her simultaneous attention to detail and to the big picture has certainly improved the quality of the contributions included.

Milojević has eloquently summarised the chapters and provided a concluding synthesis, and I would like to present in this preface how I have used and developed CLA since the publication of the 2004 *CLA Reader*.

These developments include: (1) CLA and self-transformation, (2) CLA focused on different ways to reconstruct the future, (3) CLA and scenarios, and (4) the CLA game.

CLA and Self Transformation

First, in the last 14 years CLA has increasingly focused not just on the mapping of the external world but also on the mapping of the self (*ves*). The intent has been double. First, to ensure that practitioners of foresight and/or of critical futures research are aware of their own worldviews and myths. Second, for those in workshops—whether young students, civil society leaders, government policy-makers or corporate executives—to explore their own double binds and to use CLA as a way to transform their own life stories.

To assist in this self-discovery, I've developed a series of questions to help workshop participants explore their own core lives and situational metaphors and to articulate an alternative preferred vision of the future.

However, prior to exploring these questions, I situated CLA within the work of Hal and Sidra Stone, *Embracing Our Selves*,¹ and their monumental contribution in the form of challenging maps and metaphors of the mind that assume that we are defined by one self. Just as the Futures field has ensured that there are many futures, the Stones have ensured that we need to see the world through lenses of many selves; indeed: many selves, many futures. This challenges traditional identity maps and opens up space for distancing our awareness from the habit and practice of identities. Through this distance, new selves, and thus new futures, can emerge. The driver of these new selves is not just the theoretical frame of “opening” but also the double-binds (freedom and security; work and family; profit and environment) that individuals find themselves in, what Ashis Nandy has called, the intimate enemy.* This is not the search for the shadow but the realisation that each one of us exists in a constellation of identities, with different selves offering us different futures. The challenge, as with all foresight work, is to move from fragmentation to the preferred future, the integrated way forward. By identifying the issues (the internal research question) and the double binds that restrict their solutions, individuals create alternative maps of their consciousness and then move toward a new metaphor, a new life narrative, and consequently an alternative future.

Take, for example, an individual who was pressed for time—stressed by decisions that needed to be made. The metaphorical transformation was from “running out of time” to making time. The worldview switch was from a linear-leaking view of the future to an ecological view, with far more pluralism. Systemic changes included rethinking of how the day was organised including spending more time on reflection and meditation. Litany changes included not just how much got done—the mind as check-list—but in how present one is while doing things.

Table 1. CLA on time management

LITANY	The checklist of activities	Being present while doing
SYSTEM	Daily chores	Meditation/reflection
WORLDVIEW	Linear	Ecological/pluralistic
METAPHOR	Running out of time	Making time

In another example, a CEO found himself to be losing efficacy. This was largely because the external world had become more complex. The story of his life that had previously worked was the tennis match. This was played on one surface. However, he was finding that now he was becoming confused

*Ashis Nandy, *Tradition, Tyranny and Utopias*. Delhi, Oxford University, 1987.

as the business world appeared to be like playing on different surfaces and he was never sure which surface he would play on next. His first new systemic shift was to develop new skill sets to play on grass, clay and hard courts: new languages, scenario planning and emotional intelligence. But the deeper shift was recovering his inner child—playing for the fun of it—and at the same time envisioning that in the long run he wished to become a coach. Playing for fun required a recovery of his child self, which he had repressed as he became serious about the competitive nature of business and life. The first phase was enhancing his ability to deal with new types of competition. Phase two was moving outside of competition to “the flow”, to fun.

The questions I use to lead individuals to new transformative narratives are:

1. What are the things I say over and over about the way the external world is? What are the things I say over and over about how I feel about the world?
2. What is disowned in this process, what do I push away, which selves are seen as less important? What external behaviours in others irritate and upset us? Can this provide insight into the disowned selves?
3. What are the origins of the issue? Are there any trigger events that have created this overarching inner worldview about the ways things are or should be?
4. Is there a core metaphor that describes this situation?
5. What might be a new story, a new metaphor that can reduce or transform the double-bind?
6. How can this new metaphor be supported by behaviour and practice?
7. What new indicators or measurements lead on from this new behaviour?

These questions thus begin from the litany to the system to the worldview and then to the current metaphor. The new metaphor then is solidified by a new system and a new litany. It finds support going forward.

From Deconstruction to Reconstruction

Second, CLA has increasingly not only continued to unpack litanies, to uncover levels of causality (simple and complex), but also to focus on reconstruction—of the alternative and the preferred. This can be done in a number of ways: it could be a simple deconstruction of current reality or a description of a preferred future. For example, in one foresight workshop for a department of health in Australia, the current reality for cancer futures was described and, through the day, the preferred future for cancer strategies was articulated. CLA became a template with which to describe the new desired reality. This preferred future was then backcasted to create strategic pathways and then a new strategic plan.

Table 2. Preferred future of cancer

Today	Preferred Future
One out of two will have a cancer diagnosis by 2030	Measure health: prevention plus biomedical advances
Chaotic and confused pathways	One stop shop, clear treatment pathways
Medical	Person- and community-centred
Death sentence	As a way of life

CLA also articulates alternative perspectives—deconstruction from other world-views; for example, the view from the perspective of patients, oncologists and hospital administrators. Through a dialogue of these worldviews, a transformed perspective can be created. This is more than the preferred future as it represents win-win or transcend-type* solutions inclusive of multiple stakeholders.

Table 3. CLA on higher education: From the regiment to the orchestra

	Student Worldview	Current Reality	Transformed
LITANY	Student-centred learning	Traditional teaching and learning	Holistic teaching and learning
SYSTEMIC	Learning outcome should not be predetermined Flexible learning	Rigid—one-way learning	Quality issues Assessment (self-assessment and benchmarking) Recognition
WORLDVIEW	Democratic teaching and learning	Lecturers dominate teaching and learning	Creative partnerships between independent human beings
MYTH/ METAPHOR	Tug-of-war between students, the ministry and lecturers	One man show Lecturer knows best	The orchestra—in sync and in harmony

In this process, first the issue at hand (the current reality of a higher education system, for example) is described—its litany, systemic causes, dominant worldview and metaphor—then it is deconstructed from an alternative perspective; for example, the students’ views or the professors’. Lastly, a third, integrated view is created that reconciles the tensions between the two different views. In the case of higher education this was the new story of the orchestra that reconciled the tug-of-war the students’ experienced with the “lecturer knows best” traditional perspective.

* See the works of Johan Galtung, at www.transcend.org.

This can be done on the present, how students, professors and administrators see a current issue, or it can be futures-focused. When futures-focused this process can be a scenario method—the current reality or business as usual; alternative perspectives, the current preferred, and then the transformed.

In the first example below, the viewpoints of different stakeholders were used to develop the strategic direction of the university.

Of course, CLA can still be used as a way to develop a neutral map of the future; it does not need to offer a preferred future. The map can help individuals and organisations to understand the whole of the litanies, systems, worldviews and metaphors. This guides the researcher or decision-maker as to how to best move forward while understanding the perspectives of others. In the second example below, a map of alcohol and drug policy is developed. Of most use, for those who want whole-of-system and whole-of-worldview perspectives, is how the views of the different stakeholders and ideologies differ: their core needs vary, and thus, a long-term successful strategy has to successfully reframe the entire debate or find ways such that the different stakeholders can have at least some of their needs met.

Table 4. Mapping multiple perspectives and finding integrated solutions

	Students	University	Industry	Integrated
LITANY	Can work everywhere	Produce best graduates	Industry-ready students	Best among the best
SYSTEMIC	Multi-discipline-based curriculum	Up-to-date curriculum	University within industry Graduates are market-savvy	Curriculum to be reviewed regularly with stakeholders
WORLDVIEW	Best among the best Multi-skilled students	Knowledge, critical reflection	Continuous engagement with industries	Meets the needs of all stakeholders through regular consultation and cooperation
MYTH/ METAPHOR	Borderless	Always a pioneer, always ahead	Relevant	We agree to agree

Table 5. CLA applied to alcohol and drug policy

	I	II	III	IV
LITANY (VISIBLE)	Number of people harmed (ideally a decreasing percentage)	Number of newspaper articles or search engine hits on the issue (the fewer the better)	Reduction of hospital and doctor visits (the fewer the better)	Crime statistics related to alcohol and drug abuse (ideally down)
SYSTEMIC (CAUSES)	Harm minimisation Programs for the marginal Early intervention Alternatives to prisons	Muddling through Legislation	Vaccine, gene therapy, neurological intervention during childhood	Surveillance Funding for police
WORLDVIEW	Rights—the activist and policy analyst	Politics—the minister	Techno-utopian—the scientist	Security—police
MYTH/ METAPHOR	What works	Out of sight, out of mind	Magic bullet	Clean sheets

CLA and Scenarios

Third, the process of running CLA workshops on a near weekly basis has led to the creation of a new scenario method. In this approach, first the preferred future is developed, then the contradictions or the disowned aspects are articulated. Lastly, a concluding transformed or integrated scenario is described. This enhances robustness as the preferred future can often be fanciful. An outlier is articulated to ensure that known and unknown unknowns—emerging issues and weak signals—are identified. This final scenario completes the matrix.

This scenario approach takes away the fancifulness of the preferred scenario, since the preferred scenario often disowns an aspect of reality—a dialectic contradiction if you will. In the CLA scenario method, the disowned is re-integrated, instead of being discarded.

In the example below—a workshop in the early 2000s for an Australian city, the preferred future was that of a green city using the latest in digital technologies to create liveability. However, this future disowned the politics of power and wealth—i.e. real politics. In the integrated participants focused on ways that sustainability could create wealth for city inhabitants. The final outlier was destruction because of climate change.



Figure 1. City futures

The CLA Game

Fourth, and finally, the CLA game has become foundational to explaining CLA to as broad an audience as possible, to the many. In workshop settings, after explaining CLA, I use the CLA game to illustrate and immerse participants in the process. From there, the analytic part is articulated.

In the CLA game, participants are divided into four groups representing the litany, the system, the worldview and the metaphor, then an issue is selected, the future of foresight for example. Participants are given five minutes to consider how their respective positions would approach the subject matter. In the case of the litany, what are some headlines for the futures of foresight in 2030? The systems group prepares (potential) systemic responses to any headline as well as STEEP (society, technology, economy, environment and polity) causes. The worldviews table essentially spells out how different stakeholders see the issue. In this example, the community, clients, the academy, future generations, non-western perspectives, or whatever else is perceived as salient. The myths and metaphors table articulates narratives that can be used to argue for or against a particular position (“a stitch in time saves nine” or “just crystal ball gazing”, for example).

In the group process, the facilitator initiates the game with the litany group. They present a headline. The systemic group provides causes that create the headline or, if the headline is a problem, solutions to the headline. The worldview group presents the issue from multiple perspectives. Finally, the myths-metaphors join in and tell the story. The process goes back and forth, until there is some kind of conclusion, i.e. a new narrative has emerged, or systemic reforms occur, or a dominant worldview is shown to have better explanatory power. A new litany is then offered to capture the new future.

At a meeting of futurists focused on the futures of foresight in Bellagio, Italy, the initial headline was “futurist wins Nobel prize”. Systemic reasons for why this was possible were offered (forecasts leading to policy change, scenarios leading to peace initiatives), then the views of different stakeholders were presented, followed by the underlying metaphors. As the process went back and forth, the greatest resistance came from the systems perspective; this group challenged the view that a particular futurist should win an award with the narratives being focused on community: “we are in this together”, “our future, not my future”. Generally, the worldview of the futurist challenges individual claims to fame and instead focuses on Gaian or planetary health. The role of the futurist is “not to take credit” but to get things done. The headline group then suggested another litany: “community of futurists wins Nobel award”. This too circulated back and forth between the different levels and perspectives with the guiding narrative of “futurists finally get respect” and “crystal ball thrown out” emerging.

However, one particular worldview, that of the critical futurist, was that the headline of the Nobel Prize was still within today’s future –it was not challenging that future. A third headline thus emerged: “Futurists win inaugural Gaia award” (or something to that effect). The systems’ contribution was that the award needed to focus on alternatives, offer new solutions, be community-based, and long-term-oriented—it should not reinforce the current paradigm but help to create a new one. Essentially the new narrative was: “new future, new award” as opposed to “old award, futurists finally given respect” and “old award, futurist finally wins it”.

What has fallen by the wayside

While CLA continues to grow, perhaps the greatest surprise has been that the context of CLA has largely fallen by the wayside. The four levels of CLA—as theory and practice—have taken off; however, the post-structural toolbox has seen little use or evolution. The toolbox consisted of reframing foresight within post-structuralism. The tools consisted of deconstruction, genealogy, distancing, alternative pasts and futures and reordering knowledge. I can surmise that they have become less important as they constitute the theoretical foreground to the actual practice of CLA. However, they remain crucial as they ensure that CLA remains open, and that it has escape routes, that it does not offer the pretence of attempting to become a theory of everything. Indeed, it is the escape routes that ensure that CLA continues to evolve and does not create a vertical gaze that assigns categories to those lesser and those better or indeed, to those shallow and those deep.

CLA remains not just a theoretical framework for futures thinking, it is also foundational in the practice of foresight. I use it in the six pillars approach. After mapping, anticipating and timing the future, I use CLA to articulate core metaphors and develop new strategies and measures of success. This is

followed by scenarios—although they are not required—and by visioning the desired future.

Conclusion

CLA can thus be used as a way to conduct scholarly research, and deconstruction, to search for deeper causality (even in the context of complex emergent systems where causality is problematic). It can be used as a way to analyse interpretive data. CLA can also be used as a way to map literature, for those engaged in the PhD process and to incast scenarios where applicable in specific research designs.

CLA can be used in action learning workshops, either as one of the six pillars (or as a part of other futures processes) or as a standalone; this can be done on external topics of interest or on internal ones, such as the self. CLA can be embodied in the CLA game.

CLA can be used as a way to organise and plan social or political strategies, that is, to ensure that there is a new story that reframes the issues at hand; that the respective worldviews are consulted and integrated; that systemic solutions are offered so that the strategy ensures real world change, and that the litany, or the measurements of success, are based on the narrative, and not on a used future. CLA, thus, can be an evaluative measure, ensuring that implementation follows the four constituent levels of “reality”.

¹ Hal and Sidra Stone, *Embracing Our Selves*, Novato, California, New World, 1989.

I
THEORISING CLA: HISTORY, CONTEXT AND
COMPARISONS

1. Transcendence of a Method: The story of causal layered analysis

Jose M. Ramos*

This chapter provides a historical narrative of the beginnings and evolution of CLA. It gives insight into the socio-historical context and personal and theoretical influences that were instrumental in the development of the theory and method. †

Introduction

Causal layered analysis (CLA) is a future-oriented methodology created by Sohail Inayatullah. This methodology is post-structural in so far as it seeks to problematise existing future-oriented thinking, exploring the assumptions, ideologies, worldviews, epistemes, myths and metaphors that are already embedded in images, statements or policy-oriented research about the future. It has developed, however, as a way of opening up spaces for alternative futures. These alternative futures are not based on the extrapolation of trends or on tweaking the assumptions in a systems model, as is common in scenario building, but on deconstructing/reconstructing critical assumptions about the way we constitute the world. However, the articulation of alternatives is a product of this method, not a primary focus of it.

But while the theoretical underpinning of CLA is based on post-structuralism, the approach is layered, that is, it is a method of analysis which accounts for various streams of causality operating in unison upon an issue (the issue being analysed). These streams include four primary levels:

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† A version of this chapter was previously published on Metafuture.org and is available at: <http://www.metafuture.org>

1. Litany—the sound and fury, media sound bites, clichés, images, the empirical, the visible and apparent.
2. Social and systemic causes—facilitated usually through academic policy research, creates a rational understanding of issues.
3. Worldview/Episteme—these are the civilisation-based assumptions that people rarely question, until we travel into other communities/cultures, be they other countries, research centres, villages, companies, etc.
4. Myth/Metaphor—this is the ground of being, the structures that ultimately mediate intersubjective meaning making, and identity of Self/Other, the unconscious ordering of the universe.¹

CLA is not itself a statement about the future, but a method for analysing statements about/images of the future.

Finally, the method incorporates critical theory. In the language of its author: “[CLA] searches for power so that it has nowhere to hide and [is] futures oriented, creating alternative futures”.

...theory, approach and methodology are deeply interwoven in post-structuralism, as opposed to empiricism or interpretive discourse, where there are clear differences between theory, values and data. In CLA and post-structuralism, they are all nested.²

Background

As the son of a United Nations diplomat, Sohail Inayatullah was born in Lahore, Islamabad, Pakistan, yet was raised in places such as Bloomington, Indiana, Flushing, New York, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and in Geneva, Switzerland. In addition, his mother was and is a Sufi, and his father a social scientist and human rights activist, and Inayatullah himself has come to follow and champion the work of P. R. Sarkar, the late Indian mystic. Thus, from an early age, and through adulthood, he has never belonged to one category, be it nation, ethnicity, religion, caste or philosophy. As he writes in ‘Why I hate passports and visas’, he was always in the “middle”, between categories. For example, when applying for American citizenship while living in Hawaii, the examiner did not accept him writing in the citizenship form that his complexion was brown. It had to be fair, medium or dark. He did not consider his complexion medium—it was brown. They jostled for the categorical higher ground. In the profession category he had written “political scientist” (he didn’t bother writing “futurist”), but immigration didn’t accept that either.³ In short, he never fitted well into a pre-existing category, a stereotype or classification people could easily identify without straining their minds. Nor would he want to fit into the current systems of categories. Having traversed the world of categories and never been comfortable in one, he has come to a “vision of the future, as one might

expect, committed to cultural diversity and civilisational integrity in the context of a creation of a planetary society”⁴ Transcending and including the categories that have dogged him these many years, the only thing left might be for him to receive an honorary planetary passport (but this might still seem categorically problematic for him). In short, these categories are the outward expression, in institutional form, of the social construction of reality; reified social arrangements that, instead of leading to a future that he wants, lead to a world he abhors. For him then, these categories were not only problematic, but also temporary.*

His history, as one who could not and did not want to fit into what he deems to be archaic categories, such as nationalism or ethnicity, contributed to the development of his thinking, and may have influenced the development of his causal layered analysis. He was always his own object of deconstruction—the self and its identity dissolving before the gaze of post-structural analysis, or vanishing at the achievement of spiritual insight. The Indian episteme and the teachings of P. R. Sarkar revealed to him the social construction of individual identity, and the pathways to transcending these narrow boundaries.

At the same time his experiences revealed deep structures from the individual to the social, from the local to the global levels. While he may be romantic about his childhood’s Pakistani nights spent on the rooftop of his house, under the stars, waking with the whole community at sunrise, the impoverishment of the landless, the limitations on freedom and gendered inequality that many in his own family had to endure did not escape him.⁵ Growing up in Indiana, and in other places, he was subject to racism, taught to be ashamed of his skin colour. The post-colonial status of Malaysia and Pakistan, and the dominated status of Hawaii, may have introduced him to aspects of imperialism otherwise hidden or naturalised. Deep immersion in many cultures revealed to him worldviews beyond textbook codifications. Before he was introduced to the concept of “cosmology”, he was already “speaking” distinct framings of reality, of what the world is, or can be. Language is a window into these “cosmologies”, and his capacity with Urdu, English and French (now exclusively English) must have contributed. Finally, his experiences and conversations with and within Islamic, Indian, Western, and Polynesian civilisations may have laid a foundation for

* This attitude towards categories extends into the method of CLA itself. As Inayatullah writes: “CLA can be located within futures studies... but as well within the larger development of the social sciences, the postmodern turn. I see it far more than merely a futures method” (from email communication 4 July 2002). In addition to this, CLA can be seen as a method of content analysis with the communications discipline as Inayatullah writes: “CLA is well received... because of the conflicting levels of information we receive. CLA helps sort out these levels. I guess, it is timely because of increased information and a bit of fatigue with postmodernism” (email transmission 15 June 2002).

understanding and articulating myth and metaphor from a civilisational perspective. He has been both an insider and an outsider, and perhaps, within his own visionary future, a planetary citizen.

Horizontal and Vertical

Thus his experiences revealed both “horizontal” and “vertical” elements. Horizontal refers to the plurality of discourse/worldview/episteme that gives rise to the categories we live in day to day (often the expression of power/ideological interests). This is “the post-modern turn” that reveals how reality is mediated by cultural, intersubjective factors. The vertical refers to depth, the existence of structures and layers that underlie one’s social and cultural existence. These two patterns are in tension with each other and challenge each other. A totally horizontal approach sees reality as being completely mediated by intersubjective discourse factors (those historically still active and in power). If “reality” is completely socially constructed, every culture and every tradition is, by extension, lacking any solid foundation. Only the post-modern analysis remains valid, and even this is socially constructed and can be deconstructed.*

Inayatullah rejects this extreme position. The vertical challenges this, saying that, while there is a plurality of episteme and worldview, there are still real structural layers within each bandwidth of the horizontal spectrum, despite the fact that we can no longer call these structural layers universal categories. One might say that this approach is beyond structural universalism, as well as beyond extreme post-modern relativism. Such contrasting patterns existed for him to digest while growing up, and later became conceptual elements of his causal layered analysis.

CLA thus incorporates elements that facilitate the understanding and analysis of the horizontal and the vertical. While “we assume universalities even as we speak from our own narrow tradition”, unpacking the layers, “how we mythologise the future”, is the beginning. Yet this is not a denial of the authenticity of a particular discourse, but a way of integrating—making individuals conscious of—layers. CLA is a way of “integrating levels of reality, science, social science, philosophy and religion, if you will”. When we can see and act beyond our engrained worldviews and traditions, we have the capacity to create genuinely alternative futures.

The vertical causes are expressed as four layers that are nested, and linked from top to bottom. Thus litany is ultimately an expression of myth/metaphor, but not vice versa. In the language of complexity science, this would be called “upward causation”. Whether this system of analysis

* This point is taken up in Zia Sardar’s *Postmodernism and the Other* (1998) and is challenged and rejected as yet another example of the de-legitimation/invalidation of any peripheral structures. Inayatullah also uses this position to challenge extreme postmodernist relativism.

makes intuitive sense or not, looking at the influences in the creation of each layer may be beneficial in clearing up some confusion and making the method more accessible. While I will try to show the development of CLA through a narrative, in part as an example of intuitive *action research*, cycles of theory and experimentation, an elementary sketch of the particular influences acting throughout the layers will allow us to gain a deeper understanding of the contextualising influences.

Inayatullah's conception of the **Vertical**, the general concept of layers, was most influenced by Oswald Spengler, P. R. Sarkar, and his own practice of meditation. However, Slaughter's typology of "pop, problem and worldview" levels of futures research was the catalytic enzyme in this. His thinking around **Litany** was influenced by Richard Slaughter, who derived the term from Frank Fisher. However, his and Slaughter's understandings of this are now different. **Social Causes** were influenced by Galtung's analysis of imperialism (centre/periphery theory), other neo-Marxist thought, such as that of Immanuel Wallerstein, and the dominance of "technical" explanations of social reality throughout academia. Inayatullah's ideas concerning **Worldview/Episteme** have come from such influences as Johan Galtung's analysis of cosmology and Michel Foucault's work with historical episteme. **Myth/Metaphor** was primarily influenced by William Irvin Thompson's concept of mytho-poetics, and also by Galtung's CMT (chosen-ness, myth, trauma) theory. Finally, his conception of the **Horizontal**, shifting assumptions into alternative myths, metaphors, episteme and worldviews, came from Michael Shapiro, other post-structuralist influences and the epistemological breadth implicit in his work with macrohistorians.*

Layers of Reality

There was a certain fatigue with post-modernism. While post-modernism was a clear break from the empiricist and expressive realist position,⁶ Inayatullah found that "postmodernism assumes no levels of reality, just alternative realities. Behind discourse are just alternative discourses".⁷ This has been best expressed through Zia Sardar's *Postmodernism and the Other*. In this work, Sardar shows how, instead of critiquing Western cultural and economic universalism, postmodernism has become a way to justify it. The hollowed-out values of the West, which now primarily embraces materialism and rejects other traditions with their "superstitious" ethical and mythic elements, are projected upon the rest of the world, such that traditions of the

* Some of this thinking began with the inquiry into the tension between agency and structure, two patterns that continuously resurface in the futures studies field. On one extreme are those that assert an individual's power to create anything. On the other are those who see structure as primary, that people are locked into structures of power or oppression. There also existed a Jungian influence (supported by Campbell's work) at the myth level; but most of this level's influence was from Thompson.

non-West are de-valued and trivialised, while being simultaneously mimicked and exploited for commercial and cultural gain. The appropriation (and hence disrespect) of a diversity of traditions (now cultural agglomeration into the cult of the hipster) threatens the world with a homogenisation of culture that can only embrace material values (including “multi-cultural materialism”). But irrespective of the West’s material relativism, the cultures of the world retain true difference, unique identities, histories and traditions that are just as necessary and important, that can be considered assets in the creation of truly alternative futures.⁸

This re-valuation of culture and tradition was central to the concept of layers, as it made culture a legitimate focus of inquiry, from which insight, perspective and indeed wisdom could be derived. In contrast to a technical science that created “universal” “laws” of “nature” beyond cultural and individual subjectivity, culture describes where we concretely exist, and from where we are able to know anything. Layered analysis would become one such method of gaining a deep understanding of culture.

The primacy of culture and tradition is a theme that has run throughout Inayatullah’s life. While not overly idealistic about traditions that imply inequality and oppression, as a son of a Sufi and a social scientist, and a champion of the work of P. R. Sarkar, tradition was all around him, yet not in simple form. It was tradition, but by choice. And his tradition by choice, his own personal and community journey, became foundational to his perspective that there are layers of reality. Meditation was central for him, and helped him to see from many perspectives, to “peel off the layers of the onion”, to see that superficial and deeper layers exist simultaneously.

To the partial disapproval of Jim Dator, director of the futures program at the University of Hawaii, Inayatullah decided to do his PhD dissertation on the work of 20th Century Indian guru P. R. Sarkar. While Dator wanted his students to focus on political and technological themes, his students were veering into vastly different realms of inquiry, much to his dismay. It is to Dator’s credit that he created spaces for his students to pursue their research agendas. According to Inayatullah, Dator’s authentic pluralism remains among the reasons he is admired and loved by his former students.⁹ Inayatullah’s pioneering focus on the work of P. R. Sarkar contributed to this understanding of layers of reality.

In the context of the classical Indian episteme, there are six levels of the mind. Inayatullah reviews this in his seminal work, *Understanding Sarkar: The Indian Episteme, Macrohistory and Transformative Knowledge*.¹⁰ The first is *Annamaya Kosa*, the body, glands, blood, cells, etc., and controlled through Yoga. The second is *Kammamaya Kosa*, instinct and physical desire, controlled through breath. The third is *Manomaya Kosa*, reason and emotion, including memory, thinking, dreaming and the experience of pain and pleasure, controlled through concentration. Fourth is *Atminasa Kosa*, the

transpersonal mind (corresponding to the Jungian collective unconscious) connecting every individual and allowing collective action. Fifth is *Vijnanmaya*, cosmic mind, where will and historical purposes are the same. Sixth is *Hiranamaya*, near union with pure consciousness:

The grammar of the “blissful” again is central in Sarkar’s cosmology, for it is that state of mind that is the end of all existence. It is not the accumulation of wealth, beauty, knowledge or wisdom, rather it is a state of unity wherein distinctions between subject-object no longer exist, where the mind moves in a continuous flow of unconditional love.¹¹

There were other influences. Inayatullah had begun to delve into the domain of macrohistory, the “study of the histories of social systems along separate trajectories through space and time in search of patterns, or laws, of social change”.¹² The work of Oswald Spengler, whose famous *The Decline of the West* created a stir in a climate of overconfidence and laid bare Eurocentric notions of progress and history, expressed a much different approach to understanding historical reality. For one, Spengler was a cultural relativist at a time when the West was thought to be supreme, and he asserted that each culture and civilisation has its own lifecycle. Each civilisation, moreover, could only be understood through its own internal laws, customs, origin, and context, thus he rejected the positivistic notion of a “science” of history. Most importantly, yet in a similar vein, Spengler also rejected the notion that understanding history “could be based on truth or falsity”:

True science reaches just as far as the notion of truth and falsity have validity... But real historical vision belongs to the domain of significances, in which the crucial words are not ‘correct’ and ‘erroneous’, but ‘deep’ and ‘shallow’... Nature is to be handled scientifically. History poetically.¹³

It is important to note the similarities and differences between the various conceptions of shallow and deep—the conception of layers. For Richard Slaughter the distinction applies to futures research work, from the most banal, to the most profound. For Spengler the depth is in the insight; the facts are simply an endless and meaningless litany. For Sarkar, reality’s layers are peeled away through the inner spiritual journey. While one deals with the quality of future-oriented literature, the other engages with macrohistory, and the last with an inner spiritual journey. Yet, they all deal with what is profound in human terms and what is beyond direct sense/empirical perception—with depths of meaning and orientation beyond the relativistic.

By 1982, these concepts began to take more solid form for Inayatullah; he was working in the court system in Honolulu doing strategic planning and needed to understand issues being dealt with in their court system. He also acutely remembers seeing a sociology chart showing the difference between

the individual and the structural, that is, the “person invariant”, helping him understand what aspects of society may not be subject to rapid change, but which endured beyond the individual and the time specific.

The Social Construction of Reality and Litany

Inayatullah draws the term litany from Frank Fisher via Richard Slaughter. In the context of epistemology, Fisher focused on the social construction of reality, particularly reification:

Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that is, in non-human [facts/objects] or possible supra-human [divine/natural law] terms. Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world.¹⁴

One aspect of the social construction of reality that Fisher uncovered he called “litany”. Litany refers to the endless stream of clichés, sound bites, media fragments, exaggerations, outlandish statements, disinformation, advertisement and other distortions received day to day.* Because of its ubiquity, the stream overwhelms us with disconnected ideas and images, yet it is the reality that most live and think in. While litany can lead us to a deeper, more substantial reality through analysis (as in CLA), it is often useless in and of itself—simply a distraction from deeper understanding. The concept of litany was eventually taken up by Slaughter as a characteristic of what he called “pop futurism”, and passed on to Inayatullah where it became a level in his causal layered analysis. The understanding of litany between Slaughter and Inayatullah differs in that Slaughter may see litany as the most superficial and trite expression of the field, sometimes involving the exploitation of futures thinking towards political and commercial ends. For Slaughter, the move away from litany and toward worldview reflexive “critical” futures moves us toward a “wisdom culture”. While Inayatullah originally saw litany in this way, considering it to be simply “moronic”, expressions of crude and absurd culture, he has come to see litany rather as the most visible superficial expression of deeper layers of reality, not as something that can be bypassed. Thus litany is the surface, the empirical reality.

Social–Systemic Causes

Inayatullah had begun studying at the University of Hawaii at Manoa as an undergraduate in the early '80s, taking a BA in inter-disciplinary studies, and subsequently an MA in Political Science with a specialisation in futures studies. He later went on to a PhD focused on comparative philosophy and macrohistory. Johan Galtung, who was a visiting professor of peace studies there in the political science department, became a strong influence on Inayatullah's thinking, and a mentor in some respects.¹⁵ A Right Livelihood

* For Inayatullah, these are various representations of reality.

Award winner and prolific writer in many fields, such as peace research and macrohistory, and a pioneer in the area of peace research and conflict resolution in his own right, Galtung founded the *Journal of Peace Research*, the International Peace Research Organization and, most recently, Transcend, a peace research institute that offers degrees in the field.¹⁶

In addition to a cosmological analysis of culture and civilisation, which I will examine later, Galtung also articulated a theory of imperialism that adds a critical political and structural dimension to Inayatullah's conception of the political problematic. In *A Structural Theory of Imperialism*, Galtung reveals how the relationship between centre and periphery, imperial states and dominated states operates. Borrowing from Lenin, Galtung analyses how imperialistic relations systematically create a harmony of interests and a conflict of interests, to the benefit and detriment, respectively, of countries and peoples. The centre of the Centre (the capital decision-making bodies in a dominant nation—in our time corporate/ military/political USA/China/EU) creates a bridgehead (forming a kind of unity) with the centre of the Periphery (the principle decision-making and power base of the dominated nation—for example elites in the third world, Mexico City, etc.), thereby creating a harmony of interest between the two centres, to the benefit of both. The periphery of the periphery (which is the majority of the population—for example rural Mexico/Indonesia/Zaire, etc.) is systematically exploited for resources, labour, etc. So, by way of the centre of the Periphery (third world elites) being linked to the centre of the Center (Washington DC/Wall Street/Beijing), the periphery of the Periphery (rural third world) are essentially disenfranchised politically and in other ways—thus setting up a conflict of interest between the two. The periphery within the Imperialistic nation (for example suburban America), is kept pacified through a kind of middle class contract (lifestyle, mobility, opportunity) that has its own internal contradictions. This pathology extends into economic, political, military, communications, and cultural forms of imperialism: “Only imperfect, amateurish imperialism needs weapons; professional imperialism is based on structural rather than direct violence”.¹⁷

Galtung's understanding of imperialism may have added a culture invariant aspect to Inayatullah's analysis. While cosmologies may mediate different centre/periphery relationships, this particular relational dynamic, and the human suffering and impoverishment that it produces, must be dealt with historically and into the future. At the same time, centre/periphery analysis is a way of coming to grips with the totalising and hegemonic domination of the West in its many aspects, in particular the “superior” cultural artefacts emerging from it, critiquing this domination effectively, problematising its legitimacy, and making the case for alternatives.

The other social causes that may have influenced Inayatullah's thinking are too numerous to detail. In this respect Galtung sees both Western Marxism and Liberalism as being variants of each other—the Western predilection

toward creating ideological or religious syntheses that are incommensurate with anything else, opposed to the Eastern tendency to straddle multiple cognitive templates and traditions at once.¹⁸

Worldview and Episteme

In Galtung's analysis, the actions of nations are symptomatic of deeper historical causes and civilisational cosmologies (worldviews). An understanding of "deep civilisational codes" would allow one to get past the confusing day to day affairs (litany) and official national positions to understand larger patterns. Cosmology, which roughly means a totalising understanding of the universe from particular cultural positions in space and time, expressed through a totalising relationship with that culture's life-world, is a central unit of analysis in Galtung's peace, culture, and futures research. In *Structure, Culture and Intellectual Style*, Galtung showed how intellectual productions differ from culture to culture, and civilisation to civilisation, based on the greater intersubjective processes involved—histories, cultural dispositions, worldviews. What Galtung uncovered were cultural and civilisational structures lurking beneath the façade of a legitimation process for intellectual production.

In *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the human sciences*, a book that had a significant influence on Inayatullah's thinking and development of CLA, Michel Foucault examined how knowledge had been ordered through different historical periods in differing ways, in effect revealing that what may be considered universal structure is in reality the particular expression of a researcher, writer, thinker's historical and spatial context—episteme. He showed how during the Renaissance knowledge was based on the principle of similitude and resemblance, that is, knowledge was likeness. During the classical (or enlightenment) period knowledge was representational, the signifier was the signified, language was seen as transparent and as revealing of the true nature of things. In the modern period, knowledge became an understanding of abstract forces and internal structures, history and psychology respectively. Thus, knowledge structures in the human sciences can be said to be particular and situated in history, among other factors.¹⁹ Inayatullah credits Foucault: "his epistemes, or historical frames of knowledge, are primary in understanding how particular nominations of reality become naturalised".²⁰

Myth/Metaphor

In the 1980s Inayatullah found great rapport with the work of William Irwin Thompson and spent a considerable amount of time with him. *Darkness and Scattered Light*, *The Pacific Shift*, *The Time Falling Bodies Take to Light* and *At the Edge of History*, were some of Thompson's more influential works on the spirit of Inayatullah.²¹ A cultural historian with a mytho-poetic perspective, Thompson was the son of working class Irish Roman Catholics.

However, he said that by the time nuns started to try to teach him Roman Catholicism in primary school, he had already discovered yoga through mystic experiences at an early age. He went on to champion a planetary culture, through the fusion of art, science and religion, working with people such as James Lovelock, Lynn Margulis and Gregory Bateson, who were also articulating “Gaian” ways of thinking and knowing.²² He eventually founded the Lindisfarne fellowship, which brought together creative people, artists, writers, mystics etc. from around the world who were also creating the ideas, art, science and mythos for a planetary culture. Lindisfarne was also a rejection of his academic life and the “MIT internationalism” that he felt was shallow and an expression of American colonialism.* Thompson essentially saw the primacy of myth as giving rise to science, and as underlying science.†

Thompson shows how narrations and expressions of Time are given by “unconscious systems of ordering”. From Darwinian/evolutionary thought, through to the classical history of Thucydides, he shows how narration is based on pre-existing cultural assumptions, myths or hidden needs: “All narratives, artistic, historical, or scientific, are connected to certain unconscious principles of ordering both our perceptions and our descriptions”.²³

Thus ideology and knowing is a form of “false consciousness”, including the ideas of Marx, Habermas, Mohammed and E. O. Wilson. Ideology is the “excrement” of the mind.²⁴ Thompson saw myth as the memory of the history of the universe. As such, he has interpreted the metaphor of the Eucharist “take and eat for this is my body and my blood” as describing the explosion of a supernova that scatters the heavy metals necessary for planetary life. The story of St. Michael, who forces demons down into the underworld, describes the anaerobic crisis several billion years ago in which cyanobacteria forced anaerobic bacteria down into the bottom of lakes. And

* In relation to this distinction between internationalism and planetary culture, Thompson has said: “Planetary culture isn't a mono-culture. Planetary culture is basically saying that in internationalism, the governing science is economics. A planetary culture suggests a shift to ecology as the governing science. It energizes diversity, it requires a larger gene pool and it deals with the new sciences of complexity rather than linear reductionism. We're not all becoming one. We might be going in hyperspace to a level of integration in which we all participate in this multi-dimensionality, but it's high in individuation.”

† Lévi-Strauss has said that “myth is an act of faith in a science yet unborn,” but that point of view is still too close to Frazer; it sees myth as a foreshadowing of something which will eventually be truly known through science. You could just as well say that science is an act of faith in a mythology yet unborn, and that when we truly know the universe of which we are a part, we will see that the way DNA spirals in our cells and the way nebulae turn in space are all related to a particular dance of idea and pattern. William Irwin Thompson, *Darkness and Scattered Light*.

he has said that “Gaia, the whole biosphere, is really our collective body politic”.²⁵ Thus he has fused new understandings of the Earth and biology with a mythic and poetic understanding of reality. Myth is the grand narrative, the wisdom and story of the universe, while history is simply the most recent superficial headline in the 9 o’clock news:

...history is written by elites which are the ego of a civilisation. If it's written by men in England, it's not about women and slaves in Athens or Semites with hooked noses who created the alphabet and the Mediterranean trading culture. The kind of history you learned in classics was a white, male, patriarchal narrative. That's the history of the ego. The history of the soul is always the history of the voiceless, the oppressed, the repressed: the marginal people, the artists, the women, the African.²⁶

Thompson’s thrust is toward the creation of a new myth of humanity, one incorporating the new understanding of Gaia, living systems and complexity. Thus one might say that Thompson’s influence lends Inayatullah’s conception of myth a cross-cultural and universal quality, one that is capable of transcending narrow mythic categories. Another dimension to Inayatullah’s idea of myth came from Joseph Campbell’s concept of a universal myth of humanity, such as in *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*. For Campbell, aspects of reality can be understood metaphorically, the bridge between the mythic and the everyday. Campbell’s influence can be seen in Inayatullah’s CLA, in the journey to bring mythic and narrative insight to illuminate day-to-day domestic, personal and social life. But if myth can be translated across cultures, in a planetary story of evolution, how does Inayatullah arrive at the horizontal spectrum of epistemes? How can each myth be considered to underlie *and* give rise to a particular worldview, as he writes, “created in and through myth”? The answers may lie in Inayatullah’s own understanding of identity:

... trauma creates identity, since it creates the foundational experience of inclusion/exclusion, separation and unity, which of course is about our descent from God, and on and on... The transformation from identity is transcendence, both in the evolutionary sense but as well in the spiritual sense.²⁷

Trauma may arise, then, through interaction with the environment, the Other, giving rise to myths that capture cultures’ or civilizations’ separation or “descent” from God. Thus myths are produced in some archaic point of origin, different in each place, and reflecting the distinctive features of that civilization’s identity. Galtung’s “CMT syndrome” (chosen-ness, myth, trauma), another influential element in Inayatullah’s conception of CLA, exposed how cultures often identify themselves with transcendental forces, thereby creating a belief or sentiment that they have been “anointed” with the right to show others (read “the Other”) the true way, to the point of justifying conquest, the right to dominate, control and govern, or even to

commit genocide. This chosen-ness is built into myths of a great past, a heroic age, inducing collective sentiments of grandeur, to be recreated in a great future. The present is the half-way point between a great past and a great future. Trauma represents the suffering, real or imagined, a culture underwent that may have led to a fall, and the path that that culture must travail to return to greatness. People can be galvanised and made cohesive by the memory of a trauma/glory, regardless of its historical truth. As this historical memory crosses generations, the trauma becomes embedded into the identity of the group. The above clarifies how mythic trauma helps to create that distinction between Self and Other, cohesion and separation.

This understanding of civilisational cosmologies that maintain Self/Other boundaries is also reflected in Johan Galtung's article 'Western Civilisation, Anatomy and Pathology'. This idea of boundaries is invoked through a civilisation's distinction between centre and periphery: the identity boundary of that civilisation. What gives rise to this Self/Other dynamic, different in each civilisation, are the invariant aspects of that civilisation's cosmology, which is "so normal and so natural that they become like the air around us, un-noticed".²⁸ In a passage that may illuminate how metaphor works within Inayatullah's CLA, Galtung writes: "Ideally, one should be able to invoke a cosmology by one figure alone, an image so powerful that the essence of that civilisation is carried in that image alone".²⁹

Thompson also invokes a similar understanding of metaphor in describing a cosmology and forms of rationality, that a mythic image communicates the essential quality of the "unconscious ordering", and the worldview and rationality it gives rise to.³⁰

Post-structural Influences

Michael Shapiro, also a professor in the political science department at the University of Hawai'i, argued to Inayatullah that, in Inayatullah's words, "for futures studies to move forward it must engage with post-structuralism".³¹ Post-structuralism emerged in the second half of the 20th Century through such writers as Ferdinand de Saussure, Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida who essentially began to critique the "realist" positions of so-called "structuralists". In literary criticism "expressive realism", which asserts that an inspired author reaches a state of sensitivity in which he or she communicates an ahistorical but deep truth by way of talent and other specialnesses, was critiqued by those who did not see a special author receiving transcendent truths, but rather saw a text that was and continues to be interpreted according to the conveniences of the reader and their historical and spatial location. Instead of being a window into "truth", a literary text is ideologically constructed, "rooted in a specific historical situation and operating in conjunction with a particular social formation".³² In addition, the reading of a text involves ideological interests. The same bias toward "realism" existed in the human sciences, in

which sociologists, anthropologists and the like looked for permanent structures that could be isolated and said to apply to any society and culture—a permanent taxonomy of human existence—individual and social, without a reflexive understanding of how “real” changes occurred historically. This “structure” was effectively revealed to be a product of historically/spatially situated epistemes (knowledge boundaries/orderings of knowledge) in Michel Foucault’s *The Order of Things*, as earlier mentioned.

In *Reading the Post-Modern Polity*, Shapiro argued for a “genealogical” approach to political theory, one that situates a political discourse spatially and temporally in order to open a potential for alternative discourses. As such, Shapiro critiques Habermas for assuming that the subjects of which he speaks, and of which he articulates an intersubjective communicative process capable of transcending their living circumstances, have “intentional control” over the meanings that they use to communicate.³³ Shapiro argues, in the same vein as Jacques Derrida, that this control amounts to blindness with regard to a speaker’s historical tradition that gives rise to their communication and the immediate requirements (perhaps power/legitimation) that exist in the space and time of that speaker.³⁴ In other words, the negation of the situated-ness of our discourse amounts to a loss of agency in the presence of such discourse, while the acknowledgement of our situated-ness in a discourse allows for freedom and alternatives to arise. On a similar track, while a discourse creates intelligibility, allowing for rational communication and understanding, it also sidelines and ignores other discourses and thus other alternatives, which may be a high price to pay:*

...insofar as one succeeds in loosening the bland facticity of the present, contention is discerned where quiescence was supposed, and claims of authority become contentious rather than unproblematic. The way is then opened to inquire into the forms of power and authority that the practices of the present help to sustain.³⁵

...genealogists remain suspicious of all conversations, because they recognise that systems of intelligibility exist at the expense of alternatives. Therefore to strive to deepen intelligibility and provide more access within available conversations is to consolidate the power arrangements that the persistence of such conversations helps to maintain.³⁶

* I once heard Inayatullah say that “knowledge makes one stupid”. I pondered this for quite a while, wondering just how knowledge could make me stupid. After all, all of my studies and all of my travels had revealed the world to me, not concealed it. However, upon reading Alan Watts’ etymology of the word “ignorance” in *The Taboo on Knowing Who You Are*, it finally made sense. To be in a state of (-ance) not looking at (ignor-) constituted ignorance. When we focus on one thing we lose sight of the other.

And this is why Shapiro saw post-structuralism as essential to the progress of futures studies. The program in Hawaii was supposedly about “alternative futures”, yet there could be no alternatives in Shapiro’s view if one remained blind to one’s own discourse, one’s temporal (historic) and spatial (cultural/structural/power) situated-ness. One could spin out a hundred alternatives that, because they existed within the same epistemic boundaries, would simply be versions of each other. Alternatives could only arise through an understanding of how the discourse context frames issues.

By 1990 Inayatullah had articulated this approach applied to foresight through a paper published in *Futures* called ‘Deconstructing and reconstructing the future: Predictive, cultural and critical epistemologies’.³⁷ This piece was also influenced by Inayatullah's work in the Hawaii court system. In it he looked at how epistemic assumptions were embedded in planning and futures studies. He found that futures research could be grouped into three categories: futures research that focused on prediction worked for the purpose of control and extending power and assumed a deterministic universe, with the future a place to colonise; futures research that focused on culture worked towards insight, examining cultural images, myths, and “universal narratives that ensure basic human values”, plus the analysis of class, gender, ethnic and other categories; critical futures tried to “undefine” the future, to make existing categories and discourses problematic. This approach sees the present as “fragile”, as the victory of “one particular discourse”, and analyses forms of power which underpin these discourses.³⁸ CLA exists within the last category, but can also be a pathway for cultural research.

Intuitive Action Research

CLA was first tested at two conferences in Bangkok with Tony Stevenson, the first in 1991 at a futures conference dealing with pollution and overcrowding, and later in 1992 at a futures of ecology conference. Many students took part in this conference and helped Inayatullah to develop CLA. Tony Stevenson, a Brisbane-based futurist and former president of the World Futures Studies Federation, who also worked with a critical futures focus, lent Inayatullah a practice orientation, and was, in fact, one of the people who influenced him towards incorporating action research.

In Bangkok Inayatullah found that at the litany level the key transport issues were gridlock, pollution and waiting times. The solution was to hire consultants, transportation planners both local and international, with the agency coming from government and contractors. They would build more roads and make the system more efficient. At the social causes level the issue was systemic and strategic, with hyper-urbanisation, rapid development and economic growth creating the problem. Solutions were creating overpasses, switching from an industrial to an information economy, telecommuting and mobile phone use, using transportation modelling software etc. Agency came

from international and corporate bodies. At the worldview level the issue was the development model, the framework upon which Thailand had decided to develop. Thailand had inherited an industrial, big city outlook from the West. Inherent were assumptions about the idiocy of rural people (one should leave the farm and seek wealth in the city). The solutions at this level of analysis became to transform the development model, to create deep decentralisation and localism (“where local people control their economy and feel they do not have to leave their life and lifestyle”),³⁹ and to focus on agricultural reform and the dignity of work and on valuing local customs. The agents here are public intellectuals and social movements. Finally, at the myth level was “Bangkok, city of gold”, the image of the good life in the city, the story of making it big in a West-like setting. The solution here was to focus on indigenous metaphors, and to explore pre-modern/pre-industrial ways of knowing. The agents here were the mystics and fringe artists with their visions and sentiments for Bangkok.⁴⁰

The above shows a particular example of the outcome of one testing session. It is important to note that this period of testing and refining spanned at least six years, and continues today (2015). It was not simply a theory and methodology refined through a small pool of academics in a particular field, but used the feedback of many individuals from all walks of life. Other testing grounds were the Andorra World Futures Studies Federation futures studies course, Visioning workshops at Southern Cross University in 1994–95, and Queensland Advocacy Incorporated on disability futures 1994–95, to name a few. Through the first part of this period Inayatullah did not tell people he was “doing CLA”, he just did it. They would talk and he would organise the information based on the levels. But, after a while, this became too difficult so he began explaining the method to people.⁴¹ The method then evolved through working with others.*

* While working for NRMA, Inayatullah and Saliba saw that there were similarities between their two approaches. Saliba's talent was to include in these models intangible human issues, values, interests, and perceptions and see their relevance within organisational contexts. Upon mapping a “system” (more of a “context” in Saliba’s usage), he would change the assumptions underlying that system, thereby creating the starting point for an alternative future, scenarios that could be either normative, extrapolative or strategic. Inayatullah saw how this shifting of core assumptions could be used within an analysis of layered causality. As litany- and problem-oriented levels were nested in more intangible but more profound levels of worldview/episteme and myth/metaphor, Inayatullah saw that one could work down from superficial levels to deeper levels to access culturally-based worldviews and epistemes, then switch worldviews/epistemes or myths and metaphors, and give rise to radically different framings of issues, scenarios, and spaces for action. CLA could then be a discursive method. Instead of just a method of analysis to uncover cultural assumptions, perception, worldview, episteme, myth and metaphor, it could also be used as a way of breaking out of staid and constraining ways of knowing and discovering new ways of knowing that had more to offer.

During this time Gary Saliba, an Australian futurist, gave Inayatullah the idea of switching assumptions to arrive at alternative scenarios. While Saliba applied this to strategic scenario building, Inayatullah learned to apply this to worldview, episteme, myth or metaphor, switching these “horizontally” to arrive at alternative solutions or renditions of issues.

Publication

Inayatullah’s paper on CLA was at first rejected by the *Journal of Technological Forecasting and Social Change*: “the referees could not understand a word of it”. Although Inayatullah asked the editor for his opinion, he refused to engage with him. When he finally sent it to *Futures*, it was accepted and given a good response.⁴² This was in 1998.

Since then CLA has flourished as a methodology in the field of futures studies and, to a lesser extent, as a theory of knowledge. There have been numerous Doctoral and Master’s theses on the subject—to mention a few, doctoral theses by Ivana Milojević, Patricia Kelly, Phillip Daffara, Marcus Bussey, Marcus Anthony, Noni Kenny and Gilbert Fan. CLA is currently used and taught at universities throughout the world and is a problem-solving tool and future-creating process (deconstruction and reconstruction) in hundreds of organisations globally.

As with all new approaches to challenging official descriptions of reality, it is not without controversy; most recent has been the CLA-Integral debates which led to a special issue of the journal *Futures* focused on epistemological pluralism.⁴³ The main thrust of the argument was that theory and methods must have escape routes built into them or they become reified and part of the problem. By building in worldviews and myths/metaphors, CLA helps to ensure that one does not end up exclusively believing one’s own story.

Conclusion

Sohail Inayatullah’s journey began, when he was a child, with his inquiry into the nature of reality. Cross-cultural/cross-civilisational experience may have imprinted in him the existence of many ways of knowing, the horizontal dimension. His following and championing of P. R. Sarkar and meditation may have been primary in revealing *Kosas*, or layers of mind—and in providing him with direction. Academic research in Hawaii, and experience in that state’s court system gave him post-structural influences (Foucault and Shapiro), as well structural influences (Galtung), and a futures-oriented/planning approach to policy (1989). Slaughter’s typology provided the catalyst for the development of a method (1990); but Inayatullah was practise-oriented, perhaps something he picked up from his father’s interest in action research,⁴⁴ so he quickly began testing the method with people at futures conferences and workshops (1991–92). Upon moving to Australia, he continued to test the method (1994–). It was seven years

after conceiving of the idea of a layered method, and testing it in numerous places across the world that his paper on CLA was finally published in *Futures* (1998).*

In rounding off this narrative introduction to CLA, one question we may have is whether the thrust of the development of CLA is about creating a new method of inquiry (process-orientation), or rather about opening up spaces to alternative epistemes, cultural worldview, discourses (content-orientation). In typical form, Inayatullah's response to my question was not an either/or. In affirming CLA as a method he writes that:

[CLA is about] rethinking the nature of inquiry, from either/or to both/and, and ensure [sic] that the inquiry does not lose a vertical gaze, the notion of ethics. Move people to understand that long lasting change means being focused on myth and metaphor as well as worldview and policy. In that sense, CLA is about CLA, it is about the method.

In affirming CLA's relation to generating alternatives he writes:

... (the above statement) is the litany level. At the policy level, CLA is about changing how government policy is done. At the worldview, it is about an integrated planetary civilisation, post west and post east. At the myth, it is the mode from which a new story can arrive.⁴⁵

Finally, I would like to end with a disclaimer. I have not told the true history of CLA, and how it developed. Rather, I have interpreted and created a story that I hope makes sense. Many assumptions can be employed: if one favours agency, then it was Inayatullah's championing of CLA that existed. If one favours structure, then it was his historical context that caused CLA (from Pakistani child, post-structural scholar, the rise of futures studies, and the influence of critical futures). At the litany level it may have been publish or perish. At the social level, the need to find alternatives to the Western development model—CLA as intuitive action research. At the worldview level, Inayatullah's multi-civilisational influences and commitments—post-colonial multiculturalism. At the myth level, perhaps the Indian *Kosas* (shells)—“ecology nested in the mind”⁴⁶ and the inner journey. And a metaphor for this story? What might that be?

* Initially it was called Layered Causal Analysis, however, the then editor of *Futures*, Colin Blackman, suggested Causal Layered Analysis (Sohail Inayatullah, 'Futures visions for South-east Asia: Some early warning signals', *Futures*, Vol 27, No 6, 1995, 681–688).

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- ²⁰ S. Inayatullah (2002), op. cit.
- ²¹ Email transmission from Sohail Inayatullah, 14 July 2002.
- ²² W. I. Thompson (ed.), *Gaia, A Way of Knowing: Political Implications of the New Biology*, Boston, Lindisfarne Press, 1987.
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2. From Problem-space to Solution-space: Causal layered analysis and context-space mapping

Tom Graves*

Using cross-maps between CLA and other frameworks, such as SCAN (Simple, Complicated, Ambiguous, Not-known), the chapter explores how ‘poststructuralism as method’ can be applied to address a wide variety of “wicked problems” in social, business and other contexts.

Introduction

When I first came across causal layered analysis, more than a decade ago,¹ what perhaps struck me most was its subtitle of ‘poststructuralism as method’.² I’d previously seen several attempts to use deconstruction and similar techniques in social analysis and the like, but to me they all appeared to fall over at a first crucial hurdle: they seemed very keen to deconstruct everyone else’s beliefs and assumptions, but noticeably avoided doing so to their own. CLA was the first framework of this type that I’d seen that explicitly included such recursion as a key part of its own structure and internal make-up.

Over the intervening years I have researched and written extensively on recursive frameworks for what I call ‘context-space mapping’ (CSM)—mapping a socially-constructed interaction between so-called ‘problem-space’ and ‘solution-space’ in a given social or business context—and in particular their applications in the domains and disciplines of enterprise-architecture. What follows here is an edited extract from four related posts on my weblog:

- Context-space mapping with Enterprise Canvas³
- Causal layered analysis, SCCC and Cynefin⁴
- SCAN and causal layered analysis⁵
- Metaframeworks in practice, Part 4: Context-space mapping and SCAN⁶

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Context-space Mapping

How do we make sense of story—the stories and narratives and anecdotes that people tell each other and themselves about their world? How can we link the layers of story to help us make sense of some broader picture, or to derive a clearer view of some desired future?

In whole-of-enterprise architectures for business, we frequently come across what we might describe as “existential” questions:

- What business am I in?—really?
- Who else would be interested in what I’m working on? What value do I add right now?—if any?
- Where could I add value? In what contexts?
- With whom would I need to work on this? Who would be my prospective partners, clients and other business relationships?
- For whom could I most add value? Who would pay for it?—and why would they pay for it?
- How can I describe that value? How could I prove that value?
- How would I deliver that value? How would I prove that I’ve delivered it?
- How much could, would or should I charge for this?

In a social context, the language and focus and details of those questions would differ, but the core themes addressed by the respective questions would be much the same as above. Context-space mapping provides us with a way to explore such questions.

For many people, the initial problem with context-space mapping is that although it’s a very simple idea in practice, it can be surprisingly hard to explain on paper. The core of it comes down to just four keywords:

- *Sensemaking*—making sense of the context
- *Strategy*—deciding what to do with what we’ve discovered
- *Structures*—we look for patterns, for structures, for something that’s stable enough for us to build something on or with or around
- *Solutions*—we identify and/or define the detail of what we’re going to do within the chosen context

At first, that often looks like it would be a straightforward step-by-step process. Reality, though, is a great deal messier than that—so although these four steps above do represent the overall flow of what happens, in practice we’ll usually pass through most of these steps many times, in many different ways, and in just about any order, jumping back and forth between the respective emphases as we go.

In essence, we “go for a walk” in a kind of imaginary world, in order to make sense of the real one. The imaginary world is our sense or understanding of the context in scope—for example, as above, a business and its business-models, including the practical implementation and execution of those business-models. What we’d typically want to end up with is a detailed picture of what to do, to make all of that happen back in the real-world, and also—and this is important—some clear hints about what we need to watch for and to do to change that plan on the fly in response to the actual circumstances at the time: “no plan survives first contact with the enemy”, or, more generically, first contact with reality.




Figure 1. “Going for a walk” in a context-space map

To guide us, we’d start off with a fairly simple map—often just a list of categories of things or ideas or attributes. We then add more and more detail to that sensemaking map as we go. Walking around—metaphorically speaking—gives us many different views of the context, from many different directions, sometimes as a big-picture overview, sometimes right down into the fine detail. Using different model-types as overlays on the map creates further views—not so much filling in all of the missing pieces on a jigsaw as adding richness and depth to a hologram where every point contains every other point.

However, this can be a quick way to go crazy, if we don’t make proper use of the map. Many people get stuck in analysis-paralysis, for example; others mistake someone else’s pre-packaged “solutions” for strategies, and wonder why nothing works any more. Instead, everything is built up, layer upon layer, from the base-map, with which we start and to which we return whenever we realise that we’ve gotten lost somewhere. So the maps we use will matter a lot.

Context-space maps have two distinct components: a base-map, which provides a common frame of reference for a set of context-space maps; and any number of cross-maps—other models overlaid onto the base-map—that provide alternative views and categories for sensemaking in the same context. In practice, typical characteristics for a good base-map include:

- *Universality*—in principle, it covers the entire scope of a given context
- *Sensemaking*—its purpose is to guide overall sensemaking and decision-support (rather than design and implementation of a specific “solution”)
- *Simple partitioning*—it divides the context into a small number of regions or ‘domains’ (two or three to a dozen at most, and often including a “none-of-the-above” region)
- *Fluid boundaries*—boundaries between regions may be allowed to move, blur and/or be somewhat porous
- *Usage-dependent layout*—its layout may not be semantically significant, and may take any appropriate form

In the systems-theory terms that I use in my own work, each base-map is a *rotation* that provides multiple views into the same overall space. Ideally we also want it to illustrate the balance in the context (*reciprocation* and *resonance*), and preferably the layering (*recursion* and *reflexion*) in that context too.

On CLA

A thought occurred to me over time that causal layered analysis might also work well with this technique. Here’s the introduction to the original CLA paper:

Causal layered analysis is offered as a new futures research method. Its utility is not in predicting the future but in creating transformative spaces for the creation of alternative futures. Causal layered analysis consists of four levels: the litany, social causes, discourse/worldview and myth/metaphor. The challenge is to conduct research that moves up and down these layers of analysis and thus is inclusive of different ways of knowing.⁷

The way that CLA works is indicated by the paper’s subtitle, ‘post-structuralism as method’: we apply linguistic deconstruction and the like at each the four layers, or four “ways of knowing”, moving up and down the layers to elicit more information and experiences about and views on the overall context.

The view within the litany tends to be somewhat *simplistic*, a very polarised, rule-based and often Other-oriented view of the world—“*they* should”, “*they* shouldn’t be allowed to...” and so on—a relentless “litany of complaint”. The social causes view tends to be a bit more nuanced, more aware of real-

world *complications*; the discourse/worldview layer is more able to address yet deeper *complexities*; and so on. To me at least, this suggests a crossmap with the SCCC categorisation⁸ of ways of knowing—Simple, Complicated, Complex, Chaotic—as popularised in the Cynefin⁹ framework and elsewhere.




Figure 2. SCCC and CLA

Which in turn suggests a whole stream of other potentially useful crossmaps for context-space mapping with CLA.

Context-space Mapping with Domains of CLA

To extend this context-space mapping, we can identify distinct “phase-boundaries” between the domains in this vertical stack. For CLA, going “downwards”, these might be described as:

- Litany to social-causes: “let’s think about this a bit?”
- Social-causes to discourse/worldview: “is this a matter of opinion?”
- Discourse/worldview to myth/deep-metaphor: “is this a clash of paradigms?”




Figure 3. Phase-boundaries in CLA “stack”

And we can also crossmap those domains with other views—for example, a Jungian-derived set of categories¹⁰ that align well with the CLA set, the set of sensemaking/decision-making tactics from the Cynefin framework, and another matching set of decision-drivers:

- The litany—*Simple*—inner-truth (“Believer/Priest”): “sense, categorise, respond”: rule-based
- Social causes—*Complicated*—outer-truth (“Scientist”): “sense, analyse, respond”: algorithms
- Discourse/worldview’—*Complex*—outer-value (Technologist/Magician): “probe, sense, respond”: experiment, patterns, guidelines
- Myth/metaphor—*Chaotic*—inner-value (Artist): “act, sense, respond”: principles, values

This suggests, for example, that the litany could have a strong tendency towards over-certain and over-simplified notions of “the Truth”, endless blaming of the Other without any form of self-reflection or self-analysis, and knee-jerk responses through the use of over-simple categories, maybe predefined by some self-appointed “Priest of The Truth” in an opaque and literally unprincipled way. A variety of other cross-links and interpretations can be derived from the crossmap in a similar manner—any or all of them potentially useful, but none of them purporting to be “true” per se, exactly as in CLA itself.

This crossmap does conflict somewhat with the standard Cynefin description of the Chaotic domain, which, to some extent, implies that the Chaotic is somewhere we’d usually need to get away from as quickly as possible. The CLA mapping instead here suggests that the Chaotic is a valid and *important* domain in its own right—somewhere that might well be challenging at a deep personal level, but also somewhere we might want to stay and explore for a while, until the depths get a bit too much and we need to come back elsewhere for air. Again, notice that in context-space mapping, that kind of apparent-conflict is perfectly acceptable: both views are “true”, the concern is more about which view is *useful* for a given purpose.




Figure 4. Two-axis Jungian-type crossmap between SCC and CLA

So far this mapping has only been in the form of a single-axis, vertical stack; yet that last crossmap (Figure 3, above) suggests that it could *also* be viewed as a kind of two-axis matrix, around the Jungian axes of “inner-world” to “outer-world”, and “truth” to “value”. To construct this crossmap, we can twist the vertical stack into a Cynefin-like layout around those axes, with a central “the-everything” or “reality” domain to remind us that *both* perspectives are “true”.

This could in turn suggest further ideas about how and where and in what contexts to use CLA, and when to switch between the different types of deconstruction that apply in the respective CLA layers.

Causal Layered Analysis, Time-compression and Social Stress

For me, my previous experience with this type of context-space map also suggested another crossmap-overlay; in this case another vertical axis of *timescale*, paralleling the Jungian inner-world to outer-world axis, stretching from a real-time “now” at the base to “infinity-before-now” at the top. This isn’t so much a measure of time in general, but of *time available before a decision must be made*, to guide immediate action.

To me, this has important implications for CLA. The point is that what this crossmap suggests is that any sensemaking and decision-making in the Complex or Complicated domains—discourse/ worldview or analysis of social causes—will take *time*—a fact that may be painfully evident to anyone who works in those domains. Assessments of supposed social causes, for example, will all too often tend towards analysis-paralysis; assessments of discourse and worldview will tend to get bogged down in the complexities of arguments that are changed by the mere act of looking at them.




Figure 5. Time-axis added to SCCC/CLA crossmap

In practice, when time runs out at the point of action, what’s used is not the theory, the social causes and discourse/worldview, but the more everyday rules and assumptions of the litany, or—in those contexts where “the rules” don’t work or don’t seem to make sense any more—the often-unacknowledged deeper-stories of myth and metaphor, guiding decision-making by cultural or personal values rather than surface-level “received-truths”. A key practical challenge for CLA is therefore to find appropriate ways to link the “considered” decision-making—social-causes and discourse/worldview—to “real-time” decision-making—the litany and myth/metaphor—such that theory supports practice, and practice guides theory.

Also, as the available time gets squeezed—whether because we’re moving towards real-time anyway, or because of social-panic and similar pressures—we end up being forced more and more into the sensemaking/decision-making spaces of the Simple and the Chaotic: otherwise known as CP Snow’s *Two Cultures*,¹¹ the classic worldviews of the sciences and the arts respectively. We might also note, using CLA recursively, that the assertions of those respective paradigms become more and more extreme as we move towards real-time.

What this also suggests is that when a culture is under stress, it will automatically tend towards this kind of Two Cultures dichotomy, between “Truth” (Simple) versus “Value” (Chaotic)—itself a dichotomy that often becomes over-Simple. The “Truth”-meme will tend to dismiss anything not-True as “anarchy”, but its inherently constrained set of categories will, almost by definition, never be sufficient to deal with inherent uncertainty: hence the kind of “collapse into chaos” described in the Cynefin model. On the other side, the “Value”-meme is—again almost by definition—seemingly

unlikely to generate any kind of stable categorisation through which a Simple-domain mode can make sense.

What we see in practice is that as the social stress increases and the links between people fragment, those Simple categories of *shared* “inner truths”—“what is True for *we*”—tend to separate out into *self-specific* “inner truths”—“what is True for *me*”. This also leads to a loss of awareness of the necessary *mutuality* of responsibilities that underpins all social constructs such as rights, such that “our rights” becomes reframed solely in terms of “*my* rights”: “we hold these truths to be self-evident” morphs into a self-centred demand to the Other to “hold *my* truths to be self-evident”, and so on.

And without shared-categories, any social structure based on a Simple “sense/categorise/respond” will, by definition, start to break down. The usual result is a spiralling descent into an out-of-control litany of complaint, first to “What’s in it for *me*?”, then “Me first!”, to a fully self-centred “Me-only!”, and eventually a truly chaotic cacophony of “Me! Me! *Me!*”—otherwise known as “kiddies’-anarchy”. In a very literal sense, the Simple *inherently* becomes Chaotic. And there doesn’t seem to be any direct “truth”-based path back from there, other than through some forceful imposition of rule and rules: either the “dictator’s gambit” or, in rarer cases, the “Truth of the Prophet”.

Yet from the opposite side of the “truth/value” dichotomy, what *does* seem to work is re-focusing on “inner-value”, on deep principles and, especially, deep myth. It may have a surface appearance of the Chaotic, but actually develops its own simplicity: a *functional* and, often, highly-disciplined form of anarchy, rather than a dysfunctional one. Given that sensemaking/decision-making pattern of “act/sense/respond”, the very act of expression often means that whatever arises will automatically take on a social form.

Again, from practical experience, these context-specific images seem to act as “seeds” around which directed action can coalesce—much as would happen in the more usual move into the Complex domain, except that the time pressures or social-context pressures mean that it *actually* remains within the pressure-cooker of the Chaotic. The more that the focus can be held on this mode of the Chaotic-domain, the more ideas can be created—and the more the emphasis is held on the decision-making guides of the respective principles and values, the more likely it is that these ideas and images will be experienced as “of value” *within* that context. The various ways in which directed action can coalesce around these “seeds” can sometimes—perhaps often—lead to enough of a structure to enable a Simple-type sense/categorise/respond mode of decision-making: in other words, something that is more generally actionable than a highly-personal “inner-value”. This, in turn, can provide enough of an anchor for a more

balanced and principles-guided way out of the crisis—a “values”-based way back to “truth”.

In short, what all of this suggests is that *the key people in a major social crisis are the artists and storytellers*. The military commanders and managers and the priests—the “truth-holders” who maintain order—may come to the fore *before* the collapse, or *after* the recovery has started; but *in the midst of the crisis* it is those who normally live close to Chaos to whom the baton must be passed.

CLA and SCAN

The SCCC-categorisation is useful as a base-map for context-space mapping, but unlike CLA it is not inherently iterative, re-entrant or recursive. In part to resolve this, I developed a framework called SCAN—Simple, Complicated, Ambiguous, Not-known.¹²

On the surface, it’s just a two-axis framework.¹³ The vertical-axis is the same as in the cross-map above—an indicator of available-time-before-now, with “Now!” as the baseline, stretching upward to infinity. The horizontal-axis is, in theory, a measure of modality or probability, but can take a variety of forms, such as certainty versus uncertainty, predictability versus unpredictability, and sameness versus difference;¹⁴ in each case, absolute certainty or predictability or equivalent is on the far left of the frame, and extends out to the matching infinity (such as absolute uncertainty) on the far right.




Figure 6. SCAN framework as base-map for context-space mapping

Crucial transitions occur in both dimensions. The transition in the vertical axis is, in effect, that between plan and action: what we *intend* to do, versus what we *actually* do at the moment of action. The horizontal axis transition is, somewhat jokingly described as the Inverse-Einstein test:¹⁵ on the left-

side of the transition, doing the same thing leads to the (apparently) same results, whilst on the other, doing the same thing leads to different results, or different things need to be done to get to the same results. Importantly, the transition-points on both axes can be highly-dynamic, and are also recursive, in that the characteristics of the SCAN domains can also apply to the domain-boundaries themselves.

Relevant here is that, as can be seen in an appropriate cross-map, the dynamic-layering in CLA also lines up well with the SCAN framework.

There's a crucial transition in CLA between the social causes and worldview layers that almost exactly mirrors the Inverse-Einstein test in SCAN. The social causes layer reviews the detail (and endless complaints) of the litany layer, and in some cases re-informs, re-affirms and guides the litany, *but does not question the assumptions on which the litany is based.**




Figure 7. Crossmap between SCAN and CLA

It's a description of a presumed-unambiguous world: in essence, it assumes that the litany *is* "true", rather than describing it *as if it were* "true"—a perhaps-subtle yet very important distinction. The transition to the worldview layer, and, deeper, the mythic layer, requires a willingness to let go of the assertion that there is just one single view of the world that is true—in practice, this requirement that can be extremely challenging for many people, even though it's perhaps the only way that works for building a viable sense of the whole-as-whole.

* For a real-world illustration of this, compare the various descriptions of the same event in different newspapers or other media: each describes and reviews the event from its own unquestioned worldview.

Also notable in this crossmap is the implication that as we move towards real-time action, the options get squeezed right down to either the litany, or the mythic: there simply isn't time for anything else. And if we don't have access to the mythic, then all we have available to us is the litany, the Simple and Belief-based view of the world—which often doesn't align well with the real world at all. Yet since the Belief is always purported to be “the Truth”, it's presumed that it is the *world* that is “at fault” whenever any “myth-quake”¹⁶ of misalignment occurs, not the beliefs. Hence, all too often, the litany is a “litany of complaint”.

A Practical Summary

Cross-mapping between causal layered analysis and the Cynefin-like SCCC-categorisation with the now-to-infinity timescale of the SCAN framework can deliver some useful insights about how to address high-stress social contexts—such as the kind of mess that our entire global economic system seems likely to be heading into. The main points I see arising from the cross-map include:

- Causal layered analysis is likely to be a useful technique in whole-enterprise architecture and other forms of engagement in large-scale change;
- Time-compression (reduced time for decision-making, often combined with high contextual stress) is likely to squeeze sensemaking-decision-making into a tight dichotomy between the Simple and the Chaotic (SCCC) or Not-known (SCAN) domains;
- Simple delivers consistency under high social-stress, up to a critical collapse-point, whilst the Chaotic or Not-known appears to be a potentially dangerous distraction;
- Under very high social-stress, Simple tends to collapse into dysfunctional chaos, whereas Chaotic or Not-known is usually able to regenerate a sufficient basis for rule-structures that restabilise the Simple;
- Use CLA in the Simple domain (the litany) to identify risk of collapse: the risk increases with increasing social-fragmentation from “we” to “me”; and
- Use CLA in the Chaotic or Not-known domain (myth/metaphor) to identify and support principles and values that can guide directed action during the peak of the crisis.

Some points specific to whole-enterprise architectures and related interventions:

- Identify Chaotic-domain “natives” (people who naturally work at the CLA deep-myth/metaphor layer) such as design-thinkers, artists and, especially, storytellers within the shared enterprise;

- Work with these people to identify and express key principles and values within the shared enterprise that would be viewed as “normative”—i.e. a “preferred direction” (*warning*: these principles and values *must* be allowed to emerge from the collective shared-space, and *must* be respected as such—they *will fail* if imposed, or even appear to be imposed, from “outside”); and,
- Ensure that the usual “truth-holders” are aware of and accept that there is a critical point at which they *must* let go of control, *must* allow the Chaotic domain to be what it is, *must* relinquish authority to the “storytellers”, and *must* accept and renegotiate with the “new order” that arises out of the “guided chaos” (*warning*: refusal to follow this long-proven success-pattern, or attempts to “take control” too early in the transition through the Chaotic domain, *will guarantee failure* for everyone concerned, *including* the “truth-holders”).

In effect, this is a method for defining a governance process for use in contexts where a conventional rule-based approach to governance will naturally break down—an interesting recursion!

¹ Strategic Foresight course at Swinburne University, with Professor Richard Slaughter, February 2003.

² S. Inayatullah, ‘Causal layered analysis: Poststructuralism as method’, from *Questioning the Future: Futures Studies, Action Learning and Organizational Transformation*, Tamsui, Tamkang University Press, 2002.

³ T. Graves, ‘Context-space mapping with the enterprise canvas’, retrieved 5 November, 2013, from <http://weblog.tetradian.com/contextspace-mapping-with-ecanvas/>.

⁴ T. Graves, ‘Causal layered analysis, SCCC, and cynefin’, retrieved 5 November, 2013, from <http://weblog.tetradian.com/causal-layered-analysis-sccc-and-cynefin/>.

⁵ T. Graves, ‘SCAN and causal layered analysis’, retrieved 5 November, 2013, from <http://weblog.tetradian.com/scan-and-causal-layered-analysis/>, 24 October 2012, retrieved 5 November, 2013.

⁶ T. Graves, ‘Metaframeworks in practice, Part 4: Context-space mapping and SCAN’, retrieved 5 November, 2013, from <http://weblog.tetradian.com/metaframeworks-pt4-csm-and-scan/>.

⁷ S. Inayatullah, ‘Causal layered analysis: Poststructuralism as method’, retrieved 16 November, 2013, from <http://www.metafuture.org/Articles/CausalLayeredAnalysis.htm>.

⁸ T. Graves, SCCC: Simple, complicated, complex, chaotic, retrieved 16 November, 2013, from <http://weblog.tetradian.com/sccc-simple-complicated-complex-chaotic/>.

⁹ D. Snowden & M. Boone, ‘A leader's framework for decision making’, *Harvard Business Review*, November 2007, 69–76.

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- ¹⁰ T. Graves, 'Sensemaking and the swamp-metaphor', retrieved 16 November, 2013, from <http://weblog.tetradian.com/sensemaking-and-swamp-metaphor/>.
- ¹¹ C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1959.
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- ¹³ T. Graves, 'Domain and dimensions in SCAN', retrieved 16 November, 2013, from <http://weblog.tetradian.com/domains-dimensions-in-scan/>.
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3. Roads Less Travelled: Different methods, different futures

Andrew Curry and Wendy Schultz*

This chapter compares CLA with three other scenario building methods: the 2×2 matrix approach, the Manoa approach and scenario archetypes. It investigates whether these different scenario generation methods create distinctly different outputs, and their respective strengths and weaknesses when utilised in a workshop setting. †

Introduction

Proponents of different scenarios methods often make claims for the value and benefits of their preferred approach. Yet there is little in the literature which seeks to evaluate the different types of futures insight which emerge when different scenarios methods are used, the way in which choice of method might influence the types of conversations that are enabled by different scenarios processes, or the benefits and risks in using one approach over another.

This pilot project sought to address this gap by using a set of drivers from a specific project, in the public domain, as a platform for evaluating different scenarios outcomes of different scenario-building methods. We tested four methods, representing a range of different approaches: the 2×2 deductive approach, causal layered analysis, the Manoa method, and scenario archetypes. The project can be thought of as a practitioner's exploration of methods that allowed us to draw comparative conclusions about outcomes. A longer version of this paper was first published in the *Journal of Futures Studies*.¹

The set of drivers which we used as a platform for the research was developed for the Carnegie UK Trust's project on the future of civil society in Britain and Ireland, published as *The Shape of Civil Society to Come*.²

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† A version of this paper was first published in the *Journal of Futures Studies*, May 2009, Vol 13, No 4, 2009, 35–60.

The term “scenarios”, now widely used, has come to denote stories or narratives of alternative possible futures.³ The field as a whole agrees that these depictions are not predictions: their primary purpose is to guide exploration of possible future states. Their goal is to “disturb the present”, in Gaston Berger’s words.⁴ The best scenarios do this by describing alternative future outcomes that diverge significantly from the present. Thus the notions of difference and depth underpin our curiosity about how distinctive the output might be from our chosen scenario methods.

As well as difference and depth, we were also interested in two other dimensions of scenario building: first, do these methods assist in creating a clear narrative of how each scenario emerged? Second, how participatory is the process, and what is the quality of engagement?

To some extent, any scenario method can be completed as a desk research exercise. But creating scenario processes that effectively produce change means creating participatory processes: scenarios generate new behaviour only insofar as they generate new patterns of thinking across a significant population within an organisation. So how engaging is each method, and what kind of thinking, conversation, and energy does each method produce in participants?⁵

Introduction to the Carnegie work and a summary of the drivers data

The data for this research project, including the drivers of change and the stakeholder interviews, have been taken from a futures project carried out for the Carnegie UK Trust’s Democracy and Civil Society Programme on the future of civil society in Britain and Ireland to 2025. Carnegie is a non-profit organisation, and the programme was designed to inform a Commission of Inquiry which it funded in 2007.⁶

A number of reasons suggested this project as the feedstock for our comparative scenarios methods research. The main one was that the output of the drivers analysis phase of the project had been published in a reasonably substantial report, *The Shape of Civil Society To Come*, which is now available online.⁷ In addition, both authors were centrally involved in the project; unpublished background material was available to us; and the client was sympathetic. Civil society is also a domain of which virtually everyone has some experience, as members, participants or volunteers. This seemed a valuable attribute in the context of a small research project, and one designed for a broad futures audience.*

* For clarity it should be noted that in the original project we went on to use causal layered analysis in large group workshops to develop a set of scenarios for the future of civil society. For the present research we discounted this output so that the approach to using the four methods was broadly comparable.

Research Design

The research was designed to explore whether different scenario development methods produced different scenarios, and/or different types of futures or strategic conversation, and would therefore generate different types of insight into a given futures question.

As stated, the methods we selected for this pilot were the 2×2 ‘double uncertainty’ method, causal layered analysis, Manoa, and futures archetypes. In choosing these methods, we were looking for variety. The ‘double uncertainty’ method effectively chose itself, because of its dominance in the northern hemisphere and because of its prevalence in the world of business-oriented futures.⁸ Causal layered analysis was identified as a more integrative approach, located within critical futures studies, developed at least in part as a critique of the limitations of the ‘double uncertainty’ approach. We were interested in testing whether its claims to produce a different type of scenario, and a different type of futures conversation, could be substantiated.

The Manoa method was initially developed by Wendy Schultz at the Hawai’i Research Center for Futures Studies.⁹ Although little known, it was selected because of its emphasis on “maximising difference” through a focus on emerging issues rather than on drivers of change.

Finally, the fourth method, futures archetypes, was chosen out of curiosity. There is some scepticism in the futures community of the value of using archetypes as a frame for scenario development. This is despite its role as a foundation of valuable futures techniques such as incasting.

There are obviously other methods which have been left out. For example, we did not have the experience or technical expertise to use ‘prospective’ methods. However, to the extent that all futures work can be thought of as a combination of making the future strange and making it manageable, each of the four methods appeared to us to represent a different mixture of these goals.

The research design for this path-finding piece of research was largely straightforward. Using material from the drivers research from the Carnegie UK Trust project we ran a pair of workshops at The Futures Company. Participants included Futures Company colleagues and some external guests. During each of the workshops, we explored two methods. The scenario development, therefore, was done relatively quickly.* There was a chance that the speed and constraints of the overall process may have influenced the

* There is more detail on the research methodology in the *Journal of Futures Studies* version of this paper.

outcomes, but looking at the overall output, it does not appear that this had a material effect.*

Applying Four Scenario Generation Methods to the Carnegie UK Data

The following section describes the basic research activities and output. We report in turn on each method—2x2 matrix; causal layered analysis; Manoa; and scenario archetypes. Each report offers a brief description of the method's origin, a summary of the instructions, and a précis of the resulting scenarios.

Method 1: 2x2 matrix 'double uncertainty'

The 2x2 scenarios matrix method, also known as the 'double uncertainty' method, is probably the most widely used scenarios development technique in the United States, the United Kingdom and Western Europe. It has been called the "gold standard of corporate scenario generation".¹⁰

The model is, at least on the face of it, a simple one. Through analysis of 'driving forces', one identifies 'critical uncertainties' which frame a futures landscape. Through exploring the outcomes when each of the uncertainties combines with another, scenarios are developed.

Why has it become such a dominant method? It has some advantages. The method appears to need less interpretation by a skilled facilitator; a clear "audit trail" can be constructed from the drivers to the axes of uncertainty, and thence to the scenarios. The sense that the four scenarios represent an overall futures space can also be comforting. The method has also been well promoted. The single best-known scenarios book in print, Peter Schwartz's *The Art of the Long View*, includes the method in an appendix, and it is also well-represented in Gill Ringland's *Scenario Planning* textbook.¹¹

But it also has its critics. The best known, Richard Slaughter, follows Ken Wilber in describing the approach as creating what he calls "flatland"; a set of future worlds in which "current ideologies... were insufficiently problematised and seen as natural".¹²

The 2x2 matrix 'double uncertainty' scenarios

The scenarios that emerged were as follows:

* The focus of the research was on understanding the relationship between the drivers and the scenarios which evolve from this through the application of different scenarios methods. In terms of a credible futures project, this would represent only the first half of the work: understanding implications and making choices would follow.




Figure 1. 2x2 'Double Uncertainty' schematic

The core of the 2x2 double uncertainty method is that the two axes represent the most significant uncertainties of the overall system under scrutiny (the system is defined by the project question). For the purpose of this research, we asked two colleagues who had not been involved in the original research, but who had experience of other futures projects, to develop axes from the Carnegie drivers impact matrix (part of the project resource).

Their axes were tested and further refined in the working session. They were, respectively, about the relationships between individuals and institutions ("top down" vs. "bottom up"), and the nature of identity and social cohesion ("my identity" vs. "our identity"). This is summarised in Figure 1.

A (top left): A fragile state that "others" outsiders in order to maintain its position; civil society is tolerated if it is seen to further national goals. Legitimacy is maintained by frequent referenda; minorities and dissidents are marginalised, or worse.

B (top right): Social networks create momentum around popular issues; companies embrace volunteering and social engagement to enhance recruitment and reputation. Everything is negotiated, slowly. National stories are told and retold. There are strong spatial disparities.

C (bottom right): A coffee house culture, with a weak centre, in which civil society acts as a bridge between different ethnic and cultural groups. Identity extends beyond place to cultural communities and diasporas are influential. People stretch between identities.

D (bottom left): A strong sense of national identity, negotiated between the state and different ethnic and religious groups, and formally constructed within public institutions and organisations. Civil society organisations act as forums and as a way to articulate identity to the state. The excluded can tend towards violence.

Method 2: Causal layered analysis

Causal layered analysis (CLA) was developed by the futurist Sohail Inayatullah as a way of integrating different futures perspectives—the empirical, the interpretive, and the critical—within one approach. The purpose of so doing is to ensure that “the research and discovery process is open to different ways of knowing”.¹³ As is explained elsewhere in this volume, CLA translates these different ways of knowing into four layers.




Figure 2. Causal layered analysis process

The layers of CLA represent different ways of perceiving the world, and arguably different timeframes, but Inayatullah takes care to say that no layer is privileged, and that the perspectives on the future emerge from interaction between the layers. In these acts of perception, one of the objectives is to create “distance” from the present. Although there is a developing literature on CLA, it has not been explored as much as the ‘double uncertainty’ method, and, in terms of practice, the method is not yet widely known, certainly outside the Asia-Pacific region.

The scenarios are developed in two stages. An analysis phase works through the layers to worldview and metaphor, then these are ‘inflected’, and the

scenario is developed by reinterpreting the layers in light of the inflection. In the workshop process for this paper, the litanies clustered, eventually, around three themes, and thence into three scenarios. The types of litany statements which were offered, to take some from the around 25 that were generated: “By 2025 no-one will be volunteering for anything”; “globalisation will erode all of the local colour in our organisations”; “civil society will have to meet the needs which the government can’t or won’t”; “by 2025 we’ll all be collecting money on the internet”; and, “civil society is the only defence against the state”.

The three themes which emerged for analysis were:

- The struggle of global civil society to face global problems;
- The collapse of the local; and
- Civil society acting as a bulwark against political and commercial interests.

1. Global civil society

The first scenario is a future dominated by large scale systemic problems that people seek to address at that scale, aided by technology, social networks, and patterns of migration. International institutions, however, are too cumbersome to address these issues effectively. The dominant ideology is about economic growth. There are competing worldviews, between commons and enclosure, self-interested and holistic views of the planet.

Inflecting this for the scenarios development process, the emerging scenario is of “civil society as the guardian of the future”—both of future generations, and also of the non-human future. This was connected to the Iroquois idea of the “seven generations”. But this involves civil society organisations participating in political processes rather than merely critiquing.

2. What happens locally?

The analysis and exploration of this theme starts from a fragmented world in which no-one has time; and much of what time there is is spent online. Local organisations are weaker, partly because of economic concentration and less sense of place. The worldviews: “my world” is more important than “our world”, breadth is better than depth, and—to borrow from Jane Jacobs—“traders” are more important than “guardians”.¹⁴

Building the scenario, we see civil engagement emerging through social engagement (*cf.* the Grameen Bank), with wider connections enabled digitally. Digital technologies also help people to rebuild local communities, and to reassert the importance of place.

3. Bulwark against strong interests

In the litany for this theme, civil society is a separate sphere which protects us against powerful interests which do not necessarily have *our* best interests

at heart. Civil society is protected by laws about freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, and it speaks for the marginalised. The worldview that underpins this is drawn from the European “enlightenment tradition”.

This worldview could be challenged by different cultural perspectives, such as Confucianism or Buddhism; and this opened up a discourse on Chinese Mandarinism and the British civil service’s use of the word “mandarin” as a metaphor. The scenario which emerged was one in which civil society organisations must earn their right to contribute through the quality of their work, before the mandarin class will engage with them.

Method 3: Manoa scenario building

If we think of the 2×2 approach as “binary” in posing two axes of uncertainty against each other to generate scenarios, then the Manoa approach is conceptually nearer to a complex adaptive system’s response to chaos (change turbulence). It is closer in nature to List’s ‘network scenarios’ than to the other methods explored here.¹⁵ The Manoa approach assumes that actual futures are generated by the turbulent intersection of multiple trends. Thus Manoa requires a feedstock of at least three orthogonal drivers of change, preferably emerging issues or “weak signals”. The design is best suited to creating scenarios 25+ years out, maximally different from the present: it aims to produce surprising scenarios that shake current working assumptions. It has been used in a range of projects in Hawai’i, in teaching and training, and as a basis for new scenario processes.¹⁶




Figure 3. Manoa impact cascades and cross-impacts

The Manoa approach involves five steps:

1. Choose 3–5 significant emerging issues of change (“weak signals”);
2. Brainstorm or mindmap the potential impact cascades of each, working one by one;
3. Consider the cross-impacts arising from the 3–5 drivers working together;
4. Double-check the depth of detail using an ethnographic inventory; and
5. Develop a summary metaphor or title.

The Manoa scenario for civil society

This approach immediately posed a dilemma: the other three techniques effectively began after the significant drivers had been identified, but Manoa instead required starting with weak signals of change.* We therefore reviewed the original list of potential drivers and chose three that seemed—relatively—to be the newest to emerge: “Multi-polar spirituality”; “Security state: the surveillance society” (seen as new in capability, given the NBIC (nano-bio-info-cogno) convergence); and “Agelessness: long, long, healthy, active life”. Finally, the Manoa scenario process first builds the scenarios as general images of possible futures, and then asks how the topic or issue will play out in the particular domain. Thus this scenario exposes changes relevant to civil society while not explicitly addressing it.

The vivid details that emerged for this scenario included the following highlights, organised by emerging issue (the resulting scenario—described at more length in the original paper—assumes that these changes are interacting to create the fabric of the emerging future):

- Multi-polar spirituality: new spiritual processes, practices, and places would emerge, especially new “technologies of happiness”—practices more than hardware. Society would approach happiness as an art and a “science”, seeing it as an essential component of good health. Shamanism would be a growth industry.
- Security state: communities will be safer, and need less policing. But the nature of crime, evidence, and privacy is transformed. Evidence is gleaned

* This distinction is imperfectly understood. For example, Bishop et al. err in describing Manoa as a method by which to generate “baseline” scenarios from current trends. It is also unevenly applied: given that Manoa can create divergent, transformative scenarios even from strong current trends, some might argue that the distinction is unnecessary. Since Manoa operates with a time horizon of at least 25–30 years, weak signals offer a more appropriate starting point, given the S-curve life cycle model: Manoa is designed to explore possible futures at the maturity point of a change that is today a mere twinkle in the public eye.

from endless pattern recognition analysis of surveillance feeds, leading to a social backlash, while the value of “going off the grid” skyrockets.

- Agelessness: long, long, healthy lives result in greatly extended—or even eradicated—life stages. Older people don’t retire, so younger workers are promoted less often and the “glass ceiling” hardens, generating resentment. It results in a leisure backlash that embraces extreme experiences as an antidote to “experience ennui”.
- Cross-impacts—the scenario fabric: New “grey spiritualism” encompasses greater conscious choice regarding life stages and death. Yoga keeps old joints flexible while engendering spiritual balance. Agelessness strains society’s carrying capacity. But the multi-polar spiritual renaissance acts as a moderating influence in the public discourse about the deployment of surveillance.

Method 4: Generating scenarios using archetypes

Since the mid-1970s, the Hawai’i Research Centre for Futures Studies has been using a workshop forecasting technique called “incasting”: participants are presented with scenarios to explore; the scenarios are deliberately written very generally, and participants are asked to add details to them, using their imagination while respecting the logical consistency of each scenario.



Figure 4. Scenario archetypes

The original scenarios were derived from a content analysis of futures research and forecasts available in the seventies. Six families of images of the future emerged from this analysis: “Continued Growth” (sometimes

called “Business as Usual” or “Present Trends Extended”); “Ideological Exclusionism” (originally called the “Disciplined Society”—essentially, variants of conservatism and fundamentalism); Environmental Sustainability (the “Green Politics” scenario); “High Technology Transformation”; “Spiritual Transcendence”; and “Collapse”.

The archetype scenarios

We created “decks” of the feedstock Carnegie data—both the main drivers of change, and reflective quotes drawn from stakeholder interviews. Participants in our trial workshop were assigned an archetype. The participants chose not to explore a separate collapse scenario, due to time pressures. Longer versions were published in the original paper.

1. Continued growth

In the continued growth archetype, the culture is essentially materialist, dynamics essentially win-lose, and research reductionist. Growth comes through technological innovation. Civil society becomes much more businesslike. Civil society would serve to “get the best out of pluralism”—managing diversity and massaging some of the negative effects of this future world.

2. Ideological exclusionism

This archetype assumes hierarchic political and economic systems, which promote rule of law: a disciplined society. Major actors work in a “win-exclude” mode. The law promotes the stability of belief systems. Civil society no longer takes a bridging role. Instead, it puts care back into society, looking after individuals regardless of affiliation. Most civil society organisations are licensed or formally sanctioned.

3. Environmental sustainability

The “green” archetype assumes new political and economic models that are more communitarian and promote the “rights of nature”. Dynamics focus on win-win solutions; research approaches problems holistically. Change is incremental, with attention paid to consequences for the natural world. Civil society provides conceptual structures for the debate about climate change and sustainability. Different civil society “brands” form as a response to competing perspectives.

4. High technology transformation

In this archetype, “Change ROCKS!” It suggests open source or anarchic political and economic systems, and promotes the outer journey of maximised individual experience. Major actors engage in “win-evolve” dynamics based on complexity theory, and research is transformational. Civil society will focus more on issues than place, leveraging social networks into

communities of interest. “Short, fast, and fluid” characterises both society as a whole and civil society within it.

5. Spiritual transcendence

The final—and rarest—archetype comprises political, economic, and social systems that might be characterised as “collegially selfless” (think Bhutan monastery) and a worldview that promotes the inner journey, with “win-enlighten” dynamics. Technological and economic change is deliberately slowed to de-emphasise the material. In this future, civil society takes a turn for the intimate, emerging as smaller grass-roots organisations focused on self-help. It is a less instrumental society, more focused on right living than goal-oriented good works.

Reviewing the Outcomes

The objective of this pilot research project was simple: to use the same set of project data as the basis for a range of different scenario creation methods in order to find out if this produced different scenarios. The answer to this question is an unequivocal “yes”. The scenario stories generated by the different methods were very different from one another. We also learned that different methods can produce substantively different types of futures conversations, assessed by range and type of discussion and the apparent energy level in the room. As a prelude to comparative analysis, it is worth reviewing specific findings from each method.

2×2 matrix ‘double uncertainty’ method

For the double uncertainty method—this is an obvious point, but under-represented in the futures literature—there is almost complete dependency on getting the axes “right”, at a technical level (they do not collapse onto one another), at an analytical level (they do represent the most significant uncertainties), and at a strategic level (they generate strategic insight). If they turn out to be flimsy in one of these dimensions, there is little choice but to go back to the axes and re-work them (and therefore the scenarios).

The second noticeable feature of the 2×2 matrix model, which came to light when reviewing the output, was the way in which individual axes, if not pairs of axes, tend to repeat within the same domain. The “my identity” vs. “our identity” axis, about degrees of social cohesion, was all but identical to an axis that emerged in some recent work (not presently published) done by the Futures Company with a development charity. It is hard to determine what the effect of this might be on the scenarios that emerge, and the phenomenon has barely been touched on in the literature.

Third, the nature of the 2×2 matrix produces a consistency of tone and of perspective across the scenarios. This is a strength and a weakness. The strength is that the scenarios emerge as comparable futures worlds, which

appear to cover a large part of the futures space; in this case, for example, the scenarios largely operated at the level of the nation state. The weakness is that this comparability produces a homogeneity of description and of language. There was little novelty in the conversations as we filled in the worlds of the 2×2, and few flashes of insight. This is not to say that it was dull; it felt like solving a puzzle, as we teased out the coherent world defined by each combination of uncertainties. One participant noted to us afterwards: “We looked at these [four] worlds from the outside and did not really attempt to situate ourselves in them, so narratively they are impoverished as a result”. It is not clear whether this was a function of time or of a certain “distancing” that the method tends to produce. In addition, the sense of the coverage of a particular futures space is partly an illusion, which can blind participants to disruptive change which might emerge from outside of the world defined by the “important” drivers of change.

Causal layered analysis

Causal layered analysis is designed to integrate different ways of knowing and understanding the future, and to create spaces for the development of transformative futures.¹⁷ Our learning from this project is that CLA succeeds in this. Compared to the other three methods that we tested, the CLA conversation opened up lines of discussion which were more likely to draw on historical perspectives, philosophical constructs, and cultural (and cross-cultural) references. It also appears that it is the method itself, and the questions it requires you to ask as you navigate its layers, that generates these perspectives.

The second observation is that, coming to the CLA process from other scenario-building approaches, it was sometimes necessary to remind oneself during the analysis phase that the scenario development process (and the development of alternative futures) does not begin until after the worldview and/or metaphor layers have been first constructed and then inflected to disrupt the prevailing view.

Some of the specific questions asked while exploring the systems layer, in particular about who is privileged and who is silenced, led to greater clarity than the conversation about “winners and losers” which we had during the 2×2 scenario development phase. In practice, this suggests that the quality of output of a typical 2×2 scenarios process would be strengthened by asking some of these CLA-derived questions—some practitioners may already do this.

The third observation is that in practice it did not appear necessary to deal with the metaphor layer in any detail, and that the process is sufficiently robust to withstand this weakness on the part of facilitators and group. There was no noticeable difference in the quality of the scenarios for which we had developed a good understanding of the prevailing worldview, but had not

identified a persuasive metaphor, and those built from both worldview and metaphor. (Which is not to say that the metaphor conversation is without value; it tended to open up new lines of conversation even if it didn't actually identify metaphors.) In practice, the method is resilient. If a scenario seems insubstantial or incoherent, the workshop would work back through the layers which have led to that particular scenario emerging to understand why.

Finally, the range of scenarios that emerged from the process was qualitatively different from the range which emerged from the 'double uncertainty' method. Instead of all occurring at the level of the nation state, one was an international scenario with national implications, one was clearly national and one was local and regional. Andy Hines has suggested that CLA might work less well in organisational cultures which are homogenous or have a hegemonic worldview.¹⁸ This may be true, although the depth which CLA tends to explore could have a valuable disruptive effect on such cultures. The question raised by the research is whether the range of the scenarios would make it harder for organisations to deduce strategic insight from them. This may also be a function of an organisation's culture. At this stage, however, this remains a hypothesis, since it was beyond the scope of this research.

Manoa scenario building

This approach was designed to maximise difference from the present in order to challenge the present. As a process, it also focuses on helping people understand the dynamics of change rippling through various systems. Even in the limited amount of time available to the participants—and without completing all of the steps of the process—it generated a quite divergent alternative future.

During the futures wheels step, the instructions urge people not just to brainstorm impacts of change, but also to identify backlash responses and emerging dynamics of acceleration or constraint where cascading impacts collide. As a consequence, this scenario encompassed more detail about contradictions and tensions within the future, adding to its credibility. What it did not (and does not) do was directly address the topic—the future of civil society. That perhaps seems odd, but the method assumes users will create a library of possible futures against which to 'incast' or "wind tunnel" the focus issue: you write the scenarios first, and then ask about the shape of civil society in those scenarios.

In the time available, participants were able to complete only the first three steps of the process. The lack of time to engage in a discussion based on an ethnographic inventory, which would have ensured an exploration of deep social structures and cultural and belief systems, necessarily handicapped the results; less depth was generated than the full process would typically

produce. This step also knits together the rich details produced by the futures wheels, helping to engender the moment of recognition of the core metaphor for the scenario that provides an evocative title. Time limitations also meant that we could not repeat the process in order to produce a suite of scenarios equivalent to the output of the 2×2 matrix or CLA approaches.

Nonetheless, participants observed that the process itself energised the room, in contrast to the 2×2 matrix work that immediately preceded it. It generated a buzz of energy and cross-talk as people added items, compared ideas, and expanded on each other's insights. It was later described as "playful". The energy then diminished as people were asked to hunt for system interconnections and cross-impacts among the three futures wheels to begin to knit the scenario together. It is unclear how much of that diminution in energy was due to the complexity of that step of the process, and how much to the lateness of the hour and the effort already expended on the other methods.

Generating scenarios using archetypes

The "archetypes" were originally created as simple stories to help people new to foresight to imagine and explore very different future environments. Stripped back to their basic logical frameworks, they provide scaffolds for a large variety of drivers and insights about change, and for quickly creating scenario narratives. On the day, this was perhaps the least successful approach: to use the archetype frameworks, participants must understand them thoroughly. While they had been distributed in advance, the archetypes still required explanation for participants to grasp the gestalt of each sufficiently to pattern-match the drivers and the interview quotes with their assigned archetype. Again, time limitations worked against us, but participants thought the discussion about how to "sort" the drivers across the archetype frameworks was particularly useful. By noting where drivers smeared across archetype boundaries, the conversation revealed where drivers were ambiguous or too complex. This suggested points where the data should be disaggregated to be sorted across two (or more) archetypes.

The scenarios that emerged were distinct among themselves, and they presented (albeit briefly) quite different outcomes for civil society. They offered few details as to how each particular future might have evolved but did provide launch points for strategic discussions about the role and purpose of civil society. The archetypes generated details also found in some of the other scenarios, but what distinguished the archetypes output from that of the other methods was the tight focus on the changed character of civil society itself, rather than the wider social context in which civil society might be embedded. Some similarity potentially exists between the archetypes as driven primarily by worldviews and mental models, and CLA, with the distinction that the archetypes take a set of worldviews as a given, while CLA evolves the worldviews through discussion of the specific subject for

subsequent use as scenario frameworks. A structured CLA discussion could potentially be a way to expand the archetype “library” and evade the sinkhole of wholly Western worldviews.

Difference, Depth, Detail, and Process: A comparison

One question underpins our review of each method: “what is it about this method that could generate: (a) difference, and (b) depth—and to what extent is it successful at either?” Participants generally agreed that the 2×2 matrix generated coherent, cohesive scenarios that offered enough difference from the present to generate strategic insights, but were not different enough to startle or provoke: they didn’t generate any big questions about transformations in deep structures. In contrast, the participants commented on the extent to which CLA dug into and uncovered deep cultural structures while they were in mid-process: it was immediately apparent. People perceived Manoa to be creative and effective at producing vivid, provocative detail and generating difference, but felt the time constraints limited its ability to demonstrate depth in this case. The archetypes were judged to be potentially useful at generating differences, but unlikely to generate the depth of the CLA approach.

With regard to patterns of detail, we have noted above that the structure of the 2×2 process pushes output towards symmetry across one level, that is, production of scenarios for the organisation, or the nation, or the community. CLA produced three scenarios whose focus ranged across the organisational/spatial spectrum: international, national, and local. The Manoa approach generated fairly specific details across many sectors and many scales of organisation, as it is designed to do, but with limited time we were unable to test that feature. The archetypes produced distinctly different details for civil society itself, but primarily within one scale: national. As the archetypes themselves are scaffolds for futures that generally take a national perspective, so this is not surprising. Looking across the output from the different methods for their representation of civil society, they fall along a continuum. Manoa is at one end, with its raw output depicting only the future of society. The archetypes are at the other end, with its raw output focused tightly on changes to civil society itself. The 2×2 matrix and CLA both fall in the middle, with their raw outputs depicting changes both to society itself and to civil society in particular.

Finally, a comment on process: the 2×2 approach, as we have noted, has an intellectual and problem-solving “feel”; working around the matrix to fill in the details can seem a slog. Manoa, by contrast, feels like a creativity exercise and can be used as one. The futures wheel brainstorm is particularly energising for groups. CLA begins with energy and humour: our participants found generating the litany or buzz of common wisdom and events around an issue easy and at times amusing. The technical or systemic level is more difficult without experts on the topic (e.g. civil society) in the group. As we

worked through the levels to worldview and then myth/metaphor, participants noted that the conversation slowed and the energy grew more thoughtful, but found the resulting output more significant than that produced by the 2×2 or Manoa. The archetypes process design we used here divided the participants into pairs, creating one-on-one conversations around worldviews and the drivers. Limited time hampered further insights about process dynamics.

In Conclusion

Each of these scenario methods has distinguishing strengths. The 2×2 matrix approach produces four scenarios consistently focused on alternative outcomes for an issue at a specific scale. CLA generates conversations that dig deep into the worldviews, mental models and cultural structures that inform how we perceive both issues and possible future outcomes. Manoa creates a diverse array of details across all levels of a possible future. Scenario archetypes guarantee consideration of outcomes across a specified set of worldviews. Yet none by itself is really an all-purpose approach. The differences underline the important issue, certainly for commissioners of futures work, of ensuring that the objective of conducting a project is understood, and that the participants are open to methods that are more likely to be effective in reaching a desired outcome.

The primary lesson we have learned from this exercise, as practitioners, is the value of mash-ups: combining and layering different techniques in order to enrich outcomes. The “flatland” output of many 2×2 matrix exercises in scenario building can be greatly enriched by using CLA or other techniques as probes or provocations during the scenario building process.¹⁹ A colleague commented that he regularly adds both divergence and depth to the 2×2 matrix technique by including relevant emerging issues in each of the quadrants, expanded by use of futures wheels, to create more densely detailed story fabrics.²⁰ Our experience, and that of many of our colleagues, is that our practice—and its value to our clients—has been greatly enriched both by the generation of new techniques, and by taking a recombinant/re-mix approach to using them.

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4. Creating Stories of Change: Reframing causal layered analysis as narrative transformation

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This chapter argues for the importance of stories and applies CLA as a method of transformative storytelling. Working with multiple clients from diverse industries, the authors utilise CLA to assist in the creation of multiple narratives and diverse storylines and to reveal the intricate and often hidden driving forces within an organisation.

The Importance of Story in Organisations and Society

The early 21st Century has been characterised as a time of great global change, reframing the way that we connect, create, and consume. This profound shift in human development is not only a catalyst for the destruction of our antiquated industrial systems, but is also facilitating the emergence of new models of transformation. Story has always been a critical element in mapping the human journey, whether for individuals who are

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seeking to establish identity and make sense of their lives, or for entire civilisations working to define their culture, ideology and vision. However, only in recent years has the creation of robust stories been identified as a crucial tool within organisations, governments and social structures for building unique strategic designs, crafting dynamic and long-lasting vision, and intentionally constructing pathways for meaningful change. Science has found that stories are one of the most effective forms of human communication, persuasion and translation of ideas into action. Stories evoke deep images and emotions, allowing people to psychologically identify and connect with a collective narrative. Furthermore, stories are naturally viral. Unlike any other means of transporting ideas and information, stories can quickly spread, planting a guiding philosophy in the minds and hearts of every person within an organisation. Stories create deep-seated meaning that we embrace and live; they are the gateway to our consciousness. In other words, stories are the way we create ourselves.

Because of the deluge of data afforded us in the information age, it is becoming increasingly difficult to find ourselves intimately connected to a deep, personal, and life-giving narrative. Beyond the hard data presented to us in processes, models and instructions, stories allow us to tap into authentic experiences that resonate with what makes us organic and human. According to recent studies, there are several reasons why stories exhibit this power:

- **Stories are an ancient and foundational method of communication.** They form the basis of what we consider to be universal truth, and therefore help us to create meaning through long-held beliefs, archetypes and familial traditions.
- **Stories are about the human alliance.** Stories are a way of sharing passions with the like-minded, leading others to partner with us to achieve a particular mission or vision. Stories help us to reach a common goal.
- **Stories are the way that the human mind works.** They are maps of meaning, and help us to understand how the world works so that we can make decisions. Without stories, we struggle to find our identity as individuals or as a society.
- **Stories create order.** They have structure and bring order to chaos. They guide us from conflict to resolution, providing us with the ultimate safety net.
- **Stories help us to create.** The human brain does not process imagined experiences any differently from real ones. Therefore, the emotions engendered by stories are genuine, and have the ability to move us to action.
- **Stories trigger creativity and change.** They help us to discover ourselves, to see the world in a new way, and to innovate for transformation.¹

Stories are the personification of an organisation. When processes and rules are the driving force, the organisation takes on the metaphor of a machine, lifeless and inanimate. Humans are organic—we are living, breathing and often messy. We embody stories of triumph and shame, success and defeat, love and loss. When stories are front-and-centre, the organisation becomes a living entity made up of people rather than a machine filled with cogs and gears. We empathise with that which is alive, transferring experiences so that we can feel what others feel. In this way, stories help us to synchronise our activity, the closest thing to developing a “hive mind” within an organisation.

Reframing CLA as Story: Narrative transformation

The components of narrative transformation

Causal Layered Analysis has a natural connection to the transformational potential of stories, providing a framework that can be adapted to fit the various parts of a traditional narrative. In this way, CLA can be used in conjunction with other tools and concepts to lead an organisation through the identification of its current story, and then to guide it through the development of an entirely new story and vision. We have labelled this process Narrative Transformation.

The title of the story

In the world of publishing, choosing the title of a book is of the utmost importance. In addition to sending a strong message to help potential readers make a connection with the story, it also provides a meaningful glimpse into the deeper and broader story that lies beyond the cover. Identifying the title of an *organisation's* current story is similarly critical. Just as in the traditional application of CLA, the description of the “litany” may be a given. The facts, trends or problems have surfaced and everyone agrees on their scope and definition. In our experience, however, this kind of clarity is rare. Just as unintentional blindness leaves witnesses to the same event with substantially different accounts of it, most teams are rarely on the same page as far as the current state of affairs is concerned. By beginning the process with a dialogue to develop the title of an organisation's current narrative, assumptions and biases are exposed, continuity is established, and participants begin the process of unveiling the story that serves as the bedrock of their entire organisation. Reframing CLA as Narrative Transformation sets the stage for the construction of a transformational effort.

To guide participants through the title exercise it is often helpful to use newspaper headlines as a comparison. We ask team members to imagine a current article penned about their organisation as it is today. What would the subject matter be? What publication might it be found in? Would it be

positive or negative? And, ultimately, what carefully crafted words would be chosen for the title that would accurately convey the organisation's story? Ideally, the facilitators would have insights into the organisation (either through previous engagements or pre-workshop interviews) that would allow them to guide the discussion. In one recent session, we recorded the participants' headline input and then revealed the title we had created in advance of the session, which was eerily similar. While this kind of "magic" is not necessary, it *is* critical to arrive at an agreed upon organisational title before continuing to identify the current narrative.

The elements of the story

Once a team has agreed upon the title of their book, they can begin to explore why that particular phrase has surfaced as the one which encapsulates their existing story. Within the "Elements" portion of Narrative Transformation, we identify the plot, structures, and characters that together shape the organisation's current story. Paralleled in CLA as systemic causes or social structures, this level is often the easiest for teams to recognise as they have typically focused all of their prior change management efforts solely on addressing these initial (and potentially superfluous) first-level causes. Since this part of the CLA framework is less likely to stump participants, the use of the Narrative Transformation veil provides a more definitive boundary for the identification of these systematic causes. Working within the story scaffold, users are less likely to become bogged down in inconsequential details and process minutia (e.g., Does the item raised make sense as an event in our story?). The additional intricacy of using plot elements also serves to distance participants from what could be sensitive and contentious issues. Centering the exercise on the quest to "write" their book acts as a buffer against potential territorial disputes.

Another benefit of leveraging the Narrative Transformation approach and capturing this part of the model as "plot elements", rather than just structures and systems, is that participants are able to identify causes that are less obvious. By including "characters", "plot events" and qualitative "data" in the dialogue, facilitators are able to expand the conversation beyond simple legacy processes, software systems, and other readily identifiable organisational components that are important but that can distract from true causes. If given an inch, most teams at this juncture will overrun the session with negative monologues reminiscent of the complaints commonly heard "around the water cooler". By anchoring the discussion in more than "just" systems, more productive brainstorming can be facilitated, resulting in a robust and diverse list of systemic causes that truly uncover an organisation's story.

Encapsulating the CLA offering within the Narrative Transformation framework also elevates the exercise from an inventory of disparate bullet points to a more compelling collection of convergent and integrative ideas,

just like one would see in a book. When participants understand that the ultimate goal is to craft a story, they are more apt to make connections, draw conclusions, infer implications, and recognise the larger patterns at work. The result is a discourse that not only flows from the “Title” level but which also transitions beautifully to the next phase of the tool: the theme.

The theme of the story

It is not surprising to see organisations struggle at the worldview level of causal layered analysis given that most change management efforts fail to progress beyond systems issues to address organisational issues and culture. In our experience, users become quickly frustrated when asked to identify the specific values in their firm that support the creation of the systems identified previously. It is clear that the dialogue in many of today’s corporate environments rarely delves into the realm of belief systems, even those which drive the organisation at its most foundational level.

As in the Elements section, a values discussion is aided by the use of a “book” metaphor that provides participants with a more profound connection and an ability to empathise with the organisation’s story. Participants can more readily relate to the concept of a theme in literature than to the somewhat intangible notion of the values of their organisation. Rather than manoeuvring through the minefield of potentially conflicting personal worldviews, the session is focused on understanding the theme of the story currently being authored by the team. We remind the participants that in fiction, plot is defined as the events of the story; theme goes much deeper, expressing the meaning that drives or is revealed by the story. Further, the theme is not intended to teach or preach. In fact, it is often not presented directly at all. Readers must extract it from the characters, events, and structures that make up the story. In other words, when reading a work of fiction, an individual must ascertain the theme for him or herself.

When facilitating the construction of themes within the Narrative Transformation framework, we share with participants that a story may have several themes, and that those themes are often expressed as a principle, declaration, or abstract manifestation of the human condition. The purpose of a theme is to allow the author to communicate with the reader on common ground. In the case of Narrative Transformation, the theme should serve as the foundation for determining the organisation’s common culture. Although the specifics of each participant’s experience on the team may be different from the details of their peer’s version of the story, the general underlying truths behind the organisational story will establish the connection that team is seeking. To aid in the creation of story themes, we provide participants with a series of questions that simultaneously construct the foundations of their story while also exploring the values that surround those foundations. The result of such questions is a series of value-oriented statements that can

be synthesised to reflect the worldview of the organisation. Some of these questions are:

- What is this story about at its core? Why is this story being told?
- What is it about the “hero” of the story that helps the audience to identify with that individual or group?
- What conflicts arise as a result of the elements in the story, and what obstacles are created?
- What does the hero want?
- What will the hero lose if he or she does not overcome adversity or reach his or her aspirations?
- How is victory defined in the story?

The images of the story

On the rare occasion that we find an organisation that is in touch with its theme or culture, the participants almost always still struggle a great deal with the “myth and metaphor” level of the CLA construct. Most stare at us perplexedly when we ask if they can list the cosmological concepts which have shaped their company culture. Instead, in Narrative Transformation we approach this portion of the model by expressing myths and metaphors as foundational images of the organisation’s story.

Almost everyone understands the power of images; people need little convincing of the old adage “a picture is worth a thousand words”. As a result, attaching visual meaning and expressions to an organisation’s unfolding story allows teams to deepen and strengthen the guiding narrative. Expressing these unconscious aspects of their organisation’s narrative deepens participants’ appreciation of the culture they defined in the first phase of the work. It is by establishing a layer of causes beneath their story’s theme that groups realise that culture cannot be copied, but instead must be developed through these unspoken beliefs about the universe.

Presenting information in a visual or graphic form has been proven to deepen learning and help participants make large-scale connections. Visual representation also promotes the level of communication necessary for framing the complex ideas, relationships and systemic patterns that exist in robust stories, and even expands the capacity for new ideas and concepts to emerge. ²

Images can be the most challenging portion of Narrative Transformation but it’s also by far the most rewarding. Having delivered this content to diverse audiences across the globe, we have found that it is while capturing the images of the organisation’s narrative that fascinating socio-cultural disconnects are uncovered. For instance, when we were working with a US-based, global Fortune 100 company, there were several key images that

formed the basis of the firm's narrative which did not resonate with some employees from other countries. When key foundational elements of an organisational framework are meaningless to entire groups within it, the long-term viability of the firm's DNA can come into question. As established corporations in developed nations seek to expand their holdings in emerging economies, they would be wise to take a fresh and objective look at their narratives, specifically the inclusiveness of their story's images, which may be unspoken but serve as a critical unifying aspect of their company cultures.

Facilitating narrative transformation

Narrative Transformation has already been proven to be a popular format for addressing large change management, culture assessment, and organisational transformation efforts. Through multiple engagements with clients from diverse industries, we have discovered that this tool is maximised when participants are informed about the power of story and introduced to the basics of story creation in advance of utilizing Narrative Transformation, developing a deeper sense of shared ownership around the creation of the organisational narrative. During Narrative Transformation workshops, the use of oversized table-top templates allows for full participation by all group members; opens up the entire process to more expansive, divergent and creative ideas; encourages the group to introduce some healthy peer pressure that drives the story into new arenas of change; fosters a shared experience that leads to wide-spread adoption of the narrative in the organisation; gives all the team members in the room a view of one another's templates; and allows the different styles of learning and expression that are common to each level of story building to be adapted to other parts of the process.

The success with which teams are able to reframe current narratives is also largely dependent on the level of their exposure to emerging issues in their industry and beyond. To support this understanding, we typically begin our Narrative Transformation exercise with a discussion of the emerging trends and patterns that are disrupting and shaping the future of their organisation. This type of quantitative and qualitative data coupled with the insights gained from the Narrative Transformation tool works to alter mindsets and perspectives far beyond traditional change management processes (which are usually external and superficial). In fact, story not only shifts mindsets; by nature, it also has the power to change the heart.

Discovering your present story

Initially, participants are led through the Narrative Transformation model in order to discover their organisation's current story in the same manner as they would be led through the traditional CLA model. As described above, this model leverages the principles of CLA expressed as parts of a book—working downward from Title to Images—to establish a team's current narrative including its characters, plot elements, themes, and visuals. Firms

rarely devote time to exploring their organisation's culture, much less the unspoken beliefs about their future. Narrative Transformation affords them the opportunity to define the story that drives their organisation, providing them with a foundation from which to create connected and integrated strategies and actions that can produce long-lasting effects.

Reframing your story for preferred futures

Once they have established a common current story, teams often believe their work is done. However, this is just the beginning of the process, as the real power of Narrative Transformation is in its ability to redesign culture and belief systems as a way to arrive at better outcomes.

In the most basic version of Narrative Transformation, participants are guided, step-by-step through the process in reverse order to uncover an aspirational version of their organisational narrative. Again, the “book” metaphor is extremely helpful. Armed with the robust story about their current situation that they have just created, which includes numerous entries, phrases, thoughts and ideas for each level of the model, participants are asked to create a new story beginning with new images. Rather than asking “What other myths and metaphors might we employ at this organisation?” we lead a discussion about alternative images. This is similar to seeing the illustrations of a well-known story through the eyes of different artists, or when your favourite book is turned into a movie that looks quite different from what you imagined when you first read it. Images convey the deeply embedded biases and assumptions of those creating the visuals, so breathing life into new images of the established story can quite literally change the story itself. Pictures and images can unearth emotions and ideas that can be very hard to express through the limited medium of words.

We resist asking participants to completely abandon the images identified when they established their current stories, understanding that change of that magnitude would be fool-hardy and doomed to failure. Instead, we recognise that within an organisation's DNA, their founding principles, there is a diverse set of metaphors to choose from. In more established companies, some of these foundational keystones may have long been forgotten or masked behind contemporary messages that have taken the forefront. In addition to dusting off legacy images, the reframing conversation also encourages teams to reinterpret existing visuals within the context of their new environment discussed during the introductory trend presentation at the opening of the session.

Once additional or redefined images are captured, participants continue up the framework to identify themes that would emerge from the new set of images. As in the “images” exercise, participants are not asked to discard all of their existing themes. In fact, all their current theme elements may remain. We challenge them, however, to question whether there are new or revised value statements that better align with the new images of their emerging

organisational story. Once foundational images are expressed, new values begin to emerge without having first been bounded by the constraints of the previously narrow set of ideas. This exercise is repeated similarly for the elements portion of the model, and the exercise culminates in the creation of a revised title for the team's collective aspirational story.

Creating multiple stories of the future for maximum insight

While the single story approach described above is an effective way to create a transformational dialogue within an organisation, we have further adapted the CLA tool to allow for increased insights through the creation of multiple narratives. In this version of the Narrative Transformation model, once teams know their organisational story, they are empowered to move back up the tool more than once to create several potential outcomes with different motifs and frames. Much like the trend in entertainment which allows consumers to “choose their own ending” in movies and other on-line content, we encourage participants to explore alternative metaphors or images to arrive at diverse storylines.

This revised method of administering the causal layered analysis method mirrors the concept at the heart of Strategic Foresight which is that we cannot predict the future but that we *can* map multiple possibilities and outcomes. By imagining several potential future narratives, participants are prepared to take advantage of opportunities while avoiding any potential risks, no matter what kind of future ultimately emerges. Whether in support of change management or in conjunction with a broader visioning and strategic effort, the “multiple stories” version of Narrative Transformation is a powerful and comprehensive technique for organisations that wish to reframe perspectives and create more resilient leaders, flexible environments, and living organisations.

To guide this version of Narrative Transformation, we often utilise the *Which World?* Scenario Development framework created by Allen Hammond.³ We provide session participants with a brief overview of each world (Fortress, Markets, and Transformative) and ask that they create three new organisational narratives (one for each world) beginning with images. Applying the Narrative Transformation methodology in conjunction with these three divergent macro narratives produces a diverse set of possible future stories for the organisation and explores options that would likely have been ignored otherwise. Giving the user a starting point for their new narratives (in the form of the *Which World?* scenarios) can also be useful when teams struggle to develop new organisational visions on their own.

How Narrative Transformation Elevates Us Beyond Information: Implications, Patterns, Designs and Aspirations

Stories have always been a powerful element in Futures Thinking due to a focus on scenario planning, but the latter has often been misused as a

showcase for individual trends and their linear ramifications. Narrative Transformation generates the possibility for deep and lasting change, catapulting us far beyond trend identification. Not only can this CLA-based tool reveal the intricate and often hidden driving forces within an organisation, but it also illustrates the implications, patterns, designs and aspirations that describe who we are, where we have come from, and where we are going.

Implications allow us to envision “what’s next” in a way that is not obvious and accessible in traditional trend research and analysis. Whereas trends are most often expressed as what’s unfolding now, implications probe the possible risks and opportunities that stem from those trends. It’s not enough in this day and age to understand trends; we must also map out the near and far ramifications of our decisions and ideas. Narrative Transformation paints a picture of those implications across the different levels, expanding the organisation’s view of what might be and what could be.

Patterns recognise that trends never exist in isolation; in the real world they collide, mesh and interact with one another, forming bigger clusters of ideas and issues. It is this intricate behaviour—this unique and complex dance between political, environmental, economic, technological and social issues—that can never be accurately captured in a one dimensional Mega-Trend list. To understand what is emerging, we must make sense of the patterns that are arising as a result of these collisions. Narrative Transformation folds each level into an integrated story, revealing the larger patterns at work.

Designs set the stage for turning stories of the future into action. Thinking about the future without actively creating it has very little value. We must be able to actuate our futures, leveraging the knowledge developed through the Narrative Transformation process. Rather than being shackled by the events of today, designing within the landscape of Futures Thinking allows us to hijack alternative landscapes and pull ourselves toward where we want to be. Having a deep knowledge of our present and future stories supports tools such as Design Thinking and Design Fiction, methods which allow us to prototype the future.

Aspirations elevate our organisations far beyond trends and “surface-level futuring”. Traditional trend scouting purports to remain agnostic at all costs, but the reality is that every individual and every organisation has at least one goal for their future (whether that goal is expressed or remains unspoken). By acknowledging these aspirational visions, our story-building efforts become a much more effective compass in navigating our complex and volatile landscape. Narrative Transformation provides the thinking necessary to break free from the bonds of linear or lowest common denominator futures, propelling us toward true transformation.

Narrative Transformation in Practice

In our recent work with a US-based, global design and architecture firm, we leveraged Narrative Transformation to reframe the common issue of generations in the workforce. The firm has been in existence since the 1950s and has enjoyed incredible success. Their organisation is comprised of a large contingent of more tenured individuals, some of whom had begun their careers with the firm at its inception. In terms of heritage, the company was family-owned for several decades before going public, and this legacy has continued to drive its dominant culture.

As in many of these types of engagements, this client's initial request involved a litany of questions including: "Can you teach our Boomers how to use social media and the iPad?" "How can we encourage our Millennials to stop texting and develop better verbal communication skills?" "When the Boomers finally retire, will Gen-Xers be ready to lead the organisation?" "How effective is our current generational knowledge transfer process, and will Gen-Xers stick around long enough for us to find out?"

Of course, underlying these surface enquiries is the issue of culture, but it's surprising how much time and energy is spent by organisations at the "tip of the iceberg" when attempting to solve the "generations dilemma", and this company was no exception. We often comment that a new book is written every 15 minutes on the outlooks, values, habits, driving forces, motivations, fears, likes, and dislikes of each generation alive today. Every stratum of organisational talent has heard the keynotes, attended the seminars, and memorised the acronyms that will help them to intimately know the generational traits by heart. Even with the millions of research dollars spent on understanding generational behaviours, organisations continue to struggle. In the case of our client, we leveraged Narrative Transformation to help the organisation change their current story from one of "Generational Warfare" to a collaborative and integrated landscape that was given the title "Generation Cohort".

It was obvious in previous sessions we had conducted with the strategic team, as well as in the discussions that took place in the Narrative Transformation workshop, that the firm had been crippled over time by generational strife. Due to the previous training they had all received around generations in the workforce, employees in the firm were eager to create a list of what they considered to be their peer's annoying characteristics. An environment of strife and competition had emerged within the culture of the organisation, and this practice manifested in each of the sessions we held with the team.

Progressing through the Narrative Transformation framework, the team identified plot elements and characters that went into creating their dominant "warfare" story. Among the elements in the organisation's narrative were the influence of a founder that was still very much "alive" in spirit despite his

physical death decades ago; a complicated, hierarchical organisational structure with highly visible seniority markers (e.g., differently coloured company identification badges based on status); a corporate university-focused learning and development curriculum; a bell curve performance rating process; and a traditional mentoring program.

In addition to a strong focus on the legacy of the company, the themes of the firm's narrative included: risk aversion, a puritan work ethic, and a belief that data is king. Finally, the team created a graphic montage of images that informed the organisation's current story such as "the tribe of elders", "the fountain of knowledge", and "the gatekeeper".

In creating the new, aspirational story for the client, we began by addressing what new images could be leveraged that would paint a more collaborative picture. Together, we created images that represented the rich legacy, entrepreneurship, and community spirit for which the original founder was known such as "the builder", "the bridge", "the city", "the explorer", and "the dreamer". Armed with these new images, the team was free to explore new themes. They focused on common passion, collaboration and purpose, allowing them to develop new characters and plot elements such as reverse mentoring, internal crowdsourcing of innovation and new ideas, hybrid organisational models, and open talent sharing. Lastly, we were able to reframe their new story in a phrase that disrupted the previous warfare model: Generation Cohort. In essence, this transformative title offered a renewed focus on passion-oriented cohorts or on leveraging the creativity of inter-generational networks rather than a preoccupation with classification based on birth year or generational differences.

As seen in this case study, Narrative Transformation not only creates foundational and alternative stories, it also thrusts us into the next wave of the future. Through this method, we can unlock the DNA of the organisation and ultimately create living maps that continually guide the way toward the higher order purpose of any organisation.

¹ P. B. Rutledge, 'The psychological power of storytelling', retrieved 21 November, 2013, from <http://www.psychologytoday.com/collections/201106/the-power-stories/direct-hit>.

² D. Sibbett, 'Visual intelligence: Using the deep patterns of visual language to build cognitive skills', *Theory Into Practice*, Vol 47, 2008, 118–127.

³ A. Hammond, *Which World? Scenario For The 21st Century*, Washington, DC, Island Press, 2000.

5. Metaphor and Causal Layered Analysis

Saliv Bin Larif*

This chapter examines the conceptual and political work metaphors do, and illustrates how deconstructing and constructing metaphors, in combination with CLA, can be used for the goals of policy advocacy and engagement. Several case studies are presented to illustrate the types of insights causal layered analyses can provide.

Introduction

Metaphors. What are they? How do they work? To use a metaphor about metaphor, one could say they're capable of being either sparkling unicorns—unique, magical beasts of linguistic and conceptual playfulness—or tired hacks.†

The unicorns can be found stomping (as expected) around the fields of the better quality written, visual and performing arts, but also in some unexpected places like slang and inspired advertising. The hacks, well, they're everywhere, just reach for the nearest newspaper, think about an abstract concept like technology, or start a conversation about the economy. Mind you, though, the hacks only became clichés in the first place because of the way in which effective metaphors are easily remembered and thus shared—over and over again.¹

A word of warning; the hacks may be tired but they still have fangs. George Orwell in his famous essay *Politics and the English Language* warned against “lazy thought” in writing, arguing that “...unless you make a conscious effort to prevent it, the existing dialect will come rushing in and do the job for you...”.² But don't take George's word for it. As an experiment, try to write a sentence explaining what “argument” is without using the words “defend”, “win”, “position”, or any other word from the vocabulary of war. How did you go? Not so well?

That's because metaphors, whether unicorns or hacks, all carry a conceptual load (in fact, that's their main job). In his book *I is An Other: The secret life of metaphor and how it shapes the way we see the world*, Geary tests (and

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† A hack is a worn out horse for hire.

finds accurate) the estimate that for every ten to twenty-five words spoken one metaphor is used, which is around six metaphors a minute.³ So communication floats in a sea of metaphor. Oops, there's another one.

But how to explain the ubiquity of metaphor? Is it the advantages of succinctness—being able to convey a complex message with either just a few words or an image? Or is it about power? Concrete, physical things available to the five senses have more emotional impact and are thus remembered longer than a string of abstract words. Writers, advertisers and speakers all harness metaphor because they're aware of the advantages of brevity, simplicity and emotional impact.

But as Lakoff and Johnson argue, metaphor goes beyond language.⁴ It is pervasive in our thoughts and actions because the ways in which we think, perceive and act are metaphorical in nature. Our conceptual system is metaphorical, thus we experience the world in metaphors.

So metaphors are not just figures of speech, they are ways of interpreting and conceptualising our world. This is one reason many of the most commonly used metaphors are grounded in physiology.⁵ Thus, metaphorical expressions of happiness and wellbeing are often “up” (e.g. I'm on a high, I'm on top of the world) because being active and alert (for most people) involves being upright, whereas when ill, tired or depressed, most people will sit or lie down.

The basic mental and linguistic process involved in metaphor is deceptively simple: the comparison of two things to transpose the qualities of one thing (whether it's an object, event, sensation or action) onto another. If we want to get a little theoretically fancy about it, Lakoff proposes that metaphor involves a conceptual cross-domain mapping for “understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another”.^{6,7}

Kovecses refers to the ‘source domain’ as the conceptual domain (typically very concrete and based in human experience) used to help understand another (typically more abstract) conceptual domain, the target domain.⁸ For example, in this paper the source domain of unicorns/horses is being applied to the target domain of metaphors. The limited qualities of one thing are mapped onto another, though it is usually understood that the subject they are mapped onto could not literally possess those qualities. Thus, reading this paper, readers understand that metaphors don't have four legs and a tail and that you can't literally ‘wear out’ a metaphor, only over-use it. It's through the mapping of a common pattern shared by two different kinds of thing that an abstract reality (such as “love” or “time”) is conceived and characterised using a more concrete or “embodied” concept (such as “a journey” or “motion”). Many metaphors are also so deeply “embedded” in everyday language that they become invisible (e.g., “I see what you mean, I've changed my mind”). Lawley and Tompkins classify these as “embedded metaphors”.⁹

Geary cites comparative linguist and archaeologist Archibald Sayce's argument that most language is built on "worn-out metaphors" as new words were formed by "comparing the unknown with the known".¹⁰ A brief glance at the etymology of many words supports this. Think of the compound word "light bulb". The object is named after the familiar concepts of light and the shape of a botanical bulb. Similarly, in German a light bulb is a *Gluhbirne* (literally, a "glowing pear"). Both terms succinctly capture the referential essentials of the object through calling one thing another—that is, using metaphor. In fact, Ralph Waldo Emerson used a lovely metaphor to describe language:

Language is fossil poetry. As the limestone of the continent consists of infinite masses of the shells of animalcules, so language is made up of images, or tropes, which now, in their secondary use, have long ceased to remind us of their poetic origin.¹¹

In other words, once-original metaphors (poetic unicorns) become "fossilised" through repeated use, until they are so well established in language we no longer notice the metaphorical nature of these hacks.

And, as Geary points out: "the less conscious we are of a metaphor as a metaphor, the more literal it becomes".¹² Likewise, Nelson Goodman observes that "with progressive loss of its virility as a figure of speech, a metaphor becomes not less but more like literal truth. What vanishes is not its veracity but its vivacity".¹³ Kovecses makes the same point: "[t]he 'dead metaphor' account misses an important point; namely, that what is deeply entrenched, hardly noticed, and thus effortlessly used is most active in our thought".¹⁴

Whether used consciously or unconsciously, metaphors (including—or, perhaps, especially—the tireddest old hacks) can naturalise a particular worldview. For example, war metaphors in business,¹⁵ sport and politics¹⁶,¹⁷ have become so ubiquitous that they work to naturalise (and perpetuate) the militaristic, aggressive and competitive behaviour, values and structures commonly enacted within those domains. The metaphor also justifies certain behaviour. If there's a war on, survival is at stake and there's no time for niceties like civil liberties and ethics, so take care which side you fall on the "us" and "them" divide.

Thus, metaphors not only describe reality but create it. In turn, historical and social contexts also often determine what kind of metaphors gain currency and become "entrenched".¹⁸ And what does all this have to do with causal layered analysis?

Causal Layered Analysis and Metaphor

Detailed discussion of the theory of causal layered analysis can be found elsewhere in this reader and so will not be repeated here. It suffices to note

that Inayatullah, in his six pillars approach to creating alternative and preferred futures, describes part of narrative learning as “insight into the internal and external stories of persons and organisations”.¹⁹ In other words, if people or organisations want to create new stories (or visions) of the future, they need to understand their existing stories about themselves and the future, and those of the people and organisations they seek to engage with.²⁰ Causal layered analysis is a methodology that analyses issues at four different conceptual levels, all of which Inayatullah considers important for policy and social change. However, only the analysis of metaphors is the focus of this paper.

Let’s take a quick tour of the metaphor stable to look at some of the biters in the next section.

Ponies that Bite

War metaphors

It has almost become a truism that whenever there’s a government campaign declaring war on something—whether it’s drugs, terrorism or disease—one of the first casualties is civil liberties. And, as Lakoff and Johnson note, when governments, media and other powerful groups use metaphors it has implications for policy, legislation and public opinion: “The people who get to impose their metaphors on the culture get to define what we consider to be true”.²¹

A classic example of this can be seen in the following study of a “hygiene as war” metaphor. US historian JoAnne Brown studied the martial metaphors that developed around the control and experience of tuberculosis after the American Civil War.²² Using an example from the early 1900s rather than the present is useful here as it is sometimes easier to achieve analytic distance when examining metaphors and discourse from another era.

While analysing advertisements, ordinary correspondence, health textbooks, popular literature, scrapbooks, daily newspapers, and periodicals of the time, Brown was struck by the wholesale shift from agrarian metaphors for disease (used earlier in the 19th Century) to battlefield metaphors. She found that hygiene, the identified solution to the threat of tuberculosis, became not only treated as a form of warfare, but as holy warfare.²³

Thus, an announcement about the formation of the National Association for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis (NASPT) read:

It is called the ‘Crusade,’ the ‘Warfare,’ the ‘Struggle’ against consumption. The great awakening is at hand.²⁴

In addition, in 1915 the NASPT created a public health campaign (focused on hygienic habits) called the “Modern Health Crusade”.

Brown tied the proliferation of battlefield metaphors to the fact that many of those sitting on public health committees in 1915 had lived through the American Civil War and were influenced by their memories of that experience. She also argued that many of the victims of tuberculosis following the war were Civil War veterans who chose (through the use of martial metaphors in essays, poetry and songs) to portray themselves as engaged in a noble struggle against the enemy of consumption.²⁵

While the use of military metaphors by tuberculosis patients to portray themselves as heroes and martyrs rather than victims and carriers of infection was relatively harmless, their use by public health campaigns and law makers was less so. As Dale Keiger eloquently states:

If enough people think of a public health effort as a war on disease, it becomes easier to enact policies that curtail civil liberties. A war, after all, is a crisis that sometimes calls for extraordinary measures. As Brown notes, “Military language gives priority to the immediate crisis, and trivialises other concerns”.²⁶

Brown argues that public health policies introduced during “the war on tuberculosis” to reduce contact between carriers of tuberculosis with the general public were eventually appropriated by those calling for racial segregation. Disturbingly, advertisers of the time (of both commercial products and public health messages) personified germs as characters of African, Italian, Chinese, Slavic, and Jewish descent. Likewise, medical literature demonised African-Americans as carelessly unhygienic and a risk to the white population.

Table 1. Causal layered analysis of tuberculosis problem

LITANY (VISIBLE)	Tuberculosis is a disease which the public and officials must ‘fight’
SYSTEMIC (CAUSES)	Tuberculosis is caused by poor hygiene (Solution: a public health campaign to improve hygiene habits)
WORLDVIEW	Contact between ‘careless’ unhygienic consumptives (the poor, immigrants, and Afro-Americans) a threat to the Anglo-Saxon, Christian hygienic population (Solution: segregate the ‘danger’ population from the ‘healthy’ population through public health policing of segregation and hygiene laws.)
MYTH/METAPHOR	1) A holy war to protect the clean (the Anglo-Saxon, Christian population) from the unclean (the poor, immigrants, Jews and Afro-Americans) 2) The American Anglo-Saxon, Christian population as a community ‘body’ threatened by the disease of Others

Brown argues that public acceptance of legislated public health policing (such as imposing fines for spitting) was aided by advertising which

portrayed “jolly health cops protecting little white kids from germs that looked suspiciously like immigrants and slum-dwellers”.²⁷

A causal layered analysis of the construction of the tuberculosis problem at the time, then, would look something like Table 1.

The economy is a body

Eva Kovacs traces the application of human body metaphors to the economy all the way back to the 18th Century, with Francois Quesnay (1694–1774), a French physician and economist, being the first to compare the economic and physiological systems. Quesnay likened the circulation of capital to the circulation of blood in the human body and saw the organs as representing different sectors of the economy. But with the passing of time, and the popularity of the metaphor, Quesnay’s unicorn has become a hack.²⁸

It’s important to remember that metaphors are often invoked rather than made explicit. For example, we often talk about “economic growth” which implicitly (rather than explicitly) draws on the metaphor of human physiological growth and its attendant values (i.e. growth is healthy, natural and good and creates strength and power, while lack of growth is unhealthy and leads to, or is a sign of, weakness, disease and/or decay).

This means we need to look at individual word choices when deconstructing metaphors, rather than just looking for x = y expressions (i.e. the economy is an organism/body that grows).

Pragglejaz (a group of metaphor scholars) has proposed one method for identifying metaphorically used words in spoken and written language. What they call the Metaphor Identification Process (MIP) offers some useful tips for hunting metaphors:

1. Establish the word’s contextual meaning (i.e. how it is used by the text).
2. Determine if the word can have a more basic meaning if used in another way. Basic meanings tend to be:
 - concrete (i.e. observable using one or more of the five senses)
 - related to bodily action
 - specific (as opposed to vague)
 - historically older.
3. If the word can have a more basic meaning in other contexts, decide whether the contextual meaning “contrasts with the basic meaning but can be understood in comparison with it”. If so, you’re looking at a metaphor.²⁹

So, using the example of “economic growth”, it’s clear from the collocation (a collocation is a conventional word pairing with a specific meaning) that “growth” means expansion of GDP and revenue (Step 1). But “growth” has a

more basic meaning in other contexts (Step 2). It can be a physiological change in size. However, it's also clear that expansion in profits can be understood through a comparison with physiological growth (Step 3).

Having determined the more basic meaning, and that we're dealing with a metaphor, it's time to explore the emotional and moral values attached to the metaphor. This part is more intuitive, since it relates to feelings and beliefs about physiological growth (including that of our own body). What images and feelings do you experience when you see the word GROWTH? Is it healthy? Natural? How about the word DECLINE? Or, even worse, DECAY?

Easy to see why most people, organisations and policies support economic growth, isn't it? Even when (in developed countries) basic human needs are already being met, and the pursuit of endless economic growth threatens both human and environmental health.

And, as UK academic Doreen Massey points out, conceptualising the economy in terms of "natural forces" (such as physiological change) naturalises (and thus makes invisible) a whole set of highly coordinated human activities and social relations, as well as conceptually limiting the potential for intervention and change.³⁰

The nation is a body

UK academic Andreas Musolff has written extensively on the function of metaphor in political discourse, and it is interesting to note that while English-speaking countries continue to freely use the nation-as-body metaphor (referring to "heads of state" and the "heart of the nation") its use in Germany in public discourse has been stigmatised due to historical use in National Socialist racist ideology. The nation-as-body metaphor dates back to Renaissance times and remains pervasive, as Musolff's analysis of metaphor use in British and German media coverage of public debate about the European Union indicates.³¹

So what are the implications of the nation-as-body metaphor for immigration policy? As Geary notes, metaphors prime "different associations and analogies that, in turn, prompt different attitudes and behaviours".³² Thus, Thibodeau, McClelland and Boroditsky found that framing the issue of crime metaphorically as a predator or a virus yielded different suggestions for solving the crime problem. Study participants given the crime-as-virus metaphorical framing were more likely to suggest social reform (31%) than participants given the crime-as-predator framing (20%).³³

Likewise, Stanford University psychologist Thomas Gilovich undertook several studies that demonstrated that people's decisions are influenced by misapplied associations made with past experience and generic knowledge.³⁴ In one study, subjects were tasked with rating hypothetical college football

players' potential to play professionally. When subjects received descriptions of the players that contained irrelevant comparisons with current professional footballers, they rated the college players more highly than they did those descriptions without such comparisons. In another study, subjects were asked to recommend how to resolve a hypothetical international crisis. Subjects' recommendations differed according to whether the framing of their question contained words designed to trigger associations with the Second World War, the Vietnam War, or designed to trigger no associations. The subjects who received the Second World War associations (mention of minorities fleeing in train boxcars) in their hypothetical questions made more interventionist recommendations than the subjects who received the other questions.

Similarly, researchers in the US found that interviewees expressed more negative views about immigration when America was metaphorically described as a body.³⁵ In addition, subjects who read articles about harmful bacteria, and who reported heightened motivation to protect their body from contamination, expressed harsher attitudes toward immigrants entering the United States when body-metaphoric terms were used to describe the country.

Levine notes that a central feature of the nation-as-organism metaphor is that the social community is treated as a physical body.³⁶ And, just as the body may be threatened by contaminating foreign elements, the social body is treated as vulnerable to corruption by invading sub-groups. Thus, O'Brien cites early 1900s documents in the US in which immigrants were described as: "a 'stream of impurity', that needed to be thoroughly filtered, a 'tide of pollution' that had to be purified, and a 'turgid stream of undesirable and unassimilable human 'offscourings'".³⁷

The same metaphors of "tides" and "waves" reappear in mainstream media reporting on the United States' growing Latino population.* Otto Santa Ana analysed hundreds of articles in the *Los Angeles Times* and other media in the 1990s and found metaphors such as "awash under a brown tide", "the relentless flow of immigrants" and "like waves on a beach, these human flows are remaking the face of America".³⁸

If a feature of the nation-as-organism metaphor is that the social community is treated as a physical body, and the metaphor for immigrants is an unstoppable wave or tide, then the logical fear of the community is of "drowning". Make that drowning in a polluted (i.e. "unclean") tide, as analysis has also identified metaphors of migrants as pollutants.³⁹ Invoking these metaphors thus transforms the immigration debate into an issue of survival, of preventing racial annihilation by drowning.

* They also appear frequently in Australian media. Refugees arriving by boat in Australia nearly always arrive in "waves".

Santa Ana also identifies other metaphors used to portray Latinos as invaders, outsiders, burdens, parasites, diseases, animals, and weeds. And the political implications of these metaphors? Santa Ana (among others) argues that several anti-Latino referenda were passed in California—in particular Proposition 187 (a bill to deny social services to illegal aliens)—because of such conceptual framing.

If our generic knowledge about bodies is that they are vulnerable to infection and contamination from foreign invaders (bacteria and viruses), then whenever immigration and asylum debates are ‘primed’ or ‘framed’ with metaphors of the nation as a body, they trigger associations of infection or contamination, even without these words being directly used. Analysing the historical social justice implications of the ‘nation as organism’ metaphor (similar to the nation as body metaphor) in the US, O’Brien found that these metaphors were consistently used in the political arena to support restrictive legislation against minority groups, or to block rights-granting legislation.⁴⁰

The framing of ‘nation as body’ in the context of debate over immigration and asylum may then, in part, explain the media, public and government hysteria over asylum seekers who arrive by boat in . Figures obtained by *The Advertiser* from the Department of Immigration and under the *Freedom of Information Act* in 2011 indicated that there were 13 times more illegal immigrants (who had arrived legally but overstayed their visas) in Australia than there were asylum seekers in detention who had arrived by boat.⁴¹ There were, in fact, only 4,446 detained boat people in Australia in 2011,^{42,*} and yet media and political focus has for years dwelled on the “wave” of asylum seekers arriving by boat, with Prime Minister Tony Abbott making it part of his election campaign to “stop the boats” and to establish stronger “border protection”.⁴³

In fact, if we extend the nation-as-body metaphor a little further, we could perhaps say that Prime Minister Abbott is deadly serious about not having the borders of his nation-as-body penetrated by foreign objects (asylum seekers and boats, in particular).

Since the large number of illegal immigrants arriving by plane (mainly from New Zealand, the UK and the United States) are not treated with nearly as much concern, there may be a parallel with immigration concerns in the US in the 1990s which Nelkin and Michaels pinpointed as lying not in immigration per se (which had declined) but in the changing national origin (in practice, ethnic origin) of new immigrants being seen as a threat to Anglo-Saxon hegemony.⁴⁴

* A parliamentary research paper supports this figure, with Customs and Border Protection advice provided to the Parliamentary Library putting the total number of asylum seeker arrivals by boat in Australia in 2011 at 4,565. Source: http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/2011-2012/BoatArrivals#_Toc285178607

Frequent media and political use of the term ‘illegal boat people’ in Australia has also constructed seeking asylum as a crime, and asylum seekers as criminals despite the fact that seeking asylum is not an illegal activity. However, mapping the crime/criminal categories onto asylum seekers serves the useful purpose of framing the asylum debate within a security metaphor. Operation Sovereign Borders, the name of the coalition’s expensive plan to “stop the boats”, invokes a basic security metaphor—security as containment (by securing borders to keep the threat out)—similar to that invoked by the US after the September 11 attacks.⁴⁵

As Michael Grewcock, author of *Border Crimes: Australia’s War on Illicit Migrants*, has commented. “There is a deeply ingrained political truism that, somehow, unauthorised travel from the north is going to pose a threat to Australia’s security.”⁴⁶

He argues that the fear of “hordes from the north suddenly arriving on our shores” is deeply ingrained in Australian mainstream political discourse.⁴⁷

The briefest inspection of historical antecedent would suggest this is true, since the official White Australia policy limited Asian immigration to Australia until the 1970s and the term “yellow peril” retains currency in Australia in 2013. For example, the term is used in the Australia First Party’s web article on Australian farmers being “forced to plant rice and noodles”.⁴⁸

Table 2. Causal layered analysis of asylum seeker problem

LITANY (VISIBLE)	Australia will be overwhelmed by asylum seekers ('boatpeople')
SYSTEMIC (CAUSES)	People smuggling is a border protection and security issue (Solution: Increase border security)
WORLDVIEW	Australian Government will decide who passes its borders
MYTH/METAPHOR	1) The nation-as-body threatened by migration 2) Security as containment 3) Asylum seeker arrival as a natural disaster

Perhaps this is not surprising as Musolff notes that in Critical Discourse Analysis studies of debates about immigration:

many Western countries convey the notion of the host nation’s defensive stance against migration as a natural disaster (hence the pervasive flood imagery), an invasion of enemies, an epidemic, or the spread of disease-carrying, parasitic organisms.⁴⁹

A causal layered analysis of the problem, then, might look something like Table 2.

Learn to ride: Using metaphors

So, now that you know how to detect and deconstruct metaphors, you want to go forth and hunt and/or make some yourself, don't you? Of course you do. From the analyses above, we can see that metaphors:

1. Stem from narratives based on historic events and physiological, personal and collective experiences. (Example 1: martial metaphors that developed around the control and experience of tuberculosis after the American Civil War. Example 2: framing the nation as a body due to our own embodiment.)
2. Can subtly (or not so subtly) frame thought and discourse which can affect decisions and behaviour, thus constructing reality. (Example 1: Different metaphors of crime affecting recommendations for how to reduce crime. Example 2: Decision making about hypothetical foreign crises influenced by irrelevant historical associations invoked through metaphor.)
3. Can be put to political purposes. (Example 1: framing public health efforts as a 'war on disease' to gain acceptance of policies that curtail civil liberties. Example 2: framing the asylum seeking debate in security and disaster metaphors.)
4. Have implications for law, policy and social change. (Example 1: During the "crusade against TB", public health policies introduced to protect against spread of tuberculosis were appropriated by those calling for racial segregation laws and policies. Example 2: Economic growth is widely considered "natural, healthy and good" and is sought as part of most national and business policies and prioritised over environmental and social justice concerns.)

So, given the above features, how can we usefully apply the analysis and construction of metaphors?

Narrative Analysis for Policy Engagement

From the features of metaphor singled out above, it's obvious that as a part of narrative analysis, deconstructing and constructing metaphors marries well with policy advocacy and engagement goals. This is not a unique observation, as Inayatullah (and others) have long proposed this as a goal of CLA and realising or transforming scenarios.

One other useful application of narrative analysis is to increase the transparency of engagement efforts by identifying and/or disclosing your own organisational narratives, discourses and how these influence your engagement with others and approach to problems. Explicitly acknowledging your own world view and limitations/boundaries (e.g. legislative, scientific, policy) and encouraging others to do so can help build better relationships by encouraging people to move out of entrenched positions on issues and to shift conceptual frameworks.

Another practical application is listening to stakeholders and reading their texts to identify their metaphors, discourses and core narratives. Careful reading and listening will offer clues about their priorities, preferred discourses, worldview and how they are likely to frame issues. Understanding all this can either be used to frame issues using metaphors that make the audience more receptive to ideas, change or dialogue, or to help them decide whether changing metaphors and frames could be useful.

The US company Cultural Logic explicitly uses the above process (as well as constructing and testing new metaphors with focus groups) for advocacy purposes, although their focus is, above all, on using metaphors to explain more complex issues of public interest such as global warming and government services. An important part of that work, however, is mapping what they call existing “folk models” around topics in order to learn “how best to displace, bypass, or build on them”. For example, in solving the problem of how to increase public engagement on the topic of government service delivery, Cultural Logic found that just asking people what they thought of the “government” was ineffective. They instead came up with and used the metaphor of “public structures” in order to bypass respondents’ “folk model” (or metaphor) of the government as a collection of high-profile elected officials. Once the term “government” was replaced with “public structures”, respondents gave more thoughtful answers which referred to public services and the “common good”.⁵⁰

As seen from the discussion of Cultural Logic’s work, metaphors may be useful, or not so useful, for communicating science, policy and research. Recently there has been debate in the scientific community over this topic, specifically, over the way in which metaphor has been used to communicate about synthetic biology.⁵¹ While metaphor is undeniably useful in explaining complex science issues to the public, metaphors commonly used to explain gene technology, nanotechnology, biotechnology and synthetic biology are argued to have inflated public expectations of these sciences beyond their capability. Engineering and software metaphors applied to synthetic biology are inappropriate, Voosen argues, because they suggest an advanced understanding of living organisms that doesn’t match with what’s actually known in biology. The danger of this, Pauwels states, is that:

If researchers... are aware of the relative weakness of the analogy around the ‘software of life’, the narratives produced in its wake might affect not only public perceptions and trust but might also have broader ramifications that would influence debates on safety assessment and ownership.⁵²

Public trust is a key issue, since gaining and maintaining the social licence to research and commercialise new technologies is essential for scientists and organisations to operate. In addition, public acceptance determines the legislation and regulation developed around technologies, and (thus) their market potential.

If scientists, researchers and governments are to successfully engage the public in discussion about the regulation and use of synthetic biology and other technologies, then they need to start applying what has been mapped about the existing “folk models” and metaphors around these topics in order to displace, bypass, or build on them. Furthermore, metaphors being propagated about technologies need to be carefully considered, since once a metaphor about technology “sticks”, it can be hard to dislodge. In metaphoric terms, the pony sinks its teeth in and never lets go.

Constructing New Metaphors and Narratives

Returning to the issue of asylum seekers in Australia, we saw that much of the current debate is framed as follows:

Table 3. Causal layered analysis of asylum seeker problem

LITANY (VISIBLE)	Australia will be overwhelmed by asylum seekers ('boatpeople')
SYSTEMIC (CAUSES)	People smuggling is a border protection and security issue (Solution: Increase border security)
WORLDVIEW	Australian Government will decide who passes its borders
MYTH/METAPHOR	1) The nation-as-body threatened by migration 2) Security as containment 3) Asylum seeker arrival as a natural disaster

If a group was interested in advocating for helping asylum seekers (rather than keeping them out at all costs) what metaphors might they construct and encourage the use of?

Since Australian law about who can be accepted as a refugee focuses on proving persecution (on the basis of race, religion, political opinion, nationality or membership of a social group) in the home country and lack of protection by the government in the home country this provides one starting point for constructing metaphors.

Given that the nation-as-body metaphor already exists, it could be tweaked to become ‘extending a helping hand to the persecuted’. Or, if one wanted to counter the common metaphor of the ‘refugee as an invading virus of the nation body’ one way would be to point out that shifting the ‘virus’ of asylum seekers to our near neighbour, Indonesia, will not address the ‘spread’ of the real virus, i.e. the problem of the growing number of communities unable to find a place to live in safety.

Moving away from body metaphors, another option might be to focus on the provision of safety from persecution (i.e. protection). Emma Lazarus, in composing the sonnet *The New Colossus* (that was engraved on a bronze

plaque and mounted inside the Statue of Liberty) clearly uses the parent-as-protector metaphor when referring to the United States as the “Mother of Exiles” (i.e. those unable to find freedom in other parts of the world). Other possible metaphors for framing the provision of asylum as ‘protection of the persecuted’ might be those of a guardian angel, a crime-fighter/superhero, a warrior, a carer, or a justice figure.*

Table 4. Alternative analysis of asylum seeker problem

	Current	Alternative
POLICY	Prevent border entry of asylum seekers	Provide refuge
LITANY (VISIBLE)	Australia will be overwhelmed by asylum seekers ('boatpeople')	Asylum seekers need refuge, either in their own countries or abroad, to lead productive lives
SYSTEMIC (CAUSES)	People smuggling is a border protection and security issue (Solution: Increase border security)	Provide refuge in Australia and assist other countries to provide refuge and resolve violent conflicts
WORLDVIEW	Australian Government will decide who passes its borders	Stopping the entry of asylum seekers does not resolve the issue of violent conflicts that produce communities on the run (global/humanitarian perspective)
MYTH/METAPHOR	1) The nation-as-body threatened by migration 2) Security as containment 3) Asylum seeker arrival as a natural disaster	Grow the fruit/provide a port in the storm

Since asylum seekers also, like most people, want to live productive lives but are prevented from doing so in their home countries because of persecution, another metaphor might be of fruit tree or flower seedlings looking for a fertile place to grow. This metaphor could be useful in arguments for releasing refugees to the care of family members or friends with Australian residency who are willing to bear the burden of housing and supporting them while they “take root” and prepare to bear fruit/bloom, rather than detaining them in “barren” facilities where nothing can grow.

* Author’s note: Personally, I like the idea of Australia as warrior princess–protector of refugees.

Some may think these illustrative metaphors are too fanciful or silly to be useful in framing the asylum issue in Australia but they are a starting point for alternative framing (see above).

The reader may think of several better metaphors, and it certainly wouldn't be hard to find metaphors that are an improvement on the ones currently in use by the media and politicians of natural disaster, disease and secure containment.

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⁴ G. Lakoff & M. Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1980, 3.

⁵ Ibid., 57.

⁶ Ibid., 5.

⁷ G. Lakoff, 'The contemporary theory of metaphor', in *Metaphor and Thought*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, available online: retrieved 19 October, 2013, from: <http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~israel/lakoff-ConTheorMetaphor.pdf>

⁸ Z. Kovecses, *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002, 4.

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- ²⁶ Ibid.
- ²⁷ Ibid.
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II

ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE FUTURES

6. Causal Layered Analysis, Climate Change and Limits to Growth

Ian Lowe*

The scientific evidence for anthropogenic climate change, peak oil, global environmental problems and limits to growth more generally is clear, but denial is still widespread. CLA shows that this denial arises from the conflict between the new evidence and the old myths and metaphors widely held onto by decision-makers. Faced with evidence which is inconsistent with their myths and metaphors, they reject the evidence and revert to simplistic assertions at the litany level. This appears to be a fundamental obstacle to avoiding the extremely serious problems we face.

Introduction

Gore described global climate change as “an inconvenient truth”,¹ but many intelligent people are still finding reasons to deny the link between human activity and the changing global climate, twenty years after the relationship was established to the satisfaction of scientists working in that specific field. Hubbert argued that US oil production would peak in the early 1970s and then decline;² when this prediction proved accurate, the same approach was used to show that global production of conventional oil would peak about 2010 and then decline.³ Although there is solid evidence supporting the theory of “peak oil”, most transport planning still implicitly assumes an unlimited supply of petroleum fuels. More generally, it was shown by the first global systems models in the early 1970s that there are limits to the scale of resource use and productive economic activity that the natural systems of the planet can accommodate,⁴ but forty years later most decision-makers still behave as if limitless growth is possible. The “standard world model” of *The Limits to Growth*, based on extrapolating the growth trends that existed in 1970, led to economic and ecological decline in the early to middle decades of this century; both the original authors’ thirty-year update and more recent comparisons with forty years of data showing that the global community is still on that gloomy trajectory.⁵ Four reports on the state

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of the Australian environment have shown that we have serious problems; five reports on the global environmental outlook have documented the crisis at the global level, highlighted by the dramatic decline in biodiversity.⁶ Despite these detailed descriptions (and explanations) of the environmental emergency we face, decision-makers at the national and global level still behave as if a problem caused by growth in human consumption can either be safely ignored or, even more improbably, solved by more of the growth which is causing the difficulty. For those who believe that political decision-makers are “rational actors”, the continued denial of scientific analysis would appear to present contrary evidence. Causal Layered Analysis offers a logical explanation.

Causal Layered Analysis and the Myths of Modern Industrial Society

Causal layered analysis provides insight into the reason people find it difficult to accept truths that should be unarguable; denial is an understandable response when the truths are in fundamental conflict with the myths or metaphors people hold.⁷ When those myths or metaphors are so widespread as to constitute the underlying ethos of the society, continued denial is the norm.

The framework of CLA provides a convincing explanation of resistance to change, especially when manifested as denial of clear evidence or solid science that demands a new approach. Most political discussion is at the litany level, over-simplified and superficial. An extreme example of this approach was the successful election campaign run in Australia in 2013 by then opposition leader Tony Abbott based on simplistic monosyllabic slogans: “We will stop the boats”, “We will get rid of the tax”, “We will cut the debt”, etc. Discussion of climate change in the USA, Canada and Australia is usually couched in bizarrely over-simplified terms, portraying the science as a matter of “belief” as if it were a religion, or belittling the motives of those who present the scientific data.⁸ Some analysis does go deeper and looks at social causes, occasionally even offering practical solutions that treat the disease rather than its superficial symptoms, but almost all public discourse ignores the myths or metaphors underlying the discussion: what Inayatullah has called “the unconscious dimensions of the problem”.⁹

In those terms, some obvious deep-seated myths underpin our civilisation. One is the notion that progress is inevitable and that growth is either inevitable or desirable as the hallmark of progress and the bringer of wealth and happiness. Challenging the myth of growth is tantamount to heresy. The very title of the report *The Limits to Growth* might have been chosen to provoke the response it received: shock, disbelief, and vituperative attacks that belittled the intelligence of the authors and questioned their motives. The real world is complicated and growth brings benefits and problems, but

the deep-seated *belief* in growth means that the benefits are applauded and the problems usually ignored. An interesting contemporary example in Australian politics is the rising cost of electricity. Independent analysis shows that about 70 per cent of the cost increases in the last decade is attributable to expansions of the network to provide for the growing population, because Australia has an unusually high rate of population growth, averaging about 1.8 per cent per year. Because it is heresy to question growth, political discourse blames the price rises on the increasing use of solar panels, even though they provide peak electricity at a lower marginal cost than large power stations, or on the modest carbon price introduced by the Gillard government which probably accounts for about 5 per cent of the increase.

A second underlying metaphor is the notion that we are not citizens but consumers; in a morally deficient and spiritually bankrupt society, we are urged to find fulfilment in consumption. This is an extraordinary metaphor: the individual as stomach. We don't use resources, we consume them. This is not a weakness, a pardonable foible, but almost a social and economic duty: consume and take comfort in the fact that you are helping the economy to grow. As an extreme example of this approach, as the Twin Towers crumbled after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, shocked US citizens were urged to go shopping! Experts lament any decline in new car sales or spending on tourism, as if these were indicators of social decay rather than probably representing rational choices about spending scarce resources. Raskin has argued that consumerism has been one of the triad of dominant values for the last century, along with "domination of nature" and individualism.¹⁰

The concept of domination of nature is arguably a logical extension of the enlightenment and the emerging body of scientific understanding that has allowed humans to transform the world dramatically, enabling unprecedented material comfort for billions of people. It is expressed in triumphalist slogans such as "Earth yields to the dominion of man" as well as in hubristic notions such as "environmental management", implying we have the knowledge and the wisdom to control natural systems for our benefit. The first Australian report on the state of the environment estimated that only 10 to 15 per cent of the species that inhabit the continent have even been identified, with a much smaller fraction described in sufficient detail to allow us to characterise their interactions with other species. So the notion of "management" is clearly fanciful; a parallel would be trying to manage a soccer team when you have only met one of the players and have no idea what skills the others have or how they might interact. The emergence of the discipline of "sustainability science" was based on the recognition that many of the world's most serious environmental problems are the direct and inevitable result of applying technical knowledge to part of a system, ignoring the wider consequences.¹¹ Reservoirs are built to impound water

and allow irrigated agriculture, causing soil salinity in the irrigated areas and disruption to the riverine ecosystem. Chemical attacks on pests cause flow-on effects up and down the food chain. Flood mitigation works expedite the flow of water downstream, transferring the problem to a different postcode. Expanding the capacity of a road generates traffic and creates predictable problems elsewhere in the system. Using enormous quantities of fossil fuel energy has enabled us to live at a standard of material comfort that previous generations could only dream about, but the consequence is that we are changing the global climate in ways that now threaten the future of civilisation. Raskin argues that the metaphor of domination of nature now needs to be replaced by the concept of ecological sensitivity, recognising that natural systems have critical limits and accepting the responsibility to live within those limits.¹²

Individualism has been the basic metaphor underpinning the gradual unwinding of services provided by the State in favour of the expectation that individuals would fend for themselves. Public transport systems have been removed, as with the tramways in Australian cities in the 1950s, or allowed to decline in their capacity to move people and freight, as with railways in many countries, in favour of an assumption that individuals will have cars and manage their own transport. The English-speaking democracies have gradually reduced the government share of the economy in favour of “opening up opportunities” for the private sector. The metaphor of individualism can be seen as the underpinning of the so-called Chicago School of economic thinking which has dominated politics in recent decades in most English-speaking countries, justifying the run-down of public services, the limiting of government capacity and the much more generous treatment of international capital.

Oreskes and Conway have analysed denial of climate change science and drawn parallels with the earlier denial of the link between smoking tobacco and the dramatically increased risk of lung cancer and other health problems. They found that the same underlying ideology, and in some cases the same people, were involved in both of these examples of denial of scientific evidence. Those leading the denial movement were often well-qualified scientists, but they were also people who believed deeply in the freedom of corporations to operate in openly competitive markets, so they claimed to see no evidence for effects which would lead inevitably to government restrictions on tobacco or fossil fuel companies.¹³ I have debated publicly with scientists who claim they see no evidence of human activity changing the global climate. Driven by their underlying myth of belief in free markets and the rights of corporations, they cherry-pick data, make assertions that are palpably wrong and repeat those assertions after being corrected, misquote respectable scientists or quote them out of context to give the impression that their own views are mainstream, and impugn the motives of the vast majority of scientists whose work supports the mainstream view.¹⁴ One

colleague has said that he will no longer debate with those who deny the science “because it is not a fair contest, as I feel obliged not to lie and they clearly feel no such obligation”.¹⁵

Sometimes the underlying metaphors lead individuals into positions that involve obvious contradictions. An interesting example is the stance being adopted by some technocrats and some media outlets about nuclear power and climate change. I have encountered distinguished engineers who say that they are not convinced by the argument that humans are changing the global climate, usually because it is a challenge to their underlying belief in the capacity of humans to dominate nature and the rights of large corporations to pursue their business without government restrictions. The same people often believe, driven by the same underlying beliefs, that we should build nuclear power stations. The intellectual problem is that the only way of making a rational case for building nuclear power stations in Australia is to accept that climate change demands a move away from less expensive and less risky methods of generating electricity. The editorial line of the Murdoch press in Australia shows the same contradiction. The power of the belief in the benefits of growth was demonstrated by a senior editor of *The Australian* on a media panel at a Canberra conference. He asserted that it was common knowledge that population growth is good for the economy. In the discussion period, an expert pointed out that he had conducted a detailed analysis of the data for OECD countries and found no correlation at all between the rate of population growth and the usual measures of economic well-being, such as Gross Domestic Product per capita. The editor looked puzzled, confessed that he had not seen the OECD data, but said the conclusion did not make sense to him and he was sure it would not make sense to the people he consulted on these issues. Faced with the uncomfortable choice between his myth and the real world data, he chose to reject the numbers and cling to the myth. He still pontificates about the benefits of population growth, undaunted by the reality of local calculations that show the cost of infrastructure for each additional Australian to be about a quarter of a million dollars.

On the specific issue of population, ecologists have been warning for nearly fifty years that the growth in the human population constitutes a direct threat to the capacity of the Earth’s systems to support other species.¹⁶ Those who believe in the myth of unlimited growth often respond by attacking the messenger¹⁷ or developing arguments of Jesuitical ingenuity to justify their position.¹⁸ As discussed in the following sections, most of the specific challenges humanity faces are direct or indirect results of the growing human population and the increasing pressure it inevitably puts on natural resources; but most decision-makers choose either to ignore the issue or to actively champion population growth, claiming it produces vitality.

The Myths and Metaphors of Science

It should be conceded that the scientific process is also based on myths and metaphors. In fact, an analysis of science decades before the development of CLA reached similar conclusions.¹⁹ Kuhn showed that most of the time, most scientists are conducting what he called “normal science”, solving puzzles and making modest advances in knowledge within an agreed theoretical framework or paradigm. Occasionally, the scientific work reveals that the framework is limited or flawed, leading to a “scientific revolution” in which a new paradigm is proposed. Since most scientists are reluctant to concede that they have been working within an inadequate framework, there is usually resistance to the new approach. Obvious examples are the replacement of the Ptolemaic model of the solar system by the Copernican theory, the superseding of creation stories as an explanation for the diversity of life by evolution, the refining of classical physics by the new story of relativity and the new intellectual framework of quantum theory, the replacement of steady-state cosmology by the big bang theory or the development of plate tectonics as a model to explain geophysical processes. In each case, scientists who had applied the older models were often reluctant to embrace the new ones. In some cases, the new paradigm only prevailed when those supporting the old framework lost influence, allowing the scientific community to move forward and adopt the theory which better explained the observations.

A more recent example is the development of “sustainability science”, discussed above. Fifty years ago, most scientists believed that they were rational, objective observers of the natural world. The myth of scientific objectivity implied that all competent observers would come to the same conclusion. The development of the sociology of science recognised that our perception of the world is inevitably influenced by our culture and our values, so “objectivity”, in some senses, is a myth. More particularly, sustainability science accepts that we cannot, even in principle, be objective observers of the natural world because we are an integral part of that world. To put it metaphorically, we cannot be like football spectators, sitting in a grandstand observing the game; we are on the field as the game ebbs and flows around us. Our perspective does not allow us to see all of the play and we have an obvious vested interest in the outcome; that inevitably influences what we see and how we interpret our observations. The new approach of sustainability science explains the fact that different observers of our complex interaction with natural systems sometimes reach different conclusions.

The Specific Challenges: (a) Limits to growth

In 1972, the Club of Rome published its landmark report, *The Limits to Growth*.²⁰ This was the first attempt to model the long-term consequences of global trends, taking advantage of the increasing capacity of computers to

process large quantities of data. The results were simplified by the media, which generally suggested that the report had concluded that we were rapidly exhausting critical resources or that pollution would suffocate the planet within a few decades. What the report actually said was that if the current trends of growth in population, resource use, industrial output, agricultural production and pollution were all to continue, we would reach limits within 100 years (by 2070). Since it also concluded that these limits would lead to economic and social decline in the early to middle decades of the 21st Century, the report should at least have provoked serious study and reflection, if not a revision of the standard development assumptions. Instead, it was attacked and belittled, usually by people who showed little sign of having actually read it, and for whom the very notion of limited growth was deeply offensive. The report concluded that it was entirely possible to shift the trajectory of human development onto a different path, one that would be sustainable into the distant future, but that to do this would require new policy settings. That conclusion was also ignored.

The general question posed by *The Limits to Growth* is arguably the most fundamental challenge to the underlying myths of Western society. The assumption of unlimited growth makes it seem morally defensible to live at material standards far in advance of poorer countries, because it is assumed that growth will eventually raise levels of resource use and material comfort in those countries as well. Only an assumption of unlimited growth allows the scouring of the world for mineral resources to be used in OECD nations, because it is assumed that more resources will always be found. The conclusion that there are limits to growth, that the continuation of existing growth trends will lead inevitably to social and economic collapse, is a very inconvenient truth indeed, and one that had to be discredited at any cost. So critics made *ad hominem* attacks on the authors, or set up straw-man simplifications of the argument that they then proceeded to demolish. This approach was described by Coddington as “cheer-mongering”: portray the case you are attacking in over-simplified terms, state the obvious that the real world is much more complicated and uncertain, sweep to an optimistic conclusion about that uncertain world and claim it to be the result of more sophisticated analysis.²¹ As an example, there was widespread acclaim for a more recent book which purported to show that most of the world’s major environmental problems had been exaggerated.²² I argued at the time that a more appropriate title for *The Skeptical Environmentalist* would be *The Gullible Statistician*, because the author shamelessly cherry-picked data to fit his pre-determined conclusion and ignored the overwhelming bulk of countervailing evidence.²³ Lomborg’s underlying myth is that economic growth is good and will bring benefits to all, so the data about environmental problems needed to be reviewed to fit that belief. Because most decision-makers want to believe that, the obvious shortcomings of the analysis were ignored and the author widely hailed as a modern guru. He has been supported by business interests to set up an institute and spread his message

of cheer: don't worry about environmental problems, put your trust in economic growth. To put that naïve approach in perspective, even the World Economic Forum concluded after the Global Financial Crisis that the existing economic approach is not sustainable.²⁴

The Specific Challenges: (b) Peak oil

In 1973, the world experienced the OPEC oil embargo and a consequent rapid increase in petroleum prices. While most observers had not anticipated this event, one expert had predicted it nearly twenty years earlier. Hubbert calculated that US oil production would peak around 1971, leading to a need to import more oil and changing the balance between producers and purchasers in the world oil market.²⁵ Industry derided the very idea that oil resources were finite and that production could decline. Governments did not appear to notice the debate at all.

Once the notion of “peak oil” had been verified at the national level, various analysts began using the same methodology to analyse global production. The calculation was not straightforward, as estimates of oil reserves were mostly proprietary information, kept confidential by either oil companies or national governments, so there was a good deal of uncertainty about the raw data for undertaking the analysis. But, by 1975, there was a broad consensus that world oil production would peak sometime between 2000 and 2020, with the modal estimate being around 2010. In 1977, I gave public lectures and published a paper arguing that we should be using those thirty years to plan a smooth transition out of the age of cheap and plentiful oil.²⁶ The silence was deafening. Now, over thirty years later and with more solid evidence that we are beyond the peak of world production of conventional oil, most transport planning is still based on an implicit assumption that petroleum fuels will continue to be plentiful and cheap.

In the early 1980s, I undertook a study of Australia's energy futures up to the year 2030.²⁷ I concluded that the usual assumptions based on high-energy futures, involving continued exponential growth for another fifty years, did not make sense. Even if the oil were available and the environmental impacts of its use acceptable, it seemed impossible to bear the economic burden of oil imports on the scale being projected by government agencies. Again, the silence was deafening and most government agencies continued to assume that use of petroleum fuels and other forms of energy would continue to grow exponentially. Reports even used the assumed future growth rates to calculate consumption figures decades in advance, with absurd levels of apparent precision, implying not only that growth could continue forever but also that we knew the future level of consumption to within a fraction of a percentage point.²⁸

Because the very notion of limited energy resources is in conflict with the deep-seated myth that human ingenuity will always be able to unlock new

sources of energy, the careful mathematical analysis that reveals those limits is ignored.

The Specific Challenges: (c) Climate change

In 1985, the global scientific community warned that human activity was changing the global climate. The statement of the Villach conference in that year connected the observed changes in climate to the measured increases in greenhouse gas concentrations; for the first time, climate scientists spoke up as a global body and suggested a relationship between human activity and the changing climate. The 1987 report of the World Council on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future*, considered the evidence of limited oil resources and the emerging consensus about climate change.²⁹ Recognising the fundamental importance of energy to modern civilisation, it concluded that new energy systems will be needed to power future human development, but noted that the changes would require “new dimensions of political will and institutional cooperation”. More recently, in 2008, the International Energy Agency concluded that the combination of peak oil and climate change demands “nothing less than an energy revolution”.³⁰

In 1992, the Rio Earth Summit concluded that the climate change problem was sufficiently urgent to justify developing the Framework Convention on Climate Change. By 1997, the science had provided such convincing evidence of the problem that the global community agreed to the Kyoto Protocol. That agreement was concluded despite the concerted opposition of energy-intensive industries, the commercial world generally and a few rogue states like Saudi Arabia and Australia. The Howard government agreed to the protocol at the Kyoto meeting and trumpeted it as a great deal for Australia; indeed it was, although a bad deal for the planet, as our delegation had persuaded the rest of the world to give us a uniquely generous target. Despite this favourable treatment, the Australian government joined the Bush administration in refusing to ratify the agreement, delaying the point at which the treaty became legally binding. It also disbanded the National Greenhouse Advisory Panel and did little to rein in Australia’s spiralling greenhouse gas production. More fundamentally, it continued to base the entire pattern of Australian economic development on an implicit assumption that it will continue to make financial sense to export large volumes of low value commodities, a practice that is only possible for as long as ocean freight is inexpensive (and for as long as it is seen as acceptable to keep burning coal, despite its massive contribution to climate change). It is difficult to see how that can make sense even in the medium term.

As Oreskes and Conway have shown, the ideology underlying the worst campaigns denying the scientific reality of climate change takes a very conservative view of the world, supporting unfettered markets as the source of wealth and wellbeing. From the perspective of those locked into that myth, it is unthinkable that human wealth-producing activity could change

the global climate and therefore justify government action to curb some profitable activities. So the science has to be seen as unreliable or biased or as part of some sort of global conspiracy to hold back progress. In a revealing comment some years after he left office, John Howard said that he preferred to trust his instinct rather than the predictions of climate science; in other words, he prefers to cling to his myths.³¹

The Specific Challenges: (d) Environmental decline

In the 1990s and early 2000s, a series of national and global reports spelled out the serious environmental problems we face. In 1996 I chaired the advisory council that produced the first national report on the state of the environment.³² The report concluded that many aspects of the Australian environment were in good condition by international standards, but also that we had some very serious problems that would prevent us from achieving our stated goal of developing sustainably: declining biodiversity, the state of much of our rural land, our inland rivers, pressures on the coastal zone, greenhouse gas emissions. A second report, five years later, found that all of those serious problems had worsened.³³ The third and fourth reports (in 2006³⁴ and 2011), also concluded that all of the most serious problems were getting worse.³⁵ There has been no concerted political response to these reports; if there is a trend, it appears that the political emphasis on inappropriate forms of economic development has strengthened.

At the global level, the warning bells have been ringing for twenty years. Five reports in the United Nations Environment Programme's series Global Environmental Outlook (GEO), the report of the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment research program and four reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change have all warned that we are dangerously exceeding the capacity of natural systems. The second GEO report said explicitly, "the present approach is not sustainable. Doing nothing is not an option".³⁶ The carefully argued conclusions of thousands of the world's best scientists—that we are stretching the capacity of natural systems to provide the ecosystem services on which life depends—had almost no impact on decision-makers.

Potentially the most serious environmental problem is the decline in biodiversity. The Millennium Assessment concluded that current rates of species loss for mammals, amphibians and birds are between a hundred and a thousand times the average rates over the Earth's history. The overall rate of species loss is comparable with the rates in the five previous great extinction events. The causes are well known: increasing human population and the consequent destruction of habitat, introduced species and chemical pollution. None of those driving forces is slowing, so there is little cause for optimism, especially as climate change adds a new threat to already endangered species. The myth that allows humans to ignore the destructive impact of our activities on other species is the notion of our dominion over

nature, often given a religious emphasis by reference to sacred writings which support the notion that other species were put on Earth purely to serve human needs.

Collapse

Diamond argued in his landmark study that societies will inevitably expand until they reach limits of some kind: food, water, mineral resources, relations with neighbouring societies. Whether the society then fails or survives, he said, depends on whether they are able to adapt to the new situation.³⁷ History shows that some societies, such as the Mayan civilisation, the Tigris-Euphrates settlements and Easter Island, essentially continued to do what they had always done, despite the impending crisis, and pushed themselves on towards inevitable collapse. Diamond cites further examples, such as other Pacific island states and medieval Japan, where problems prompted changes in social or economic arrangements to meet the new reality and the society survived. His book is sub-titled “How societies choose to fail or survive” because he argues that any society can choose either to adapt to new realities or ignore them until it is too late to adapt. The critical issue is whether societies are able to adapt to the new reality. Diamond argues that the answer to this question is determined by the values of the society, which sets limits on the scale of change that is acceptable; where survival would require change to deeply embedded values it is less likely to be chosen than persistence in the old ways, despite their predictably tragic outcome.

Table 1. CLA

	Traditional approach	The new story
LITANY	GDP, measuring growth	Triple Bottom Line accounting
SOCIAL CAUSES	Shopping centres, large-scale energy use, urban transport, externalising nature	Internalising the environment, incentives for clean energy, better urban design
WORLDVIEW	Individualism, consumption	Ecological
MYTH/METAPHOR	Human as stomach	Healing

The analysis in this chapter supports Diamond’s theory that societies collapse when they are unable to adapt to changing circumstances, providing a causal explanation: while responding with change appears to be a more rational approach than marching bravely to inevitable collapse, that apparently irrational behaviour can reveal the way underlying metaphors are acting to prevent a concerted response. That is a very uncomfortable conclusion for our present civilisation, since it is reasonable to conclude that our underlying myths and metaphors are certainly a very serious obstacle to

meeting the challenges we now face. They could very well prove insurmountable.

Conclusion

Causal layered analysis provides not just insights, but a rational explanation for the continued failure of decision-makers to see the “inconvenient truth” of such problems as climate change, peak oil, environmental decline and, the most fundamental issue, of the limits on the scale of human resource use. It also suggests that there is little point in refining the science or improving the mathematical proofs for these serious problems. Effective responses are only likely to be socially acceptable and politically practicable if society somehow embraces new metaphors that are compatible with the goal of living sustainably: in Inayatullah’s words, replacing strategy with healing.³⁸

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7. The Future of Water Resource Management in the Muslim World

Syeda Mariya Absar*

This chapter provides an insight into water availability and usage in the Muslim world, based on global data on water consumption and availability with respect to specific geographical regions and an extensive literature review to categorize the regions with similar socio-economic and hydro-geological make up into distinct water zones. CLA is used to examine the way water has been valued and managed, and the systems and worldviews that have influenced current human-water relationships in the Muslim world.[†]

Introduction

Water has immense spiritual importance to Muslims as a symbol of purity and cleanliness, which is the essence of Islam. Water concerns in the Islamic world vary from being negligible to severe, local to nationwide and, at times, transcending borders. These concerns also extend to quality and quantity. Countries in the Muslim world typically confront a combination of these problems.

Water is of profound importance to Muslims. The *Quran* mentions water in sixty three separate verses. In one verse Allah says, “And we created from water every living thing” and in another verse He says that His most precious creation, after humans, is water. The *Quran* describes Allah’s throne as floating on water and there is clear reference to streams flowing underneath the gardens of paradise. The life-giving properties of water are reflected in the verse, “And Allah has sent down water from the sky and therewith gives life to the earth after its death”.¹

One of the five pillars of Islam is praying five times a day and each prayer is preceded by *wudu* or “ablution” which is a ritual cleansing of hands, feet and face with water. Without this ritual a prayer stands void. The Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) compared the five prayers to the cleansing property of water in the following saying: “The similitude of five prayers is

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like an overflowing river passing by the gate of one of you in which he washes five times daily”.²

Muslims also observe certain hygiene practices that set them apart from other religious groups. As an Islamic tradition, all Muslims wash with water after urination or defecation; toilet paper is used merely as a drying agent. This illustrates the importance of water and the need for access to clean water. There are special plumbing fixtures that supply water in the toilet, such as hand showers, water spouts fitted into the toilet bowls or bidets. The need to wash prior to the five prayers daily and to wash every time the toilet is used increases the per capita water consumption of all Muslims. According to the Pacific Institute’s data on water resources, approximately 75% of people in Muslim-majority countries have access to clean drinking water and 60% have access to sanitation.³

According to Islamic principles, humans may consume and utilize natural resources, but should not manipulate nature in a way that irreversibly degrades the environment. Islamic doctrine asserts that the ecosystem belongs to Allah, who entrusts humankind to pass it on, relatively unharmed, to succeeding generations. This is consistent with the notion of sustainable development and inter-generational equity. People ought to share in the abundance as well as in the scarcity of resources because they are finite and people, as inheritors, are accountable to Allah for their actions on earth.⁴

The Muslim world experiences various environmental, economic, and political challenges, but it is, to some extent, united by certain common religious and ethical guidelines, and these can form the basis of water management policies. Globally, there is a growing recognition of the effectiveness of resource management policy influenced by the traditions and knowledge of indigenous peoples, though the potential role of religion as the basis for policy-making is arguably underestimated. In countries where the majority of people are practicing Muslims, a water management policy that is grounded in the tenets of Islam has a greater chance of being effective.⁵

The Water Map: Six distinct socio-economic and hydro-geological zones

This section introduces six socio-economic and hydro-geological zones which will form the basis of the analysis. The framework behind the division of the countries of the Muslim world into six distinct zones depends on three basic elements; the geographical location of the country, the natural occurrence of water in that country, and how the water is managed by that country. This methodology builds on the work done by Marcus Barber,⁶ who uses these elements to understand what water means to different cultures and to people in differing geographical zones, and how these zones and cultures approach the use of water. The categorisation of the Muslim world into

distinct water zones was based on the global data on water consumption and availability for specific geographical regions published in FAO's *Statistical Year Book* (2009)⁷ and the Pacific Institute's *The World's Water 2008–2009*,⁸ coupled with case studies from the Muslim world.

Countries with similar natural water distribution and strategies for the use of water are clumped together to form a zone. These zones, for ease of reference, are called the 'Oil Barons in the Desert', 'Water Stressed', 'Mediterranean to Tropical', 'Global Charity', 'Tension Driven', and the 'Disaster Prone'. These zones are distinguished, as mentioned above, either by their geographic location or hydrological makeup, their strategies of water management, or their experience of similar water-related events such as floods, glacial melt, droughts or their sharing of water resources with their neighbours. Most countries have overlapping attributes that would allow them to fit under more than one zone; I will therefore be using the discrete characteristics and assumptions highlighted below to simplify my analysis. For pictorial reference, the geographical zones are illustrated in Figure 1—The Water Map.

Zone 1—Oil Barons in the Desert—This zone includes all of the Muslim countries that are rich in oil and are located in the arid desert belt of the Middle East and Western Asia, including, but not limited to, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman. This is one of the driest regions of the world and has only 1% of the world's renewable fresh water resources. According to the 2010 report of the Arab Forum of Environment and Development, precipitation in the region is expected to drop by 25% and evaporation to increase by 25% by 2015. As a result, average crop yields in the region will drop by 20%. Some of these countries have rainfall as low as 29mm per annum.⁹ To meet the growing demand for water, especially in the agriculture sector, most of these countries are augmenting their water supply by tapping into non-renewable trans-border groundwater aquifers, and investing in sea water desalination and waste water recycling. The increased dependence on groundwater has led to a decline in aquifer water levels. Furthermore, saltwater intrusion is contaminating the aquifers and causing disturbance of the dynamic equilibrium that exists between aquifers, leading to a decline in agricultural productivity and an increase in migration from rural areas. Tapping into non-renewable groundwater sources or fossil water also means that there may not be enough water left for future generations.¹⁰

Zone 2—Water Stressed—Countries with a low GDP and little access to fresh water in North Africa and parts of South and Central Asia including Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, the Central Asian countries of the former Soviet Union and Afghanistan, among others. This zone comprises the sub-tropical arid or semi-arid countries where summer temperatures are soaring and rainfall is low. The river systems experience seasonal variability exacerbated by fluctuation in precipitation due to climate change. They are experiencing

or approaching physical water scarcity. * In this region, more than 75% of river flows are withdrawn to meet agricultural, industrial and domestic needs, with irrigation taking the largest share.¹¹ Substantial resources have been diverted to the expansion of irrigation systems and to water management. However, mounting demographic stresses and climate change are continually reducing the water supply.

Zone 3—Mediterranean to Tropical—The countries in this zone have good access to fresh water, are richly bio diverse and have low to medium GDP. These countries include Turkey, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina located in the Mediterranean region, Guyana and Surinam in South America, and Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei Darussalam in South East Asia. These countries do not face immediate water shortages and have allocated substantial resources for the development and management of water for irrigation to achieve significant economic growth and poverty reduction. Countries such as Turkey, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam have also paid significant attention to integrated watershed management in water planning and development projects and have ensured equity of services and distribution to all households, especially the poor.¹² However, although water supply per capita is adequate in this zone, some social and environmental problems still exist in the river basins, such as population growth, non-point source pollution and degradation of water resources.¹³

Zone 4—Global Charity—Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa are experiencing economic water scarcity, which occurs when human, institutional and financial capital are the constraints to accessing water, even though naturally occurring water is available locally to meet human demands. Most of these nations are also dependent on foreign aid for food and medicine. Investment in water management infrastructure has been slow and inadequately financed.¹⁴ Vulnerability to climate change will aggravate the economic water stress in this region. The resulting droughts and famines are attracting considerable attention from international donor agencies. With poverty on the rise, women are the most vulnerable segment of the society as they are burdened with the responsibility of fetching water for the household. Countries in this zone require financial assistance in building large water storage facilities and other infrastructure to mitigate the effects of water scarcity.¹⁵

Zone 5—Tension Driven—This zone comprises countries sharing trans-border rivers and/or aquifers with neighbouring countries. These countries include Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, Sudan, Somalia, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Kuwait and Bahrain share their groundwater with Saudi Arabia. The Tigris-Euphrates river basin is shared

*Physical water scarcity occurs when water resource development is approaching or has exceeded sustainable limits. Physical water scarcity relates water availability to water demand and implies that dry areas are not necessarily water scarce.

by Turkey, Syria and Iraq with tributaries in Iran. Egypt, the Sudan and eight other countries share the Nile river basin. The River Jordan is shared by Jordan, Lebanon and Israel. Increasing water shortages in most of these countries are leading to conflicts as the management and allocation of water resources goes beyond local communities and crosses borders. Shared water resources can become contentious, especially when water governance ignores international rivers and their respective watersheds and aquifers.

Zone 6—Disaster Prone—All nations in this zone are vulnerable to disasters such as floods, droughts, glacial melts and sea level rise. Most of the countries that are expected to experience such disasters more frequently in the coming years lie in South and Central Asia, including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, the Maldives and Kazakhstan. Pakistan and Bangladesh have a long history of floods and, more recently, have been affected by glacial melt in the upper reaches of their river basins. Kazakhstan is also reporting its glaciers melting at a faster rate. The Maldives, like Indonesia, was adversely affected by recent Tsunamis in the region. The Maldives’ existence, including its inhabitants, plants and animals, is also directly threatened by sea level rise due to polar ice melt caused by global warming, and consequently the country’s residents will be forced to move to other countries.

These are largely low income countries and the onslaught of any disaster, whether natural or man-made, is likely to economically weaken them further.




Figure 1. The Water Map: Depicting the six socio-economic and hydro-geological zones

Applying Causal Layered Analysis to Fresh Water Availability and Usage in the Muslim World

The analysis in this section is based on a literature review of emerging trends in addition to a culture-, gender- and location-specific interpretation of how water as a resource is perceived and managed in each of the six zones. The analysis was carried out based on case studies of water usage and availability in each of the six zones.

Table 1. The ‘Oil Barons in the Desert’ zone

	Societal approach/thinking
LITANY	Water is an expensive commodity but the nation is wealthy. Desalination, ground water extraction and virtual water trade is the way to sustenance
SYSTEMIC	Society accepts the need to conserve water. Using oil revenue to desalinate sea water for drinking and pumping fossil water to grow food is the means for meeting the population’s drinking and food requirements
WORLDVIEW	There is a need to establish more water reserves through desalination to increase living standards. Drinking imported bottled water is a status symbol; it is the purest form of drinking water
MYTHOLOGY	“Power from oil”. Wealth from oil means power. As long as there is oil there will be drinking water for a healthy society. “Power from fossil water”. Future generations will find their own solutions to water shortages

Table 2. The ‘Water Stressed’ zone (physical scarcity)

	Societal approach/thinking
LITANY	Damming the rivers and pumping groundwater provides water for competing uses. Agriculture takes the biggest share of fresh water usage
SYSTEMIC	Building dams, reservoirs and tube wells ensures future supply of water and meets the population’s drinking, food and energy needs. Water seen as a right for agricultural and domestic use, wastewater disposal seen as government’s problem
WORLDVIEW	Downstream impacts of dams, diversion of water from rivers for agriculture are ignored or denied in order to preserve self-benefit. Agricultural productivity is the only road to prosperity. Traditional irrigation methods are time-tested and should be maintained, no matter how wasteful
MYTHOLOGY	“Power from dams”. Water abundance and control indicates wealth and security—a right afforded by Allah. “We have the right to exploit water”

Table 3. The ‘Mediterranean to Tropical’ zone

	Societal approach/thinking
LITANY	Water will continue to be in abundant supply as it has always been; the rainy season never fails. Water sustains food and economy
SYSTEMIC	Water drives the plantations, so more forests are cut down for palm tree plantations, the products of which are exported. Loss of natural habitats. Most water-borne diseases are avoidable but precautions are not always taken. The gap between rich and poor grows as the rich pocket the wealth
WORLDVIEW	Rainforest timber brings instant rewards. Water degradation seen as minimal due to abundance of water supply. The west will buy natural assets feeding many more mouths
MYTHOLOGY	“Wealth from the rainforest”. Water helps grow trees that are a source of wealth (palm oil, rubber, timber) and have medicinal properties. Meeting western demand helps feed the domestic population. “Nature will provide”

Table 4. The ‘Global Charity’ zone (economic scarcity)

	Societal approach/thinking
LITANY	Water provision is the role of the government on a national level and the role of women, who carry water over long distances, at a local level. Education on disease is limited. Water is seen as a gift from Allah; tainted water is a curse from Allah. Oceans and rivers supply food
SYSTEMIC	Water quality and access are major concerns. Men work to earn a living while women are responsible for unpaid labour (including fetching water). Water-borne disease has a huge impact on death rates, medical costs and self-sustainability, but means of prevention and treatment are limited. Low water access reduces food supply, increasing dependence on foreign aid
WORLDVIEW	Women carrying water for the household stems from an androcentric world view. Birth rates remain high to combat high mortality rates. Western scientific interventions are seen as a silver bullet. Food aid always comes in time to save the masses
MYTHOLOGY	“Water means life and death—the prayer to Allah brings rain”. Every drop is a gift and water is sacred no matter how dirty. In a patriarchal rural society women are water suppliers, men are water consumers. Changing seasons bring hope or despair

Table 5. The ‘Tension Driven’ zone

	Societal approach/thinking
LITANY	If a river passes our land or if there is ground water available below our land, we have the right to it. Increasing demographic pressures on the water require us to make the most of available resources. Most multilateral treaties fail to reach a far-reaching agreement or framework, especially when there is serious contention
SYSTEMIC	River basins transcend national boundaries. Exclusive ownership of water is preferred. Multilateral agreements that do exist are not holistic or inclusive especially those dealing with shared aquifers
WORLDVIEW	Upper riparian nations have the right to water. The country with the most power to exert has the right to water in a given basin; might is right
MYTHOLOGY	“Power from individual ownership of nature” and “might is right”. The idea of the sovereign individual/state as a single entity. Inequitable sharing due to the political strength one nation can exert over another

Table 6. The ‘Disaster Prone’ zone

	Societal approach/thinking
LITANY	There is drought and then there is flood. There is a lack of effective use of water. Population increase and competing uses put stress on water resources
SYSTEMIC	Watersheds are not managed properly so are prone to disasters. Each sector of society has distinct beliefs about water, at times in conflict with each other, that go unquestioned. What gets flushed is out of sight and out of mind
WORLDVIEW	Our society is confounded by how or when to tackle a problem. Industry in denial looks for the most cost effective methods. Someone else is responsible for environmental degradation. Repeating mistakes made by other nations. We have been making use of our rivers in this manner for centuries
MYTHOLOGY	“Wrath of mother nature—punishment of our sins”. Success means a bountiful crop and plenty of water for agriculture

The analyses in tables 1–6 deconstruct the cultural practices and societal approaches around water management into four levels. The goal is to show that although Islam is a common factor in each of the zones, there are diverse value systems, cultures and lifestyles at play in how water is managed in each of the zones. Identifying these cultural and geographical underpinnings allows for the reconstruction of location-specific alternative futures for each zone. This analysis is continued in a subsequent section, where a triangulation between basic Islamic principles, culture and the

hydro-geological zones is used to explore alternative solutions for future water management.

What will Challenge the Current Water Map?

There are certain global phenomena that might challenge this water map as the six zones move into the future. These phenomena include the “Planetisation of water”, the “Geo-politics of water” and the “Globalisation of water”. The **planetisation of water** is the understanding that there is plenty of freshwater in the world to meet the current consumption patterns; however, regional and local water availability and access vary greatly. Some regions have large amounts of water availability yet suffer from water stress due to inadequate funds to invest in water infrastructure. Others may appear to be statistically water stressed but are able to alleviate the natural shortfalls through capital investments into water-augmenting infrastructure. Climate change will have a significant impact on the global sustainability of water supplies in the coming decades. In many regions, it will lead to increased precipitation variability, reduced water quality and flood risks. This will impact food security, especially in the arid and semi-arid tropics and Asian and African mega-deltas.¹⁶

The **geo-politics of water** shape the future of the world when most of the world’s fresh water resources are contained in watersheds and aquifers that cross national boundaries. Climate change is expected to change the onset and intensity of precipitation and the impact of these changes will be felt multifold when a system is shared amongst nations. The drier regions in the middle latitudes are expected to receive reduced runoff and the number of extreme events of flooding and drought is expected to rise, both in frequency and in duration.¹⁷ The supply of fresh water is limited and dwindling as the global population increases and with it the demand for water, leading to a potential increase in water conflicts, especially in shared watersheds.¹⁸ Countries with economies in transition and less developed countries are among the most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change; as they have disparate adaptive capacities. When risks and challenges are shared, solutions must be similarly coordinated.

As a result of the changes brought about in the global economy by neo-liberal globalisation, water will become a global commodity as a coping mechanism to water scarcity, characterized by water property rights, free markets and free trade.¹⁹ Consumption in one country impacts water systems elsewhere in the world, where the production processes take place. Virtual water flows across national and regional borders. This makes most countries dependent on water resources in other parts of the world, making water a global commodity, hence the term **globalisation of water**. Some recent examples include the sale of pristine glacial water from Alaska to the Middle East through privatization and allowing a market mechanism to allocate a scarce resource.²⁰ To cope with future water shortages, Olmstead argues that

clean water can be efficiently allocated for human consumption by making use of market-based incentives for consumption and conservation of water through water pricing within and between various markets, including agricultural, industrial and domestic.²¹

Global Perspectives on Water Futures

The futures of water call for a global initiative similar to those needed to address ozone layer depletion and climate change. The solution to future water problems requires concerted efforts on the part of all nations based on science and culture; this is also known as **glocalisation** of water, the local expression of a global policy. These local efforts include control of population growth, conservation of water through water pricing, being cognisant of water footprints, taking measures to augment water supply and adopting integrated watershed management techniques.

These local efforts also require striking a balance between human water needs and ecosystem health in order to be sustainable. The huge amount of money spent on water infrastructure globally has safeguarded water supply in the developed world at the expense of nature but most developing countries cannot afford such investments. An article titled ‘Global threats to human water security and river biodiversity’, published in the journal *Nature*, urges developing countries not to follow the same path as the developed world. Instead, it suggests that “governments should invest in water management strategies that combine infrastructure with “natural” options such as safeguarding watersheds, wetlands and flood plains”.²² Development organisations are advocating the idea of integrated water and watershed management, where the needs of all users are taken into account and where natural features are integrated with human engineering as a solution to global water stress. The developing world can opt for greener, less expensive options like using wetlands and flood plains for water purification and aquaculture instead of draining them for agriculture. The watershed should be managed so as to provide adequate supplies for all competing uses.²³

Alternative CLA Approach to Water Management Incorporating Islamic Ideology

This section explores alternatives to the current world views and metaphors around water management in the Muslim world by incorporating basic Islamic principles into water management policies and/or public awareness campaigns. These alternative approaches to managing water are based on the Quranic text and the Islamic tradition and the importance they ascribe to nature and the environment. These principles have often been ignored in water policy in most Muslim countries because until recently there was no need for them and nor was there any tradition in Islam of forming policies specifically for water management and distribution. Water was always seen

as a human right and a gift from Allah, and water shortages, consequently, were perceived as a stroke of fate and Allah’s prerogative. The paradigm shifted with the advent of new water management and storage technologies, mostly developed in the West, that allowed humans to play a part in water availability and to cease depending solely on nature. As water shortages meet with other stressors of present times, such as population increase and climate change, there is a need to internalise Islamic principles into water management strategies just as they are a part of virtually every other aspect of Muslim life. The causal layered analysis is again undertaken for each zone.

Table 7. Zone 1—Oil Barons in the Desert

	Societal approach/thinking
LITANY	Solar- and tidal-powered desalination plants and water treatment help augment sustainable water supplies
SYSTEMIC	The oil industry invests in renewable energy technologies
WORLDVIEW	Fossil water and oil are limited in supply and are blessings from Allah which should be preserved for future generations. Sustainability is the way forward
MYTHOLOGY	“Trust in Allah but tie up your camel”. Taking ownership of our future and securing our resources will help us achieve a desirable water future

Table 8. Zone 2—Water Stressed (physical scarcity)

	Societal approach/thinking
LITANY	Environmental flows in rivers allow for healthy watersheds. Treated effluent preserves rivers and biodiversity
SYSTEMIC	Alternative methods of augmenting the water supply in times of water shortages such as rain water harvesting, water treatment and putting available resources to their most efficient uses are explored
WORLDVIEW	Water is finite and increase in demand does not always come with increase in supply. There is a need to conserve the available water resources and the health of watersheds
MYTHOLOGY	“Among the most beloved of deeds to Allah is the one that is continuous, even if it is little”. Water is a blessing from Allah and should be preserved in a manner that will allow future generations to benefit from it

Table 9. Zone 3—Mediterranean to Tropical

	Societal approach/thinking
LITANY	Extensive water treatment prevents water-borne diseases and preserves the health of the watersheds
SYSTEMIC	Preserving the quality of water bodies helps preserve human health
WORLDVIEW	Human health and environmental health are interlinked and are blessings from Allah. All other life forms upon which humans depend are sacred and are all Allah's creations
MYTHOLOGY	"Cleanliness is half the faith". Water is precious, it brings life and purifies sins and its sanctity should be preserved

Table 10. Zone 4—Global Charity (economic scarcity)

	Societal approach/thinking
LITANY	Rainwater harvesting and the introduction of water markets helps alleviate the effects of droughts
SYSTEMIC	Civil society joins hands with government to find local solutions to water shortages. Female empowerment through education increases domestic health and wealth and stabilizes birth rates
WORLDVIEW	For long term solutions to water shortages one needs to look beyond what the government and foreign aid has to offer. Men and women are equal in the eyes of Allah and should share domestic and social responsibilities and move toward social equality
MYTHOLOGY	"Allah helps those who help themselves"

Table 11. Zone 5—Tension Driven

	Societal approach/thinking
LITANY	Countries unite to create neutral water management bodies for trans-border integrated water resource management
SYSTEMIC	Equitable distribution of water resources can prevent water wars
WORLDVIEW	Joint management of watersheds provides synergistic solutions. Reduced political and social tension supports domestic harmony
MYTHOLOGY	"Share in the abundance (as well as the scarcity) of all the blessings of Allah because they are finite and people as inheritors are accountable to Allah for their actions on earth. Human beings are stewards of Allah on Earth"

Table 12. Zone 6—Disaster Prone

	Societal approach/thinking
LITANY	Integrated watershed management, sewage and drinking water treatment and better planning of urban settlements helps reduce the impact of natural disasters
SYSTEMIC	Protection against all the stressors on water systems is the key to protecting our water resources
WORLDVIEW	Access to water is the fundamental right of every human being and this blessing should be sanctified and equitably distributed
MYTHOLOGY	“A disowned future shows no mercy”. We need to address the issues in a sustainable manner now to mitigate the impacts of natural disasters on our populations and future generations. We can create better futures

Conclusion

The Muslim world cannot afford to waste a single drop of water. Governments should urgently implement sustainable water management policies which ration demand to ensure more efficient use. This can be achieved by attaching an economic value to water, measured by the value of the end product of each drop. Governments should implement water efficiency measures, shift from irrigation by flooding to more efficient irrigation systems including drip irrigation, introduce crop varieties that are resilient to salinity and aridity, recycle, treat and reuse wastewater, and develop affordable technologies for water desalination.

Islamic principles stress women’s rights, especially their equal rights to education and inheritance. According to a saying of the Prophet Muhammad: “Acquisition of knowledge is binding on all Muslims (both men and women without any discrimination)”. Providing equal access to education and inheritance would empower women with knowledge and wealth, enabling them to become valuable members of the labour force and the economy. Taking women away from solely domestic roles has many long-term benefits such as economic development, a lower birth rate and the prevention of water-borne diseases, thus improving public health and reducing stresses on water and food production.

Given the importance of water in Islam, a management instrument that broadens traditional economic water management approaches to include non-traditional cultural and spiritual approaches is more likely to succeed in the Islamic world. This would involve looking for solutions beyond the litany level and changing the worldview and metaphor of water management by incorporating Islamic principles into water management policies or public awareness campaigns. This grassroots, culture- and religion-based approach

to water conservation and protection may help the Muslim world look beyond the neo-liberal globalisation of water, where water is seen as merely a commodity.

¹ N. Faruqui, A. Biswas, & M. Bino, *Water Resources Management and Policy: Water Management in Islam*, Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2001.

² Ibid.

³ P. H. Gleick, H. Cooley, M. Cohen, M. Morikawa, J. Morrison, & M. Palaniappan, *The World's Water 2008–2009: The Biennial Report on Freshwater Resources*, Washington DC, Island Press, 2009.

⁴ H. A. Amery, 'Islamic water management', *Water International*, Vol 26, No 4, 2001, 481–489.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ M. Barber, 'A drop in the ocean for foresight practitioners: What the future may hold for fresh water usage and availability throughout the globe', *Journal of Futures Studies*, Vol 11, No 3, 2007, 61–78.

⁷ FAOSTAT, *FAO Statistical Year Book*, 2009.

⁸ P. H. Gleick et al. (2009) op. cit.

⁹ FAOSTAT (2009), op. cit.

¹⁰ S. Barghouti, *Water Sector Overview*, in M. El-Ashry, N. Saab & B. Zeitoun (eds.), *Water: Sustainable Management of a scarce resource* (19), Arab Forum for Environment and Development, 2010.

¹¹ UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps and Graphics Library, 'Areas of physical and economic water scarcity', retrieved 2 February, 2011 from <http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/areas-of-physical-and-economic-water-scarcity>

¹² M. Mokhtar & K. W. Tan, 'An appropriate institutional framework towards integrated water resources management in Pahang River Basin, Malaysia', *European Journal of Scientific Research*, Vol27, No. 4, 2009, 536–547.

¹³ S. Barghouti, *Managing Water Resource and Enhancing Cooperation in IDB Member Countries*, Islamic Development Bank—Economic Policy and Strategic Planning Department, 2005, 1–2.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 'Climate change and water', in B. C. Bates, Z. W. Kundzewicz, S. Wu & J. P. Palutikof (eds.), *Technical Paper of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (2008), Geneva, IPCC Secretariat, 210.

¹⁷ P. H. Gleick et al. (2009) op. cit.

¹⁸ J. G. Timmerman & F. Bernardini, 'Adapting to climate change in transboundary water management', *Perspectives on Water and Climate Change Adaptation*, 5th World Water Forum, 2009.

¹⁹ S. M. Olmstead, 'Water supply and poor communities: What's price got to do with it?', *Environment*, Vol 45, No 10, 2003, 22–35.

²⁰ J. Interlandi, ‘The new oil—Should companies control our most precious natural resource?’, *Newsweek*, 18 October, 2010, Pakistan.

²¹ S. M. Olmstead (2003) op. cit.

²² C. J. Vorosmarty, P. B. McIntyre, M. O. Gessner, D. Dudgeon, A. Prusevich, P. Green, S. Glidden, S. E. Bunn, C. A. Sullivan, C. R. Liermann, & P. M. Davies, ‘Global threats to human water security and river biodiversity’, *Nature*, Vol467, 2010, doi:10.1038/nature09440.

²³ R. Black, ‘Water map shows billions at risk of ‘water insecurity’’, retrieved 6 October, 2010, from: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-11435522>

8. Causal Layered Analysis: Case study of Nipah virus emergence

Peter Black*

This chapter investigates discourses around emerging infectious diseases in general and the Nipah virus in particular. The case study provides an example of the application of CLA in the area of veterinary epidemiology in order to rethink and broaden preventative policy solutions.

Challenging Epidemiologists

I was first exposed to causal layered analysis (CLA)¹ in 2001 when Sohail Inayatullah spoke to students in Brisbane who were undertaking strategic foresight study at the Swinburne University of Technology. I recall realising how powerful the method was as we worked through a few examples. CLA is one research method that has become embedded within my futures toolbox. CLA has opened my mind to looking at issues from a broader and deeper perspective. I am unsure whether my training as a veterinary epidemiologist actually assisted me to fully embrace CLA—but what I do know is that CLA made sense to me almost immediately. I first presented the following case study to fellow veterinary epidemiologists at the International Symposium for Veterinary Epidemiology and Economics in Chile in 2003.

The premise behind the paper and presentation as delivered was that the overarching objective of veterinary epidemiology is to improve quality of life. It was within this context, that I challenged epidemiologists to broaden their thinking about emerging infectious diseases (EIDs). CLA was introduced as a method to assist epidemiologists to examine their proposed solutions in terms of the likely effects on future generations.

Analysing the Emerging Infectious Diseases Discourse

For the purposes of the paper, EIDs were defined as infections that have newly appeared in a population or have existed but are rapidly increasing in

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incidence or geographical range.² A number of investigators had addressed the issue of EID and there was some general agreement about the risk factors. For example, one of the goals of the *Journal of EID* is to investigate factors known to influence emergence, including microbial adaptation and change, human demographics and behaviour, technology and industry, economic development and land use, international travel and commerce and the breakdown of public health measures. Morse listed a range of probable factors that contribute to emergence for a range of viral, bacterial and fungal diseases in humans.³ Woolhouse investigated emergence from another perspective and built up a profile of an emerging pathogen.⁴ Such information is useful and contributes to understanding of the factors that promote disease emergence. I suggested to my colleagues that the fact that 75% of emerging human pathogens are zoonotic (i.e. diseases that can be transmitted from animals to humans) should alert veterinarians and veterinary epidemiologists to the importance of developing strong links with workers in human health. In addition, the role of wildlife as a source of disease and the human encroachment on wildlife habitats,⁵ also demand multidisciplinary teams that cover a broader range of perspectives than conventional veterinary and human health. This need for a broader, multidisciplinary approach was becoming well accepted in the EID research community by 2003.

At that time the conventional argument was basically that if the dynamics of infectious diseases in complex multi-host communities could be better understood, then it may be possible to control or influence the identified threats to public health, livestock economies and wildlife.⁶ Most researchers seemed to view the EID challenge as a battlefield where the final outcome may be some form of victory in the continuing battle against disease. To this end, it was recognised that a key defence⁷ in any battle plan is to identify the enemy early before its spread-potential outstrips the capacity of the defenders to adequately respond. This meant that surveillance should be viewed as a preventive strategy. However, I noted that preventive strategies often suffer from the short-term perspectives of the many institutions (including many governments) that allocate resources. Effective surveillance is dependent on the provision and allocation of resources and infrastructure, which requires political will and money. Emergencies tend to refocus attention. For example, the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 certainly reinforced the need to increase surveillance efforts and to improve their effectiveness and efficiency across the globe.

Many scientists were interested in taking a broader perspective with respect to EID emergence. Population growth and global warming were EID risk factors that had been identified by most researchers.⁸ These society-level determinants created the environment for the emergence of infectious disease. From this perspective, surveillance and associated diagnostic activities are secondary prevention methods and the disadvantage of these

methods is that they identify an EID after the event has begun. The primary preventive approach seeks to modify or eliminate the risk factors. Strategies in human health include immunisation, improving public health infrastructure, prudent use of antimicrobial chemicals, and the amelioration of societal variables. The major societal determinants of EID were—and still are—the same as those that will influence the survival of life on earth.⁹ From a holistic systems perspective, it should come as no surprise that the societal determinants are interrelated and that many are anthropogenic in nature. I argued, therefore, that veterinary epidemiologists and economists working on health and production issues in any animal population worldwide should be alerted to the fact that their work, at some level, has the potential to influence human health and, indeed, the survival of civilisation. However, many of us working in this area were not willing to address our role from such a broad perspective. But why not?

Veterinary epidemiologists tend to pride themselves on seeing “the big picture”. They deal with populations (as opposed to individual animals) and investigate complex multifactorial determinants of animal health (not the simple single cause and effect model). They work within the empirical scientific tradition that focuses on data and statistics. This approach was adequate for addressing problems at a certain level, but I noted that animal health policy was being decided every day in the absence of information that epidemiologists would be confident to call adequate. Hueston had stressed that “the best animal health policy decisions result from consideration of both science and politics”.¹⁰ Indeed, it was easy to present a case that epidemiologists should examine their place in the world on a number of levels that were broader than simply “science” and “policy”. This opened the door for me to share the CLA method and the insights that flowed from it.

Application of CLA to the Emerging Infectious Diseases Discourse

Most of the literature on EIDs referred to so far concerns the litany and social causes layers. Investigations at the worldview level require a broader understanding of the cultural milieu from which each of us draws our opinions and assumptions. This is not about facts. At this level, it is about why we seek some facts and not others; what the contradictions and prejudices that emerge are; and whether we can discern cultural structures that are independent of the actors. There is the implicit recognition that you do not know what you do not know.¹¹ This is not a skill that most scientists are being taught even now, and certainly were not in 2003.

The example I used to encourage this broader view in 2003 was the emergence of Nipah virus. The drivers of the emergence of this disease included population growth, intensification of agriculture (with co-location of piggeries with orchards),¹² and habitat degradation and modification (slash

and burn deforestation). This analysis fitted neatly within the social causes layer of CLA.

To investigate the emergence of the virus at the worldview level, other matters needed to be addressed. For example, the whole problem of population growth stems from the western industrial worldview that tends to ignore the other side of the population coin—resource consumption. The driver of habitat degradation and modification lies in the domain of *total* resource consumption, which is influenced strongly by population growth, but is also directly driven by consumption patterns and levels per person. The next issue is why farmers were seeking to increase the intensification of pig-raising in combination with orchard growing. Such activities are related to social systems that value profit, economic growth and “efficiency”, as defined by a certain worldview that dominates in developed and rapidly developing countries. The very term “developed” reflects this worldview.




Figure 1. Causal layered analysis of Nipah virus emergence in Malaysia

At the myth/metaphor layer, the types of metaphors that seemed to make sense were that “west is best”, “growth is good” and that “technology will save us” if there are challenges. I acknowledged that the metaphors that actually make sense in Malaysia might be different from those I discerned,

but thinking at this level still forced a much deeper appreciation of the overall context of disease emergence. The main issues at each layer of this analysis are shown in Figure 1.

Finally, I presented the case that the opportunity to investigate alternative futures and worldviews would only arise once this type of enquiry was understood and practised by a wider range of epidemiologists.

Conclusion: What has happened since?

I have applied CLA to a wide range of issues including a number of other EIDS such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), H5N1 influenza, the Q fever outbreak in the Netherlands from 2007 to 2010 and, more recently, the global challenge of antimicrobial resistance (AMR). In all cases, the method has improved my capacity to think about the range of drivers that are at play and to raise questions about appropriate policy options and responses. CLA has also revealed a number of common themes across many of these topics. Within the social causes layer, there are strong linkages between these issues to do with food systems and how these have evolved and/or been constructed. Who has the power and why is revealed more clearly within the worldview and myth/metaphor layers. For example, within the worldview layer, I often detect the pervasive influence of a worldview that values continued economic growth—and which, in fact, denies the possibility that there are limits to growth. Of course, this is not a unique or particularly new insight.¹³ However, reaching this insight through CLA allows the development of strategy across all four layers. This gives me back a sense of agency.

For the scientists and policy-makers with whom I work there are numerous challenges in translating the insights from CLA into action. For example, there seems to be a critical need to rethink how food is produced, moved, valued and consumed—in other words, a need to reconfigure the food systems of the planet. CLA leads to insights that starkly reveal that this is not a technical issue, but an eco-social issue that requires a multipronged and multilayered approach. I recognise that the gender, race, culture and socio-economic background and experience of any individual will influence their worldview. For example, their dominant worldview will fundamentally influence their perspective on whether the current trajectories of growth and consumption actually contribute to one's quality of life or merely seem to.¹⁴

I have continued to advocate the view that critical futures thinking needs to become a core part of any study that aims to seriously address global challenges such as EID to my peers. I have also challenged epidemiologists to examine their proposed solutions in terms of the likely effects on future generations of humans. I have argued that as epidemiologists we have a unique opportunity, and indeed a social obligation, to look at the really big picture in all of our work. CLA is a method that certainly helps us to

conscientiously work towards this aim and to break out of the technical biomedical view of “curing” the world’s ailments. CLA is a great first step on the path to developing a more comprehensive appreciation of the need for a new global consciousness backed up by new ways of thinking and behaving.

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9. Complementing Causal Layered Analysis with Scenario Art: To develop a national vision and strategy for Australia's minerals industry

Aleta Lederwasch*

This chapter provides an overview of a futures workshop, 'Vision 2040: Innovation in Mining and Minerals', which used CLA, alongside several other futures methods, including Scenario Art, to develop a shared vision and strategy for the future of Australia's minerals industry. The workshop provided mining stakeholders with an opportunity to explore how Australia's minerals industry can deliver long-term national benefit. †

Introduction

For Australia's minerals to deliver long-term national benefit, an important step is to explore and analyse plausible future scenarios. These scenarios should reflect and provoke thought on the possible impacts of changing international and local drivers and constraints. They should also communicate how Australia's minerals can be coupled with more sustainable patterns of production and consumption and the potential for the monies from mining activities to be invested in innovations, which underpin long-term prosperity. Contemporary pressures on Australia's minerals industry include strong demand from China on the one hand, but then climate change

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† This report is an updated version of a previous report: 'A vision for mining and minerals: Applying causal layered analysis and art', *Journal of Futures Studies*, Vol 15, No 14, 2011. Since then a National Vision and Strategy has been developed, and the application of Scenario Art has been further evaluated and refined.

and higher social and environmental impacts on the other. Additionally, developing new ore bodies is getting harder and productivity is declining, as higher quality ores are being depleted. Whilst this challenge has been masked recently by high commodity prices, the risks presented by ‘peak minerals’ warrant further attention.

‘Peak minerals’ is a conceptual framework used to illustrate the finite nature of minerals and the increased effort over time required to obtain value—moving from ‘cheaper and easier’ extraction processes to accessing remaining stocks which are ‘more difficult and expensive’ to extract. These challenges are important for considering the future competitiveness of Australia's resources sector. They also call for an innovative, coordinated strategy and action, to increase the value and benefits derived from Australia's minerals.

The Vision 2040: Innovation in Mining and Minerals Forum (Vision 2040) aimed to provide an opportunity for mining stakeholders to explore and analyse plausible future scenarios as input to developing a preferred vision, in line with the ‘iterative backcasting’ approach of Giurco and colleagues.¹ Vision 2040 was part of the CSIRO Mineral Futures Collaboration Cluster, and brought together over 30 stakeholders from government, industry and the research community to develop key elements of a shared vision for Australia's mining and minerals future. The workshop, facilitated by Professor Sohail Inayatullah and researchers from the Institute for Sustainable Futures (ISF) at the University of Technology, Sydney, gave participants an opportunity to engage in, and contribute to, a larger process of exploring how Australia's minerals can deliver long-term national benefit.

Vision 2040 ran for a day and a half (evening session, then full day) in Brisbane over 14–15 November 2010. It began with presentations from industry experts and continued with a mix of activities—a range of popular futures methods, as well as a new method (Scenario Art) that asked participants to analyse artworks. The range and order of futures methods used generated valuable discussion, innovative ideas, and useful output to develop key elements of a mining and minerals vision and strategy.

Background to the Research and Workshop Objectives

Vision 2040 formed part of the Commodity Futures stream in a broader program of research supported by the CSIRO Mineral Futures Collaboration Cluster within the Minerals Down Under Flagship. This Cluster united five university research institutions in collaboration with CSIRO to address the future of sustainability challenges for Australia's minerals industry. ‘Commodity Futures’ was led by ISF, UTS. Other collaborators explored ‘Technology Futures’ and ‘Regions in Transition’.² Vision 2040 provided mining stakeholders with an opportunity to engage in a creative process that aimed to establish a shared vision for Australia's minerals future—one in

which Australia's minerals are delivering long-term national benefit. Specifically, the workshop aimed to answer the following questions:

1. What should Australia be doing with its mineral endowment over the next 30 years to underpin long-term national benefit?
2. What strategies can deliver on a shared vision for a minerals industry embedded within a more sustainable Australia?
3. What will help us create such an industry and ensure that it has the necessary resilience when confronting a range of different future scenarios?

Building on two earlier workshops, (the National Peak Minerals Forum held in Sydney in April 2010³ and the World Economic Forum Australian Workshop on Mining and Minerals in Melbourne in September 2010),⁴ together with the findings of two reviews,⁵ the workshop began with presentations on the future of innovation, mining sustainability and technology; communities of the future; and new understandings of long-term benefit.

Opening Presentations

Presentations by Professor Göran Roos (VTT International), Dr Joe Herbertson (Crucible Carbon Pty. Ltd.) and Darryl Pearce (Lhere Artepe Aboriginal Corporation) set up a useful and energising platform to generate innovative and strategic thought for a vision of Australia's mining and minerals in 2040. The presentations addressed key areas for positioning Australia's minerals industry within a more sustainable Australian economy, including:

1. Technological advances as key factors in the future sustainability of the mining industry.
2. The establishment of Australia as a minerals services hub, not simply a quarry for global mineral needs.
3. Ensuring that the impacts from mining are balanced by better and more even distribution of wealth from minerals.

All of the presentations provided significant inputs to further group-based discussions, which attempted to draw out the implications of the foreseeable changes identified over the next several decades. A question and answer session, which followed the presentations, generated interesting discussion around the need for a new business model for the minerals industry in Australia.

Workshop Process

The workshop was divided into three general sessions, which involved a unique mix of futures methods in order to provide insight into foreseeable

enablers and constraints affecting potential visions. The collective outputs of these activities included an articulation of a vision and key elements of a strategy to achieve this vision. A brief evaluation of the futures activities facilitated at Vision 2040, based on comparing expected outcomes against actual outcomes, follows.

Table 1. Day 1, Evening; over pre-dinner drinks: Futures wheel

Expected Outcome	Perceived Outcome (from perspective of ISF team)
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Use key issues (identified during the Q&A session) to identify plausible challenges to existing views of the future for the Australian minerals industry 2. Provoke creative thinking around how these challenges may play out in the future 3. Use this expanded view to explore the implications of the challenges for Australia's minerals industry future (including opportunities and potential new stakeholder groups) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 6 key issues were explored and continued to be the focal points for workshop discussion 2. Continued conversations from keynote speakers 3. Established good rapport amongst participants

Table 2. Day 2, Morning: Scenario art

Expected Outcome	Perceived Outcome (from perspective of ISF team)
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reflect creatively on alternative futures (three plausible and one utopian) using art to reduce the risk of people getting stuck on debating the probability of the scenarios playing out 2. Engage participants with the scenarios and generate discussions on alternative interpretations of key elements (to bring out different views of what each scenario might signify for stakeholders) 3. Identify areas of agreement on the implications of the WEF Minerals Scenarios for Australia (previously there has been significant disagreement) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Generated in-depth and creative discussion on key issues 2. Participants shared alternative perspectives on the key elements within the scenarios and the implications of these 3. Generated creative ideas for potential challenges and opportunities presented by the key elements (ideas were shared and widely discussed despite significant variation and sometimes conflicting ideas amongst participants) 4. Participants showed an appreciation of the role of decision-making and agency in long-term planning

Table 3. Day 2, Mid-day: CLA

Expected Outcome	Perceived Outcome (from perspective of ISF team)
1. Encourage participants to think very broadly about the roots of existing 'problems' and how this might affect the way in which solutions are developed	1. Took participants a while to understand and engage in the process
2. Engage participants in reformulating their understanding of existing 'problems'	2. Participants articulated the worldviews that drive current discussions, and developed alternative views that may support more effective future discussions
3. Identify new opportunities that emerge from this reformulation	3. Generated discussion that reflected long-term thinking and an appreciation of long-term prosperity (beyond short-term economic thinking)

Table 4. Day 2, Mid-day: CLA—Scenario drama

Expected Outcome	Perceived Outcome (from perspective of ISF team)
1. Explore how different stakeholders might interpret new formulation of the problems, and how this might affect their decisions regarding solutions	1. Fast pace of activity renewed momentum in the group
	2. Acted out characters of the future with seriousness, which gave the issues of the future being considered a sense of reality and significance

Table 5. Day 2, Mid-day: Futures triangle

Expected Outcome	Perceived Outcome (from perspective of ISF team)
1. Use concepts of drivers, barriers and vision to ground strategy development	1. Participants imagined what their vision may look like and identified key governance, environmental, social, economic and political pushes and pulls
	2. Began to create a picture of how to achieve the vision (what would be needed to overcome the key challenges and take advantage of the opportunities presented)

Table 6. Day 2, Afternoon: “Dot-mocracy”

Expected Outcome	Perceived Outcome (from perspective of ISF team)
1. Prioritising elements identified in earlier activities as key characterises of a shared vision	1. 5 points were identified for inclusion in draft vision (these formed the foundation for strategy development)

Table 7. Day 2, Afternoon: Backcasting

Expected Outcome	Perceived Outcome (from perspective of ISF team)
1. Engage participants in a detailed exploration of how initiatives and strategies might play out over time to arrive at the vision	1. Participants found this very difficult initially 2. Although some initiatives and strategies to achieve the vision were identified, there was very limited exploration of these

Greater detail on the application and results of Scenario Art and CLA during Vision 2040 are provided below.

Scenario Art

1. Why did we use Scenario Art at Vision 2040?

Scenario Art was used to engage participants with four Australia-specific scenarios developed through analysis of three global scenarios developed by the World Economic Forum (WEF),⁶ and the Great Transitions scenario.⁷ It achieved this by providing a stimulating ‘picture’ of the opportunities and challenges that each presents for Australia's minerals future. The WEF scenarios, which form part of an international program, represent an opportunity to engage with an important global context for decisions made by individual nations. They were used to provide examples of long-term trends that require responses from Australian mining and mineral processing industries. This international context is deemed to be highly significant given the export orientation of the Australian industry.

Scenario Art was developed largely as a response to the call for “methodological renewal to improve the depth and criticality of futures work”.⁸ It is acknowledged that while existing futures methods and theory, such as CLA⁹ and Integral Futures,¹⁰ are at the core of this methodological renewal, complementary methods and techniques are needed to increase the accessibility and impact of these existing approaches.¹¹

2. What is Scenario Art and how did we use it at Vision 2040?

Scenario Art involves the use of visual representations of future scenarios, alongside a process of asking a series of strategic questions.¹² In this case, four artworks were created for the Vision 2040 workshop, each representing one of the four Australia-specific scenarios. The steps involved in Scenario Art are outlined below.

Table 8. Steps of Scenario Art

Preparation	Notes
1. Facilitator/Artist explains the purpose and value of analysing the artworks to the participants	1. This could involve introducing and discussing the notion of the 'death of the author'—a philosophical concept that relates experience to perception. The purpose of introducing this concept is to encourage participants to appreciate that their interpretations of the artworks are valid and valuable
2. Facilitator/Artist presents and describes the Scenario Artworks	2. A) The facilitator/artist details the key characteristics of the scenarios to a sufficient extent but does not draw out the implications of these characteristics or make judgment on the scenarios (i.e., the facilitator/artist should not analyse or evaluate the artworks; this will be a task for the participants) B) Some useful questions may include: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 'What aspects of the artwork resonate with you?' 2. 'What are the challenges and opportunities you see in the scenario?' 3. 'What role would you like to be playing in this scenario?' 4. 'What would it take for you to achieve this?' C) It is important to encourage participants to do this step on their own, preferably in silence. This step enables the participant to reflect on their experiences and contemplate their values and ideals. It is desirable to capture these insights. This could be done by an observer taking notes during later discussions or through worksheets that participants fill out during the interpretation/reflection step
4. Facilitator/Artist opens the interpretation/reflection activity up for group discussion (15–20 minutes)	4. A) In the case of a group larger than eight it is recommended that these discussions initially occur in small groups of roughly five to eight people. Key issues/ideas that arise from this discussion can then be shared with the larger group B) The facilitator/artist should work to ensure that each participant has an opportunity to contribute

Participants were divided into four groups. Each group was provided with an artwork, an overview of the symbolic images within the art, and an explanation of the value of multiple and fresh interpretations of the works. Participants were asked questions that aimed to gain insight into their personal values, as well as their ideas for opportunities and the risks that Australia's mining industry will face over the next 30 years.

3. Preparation required

Prior to applying Scenario Art the art itself must be developed. This involves drawing out key elements of the subject scenarios and selecting symbolic images and concepts to visualize these. The scenarios should describe the social, political, economic and natural environments of the scenarios. An individual artist may do this; alternatively the art could be developed through a participatory process prior to its use as Scenario Art. The works used at Vision 2040 were created by the author, an ISF artist/researcher.

4. Results

The artworks provided a common reference point. They enabled participants to point to specific aspects of the visualised scenario that resonated with them and to share their interpretations and perspectives on these elements. The artworks provided an opportunity for participants to readily access and engage with each future scenario in their own way. This contrasted with the experience of presenting the same scenarios in a plenary session using a corporate video format at the earlier World Economic Forum workshop (September 2010). On this occasion, there was much more discussion of whether each scenario was in fact plausible or not, rather than on exploring the implications of the scenario.

The use of artwork as a focus for discussion allowed for multiple interpretations to be brought forward and increased the willingness of participants to consider a broader range of perspectives on the opportunities and challenges presented by each scenario. Scenario Art facilitated a deep engagement with the scenarios as part of the groundwork for developing a preferred future and strategy. A summary of the art analysis output of two groups is provided in Table 9 and 10.



Figure 1. The Great Transition

Scenario overview: In 2030, a socially and environmentally sustainable Australia exists. Sustainable industries, including education, health, renewable energy and agriculture are flourishing. Australia is embracing the wisdom of the traditional owners of the land. There is no waste; everything is recycled. Levels of well-being are at an all-time high.

Table 9. Results of Scenario Art for ‘The Great Transition’

Opportunities	Challenges
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Indigenous empowerment—learning from Indigenous Australian’s knowledge of the land—working with Indigenous people to value add, e.g.re-generation techniques 2. Development of sustainable business models—recycling and expansion of mineral services such as exporting mining expertise 3. Sovereign wealth fund may lead to greater industry support if equitable distribution of wealth across Australian stakeholders and generations 4. Self-sufficiency 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Resolving land use issues—who gets what and for how long is especially significant at regional levels 2. Sustaining the Australian economy—creating value from social and cultural services 3. Determining how to measure and distribute this value




Figure 2: Rebased Globalism

Scenario overview: In 2030, the world is committed to realising the benefits of global interconnection but has become far more complex and multipolar.

Table 10. Results of Scenario Art on ‘Rebased Globalism’

Opportunities	Challenges
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Build up Australia’s manufacturing industry—implement policies to support this 2. Expansion into mineral services 3. This scenario makes obvious the need to focus efforts on re-generating Australia’s land and its economic and political environments 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Exporting such large quantities of material has driven our dollar up, and in response we have lost other forms of industry such as agriculture and manufacturing 2. Countries in need of Australia’s minerals and metals are taking them and value adding themselves; Australia is not value adding 3. A lack of government action has allowed the industry to ‘ruin the people’. We need to create opportunities for other industries to rebuild Australia 4. Australia is greatly reliant on minerals in this scenario. What happens when we hit peak minerals?

Power comes from control of resources as well as possession of capital, with resource-rich countries playing by their own rules. Civil society has gained power, resulting in various local laws that affect global corporations. This scenario is based on one of the three World Economic Forum Mining and Metals Scenarios to 2030.

Whilst further testing and refining of Scenario Art is needed, the results of applying this method at Vision 2040 provide a strong case for further exploration of its value. The results demonstrate its potential to bring greater depth to the utilisation of existing futures methods. Preliminary evaluations support a potential role for Scenario Art in catalysing sustainability transitions by improving dialogue and decision-making. It is proposed that Scenario Art may increase the accessibility of existing futures methods, and enable greater insights, by helping to draw out and challenge worldviews and generate meaningful dialogue around sustainability. This is based largely on art's capacity to enrich these processes by evoking emotion and empathy, increasing responsiveness to risk, stimulating creative and innovative thinking, and breaking down stakeholder barriers.^{13,14} Drawing on these propositions Scenario Art may be offered as a complementary method to CLA, through its potential to help participants move down the CLA ladder to the myth/metaphor level.

Causal Layered Analysis (CLA)

Participants conducted a CLA¹⁵ on issues that they (as a group) identified as key for deriving long-term national benefit from Australia's minerals. Identifying existing metaphors underlying the issues being explored allows participants to identify the limits of existing ways of thinking, and to evaluate what becomes possible when the metaphor and worldview underlying the first two levels of analysis are shifted. Moving up and down these levels encouraged an appreciation of different ways of knowing and alternative responses.

Whilst it was originally planned that CLA would be done for each scenario, a simpler approach that allowed participants to address key issues while becoming more familiar with CLA was taken. Previous sessions provided considerable recognition of the need to diversify services and products and to evaluate the appropriateness of current governance structures (both within government and industry) in light of new and changing economic, social and natural environments. Consequently, the following topics were chosen for the CLA activity:

1. The resource curse and long-term benefit
2. Understanding the minerals industry's contribution to Australia's long-term benefit, and
3. Distribution of mineral wealth for long-term benefits/equity across society.

1. Summary of the worldview and myth/metaphor level for each issue

Issue 1: The resource curse and long-term benefit

At the worldview and myth levels participants interpreted this issue not as arising from a lack of skills, poor communities or the stunted growth of non-traditional mining industries but of a narrow view and mismanagement of mineral wealth. The issue then became one of managing mineral wealth toward long-term national benefit. Potential solutions discussed here included diversifying the services of the minerals industry towards those that can be sustained, such as selling minerals expertise; increasing export markets for mining software and technologies; investing in technologies and processes that are energy and water efficient, including recycling technologies; and investing in other industries that do not rely on non-renewable resources.

Table 11. The Resource Curse and Long-term Benefit

	Issue	Strategies and Solutions
LITANY	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Lack of skills diversity 2. Stunted growth and/or degradation and inhibition of all non-traditional mining industries 3. Poor communities 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Invest in building up skills outside of traditional mining industries 2. Implement initiatives that support Australia's agriculture, education, manufacturing and other industries that do not depend on finite natural resources 3. Allocate resources to build capacity of communities
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Current governance structures do not enable long-term strategic planning 2. Lack of infrastructure, education and resources to enable successful transition to other industries 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Redesign governance structures 2. Invest heavily in education and infrastructure needed to build up other industries
WORLDVIEW	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Short-term goals that are market driven overall and fixated on GDP alone do not lead to long-term national benefit 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Introduce new measures of wealth to determine progress—ones that are responsive to long-term goals and are holistic (encompassing well-being and other aspects of human and environmental health)

MYTH/METAPHOR	1. People only value money and are driven only by short-term interests	1. Value and manage Australia's minerals toward ensuring long-term benefit to Australia that extends beyond economic benefit
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Issue 2: Understanding the mining industry's contribution to Australia's long-term benefit

Table 12. Understanding the minerals industry's contribution to Australia's long-term benefit

	Issue	Strategies and Solutions
LITANY	<p>1. Uncertainty around how long Australia's minerals industry will account for significant export value and GDP (currently 55% of Australia's export value and 9% of GDP)</p> <p>2. Mining drives regional development during operation years but this is not necessarily sustained when mines close down—in some cases the towns may be worse off due to environmental degradation</p> <p>3. Current heavy reliance of Australia's economic development on the minerals industry (significant royalty and tax contributions)</p>	<p>1. Increase investment in, and communication of research around peak minerals and increase research and development around more efficient and effective mining technologies and practices</p> <p>2. Invest in local communities (via infrastructure which drives long-term economic development such as schools and non-mining local businesses) and increase the extent and quality of rehabilitating environments affected by mining operations</p> <p>3. Expand mineral industry services to services that can be sustained (such as education) so that the industry can continue to significantly support Australia's economic development</p>
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	<p>1. Significant loss of jobs and income when traditional mining operations cease</p> <p>2. Challenge to sustain mining equipment and technology (which accounts for \$30 billion) when traditional mining techniques are no longer viable</p> <p>3. Current governance structures do not support deriving long-term benefit from Australia's minerals</p>	<p>1. Invest in re-skilling existing mining workforce to meet the needs of new minerals services</p> <p>2. Invest in technologies and equipment that will transform the minerals industry from one that degrades the natural environment into one that contributes to rehabilitating it</p> <p>3. Address current governance structure (governance and industry) so that long-term benefit from Australia's minerals is prioritised and enabled</p>

WORLDVIEW	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Industry success is currently evaluated against short-term, monetary contributions, which does not guarantee long-term benefit to Australia 2. The current perception that it is sensible to have a primary industry as Australia's main economic engine is blinding Australia to the significance of preparing for when this industry is no longer viable 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Develop new measurements for determining industry success which reflect the significance of long-term and more holistic contributions to Australia's wealth 2. Raise awareness of the risks associated with relying on a primary industry as the main economic engine of a nation and invest in building up industries and services that can be sustained
MYTH/ METAPHOR	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. People only value money and material goods and believe this leads to success, which leads to happiness 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Implement new development measures and make investments and decisions that contribute to the new additional factors of development (such as human and environmental health and well-being)

At the worldview and myth level the problem was seen as a false perception that protecting a natural resource industry, so that it remains Australia's key economic engine, is in Australia's long-term national interest. Additionally, it was identified that this perception is based on the assumption that success and well-being is achieved through satisfying short-term and selfish interests. Solutions and strategies thus moved from investing in additional research, innovative and clean technologies and re-skilling the industry to developing and responding to a more holistic and realistic perception of national benefit, as well as developing long-term strategies for Australia's minerals industry to reposition itself as a major industry player in delivering on the new perceptions of long-term national benefit.

Table 13. Distribution of mineral wealth for long-term benefit/equity across society

	Issue	Strategies and Solutions
LITANY	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Current mining practices are causing environmental degradation and are not ensuring that future generations will have access to the same minerals 2. Local communities can suffer when mining operations cease 3. Australia has an abundance of minerals, 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Redesign mining practices so that they have minimal impact on the environment (positive where possible) and put systems in place to prolong the supply of minerals 2. Re-distribute mineral wealth to ensure that local communities get financial benefit via jobs and infrastructure 3. Commit a portion of Australia's minerals to developing nations

while developing nations need these minerals for development—Australia has a duty to supply

SYSTEMIC CAUSES

1. Current practices are driven by historical terms of trade, which do not ensure equitable distribution of wealth
2. Australia's minerals industry is predominantly driven by external demand
3. Current governance structures do not ensure equitable distribution of mineral wealth (on an inter- or intra-generational level)
4. Implications of the perception that Australia's minerals industry has a comparative advantage

1. New terms of trade distribute wealth more equitably (e.g. compensation for environmental damage)
2. Expand down-stream services of the minerals industry, including manufacturing, which drives domestic demand
3. Restructure governance mechanisms, such as longer terms of government, to enable strategic planning that addresses significant and long-term issues, such as inter- and intra-generational equity.
4. Recognise and make strategic decisions around lost opportunities from investing heavily in Australia's minerals industry

WORLDVIEW

1. The current perception that Australia's wealth resides in its natural resources obstructs preparation efforts for when natural resources are depleted
2. Current perceptions of wealth and development hinder Australia's ability to fulfil its duty to ensure mineral wealth is distributed globally to facilitate global development

1. Invest heavily in peak minerals research—giving priority to minerals that humanity depends on for survival, such as phosphorus (essential for agriculture) and basic structural minerals and metals; implement appropriate management plans to minimise and increase efficient use of peaking minerals; and share this knowledge world-wide
2. Adopt development indicators world-wide that measure progress on the basis of well-being and equitable distribution of wealth, and new perspectives on value, including cultural and social benefits, which drive long-term and international development goals through sharing knowledge, resources and building capacity

MYTH/ METAPHOR	1. Mining is seen and treated as the 'Golden Goose'—nothing must 'kill or threaten to kill it'	1. Use Australia's minerals to transition Australia and the developing world to a sustainable future—new measures of development and an orientation toward long-term goals sees Australia gain a new perspective on its mineral wealth, enabling it to use its minerals in innovative and strategic ways (investing in sustainable industries and contributing to research that advances world-wide inter- and intra-generational equity)
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Issue 3: Distribution of mineral wealth for long-term benefit/equity across society

The perception that Australia's minerals industry enjoys a comparative advantage was challenged when exploring this issue. The worldview analysis identified current short-term and narrow measures of wealth as an underlying foundation for existing decision making processes that do not recognise lost opportunities or evaluate all options in a critical way. A potential response identified was setting up new strategic and innovative management systems that ensure Australia's mineral wealth contributes to broad and long-term national benefit.

The output of CLA, Scenario Art and the other futures activities led to the early development of a shared preferred future (vision).

Key Outputs from Vision 2040: Draft Vision and National Strategy

In small groups, participants described their vision, through words and images, and identified the 'pushes' and 'pulls' of these visions. These results were then discussed with the group at large, the output of which was the identification of a shared vision and five key elements of this preferred future.

Draft Vision statement

Mineral production makes a net positive contribution to a sustainable Australian economy

Key elements of the Draft Vision

1. Prosperity from new business models used to unlock value along the commodity chain (e.g. expanding services and renting minerals);

2. Achieving net positive benefits (sequestering carbon, clean water/energy provider and biodiversity);
3. Indigenous leadership and investment;
4. Brand Australia = clean energy solutions for the planet; and
5. Energised regional towns/centres.

From here, ‘back-casting’ was used to begin the development of a strategy to achieve the vision. Participants were asked to imagine that the shared vision had come to fruition and to explain to Sohail, who took on the character of a person who had slept for the last 30 years, how we had come to arrive at this preferred future. It took participants a while to engage in this process. Perhaps this was due to the apparent uncertainty amongst participants about what their participation should look like; on the other hand, this activity was conducted at the end of a two-day workshop that had been very demanding on the creativity of the participants, so perhaps fatigue played a part. Whilst not generating actions for ‘how we get to the vision’, the back-casting identified linked events which could lead to such a future and illustrated that 30 years into the future is not so long a planning horizon as was first thought.

Draft Strategy

Table 14. Key themes of the Draft Strategy developed at Vision 2040

Key Theme	Detail
Develop new governance structures that enable long-term strategic thinking and planning	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Address lack of coherence between levels of Government 2. Ensure governance structures fit regions 3. Address perceived lack of leadership and desire for a new business model 4. Develop shared objectives 5. Develop policy for identification and distribution of benefits (national/global)
Investment in new technologies that reduce environmental impact such as recycling technologies	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Address resource scarcity (e.g. peak oil, workforce) 2. Address the extent to which significant change is associated with high costs, time constraints, technological lock-in 3. Evaluate de-materialisation as a strategy, including LCA standards on all products (incl. social) 4. Evaluate impact (e.g. energy/water) per unit on all goods/services

Greater emphasis on people—greater involvement with mining communities and the wider Australian community	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increase trust across industry/government/community Upskill/empower Aboriginal populations 2. Support Aboriginal autonomy 3. Develop strategies to enhance regional development 4. Make information on products'/services' impacts available to consumers
Develop appropriate metrics—consistent reporting and monitoring of national indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Encourage and enable value across full life cycle of mineral management 2. Facilitate regional diversification 3. Develop new measures of wealth to realign existing narratives and worldviews on what wealth and value are with respect to community values and community desire for a sustainable future 4. Implement monitoring and evaluation to ensure production reflects true costs (internalizing externalities)
Greater investment in human capital—new skill sets needed	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Prioritise world leadership in the areas of high value mining services and innovation 2. Improve and enhance the relationship between urban and regional communities <p>Invest mineral wealth so that it pays dividends to the national community—education, health, infrastructure</p>

The key themes of the draft vision, and the strategy to achieve this vision, acted as the foundation on which to build a more robust and detailed vision and strategy. The next step involved providing the workshop participants with an opportunity to critique and add to the raw data collected at the workshop, and to incorporate this feedback into the final vision and strategy. Supplementary interviews with key stakeholders were then conducted to test the robustness and practicality of the vision and strategy and to explore their implications. A consultation paper containing the draft Vision was used as the basis for stakeholder engagement. A national online feedback process, open to industry, government and the community, was supplemented with key informant interviews. The final outputs of this research, including these survey results, can be accessed on the CSIRO's website.* These outputs aim to facilitate a national conversation about the future of Australia's minerals industry.

* See: <http://www.csiro.au/en/Organisation-Structure/Flagships/Minerals-Down-Under-Flagship/mineral-futures/mineral-futures-collaboration-cluster/Publications.aspx>

Where to From Here?

Great opportunities exist in transitioning from Australia's current 'dig and sell' model of resource extraction toward a closed-loop resource management system. Whilst growing signs of physical, environmental and social limitations are causing pressure on dominant chain-like systems of production, consumption and disposal of natural resource-based goods, these limitations are opening up many opportunities to realise greater and more sustained 'value' from our natural resource base. The outputs of Vision 2040 and the wider program of research supported by the Minerals Futures Collaboration Cluster demonstrate Australia's recognition of such opportunities.

An aim of the Mineral Futures Collaboration outputs is to influence and support future research that may enable a transition to a sustainable Australia; and this influence has begun. An example is the Wealth from Waste Cluster (WfW), which is another CSIRO initiative. WfW is a multi-organisational, multi-disciplinary research collaboration that joins UTS, Monash, UQ, and Swinburne with Yale and an International Reference Panel to build knowledge networks, assemble evidence, and develop new science to assess the implications that recycling will have on the Australian resource base and manufacturing sector of the future. A significant component of this research will be the development of transition pathways toward a closed-loop resource management future, which will involve the application of CLA. The formal launch of this Cluster will occur in March 2014. The Cluster website is currently in development and should be active by April 2014. For more information on the WfW Cluster in the meantime, please see the information provided on the CSIRO website.*

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* See: <http://www.csiro.au/Organisation-Structure/Flagships/Minerals-Down-Under-Flagship/mineral-futures/wealth-from-waste-cluster.aspx>

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10. Causal Layered Analysis as a Tool for Policy: The case study of Australian agricultural policy

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This chapter discusses CLA as allowing a reflective and contextual approach to policy implementation. It also provides an example of this approach and its application to the implementation of sustainable Australian agricultural policy in the face of climate change.[†]

Introduction

In dealing with policy in the complex contextual domain, emerging patterns of change need to be recognised and monitored.¹ To achieve this it is essential that a multilevel approach is adopted. One such method is causal layered analysis² which allows for deconstruction on a number of levels. It is this process of deconstruction according to multiple layers that gives depth beyond that of a typical thematic analysis.

Application of CLA in Australian Agricultural Policy

One of our earliest applications of CLA as a methodology to deconstruct complex social issues was in partnership with government agencies and farmers in central New South Wales (NSW), the most populous state of

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Australia. The aim of the research was to identify how communities and government agencies could work together to reduce the environmental impacts of farming, especially given the effects of global climate change. We sought to identify opportunities and impediments to the adoption of farming practices that could be more “sustainable”. We report one such CLA workshop as an example of what can be done.

Method

The workshop, in which 17 people participated, was facilitated by three staff members of the CSIRO (Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, a federal government scientific organisation established in 1926)—a facilitator, who led the discussion, an observer and a recorder. The recorder was able to type extensive notes of the comments, almost verbatim. An audio recording of the session was made to contribute to the accuracy of the recorder’s notes. The facilitator asked questions and gave prompts designed to elicit information about the litany (e.g. “What type of farming practices are you engaged in?”), social-structural (“What’s been the impact of the financial crisis?”), worldviews (“Richard [pseudonym], you talked about sustainability as a European notion. Could you tell us some more about this?”) and myth-metaphor (“If you wrote a book to describe your experience as a farmer, what would the title be?”).

The transcripts were coded according to CLA; this is a process of reading and re-reading the transcripts to identify utterances in the text that relate to a specific causal layer. For example, the use of a metaphor would be coded as relevant to the myth/metaphor layer, a reference to social structures such as family, the local community or government would have relevance to the social causes layer. Following this, the extracts relevant to each layer were coded thematically. This thematic coding within each causal layer allows for further deconstruction of the issue under investigation. More specifically, themes relevant to the litany layer provide an understanding of the overt or, superficial way in which the issue is conceptualised. Themes at the social causes level provide an understanding of how the issue manifests itself within and effects social structures such as families, friendship or working groups, and the community at large. Themes at the worldview discourse level provide an understanding, obviously, of the different worldviews and discourses that exist regarding the issue being investigated. This can include complementary and contrasting worldviews. Themes at the myth/metaphor level provide an understanding of the deeper and more complex ways in which the issue may be conceptualised. For example, it is not uncommon at this level for social archetypes, stereotypes, myths, “untruths” and cultural stories related to the issue being investigated to emerge. The merit for the contextualist researcher in adopting CLA is that it offers a deeper and more active deconstruction: the layers provide specific frames of reference which

guide the analysis, while the thematic analysis within the layers gives contextual depth and richness.

As such, conducting a CLA requires the first step of deconstructing an issue according to the specified layers, followed by an in-depth thematic analysis within each layer. Following the deconstruction of the issue, there is an opportunity for transformation. More specifically, once there is a deeper understanding of the issue, there is an opportunity to consider how the “true issue” at hand can be addressed. This allows second order change to be addressed.

Findings

Litany

The litany is the uncontested “facts”, or the superficial or overt conceptualisation of the issue. There was an overwhelming theme at this level of the harsh realities of farming in the Australian social, environmental and economic context. In all, a vast range of farming hardships were reported by participants, dominated by the farmers’ experiences of difficulty due to the long term drought experienced in their district. Farmers made explicit connections between the drought and their ability to be good land managers. A lack of rainfall, and the drying up of dams and creeks made watering stock and crops next to impossible for some farmers. For example, one farmer stated that: “Seasons can make a good manager... and a good agronomist. Good seasons even everyone out. Success is hard without rain”.

Social causes

At the social causes layer of analysis, the same reflection of pressures on farming was evident, though these were related more to the social ramifications of these pressures than to the farmers’ ability to manage their properties effectively. For example, in the following extract the farmer laments the state of world wool prices in the context of the Global Financial Crisis:

The prices for super-fine wool are shocking. We have a friend with pretty good super-fine wool and he was devastated as he got half the [usual] amount per kilo this year.

This comment illustrates how global financial issues can severely affect people at the local community level. Such mammoth and complex challenges as global markets were observed at the social causes level as resulting in farmers feeling that they were at the mercy of social and economic systems. For example, one farmer reflected on experiencing a lack of control:

Doesn't matter what you're farming. . . your input costs are slowly going up but your income is fairly stationary. It puts the squeeze on, harder and harder.

Incidentally, this statement is also relevant to the myth/metaphor layer of analysis ("it puts the squeeze on harder and harder"). Here the metaphor is used to illustrate the social and emotional impacts of the global economy on the individual. Building on this sense of a lack of control another farmer said:

The variables we can't control. Don [pseudonym] might grow the best cattle in the world and do everything right with genetics and breeding but unless the market is having a good time he can't get his rewards for the efforts he puts in, because the other person's not in a position to buy.

In this example, it is evident how the actions of a farmer at the individual level (illustrated through their farming practices) are inherently connected to and dependent on the actions and decisions of others. This reveals the system in which farmers operate and the social dependency they have on others if they are to not only farm well, but to make a living. With a lack of control comes uncertainty:

We just can't keep budgets though. From year to year you don't know your income. You do well one year and think you can buy that new ute [pick-up truck], then the next year you have a bad one and it takes ten years to recover from it. You need to have three budgets: one for yourself, one for the bank manager and one for the accountant.

And:

You can't plan as you don't know what's going to happen up here [in terms of rain]. You can plan but you don't know if it will come into fruition.

Worldview discourse

At the worldview discourse layer, the dominant theme was of a "farming worldview". Farmers articulated that in their role, farming was more than simply tending the land and caring for animals. Farming was described as a passion through which they felt connected to the land, and a level of responsibility in caring for it. It was this passion and connection that had kept the farmers in farming despite the obvious economic and climatic pressures. One farmer described, in the following quote, a tension between loving farming and feeling as though it is something they were born to do and the difficult conditions. He reflected that there is a conflict between the heart (the passion to farm) and the head (the reality that farming is currently risky and not particularly viable financially): "It is in our blood. There is something wrong up here [points to head]".

In this excerpt we see metaphors used to illustrate the participant's perspective on farming. Another stated, "It's the love for it".

Myth/metaphor

At a deeper cultural level is the myth/metaphor layer. These comments reflect deeper aspects of the local and broader culture and, as such, represent core aspects of local social functioning that are much less amenable to change. Comments at this level were dominated by farmers' reflections on the effects of globalisation, and a move away from buying locally. There was a distinct message that farmers felt besieged by larger corporations, that farming was no longer valued as a family run enterprise and that there was the potential that, due to these factors, they could be the last generation of farmers in their district. On trends of globalisation:

It's a worrying trend. 80% of the [sale of] food is controlled by two supermarket companies and a lot of the produce is from overseas. What we don't want is to rely on other countries for our primary needs; it makes us very dependent on other countries. Other countries have subsidies to keep agriculture going, but we don't. Beef into the States [USA] is one thing, there's a flat limit...

And:

Go to the supermarket and the produce there is from all over the world—very little of it is local produce.

A third commented on the globalisation of food resources:

I think food security will be a major issue, especially with population growth. Once the southeast Asian population is too big and can't feed itself they'll look at our big open land and say "hey, we could have a part of that". Everyone talks about this even playing field we're playing on, but we play on the bottom and everyone else is on top. [This comment elicited general agreement.]

On the effects of geography on government decision-making:

Decisions...are made on the coast [cities] and you get little once you get over the mountains [into the farming areas]. It's just getting worse and worse. . . in terms of infrastructure decisions that is not relevant to this area...people [agricultural advisors] not getting out of the office.

And regarding large agri-businesses:

A lot of people are selling up and leaving the land, a lot of big companies buying up land and getting bigger and pushing out smaller farms.

In these remarks the farmers provide their account of instances where global food production and selling patterns are changing the dynamic, affecting how people source their food and, ultimately, live their lives, and affecting

traditional family-run enterprises. There is a sense that they, as producers, are being threatened by an amorphous entity that is beyond their control. The word “globalisation” suggests enormity, and while it implies the potential of a global community, the construct in real terms means the removal of local power, control, decision-making and, eventually, of localism itself—all of which are prized in rural agricultural communities.

Transformation

The above deconstruction illustrates the complex experience of being a farmer. “Rural issues” are complex and not constrained to the happenings within a rural community; challenging experiences at the local level can be driven by global changes. Given this, there is a recurrent myth throughout the interviews relating to scale and power. We see that the myth is closely related to the social causes layer of the analysis, because the participants are reflecting deeply about their social circumstances. The farmers are reflecting on the difference in power that they feel distances them (psychologically, socially and physically) from city power. To encapsulate their experience of being in a position of lesser power, they reflect on the social structure of rural communities and adopt metaphors of scale (small and large), of force (being “pushed out”) and of inequality (challenging the construct of an “even playing field”). Further, the farmers acknowledge that there are myths associated with the value of their role within the broader society. Thus, the connection between the social causes and myth/metaphor levels of this particular analysis is very strong. The connection is present because, while issues regarding farmers’ relationships with the city people imply applicability to the social causes layer, it is the farmers’ *responses* to the dynamic which make it appropriate to the myth/metaphor layer. The farmers appear to be actively challenging the negative constriction of their role and the myth associated with food production and this makes globalisation the dominant belief. While there is considerable discussion about the influence of vertical integration of farm prices, this is far from simple.³

There are tensions in the dynamic between city and rural communities, and this has implications for policy interventions, as policy, decision-making and funding for initiatives are all determined within the city before being enforced in rural communities (e.g. the current policy direction for sustainable farm management practice is set by an Australian government initiative called *Caring for Our Country*; the program encourages sustainable land management, environmental stewardship, biodiversity and conservation).⁴The implication is that greater ownership of changes in policy is necessary for their acceptance by the farming community. If we consider transformative futures for rural agricultural communities, this must be done in light of these inherent tensions between decision-makers and those whom their decisions affect. Contrasting the views of agricultural scientists and “experts” and of local communities reveals broad differences which are major impediments to change. This is reflected in table 1, below, in which

the implicit values and approaches of scientists and experts are contrasted with the views reflected in the above analysis. The scientific approach was distilled from a CSIRO sustainable research program.⁵

Table 1. CLA

	Scientists and Experts	Farmers
LITANY	Land and water are degrading	Farming is getting tougher
SOCIAL CAUSES	Need for changed land management strategies	GFC
	Assist rural communities to manage change	Climate is variable Planning is difficult
WORLDVIEW	Science knows best	Farming as lifestyle
	Community needs to be “brought along”	
MYTH/ METAPHOR	Farms as business	Decisions are made on the “coast”
	Science has helped in the past	Farmers are “price takers” not price setters
	Heartlands will help develop economic and environmentally sustainable farming	Farmers are at the mercy of big business

Understanding the discrepancy between “top down” and local decision-making, and determining appropriate strategies as to how this can be remedied, can be considered in terms of some of the fundamental principles within community psychology. For example, we argue for the importance of genuine engagement⁶ and of distributive as well as procedural justice.⁷ CLA enabled the possible transformation from disengaged and disempowered rural communities to communities that are actively, genuinely and meaningfully engaged in determining their futures.

Discussion

The deconstruction of the issue of land management in rural Australia is clearly complex. It is an issue that is further reaching than contending that farmers have to make difficult land management decisions; their experiences, and the challenges they face in being “good farmers” relates to broader social, cultural and economic patterns and pressures. Conducting a contextualist piece of research, specifically using CLA as the method for deconstructing the social issues, meant that we were able to comprehend the matter’s complexity. This method allows us to deconstruct, and reconstruct, the issue. It is a powerful methodology for policy development because it means that issues must be considered in all their complexity. For example, why were farmers having so much difficulty managing their land? It was more than a drought issue, and more than a global financial issue, but these are still fundamental problems for the farmers and have become the focal

point of policy. However, drought policy is decontextualised, and historically has not been considered in *its* full complexity. Fundamentally, the pressure experienced in farming communities also relates to a change in the perceived dominant value in farming. Globalisation, and the emergence of large supermarket chains, super-corporately owned (as opposed to family-owned) farms and a growing emphasis on importing products, even when they are being grown locally, is dramatically challenging farmers' capacity to be "good farmers". Farming, as evident in the analysis at the worldview discourse level, is a part of their being, and being a farmer in Australia carries with it a particular cultural archetype. This too is being challenged by a consumerist value system; this ultimately threatens rural communities. As family farming becomes more challenging and less viable, so too are the surrounding communities threatened.

To recapitulate, we are informed by contextualism, a philosophical framework for understanding people and community, and reject both the positivistic notion of community comprising discrete and separate individuals and the organic notion of people in community. Community is people and people are part of communities. The people are not separable entities but share cultures in which there are not interactions but *transactions*.

CLA offers the opportunity to recognise that transactions operate at a number of conceptual levels. People do not simply address litany-level issues; their words have symbolic meanings that convey emotions, as well as deeper understandings of common history and community life. It allows us to see aspects of their lives that are often well-disguised. As a method, it can help to reveal what is not needed to be said along with what is actually said—and it is often what is *not* said that is reflective of culture and community. Thus, CLA can be a useful tool in policy development as it allows acknowledgement of what is explicit, but also of the implicit and tacit aspects of local and broader cultures. It is critical that as community psychologists we have the appropriate tools with which to fully deconstruct complex social issues. Entering into the policy arena, it is crucial that we understand social issues beyond the superficial. As evidenced in this analysis, farm management challenges are more complex than the decisions that farmers make on their own properties. The challenges relate to larger social, cultural and economic factors, particularly around globalisation, and threats that farmers feel to their lives as local producers. Policy in this area needs also to think about changing values, particularly those towards rural and agricultural communities, and the social and economic stressors that are placed on them.

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- ² S. Inayatullah, 'Causal layered analysis: Theory, historical context, and case studies', in S. Inayatullah, *Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) Reader* (1–50), Tamsui, Tamkang University Press, 2004.
- ³ D. K. Round, 'The power of two: Squaring off with Australia's large supermarket chains', *Australian Journal of Agricultural & Resource Economics*, Vol 50, 2006, 51–64; R. L. Smith, 'The Australian grocery industry: A competitive perspective', *Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics*, Vol 50, 2006, 33–50.
- ⁴ Commonwealth of Australia, *Caring for our Country: An Outline for the Future 2012–2018*, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, 2012.
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11. Deep Futures and China's Environment

Marcus T. Anthony*

This chapter unpacks the discourse on China's futures, with a particular focus on the relationship between Chinese people and the environment. The goal is to problematise the dominant discourse using CLA, thus viewing the issue from new perspectives. Two possible scenarios for China's futures are used as a focus: Brave New China and the Harmonious Society. †

Introduction

The economic crisis of 2009 saw political leaders in China, and around the globe, begin to think carefully about the development of their countries; and the development of the world. A government report by Chinese premier Wen Jiabao just prior to the staging of the National People's Congress placed most importance upon maintaining rapid economic growth, accelerating economic restructuring and improving people's well-being. Education and social welfare were also mentioned.¹ When the 2009 Congress was held, comments about green issues were conspicuously absent, indicating that short-term economic progress was being valued above long-term sustainable futures. The question is: just how deeply are China's leaders thinking about the current problems faced by China and the world, especially in terms of the environment?

China's futures run deep. The problem requires an approach more sophisticated than simply asking how China will make things "greener", and what problems economic development will cause. Therefore, this chapter takes an expanded perspective on the problem. This perspective will not only identify the broader drivers of change, and the potential pitfalls and benefits,

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but will identify questions that are typically not asked, with the aim of eliciting deeper meanings than usually considered in related discussions. The goal is thus to disrupt the dominant discourse.

The Theoretical Approach

The approach here will employ two tools from Critical Futures Studies: Sohail Inayatullah's causal layered analysis (CLA) and scenarios. Two scenarios—Brave New China and the Harmonious Society—will provide focus for the discussion.

A problem with dominant discourses within particular domains of enquiry is that they tend not to question the givens, the fundamental predicates which underpin the discourse. Paradigmatic restrictions may lead not only to restricted hypotheses, but to delimitations regarding which kinds of questions are permitted to be asked.² The result is that thinkers may be too close to their subject matter, and fail to achieve the “distance” necessary to see alternative perspectives.³

Three Textual Mythologies

Elsewhere I have discussed three mythic textual mythologies as scenarios for China's futures. These were the Brave New World/Brave New China (BNW/BNC) (materialism and hedonism), the Harmonious Society (HS) (spiritual integration with nature, with a market economy) and Big Brother (BB) (totalitarianism).⁴

Table 1, below, compares and contrasts the two scenarios according to eleven key variables.

Brave New China

In his novel *Brave New World*, Aldous Huxley creates a dystopian vision where an entire society becomes enslaved in a carefully manufactured yet dehumanising social system. Life is reduced to simple hedonistic pleasures, sexual gratification, and generally mindless pursuits. All pain and discomfort have been anaesthetised by the drug “soma”, with the purpose of keeping the population enfeebled, compliant and “happy” in the name of social stability. The motto of *BNW* is “community, identity, stability”.⁵

Brave New World is a textual mythology which has many parallels with modern China. Most apparently, China's is now a very materialistic culture where hedonistic distractions have subsumed deeper intellectual, social and spiritual concerns. Therefore the dystopian expression of where current Chinese materialism may lead shall be referred to as Brave New China.

The Harmonious Society

At the Fourth Plenum of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP) in 2004, President Hu Jintao announced that China was trying to develop a “Harmonious Society”, or *xioakang*.⁶ In the following Party Congress in 2007, the concept was downplayed, possibly reflecting backroom Party factionalism. Nonetheless it remains a significant concept underpinning contemporary Party policy.⁷

Table 1. Scenarios: Brave New China versus The Harmonious Society

	Brave New China (Dystopian)	Harmonious Society (Utopian)
Depth of Futures	Shallow. Market-driven More expansive and alternative futures, and other ways of knowing suppressed	Deep. Disowned and alternative futures return to discourse: incl. spiritual and feminist. Other ways of knowing permitted
Environment	Not a priority. Alienation from nature	Strong priority. Deep relationship, humanity/nature
Consumption/ Energy Needs	High consumption. Rapid GDP growth essential for social stability	Medium/low GDP growth rates fall
Values	GDP as God. Market. Money. Goods. Hedonism. Status. Power and Glory	Market and non-market balanced Family. Community. Harmony Confucian. Taoist and Buddhist Spiritual
Innovation	Strong Driven by market	Strong/moderate, but with added non-market focus. Driven by need, and responsibility to humanity and nature
Social Stability	Strong, via sedation of the people Distraction via technology & entertainment Collectivism Peace valued	Strong, but possibly less control. Increased possibility of dissent Collectivism, but with more empowered individualism Peace valued
Bureaucracy	Heavy. Strong surveillance	Moderate. Moderation of surveillance
System	Neo-Darwinian Western (partly) Confucian hierarchies Hong Kongisation Minimal civil society. Self-interest	Cooperation. Confucian hierarchies remain, but softened Civil society strong Civic responsibilities

Democracy	Minimal, or “window dressing”. Strong control via entertainment, consumption & hedonism Freedom of information curtailed	Strong. Civic responsibility emphasised Increased freedom of information
Psyche	Alienation. Dissociation ego/body/psyche; rational/affective	Integration of ego/psyche/ rationality/affectivity
Archetype myths & symbols	Huxley’s <i>Brave New World</i> 1920s Shanghai The shopping mall The machine, conveyer belt Babylon. Ozymandias	The harmonious society (Asia) Eden, Gaia 1960s idealism The liberal society

Hu Jintao’s harmonious society includes the following:

- Sustained, rapid and coordinated economic growth;
- Development of “socialist democracy”;
- Rule of law;
- Strengthening of ideological and ethical build-up;
- Maintenance of social equity and justice;
- Establishment of “a fine-tuned social management system”, including the management of “the people’s internal contradictions”;
- Environmental protection.⁸

Superpower China/Glorious China

One final image/pull of the future must be mentioned even as we focus mainly on the two scenarios above: Superpower China. Like the United States, China sees itself as having a special place in the evolution of humanity.⁹ While America sees itself as a kind of evangelist, promoting the rights of man, democracy and capitalism, the Chinese simply see themselves as the greatest civilisation on Earth: Glorious China. The sense of superiority to outsiders (often referred to as “barbarians”) is an entrenched part of the Chinese psyche, and probably emerged as a psychological means of compensating for the incursions of aggressive powers into the Chinese mainland throughout its history.¹⁰

Causal Layered Analysis

Causal layered analysis is particularly useful as a means to conduct inquiry into the nature of past, present and future. It opens up the present and the past to create the possibility of alternative futures. It is for this reason that it

has been chosen as an ideal tool to unpack the discourse on China's environmental futures.

CLA 1: The litany

The shallowest analyses of China's futures focus on logistical concerns, and often back them up with empirical data. These may include a limited layman's interpretation of events, or simplistic government media statements which deliberately try to obfuscate deeper analysis. Litany-focused analyses can also be found in brief/specific statements within texts.

Shallow futures

A reduction in the consumption of fossil fuels is acknowledged as one of the most important goals of responsible ecological development. There are four generally discussed viable options for China if it is to do this. They are solar power, hydro-electricity, wind power and nuclear power.¹¹ Yet a discussion of these alternatives, without a corresponding analysis of the deeper issues which underpin their use, creates a discourse without depth.

In July 2008 the energy ministers of the Group of Eight and China, India and South Korea suggested that the age of oil is over (due to rising prices). These leaders concluded that we must find clean alternatives to protect the environment and "ensure global stability". The solutions put forward involved replacing fossil fuels with nuclear, hydro, solar and wind power. Those attending the meeting concluded that improved efficiency and an acceleration of investment in the new energy technologies are necessary. Yet this analysis clearly remains fixed at the litany level, or the surface. Its limited focus is on why oil is so expensive—political uncertainty, the weakness of the US Dollar, growing consumption, or insufficient output oil reserves.¹²

The reason attention has remained narrowly fixed is that the stakeholders were part of the system, a system that they did not wish to be challenged. Those suggesting visions of the future were those who held the most power within the system. So the system was not questioned, nor were any deeper underlying factors brought forward for discussion.

Solutions to environmental problems offered at the litany level are inevitably "rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic". They become concerned with surface features, and the analysts may have neither the desire nor the capacity to address deeper systemic issues. In Chongqing in southern China, the air is so polluted that it has "painted apartment blocks in a layer of soot and contaminates the air".¹³ The local authorities, upholding their motto of "sustainability, sustainability, sustainability" have spent 24 billion Yuan to "fix" the problem. They have relocated the town's steel factory to a location further out of town, and introduced better pollution controls, including on buses and taxis. But even as the officials have done this, the fixed system-

level economic policies represent a complete contradiction to official environmental policy; for Chongqing is now aggressively trying to lure more foreign investment, while positioning itself as a transport corridor to western China. It is attempting to make itself the economic hub of the nation. Further, authorities are building new freeways and bridges, thus encouraging the use of cars.¹⁴ This contradiction, of expressing environmental concern while encouraging the massive expansion of the car industry, is also present in central government policy.

Used futures

Much discourse at the litany level contains what Inayatullah calls “the used future”, adopting themes unconsciously borrowed from someone else. Referring to the development of Asian cities in general, Inayatullah writes that they tend to show the same pattern of urban development as western cities. Ironically, many in the west now believe this model is flawed. There should have been more focus placed on creating liveable communities, and thus maintaining green public spaces between developed regions. Growth without vision, or concern for nature or liveability, has created huge megacities in western nations, providing high levels of employment but creating much suffering.¹⁵

Asian cities have unconsciously followed the western pattern. They have forgotten their own traditions where village life and community were central, and where living with nature was important. Now they must find ways to create new futures, or continue to go along with the future being discarded elsewhere. This used future is leading to a global crisis of fresh water depletion, climate change, and loss of human dignity.¹⁶ It also causes vast expenditure of energy, as inefficiency in energy use is a constant problem.¹⁷

CLA 2: Systems and social level

Moving the problem of China’s environmental futures to the next level, we find issues that reflect deeper social and systems issues. China’s complex social and political systems are often discussed within academic and scientific discourse, and so this level tends to appear explicitly in many analyses of development in China. Yao is typical. Examining China’s strategies for obtaining more oil to fuel its booming economy, he concludes that China must apply domestic demand-side measures and a market approach, and cooperate with the United States without violating international protocols.¹⁸

The unexamined

Analyses such as Yao’s, although they incorporate systems perspectives and go deeper than litany-level analyses, often contain unexamined pre-suppositions. Yao, for example, makes no attempt to question the system itself.

Chang's "Transformed World" scenario, on the other hand, echoes much of the harmonious society. It emphasises "social and political changes as well as value and cultural-norm changes [which] shape and supplement market mechanisms".¹⁹ There is greater equality of power distribution, and information is freer, similar to the harmonious society described in Table 1, above. Cooperation and competition work in an ideal relationship for better social, environmental and economic benefit for all.²⁰ Notably this involves "Gaian friendly technologies"²¹ and deep ecological concerns. Yet, consistent with much academic analysis, Chang fails to entertain deeper mythic or spiritual considerations. The Buddhist/Taoist metaphysics inherent within the harmonious society are absent.

For Chang, China's future is being influenced by broader global trends and issues. His "Market World" scenario is a "possible future... grounded in the belief in the power of markets and of private enterprise to create prosperity and improve human welfare in the world".²² Chang's model is essentially utopian. However, it has commonalities with the Brave New China scenario, where economic and material considerations became all-important at the expense of deeper ecological and spiritual matters. These are societies of institutionalised distraction. Modern China has more in common with this future. There are hours of daily television, the ubiquitous MP3 players, and wireless internet hotspots; the increased urbanisation and commercialisation of cityscapes; and more permissive attitudes towards sexuality and violence in the media. These suggest that China is adopting a "used future" first established in the west and in east Asian nations such as Japan and South Korea, where *Brave New World*-like societies have emerged. In turn, this "image" has been pulled down by the weight of the industrial era.²³

The political

In considering China's futures, it must be acknowledged that ultimately the push for material prosperity in China establishes the CCP's authority to rule.²⁴ The PRC's founding communist ideology has been abandoned. Mao's portrait in Tiananmen Square merely grants a token sense of legitimacy to the CCP leadership. Deng's mythic affirmation that "It's glorious to be rich" may be employed to keep the future shallow, and to stop people asking too many questions.

At the political level, the authorities have long played up nationalism, and have carefully cultivated patriotic education and emphasised the "glorious" history of the nation.²⁵ While this is arguably a necessary phase for a developing nation to pass through, there is no reason why there cannot be equal emphasis upon situating China within the global community. "Patriotic education" will have to be balanced with "global consciousness" if China is to take its place in a sustainable future.

There are two factors at work here. The first is the likely reality that the Chinese government is trying to deflect responsibility on to western nations,

because it has no immediate answer to the environmental crisis it faces. Yet at the worldview and metaphor levels, there are psychological and civilisational factors involved. As with many postcolonial powers, Chinese people and their leaders have developed a strong victim mentality. At school, Chinese History focuses on “the century of humiliation”, the height of the colonial period between 1842 and 1945. As a result, the Chinese tend to identify themselves as victims of foreign control and manipulation, as the abused (and never the abusers). This is a dominant narrative which lies within the modern Chinese psyche, indeed which lies within the modern human psyche. A global and national change in mindset is thus required. China will need to begin to move beyond its current state of mind if it is to establish a harmonious relationship with the world community, including responsible and accountable environmental policies.

The moral code

Corruption remains a crucial systems issue. Local officials often have unaccountable power, and are commonly in league with developers and their big money.²⁶ Enforcing central government pollution controls and environmental protection policy is problematic where local officials and workers in responsible positions can be paid off. This situation has historical roots. China was traditionally a feudal society, with the emperor in command, followed by the military and public servants, with merchants and peasants at the bottom.²⁷ The nation’s moral code followed from the fact that every person’s role and power was defined by his/her position within the system. In modern China, that structure has broken down; meaning, most worryingly, that Chinese society now lacks a definitive moral code. Business people have more power, and the idea of “prosperity” has captured the public imagination. As Li Peilin states, a harmonious society is one “in which the majority has a solid awareness of the obligations of citizens and high ethical standards”.²⁸ The current top-down system, where unaccountable authority is in league with big business, is a recipe for corruption.

Images from mid-2008 of a Chinese ship loaded with arms docked in South Africa, waiting to arm the thugs of Robert Mugabe’s regime, brought out a crucial issue. The “value-free” futures which drive Chinese market Leninism are morally bankrupt. Ma Jian’s image of China as “a fat businessman with his pockets stuffed with money”,²⁹ is a repulsive *present*, and an unsustainable future. The prime use for nature and environment in such a society is to ensure industry continues to stuff those pockets with more and more cash. The result is likely a disastrous future in which values such as human rights and ecological concern evaporate.

Greed and I

A “me first” attitude has developed in modern China and represents another problematique in its development. This can be personally experienced in

public spaces. Boarding trains and elevators in China, it is common to see people barging onto the train or lift as soon as the doors slide open, paying no heed at all to people getting off. Looking at this historically, we can see that scarcity of resources is likely a factor. Famine and disaster have been common themes in China. Just forty years ago, many Chinese people were eating leaves and grass as they starved to death in their tens of millions. Social instability and disaster have never been far away, and the lack of information about what is going on in the country, means that people have little trust in the authorities, nor in each other or the future. The often reckless disregard for the environment by individuals and corporate entities may emerge from this mindset. What concern should there be for sustainable development when tomorrow is an uncertain future away? This live-for-now mentality fosters short-term thinking and an attitude of selfishness.

Such a mindset is obviously contrary to the tenets of the Harmonious Society. Yet the HS is perfectly compatible with Chinese history and tradition. Despite the distortions of Chinese society after the CCP came to power in 1949, a “harmonious society” is a traditional Chinese (and Asian, and indeed human) aspiration, and mythology. It thus exerts a psychic “pull” upon the collective. It combines aspects of traditional Chinese culture and metaphysics with China’s development within an increasingly connected world. Its emphasis upon the collective may serve as an antidote to the self-interest and greed which seem to have overrun the traditional Chinese concepts of harmony, family and working together as a team.

Most alarmingly, given the factors which underpin the pushes of the Brave New China scenario, enough can never be enough. Growth in GDP becomes both the means and the end, because society’s depth has been back-filled; all deeper meaning and purpose has become part of the disowned future. In such a system, no amount of development will ever be enough. The entire system is self-perpetuating. Without some severe discontinuity in the dominant narrative, the system is not likely to change. The discontinuity is likely to take the form of the severe disruption or collapse that some have argued may occur if China does not change its current model of development.^{30,31} The economic crisis which began in 2009 represents an even greater disruption.

Perhaps the greatest problem with the concept of the Harmonious Society is that it is not aligned with the extant reality of Chinese society today. China’s leaders will have to think deeply about how to move closer to the vision; the top-down social structure may have to be dismantled if this is ever to take place. This is because responsibility and accountability are intrinsic components of the HS. Too many people at all levels of society are presently failing to act responsibly, or with a view to something greater than themselves. In ancient times, Chinese people acknowledged the idea of *li*, or the will of heaven, seeing themselves as accountable to divinity, and this kept the system in check.³² These metaphysics have now been abandoned. How a Harmonious Society might function without them remains to be seen.

Chinese development needs to more readily balance its emphasis upon economic growth rates with the development of morality, civic responsibility, accountability, and reward for the ethic of hard work. The concept of the Harmonious Society theoretically meets this requirement.

CLA 3: Worldview

When we move into the third and fourth levels of CLA, the analysis is not so much about individual thinkers, but about concepts that are implicit yet unexamined, or simply absent from the discourse. Alternative ideas and futures, as well as conjecture, play a greater role here. Many of the following insights and observations come from the author's own decade spent in the greater China region, and are therefore subjective.

Global-tech and the west

The “global-tech” mythology is a key ‘push’, a driver of the future.³³ This is perhaps the dominant image of the future on the internet, in movies, science and science fiction. It is almost synonymous with Chang's “Market World”³⁴ as discussed in the previous section. Looking at this from a worldview perspective, it appears to be an image of the modern West.

Yet upon deeper examination, this is only a *partially* Western future. Other Western institutions, like democracy, freedom of speech, human rights, and environmental awareness, are largely absent from modern China. China is thus “capitalising” as much as “westernising”. Market Leninism is effectively capitalism without democracy.

Therefore Brave New China cannot accurately be called a “Western” system. Many critiques of Western culture are directed at the alienating potentials of capitalism, and its essentially patriarchal basis.³⁵ The aspects of Western society which are generally praised in terms of human social evolution are its democratic and human rights ideals. If we turn our attention to China we see that it has embraced many of the most widely criticised aspects of western culture and jettisoned the more humanistic ones.

This is a highly problematic issue in terms of China's futures. Who will have the courage to stand and challenge those in power, to suggest that there may be limits to growth, or that the story might need changing?

The disowned future: The Taoist/Confucian worldview

As Inayatullah argues, a challenge in developing preferred futures is to integrate our disowned selves.³⁶ For the Chinese and their relationship to the environment, this could mean re-discovering their long-lost spiritual and Taoist roots, which may bring them closer to the Harmonious Society. In order for this to happen, the neo-Darwinian, competition-focused society will have to be more evenly balanced within a softer culture. Yet, notably, China's current model of development is out of “alignment”³⁷ with the Taoist worldview.

Further, in modern China the CCP has actively destroyed China's connections with its civilisational and spiritual roots. The people have been pacified, disaffected and dissociated from each other and from nature. During the Mao years (1949–1976), people were deliberately turned against each other—even their own families—in order for the authorities to gain greater social control.³⁸ Indoctrination against the “superstition” of religious and spiritual practices has been strong.

Connection with nature has also been greatly eroded. The concept of a Harmonious Society incorporates a metaphysical dimension, including “the internal harmony of individuals to the ultimate harmony between the human race and nature”. Ideally this involves an empathic relationship with nature to form “part of a harmonious natural symphony”. Lau writes:

But it all has to start with one's internal harmony, graduating into family harmony, then social harmony and so on. The secret is not to over-emphasise the individual at the expense of the interest of a higher order.³⁹

However it remains to be seen whether a re-ignition of Confucian ethics and philosophy can reinstall a culture more consistent with traditional Chinese spirituality.

CLA 4: Myths and metaphors

Here I modify CLA's deepest layer by focusing on a domain that has inspired me in much of my own life and research: that is, human consciousness and the deeper psychological and spiritual underpinnings of discourses. Although often completely obscured in conventional analyses, an appreciation of this level is vital to a deeper understanding of many problems.

Glorious China

One of the key narratives of China's development is also one of its pulls towards the future –Superpower China. The Chinese national symbol of the dragon suggests a powerful and aggressive nation that bows to no one. Here we can contrast the dragon with another symbol: the Taoist Yin and Yang; a ready balance of the masculine and feminine. At the dawn of the 21st Century, China is the Dragon, and the neo-Darwinian and patriarchal consciousness is in full flight. This provides great thrust for the economy, but is not so great for the environment, or for the moral development and deeper introspection required if China's problems are to be addressed.

The Superpower China pull invites key questions:

- What does it mean to be powerful?
- What does it mean to be a leader?
- What does it mean to be a “glorious” country?

In a country which has made the future an incontestable domain, these are questions that must be answered.⁴⁰

Shallow prosperity

In modern China “prosperity” has come to be narrowly defined. It is about how much money one has in the bank, driving a flash car, and wearing an expensive watch. And you *can* take it with you! Packing coffins with fake money to accompany the loved one to heaven is a common (and traditional) practice, as is burning fake money for the deceased.

More obvious materialistic symbols are coming to represent life in Brave New China. In Chinese writer Ma Jian’s archetypal novel *Beijing Coma*, the protagonist loses consciousness amidst political turmoil after being shot in the head in the Tiananmen incident in 1989.⁴¹ He falls into a ten-year-long coma, and awakens in a shopping mall, in a “deadened culture that has no memory”.⁴² The symbolism is obvious: in modern China, the people have allowed themselves to fall into a collective amnesia as the price of social and political stability. It is a world of hedonism, devoid of deeper meaning or spiritual fulfilment. Unsurprisingly, many of Ma Jian’s books are banned in China.

Human vanity is thus another key “psychic” force compelling the development of modern China.

The fake

An unflattering symbol of modern China is “the fake”. Besides the obvious fake brand-name clothes and bags, there have been cases of fake software, fake batteries, fake books, fake (tainted) baby food (fatal), fake journalists, fake monks (beggars), fake taxis, fake ambulances and just about any other kind of fake you can think of.

In 2007, there was a media story of fake *jiaozi* (meat-filled buns). A journalist reported that a Beijing street vendor was shredding cardboard boxes and using them as part of the bun filling. The story was a sensation, spreading to foreign media and embarrassing China. A few days later the authorities intervened and reported that the journalist had lied, and would be punished.⁴³ But, given the long history of government deception in media announcements, some questioned whether it was in fact the government pronouncement that was the lie. So which was the real fake: the buns, the journalist’s story, or the government’s correction? The entire saga is testament to a society where respect for truth has been severely diminished.

The problem is top-down. Authorities have long “embellished” the facts in their public announcements, and information which is unflattering to the authorities or seen as undesirable is typically erased. There are few honest role models for the Chinese people to look up to and emulate.

Materialism and sustainability

The current materialist culture of modern China is unsustainable. It seems unlikely that all of China's 1.3 billion people can be rich, at least not in Western terms. As pressure on resources and the environment mounts, Chinese people (and people across the world) may need to redefine the concept of prosperity. In Bhutan, Gross National Happiness has become the definition of prosperity.⁴⁴ Redefining wealth to include mental well-being and living in healthy surroundings will likely affect China's environment in a positive way, as it will slow down the fast-paced, consumption-based culture which is emerging.

The rape of the mother

Moving into the mythical level of the discussion, the constant pulling of resources from the belly of "mother Earth" can be seen as a projection of the patriarchal society—the rape of Gaia. Various western philosophers and critics have made this point in reference to Judeo-Christian values.⁴⁵ Yet the fact that the Chinese nation has also pillaged and polluted its portion of the Earth suggests that the root cause of such problems is not culturally specific. At the litany level, the "scarcity of resources" is a logistical fact that has to be acknowledged. Place 1.3 billion people in a single country, and then turn it from an agrarian economy into an industrial economy, and vast amounts of energy and resources will be used.

Also at the mythical level, we can consider the dissociation of mind, body and spirit. There are a number of philosophers of science who have referred to this issue in contemporary western society.⁴⁶ At a perceptual level, this dissociation entails a separation of observer and object, a problem which results in the erasure of *eros* (love) and *agape* (compassion).⁴⁷ Feminists have claimed that this affects humanity's relationship with nature.⁴⁸

In Brave New China, the culture is inherently selfish, and ego-focused. In individualistic societies where a sense of community is diminished, people may be tempted to take from the environment without giving, for the individual sees himself as the centre of the universe. The relationship with the environment, including society and nature then becomes a projection of the psyche, driven by an incessant want and the hunger of the ego for more.

Transpersonal researcher Grof has argued that many of the world's major conflicts are projections of deep psycho-spiritual drives within the human psyche.⁴⁹ Could the desire to have control over nature also be a function of deeper imperatives within the human mind? In the transpersonal vision, humanity has become cut off from its spiritual essence; the Atman is alienated from the Brahman. In this sense the drive of the human ego for control and power is an "Atman project",⁵⁰ a substitute quest for immortality. In turn then, perhaps the Harmonious Society represents a Chinese longing

for a return to Taoist and Buddhist roots, and the connection of self with cosmos, body with soul.

Cracks in the monolith

What does the “energy” mean within the human psyche? Energy is power, the ability to do work. In another sense it is the capacity to move Heaven and Earth. Just as authoritarian governments have done since the beginning of the 20th Century, the CCP has elevated its own monolithic structure, the Three Gorges Dam, a symbol of the power of the Party and of the Chinese people to harness the power of nature. In this sense, human power over nature has replaced *li*, or the Will of Heaven, within the Chinese psyche. In an age where we have alienated nature and made it our slave, we believe the resources of nature are there for us to exploit as we like.

Spiritual and philosophical lore suggests that hubris is inevitably followed by a fall. Pollution and environmental devastation in China are the cracks that have appeared in the monolith. The mighty Three Gorges Dam is literally cracked, and even Chinese state media have begun to report that the project is facing major problems.⁵¹

Which Way Now?

If something akin to the Harmonious Society is ever to eventuate in China, and if the human relationship with nature is to become a more responsible one, questions will need to be asked by the Chinese authorities. What kind of symbols, images and narratives should we found our futures upon? Do we need masses of advertising, or a consumer society at all? What kind of education do we need? Are we willing to empower the people with the capacity to be able to develop the intellectual and spiritual reserves that will enable them to be responsible citizens?

Educator John Moffet points out that policy-makers will never create an empowered citizenry through market-centred education, which denies human personal and spiritual development.⁵² Vocational training and the “3-Rs” are not enough. If the futures of China and of the world are going to be sustainable, if they are going to be futures of depth, we need education that transforms the individual from the inside out.

In the response of Chinese leaders and public to the Sichuan earthquake of 2008, novelist Ma Jian sees a flicker of hope. Ma noted that this represented “the first time in a millennium of Chinese history that the state has officially mourned the deaths of its citizens”.⁵³ Ma longs for the time that other man-made tragedies in China, such as the Tiananmen massacre and the Cultural Revolution, will be remembered also.

Ma’s observation is important at the mythic level. It suggests the possibility of the reigniting in Chinese culture of two of Buddhism’s central tenets: love and compassion. It is a greater empathy for humanity, nature and the cosmos

that is so greatly needed in modern China. But that will require healing, and healing will not occur if the mistakes of the past are anaesthetised under the veil of consumerism and hedonism of Brave New China. At present the CCP's leaders show no sign of addressing the massive historical errors and crimes of the Party.

If deeper factors are not addressed, interventions at the litany and systems levels may fail. It is entirely possible that "intelligent" changes in policy at a superficial level may founder if deeper civilisational, mythic and spiritual dimensions are not addressed. As just one example, will more and better roads, cars and bridges pacify the people of Tibet while the half a million Tibetans who have vanished since the 1950 invasion continue to be excluded from history as if they never existed?⁵⁴

In terms of sustainable Futures, the Brave New China scenario is not workable. Whether the impact on environments will be unsustainable or not is merely the surface of the problem, as is the question of whether specific fuels are low-emission. Rather, the underlying psycho-spiritual imperatives which drive "development" are truly of the essence. The principled Harmonious Society is a better ideal to aim for than Brave New China. It is utopian, but as Milojević points out, utopian ideals may serve to provide improved futures, not necessarily perfect ones.⁵⁵

Brave New China is a fast-emerging scenario, and represents a Great Wall standing between the people and genuinely "prosperous" futures. Solutions will need to be deep and profound, plumbing the full depth of the litany, systems, worldview and mythical dimensions. The Harmonious Society stands as a useful model to mark the way forward. Re-arranging the deckchairs, no matter how ego-inflating, is no way to save the Titanic.

Human beings take their identities from the kinds of narratives they are exposed to, or invent. Collectively, the dominant narratives of society induce the identity of that society. The story we see repeated within Chinese state media is that China is healthy because of its rapid GDP growth, but how much GDP is necessary? What do we *really* need to live our lives? What does it mean to be rich or poor? What does it mean to be Chinese in the modern age?

The Harmonious Society concept must not be allowed to disappear. The Communist Party should acknowledge the inevitable; that it must make way for a political system and value structure which will permit something akin to the Harmonious Society to emerge. This cannot be realised in a society where GDP, consumption and entertainment dominate.

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12. *Avatar*: Higher education and sustainability

Patricia Kelly*

Using the film Avatar as the basis for transdisciplinary insights, this chapter argues that integrating feeling and rationality might nurture the imagination we need to find equitable alternatives to the business-as-usual approach that is currently leading us to a dead end. The chapter applies CLA to provide a summary analysis of four key players in the film giving insight into diverse stakeholders' perspectives.[†]

Introduction

This chapter discusses James Cameron's science fiction epic *Avatar*, making parallels between angry conservative responses to the film and some harsh criticism of the concept of "re-enchantment" in the emerging area of sustainability in higher education. This raised the question as to whether spirituality and scholarly thinking can complement each other in the growing values struggle between business-as-usual futures and sustainable futures. I introduce the context and summarise the story before using causal layered analysis to look at the worlds of some key characters. Like *Avatar*'s imaginary planet, Pandora, education is a site to watch in the growing values struggle between business-as-usual futures and sustainable futures, both of which are expressions of McGrail's "competing ethics of the future".¹

In Greek mythology, Pandora is infamous for opening a forbidden box. This released all the ills of the world, but she heard a last small voice asking to be let out. It was Hope. I feel like that about *Avatar*. Despite its shortcomings, I see it as a timid cinematic transition point, in which we see an actor representing the "death culture", opt for "life" instead. This reflects Posch's warning about the growing "death potential" of economic/technological development confronting its "life potential" to the point where human activity threatens our survival.² Pandora's Na'avi offer an artistic vision of

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one different way of being. I watched *Avatar* because I am always searching for healthy alternatives to our “self reinforcing engine of growth based on insatiable desires”.³ I was disappointed by the movie. The animation is clever, but the script is predictable; baddies versus goodies, boy meets girl, battles on flying beasts replace car chases and most of the characters are cardboard cut-outs. As reviewer Paul Byrnes comments, “the story takes us every place we’ve ever been”.⁴

But *Avatar* polarised viewers. Some were surprised that despite its alternative “eco” vision, it has been incredibly popular, rating as the “fourth-highest-grossing film of all time”.⁵ In the USA it set “the right’s hair on fire” on political and religious grounds.⁶ For example, Nolte saw it as “critical of America from our founding straight through to the Iraq war”.⁷ The Christian right rejected what it saw as its “abhorrent New Age, pagan, anti-capitalist worldview that promotes Goddess worship and the destruction of the human race”.⁸ Goldstein offers several reasons for the Right’s fury: 1) the conservatives are a focus for global warming scepticism and anything else they associate with “liberal planet savers”, using ridicule as a favoured strategy; 2) they see it as an attack on religion (Christianity); and 3) they see it as a continuation of Hollywood’s “anti-military sloganeering”. He suggests that the public are more interested in the spectacle than the politics and because it is set in the future, may not even make the political connections.⁹

I saw echoes of Colonel Quaritch’s actions and the Right’s responses to the film in some academic rejections of the deep values change involved in embedding sustainability in higher education. My preferred definition of sustainability centres on responsibility and equity and includes all other species, on which human survival depends:

Sustainability is a possible way of living or being in which individuals, firms, governments, and other institutions act responsibly in taking care of the future as if it belonged to them today, in equitably sharing the ecological resources on which the survival of human and other species depends, and in assuring that all who live today and in the future will be able to satisfy their needs and human aspirations.¹⁰

Sustainability in higher education is regarded as an emerging area even though its origins go back over thirty years.¹¹ Wright analysed a series of international university agreements, beginning with the Stockholm Declaration of 1972.¹² All have urged higher education to play a leadership role in preparing graduates who understand the huge social and economic changes facing us and can work effectively to build sustainable futures. We are well into the UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (2005–2015). Sustainability in education is often expressed through environmental education programs, integrating sustainability issues into curricula, sustainable operations and green buildings.¹³

Stephen Sterling's three level analysis of educational responses to sustainability and their implications clarifies why embedding sustainability is difficult. Level one, "Education about sustainability" is First Order change or learning using sustainability as a controllable "add-on" in which you transmit knowable, uncontested sustainability as a separate content area.¹⁴ The more progressive Second Order/level, "Education for sustainability" involves "learning for change" and examining the values and assumptions of first order thinking.¹⁵ The underlying myth is that with policy reform humans can manage the world's complex eco-systems in the same way as a business. Third Order/Level change is "education as sustainability" or "learning as change, which engages the whole person and institutions".¹⁶ McNamara rightly identifies this as transformative change, a "challenging and evolutionary process" that needs skilled leadership, supportive internal and external conditions, involved stakeholders, resources of time and money and effective communication processes.¹⁷ This kind of education, and these educators, would help to develop graduates who will live and work with a futures awareness and an openness to evolving alternative ideas—*Globo sapiens* or wise global citizens.¹⁸

Sterling's levels also span a sustainability spectrum, ranging from extreme Technocentric or weak sustainability, expressed as unlimited growth and faith in the market (Level 1 education), to "accommodating" sustainability based on 'managing' resources and economies to preserve human society¹⁹ (Level 2 education). The spectrum moves to Strong Sustainability, including communalist approaches, such as steady-state economies with ethical responsibility for other species, and then to the other extreme, Deep Ecology, which preserves the environment through regulation and reverence for nature. This requires transformative education.

The next sections of this chapter outline the story and offer a layered analysis with the aim of understanding the polarised responses to *Avatar*, as well as how they relate to resistance to embedding sustainability in higher education and the radical changes involved in surviving on a damaged planet.

The Context

James Cameron's film *Avatar* is set on Pandora, in the 22nd Century. This is a fertile planet, the indigenous inhabitants of which, the Na'avi, are tall, blue, slender creatures with humanoid features, but also long tails and moveable ears. They are a wasp-waisted combination of Barbie dolls, Minoan athletes and meerkats. They live in harmony with their spectacular, technicolour and glowing landscape, unlike the Sky People, as they call the earthlings who have come to exploit their mineral resources. The miners want unobtainium, which is worth \$35 million per ounce on Earth. As the name suggests, the substance stands for the latest object of human greed. The film depicts the usual struggle between indigenous people trying to protect their environment

and outsiders whose job is pillaging it to make money. The clash is, of course, deeper than money, it is about values. Unlike previous films about culture clashes, such as *Dances with Wolves*, it is the imperialists/Sky People who trudge off defeated, watched by the victorious Na'avi and their hybrid earthling allies, who did battle on their behalf and have used Na'avi science to transfer permanently to their Na'avi "avatars", rejecting their Earthly life forever. Humans seem to have learnt nothing by the time of this future. Similar to so many screen (and real life) war veterans, the hero, Jake Sully, has been damaged in body and soul by his soldiering life. He is a paraplegic. Even his name "Sully" suggests someone morally polluted and/or with the capacity to damage others. He is only on Pandora because he offers an exact DNA match for his scientist twin brother who died, leaving an expensive gap in a project based on creating human-controlled Na'avi clones.

The scientists have tried the colonial approach of "teaching" the Na'avi their ways with little success, and are now trying hybrids as a kind of cultural Trojan horse. These clones/avatarshave a Na'avi body which is "driven" by a human in a state of suspended animation. The scientists hope that the avatars will help them to find a way to work with the Na'avi, and so prevent the miners using force, including fire bombs and rockets, to get the ore, a major source of which is under the Na'avi's sacred Home Tree. The scientists are also interested in Na'avi communication with nature, which they gradually realise is not simply nature worship. The Na'avi use electrochemical connections more complex and numerous than those in the human brain, to connect with Nature, as well as to heal themselves and to upload and share individual and group memories.

The Future: Fortress world

There are only snippets of information about the Earth Sully has left behind. It seems to fit Raskin et al.'s 'fortress world' scenario.²⁰ These authors describe three world futures, depending on our choices: "Conventional worlds, Barbarisation and Great Transitions". Fortress world is one of two possible Barbarisation scenarios, in which resource scarcity has resulted in either "anarchy or tyranny".²¹ Fortress world is based on tyranny, in which a small minority controls the world through force, taking what few resources remain and protecting themselves from the have-not majority with barbed wire and private armies.

This sounds like the Earth of *Avatar*'s time, in which some kind of business-as-usual, techno-fix world survives. Having rendered Earth a polluted mess, the military industrial complex has moved on to other planets. Pandorateems with life, while according to the Na'avi, Earth has "no green, they have killed their mother". Resource wars continue over the scraps, having moved from the Middle East to Africa. We can infer this because Colonel Quaritch, Head of Security on Pandora, and a reprise of every mad commander from Captain Quigg to General Jack Ripper, has survived three tours of Nigeria

“without a scratch”. For-profit companies somehow remain the foundation of Earth’s economy. Quaritch is only concerned that “killing the indigenous looks bad” to the shareholders. This doesn’t prevent it.

The US health care system has not become more egalitarian. There is the medical know-how to restore Jake’s mobility, but “not on vet benefits, not in this economy”. Jake is persuaded to spy on the Na’avi in return for receiving the surgery he needs when he returns to Earth. This seems to be a good bargain until, through his Na’avi body, he falls in love with his Na’avi tutor Neytiri and comes to know the Na’avi and their ways.

Cameron has mined many cultures to create Na’avi culture. For example, they greet each other by pressing noses, exchanging the breath of life, as in a Maori *hongi* greeting and when they communicate with each other and their sacred tree, they sit in tight concentric circles, resembling the Balinese *Kecak* (Monkey) dance.

I turn now to a deeper analysis of the film.

Causal Layered Analysis (CLA)

There is a large body of CLA-based work in multiple disciplines; the methodology is described in this book’s introduction. The CLA in Table 1 is a summary analysis of four key players in the film, the Sky People, including military-industrial figures and the scientists, Jake Sully and the Na’avi. A more detailed explanation follows.


The four main groups in *Avatar* as outlined below offer simple litanies. The military-industrial complex has exchanged “fighting for freedom” for being “hired guns working for the company”, as have many Coalition soldiers now working for private companies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The *Avatar* combat troops are male and female and obviously of diverse ethnicities, but white males still have the power. This seems an unlikely prediction, given changing world demographics.²²

At the systemic level the mercenaries see their only problem as the indigenous people preventing them from accessing the mineral and their profits. Quaritch’s solution is to use more force and, with genocidal intent, to “blast a hole in their racial memory”.

One hundred years from now, the military-industrial complex has even more powerful weapons at its disposal. The soldiers represent a techno-future. They are human “transformers”, operating individual machines of destruction against “savage” nature. Pandora is described as the “most hostile environment known to man (sic)”.*

* Meaning, of course, “known to humanity”. “Man” does not speak for “woman”, so I am resisting the use of that term on principle.

Table 1. CLA of Avatar through key groups/individuals

	Scientists and Experts: Military/ Industrial	Scientists	Jake Sully	Na'avi
LITANY	Doing a job Make profit Control 'natives'	"Teach" them our ways Study the exotic "other"	Obey orders Repair damaged body	Protect sacred tree Resist sky people Maintain Na'avi culture
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	Mine unobtainium Destroy cultural obstacles Maintain profits	Communicate with Na'avi Learn their science Analyse culture	Learn Na'avi ways Spy and report Choose sides	Throw out invaders Adjust to Sky culture Cure Sky People's insanity
DISCOURSE/ WORLDVIEW	Profit-based Sexist, racist, military might Genocide as a solution Reject feelings Tree of souls shit	Listen, record, objectify, integrate	Struggle: rebirth Who am I? Rejection Adaptation Transformation	Spiritual connection: Listen, feel anger Future generations Deep reciprocal connections person to person, person to animal, person to Nature
MYTH/ METAPHOR	Business as usual Might is right Sky father	We know best	What's in this for me?  We're in this together	Protect, connect, heal 'Earth'-mother Tree of souls

In line with the simple litany, the military-industrial discourse is based on hatred, fear and distrust. The language of the Sky People is ugly, embodying their brutalisation and dislocated feelings; it could come from any movie depicting war between cultures. The soldiers and miners depersonalise women and the Na'avi generally through scatological, racist and sexist abuse. The Other role, variously held by "Red Indians", "gooks" and now "towel heads" (Islamic extremists), is here played by the Na'avi. The security forces dismiss Na'avi spirituality as "pagan voodoo", "tree hugger crap" and "tree of souls shit". They refer to the Na'avi as "savages

threatening our operation”, “fly-bitten”, “blue monkeys”, and even use the old racist favourite “vermin”; Quaritch refers to Na’avi as “roaches” that must be scattered. He uses the expression “local tail” to denigrate Jake’s relationship with Neytiri, who was charged with Jake’s re-education by her mother, a holder of wisdom for the Na’avi. “Son of a bitch” is another of his favoured epithets, revealing his attitude to women.

The military-industrial litany emerges from anger and requires constant refuelling. The disconnection and self-loathing of the soldiers is evident in the way they refer to new recruits as “dumb grunts” and “fresh meat”. The soldiers and scientists despise each other. The scientists are dismissed with abuse that combines anti-intellectualism with psycho-sexual fears. Colonel Quaritch refers to the scientists as a “bunch of limp dick science majors” and “science pukes”.

Science (reason) simultaneously threatens his masculinity (certainty) (limp dick) and must be physically rejected (pukes). Quaritch’s “hard” masculinity is also threatened by Pandora, which is personified as a man-eater. “You get soft; Pandora will shit you out dead, no warning”. In line with his contempt for/fear of anything “soft”, the main scientist is the tough, chain-smoking Dr Grace Augustine. She mirrors the patriarchy in her swaggering, rough, “male” persona, challenging Quaritch, but on his terms, by rejecting her feminine self. Through this lens, Augustine sees the soldiers as “idiots with a gun” and dogs that need to be muzzled. Her approach to the Na’avi is not a partnership but colonialist and maternalistic. Her team have learnt the Na’avi language and tried to set up schools to teach the Na’avi the Sky People’s language (English, of course) and ways. She and her team have acquired “knowledge” about Pandora and the Na’avi. Augustine tries to explain to Quaritch that the Na’avi are not interested in money, because they have natural wealth all around them. As she argues, “We have nothing they want. They aren’t going to give up their homes for light beer”. However, she feels “for” but not “with” the Na’avi. The Na’avi understand this, observing that the sky people, “cannot listen, do not hear ...a rock sees more”. Grace finally reconnects as she dies, becoming part of the Na’avi collective memory through its neural networks. At the mythic level, the underlying battle is the ancient one between Sky Father, represented by the sky-people and “Earth” Mother, represented by the Na’avi. The Na’avi know that the Sky People have killed their own mother, Earth. Having learnt nothing from this, they are now exploiting other planets. I see hope in Jake’s transformation because, unlike many screen heroes, he realises that he needs to be humble, to ask for help rather than just assuming he knows or giving orders. Ultimately this leads him to trust a radically different way, based on his revived respect for Nature, a re-enchantment or resacralisation.

There are several critical points in his transformation. He is reborn into a perfect body, which gives him the opportunity to re-discover the world physically and emotionally. However, he brings his cultural assumptions

with him and uses his new strength to fight off savage viper-wolves, expecting praise for his heroic exploits. He is shocked when, instead, Neytiri abuses him for their unnecessary deaths and for his ignorance in attracting them: “This is sad only!” He learns respect for life, in that each creature’s death must be humbly acknowledged: “I see you brother and thank you”. In another incident, when the might of the Sky People seems overwhelming, Jake admits that he doesn’t know if Eywa, the mother/creator/deity of Pandora exists, but asks for her help anyway.

The environment responds, with all living creatures combining forces to defeat the Sky People, despite their superior military hardware. Finally, he trusts Na’avi science, using it to leave behind his dying human body and, in a quasi-Christian death and resurrection, transfers irrevocably to his Na’avi body. This physical transformation is minor, simply an “outward and visible sign” of the inner psychological and spiritual healing he has already experienced.

What’s This Got to do with Sustainability in Higher Education?

Wals and Jickling view the complexity and multiple perspectives of sustainability as positive opportunities to grapple with its meanings and impacts on every aspect of universities, values, practices, pedagogies, resources and resource allocation and how they relate to the community,²³ as does McNamara.²⁴ One exemplar is US anthropologist Peggy Barlett’s work, based on a staff development program designed to help academics/faculty incorporate sustainability principles into their curricula. She argues for combining re-enchantment with reason to create a “stereoscopic paradigm that will help us to think, in Rappaport’s terms, on “*behalf*” of the world, not just “*about*” it”.²⁵ *Avatar*’s Dr Augustine illustrates this difference since she is intelligent and conscientious, but can only talk *about* the world. By adopting Quaritch’s language and framing of the world, she serves that world, and thus cannot connect to others, to herself or across different “knowings”. She thinks that acquiring more knowledge about the Na’avi will provide solutions. However, fundamental changes are more likely to come when we hear people “speak differently”, offering a new language to create a different consciousness.²⁶

This speaking differently may be why some academics find “re-enchantment” so threatening. Colonel Quaritch’s visceral rejection of Na’avi spirituality and reverence for nature came to mind when I read recent papers condemning Barlett’s work and identifying concerns about sustainability in higher education.^{27,28,29} Wimberley is concerned that embedding David Orr’s “radical” sustainability into the curriculum has led to a loss of pluralism and that those teaching it act like “high priests and prophets rather than dispassionate academics”.³⁰ I agree with his point that all ideas, even the “most disagreeable and offensive”, should be open to debate and analysis and that: “If education is to remain a liberating force within society it is

imperative that we disallow any one value or philosophy from taking other competing values and philosophies hostage”.³¹

However, his criticisms could equally apply to the way corporatisation has driven university thinking and curricula since the 1980s. Sanderson and Watters view this through a Competing Values Framework based on four quadrants, each representing outcomes and the ways they are achieved.³² Moving too far in any one quadrant can affect the effectiveness of an organisation’s functioning. They argue that universities have moved from a “corporate collegial model” towards a “corporate-managerial model” which, at worst, operates like a “sweatshop” where:

... resources are taken away from core services such as teaching, learning, research and community service into operational areas that support the dominant culture, such as support services, management, administration and bureaucratic functions.³³

Wimberley’s criticisms of the sustainability program at his university were not backed by evidence. The work of these critics illustrates the tenor of “resistings” that may be met at any level when working in the area of attitude change. While calling for “dispassionate academics”, Wimberley uses an emotive mish-mash of religious labels to damn sustainability colleagues as “ecological missionaries”, “high priests and prophets” trying to “convert” “captive parishioners” to their “gospel of sustainability”.³⁴ McNamara’s research notes how resisters with power at high levels in the institution can “limit the success” of any initiative, particularly where it depends on individual change agents.³⁵

Most people accept the overwhelming scientific evidence that our current overuse of resources, anthropogenic global warming, combined with growing demands and increasing inequalities is straining the capacity of Earth’s natural systems to cope.

Wood links himself to the conservatives by welcoming what they call Climategate because it “has made global warming skepticism respectable”.³⁶ He regards “global warmingism” as “quasi-religious”, “cultic” and having produced “close-minded zealots”³⁷ whom he labels “sustainatopians”³⁸ and “sustainabullies”.³⁹ By linking sustainability with scepticism about climate change he reinforces the conservative message.⁴⁰ McKibben regards climate deniers as the true radicals, because their delaying tactics mean that “they will have helped prevent us from taking the steps we need to take while there’s still time”.⁴¹ Wood’s most damning assertion is that Barlett “promotes the idea that rational scientific approaches towards nature need to be pushed aside in favour of “reenchantment””.⁴² This is a dualistic view in which science and spirituality cannot coexist or be reconciled.

I read Barlett carefully. I found no evidence that she rejects or suggests “pushing aside” scientific views. Unlike her critics, she does not use the language of aggression or religion (perhaps in an effort to avoid such

criticism). Moreover, her work is evidence-based. Wimberley, by contrast, merely asserts that “a significant proportion of those who teach or have taught the course consider it to be of inferior quality”.⁴³

Barlett defines re-enchantment as a way of knowing that involves a sensory, affective engagement that includes dimensions of wonder and delight and embraces an identity that includes connections to other species and the earth’s living systems.⁴⁴ She suggests reconstructing these “as a legitimate part of our contemporary worldview”,⁴⁵ and she does use a different language from her critics. Her language is consistently conciliatory and cooperative: “recovery”, “reintegrate”, “support”, “combine”, “expand”, “augment”, “reinforce”. She suggests that using reason and re-enchantment could “strengthen both scholarship and the effectiveness of cultural change efforts”.⁴⁶

Futurist Marc Luyckx thinks many people all over the world are already in transition to transmodern thinking, which combines “intuition, spirituality and rational brainwork”, which could mean “keeping the best of modernity but going beyond it”.⁴⁷ Moreover, he suggests that 21st Century conflicts are likely to be between the premodern, modern, and transmodern worldviews *within* cultures and religions. Seen in this light, Colonel Quaritch, Dr Augustine and the critics represent aspects of the modern worldview, struggling with what can be seen as both premodern and transmodern. Quaritch is the mindless servant of a hierarchical system. The Na’avi are an obstacle to him fulfilling his job. Dr Augustine is a caricature of a scientist who has rejected her feelings for the appearance of “hard” objectivity. The critics of sustainability overtly fear a return to premodern oppressive certainties, and yet they use premodern certainty to condemn. The Na’avi have pre-modern aspects in their traditions and values, but females seem to share power and their highly developed neural communication networks indicate horizontal rather than strictly hierarchical decision-making. Cameron, as director, did not make the leap to the transmodern to see how relationships based on this highly developed communication network could make warfare emotionally impossible by enabling, for example, understanding, empathy and mutual respect at levels humans can barely imagine. Barlett hopes to contribute to reconciling science and humanistic values, a profound current problem. Senge encourages this “nondualistic” approach, asking “what if the spirit of inquiry, skepticism, and learning that undergirds science were connected to deep personal development?”.⁴⁸

Barlett’s research is based in professional staff development, my main area of work. One of the most rewarding aspects of that work is helping academics to reconcile their inner and outer worlds to find their own “voice” in writing. This can be a particular challenge for staff from scientific disciplines, who find it hard to use the first person and to move from the passive voice, which they associate with objectivity, to a more active style. Another challenge is to help them use plain English, rather than the jargon

(client-focused, market-ready) most have developed in order to succeed (sorry, *move forward as part of an outcomes-focused, industry-relevant approach*) in a corporatised university.

Dutch educator Karel Mulder warns that if we neglect norms and values, we are taking the implicit norms of our society for granted.⁴⁹ Wimberley is correct in asserting that effective changes do call for a “profound social change tantamount to an ecological cultural revolution”.⁵⁰ The antagonism towards those working for sustainability in higher education reminds me of responses to feminism, encapsulated in Rebecca West’s quip that “people call me a feminist if I do anything that differentiates me from a doormat or a prostitute”.⁵¹ Even the World Economic Forum has called for mindset shifts to create a “moral economy”.⁵² We know that business-as-usual isn’t a preferable or even a probable future, so the privileged of the world, particularly, must engage with alternatives. It seems that, as with feminism, one can teach *about* sustainability, as long as it doesn’t change anything.

Business Unusual Futures

Higher education, like “every force in our society is trained to want more growth”.⁵³ Emerging alternatives to growth as a guiding principle include “sufficiency”⁵⁴ and “healing”⁵⁵—if we have the time. James Lovelock warned that without rapid changes we may be reduced to small “lifeboat” regions where humanity *might* survive.⁵⁶ Gleeson urges survival values of “restraint, sacrifice and solidarity” as the basis of new national and international politics. Democratic governments would make hard, long-term decisions based on “decisiveness and equity”⁵⁷ as an alternative to short-term expediency. Bill McKibben renames the “tough new planet” ahead “Eaarth” and offers a framework for changing our habits in order to live “lightly, gracefully, carefully”.⁵⁸ Developing Barlett’s stereoscopic vision could result in increased awareness and willingness to take appropriate actions.⁵⁹ This should avoid the “shadow fundamentalist” potential of “dark green religion”.⁶⁰ Inayatullah urges engaging with other world views by listening with empathy, not retreating from basic values such as gender equality but “expanding them”.⁶¹ Re-enchantment involves expanding our capacity to feel beyond ourselves, our family, our nation or religion, or even humanity.⁶² This includes the “feeling with” that Jake Sully finally understood about the animals he killed on Pandora.

Conclusion

Higher education will have to contribute to such cultural change across all disciplines, even though academics are regarded as difficult to engage.⁶³ My work with engineering students shows that with scaffolded support, most students take up opportunities to challenge their assumptions about themselves, sustainability and their chosen profession.⁶⁴

The problem with the Colonel Quaritchs of any world is twofold: it is their certainty that they are right, coupled with the power and opportunities they have to push their views, which they have *because* they support the status quo. They not only make it difficult to develop respectful dialogue or mutual learning, they encourage the opposite. Thus there is no win-win solution in *Avatar*. Sully and the other scientists reject Earth in favour of Pandora. Quaritch is killed and the remaining Sky People only leave because they are beaten militarily. The seeming culture shock of some critics may lie in the fact that Sully rejects business-as-usual. He could have saved himself, using the “greed is good”, “what’s in it for me?” approach, but he rejects it in favour of “we’re in this together”. Jake models how we can change our founding myths and “speak differently”. His avatar mimics the original Sanskrit *avatar*, the god Vishnu’s assumption of one form or another when he descends to Earth to rescue or to impart wisdom, although Jake had to *leave* the Earth in order to gain it. This is the Hope I perceived. Jake’s avatar models transformation into his reintegrated, ideal self. With new attitudes and behaviours, each of us has the potential to save the Earth. Integrating feeling and rationality might also nurture the imagination we need to find equitable alternatives to the business-as-usual approach, which, as *Avatar* shows, is leading us to a dead end.

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III

CONFLICT, PEACE AND SECURITY

13. Defeating the Taliban: One joke at a time

Sohail Inayatullah*

Focusing on the use of narrative and reframing in strategy, in this chapter it is argued that defeating the Taliban should not be through military force but a deeper communication strategy focused on de-legitimatisation through humour. From the deepest layer of CLA, systemic suggestions for strategy are offered.

Throwing Shoes at the President

While more than an American electoral cycle away, it is still relevant to note that among the many reasons for the Republican loss in the 2008 election was the ridicule poured on former President George W. Bush. Whether by Jon Stewart's *The Daily Show*¹ or Will Ferrell's impersonations,² few could see Bush in a serious light any longer. He had become a comic figure, even tragic, such that a journalist in Iraq could consider throwing his shoe at him. The "most powerful person on the planet" story had been transformed into "inept leader".

In the May issue of *Time Magazine*, Michael Grunwald reflects on the future of the Republican Party and asks, "Is the party over?"³ Who can take them seriously, he argues, when some of their leaders believe the Earth is cooling? The mockery began, says Grunwald, when GOP leaders, to counter President Obama's budget figures, released their own. Unfortunately, they did not provide any numbers, data, in their budget. And, more recently, after Tea Party leader Michele Bachmann's claim that these are biblical times, like the days of Noah,⁴ legitimacy has become an issue. While the GOP may be able to shut down the government, they are unable to respond to data that citizens see the Republican controlled Congress as "worse" than toenail fungus or cockroaches.⁵ Even with congressional votes, real-politics, their ability to define the overall agenda has slipped dramatically.

In Australia, more than an electoral cycle ago, Kevin Rudd used reframing through mockery to unseat then Prime Minister John Howard. Instead of

* This chapter originally appeared in *Pragati: The Indian National Interest Review*, No 28, July 2009, 24-25. It was also published as 'Mockery may unmask the Taliban', in *The Australian Financial Review*, 31 July, 2009, 2 and the *Journal of Futures Studies*, Vol 14, No 1, 2009, 95-102.

debating policy, which he understood would turn off the Australian public—making the Labor Party look overly intellectual—he focused on constructing Howard as out of touch, and indeed dangerous for Australia's future. When asked about Howard, Rudd remarked, “He used to be captain average, now he is just an extremist”.⁶ The damage was done; Rudd could now move to a serious discussion of policy differences. But first he had to reframe the debate. In the recent 2013 election, however, he failed in this effort. He constructed himself as “New Labor” but citizens remembered that there was nothing new about Rudd, he was part of the politics of division that had beset the party for the past few years.

Talibanisation

Far, far away from Washington and from Canberra, in another land, there is not much to laugh about—electricity outages and an unending war against the Taliban sap any sense of hope for the future. However, Pakistanis do not wish to fight their own; they especially do not wish to fight fellow Muslims, even as evidence of Taliban atrocities mounts daily. The Taliban, some believe, are pure, virtuous, fighting the good fight. And when evidence to the contrary is given, most Pakistanis assume the ubiquitous “foreign hand” theory: it must be the Indians; we are innocent, they seek to destabilise us. The basic tenet of social science—correlation is not causation—is forgotten; perhaps having never been learned. Moreover, the strategic discourse of seeing all reality as conspiracy-based—hidden motives, agents, and governments secretly trying to defeat each other—dominates. Acting in ways that lead to a better society, better health outcomes, increased prosperity, greater community, is a mirage. South Asian history from the Aryan invasion to Partition has been brutal. Thus it *must* be them. It cannot be us, given the need to ensure that there are more of “us” than “them”, even if “us” includes the Taliban and its barbarism.

Creating change in a cynical population will not result from mere financial promises, since that is what citizens believe governments do to placate them. And if the money—in the form of schools, roads and water projects—is delivered, more money continues to create a feudal dependency relationship, though instead of a feudal lord the people are now ruled by the Islamabad government—a classic child/parent bonding pattern (earlier it was with the British). Dependency relationships do not create long-term economic development or innovation, and certainly not enhanced equity.

Fighting and defeating the Taliban militarily is unlikely as well. They are not trained in classical war—military formations with clear command and control by a governmental hierarchy and bureaucracy with the goal of holding territory. Rather, their training is in guerrilla tactics. Moreover, along with Al-Qaeda, they lead globally in organisational innovation. Their organisational structure is more viral and mobile than fixed. By being peer-to-peer, with some degree of command and control they can quickly morph,

being highly agile and flexible. They also have ideology on their side, believing that they are destined to win. Finally, they are fighting in their own territory.

Sri Lanka's recent military success in defeating the LTTE should not be considered a hopeful sign for Pakistan. Sri Lanka succeeded because the Tamil Tigers had nowhere to hide. The Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan has many places to hide, in the mountains and in households. Furthermore, the Sri Lankan government chose not to worry about civilian casualties, whereas Pakistan and NATO concern themselves with every civilian death.* Finally, the Tigers lost as they moved from being a guerrilla army to a would-be conventional nation-state holding territory. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda are unlikely to be able to hold any territory, but they are able to hold Pakistan, and indeed the entire world, to ransom.

Asabiya

Ibn Khaldun,⁷ 14th Century founder of sociology, wrote that it is *asabiya*, or unity gained through struggle, that forms the glue of long-term successful governance. Away from the corrupt cities, the Bedouins toil in the desert or mountains fighting the harsh elements. This struggle creates an ideological community, a profound solidarity. They become brothers in war. And religion adds the final aspect to *asabiya*.⁸ The Bedouins become an unstoppable force, knocking at the doors of civilisation, unable to build but certainly able to destroy.

With *asabiya* on the side of the Taliban, what hope does NATO have of defeating them in Afghanistan or in Pakistan?

And yet this is what was said about General/President Zia-ul-Haq: that he would rule forever. He governed Pakistan with an iron fist, was the true father of the Mujahedeen who fought and defeated the Soviet Union, of whom the Taliban are the “bastard children” (and like all those ignored, they desperately seek attention).[†] Most did believe that the General would last forever. Yet there was one writer, Syed Abidi, who argued that one way to judge if a regime is about to fall is to listen and observe how the masses talk about their leaders. He argued that ridicule was one indicator that a regime

* NATO answers to its constituent governments and the citizens who elect them not to mention the world press. Pakistan must answer to its citizens. Collateral damage only convinces most Pakistanis that this is not their fight but an American and European one.

† A Jungian reading is obvious. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are the disowned selves of the modernists. As they sought to shed religious history and join the linearity of secular progress, leaving behind religion, the disowned part has come back, as it tends to, and in pathological forms. For more on this, see H. Stone & S. Stone, *Embracing Our Selves*, Novato, California, New World, 1989.

was on its way out.⁹ Before Zia's death in a mysterious plane crash, Abidi, in his field work, encountered the following jokes.

In the first, President Zia is in Paris for a conference where he sees a Pakistani woman dressed in Parisian attire. He asks one of his men to tell her that the President wants to see her. At the hotel, the President invites her to his room where he chastises her for wearing foreign clothes. He tells her to take off her French coat. She does. "As a Muslim woman, how dare you wear a skirt? Take it off", he says. She does. "Don't you know about Islamisation in Pakistan, how you dare wear such frilly underclothes. Take them off". She does and stands there naked in front of the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. "Now come embrace Islam", he says with his arms outstretched.¹⁰

Clearly the supposed purity of President Zia-ul-Haq was being questioned. The citizenry understood that he was buttressing the Islamic right wing so that he could stay in power.¹¹

In another telling popular joke from the 1980s, both the Ayatollah Khomeini and General Zia have an audience with Allah, each being allowed one question. Khomeini asks if the Islamic revolution in Iran will be successful. "Not in your lifetime", responds Allah. "And in Pakistan", asks General Zia. "Not in My lifetime", says Allah.

Everyone knew General Zia's Islam was a sham, a strategy. Not so with the Taliban. They appear to be above mockery. Perhaps it is time to use humour to dislodge their claim to purity, their claim to be God's warriors? Richard Holbrooke commented that beyond killing there was an important battle of communication. As he says: "The Taliban have unrestricted, unchallenged access to the radio, which is the main means of communication in an area where literacy is around 10 percent for men and less than five percent for women".¹² Also, in praise of Osama Bin Laden, Holbrooke rightly argued that, while for the West caves are primitive places, for Muslims, they are often associated with miracles.¹³ The Western worldview, argues Holbrooke, was unable to understand the images and metaphors Bin Laden used. Crucial, he argued, was a strategy, and funding, to counter Taliban communication supremacy. But what should be broadcast?

Learning from Defeating the KKK

The answer to this question of broadcasting content comes from Steven Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner in their *Freakonomics*. Levitt and Dubner demonstrate how mockery became the decisive tool in defeating the rise of the KKK after World War II. Intending to defeat bigotry, one citizen, Stetson Kennedy, decided that he could de-legitimise the KKK. It was exposure to the Klan at an early age that helped him make his ideological decision. His family's maid, "who had pretty much raised Stetson, was tied to a tree,

beaten, and raped by a gang of Klansmen. Her offense: talking back to a white trolley driver who had short-changed her”.¹⁴

This is a lesson the Taliban have learned well in South Asia—do not tolerate any challenge to authority, especially by females (and thus the attacks on Malala Yousafzai).¹⁵ Stetson infiltrated the Klan and learned about their success. First, lynching worked because this threat kept the black population in fear; the Taliban have used a similar strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, most recently in Swat. Once Stetson had figured out the culture of the Klan—code-words, rules, acceptable and unacceptable behaviour—he embarked on a mission to expose them. He first tried to expose their financial base. Then he would tip off police leaders of Klan activities. But ultimately Stetson, write Levitt and Dubner, felt as if these actions were merely throwing pebbles at a giant. Finally a new idea came to him, he chanced upon the *Superman* radio show: he passed on all of his secret information (on handshakes, what they called the Klan Bible—the Kloran, interestingly enough) to the producers, who had Superman take on the Klan.

Writes Levitt:

One Klan member coming home from a meeting saw his young kids playing in the street. When he asked them what they were doing, he said they were playing a new type of game, like cops and robbers but called, Superman against the Klan. He said: “they knew all our secret passwords and everything... I never felt so ridiculous in all my life”. Historians now consider the work of Kennedy as the “single most important factor in preventing a postwar revival of the KKK in the North”.¹⁶

While having some short-term military success, the NATO/US tactic of using drones to kill Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders positions Americans as cowards. Write Bobby Ghosh and Mark Thompson in their article, ‘The CIA’s silent war in Pakistan’:

Ordinary Pakistanis... remain unconvinced that the [drone] campaign serves Pakistan’s interests. The drones feature in anti-US and anti-Zardari graffiti and cartoons, and are the punch line of popular jokes about American impotence or cowardice: Asked why she’s ditching her US boyfriend, a Pakistani woman says, “He shoots his missile from 30, 000 ft”.¹⁷

The Way Forward

While humour* and mockery must be a central tenet of any long-term strategy for those who wish to defeat the Taliban, the ways forward in

* For an excellent example, see: Radha_reddy, Taliban Democracy (Satire), retrieved 6 November, 2013, from http://creative.sulekha.com/taliban-democracy-satire_431764_blog.

Pakistan and Afghanistan are, of course, multiple. Within the CLA model, systemic and worldview/metaphorical strategies are required.*

First, protect those who are willing to stand up to the Taliban. The Taliban fight back with weapons and threats to producers and directors who create inappropriate television shows.¹⁸

Second, turn those who are killed, such as the journalist MosaKhankhel of Geo TV, into heroes.¹⁹ Tell a different story of heroism, as the world is currently doing with Malala.

Third, develop radio shows, TV shows, cartoons that show the Taliban not as courageous heroes fighting for the nation, but as those bankrupting the nation, driving away investment, taking away jobs, removing the ability of women and children to learn—driving Pakistan into poverty just as the same time India rises to world stature. “Does Pakistan wish to be the beggar, while India becomes the feudal lord”, is the scenario that needs to be presented. Certainly the efforts of Younis Butt are impressive. As he says: “We should fight terrorism with humour”, and he does so through his television programs.²⁰

Fourth, over time, once this has worked, then the Taliban’s atrocities can be shown. Says Supreme Court Advocate Aitzaz Ahsan, “the whole nation needs to see... the floggings, the digging up of the graves of our saints, the burning of our girls’ schools”.²¹ However, if images of their atrocities are shown first, then cognitive dissonance will result, and the population will see it as Pakistan government, US or Indian propaganda.

Fifth, create an understanding of social science,[†] that is, challenge the world of conspiracy theories with basic knowledge of causality, validity, and reliability but, more importantly, go to a root understanding of conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories are created by the powerless, those who feel overwhelmed by processes they cannot understand, that they do not have the tools to understand.

Sixth, continue to support democracy, and not just at political levels but at economic levels too—micro credit and cooperatives, for example.

* In Australia, the work of Nazeem Hussain is remarkable. In his weekly television show, he mocks dominant modes of representation in Australia, and even succeeds in making jihad funny (where he pretends he is a stand-up comedian at the Al-Qaeda comedy club—the jokes obviously do not go over well). W. Aly, ‘Legally Brown: Muslim comedian finds the funny in radical, be it jihadists or bogans’, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 24 September, 2013; see: <http://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/box-seat/legally-brown-muslim-comedian-finds-the-funny-in-radical-be-it-jihadists-or-bogans-20130924-2uavt.html>.

† See the Council of Social Sciences in Pakistan: <http://cosspak.org/>. Retrieved 23 May, 2009.

Remember: it is illiteracy and unmet expectations (poverty in one area, incredible wealth in another) that create recruiting grounds for the Taliban.

Seventh, frame the debate within the terms of the syncretism of Pakistani Islam. Currently, the Taliban and other extremists create the framework; they use their myths and metaphors to define reality.* As physicist Pervez Hoodbhoy, argues, “Many fear that to be seen protesting against the extremists would be seen as protesting against Islam”.²² As long as the Taliban control the framework, other measures will fail since Muslim Pakistanis do not, in general, wish to fight against other Muslims. Within the conspiracy framework, the Taliban need to be constructed as outsiders. But over time, this will stop working, since the self-other division leads to long-lasting problems of identity. Other frameworks are required. Currently, the strategy is to see the Taliban as anti-national. This may be enough but most likely language from Islamic history will be required. Stories of other Islamic groups who stopped the rise of extremism through Islam need to be told. And, beyond this, the state needs to show and demonstrate that it is pro-Islam, pro-Pakistan, anti-Taliban and neutral towards the West.

Eighth, military action should be, and this is crucial and controversial, led by a woman. There is considerable Islamic history that tells stories of the valour of women. Fatima Mernissi's *The Forgotten Queens of Islam*²³ stands out. Mernissi starts with Benazir Bhutto and then goes backward in time, telling us of the heroism of, for example, Sultana Radiyya (Delhi, 1236) and of Shajarat al-Durr (Egypt, 1251). More recently there was Malalai, an Afghan woman who led soldiers into battle in the second Anglo-Afghan war.²⁴ An all-women's army would be better, but that is unlikely. In either case, a woman general would challenge, at a profound level, the Taliban's disowning of gender. And every skirmish, every battle won would dishonour the Taliban amongst the tribes. They would not be able to epistemologically survive. Once epistemology is challenged then ontology is possible.

One Joke, One Frame at a Time

The Taliban will disappear when they have been de-legitimised. This will not happen through war but by reframing this battle, taking back the terms of the debate, moving from extremist to syncretic Islam. Humour can be an outstanding strategy in communicating that the Taliban's vision of the future is not in the interests of 99% of Pakistanis, nor of the world. Being mocked is what the Taliban are deathly afraid of (not of death). As religious warriors

* For this approach to strategy, see S. Inayatullah (ed.), *The Causal Layered Analysis Reader: An Integrative and Transformative Method*, Tamsui, Tamkang University Press, 2004; and ‘Research on causal layered analysis (CLA)’, retrieved 6 November, 2013, from <http://www.metafuture.org/causal-layered-analysis-papers.html>. For a similar approach, see G. Lakoff, *Don't Think of an Elephant*, Melbourne, Scribe, 2004.

they wish to be respected, seen as strong and as virtuous, brave in the face of every obstacle. Killing children is not brave. A new story has to be told.*

Acknowledgment

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- ¹ Comedy Central, 'The Daily Show', retrieved 22 May, 2009, from: <http://www.thedailyshow.com/>.
- ² The Daily Show, 'George Bush on global warming— Spoof by Will Ferrell', retrieved 22 May, 2009, from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jOjfxEejS2Y>.
- ³ M. Grunwald, 'Is the party over?', *Time*, 18 May, 2009, 18–23.
- ⁴ Huffington Post, 'Michele Bachmann: Obama 'funding' terrorists is proof that we're living in the end times', retrieved 6 November, 2013, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/07/michele-bachmann-end-times_n_4060063.html.
- ⁵ C. Hiaasen, 'What's even worse than toe fungus? Read on. . .', retrieved 6 November, 2013, from <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Whats-even-worse-than-toe-fungus-Read-on--30217707.html>.
- ⁶ P. Coorey & P. Hartcher, 'Howard v Rudd: The war of ideas', retrieved 8 February, 2014, from: <http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/howard-v-rudd--the-war-of-ideas/2006/12/08/1165081157079.html?page=3>.
- ⁷ I. Khaldun (F. Rosenthal trans., N. J. Dawood, ed.), *The Muqaddimah*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1967.
- ⁸ J. Galtung & S. Inayatullah, *Macrohistory and Macrohistorians*, Westport, CT, Praeger, 1987.
- ⁹ S. Abidi, 'Social change and the politics of religion in Pakistan', Doctoral Dissertation, Honolulu, University of Hawaii, Department of Political Science, 1988.
- ¹⁰ S. Inayatullah, 'Mullahs, sex, and bureaucrats: Pakistan's confrontations with the modern world', in D. Petraglia-Bahri & M. Vasudeva (eds.), *Between the Lines: South Asians In/On Postcoloniality*, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1996, 125.
- ¹¹ S. Abidi, op. cit.
- ¹² P. Eckert, 'Information war key to USA Pakistan strategy: envoy', retrieved 13 May, 2009, from http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20090512/pl_nm/us_pakistan_usa_envoy_1.
- ¹³ M. Jones & P. Silberzahn, 'What a caveman can teach you about strategy', retrieved 6 November, 2013, from <http://www.forbes.com/sites/silberzahnjones/2012/09/04/what-a-caveman-can-teach-you-about-strategy/>.

* As a brilliant resource of old stories, see A. Ahmad & R. Boase, *Pashtun Tales from the Pakistan-Afghan Frontier*, London, Saqi Books, 2009.

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- ¹⁴ S. Levitt and S. J. Dubner, *Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side to Everything*, London, Alan Lane, 2005.
- ¹⁵ *The Express Tribune*, 'Taliban says its attack on Malala justified', retrieved 6 November, 2013, from <http://tribune.com.pk/story/452331/taliban-says-its-attack-on-malala-justified/>.
- ¹⁶ S. Levitt and S. J. Dubner (2005), op. cit., 65.
- ¹⁷ B. Ghosh & M. Thompson, 'The CIA's silent war in Pakistan', *Time*, 1 June, 2009, 22; not to mention the jihadi recruits the Taliban gains from every strike gone wrong.
- ¹⁸ R. Siding, 'Taliban's sense of humour fails TV test', retrieved 6 November, 2013, from: http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=102x911942.
- ¹⁹ Z. Bazrawi, 'Journalist killed in Taliban region', retrieved 20 May, 2009, from www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/02/18/pakistan.journalist/index.html?eref=time_world.
- ²⁰ C. McDonald-Gibson, 'Pakistan comedians fight Taliban with humour', retrieved 6 November, 2013, from http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iJI_CexWu94aMJCSnPjMnOFg31MA.
- ²¹ A. Baker, 'The nation that failed itself', *Time*, 25 May, 2009, 17.
- ²² A. Baker, op. cit., 14–17.
- ²³ F. Mernissi, *The Forgotten Queens of Islam*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003.
- ²⁴ G. Ewing, 'The second Anglo-Afghan War 1878–1880: Malalai: Afghan heroine of Maiwand', retrieved 15 February, 2014, from <http://www.garenewing.co.uk/angloafghanwar/biography/malalai.php>.

14. Transforming Global Governance

Anita Sykes-Kelleher*

Using CLA to discuss global governance, this chapter compares and contrasts two distinct images of a reformed United Nations (UN): Assertive Multilateralism, the preferred future model of the Commission on Global Governance (CGG) and Ubuntuism, a model constructed from the views of twenty-five international delegations participating in the General Assembly of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO).†

Introduction

Governance of human society throughout history is fundamentally a social phenomenon. Society gives itself identity, decides how it will manage itself and make its decisions, establishes rules and, in recent times, institutions to enact its will. Over the millennia societies have risen and fallen. Conflicts between and within societies, environmental collapses, and natural disasters have changed the physical and geopolitical landscapes over time. Yet it seems that, almost inexorably, societies reform into larger groupings. Planetary civilisation is therefore considered to be a process of becoming: a complex emergent entity in a long history of rearranged interdependence, conflict, network creation and development.

Scholarly literature suggests that a system of global governance is needed to address global issues that are beyond the capability of individual nations, to handle the common affairs of an emerging planetary civilisation, and to manage the effects of neo-liberal globalisation.¹ However, research in the field of global governance has been dominated by Western civilisational images, thinking, institutions, and perceptions of the most urgent issues facing the world including, for example, the reports of the CGG,² publications by Evans et al.,³ Falk,⁴ Held,⁵ and Huntington.⁶ To date, researchers do not appear to have considered the diversity of views envisaged by the CGG in 1995 when they announced that the people of the world have more opportunity than ever before to have a say in how the

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world's affairs are managed. Nor have researchers, or many governance institutions, provided the means by which the people of the world might take that opportunity. Consequently, what is missing from the global governance futures conversation is an opportunity to hear what the voiceless, the marginalised, the excluded and the victims have to say. This chapter takes a step towards redressing the balance and gives equal weight to the previously unheard voices, placing their preferred future alongside that of the CGG: Assertive Multilateralism.

Understanding the UN through Layered Analysis

In this section I use CLA to better understand how and why the UN-centric global governance system was created, and the prevailing worldviews, discourses, metaphors and myths that are maintaining the system. The Litany provides a synopsis of the current system's history, as well as how it measures its success as a global governance system, and discusses the changing perceptions of UN effectiveness. At the systemic level, I discuss the dominant political and economic systems and the social causes that led to them becoming privileged over other systems. A deeper level of analysis reveals the worldview and prominent discourse that continues to shape the way the system and structure are organised. Finally the more subliminal drivers of metaphor and myth are explored. Table 1, below, maps the discussion that follows in this section and is used for comparative analysis later in the chapter.

Table 1. CLA of the current global governance system

LITANY	Measures of progress: number of member States Perceptions of UN effectiveness Official history: Westphalia, League of Nations, Bretton Woods, UN
SYSTEMS AND SOCIAL CAUSES	Political and economic systems dominate Need to create wealth and peace after major conflicts
WORLDVIEW AND DISCOURSE	Dominator, power shared amongst the already powerful Control versus freedom
METAPHORS AND MYTHS	The Queen Mary—exclusive cruise ship—limited places at the Captain's table Man controls all. Government knows best. West and the rest

The litany

The evidence of the success of the UN system is the number of eligible member States, 193 of 194, participating in its General Assembly. Yet increasingly the effectiveness of the UN is being questioned in the media, in

international relations literature, and by the UN leadership itself. The official history of the UN is reviewed at this level of CLA.

According to Falk, the antecedents of today's global governance arrangements are the Treaty of Westphalia, the League of Nations, and the Bretton Woods and UN organisations.⁷ The Treaty of Westphalia was signed to end the 30 Years War in Europe in the 17th Century with a view to securing peace and prosperity for its signatories. It established a new system of international relations based on a set of agreed principles that remain largely unchallenged to this day. Falk lists these as:

- The primacy of the territorial State as political actor on a global level,
- The centrality of international warfare,
- The autonomy of the sovereign State to govern affairs within recognised international boundaries,
- The generalised tolerance of human wrongs committed within the scope of sovereign authority,
- The special leadership role in geopolitics claimed by and assigned to leading States, and
- The absence of strong institutions of regional and global governance.⁸

Framed within these principles, the League of Nations was formed in 1920 after World War I with the aim of fostering international cooperation to achieve peace. However, the ideal of cooperation was ultimately undermined by “the more enduring methods based upon force, rearmament, and the old diplomacy”.⁹ The failure of the Disarmament Conference in 1934 was the final incident that led to the League's eventual disbandment in 1946.¹⁰

The UN and Bretton Woods organisations were the next development in the history of global governance systems. The UN was formed in 1945 to replace the League of Nations and many of the League's aims and policies were transferred to the UN at this time. The social and financial impacts of World War II encouraged more nations to join an international cooperative effort working for peace, state security and economic development. Financial crises experienced in the period between World War I and World War II were the catalysts for the 1944 UN Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods in the US for the purpose of creating a new international monetary system at the end of the war. During the conference, participants developed a framework for international economic institutions and signed agreements that set in motion the eventual formation of the World Bank, IMF, the International Trade Organisation, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).¹¹

Over the past two decades, these entities have come under increasing scrutiny and criticism. The present structures of political and economic institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the G7 and GATT are viewed

by social movements in particular as underpinning the wealth of the global North and serving the interests of trans-national corporations, banks and investment firms.¹² Galtung believes that in order to achieve a globalisation that supports life in dignity for all, vast civil society movements are needed that can stand up to the IMF, WTO and World Bank.¹³ The political system at the heart of the UN has also been found wanting, with allegations being made of bribery and corruption in decision-making processes. The process itself currently permits decisions with global implications to be made by a few powerful nations with little consideration of the perspectives of the less powerful. Should the latter prevail, the right of veto has been bestowed on the powerful few, allowing them to block what they consider to be unfavourable decisions.¹⁴ In 2003, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan publicly declared that the UN needed to be restructured in order to re-establish credibility and legitimacy on the world stage.¹⁵ However, despite Annan's considerable efforts to drive the proposed reforms, including changes in the permanent membership of the Security Council, the creation of opportunities for non-State actors to participate, and the need for an emergency UN peacekeeping force capable of intervening in States where natural catastrophes and international humanitarian concerns warrant intervention, Annan could not overcome the resistance to change from within.¹⁶

The involvement of non-State actors at the UN has a historical precedent in civil society's involvement in the 1940s UN meetings, when NGO representatives contributed to the drafting of the UN charter.¹⁷ If precedent is followed, the inclusion of civil society could see the pendulum of population power swing towards nations currently excluded from the General Assembly (UNGA). However, a successful program to engage civil society groups in the 1990s as active yet informal participants in UN conferences on issues such as the "environment, human rights, women, population and social wellbeing", was perceived by some as a threat to the States-based system and "no further global conferences on high-profile issues of interest to civil society have been held or scheduled".¹⁸

Regarding Annan's proposed emergency peacekeeping force, events such as natural disasters and internal conflicts are categorised as domestic issues in the current UN-centric system that upholds the Westphalian policy of non-interference in domestic affairs.¹⁹ A peacekeeping force needs the permission of the relevant State authority to enter its territory, or approval from the UN Security Council. Insofar as UN led and sanctioned State interventions are concerned, exceptions to the policy of non-interference are rarely made. Approved interventions have been for humanitarian purposes where the intent is to address large-scale violations of human rights. Even then the intervention must be authorised by the Security Council after a lengthy application process and careful deliberation.²⁰ However, delay in humanitarian intervention resulted in significant loss of life in Bosnia,

Kosovo, and Rwanda.²¹ Following a review of the management of international crises, Annan released a statement acknowledging that the UN recognised:

the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorising military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide or other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violation of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.²²

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) strategy was launched by Annan at the UN World Summit in 2005.²³ Implementation of the R2P strategy was debated at the UNGA in 2009 amid delegates' concerns that R2P would increase the dominance of the Security Council's elite five permanent member nations.²⁴ To date there is no indication that the Security Council members are willing to extend their membership or to renounce the veto. For Falk, proposals suggesting that R2P can be introduced without changing the status of Security Council members and without UN institutional support are naïve:

The only way that the Security Council could be meaningfully empowered to implement the suggested supervision over extended claims of self-defence is to deny the availability of the veto to permanent members, but the issue is so delicate that it is not even mentioned, much less creatively addressed.²⁵

In such a highly contested politically and economically dominated arena it is challenging for the UNPO to be heard.

Systems and social causes

Underpinning the current UN-centric global governance arrangements are two dominant systems: political and economic. Each historical attempt at global governance emerged as a States-based attempt to secure international peace through cooperation after a major conflict. The Westphalian system was developed after the 30 Years War; the League of Nations and Bretton Woods systems were created after World War I and the financial crises that occurred before World War II; and the UN was formed almost immediately after World War II as a result of the failure of the League of Nations to prevent war. When the UN was established, States were dominant powers and many believed in the ability of governments to protect them and improve their lives. States were focused on preventing another world war and another global economic depression; consequently the “establishment of international, intergovernmental institutions to ensure peace and prosperity was a welcome development”.²⁶ However, the result of many of the past victors of wars being rewarded with sovereign rights over their conquests is that we now have “2,000 nations in 200 countries”.²⁷ It is these “200”

countries or States that are entitled to membership of the UNGA and legitimacy in the UN system; the remaining 1800 nations are not formally recognised and therefore have little or no access to the forums in which decisions are made that affect their futures. Yet the definition of global governance provided by the UN-sanctioned CGG accommodates a broader range of perspectives than is currently admitted to UN decision-making forums:

Global governance is effective global decision-making [that] needs to employ the skills and resources of a diversity of people and institutions at many levels [in a] continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken.²⁸

Cavanagh and Mander are critical in their appraisal of the Bretton Woods institutions stating that they are “bringing about the most fundamental redesign of the planet’s social, economic, and political arrangement since the Industrial Revolution”.²⁹ The global governance systems to date can therefore be summarised as being politically and economically focused whilst upholding the principles of the Treaty of Westphalia.

Worldview and discourses

The Treaty of Westphalia effectively set the scene for the next 350 years of developments in international relations. It established an elitist structure awarding leadership of the system to nations who were the victors of conflicts and rewarding them with territory.³⁰ This dominator worldview, where power is shared amongst the already powerful, continued throughout the formation of the League of Nations and is in evidence today in the power of veto accorded to five “leading States” in the UN Security Council: the US, the UK, France, Italy, and Japan. According to Falk, the UN has been unable to adjust to changes in its operating environment since it was formed in 1945, particularly changes associated with globalisation. It has been “stuck in the Westphalian paradigm that fit global realities reasonably well” in that era.³¹

The most prominent discursive thread running through the global governance literature is control versus freedom. This thread is suggestive of people questioning how a global governance system might deal with intractable problems within States, such as conflicts, abuses of human rights, and genocides, in the context of the Westphalian agreement of non-interference in recognised sovereign territories. It encompasses such concerns as whether or not global ethics and norms can be established whilst respecting local values and customs; and whether issues such as water and food shortages can be managed across agreed territorial borders without creating conflict.

The language around global governance has also been called into question as the term “governance” is suggestive of power *over* rather than power *with* others. The many and varied definitions continue to emphasise economic and political power and domination,³² effectively promoting neo-liberal globalisation. In India, for example, the word “governance” is controversial for some due to its association with the Washington Consensus, and “good governance” is opposed because of its inherent neoliberal conditions.³³ If we are looking for a means by which the peoples of the world can contribute their knowledge and wisdom to addressing the global issues of the 21st Century, as suggested by the CGG, then it appears that a shift away from neoliberalism and the States-based system is required.

Metaphors and myths

Literature from the environmental and systems sciences metaphorically refers to our planet as “Spaceship Earth”.³⁴ In my view, an appropriate metaphor for the current system of global governance is the exclusive cruise ship, the Queen Mary. The “Spaceship Earth” metaphor has linguistic entailments such as “we’re all in it together” whereas the Queen Mary metaphor suggests there are limited places at the Captain’s table. Underpinning the Queen Mary cruise liner metaphor, I propose, are the myths that man controls all, government knows best, and “West and the rest”. These myths reflect the assumptions based on European history and scientific and evolutionary principles that Man (gender demarcation deliberate) is master of all he surveys and is superior to all other life forms, including women and children; that governments of States represent their nations and peoples and know what is best for them; and that European nations and their progeny, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, often referred to as “the West”, are superior to other nations and civilisations. In the next section I challenge these myths and assumptions by presenting the views of the UNPO and propose an alternative system.

The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples

The litany

In discussing the possibility of an emerging planetary civilisation, UNPO delegates look forward to a civilisation founded on social justice that promotes equality, solidarity, access to human rights, natural ecology rights, and a life of dignity for all. However they are concerned at current and potential inequalities in four broad areas. The first, that new levels of “haves and have nots” will be created if a planetary civilisation emerges. The second is related to information and communications technologies: some view these technologies as a way to raise issues, while for others technology is experienced as a means for “the oppressor” to assimilate minorities and as a potentially dehumanising instrument of globalisation. Thirdly, whilst acknowledging that everyone has the same human rights, there are

considerable inequalities in access to them. A particular emphasis was placed here on the need for women to be included and valued in decision-making forums. Finally, they are concerned at the unequal distribution of natural resources, ranging from food shortages and gluts to the exploitation of indigenous lands for the benefit of overseas business interests. Whilst the UNPO hopes for an egalitarian, future planetary society, some delegates are of the view that the human family might only learn how to live together in this way after a catastrophe.

Table 2. CLA of UNPOpreferred global governance future

LITANY	Issues: security, environment, social justice, inequality, identity, exclusion, neo-liberal globalisation. Cultural genocide Histories of unrepresented status: wars, 20 th Century decolonisation Measures of progress: Genuine Progress Indicators, indices of democracy, freedom and planetary well-being
SYSTEMS AND SOCIAL CAUSES	Interconnected systems and dominator societies. Prefer reformed UN. Democratic; egalitarian; power sharing. Authority decentralised to the local level. Symbiosis of nations. Heterarchy structure Power is in moral authority
WORLDVIEWS	Dominator, power shared amongst the already powerful Control versus freedom
DISCOURSES	Self-determination; solidarity; non-violence; equality; indigenous knowledges; love of nature. Progress is peace, unity of the human family and recognition of the 2,000 nations
METAPHOR AND MYTH	The world is a village. Symbiosis “One World”

The role of identity was raised in connection with planetary citizenship. Delegates were divided on this issue. Some thought this might be a unifying factor whilst others, still working towards recognition of their existing national identity, were concerned that they might lose ground. When some UNPO respondents discussed their unrepresented status, despite the varying circumstances that led to this situation, the responses were common: they are not allowed to use their name, their identity is ignored, many are living in exile from their homelands and they have no hope for their futures. As one delegate said of the situation that led to their unrepresented status “the people ceased to exist at that time; we ceased being”. UNPO delegates are not seeking independence from their State. Their focus, consistent with the UN Charter for Decolonisation,^{*} is on achieving recognition of their existence and a level of autonomy that would enable them to determine their futures in a way that facilitates peaceful coexistence with their neighbours.

^{*} See <http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml>.

A number of UNPO delegates expressed concern at the potential for a future globalisation to be a continuation of the recent past, in which many have been victims of corporations and governments. A few delegates provided examples, such as a government killing a generation of leaders for questioning environmental destruction, a corporation funding an army to get rid of people, and other corporations that have assisted with communications blackouts so that news of atrocities does not reach the rest of the world.

This led to the sharing of local stories as to how these nations came to be unrepresented; two common themes emerged: wars (used here to denote all armed conflicts) and decolonisation. Some nations were defeated in battle and subjected to military occupation, others were forced to surrender after being sprayed with chemicals, and another group was starved into submission. Many still live under constant threat of physical violence in the form of torture, forced disappearance, and execution. The term “cultural genocide” was used to describe deliberate attempts by the aggressors to erase all traces of a culture. Examples provided included the execution of teachers who taught traditional language and cultural practices, the burning of schools, banning and destruction of books and cultural artefacts, and the prohibition of spiritual and religious practices. A combination of physical and cultural violence over time is expected to eliminate a culture, thereby eliminating challenges to the dominant nation’s rule of the State and its own cultural norms. A few delegates discussed the effects of the UN-led Decolonisation Commission, which they consider to be incomplete and the cause of many of the conflicts in their regions.

For the UNPO progress towards an ideal global governance system will need to be measured across a broader range of indicators that address their concerns for health and wellbeing, environmental and social issues, and their continuing nonviolent struggles for self-determination and democratisation. I have suggested Genuine Progress Indicators,³⁵ and indices of democracy, freedom and planetary wellbeing as useful measures for determining whether or not their preferred global governance future is on track.

Systems and social causes

The issues of concern to UNPO have been produced by interconnected systems that span social, ecological, political, economic and technological domains. Consistent with indigenous and neohumanist epistemologies, UNPO understands this interconnectedness at the centre of which, in their experience, is the human relationship with the natural environment. One delegate proposed a future story in which all people “live in harmony with each other and nature around to know life as a form of education”.³⁶

The current system that excludes them from involvement in UN decision-making processes has been created and is maintained by dominator societies; “to the victor go the spoils”. The States have either acquired their constituent

nations by winning armed conflicts or by default during a decolonisation process. Almost all UNPO nations and peoples are dominated in States where violence has been used to overthrow the old order so that the new order can take control. In a few cases, one nation has been given to another as part of the decolonisation process, which, as UNPO argues, is contrary to the right of self-determination stated in the UN charter and to the agreed decolonisation process. A few delegates feel strongly that the UN is at the root of their problems, and are concerned at its perceived inability or lack of will to go into places where atrocities are being carried out, to enforce agreed treaties and to deal with abusers of human rights. Corporations and economic power dominate other UNPO members who would like to see these corporations held accountable by a global authority for their destruction of lands and forests and their pollution of water. A new economic system is seen as desirable, provided it is not a capitalist system.

Despite their disappointing history with the UN, when asked about future global governance organisations most UNPO members favour a reformed UN. Their ideal UN would admit non-state actors. It would be democratic in line with UNPO principles, egalitarian in the gender and cultural senses and would ensure power sharing. One participant proposed that structural reform accommodate a UN Parliamentary Assembly to ensure the direct representation of the people. Another envisaged that the future global governance organisation would start with decision-making through regional groupings and eventually become a “symbiosis of nations” working together to look after humanity’s common affairs.

In this new system decision-making would be decentralised to the local level enabling local leaders to contribute to and enact global decisions in a manner sensitive to the natural environment. Here I envisage the structure as heterarchical, similar to Deleuze and Guattari’s Rhizome in which:

any point is connected to any other point ... is reducible neither to the One or the multiple... has no beginning or end but a middle from which it grows... the Rhizome pertains to a map that is always... detachable, connectable, reversible, modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exits and its own lines of flight.³⁷

Regarding agency in the new system, however, the strongest meme that emerged was “cultural genocide” as discussed earlier. The term suggested a sense of powerlessness at odds with delegates’ determination to continue their struggles for life, freedom and access to their human rights, reflecting their lack of agency in the current system.

Worldviews and discourses

My analysis of UNPO texts revealed their ideological worldviews and values. The language revealed a strong foundation of indigenous and ecological epistemologies and the worldview of the excluded and the “non-

existent”, described by de Sousa Santos as a constructed product of neoliberal globalisation.³⁸ It also uncovered what I have termed “a worldview of Ubuntuism”, from the African spirit of Ubuntu, which epitomises the solidarity of the UNPO. Whereas Europeans are familiar with “I think therefore I am”, a highly individualistic statement, in Africa the spirit of Ubuntu says “I am because we are”, reflecting a collectivist character. This worldview produces a preferred globalisation and planetary civilisation that fosters unity of the world’s peoples and is a way to reduce conflicts.

Epistemologically, the UNPO values many ways of knowing, appreciating that no one form of knowledge has the monopoly of wisdom and that the collectivity of knowledges could have the answers to the world’s challenges. By way of example, one delegate said “dances and poetry were used to promote cultural norms and behaviours”.³⁹ UNPO discourses include self-determination, solidarity, non-violence, equality, indigenous knowledges, and a love of nature. The UNPO interprets self-determination broadly “as a process providing a wide range of possible outcomes dependent on the situations, needs, interests and conditions of concerned parties”.⁴⁰ A rights-based theme runs throughout the discourses. In the case of self-determination the UNPO quotes Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

What I found particularly interesting was that none of the nations appears to be seeking independence. A few talked about autonomy as simply being the freedom to live as they choose in harmony with others and with nature.

The solidarity of the UNPO was demonstrated in presentations to their General Assembly. Eleven delegations called on the membership to stand with them in making their petitions for human, cultural, and self-determination rights to be upheld by international organisations. Each petition was supported, though in some instances conditionally. Members not petitioning assisted in the preparation of documents. A few offered to collaborate on a specific issue where they faced the same aggressor. The final copies of such resolutions are presented in one brief to media channels and international organisations that UNPO might seek to engage with on occasion, such as the International Courts.

Despite considerable provocation, UNPO members commit to non-violence. They value a more egalitarian society at the global level and advocate the importance of women in decision-making roles. Consistent with most delegations identifying with their indigenous origins, the UNPO values the wisdom in indigenous knowledge, promoting sustainability and harmony between humans all other forms of life. Progress towards a desirable planetary civilisation would see world peace, unity of the human family, and recognition of the existence and rights of unrepresented nations and peoples.

Metaphor and myth

The UNPO chose the metaphor “the world is a village” for their preferred planetary civilisation. The word “community” was used by most delegates in relation to a sense of responsibility for the collective at the local, national and global levels, and is evocative of the African proverb “it takes a village to raise a child”.⁴¹

The myth proposed by the UNPO as the new story for global governance, “One World”, emerged spontaneously and is reflected in the worldview of Ubuntuism. Delegates felt it was important to adopt a collaborative global approach in the interests of humanity and as one said “the UN charter says ‘we the people’ not we the nations”. Here I discovered the paradox of Galtung’s 2,000 nations and One World; on the one hand the UNPO is calling for recognition of all nations and on the other hand for a unification of nations and peoples under One World. Table 3 uses CLA to analyse the two preferred future global governance models of Assertive Multilateralism and the UNPO and is followed by two short stories interpreting these models.

A story for the future of assertive multilateralism

In this future, global governance is based on a modified version of the current UN system. Still concerned with issues of political security and economic development, an elite group of States rely on coercive and economic power to dominate decision-making forums and policy formulation. The widely debated UN reforms of the early 21st Century did not eventuate. States-based membership was extended to allow for some deliberative processes with non-state actors such as international NGOs, corporations, and, occasionally, indigenous peoples, but the promise of decisions by planetary citizens is still a chimera. The weight of the past continues to influence the present and the future in an organised, linear progression. A hierarchical structure is maintained; States dominate the hierarchy and the elite States dominate the less politically and economically powerful. The 20th Century machine metaphor has evolved to “the World is a Green Machine” but the underpinning myth remains: “Survival of the Fittest”.

A story for the UNPO preferred future

In this future, global governance is a reformed UN called “One World”. The old UN model has been democratised with global civil society admitted to planetary decision-making forums through a civil society assembly. Security Council membership has been extended, the power of veto abolished, and Responsibility to Protect measures have been introduced, ensuring that genocide is a distant memory and that the human and cultural rights of all people are accessible. The decolonisation commission has been reinstated and is negotiating peaceful terms of settlement between nations still in

conflict over 20th Century settlements. One World's democratic and egalitarian decision-making processes ensure gender balance in major forums and encourage decentralisation of authority to local levels. This enables the leaders of almost 2,000 nations to engage in democratic processes that use communications technologies to facilitate local, regional and planetary participation. Planetary civilisation is taking shape as more people assume the additional layer of identity of "planetary citizen" and the world is becoming a global village.

Table 3. Preferred global governance futures

	Assertive Multilateralism	UNPO Preferred
THE LITANY		
Measures of Progress	Trade balances, GDP, stock exchanges, transnational corporation listings	Genuine Progress Indicators, indices of democracy, freedom and planetary wellbeing
Issues	Security and development	Security, social justice, environment, inequalities, identity, exclusion, neo-liberal globalisation. Cultural genocide
History	17 th to 21 st Century Westphalia, League of Nations, Bretton Woods, UN	Wars, 20 th Century decolonisation
SYSTEMS AND SOCIAL CAUSES		
Structures and Agency or Communion	Economic and political systems Counter to Keynesian economics that led to stagnation of economies. Reformed UN State-base extended to include non-State actors Hierarchical structure	Interconnected systems Dominant societies Reformed UN Civil assembly, heads of nations and INGOs admitted
Basis of Power	Decisions by "world citizens"; States dominate. Coercive, economic and institutional power	Democratic; egalitarian; power sharing Decentralised authority to the local level Symbiosis of nations Heterarchy structure. Power is in moral authority
WORLDVIEWS		
Ideological	Neoliberalism	Ubuntuism
Epistemic	Epistemology of positivist scientific thinking	Epistemology of many ways of knowing.
Globalisation	Globalisation as economic agent	Globalisation as unity of the world's people
Time	Linear time	Sync time

DISCOURSES	Consumption, nature as commodity. Progress is industrialism, materialism, competition, growth We have the tools to fix the problems	Self-determination; solidarity; non-violence; equality; indigenous knowledges; love of nature Progress is peace, unity of the human family and recognition of the 2,000 nations
METAPHORS AND MYTHS	The world is a green machine 'Survival of the fittest'	The world is a village Symbiosis. 'One World'

Towards a Transformed UN

As the UNPO favours a reformed UN, I will summarise the analysis of findings with two CLA matrices that represent a synthesis of elements from the literature and the UNPO materials. The first, Table 4, maps the distinctions between the current UN model of global governance, based on outdated Western notions of linear strategy, and the UNPO-preferred future that is founded on more contemporary, collaborative, and non-linear strategy concepts.

Table 4. Contrasting UNPO and UN Systems

CLA	The Current UN System	The Preferred UNPO Future
THE LITANY as measures of success	Number of States as members of UN	Number of people with access to planetary decision-making forums
THE SYSTEM AND STRUCTURE	Political/economic systems Hierarchy, silo structure	Interconnected systems Heterarchy, network structure
WORLDVIEWS		
- Ideological	Neoliberalism	Ubuntuism
- Cultural	Individualism	Collectivism
- Scientific	Western science	New sciences: complexity, foresight
- Temporal	Time as commodity; linear time	Future generations' time; Sync time
- Societal organisation	Domination	Collaboration
METAPHORS AND MYTHS	West and the rest. I think therefore I am. The Queen Mary exclusive cruise ship: limited places at the Captain's table	The world is a village. I am because we are. "One World" inclusive spaceship: rotation of invitations to the bridge

This provides a sharp contrast between the cultural orientations of individualism and collectivism expressed as "I think therefore I am" and "I am because we are". The UNPO delegates envisage global decisions made at the nations and communities levels, articulated through regional groupings

such as the African Union and then into a reformed UN. A Civil Society Assembly would provide access to “the people of the world”, including heads of nations, other non-State actors, and individuals, as envisaged by the CGG. In Table 5, below, I have further interpreted the summaries, deconstructed the current UN-centred global governance system from both the UN and non-state actor perspectives, and provided a synthesis that, borrowing from Giri, is intended to work “out an emancipatory space that inhabits both and transforms the space to one of creative reconciliation”.⁴² The final word of the synthesis is the metaphor “Symbiosis” as proposed by the UNPO:

Table 5. Deconstruction and reconstruction as synthesis

UN Perspectives	Non-State Actors' Views	Synthesis
Global governance is the responsibility of the powerful	Participation in planetary decision-making is the right and responsibility of all	Non-State actors are key partners in global decisions, policy making and local implementation
Heads of States are the legitimate decision makers	Heads of States do not represent the people of the world	The inclusion of non-State actors will improve planetary decision-making and democratise global governance
UN global governance is necessary for peace and prosperity	UN global governance is at risk of becoming irrelevant with the decline of States	Reform is necessary for the UN to remain relevant and for stewardship of the interconnected systems that nurture the human family
Might is right	The sacred cow (States)	Symbiosis

Conclusion

This chapter explored two images of global governance futures using CLA to compare and contrast the current UN-centric global governance system and its preferred future of Assertive Multilateralism with a reformed UN model developed from the perspectives of UNPO delegates. Both actor groups reject radical alternatives to the current system in favour of a reformed UN.

UN reform is seen as imperative by the current and former Secretary Generals, non-state actor groups, and scholars if the organisation is to remain relevant in a changing world. Increasing activism and pressure from global civil society, coupled with the declining power of States in world affairs and the need for a coordinated approach to issues such as climate change, point to the need for urgent action on reform. A proposed metaphor and myth for planetary participation in global decision-making, “the world is a village” and “One World”, speak to the need for greater involvement of the local in

the global. A constructive, and perhaps more palatable, discussion within the UN might be framed as organisational transformation within the context of societal evolution to the planetary phase, rather than as reform per se.

The continuous efforts of Annan and Moon to encourage reforms have largely been unsuccessful due to resistance to change and reluctance to cede power within the General Assembly and the Security Council. In this regard the UN could learn from the UNPO. At the UNPO General Assembly 2010 the solidarity of members in addressing issues of significance to the attending delegations overcame all other potentially divisive matters such as race, religion, political affiliation, gender, class and the like: they were united in their common cause. The potential scale of the current challenges facing the human family is such that solidarity of this nature within the UN is required to effectively coordinate global responses.

Whilst some scholars maintain that the first step must be rescinding the power of veto and extending Security Council membership, the inclusion of non-State actors in global decision-making forums might be an easier way of promoting further reforms. Past experiences of civil society involvement in UN forums on environmental issues, for example, have been successful and have added considerable value to the proceedings.⁴³ UN policy could be drafted to accommodate such involvement in accordance with the recommendations of the CGG and other eminent scholars and advisers. A five-year trial program could be initiated, during which strategies and processes could be evaluated and used to improve the program.

Non-State actors are powerful on the international stage as global civil society. Unrepresented nations and peoples, if recognised, would represent the majority of the world's human population. Combined they are powerful beyond measure, if only they will unite on the issues that affect us all—then, perhaps, we might see what the CGG envisaged in 1995: the “people of the world” using their power, at this critical juncture in human history, to collaboratively manage the common affairs of the human family.

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15. Terrorism Futures: Constructing and deconstructing using causal layered analysis

Noni Kenny*

Focused on the alternative futures of terrorism, this chapter describes the restrictive narratives of terrorism: “society must be defended” and “constant and evolving terrorist threat”. Alternative terrorism futures are identified through CLA and collectively depicted as a maze, revealing the prospect of navigating towards preferred and/or shared futures once these are supported by new and inclusive metaphors and stakeholder engagement.†

Introduction

Terrorism has been a steady feature on humanity’s future horizon¹ and is implicitly tied to risk, and the management of that risk. Threat scenarios and probabilities remain the most problematic part of terrorism risk analysis,² raising the need for greater incorporation of methodical futures thinking capable of identifying and unpacking terrorism knowledge funnels. 11 September, 2001, (hereafter September 11, to use its US English name) was a “wake-up call”³ for Western societies, highlighting the need to challenge terrorism knowledge boundaries as a way to transform the traditional responses to terrorism. Consistent with the critical futures framework, one must consider world problems in light of the human values and concepts that created,⁴ supported and sustained them. For example, the manner in which the problem and threat of terrorism is communicated and perceived by the West has an inherent implication or directing effect towards what are often reactive, action-oriented counter-measures. Lal and Nandy note that “few in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 have cared to investigate the systematic fashion in which terror has been institutionalized over the last 200 years as an integral part of modern statecraft and public policy”.⁵ This highlights the need to adequately acknowledge the effects of terrorism discourse and

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† This chapter is a summary of Noni Kenny’s PhD thesis, titled *Meta-level Terrorism Futures: Constructing and deconstructing using Causal Layered Analysis*.

metaphors. This level of analysis will provide a stronger foundation, one that encourages long-term thinking that incorporates perspectives beyond those that constitute or reinforce the current dominant views of terrorism and terrorism futures.

While my interest in studying terrorism was largely driven by the events of September 11, my interest had first been sparked several years earlier. At the time of the September 11 attack, I remember being curious as to why the events of that day had not been anticipated in a broad sense. Hindsight is a powerful factor and informs the story of the Twin Towers: the “target” indicated in 1993*⁶; the potential to hijack aircraft for non-traditional tactical purposes demonstrated in 1994/1995†⁷; and the growing (and innovating) threat which had been posed by extremists throughout the 1990s. This “reality” resulted from the non-realisation of other “presents”,⁸ for example what would have happened on September 11 had the 1993 attack on the World Trade Centre been successful; or if the 1998 cruise missile attacks on Afghanistan-based training camps ordered by former United States President Bill Clinton had taken the life of Osama bin Laden as intended; or furthermore, as questioned by Cid, had security measures to reinforce and lock cockpit doors been implemented?⁹

September 11 generated one major shift in my thinking: I became more interested in what the future would hold in the theatre of terrorism; and the options for policy-makers seeking to prevent terrorist acts and the conditions that lead to terrorism. My curiosity led me on this quest to generate a level of foresight within Terrorism Studies that would encapsulate terrorism trends, systemic causes, worldviews and myths as a means of constructing and deconstructing terrorism issues to positively influence the future. Engaging with terrorism futures enables movement beyond a reliance on worst-case prophecies that are based exclusively on knowledge found at the litany and systemic levels; knowledge sustained by our existing knowledge structures and governing mythologies. This chapter champions the cause and necessity of extending terrorism futures research beyond the traditional Western frame of incident-specific, trend-centric or worst-case scenario focus, in order to approach the futures in a manner that considers terrorism and terrorism

* In February 1993, Ramzi Yousef attempted to destroy the World Trade Centre with a truck bomb parked in the car park of the North Tower. The objective had been to destroy both towers, one toppling onto the other.

† The tactics of September 11 could have been inspired by the foiled attack by Algerian terrorists on 24 December 1994 which involved the crashing of an Air France flight into the Eiffel Tower. Additionally, the 1995 Bojinka Plot was believed to be a precursor, where September 11 architect Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his nephew Ramzi Yousef, speculated about using aircraft as weapons to strike the World Trade Centre and the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency.

futures as spaces of opportunity that are malleable and susceptible to influence.

The application of causal layered analysis (CLA) to terrorism futures facilitates this required expansion of terrorism research. Terrorism literature is replete with knowledge at the litany and systemic levels, often reinforcing Western thought. While discussions of the terrorism discourse feature in portions of the existing terrorism literature, the examination of underlying metaphors is not a feature of them. CLA assists in identifying how worldviews and myths feed and drive issue-framing, implicitly governing the generation, depiction and communication of terrorism fact and lack of positive aspirations for the futures. This identification of worldviews and myths and their corresponding issue-frames is an important level of knowledge to generate because the worldviews and myths that govern our terrorism knowledge systems inevitably set the direction of counter-terrorism policy.

Litany

Terrorism litany knowledge is primarily derived from, or the focus of, secondary sources and event analysis. The common trends within terrorism literature pertain to the significance and broad threat adaptation characteristics of the modern terrorist threat, and are often linked to incidence and lethality rates. These commonly include:

- The escalation of violent or destructive objectives;
- Decreasing incidence but increasing lethality;
- Increasingly well organised and calculated attacks;
- The changing nature of terrorist tactics and weapon selection or delivery mechanisms; and
- The increasing prominence of, or cyclical return to, religious undertones.

Overall, the terrorism litany presents the evolving and amorphous nature of terrorism as being presupposed. Collectively, the experiences of the 20th and 21st Centuries have highlighted the adaptive nature of terrorism". Terrorism has existed for over 2,000 years and owes its survival to an ability to adapt and adjust to challenges and countermeasures and to continue to identify and exploit its opponent's vulnerabilities".¹⁰ Accepting the continuation and probable escalation of terrorism, litany futures are intrinsically linked to the level of attack sophistication evident and the level of destruction achieved. This is demonstrated in Figure 1, below, the terrorism litany futures scenario matrix, which provides the scope for terrorism futures based on the characterisations of the litany of the past and near-present nature of terrorism.

The litany scenarios are broadly consistent with qualitative futures descriptions found in terrorism literature. The four immediate scenarios* are:

- Low destruction and high sophistication: *experimental* (attacks or incidents arising due to experimentation by terrorists to extend the “traditional” arsenal, without achieving the desired or maximum level of destruction);
- High destruction and high sophistication: *spectacular* (attacks involving the successful use of previously experimental elements, exceeding and further challenging constraints);
- High destruction and low sophistication: *spectacular repeat* (representing the repetition of elements of previous spectacular attacks); and
- Low destruction and low sophistication: *traditional*-type attacks (representing the use of the existing array of tactics and/or weapons).

A fifth scenario at the litany level emerged from the cyclical quality of the litany scenario matrix; a cycle of innovation, beginning with experimentation, followed by the successful utilisation of a new tactic, technology or weapon, which, over time, flowed to the lower sophistication quadrants to be absorbed into the orthodox terrorist arsenal.




Figure 1. Terrorism litany futures scenario matrix

The infliction of substantial damage and casualties to achieve ideological, vengeful or religious goals is often difficult for victims and the global

* These, and the following scenarios, are not geography- or group-specific, but reflect a largely Western-oriented worldview. Aspects of all four of these futures are likely to occur in the future, rather than one of the futures outlined in the matrix occurring in isolation.

community to comprehend¹¹ and is subject to knowledge and issue framing. Regarding this framing, two key metaphors have been identified at the litany level: 1) political Islam is the new Soviet Union,¹² and 2) al-Qaeda's Islamic fundamentalism has the monopoly on the jihad enterprise.¹³ Both metaphors match the sentiment that September 11 was a "wake-up call"¹⁴ and that we are "playing catch up" with the terrorists¹⁵ in terms of capturing the nature of the terrorist threat, and the need to prepare. Interpreting terrorist actions remains a complex task. Previous notions that terrorists used violence to gain power in negotiations appear to be in turmoil as "[t]heir violence is not designed to get a seat at the negotiating table",¹⁶ instead "they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it".¹⁷ As such, the litany level inadvertently emphasises the Western imperative of detection mechanisms in countering terrorism, particularly initiatives to detect, anticipate and prevent attacks. However, comprehension requires not only understanding of the act itself, but also of the terrorist actors and their episteme. As Dostoevsky wrote "[w]hile nothing is easier than to denounce the evil doer, nothing is harder than to understand him".¹⁸

Systemic Causes

Examining how and why terrorism has emerged is critical, and it is likely that the process differs between entities, societies and times. The Terrorism Studies community assumes that the causes of terrorism can be determined, and, in many instances, addressed. Theoretical insights into the causes of terrorism have been sought by political scientists, psychologists and sociologists alike, exploring *why* terrorism emerges and the range of personal and societal factors that create recruitment pools and enable radicalisation. The decision to resort to terrorism can be interpreted as a reasonable and calculated response given personal conditions and experiences.¹⁹ It is therefore not useful to characterise terrorism as a merely irrational act, nor should the quest for understanding be mistaken for support or sympathy for any given terrorist cause.

The terrorism literature encompasses two relatively distinct systemic dynamics: factors that lead to the emergence of terrorism (causal) and drivers of change (the symptoms or manifestations):

1. Causal: Personal* and societal† factors that lead to the emergence of terrorism: the "root causes of terrorism" hypothesis suggests that terrorism exists under relatively specific personal and societal conditions, and that it may be part of the cyclical rhythms of the global system.²⁰

* Including difficult life conditions, the need for security, self-determination, social respect of cultural identity and values.

† Including interpersonal and intrapersonal factors such as normality, rationality, characteristics identified through biographical profiling, and individual versus collective identity.

2. Symptoms: Interpersonal* and environmental† factors that contribute to the litany of terrorism, and, specifically, the amorphous nature of terrorism. Threat adaptations, as part of terrorism’s litany, could also be described as manifestations of changes in the global system.

Analysis at the systemic causes level reveals an overarching reactionary and adversarial approach to countering terrorism. Further, there is a disconnect between the factors leading to the emergence of terrorism and the drivers of change, and this disconnect represents a significant challenge for counter-terrorism strategists; in other words, the initiatives used to counter threat adaptations are inherently different from those required to reduce the emergence of terrorism or radicalisation (the gateways to terrorism). In acknowledging the threat’s “causal versus manifestation” characterisation, implications can be identified within the counter-terrorism approach: the immediate prioritisation of detecting and eliminating the threat by treating the symptoms through an action-reaction dynamic, at the expense of acknowledging and addressing that it is societally caused. Indeed, Gunaratna has criticised the counter-terrorism strategy as being overly focused on operational counter-terrorism (disrupt, capture, eliminate) and has emphasised the need to expand this focus onto the environmental factors driving radicalisation and recruitment.²¹ Accepting the likely continued prioritisation of symptom-based responses, the systemic causes futures are intrinsically linked to the level of identification (allowing for high or low levels of adversarial engagement with terrorist entities in terms of identifying, exploring and alleviating their personal and societal conditions) and the level of reactive force (encapsulating the action-reaction dynamic). This is demonstrated in Figure 2, below, the systemic causes terrorism futures scenario matrix, which provides the scope of responses to terrorism based on characterisations of the systemic causes of the past and near-present nature of terrorism.

* Including divergent group dynamics, group splintering and professionalisation.

† Including the political landscape and available avenues of redress and change, counter-terrorism arrangements, domestic and international social and life issues such as globalisation and modernisation pressures.




Figure 2. Systemic causes terrorism futures scenario matrix

The systemic causes terrorism futures scenario matrix both captures and challenges the dominant approaches to countering terrorism. The matrix introduces futures involving greater stakeholder engagement to challenge the traditional reactionary and adversarial approach. The systemic causes futures presents terrorism as requiring social control mechanisms ranging from highly reactive or treatment-based profiling measures, to some form of dialogue accompanied either by force or by a healing mentality. The four scenarios are:

- High reaction force and low identification: *hunt, capture and kill* (a mentality reflecting the “take them out” mindset with a focus on profiling at the expense of identifying underlying grievances);
- High reaction force and high identification: *war and dialogue* (characterised by aggressive counter action accompanied by some form of dialogue; essentially a mismatching of causal knowledge and the mode of redress; only the state can solve the terrorism problem by first obtaining control through the immediate application of forceful counter-measures);
- Low reaction force and high identification: *dialogue of healing* (featuring engagement and dialogue aimed at the recognition, consideration and alleviation of grievances); and
- Low reaction force and low identification: *targeted evil-healing* (resulting in profiling and healing the terrorist evil by identification and labelling, and the subsequent treatment of their terroristic attributes in the ignorance of the causal environmental factors).

The systemic causes level allows people, as individuals and as members of a global community to ask how terrorism should be responded to and/or prevented in the future. Does the continued adoption and imposition of Western ideals such as globalisation and democratisation foster the preferred

futures—and who’s preferred future? Do we favour the path of profiling, in the hope of potentially eradicating persons fitting a so-called “terrorist profile”, or should we expend more energy and funding to remove the conditions which cause terrorism by engaging with selective* stakeholders in an appropriate environment? It is important that this level of understanding also goes beyond the superficial treatment of symptoms/manifestations and into the domain of those causal societal grievances—the gateways to terrorism. To achieve this, the governing knowledge frames that inhibit engagement, and that support or constitute problematic and inaccurate communications, need to be identified and countered with new, shared metaphors that progress knowledge beyond the “solution” boundaries of the adversarial and reactionary application of force.

Worldviews and Myths

The Terrorism Studies community has largely failed to identify the governing metaphors of terrorism and to assess their impact on knowledge-shaping and problem-solving (counter-terrorism). Exploring and deconstructing existing terrorism framing can help identify the worldviews and governing metaphors that lead to the construction of terrorism knowledge, and the resulting litany and systemic causes futures. CLA provides a powerfully logical and intuitive system with which to examine the connections and disconnections between terrorism’s litany and its systemic causes by actively exploring the governing worldviews and myths. The collective litany and systemic image portrays terrorism as a constantly evolving and ever-present threat in the 21st Century, where terrorism futures are anticipated to feature a highly capable and amorphous threat requiring detection and containment to curb the continuous targeting of innocent civilians across the globe. There is an overarching prioritisation of engagement with trends rather than with the stakeholders to address the gateways to terrorism. Similar to Inayatullah’s challenge to the idea that war is here to stay,²² we need to challenge the aspects of terrorism’s litany and systemic causes that support the threat, specifically by challenging the underlying worldviews and metaphors that perpetuate it.

Terrorism worldviews and myths can be characterised according to the following four vantage points and governing metaphors.

In the stakeholder worldview, terrorism knowledge is framed and governed by the “us versus them” metaphor, where threat detection and prevention by treating symptoms is paramount to countering the constant and evolving threat.

* Assessments are required to identify those terrorist identities and objectives that can be engaged through this process; ensuring the security and safety of all participants and the effective exchange of dialogue.

The ideological worldview highlights the shared overarching political ideology of stakeholders and hence the “politically engaged” metaphor emerges, providing the potential for diametrically opposed stakeholders to engage with one another to identify and address the gateways to terrorism, and perhaps even their competing utopian terrorism futures.

The civilisational worldview appears to be consistent with litany explorations that categorised the terrorism problem according to culture and, therefore, civilisation; underpinned by “the West versus the rest” metaphor applying the Western ideal of a universal civilisation,²³ alongside the promotion of globalisation and Westernisation²⁴ to address the constant and evolving terrorism problem, positioned as the “mortal enemy of democracy”.²⁵

At the epistemic worldview level, knowledge and action are governed by the intrinsic requirement that “society must be defended”. This leads to the prioritisation of defensive measures at the systemic level, for threat detection, prevention and protection against the litany of a constant and evolving threat; “justice can only take the form of extirpation—root, trunk and branch”.²⁶

The four worldviews and corresponding metaphors above highlight the layered progression (and limitation) of thought and understanding of terrorism. Holistically, the worldviews and myths that characterise terrorism have revealed:

- An overarching lack of consideration of alternative (including positive) futures;
- The power and influence of dichotomies that are created and reinforced by the episteme; and
- An overtly negative and reactionary terrorism discourse.

The potency of viewing the world through such a lens, and one that is arguably shaped, governed and sustained by three of the four metaphors (the stakeholder “us versus them”, the civilisation “the West versus the rest” and the episteme “society must be defended”), is prohibitive to co-operative futures engagement and positive futures manipulation. Failure to engage with and challenge these knowledge funnels, will mean terrorism futures are likely to remain closed, used and disowned. To both capture and aid the challenging of the overarching negative and reactionary discourse and lack of consideration of alternative futures, “humanity” (capturing and challenging the adversarial stakeholder dichotomy) and “futures attitude” (referring to the sense of malleability of the futures) form the basis of the combined worldview-myth scenario matrix. This demonstrates how different the futures of terrorism could be if stakeholders were engaged with one another and the future, as the opportunity presented at the ideological

worldview level suggests. Terrorism’s combined worldview-myth futures are captured in the scenario matrix below (Figure 3).




Figure 3. Worldview-myth terrorism futures scenario matrix

The combined worldview-myth futures scenario matrix captures and challenges the “battle space” of delineated sides whose stance on terrorism is unconsciously influenced by existing dichotomies reinforced by the stakeholder, civilisation and epistemic worldviews and governing myths. In challenging this approach, futures featuring co-operative engagement between stakeholders and positive terrorism outcomes are created. The worldview-myth futures highlight opportunities to deviate from the current frames in order to consider greater stakeholder and positive futures engagement, supported by the shared overarching political ideology evident between dichotomous stakeholders. The four scenarios are:

- Global community and predetermined terrorism futures: *competing utopias* (where a series of autonomous preferred futures can be created, acknowledged and exchanged, while also existing in competition);
- Global community and undetermined terrorism futures: *futures alignment* (providing futures space where stakeholders can engage with the concept of alternative futures and the purposeful alignment of those futures);
- Sustained dichotomies and undetermined terrorism futures: *dystopia* (characterised by worst-case scenario planning as a way of preparing for possible futures), and;
- Sustained dichotomies and predetermined futures: *replication of litany and threat escalation* (a business-as-usual future as per the litany scenario matrix in Figure 1).

The combined worldview-myth terrorism futures scenario matrix demonstrates the deconstruction of terrorism knowledge and the opening of

the futures for alternatives—demonstrating how different the futures of terrorism can be if the underlying, limiting “us versus them”, “the West versus the rest” and “society must be defended” metaphors are challenged and replaced by more inclusive metaphors. New metaphors are required to open the futures and steer humanity towards preferred terrorism futures.

The Re-ordering Challenge

CLA highlights that the ordering of terrorism knowledge at the litany level is largely based on, and reinforced by, the dichotomous and polarising worldviews at the stakeholder and civilisation levels; underpinned by the episteme, particularly through supporting discourses; and deliberately maintained through language selection. Indeed, the framing at the stakeholder and civilisation worldview levels is used to determine and contextualise who needs defending from whom. In essence, three of the four worldviews (the stakeholder, civilisation and episteme) and driving myths refer to a “battle space”, characterised by clearly delineated sides and a predetermined view of how the futures of terrorism will unfold. These perspectives on the futures may be established according to the stakeholders’ points of view, or through fixed, civilisational identification—each of which has been largely reinforced by the terrorism episteme. The episteme has not only played a powerful role in shaping the terrorism discourse through the language, dialogue and categories used and exchanged, but has also revealed the deepest unconscious concern of terrorism futures: the need and desire to “defend society”. This need has been brought about by the creation, positioning and reinforcement of the self and others reflected in the dichotomous stakeholder and civilisation worldview metaphors, but is also entrenched within the episteme by the need to identify, and guard against, feared differences; sentiments reflected within the litany and systemic causes scenarios. CLA has identified that the potential to challenge these dichotomies exists at the ideological level through co-operative engagement with stakeholders. The shared, overarching political worldview at the ideological level revealed the possibilities for selective stakeholder engagement in a supported and transformative space in which to construct and deconstruct alternate and possible shared futures based on political visions. The “politically engaged” metaphor provides the opportunity for all stakeholders, particularly those in dichotomous relationships with one another, to pursue and engage in dialogue about terrorism and its futures. This opportunity will not exist at the stakeholder, civilisation or epistemic worldview levels (as demonstrated and discussed below) until the current metaphors restricting the prospects for co-operation are challenged.

Table 1. Connectivity and governance of terrorism futures at the litany, systemic causes, worldviews and myths levels

LITANY	Constant and evolving threat	Engagement through increased identification	Constant and evolving threat	Constant and evolving threat
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	Threat detection and prevention by treating symptoms	Balanced focus between terrorism gateways and symptoms	Western orientation will cure: Westernise, globalise and democratise	Defence priority—threat detection, prevention and protection by treating symptoms
WORLDVIEW	Stakeholder	Ideological	Civilisation	Episteme
MYTH/METAPHOR	Us versus Them	Politically engaged	The West versus the rest	Society must be defended

Table 1, above, highlights the interconnectedness of the futures of terrorism as revealed through CLA, arguably facilitated by the governing affect that terrorism metaphors have had; the stakeholder, civilisation and episteme worldviews all share the same (and arguably the present day) litany, depicting terrorism as a constant and evolving threat. The ideological worldview is the only level that has a knowledge frame that supports a different future—a future which prioritises engagement, and challenging the persistence of terrorism as a constant and evolving threat. The episteme myth that “society must be defended” reinforces the dominant “us versus them” stakeholder metaphor, and the larger “the West versus the rest” civilisation metaphor, at the expense of the opportunities to open the futures that are offered at the ideological level of CLA. These metaphors, if left unchallenged, will continue to close the transformative space in which dialogue, negotiation and public engagement could be fostered. Additionally, it should be noted that the governing metaphors form “tiers”: “society must be defended” is supported by the “West versus the rest” and the “us versus them” metaphors. Figure 5, below, depicts these tiers, and also features some supporting metaphors identified in the terrorism literature.




Figure 5. Tiered stakeholder, civilisation and episteme worldview metaphors

Unchallenged, these metaphors, mutually supportive, will continue to govern terrorism knowledge systems and thus, inevitably, set the direction of counter-terrorism policy. The “us versus them”, “the West versus the rest” and “society must be defended” metaphors need to be challenged through the generation of new and inclusive language and metaphors that continue to open terrorism futures. These new metaphors could expose different realities, characterised, for example, by understanding or togetherness. These realities need to work towards Gidley’s requirement of addressing and reducing the application of the limited logic of dualistic thinking to complex problems.²⁷ Hence, the “us versus them” and “the West versus the rest” metaphors could become more collective and cohesive, taking the form of a partnership or alliance, working together to open the futures. The grand story and imagery provided by the “society must be defended” metaphor is more challenging and the deconstruction of all of its pertinent elements will require stakeholder engagement. Creating new or alternative language, paradigms and practices requires the engagement of all stakeholders to ensure that the structures inhibiting or reinforcing the old, dominant worldviews are challenged and altered.²⁸ The challenge may progress in increments like this: “society must be defended” to “society is defended” to “defence through engagement” to “communities engaged” to “Gaia enabled”.

Having been opened by CLA, the futures of terrorism can now be thought of as a “living maze”—imbued with the prospect of new pathways opening into, around and out of itself, presenting opportunities to build layered knowledge, understanding and even shared and preferred futures. The terrorism futures maze (designed with reference to the scenarios above) is presented in Figure 6, below. The maze demonstrates that the futures of terrorism are not limited to the depictions of a constant and evolving evil; instead they are open and malleable and can feature greater engagement between stakeholders and with futures thinking.




Figure 6. Terrorism futures maze

The application of CLA to terrorism research has highlighted the existence of, and interrelationships between, disparate layers of terrorism knowledge (litany, systemic causes, worldviews and myths). Each of the four layers has enabled a different type of engagement with the terrorism problem and its futures, producing a layered understanding of terrorism that extends beyond the traditional confines of the litany and systemic causes. The litany represents terrorism as an evolving threat that is increasingly sophisticated and destructive. While the systemic causes lens remains focused on highly tactical processes for detection, prevention and pre-emption, it also revealed the array of intrapersonal, interpersonal and environmental causes and grievances that represent the gateways to terrorism—or drive terrorism’s litany. The worldview and myth layers deconstructed terrorism and its futures, uncovering several myths that govern the framing of the issues, which implicitly also govern the generation, depiction and communication of facts and (lack of positive) images of the futures.

Conclusion

More than a decade on from September 11, the fear-inducing and reactionary framing supported (and, to a large extent, established) by former President George W. Bush has persisted. Indeed, it is questionable whether the present and, indeed, the direction of the futures, would have unfolded in a different way had Al Gore won the presidential election in 2000. The overarching metaphors established then have remained prominent throughout President Obama’s first five years in office. This again demonstrates the power of these governing metaphors, and emphasises the fact that without new metaphors the outlook appears to be relatively static: the continuation of terrorism as a constant and evolving threat. The key question for counter-terrorism strategists now is how to set a different direction and what metaphors will be required to support that new course through “the maze”.

A different post-September 11 direction could have been set and supported, particularly by the findings of the 9/11 Commission. The focus on “attacking terrorists and their organisation”, “preventing the continued growth of Islamic terrorism” and “protecting against and preparing for terrorist attack”,²⁹ could have been expanded to also support other kinds of strategic and tactical responses, such as:

- Enhancing cultural awareness to challenge dualistic thinking (for example, public education campaigns to increase religious and cultural knowledge, and the promotion of a media reporting policy that accurately communicates terrorism threats in terms of their statistical likelihood);
- Redirecting portions of the \$808 billion³⁰ defence budget to community engagement and development programs (for example, using unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver medical supplies and other necessities to tribal areas vulnerable to, or affected by, the Taliban, increasing engagement between stakeholders, or empowering the United Nations and aid agencies to adequately engage with communities, facilitating the change they desire in order to stop the flow of recruits); and
- Searching for and engaging with preferred and positive futures.

These steps, had they been explored, may have advanced the “politically engaged” metaphor, limiting and reducing the control of the “us versus them”, “the West versus the rest” and “society must be defended” metaphors and allowing positive manipulation of the futures of terrorism.

CLA has enabled the introduction of the idea of positive futures manipulation into terrorism research and counter-terrorism strategy formulation; and this chapter has demonstrated that terrorism futures are an open space (even if that space is potentially maze-like) that can be navigated and influenced to create a desired future. For example, it is now possible to ask: what is the end goal and how will we traverse the landscape to achieve that desired state? What supporting metaphors will be required? Care must be taken to ensure that the future does not become rigid over time and that it is viewed in terms of capability and opportunity. This includes envisaging where decisions can be made, who has that decision-making power, and how the unknown can be better factored into decision-making. A combination of initiatives will be required, but the end state, as the futures presented in this chapter indicate, does not have to be characterised or dominated by further escalation of terrorist violence. Additionally, positive manipulation of the futures should incorporate future-proofing through the assessment and review of mechanisms (past, present and future) designed to promote desired future states.

Terrorism futures are malleable, they are not predetermined. Their achievement will, however, require negotiation of the “maze”. The futures are a transformative space in time which emerge as a result of decisions and actions, so too non-decisions and inaction, of the past and present. This

chapter has challenged the mindset that “the futures of terrorism cannot be studied” by showing how researchers can engage with the terrorism futures landscape to produce a number of alternative futures. This chapter has also shown that despite the uncertainty of the futures and of terrorism, that through the application of critical and layered methodologies, valuable investigations into terrorism futures can be undertaken. The power of CLA in constructing and deconstructing terrorism and its futures has been clearly demonstrated. CLA facilitated the identification of the different levels of terrorism knowledge, and of the self-supporting inhibitive metaphors that have governed, and continue to govern, the present. Indeed the worldview and myth levels illustrated how the governing metaphors have shaped not only public opinion and policy, but also, potentially, research agendas. Failure to challenge the mind-closing metaphors of, and the meaning given to, terrorism will keep humanity blind to paths towards alternative futures and the positive manipulation of them. Terrorism need not be an ever-present and expanding threat—new metaphors are required to act as guides through the maze and towards preferred futures.

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16. The Common Futures of India and Pakistan: A new approach

Gautam Wahi*

This chapter analyses the futures of India and Pakistan. It does so by deconstructing discourses which condemn the existing conflict between the two nations to permanent, inevitable finality and uses CLA to map the most common images of the India-Pakistan relationship as seen by the key actors. It then utilises CLA to reframe popular thinking, uncover myths and metaphors, and create alternative futures.†

Animosity Since Birth

The animosity and hostility in India-Pakistan relations have confounded social scientists ever since the tumultuous births of the two nations in 1947. The conflict between the two is one of the most costly and enduring and has pulled the region back from making developmental strides; this has confined a large proportion of the countries' populations to utter poverty.¹ Notwithstanding their common colonial legacy, the two nations have charted different and, at most times, confrontational ideological paths. The countries' similarities in most social indices match the similarity of their strategic discourse towards each other. This discourse has been mired in hostility and mistrust, which feeds iteratively into itself to create a never-ending vicious cycle.

Ironically, even as the two countries grapple with their internal issues of sectarian conflict, secession movements and high levels of government corruption, they continue to spend a very high proportion of their resources in maintaining a huge security infrastructure, pitting themselves against each other. In addition, the two nations are now declared nuclear powers. The spectre of a nuclear holocaust remains a clear and present danger in view of

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the forces of the two nations being “eyeball to eyeball”^{*} across the volatile border. This has been described by the former US President Bill Clinton as the most dangerous place on earth.² Even a conventional war is something that the region cannot afford in view of its immediate impact on the lives of the poorest of the poor; indeed, while for military strategists war is an option, for everyone else it is a given that it will only reinforce hatred and trauma for generations to come. The most common idiom on the popular understanding of relations between India and Pakistan revolves around the conflict between the two nations. The titles of books on the subject are usually on the following lines: *The Great Divide, India and Pakistan in War and Peace, India-Pakistan: A History of Unsolved Conflicts, Uneasy Neighbours, India and Pakistan: Friends, Rivals or Enemies* etc. The popular literature, even when it seeks to find the way forward from the conflict, because of its past-orientation, condemns it to finality; at a superficial level, permanence seems to be embedded in the conflict.

This chapter seeks to look at the past and the present of these relationships, which throw light on the key basis of prevailing psycho-social thought and the popular conventional wisdom, which will further assist in looking at their shared futures. This paper seeks the “opening up [of] the present and past to create alternative futures”,³ which is in line with the vertical dimension of the causal layered analysis technique. The chapter strives to pan out “constitutive discourses, which can then be shaped as scenarios”.⁴

Method

The paper relies heavily on the CLA method used in the work of Jeanne Hoffman in her article ‘Unpacking Images of the Futures of China Using Causal Layered Analysis’.⁵ CLA, which was developed by Sohail Inayatullah,⁶ has been chosen as the method to map the most common images of the India-Pakistan conflict as seen through the eyes of the key actors. This allows an opening of the present and past to create alternative futures instead of predicting a particular future based on a narrow empiricist or anecdotal viewpoint. The framing of the problem provides the answers, thus framings are not neutral but are, themselves, the analysis. CLA is able to get to the bottom of the nested arrangements of the various stakeholders and their key assumptions.

CLA seeks to unravel the layers of popular thinking and to inquire deeper into its many Levels, from Systemic understanding to Discourses and Worldviews, finally leading us into Myth and Metaphor.

* “Eyeball to Eyeball” is a term used in the strategic community in South Asia to describe the close proximity of combatants across international borders. This close proximity has often led to tensions between combatants. Such tensions have further led to sector- and location-specific skirmishes resulting in frequent loss of life on both sides of the border.

Litany is popular imagination and is often undifferentiated and monolithic. It is often an incorrect understanding that is impervious to alteration; belief psychologists call a “self-fulfilling prophecy”, feeding into itself to become stronger and more unchangeable.

Below this layer is Systemic Causes, where the inter-linkages between the political, cultural, societal and historical factors of an issue, along with some empirical evidence, are examined. At this Level, all that can be questioned is the data, not the paradigms.

The Litany and Systemic Cause narratives can be viewed as shallow empiricist and anecdotal expositions of the deeper worldviews. The worldviews legitimise the two layers of Litany and Systemic Causes. As Hoffman states in her article, the inclusion or exclusion of a particular discourse can eventually privilege the issue and the consequent scenarios that may emerge.⁷ This allows other perspectives or epistemologies to place claims on how the scenarios are framed: so regardless of the worldview that is chosen, it will have consequences for how scenarios are constituted.⁸

The layer below Worldview is Unconscious and Subconscious Myths and Metaphors. Myths create a sacrosanct image of the future which structures and presupposes perceptions and worldviews and hence a person’s experience of the world. This Level is dependent on specific civilisational and cultural underpinnings about the nature of time, rationality and agency.⁹

CLA is based on the deconstruction of the underlying four layers of assumptions, narratives, worldviews (zeitgeist) and metaphors/myths so that the future may not merely be perceived but also melded.

In this chapter, CLA is applied to both the Pakistani and Indian perspectives to arrive at the defining myths and metaphors and the alternative futures for the “Common futures of India and Pakistan”.

CLA on Pakistan

Litany

The most enduring image of the rhetoric of India and Pakistan, that they are sworn enemies, out to devour each other in a war of attrition, is witnessed at the Wagah border crossing on the road that leads from Amritsar to Lahore. This has been described in a *New York Times* blog in the following words: “The world’s most spectacular border ceremony takes place every day before dusk at Wagah”, symbolising the enduring conflict between the two neighbours.¹⁰ A news report in the *Friday Times* reads: “India is the enemy, emerging religious alliance tells Karachi”.¹¹ Even in the understanding of the sober press of Pakistan, India remains one of “Pakistan’s Internal and External Challenges”.¹²

Systemic causes

Historical cause: Pakistan's rootedness in its religious identity and the intertwining of that identity with a checkered history has been central to the understanding of the conflict in the Pakistani psyche. The centrality of "differentness", or rather "opposition", of this identity to that of India has been the pivot in the sociological understanding of this narrative. The foundational article of faith for the Pakistani state has been its uniqueness and non-"Hinduness",* which found its expression in the "two nation theory" even before independence from the British. The theory is based on the premise that the Muslims and Hindus are two different nations and they cannot coexist in the same political entity.¹³ Pakistani analysts have seen their pre-partition co-existence as nothing more than two rivers "which meandered close to each other here and there, but on the whole the two have flowed their separate courses".¹⁴ The partition of India was the culminating event of this political movement based on religious identities. It was the wheel coming a full circle, a wheel which had started spinning with the birth of Islam, with the first Muslim invasion of India by Muhammad bin Qasim in the early 8th Century, resulting in the birth of a "land of the pure" for Muslims, i.e. Pakistan. In the thought process of most Pakistani analysts, a "Hindu India" was thus based on the polar opposite of the Muslim Pakistani identity.

Political-ideological causes: The Kashmir issue is the other major irritant, an outflow of the previous argument: "Pakistan holds the view that partition of the sub-continent is still incomplete and Pakistan's Islamic identity will not be complete until the territory is unified with that country".¹⁵ Kashmir has been central to the Pakistani identity and its "occupation" by India is considered, in the Pakistani psyche, to be a dream unfulfilled. Pakistan treats the Kashmir issue as the "core" issue, a symbol of India's duplicity and intransigence, a territory that must be wrested from India. To Pakistan, Kashmir is still the "unfinished task of partition".¹⁶ And, at the ideological level, there is an existential fear that India has still not reconciled with the partition and shall seek to undo it if ever Pakistan is unable to defend itself.¹⁷ So hostility against India becomes a reason for Pakistan's very existence.

Economic/material causes: There is also a "material" narrative for the conflict. Water scarcity, cited as a probable cause of future conflict, is a pillar in this analysis: it is contended that Kashmir is critical for Pakistan in view of the fact that the western rivers of the Indus Valley originate in that troubled state. It is feared, in some quarters within Pakistan, that in the years

* "Hinduness" is a term used to describe the Hindu identity. It is not equivalent to Hinduism, which is a religious faith. The former is a broader term than Hinduism which encompasses the religious dimension and socio-cultural motifs in its sweep. Hinduness is thus a way of life and is not limited to the religious doctrine of Hinduism.

to come India may threaten to use the source of irrigation as a bargaining chip in other contentious issues.¹⁸ In other quarters it is also feared that India may release dammed waters in order to inundate the Pakistani plains in the event of a war and thus use water as a strategic weapon.¹⁹

Worldview/discourse

The “Territory-Centric” worldview: This theoretical framework gives an explanation to the Pakistani “steps to war” worldview. It states that as regions adopt certain goals and engage in certain behaviours, and then take action to support those behaviours, they increase hostility and threat perception. The territory-centric view emphasises territory as the underlying cause of war.²⁰ Kashmir, the territory in question, will remain a cause for conflict until its status is amicably resolved to the satisfaction of the two states, or when one of the states has a decisive military victory over the other. Any solution acceptable to both states seems to be an impossibility, since this would mean a compromise on their long-standing positions—to which there has been a considerable escalation of commitment. The nuclear balance in the subcontinent rules out a decisive victory for either side. This viewpoint thus seems to condemn the subcontinent to a never-ending spiral of attrition.

Territorial disputes remain intractable because the pieces of land in question become infused with symbolic or even “transcendental” qualities which make them intangible, perceived as a zero-sum game and thus difficult to divide. Symbolic stakes involve the idea that a given entity is important not for its intrinsic value but because it stands for a number of other interests.²¹

The realist “Balance of Power” worldview: The understanding of the world in the Realist Worldview is based on the distribution of power in the international system. This is calculated in the limited military sense and discounts other socio-cultural forces. According to this worldview there must always be a balance of power in any given setting; imbalances of power impel the actors to act in the direction of restoring balance.

Building on the realist tradition of the zero-sum game and the “Balance of Power”, this worldview suggests that Pakistan is in mortal fear of India and must seek to neutralise the threat on its western border. This worldview states that the “India-Pakistan relationship is one of enduring rivalry, enemy imagining and zero sum calculations”. In that sense, disputed geography and divergent ideology have proved to be far more powerful than sociological kinship and economic similarity in shaping their divided history”.²² Further, this worldview states that the balancing of the asymmetries between India and Pakistan can be done by Pakistan engaging in low intensity conflict in India by fuelling ethnic dissent and fissiparous tendencies so that India collapses from within. Prominent amongst such plans was the support for an independent state of Khalistan in the 1980s, wherein the Sikh dissidents in

Pakistan would obtain “refuge, training, arms and money from their hosts”.²³ It seems that given Pakistan’s smaller size and its difficult geographical position in relation to India, Pakistan feels more vulnerable with regard to its own philosophical position and justification.²⁴

The Realist Worldview symbolises the Lockean paradigm of rivalry at its best and the Hobbesian paradigm of conflict at its worst. This implies that the options for the states can at best be protection at one end, emphasising survival, and, at the other, the consequent dilemma of kill or be killed. According to this worldview the structure of anarchy between India and Pakistan is such that ideas and identity prevail over structures.²⁵ The corollary that follows from this rivalry/conflict worldview is that this rivalry fuelled by the close proximity of military forces on both sides, the nuclear dimension and the continuing tensions over the violence in Kashmir, makes another war with India inevitable, and near.²⁶

The institutional turf preservation worldview: The key stakeholder in the Pakistani scheme of things is the Army and the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence).^{*} The Pakistani Army draws its sustenance by perpetuating the threat from India. The tumultuous years after the partition and the four wars fought require the Pakistani Army to proclaim itself as the defender of Pakistan. India’s role in the creation of Bangladesh remains the most cited example of India’s duplicity which has pushed Pakistan towards a perpetual state of hostility with India, as elucidated in the HumoodurRehman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971 war. The strategy of the Pakistani army has been to garner cult status and support from the Pakistani citizenry. A Pakistani General, Mirza Aslam Baig, has described the Army of Pakistan as the defender of the ideological and geographical frontiers of the country.²⁷ The Pakistani Army is the key beneficiary if the battle lines with India remain drawn. Ironically, the heavy military loss in the 1971 war with India over Bangladesh, which observers thought would be a decisive end to the ongoing tensions, only ended up consolidating Pakistani military assets on the western border. The societal dominance of the Pakistani Army is built around the acquisition of Kashmir and balancing the power of its larger neighbour.²⁸ “Reducing the significance of the Kashmir issue could diminish the value of the army in the Pakistani society and the extensive corporate interests built around it”.²⁹ The existence of the Pakistani Army perpetuates its centrality in the Pakistani political canvas, since it supports the economic interests of serving and retired army personnel. It is estimated that “the Pakistani military’s private business empire could be worth as much as £10bn. Retired and serving officers run secretive industrial conglomerates, manufacture everything from cement to cornflakes, and own 12m acres

^{*} The ISI is the espionage arm of the Pakistani Government. It has been notorious for its fiercely autonomous ways and is often been described as a “State within a State”.

[4.8m hectares] of public land”.³⁰ This view is corroborated by Hamza Alvi who states:

The landlords as the members of the bureaucracy and the army are the most powerful indigenous class in Pakistan which is directly entrenched in the structure of state power. The “autonomous” role of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy “is subject to the structural imperative of peripheral capitalism in which it is located.” Hence the state has to satisfy the requirements of a peripheral capitalism and ensure the smooth functioning of the economy as a whole.³¹

Myth/ metaphor

The defining metaphor for Pakistan's identity is that of “un-Indian-ness” and “anti-Indian-ness”. There is an urge to chart a separate course and seek the leadership of the Islamic *umma* or the pan-Islamic brotherhood. This is typified by the great pride that Pakistan takes in possessing the so-called “Islamic bomb”, which on one hand has been a great equaliser against her stronger nuclear neighbour and on the other hand is a potential weapon that could be used in the strategic equations of the Middle East.³²

Contradictions and limitations in the Pakistani worldviews

The worldviews held by the Pakistani establishment have come back to haunt the state by inflicting damage on the country itself. The idioms of exclusivity and power balance are increasingly under question. Religion can no longer be treated as the sole basis of nationhood. Pakistan finds itself fighting with an enemy not on the western borders but within itself. The cost is increasingly being paid by the hungry millions. With the state facing increasing challenges from fringe Islamic elements, its aspiration for dominance and leadership in the Islamic world is increasingly in question. With part of the existing Pakistani territory bleeding the country in Khyber PukhtoonKhwa (KPK), there may be a need to reassess the centrality of the link between territory and identity. The swelling middle class now asks questions about the rationale of the military-dominated discourse and are looking for the enemy within rather than the one across the border. “Pakistan’s politics and social analysis could move forward from endless discussions and debates on partition to discussions about what type of Pakistan is desired tomorrow, and what can be done today to realise that vision. Otherwise, 1947 and the trends of today—poverty, malnutrition, economic inequity, gender dominance—will become the reality of tomorrow”.³³ The futures lie in questioning the sacrosanct assumptions held so far.

CLA on India

Litany

For the popular press in India, Pakistan is a basket-case teetering before its fall. *The Hindu*, in its report on the Mehran Naval Base attack in Pakistan, featured a report titled ‘Pakistan: shakier than ever before’.³⁴ There is also a propensity to see Pakistan as a monolithic entity, and there is a common cause made with the rest of the world that Pakistan is a source of terrorism and global chaos. A news article in the *Indian Express* regarding the terror threat emanating from Pakistan is titled ‘An enemy that may mutate and even grow’.³⁵ The popular press continues to portray Pakistan in general, and its army in particular, as set to target India. The popular Indian magazine *India Today* in its cover feature titled ‘Target India’, dated November 16, 2009, featured a photograph of the chief of the Pakistani Army.³⁶ Even in the instances where sports and the arts are covered, the Indian press brings out the element of rivalry and hostility between the two countries.³⁷

Systemic causes

Historical cause: In parts of the Indian psyche the creation of Pakistan is viewed as an unfortunate accident. There was a lack of reconciliation to the creation of Pakistan at the time of partition and that continues to this day.

India had never accepted Jinnah’s two-nation theory which was based on separate religious identities between Hindus and Muslims, and only went along with this “absurdity in order to keep the British happy and expedite their departure”.³⁸ “Pakistan’s relations with India are influenced by a great extent by the pre-partition struggle of Ideas between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress”.^{39*} Many authors have called the division of India on the basis of the two-nation theory an “Anglo-Muslim conspiracy”, wherein the Muslim League played ball with the British and fulfilled its agenda of “Divide and Rule”.⁴⁰ The first Prime Minister of India, J. L. Nehru, said in a speech at Madras in 1957, ten years after partition, that “We have never accepted it [Pakistan] and we do not propose to accept the two-nation theory on which Pakistan was founded”.⁴¹

* During India’s struggle for independence from the British, the Muslim League proclaimed itself the sole representative of the sub-continental Muslims and was instrumental in carving out a Pakistan from India under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah. This was seen as a betrayal of the principles of unity and secularism that had been accorded great importance by the Indian National Congress under Mahatma Gandhi; he called the partition of India on religious lines a “vivisection” of the country. The Indian National Congress which was at the forefront of the freedom struggle and which sought to be the face of a unified struggle against the British, was dubbed a Hindu party by the Muslim League.

Years later, the 1971 war with Pakistan, in which India supported the MuktiBahini* in its struggle against the Pakistani establishment for the creation of Bangladesh, was seen as a strategic move and as a repudiation of the two-nation theory by native East Pakistanis. The creation of Bangladesh was, in effect, an attack on the very ideological foundation of Pakistan.⁴² To this day India takes great pride in its secular roots which is antithetical to the two-nation theory. The word secularism finds mention in the Preamble to India's Constitution which is in contrast to the state of Pakistan which by its very name is an *Islamic Republic of Pakistan*

Geo-political causes: The recurring wars in the region, and the mutually reinforcing mistrust with Pakistan, have made the militarily superior India distrustful of Pakistan. This is consistent with the hypothesis of “realpolitik experiential learning” which states that nations which find themselves in recurring crises with the same adversary are likely to continue strategies that have been successful in the previous crises, and to turn to more coercive strategies when they have been unsuccessful.⁴³ Leng further goes on to say that the volatile circumstances in Kashmir have reinforced Indian distrust of Pakistan's intentions, and to India's decision-makers overestimating the hostile intentions of Pakistan. Fearing any external influence on Kashmir, Indian strategic thought seeks to deal with Kashmir *only* unilaterally. Coupled with this, is the doctrine that “offense is the best defence”. By seeking to embroil Pakistan in the internal conflict in Balochistan, India hopes to put increasing pressure on the Pakistani security apparatus and to orchestrate another Bangladesh in Pakistan. This also explains the Indian endeavours to install a friendly government in Kabul to “outflank Pakistan by exploiting the Pustoonistan issue”.⁴⁴

Worldview

Indian strategic worldview: A Realist's Worldview of complete hegemony and containment of Pakistan: India seeks to have complete hegemony based on the Indian notion of the sub-continent being deemed a single entity, notwithstanding the newly crafted borders following the partition. India deems its hegemony in the sub-continent to be both natural and desirable.⁴⁵ As corollary, the primary objective of India's security policy is the isolation of the sub-continent from all external powers and influences with the potential of primacy, and freedom of action for itself within the region. India seeks to contain Pakistan militarily and to isolate Pakistan from its major external protector, i.e., China.⁴⁶

An isolationist's worldview of Pakistan: India now seeks to embarrass and isolate Pakistan in the international community for its role in spawning

* Mukti Bahani (“Vehicle for Independence” in Bangali) was a resistance movement of the native Bengalis of East Pakistan who took up arms against the Pakistani Army.

global terrorism.⁴⁷ This appears to be a worldview that speaks of a lack of any well thought-out strategy on Pakistan following the escalation of Pakistan's internal troubles.

Myth/metaphor

India has sought to “de-hyphenate” and leave behind its “irritant neighbour”. India sees itself as a victim of Pakistani depredations and seeks to conclusively win the battle for mindscape, money and military power against Pakistan on the world stage. India seeks to wish Pakistan away.

Contradictions and limitations of the worldview

India's claim to membership of the powerful nations club has to be looked at from the perspective of the number of poor people (in absolute terms) within a political unit. The discourse of macho nationalism must marry the stark realities of under-development. On the “idea of India” there is a need for sobriety, since there is immense ground to cover if India is to be made truly secular. The repudiation of exclusiveness would ring hollow unless India actually translates its possession of a Constitution to *constitutionalism*. An unstable Pakistan cannot be left behind, it is here to stay and the more India wishes it away or seeks its demise, the more India will get entangled with an unstable neighbour. A weak or impoverished Pakistan, or even a Pakistan burning in secessionist's flames, is the worst thing that can happen to India. By virtue of their common border, a fire burning Pakistan would spread to India and make the region unstable. Engagement, not containment, alone can strengthen democratic institutions in Pakistan and create a better environment.⁴⁸ Also, with national sovereignty slowly becoming less important, dominance or complete hegemony in the sub-continent seems to be neither desirable nor possible. If there is any scope for dominance, it could only be economic, which is a win-win scenario for the region. Nandy has also supported the view that nation-states in South Asia are fictitious entities, and Indian and Pakistani nationalisms are artefacts.⁴⁹

Common India-Pakistan Futures

Litany

The emerging trend that is seen, and could be the Litany of the future, is captured in a feature article in one Pakistani newspaper which speaks about ‘Pakistan's non-‘anti-India’ generation’.⁵⁰ The change in the popular idiom (even if yet only sporadic) speaks of a change in the popular mindset, as evidenced by the blog *Pakdefence* (which deals with Pakistani defence matters) a post on which was titled ‘India no longer No. 1 Enemy of Pakistan’.⁵¹ Other news sources have also voiced their opinion, stating, to adapt the title, that “For Pakistan, [it is] time to try India as a friend”.⁵²

Systemic causes

Historical cause: The Indian subcontinent has been host to waves of settlers and invaders who may have started as victors in conquest but were eventually amalgamated into the broader Indian identity. The first wave of Muslim settlers came to India from the southernmost Indian state of Kerala in 632 CE, a few years after the passing of the Prophet Muhammad.⁵³ This wave was accompanied by peaceful adoption of Islam. What is often missed in the analysis in this layer is that Islam first spread not by the sword but voluntarily. The next influx happened through conquest, but even then there was no forced conversion to Islam; conversion was by insinuation rather than by systematic introduction or invasion (i.e. compulsion).⁵⁴ Indian cultural symbols, such as culinary habits, ways of living, languages and architecture, which is the surviving relic of this amalgamation, chronicle the blending of these disparate identities into a common one.⁵⁵ These “glorious instances of synthesis of two civilisations [are] exemplified by the Taj Mahal, Hindustani dance, music and painting, architecture and even cuisine”.⁵⁶

Before the advent of the British there was no chasm in the identities. The mobilisation of peoples into the silos of “Hindu” and “Muslim” happened only with British rule.⁵⁷ At one level, British rule gave a political canvas to the Indian principalities and brought a degree of political unification. At the same time it suited the British to pursue its policy of divide and rule and consequently there was a framing of a Muslim identity and a Hindu identity. Their common legacy and cultural motifs could be the future of unison in cultural terms, even while the current political boundaries remain intact.

Political causes: Notwithstanding the two and a half year hiatus in democracy in the late 1970s in India, there has been a complete acceptance of democracy by the Indian people and state institutions. This has been orchestrated by the steadfast “commitment of India's key institutions, such as the judiciary, parliament, media, the army, and the national and regional leaders to democracy and secularism”.⁵⁸ Similarly, in Pakistan there appears to be a strong movement towards democracy, as can be seen in recent public discourse in Pakistan. The Pakistani state is in a stage of turmoil and it is now becoming increasingly clear that a military coup may no longer be possible in view of the degree of international pressure and internal opposition. There are questions in Pakistani civil society about how the Pakistani Army, which is referred to as an “army with a country” by the Pakistani media, needs to be reined in.⁵⁹

The theoretical concept of “democratic peace” states that there is a higher probability of peace between any two democracies than between states of different political structures. There is an emerging consensus that “two democratic states will not fight each other in a war”.⁶⁰ Democratic peace has a significant impact on rivalries, not merely on the outbreak of war. In

relation to India and Pakistan it has been observed that their rivalry was less dispute-prone under democracy than during periods of non-democratic rule. Thus, joint democracy may be associated with the termination of rivalry after a period of time.⁶¹

Secondly, a “Political Shock” has been described as one of the possible reasons for the termination of rivalries. It has been hypothesised that a civil war in one or both states involved might lead to an end to rivalry as the affected state/s might direct their attention inwards to deal with the internal threat.⁶²

Following 9/11 and the consequently changed dynamics of the international arena, Pakistan’s military role in fomenting global terrorism is being increasingly scrutinised. With Pakistan facing increasing terrorist violence, there is also an increasing internal debate about the role of the military apparatus in Pakistan’s politics. This situation can be likened to political shock.

Similarly in India, even while there may not have been a dramatic political shock related to an internal security issue, there is ferment in the public discourse against corruption; this is nothing short of a revolution against the entire political class, which is increasingly losing its legitimacy. Anna Hazare, a Gandhian anti-graft activist and the focal point of the anti-corruption movement in India, has famously said that “Corruption [is] a bigger threat to India than Pakistan”.⁶³ This too can be considered a political shock that is changing public attitudes about what is considered to be important to the public interest.*

Post-colonial/south-south cooperation causes: In the years to come there is a possibility for common interest in issues like convergence on per-capita greenhouse gas emission norms for the developing world. India and Pakistan find themselves on the same side of the table on the issue of climate change. The then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Yousaf Raza Gilani, said in a statement that “[Climate change] is quite visible in my country. We have suffered both drought and heavy rains in the past year. It was horrible, not just by our estimates but also as per the estimates of World Bank and Asian Development Bank”.⁶⁴ There is also a possibility of cooperation in the WTO regime on agriculture patents and livelihood issues. The WTO’s Mode IV “movement of natural persons” service also holds great promise for

* Diehl, Goertz and Saeedi were less sanguine on the reduction of rivalries between India and Pakistan as a result of “political shock”. However, it bears noting that their chapter was written in 2005 when the involvement of Pakistan in the war on terror on its western borders had not yet escalated to an internal security threat, as it came to be in 2012–13. Similarly, the “India Against Corruption” campaign, directed domestically at the Indian government, has increased internal unrest against the entire political class to an unprecedented level.

cooperation between these two countries in a united front against “the North”.

Worldview: Realpolitik or real idiocy?

The traditional worldviews of both Pakistan and India have degrees of fatalism and finality in them. These worldviews inextricably frame their opposite number as the enemy responsible for hurting the very concept of their nationhood. Counter-balance and aggressive vendetta based on this worldview is the leitmotif of all India-Pakistan calculus. The changing dynamics in the world, and the realisation that the world is moving forward, breaks the mould of this traditional mindset. The India-Pakistan leadership seems to have drawn no lessons from the futility of pursuing their extremely expensive and absurd animosity; they have been likened to the 18th Century Bourbon monarchs: “learning nothing and forgetting nothing over the course of the rivalry”.⁶⁵

Coercive bargaining and strategies have created only self-fulfilling prophecies. More harmonious past relations between Hindus and Muslims, either before the partition or within India, have been forgotten or presumed to be exceptional. The competitive relationship presumed by this *realpolitik* approach accentuates Hindu-Muslim differences and masks the cultural and historical commonalities in the identities of Indians and Pakistanis.

A critical step towards the stabilisation of India-Pakistan relations would be to have the leaders of the two sides move away from sabre-rattling and into a public recognition that a generally war-like atmosphere creates the possibility of minor skirmishes escalating into catastrophic conflict.⁶⁶ This has to be accompanied by both sides giving up on hostile goals: India would give up its strategic objective of complete hegemony or pushing Pakistan over the precipice, and Pakistan would give up its claim to a forced “liberation” of Kashmir. The new worldview has to be based on a Kantian system of anarchy like the one between the US and Canada in which political, economic, or even territorial disputes do occur but are settled with other strategies, such as discussions via international arrangement; these strategies would change the meaning of military power from rivalry to shared knowledge, which would foster a secured community. In disputes between rivals, military capabilities have an impact on the outcome because the parties know that these strategies might be used against them by their rival; among friends this is not the case. Under Kantian anarchy, the meaning of military power moves away from a neo-realist balance of power; military power has a different meaning because it is derived subjectively from shared cultural ideas constructed between states.⁶⁷

As paraphrased from Zia Sardar: “we must destroy the pervasiveness of modernist ideology and recreate autonomous traditional communities.

Moving forward then means returning to the historic past and unfettering ourselves from the domination of our illusionary national identities”⁶⁸.




Figure 1. Deconstruction-reconstruction process in India Pakistan futures CLA

On 1 January, 2010, a peace initiative called *Amanki Asha* (“Hope for Peace”) was launched by the Jang Group of publications and newspapers in Pakistan and the Times of India Group.* The project is aimed at creating an enabling environment and contributing to peace-building between Pakistan and India. This could be the starting point of a unified future wherein the sub-continental identity at the political level may remain intact and yet friendships may be built on the common bonds of culture and history and the hope for a brighter future for the people of both nations, benefiting from acting in unison at the international level. This unified future aims to address the global challenges of poverty reduction, climate change, and inequity in the global order, and perhaps holds the solution for pulling these nations out of the cycle of hatred.

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17. Unpacking Images of the Futures of China Using Causal Layered Analysis

Jeanne Hoffman*

This chapter maps the most widely discussed futures of China as constituted by International Relations theories. These are: the “China threat”, as constructed and re-constructed by western and Chinese theorists and the alternative future of “Peaceful development”. The article concludes with three CLA stories for the rise of China.[†]

Theoretical Framework

CLA was selected as the method to map the most common images of the rise of China because it allows an opening of the present and past to create alternative futures rather than simply predicting a particular future based on a narrow empiricist viewpoint.¹ In CLA, the way in which a problem is framed ultimately provides its solution, thus framings are not neutral, but part of the analysis. Should, for example, the frame be realist or idealist? Chinese or Western? CLA does not claim or argue for any particular “truth”, but to explore how a discourse becomes privileged—that is who gains and who loses when a particular discourse becomes dominant. For this reason it is useful in examining the conclusions made by popular images of the future of China and in testing whether or not they have enough depth to support those conclusions. As such CLA requires the user to travel through a number of layers which ultimately question or “undefine” the future and make the units of analysis problematic.

Setting the Scene

Realists in the West tend, generally, to focus on distribution of power in the international system, either in terms of an economic rise or a military threat, both of which often neglect deeper social and cultural dimensions. War is the normal state of affairs when the hegemonic balance becomes disrupted.

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Defensive realists such as Waltz argue that states have every intention of maintaining the balance of power in order to provide stability.² Offensive realists such as Mearsheimer argue that China “might be far more powerful and dangerous than any of the potential hegemon that the United States confronted during the twentieth century”.³ According to Mearsheimer, even integrating China into the world economy is “misguided”, because as it becomes wealthy it will become “aggressive ... determined to achieve regional hegemony”.⁴

China’s realists are considered to be the dominant group in the discourse about China’s future and they too sit within “offensive” and “defensive” camps, using the concepts of “soft”—attraction and influence—and “hard”—coercive—power. Chinese realists also see the international environment as anarchic and unpredictable; they uphold the principle of state sovereignty and thus see a need for a strong state capable of navigating the pressures of external influences. Somewhat differently from realists in the West, there is a strong sense of discontent over China’s historical weakness and “Century of Humiliation”⁵ among China’s realists.

Liberal theory (liberalism) focuses on individual rights, constitutionalism, democracy and limitations on the power of the state, and this can be seen in the spread of democracy and globalisation.⁶ Adhering to this theory are the institutionalists, who believe that if a rising power (China) is integrated into the system of international institutions, it will be possible to avoid future military conflict.⁷ In this way China becomes a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system and will avoid conflict with the United States at all costs.⁸ This view is common to both the Western liberal and Chinese perspectives.

In both theories, economic interdependence plays an important role in determining the likelihood of war. Realists believe in a mercantilist view whereby access to goods and materials must be maintained and this creates an incentive to initiate war. Liberalists claim that interdependence increases the value of trade relative to aggression and thus reduces the incentive to initiate war.

The Realist Paradigm—Origin of the “China threat” theory

The origin of the notion that an economically rising China could be a threat was first put forward in August 1990 by Tomohide Murai, a professor at Japan’s National Defense Academy. Murai wrote an article describing China as a potential adversary in view of its comprehensive national strength and sustained development. The phrase “China threat” itself is said to have been coined by a Chinese writer, in a *Renmin Ribao* (*People’s Daily*) article titled ‘Put an end to ‘China threat theory’’.⁹ According to Deng, another account comes from Xu Xin who claims that in August 1992, at a Heritage Foundation symposium in Washington DC, the United States Assistant Secretary of Defense blamed China for sparking an arms race in the Asia-

Pacific.¹⁰ Also in late 1992, the confluence of Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour, and the consequent economic growth, and the passing of the Law on the Territorial Sea, which claimed sovereignty over some of the islands in the South China and East China Seas, was interpreted by some in the Japanese media as a sign of China’s expanding military and its hegemony strategy.¹¹

This term now captures a full range of foreign fears about the ways in which China might be harmful to the global order, as well as Chinese fears about containment and international perception.¹² The “China threat” theory is used not only by Western and Chinese realists to construct a version of national identity, but has also been advocated by commentators in Japan, India, Taiwan and, briefly, by South Korea to create their own versions of China threat theory. Having said that, this chapter will focus primarily on the discourse in the United States, and will include only a few comments on the discourse in other countries.

Table 1. Western and other realist arguments supporting “China threat”

Economic	Military	Ideological
Cheap labour stealing our jobs	First rate military power by 2020	Non-democratic, one party state
Currency manipulators	Push to control sea lanes	Poor human rights record
Competition for energy and resources will create shortages	Will create provinces	Unreasonable territorial claims
Relationships with SE Asia will destabilise the region	Establish regional hegemony	Revisionist power that will stop at nothing to become the regional hegemon

The realist discourse outside China focuses on the link between China’s increasing economic strength and its political weight¹³ and is further echoed in the hyperbole of realist pundits in the United States who claim that low Chinese labour costs are stealing jobs from the US, that currency manipulation enhances China’s trade position, that competition for energy and resources will create shortages and that economic ties with South East Asia will destabilise the region. The pessimism about the rise in Chinese military spending is also seen by some outside the US as being quite aggressive. Shoichi Nakagawa, former policy chief of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, said that Japan could be subject to strong Chinese influence in the context of China’s “rising military spending”. He went on to say: “If something goes awry in Taiwan in the next 15 years, then within 20 years, Japan might become just another one of China’s provinces”.¹⁴ Taiwan and India have also found the realist “China threat” discourse useful to

achieving policy ends. India was once a leading proponent of the “China threat” theory and in 1998 the Vajpayee government touted the “China threat” theory as a pretext for nuclear testing.¹⁵ The 2011 Taiwan Ministry of National Defense report argues that China’s growing military strength continues to target Taiwan and still poses a major threat to the country and, despite increasing economic ties, that China’s threat to Taiwan remains “unabated”.¹⁶

Table 2. CLA—Western interpretation of the “China threat”

LITANY	China cannot rise peacefully, creating potential for war. Growing economy, increasing military spending, still authoritarian
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	Balance of power and security dilemma. Structure of international system: anarchic, building up of offensive military capability and asymmetric information about states’ intentions
DISCOURSE/ WORLDVIEW	Realist worldview: seeking power for power’s sake, attain resources through violent means. Must contain China’s growth, otherwise neighbouring states will become vassals
MYTH/ METAPHOR	Clash of civilisations. Yellow Peril. China is an angry dragon, Godzilla; a “bully”. The only way to deal with a rising China is to push or tie it down

Litany level

The message at the litany level of the “China threat” argument is one of fear. The characteristic of this level is that it is the most superficial, appeals to mass audiences and fails “to probe beneath the surface of social and cultural life”.¹⁷ The central concern here is the potential for war as a result of China’s economic growth. The assumption is that this growth (although only returning to relative historical levels), will push China to restore its lost superpower status, to expand its political influence in the region, and in so doing, to make military conflict inevitable. The pattern of China’s behaviour is clear; with its growing economic clout, it will emulate the push for hegemony attempted by Germany (1900–1918, 1933–1945) and Japan (1931–1945) and achieved by the United States in the 19th Century.¹⁸

We are often reminded that the growth of China’s economy is “unparalleled in modern economic history” and so “poses challenges for other countries”.¹⁹ The litany of economic data tells us that jobs have shifted from the US to China, that resource costs are being driven up and that China is the world’s largest creditor nation to the world’s largest debtor nation, the United States. Negative images in the media reinforce a threatening image of suppression and state violence, warning of “angry Chinese hurling rocks at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing”.²⁰

Systemic causes level

Mearsheimer envisages a system where fear and brute strength are the driving factors for states concerned about their security in the international system.²¹ Once this zero sum paradigm is created, the anarchy, build-up of military capability, and uncertainty of other's intentions, the data itself must be forced to fit within this paradigm in order to maintain it. Denny Roy fans these flames when he argues that: "China's military modernisation has included weapons systems that can boost the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) capability to project power beyond China's shores". He further states that: "Many observers infer from all this that China intends to build itself into a military superpower by early next century". And, for added effect, he then goes on to say: "presumably to enforce a regional hegemony".²²

Worldview/discourse level

The realist worldview here frames a rather limited and ultimately bleak image of China. The foundational definition of the paradigm is that "the mightiest of states attempt to establish hegemony in their region of the world while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region".²³ Thus, China will always be an aggressor, bent on threatening the Western way of life in its relentless pursuit of power and historical redemption. The problem with this worldview is how reductive it is in its conclusions; indeed, no matter what action is taken by China, the country will be seen as a threat. Based on this paradigm, any policies of engagement are doomed to fail, because the great powers must seek power continually if they want to maximise their odds of survival.²⁴

Metaphor/myth level

For, as Kelly has argued, "Metaphors serve the discourse and support the litany".²⁵ Because the only solutions to a rising China from a realist point of view involve maintaining the US military presence in Asia in order to contain and enmesh China, the myths supporting these solutions reinforce the Eurocentric, linear historical and cultural Great Power paradigm. The metaphors and myths of "China threat" are discussed below.

Yellow Peril

Samuel Huntington provides us with a new enemy: the "ideal enemy for America would be ideologically hostile, racially and culturally different, and militarily strong enough to pose a credible threat to American security". He believes China fits this bill.²⁶ This clash of civilisations parallels images of a "Yellow Peril" or "Yellow Terror" in which the Chinese swoop down like a Mongolian horde with their cheap workers, authoritarian rule and development model and uncompromising attitude threatening Western "values" and reclaiming their past glory. According to Huntington, China is undergoing sustained expansion of its military power; he cites evidence of it

testing a one-megaton nuclear device, the development of aircraft carriers, and a new form of arms competition. For these reasons, Huntington argues that the expansion of Chinese military power needs to be contained. There is a clear anti-Chinese fear of the other (the Chinese cannot represent themselves) and, as Edward Said detailed, an assumption around the myth of “the inherent superiority of the former (the West) to the later (the East)”.²⁷

Mearsheimer argues that due to its size and growing economic clout, China will attempt to establish regional hegemony while making sure the United States loses its advantage and dominance (hegemony) in Northeast Asia. China should be expected to develop a kind of Monroe Doctrine to support its claims and make it clear that “American interference in Asia is unacceptable”.²⁸ Mearsheimer further claims that “the United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead”.²⁹ Realism, and the offensive realism of Mearsheimer in particular, holds that China is a “revisionist power” and as such needs to be contained and prevented from becoming a regional hegemon at all costs. Simply put, China is a non-democratic, one party state pursuing military modernisation. The consequences of these values are absolute in realist terms. Roy states: “Beijing has long generated bad feeling among many outside nations with its poor human rights record, its resistance to multilateral discussion of expansive Chinese claims in the South China Sea, and its persistent threats to use force against Taiwan”.³⁰ It is therefore a simple, linear argument to make that the only way China can return to its past glory as the dominant power in the region is through military and economic dominance. Because China is a “bully” which, if not contained, will threaten war, its “growing too big and too strong for the continent it finds itself on” carries the subtext that it is coming after yours.³¹

Angry dragon

“We have an image of China as an awakening dragon. . . It is non-European, non-democratic and avowedly the last communist stronghold in the world”.³² In China the symbol of the dragon is one of power, strength, and good luck, but in the West it is one of malice, greed and destruction. “It is better to be Godzilla than Bambi”, claims Mearsheimer.³³ And so there is only one solution: “For a declining hegemon, ‘strangling the baby in the crib’ by attacking a rising challenger preventively—that is while the hegemon still holds the upper hand militarily—has always been an attractive strategic option”.³⁴ A peer competitor cannot be tolerated and so the dragon must be “tied down” and strangled.³⁵

Charles Krauthammer promoted the view of China as a “bully” that needed to be contained, going so far as to suggest that, if it is not contained, China could be the instigator of the next world war.³⁶ Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro wrote in *The Coming Conflict with America* that China sees the United States as the “chief obstacle” to its strategic ambitions in Asia.

Bernstein and Munro further paint a picture of a China that is “driven by nationalist sentiment, a yearning to redeem the humiliations of the past and the simple urge for international power”.³⁷ They further claim that any vision of an “unthreatening” China becoming more like the West as a country that is “non-ideological, pragmatic, materialistic and progressively freer in its culture and politics” was obsolete.³⁸

More recently, Western pundits have begun to call China’s behaviour “aggressive, assertive, hard-line, obstructionist, deliberately insulting, tough and confrontational”.³⁹ India and China have been squabbling about border disputes and the Dalai Lama, a stronger stance on south-east Asian issues has been troubling those in the region, and trade difficulties in Latin America and the arrest and jailing of executives from Rio Tinto-Chinalco has strained relations with Australia.⁴⁰ For realists in the West and elsewhere this provides “evidence” of China’s true colours, with articles titled, ‘The Chinese tiger shows its claws’⁴¹ and statements such as “China is behaving exactly as one would expect a great power to behave”.⁴²

This discourse ultimately appears to be bounded by its own definitions and cannot see China as anything other than a rival to the United States and the West. Joseph Nye has argued that war is caused by fear engendered in one power by another, and that belief in the inevitability of conflict is a self-fulfilling prophecy.⁴³ At all of these levels, the only solution offered is to contain China through balancing, undermining and, inevitably, war.

Chinese “China Threat” Perspectives

From the Chinese perspective it is perhaps unsurprising that the “China threat” theory is viewed as a way for the United States and its regional allies to “denigrate the Chinese political system, overstate China’s strengths and [assign] irresponsible, destabilising motives to Chinese external behaviours”.⁴⁴ In this way the realist discourse in China views the “China threat” theory as being about international perception and quality of treatment abroad and, ultimately, simply concocted by hostile forces seeking to threaten China on the basis of racist “Yellow Peril” conjecture.⁴⁵

Table 3. CLA—Chinese Interpretation of the “China threat”

LITANY	The West is trying to contain or impede the rise of China. Fear gripping the West
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	A way to deny China’s rightful place at the table of global institutions. Threatening to China’s core interests
DISCOURSE/ WORLDVIEW	Use the “China threat” theory to reshape the international environment. Useful for identity construction. “China threat” aims to tie China down
MYTH/ METAPHOR	It’s a trap—US trying to surround China. Sense of victimisation from historical wrongs. China is different—will not be a hegemon

Litany

The litany for realists in China is that China is a natural competitor to the United States, but that this relationship can be managed without clashes that threaten the global order.⁴⁶ There is an “unjustified fear gripping the West” and a view that “China is just regaining its long lost right to have its say in world affairs” according to Lui Xiaoying.⁴⁷ According to Rozman, the recent realist “China threat” narrative focuses on three factors. First is the failure of other countries, especially as a result of the recent global financial crisis, casting doubt on the current capitalist model and increasing the appeal of the “China model”. Second, the assumption that China will be expansionist as the Western realist paradigm predicts. And third, the identity crisis in Western countries, especially the United States, where continued ascendancy is not assured meaning that China must be demonised while it is still relatively “weak”.⁴⁸ From a Chinese perspective, “China’s supposedly more activist, assertive foreign policy stance reflects intense anxiety over the gradual loss of American political, military and economic power and influence globally, as well as an effort to make China into a scapegoat for the failings of the West”.⁴⁹

Systemic causes level

“China now wants a seat at the head of the table” and “its leaders expect to be among the key architects of global institutions” according to Cheng Li, director of research at the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institute.⁵⁰ The “China threat” theory is seen as a way to deny China’s rightful place at the table. Ultimately Chinese realists are pessimistic about China’s external environment, specifically its cross-strait relationships, and especially the United States. Concepts such as transnational challenges, globalisation and global governance are rejected.⁵¹

The “China threat” theory is then seen as threatening to Chinese “core interests” and is implicated in related “national security” issues, including US military activity near China, arms sales to Taiwan, disputed territories in the South China Sea and other incidents. Yan holds the view that realists in China should “actively participate in international affairs, open itself up to the greater world, and enlarge international cooperation; however, all of these should be in favour of China’s national interests”.⁵²

Worldview/discourse level

The dominant discourse is not to “put an end to the China threat theory”, but to use it to reshape the international environment.

Official Chinese publications often refer to the “China threat” theory and so can be seen to be a useful tool for identity construction whereby anything considered hostile to the interests of China is lumped in with the “China threat” theory. A common response then becomes that America is the real

threat, or Taiwan, or Japan, or India or whomever, depending on the needs of the security matter at hand.⁵³ This discourse is useful for the ears of a domestic audience with historical sensitivities to foreign invasion and other external threats and the internal uprisings that have often ensued as a result. There is no doubt that a strategy that aims to keep China weak, to contain its rise by militarily encircling the mainland, and to slow its economic growth through currency and trade wars for no other reason than preventing it from emerging as a peer competitor, is open to moral criticism.⁵⁴

Carlson sees the Chinese worldview as evolving into two contrasting, contested and more fluid shapes.⁵⁵ On the one hand, China accepts the bedrock of the international system, tempered by a realistic acceptance of US hegemony and a degree of diminution of its states' rights and capacity for multilateral intervention. On the other hand, there is a renewed interest in the vision of *Tianxia* ("all under Heaven"; this will be developed further in the "Peaceful Rise" construct, below) put forward by Zhao Tingyang, based on particular interpretations of Chinese history and the normative principles underlying the current international order. Zhao cautions that we are currently facing the prospect of a "failed" world, in which the "American empire as 'winner takes all' will not lead to something of a cheerful 'end of history' but rather to the death of the world".⁵⁶ Zhao argues that the only way to prevent such an outcome is to create a grand narrative of three elements: a view of the world as a global geographical entity or "Oneness of the world", a commonly agreed, institutionally ordered world/society as the highest political order, rather than one of nation/states; this new order must be somehow legitimised by most of the people (and yet not be democratic).⁵⁷

Metaphor/myth level

It's a dangerous trap; "encircled"

The People's Republic of China has countered the "China threat" theories by equating them with a cold war mentality, ill will and a bias against China which jeopardises China's national interests. Chinese realists argue that "Western attempts to enlist greater Chinese involvement in global management and governance is a dangerous trap aimed at tying China down, burning up its resources, and retarding its growth".⁵⁸ "If China does not oppose the US, the US will abuse China's interests and China will become America's puppet", says Zhang Ruizhang.⁵⁹ According to Dai Xu, in response to an agreement between South Korea and the United States to construct a naval base to protect Seoul from attack, Beijing "cannot always put up with American provocations", and China "must draw a clear red line against American attempts to surround it".⁶⁰ Dai Xu further states that the US is trying to form a kind of "Asian NATO" in order to "create a global empire, and China will be the first to be threatened, because this undercover Asian NATO will be distributed along China's soft underbelly similar to the 'encirclement' seen during the Cold War".⁶¹

Any slight to national pride and sovereignty adds fuel to the sense of historical victimisation. From a Chinese perspective, the threat comes from a United States, along with other Western powers, Japan, India and Taiwan, that is hostile to China's political values and wants to contain its rise by supporting Taiwan's separation from mainland China, by offering sympathy to the Dalai Lama and to Uighur separatists, by forging military alliances perceived to encircle the Chinese mainland, and by the sustained argument that China should slow its growth. The unrest that erupted in Tibet in 2008, Xinjiang in 2009, and over the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, are all evidence of "foreign hostile forces" and Westerners' "ill intentions".⁶²

This time it's different

China's expansion will be different from the "imperialism and hegemony of the United States and 'the West' because it is aimed at restoring justice in an unjust world order".⁶³ Realists such as Yan Xuetong offer a moral argument about China's rise. Yan claims that China is only concerned with national rejuvenation and regaining its "lost international status rather than obtaining something new".⁶⁴ He believes that by dismantling the unipolar configuration of the world, China will make the Asia-Pacific region more peaceful, the world more civilised, bring about a booming world economy and contribute to scientific progress.⁶⁵ Not to be misunderstood, Yan argues that "Peaceful rise" is a dangerous theory which impedes China's ability to act forcefully to protect its national sovereignty and interests, especially with regard to Taiwan. This is echoed in the more nationalistic writings of Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu who argues in his book *China's Dream* that "Chinese cultural and racial superiority will allow it to outpace the United States economically" and bring in an "era of 'Yellow Fortune'".⁶⁶

Peaceful Rise (Peaceful Development) Construct

That China will rise peacefully, without threatening the current world order, is a policy produced as a direct response to "China threat" theories and discourses. In 2007, at the 17th Party Congress, held every five years, President Hu Jintao reiterated that China's foreign policy will follow the path of peaceful development and pursue a win-win international strategy.⁶⁷ The concept of a "peaceful rise" was first discussed in 1998 by Yan Xuetong with three other researchers at the China Institute for International Relations (CICIR).⁶⁸ Zheng Bijian, then Vice Principal of the Central Party School, articulated the concept of a "peaceful rise" during the 2003 Boao Forum for Asia. Wen Jiabao, in a speech at Harvard University, introduced this concept by declaring: "We are determined to secure a peaceful international environment and a stable domestic environment in which to concentrate on our own development, and with it to help promote world peace and development".⁶⁹ Hu Jintao officially launched this model as a strategic choice for China in December 2003. By mid-2004, "peaceful rise" had

become “peaceful development”, and by 2006 Hu Jintao declared that China’s principal objective was to build a “harmonious world”.⁷⁰

Table 4. Liberalist arguments supporting “Peaceful development”

Economic	Military	Ideological
Continued economic and political reforms	Military spending is considered routine, moderate and long-overdue	A harmonious society will be created if all act according to the “rules”
Plans for a “well-off” society	No recent military incursions	Competing social interests are balanced
Working within the current world system	Security sought through institutions, cooperation and interdependence	Broad social support
Deepening economic ties make conflict unlikely	Establish regional hegemony	Cooperative internationalism

Peaceful rise (from now on referred to as “peaceful development”) is about the “soft power” aspects of participating in the globalised economy and lifting the Chinese population’s standard of living into a middle income bracket. Importantly for liberalists, the “peaceful development” theory holds that China will not seek hegemony, nor attempt to destabilise the international order. Peaceful development is echoed in the liberalist view that states with high economic interdependence are prone to foster peace as this is more profitable than war. States must therefore choose between being a “trading” state, concerned with gaining wealth through commerce or a “territorial” state, obsessed with military expansion.⁷¹

“Peaceful Development” Theory Seen Through CLA

Litany

The message at this level is one of stability, development and cooperation. The central image that China wants to create is that of a “Harmonious Society”, which President Hu Jintao described in 2006 as “one that develops in a comprehensive way, which gives full play to modern ideas like democracy, rule of the law, fairness, justice, vitality, stability, orderliness and harmonious co-existence between humankind and nature”.⁷² In order to do this China will behave in a way that respects the current international order while pursuing a higher standard of living for its people and a more active role in the international community.

There is a strong narrative link between the litany level and all other levels, where the messages reinforce each other and support a simple view that “most Chinese people merely hope that their nation can grow to be as rich as the United States and can secure proper respect in the international community”.⁷³

Table 5. Alternative future—“Peaceful development”

LITANY	Focus on economic growth and on securing a comfortable life for its people
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	Internal security environment and economic growth important to maintaining power
DISCOURSE/ WORLDVIEW	Liberalist international relations. Rejuvenation of China to regain its lost status. Restoration of fairness by China becoming a recognised power rather than through military or territorial gains
MYTH/ METAPHOR	<i>Tianxia</i> or Grand Harmony. Tribute system where all neighbouring countries live in harmony while respecting China’s cultural and civilisational superiority

Systemic causes level

It is generally accepted that China is working within the current world system, and as such it is regarded as a status quo state. “What separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers, is that not only is it ‘growing up’ within a milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country’s development of global power status”.⁷⁴ The number of international institutions China is a member of is no small matter: it is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council with veto power (and is the largest contributor of peace keeping personnel among the five members), a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2001, a member of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and an active participant in a number of regional organisations including the ASEAN-China dialogue, ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, South Korea), ASEAN Regional Forum, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), East Asia Summit, Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Asia Europe Meeting.⁷⁵ It has joined well over 1, 000 international institutions and organisations which seek to both uphold the international order as well as to reform the international order to balance its interests. China has accumulated a great deal of material by working within this system and the trend is clearly towards continued integration.

The problems that concern the Chinese leadership at this level are economic growth and gaining acceptance as a great power.⁷⁶ The Chinese government appears to be well aware of the challenges it faces in achieving these interrelated goals and as a result has committed itself to further structural reforms in the 12th five-year plan (2011–2015) delivered by Premier Wen Jiabao in March 2011. So the solutions offered at this level are about continuing to grow the economy within the current world system but in a way that also contributes to sustainable environmental outcomes.

Worldview/discourse level

There are a number of elements to the liberalist worldview that are important here. Perhaps the most important is the rejection of the realist worldview that nation-states are “trapped in a struggle for power and security”.⁷⁷ The diplomatic philosophy is to maintain a strong, united and independent China so that it can continue to pursue its goal of economic development. If there are times where, in pursuing these goals, China appears to be aggressive, as “China threat” proponents charge, it is because of a “Chinese Cult of Defence”, a combination of two strands of culture—a Confucian/Sun Tzu element and a realpolitik element. The Confucian/Sun Tzu element promotes a primarily pacifistic, non-expansionist view, while the realpolitik element is predisposed to deploy force when confronted.⁷⁸

The “liberal internationalists” group of Chinese thinkers, including Zheng Bijan, Qin Yaqing and Shi Yinhong, believe that China is and must continue to be a peaceful and responsible member of the international order.⁷⁹ The overriding narrative of the Chinese worldview is that China has sought to join the institutions that support the current system of international rules. In working within the market system and established institutions it has been able to achieve massive economic benefits and will ultimately be able to increase its power and influence within these already established systems. This is a world where China is a successful trading nation, on a path to prosperity and increasingly sharing “certain basic values with the US”, which includes a commitment to the free market.⁸⁰ The tone of repeated and consistent messages of “peace, development and cooperation” is reassuring. Premier Wen Jiabao’s message that “The Chinese government and people are willing to work with the international community to respond to risks and challenges, share in development opportunities, and make new contributions to humanity’s lofty causes of peace and development” requires some consideration.⁸¹

Metaphor/myth level

As an ancient culture, China has a number of deep narratives from which to draw its underlying stories as to what the future should look like. The roots of the “Peaceful development” concept can be found in the Chinese philosophies of Confucianism and Daoism.

Tianxia—all under heaven

This vision of a utopian world where all things are in balance sits as both a worldview and a myth. *Tianxia* originally “was shaped only by the Chinese experience” which “embodied the idea of universalism and a superior moral authority that guided behaviour in a civilised world”.⁸² The concept in recent times has been more broadly applied to a universal utopian system and is consistent in message with those in the West who desire “world peace” or “world governance”. There is clearly a desire to return to the time before

China's interaction with the West, when China was the centre of the region's political, cultural and economic system—indeed it thought itself to be the centre of the world. It is well known what happened from there; the “Century of Humiliation”, now often used as an argument for the need for a return to a utopian Sinocentric world order with its guiding Confucian moral superiority.

Tianxia is seen as a way to give priority to mutual benefit, in which the global public interest is not served by inter-state competition with winners and losers, as seen in the Westphalian system.⁸³ At a policy level, *Tianxia* claims the grand strategy for the future of China will be won by the concepts of peace, development and cooperation—all key elements of China's stated foreign policy.⁸⁴ Understanding *Tianxia* and the repeated use of Confucian concepts disparaging the use of force does offer some assurances to westerners that China does not seek conflict and perhaps even opens some room for greater understanding of the cultural factors which shape China's decision-making.

Table 6. Three CLA stories for the rise of China

(1) Western CLA—China Threat (dominant)	
LITANY	China is on the rise—it is a potential hegemon
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	Anarchy in international system shifting the balance of power
DISCOURSE	Must stop the emerging hegemon
MYTH	China can be controlled
(2) Chinese CLA—China Threat	
LITANY	They're afraid and they're trying to stop us. They're the ones with problems, not us
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	We have legitimate issues of a developing nation-state
DISCOURSE	Global institutions need to recognise our interests. We're not going away and things are going to change. Don't humiliate us
MYTH	We're not the threat—they are. We will bring in a new golden age
(3) Alternative Future—Peaceful Development	
LITANY	Focus on economic growth and securing a comfortable life for its people
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	We're trying to work in the system
DISCOURSE	We will regain our lost international status through peaceful means
MYTH	All neighbouring countries will live in harmony while respecting China's cultural and civilisational superiority

As a non-democratic, authoritarian state in a region with democratic societies whose regional security relies on the large liberal democracy of the

United States, China faces challenges in its capacity to establish the legitimacy of this discourse without it being seen as “a hunger for nationalistic solutions to global issues”.⁸⁵ Blame for the West’s failure to fully embrace this concept is often placed on its stereotypical thinking.⁸⁶ *Tianxia* also embraces a cure for growing socio-economic inequality in China but is unclear on how an essentially Confucian ideology will prove to be a model for change in an already established world order.

Conclusion

The transformation of China in the last thirty years has changed the world, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. If China’s leaders and citizens do not engage in creating a positive, preferred future and the rest of the world does not respond in a constructive and creative way, the future of the international order, and perhaps the planet, could be threatened. Each of the futures presented in this chapter is seen to be the “disowned self” of the other, whereby each future disowns or pushes away its opposite.⁸⁷ As long as the opposite future pushes away its alternative, we cannot discover or develop scenarios that sit outside our discursive frames. By viewing the future of China through the narrow lens of international relations (IR) theory, without examining the deeper myths and worldviews held by those interest groups claiming expertise, it is not possible to move to a future beyond those officially planned. IR theory in the West is considered to be a general theory and as such may be resistant to incorporating futures thinking and methodologies into constructing policy analysis. This is a mistake. I argue that because the future cannot be predicted with any sort of accuracy, it is important to challenge the conclusions made by IR theory and to make use of broader and deeper perspectives in order to move toward preferred images of the future. Only in this way, by broadening the research agenda to explore the deeper layers of the way strategic identity is formed, can we move away from continued limited and potentially dangerous thinking and allow a new story of transformation to emerge.

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18. The Vulnerable Body: Using causal layered analysis to analyse a scene of violence

Joonas Vola *

This chapter uses CLA to analyse photographic images of violence in the context of war and peacekeeping. The aim is to recognise culturally coded signs of vulnerability as well as to deploy the potentiality of CLA in analysing visual material.

Introduction

This chapter uses CLA to critically analyse the contents and context of photographic images. The case study material, the two Pulitzer Prize-winning photographs taken by the photographer Paul Watson in Mogadishu, frames the analysis of war photography as a public and visible expression of violence and vulnerability for the Western media audience. The aim is to estimate the representative power of the images and their potential effects on international politics when it comes to the legitimacy of military intervention and peacekeeping operation in the eyes of the public. The argument is constructed on a critical reading of image and photography, social representations, as well as culturally-oriented perceptions of visual signs.

CLA functions as a methodological umbrella for different disciplines from social sciences to art, enabling the combination of different kinds of approaches as layers of a single analysis. The four layers of the CLA in this chapter reveal multiple levels of violence in the representations, within and beyond the photographs' physical frames. Racist bias, imperialistic practices and brutal scenes move the analytical focus from reconstruction of a violent event towards understanding of symbolic violence. The symbolic violence emphasises that violations happen not only in the past event but also in the present moment, in front of the perceiver's eyes through the representative practices themselves, constructing the social reality and stressing the vulnerability of life.

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CLA in Visual Analysis

In 1996 Osama bin Laden stated that the death of one American in Mogadishu led to the withdrawal of the United States from the peacekeeping operation there, revealing their impotence and weakness.¹ He was referring to the US Staff Sergeant, William David Cleveland, who was killed in Mogadishu, and to the decision of then President Bill Clinton to abandon the pursuit of General Mohamed Ali Farrah Aidid and to withdraw from Somalia by 31 March in 1994.² What caused the transformation of a single body into an object of vulnerability and death, and made its appearance unbearable in the presented political context? The following theoretical observations take us closer to the answer.

In CLA, language is the constitutive matter of reality, where a text is “something or someone that can be read”.³ Also, in Serge Moscovici’s theory of social representations, knowledge is produced through interaction and communication, which are always linked to human interest.⁴ Social representations are the objects produced and consumed in communication⁵ constituting the social reality.⁶ Guy Debord emphasises the centrality of documents as the linguistic non-personal memory of social governance.⁷ Similarly, Susan Sontag claims that photographic documents “alter and enlarge our notions of what is worth looking at and what we have a right to observe”.⁸

This frames the case study into the documentation of the event in question: the two Pulitzer Prize-winning photographs taken by Canadian photographer Paul Watson in Mogadishu.⁹ It is a question of the representation of the event, a process where a set of photographs affected the collective consciousness, something which “brings us close to an understanding of the fragility and mortality of human life, the stakes of death in the scene of politics”.¹⁰ The research question is *how does the represented body of the soldier transform into a sign of vulnerability?*

The following analysis is based on the author’s perceptions of the two photographs supported by various academic studies. The conducted Barthesian reading of the photographs is culturally-oriented, but it highlights the individuality of the perceiver: “culturally [...] I participate in the figures, the faces, the gestures, the settings, the actions”;¹¹ “it is what I add to the photograph and *what is nonetheless already there*”.¹² This is comparable to Johan Galtung’s “socio-cultural *code* of civilisation”. He divides the cultural spheres into six cosmologies: collectively held, subconscious ideas about what constitutes normal and natural reality.¹³ The *Western* sphere used comes closest to the cosmologies *Occident I* and *Occident II*, where the focus is in the Greco-Roman and modern sphere of *Occident I*. These cosmologies share the same Semitic-Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity and

Islam¹⁴ making some of their features comparable and helping to capture the vision of the Western viewer through the author's eyes.

In this chapter, the signs of vulnerability and violence emerging from the photographs are searched by dividing the images into the four layers: litany, systemic causes, discourse/worldview and myth/metaphor. The litany describes what is there in the picture, the visual data for further analysis. Systemic causes looks into the practices of producing and framing a photograph. The discourse/worldview explains from which discourses the "otherness" of the Western worldview is constructed. Finally the myth/metaphor combines semiotic and anthropological knowledge to illustrate the symbolic level, deeply embedded to the codes of the cultural spheres.



Figure 1. Mogadishu case study image series¹⁵

Litany

The litany level of the two photographs reveals to us their visible and obvious messages.¹⁶ A photograph is often understood as a factual object and indisputable evidence. Furthermore, the fact that these are news photographs increases their informative nature. Apparent units of visual data derived from the photos are the body (white male, either unconscious or dead, lying on the ground), the crowd ("African" men and women, with strong facial expressions, hands raised), and the canes and ropes (used by the members of the crowd to drag and hit the body). The clear distinction between the crowd and the body and the connecting physical instrument places them into the

roles of victim and perpetrators. The witness to the violent event, even though providing the “first person” perspective for the viewer of the photographs, is still not clearly visible in the litany level (the photographer doesn’t cast a shadow or mirror image into the space within the photographs). The “evidence” of the event divided into and between the images seems easily discontinuous¹⁷ and does not give a fully satisfying understanding of the claim of the vulnerability of the US military force. That is why a deeper view of both the contents of the photographs, and of the concept of photography, is required.

Systemic causes

When the systemic level is analysed, it is crucial to recognise the dominant representative practices and mediating technological applications. As Sontag puts it “Photographs furnish evidence” having “a more innocent, and therefore more accurate, relation to visible reality than do other mimetic objects”.¹⁸ The main questions can be drawn to the informative nature of the photograph and to the participatory role of photography in how the event is constructed. For Sontag the photographs are only small fragments of the reality, which may shock us and cause emotional reactions, but they are not interpretations *per se* or informing and moving us politically.¹⁹ Judith Butler criticises the taken for granted evidential nature of the photographs²⁰ by highlighting the interpretative side:²¹ “The photograph is not merely a visual image awaiting interpretation; it is itself actively interpreting, sometimes forcibly so”.²² Framing is the central act that produces and reveals the interpretation. All images are framed, and not without a purpose,²³ because the act of photographing an event does not occur in a socio-political vacuum. For André Bazin a photographic image is rooted in reality, but one needs to ask what lies beyond the image.²⁴ As in Jacques Lacan’s analysis of gaze and voice, *objet petit a* in the picture cannot be placed on the subject but rather on the object. Gaze is a place in the picture where the object is looking at you (the viewer); the frame of the gaze is already coded into the content of the picture.²⁵

The fragmented reality produced by photographs can have a similar effect to narrative via montage. Russian film director Sergei Eisenstein is known as the creator of montage theory. The expressive power of montage is based on the low density and strong contrast between the structuring elements, which is opposite to clear continuity. To be able to maintain the causality of what is seen, this empty space is filled with material from the viewer’s mind, based on their thoughts, cultural background and worldview. The viewer transforms from a passive to an active constructing element of the representation. Montage technique creates a strong experience and illusion of reality.²⁶ As Kari Pirilä and Erkki Kivi conclude, the essence of montage is not a sum of images but a third expressional reality.²⁷ Montage theory has similarities

with Sontag's claim that the photographic image of the event structures memory more effectively than understanding or narrative.²⁸

The framing of the Mogadishu photographs places the body in the centre of the picture, which makes it the dominating element of the documented event and awakens the feeling of "being there". The shot of a camera actually captures a very short moment from the event and leaves the beginning and the end open for interpretation. In a montage the elements can appear at the same time or follow each other. The constantly changing power and counter-power are constructing the dramaturgy of the event.²⁹ Also, the interpretation of the event may vary depending on the structure of the representation. The two photographs are the variable elements which create the montage depending on which pictures are used and in which order. This potentially highlights a certain aspect of the event. Butler refers to this as the meaning of changing context and of the selection of what is shown and how it is shown, for example the size of the printed pictures.³⁰

Discourse/worldview

Revealing the worldview and discourses that set the aspect for the analysis of the event "behind" the physical photographs is required if the way the visual signs are read and understood is to be acknowledged. The analysis of the worldview layer divides the event into stereotypic forms of "us" and "the other".* The status of the person representing "us" can be briefly identified as a white Western soldier/peacekeeper. This status embodies dominance and protection, a human barrier between the conflicting parties. The contents of the photos break the social order; the protector becomes a victim, and the ones who need to be either protected or controlled become violators. A threat to an institution can be seen as more threatening than a direct threat against individuals, because the former presents a danger not only for the individual but also to the collective. To "prevent killing" has turned into "to be killed". The attempt to present death as a meaningful sacrifice for the community's aims and values likely failed in the case of Mogadishu because the published photographs seem to have had an important role in the change of public opinion against keeping US forces in Somalia.† In the context of the photographs, this is possibly based on the presented reaction of the crowd, which celebrates death and does not appear as something either vulnerable or protectable; on the contrary it makes the event of death meaningless, unreasonable and horrifyingly performed.

* See e.g., V. Harle, 'Identiteetti politiikka ja kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkimus', in M. Luoma-aho, S. Moisio & M. Tennberg (eds.), *Politiikan tutkimus Lapin yliopistossa* (101–131), Rovaniemi, PSC Interry, 2005, 102.

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A worldview consisting of presumptions cannot change immediately, because language does not transform or disappear instantly, leading to long-term pre-condition.³¹ The presumptions for the other/enemy, are built on old discursive formations based on missionary and colonial practices, historical and cultural misunderstandings and present development debates in the West concerning the African continent. Historical perceptions and modern Western media draw an image of an unstable and unpredictable continent and its people which needs aid and control. This clearly reflects the imperialistic discursive practices (not just language) that Galtung describes. In his structural theory of imperialism the world is divided into Centre and Periphery nations³² and relations between these nations are formed by exchange in the fields of the economy, politics, military, communication and culture.³³ In the case of Africa these relations concern development and humanitarian aid given by the West, military intervention and peacekeeping, mass media, medicine, technology and education. Within the analysis these discourses are named *negro/necro*, where the term carries two sets of meanings, myths and metaphors: *black* and *death*.

Myth/metaphor

Negro in this context expresses not only the physical sign of skin colour but also the unknown, primitivism and instability; a cultural blackout. *Necro* means death, describing Africa as a continent with wild life, civil wars, ethnic conflicts, lethal diseases and humanitarian crises constructing an image in the Western media of great danger to the lives of others, and even to itself. In *necro*discourse death dominates life, and life exists only in the context of dying. An example which George Yancy presents is the “cannibal Negro”, a perception and expression of a white western child while encountering a black person.³⁴ Yancy describes the western white population’s presumptions as following: “Negroes steal, they cheat, they are hypersexual, mesmerizingly so, and the quintessence of evil and danger”.³⁵ Similarly, Achille Mbembe states that these “savages” are seen as lacking some of the human character, leading to a horrifying and alien experience.³⁶ The inability to recognise and separate a *human being* from a *human beast* makes “us” more vulnerable when encountering different ethnicities.

The analysis on the myth/metaphor level is complemented by semiotic theory and structural anthropology on myths. Metaphor is understood here as a semiotic act, a culturally recognised and systematically coded association³⁷ which relates to Claude Lévi-Strauss’ approach to mythology, in which myth resides as a combination of elements, not as isolated units, withholding more complex information than any other form of linguistic expression.³⁸

To describe the relations inside the photograph, each image is divided into separated units with three roles: *the subject*, *the object* and *the viewer*. These roles are not “owned” by the different visual units, but they emerge in varying ways depending on their mutual relations and dynamics within the

frame, and, in the case of the viewer, extending outside the frame. *The subject* is active, dominant, visible and connected to *the object* which is passive, dominated and visible. *The viewer* reveals the context and gives the physical perspective for the representation. One unit can also hold more than one role simultaneously. For example *the viewer*, might be drawn to the image by some visible connection (other than just physical perspective), depending on the positions of *the subject* and *the object*.

In the photographs the body is inert. The images don't show any major injuries like wounds, missing limbs or bleeding, so no clear diagnosis concerning the present state of the body or the cause of death can be made. The position of the body tells us more than its other features.

A military uniform is a sign of power. It places the person wearing it above civilians or illegal combatants as a representative of sovereign power. The uniform affords a dominant role and also creates a hierarchy among those who wear it. Wrestling the uniform therefore has a meaning which I call *symbolic skinning*. In warfare the skinning of the enemy appears as a spectacle of violence but also as the ultimate act of power over the life of the enemy and even his/her existence as a human being. Clothes are the "skin" that is ripped off to diminish the victim's personhood.

The relationship between *the object* (the body of the soldier) and *the subject* (the crowd) can be partly explained by Michel Foucault's study of torture, a practice of the thousand deaths where life is maintained and subdivided into several acts of killing,³⁹ a practice of punishment-as-spectacle. Foucault defines torture as an exercise in terror which makes one aware of the presence of the sovereign power through the body⁴⁰ as "the ritual praise of its force, on a corpse".⁴¹ A corpse has no capacity to feel pain, but the behaviour of the crowd makes the clear division between a living body and a corpse waver. This leads to a situation where the nature of violence is symbolic and presents the absolute power of *the subject* over the existence of *the object* as a living or dead being. Quoting Baudrillard: "Violence in itself may be perfectly banal and inoffensive. Only symbolic violence is generative of singularity".⁴² The way the body is treated by "skinning" and dragging it reminds the viewer of the butchering of an animal, as Foucault describes the mutilation of the body and the removal of organs "as one does with an animal".⁴³ In a sense, the body of the man is transformed into the body of a sacrificed animal. This makes a reference to the western myth of the sacrificial animal and its anthropomorphic counterpart, the victorious lamb, where the body of the soldier becomes a reference to one of the most powerful mythic events, the crucifixion of the messiah. This gives demonic features to the cheering crowd which is violating the body.

An important detail is that the corpse is never directly touched by the crowd, which is in the role of *the subject*. The corpse is dragged by ropes, hit with

rods and stomped with sandals.* If the event is seen as a ritual it can be analysed through the concept of impurity. Contact with an impure thing makes the person who makes that contact impure and this is *a fortiori* in cases where the impurity is caused by acts of violence.⁴⁴ As an object of violence the body also symbolises the presence of violence. Direct contact must be avoided, because touching the body of the sacrifice would lead to a physical spread of the sign of violence into the community, which tries to keep it outside. The instruments that are used are contaminated, but they allow *the subject* to maintain the necessary distance from the object of violence.

The viewer in this case is not only in the role of a witness but also of a participant. Foucault claims that images observe us and that the spectator is forced to enter the picture, which is privileged and inescapable.⁴⁵ The photographs were taken in the middle of *the subject*, surrounded by the crowd. Because of the physical perspective and location of the photographer, *the viewer*, the one who perceives the photograph outside of its frames, is taking part in the event, and becomes a constructing element of the representation. The second photo is the turning point of the roles. Two men in the crowd are looking at *the viewer* and the one on the left has an expression of rage on his face; *the viewer* has become revealed, vulnerable and a potential object for violence.

Life and death are fundamental oppositions in Lévi-Strauss's structuralism.⁴⁶ The analysis used in the case study of Mogadishu shows these categories as elusive. The difference between representing life and death is extremely "thin" and that's why the line between the two is hard to draw. *Symbolic violence* creates a mixed message where *the viewer* is unable to discover the reasons and causality because of the conflicting signs. The assault of the body reaches such an extent that the act of violence is not limited to the concept of life, but goes beyond it. This case also depicts a moment where *the viewer* transforms into *the object*, threatened by violence instead of just observing a violent event.

Table 1. CLA Summary

Mogadishu—Death of the U. S. Marine	
LITANY	Violent crowd, violated Body
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	Photograph as reality, montage as causality
DISCOURSE/WORLDVIEW	The West and the other
MYTH/METAPHOR	The human beast, the cannibal

* Touching a body with a foot or footwear is an extremely insulting, culturally-oriented semiotic act.

Conclusion

CLA as a method offers a possibility to increase depth when it comes to analysing visual material. The litany is the level where the researcher recognises the significance of a certain picture, a surface and trace of a phenomenon in a single disappearing moment. The systemic causes reveal the technological/material practices, while the discourse/worldview reveals the linguistic practices behind the image connecting the separated event with the world. The myth/metaphor can, finally, show the level of the symbolic exchange, expanding the historical and geographical context. In a photographic event, the eye is fixed, leaving the analysis also with a blind spot in reconstructing the complete event and variety of different perspectives. Within the work on the vulnerable body, CLA is used first and foremost as a problem-revealing analysis. The findings show that violence and death can emerge as a sign of vulnerability, but that these forces do not necessarily make such a sign a political phenomenon. The *symbolic violence* works on the collective level of knowledge and that is where violence becomes highly political. Setting, framing and presenting an event circling around an assaulted human body makes the violence political because it doesn't only happen, it is constructed. In the process of symbolic violence, *the subject* affects not only the ways, how *the object* is, but moreover, what *the object* is. How one is treated defines what one is. It manipulates the appearances of being alive, in pain or dying, even one's appearance as a human being. The possibility of entering and transforming one's existence reveals the true vulnerability of *the object*. The represented event of violence inevitably becomes a constructing factor of social reality and a sign of vulnerability.

¹ Iconic photos, 'U. S. Soldier dragged through Mogadishu', retrieved 28 October, 2013, from <http://iconicphotos.wordpress.com/2010/03/10/u-s-marine-dragged-through-mogadishu/>.

² Ibid.

³ S. Inayatullah, 'Theory and case studies of an integrative and transformative methodology', from S. Inayatullah (ed.), *The Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) Reader*, Tamsui, Tamkang University Press, 2004, 13.

⁴ G. Duveen and S. Moscovici (eds.), *Social Representations: Explorations in Social Psychology*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000, 2.

⁵ Ibid., 3.

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- ¹⁸ S. Sontag (2005 (1973)) op. cit., 3.
- ¹⁹ J. Butler (2009), op. cit., 66–69.
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- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.
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³⁹ M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, London, Penguin Books, 1991 (1977), 33–34.

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IV
FINANCIAL AND WORK FUTURES

19. World Futures and the Global Financial Crisis: Narratives that define

Sohail Inayatullah

*Using CLA, the underlying stories of the global financial crisis are explored. The seven narratives presented are the GFC as: (1) a mortgage crisis, (2) a global banking crisis, (3) creative destruction as part of the natural cycle of the capitalist system, (4) a geopolitical shift from the USA to Chindia, (5) part of God's plan, (6) a symptom of the inequity of the world capitalist system, and (7) a window of opportunity to a transformed greener partnership world. From analysis, the essay moves to five scenarios of the futures of the world system. These are: (1) business as usual, (2) the rise of 'Chindia', (3) the quick and long path to sustainability, (4) the end game of capitalism, and (5) a new era.**

Narratives that Define

While most believe the global financial crisis to be clearly over—‘We’re in the money: it’s party time again’¹—others are far less certain that the crisis is really over. With sovereign default hanging over the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain), crippling debt may still lead to a systemic collapse. Five years back, economics professor Nouriel Roubini, one of the few to accurately forecast the financial crisis, argued that “the outlook is precarious under the best of circumstances”.² More recently he writes that even though the markets have recovered “excess liquidity is flowing to the financial sector rather than the real economy”,³ leading to yet another bubble and thus another crash. Further stimulation is challenging because conservative groups demand tax relief. Lena Komileva, an economist with British firm Tullett Prebon, writes: “The foundation of the global economy remains unstable even if the cracks have been smoothed over and we are happy to forget what lies beneath the heavy layer of [the] public sector’s liquidity insurance”.⁴ Paul Krugman argues that the recovery only exacerbates the causes of the GFC, that is, increased inequity. While the

* An earlier version of this chapter appeared as: ‘Emerging world scenario triggered by the global financial crisis’, *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, Vol 14, No 3, 2010, 48–69; and in Spanish as ‘Los futuros del mundo y la crisis financier global: narratives que definen y escenarios que crean’, *Ekonomiaz*, No 76, 1 cuatrimestre 2011, 64–91.

wealthy lost income during the GFC, Krugman writes, “95 percent of the gains from economic recovery since 2009 have gone to the famous 1 percent. In fact, more than 60 percent of the gains went to the top 0.1 percent, people with annual incomes of more than \$1.9 million. Basically, while the great majority of Americans are still living in a depressed economy, the rich have recovered just about all their losses and are powering ahead”.⁵ With the causes unresolved, the prognosis for the patient is obvious. Of course, others are more hopeful. UBS analysts, while mindful of the challenges facing the world economy, argue that a slow recovery is ahead even if it is unlikely to be a “normal” recovery.⁶

Taking a longer view, chaos, uncertainty and complexity have become the new normal; business-as-usual is now business-*was*-usual. This chapter does not attempt to provide market predictions—to play the “getting it right” forecasting game. Rather it analyses the myths underlying how we perceive this crisis, with the intention of creating policy contexts for different and deeper futures.

The methodology I use to understand the global financial crisis is narrative-based. Writes Daniel Yergin, chairman of IHS Cambridge Energy Associates: “Narrative goes beyond the dramatic stories of how it unfolded. It provides the explanation of what happened and the framework for organising thinking for the future”,⁷ essentially a version of causal layered analysis.⁸ As CLA moves from the interpretation of particular interest groups to a wider systems and worldview perspective, the market trader, the financial specialist, the economist, the social reformist, the new age transformationalist and the green sustainability enthusiast may find an aspect of how they constitute reality present in this analysis, but some dimensions may be outside their particular cognitive framework and organising myths, and thus they may individually find the suggested alternative challenging.

While I use the perspectives of these interests groups, I argue that the problems associated with the GFC (and other similar macro problems) are at a level that none of these particular knowledge interests can adequately understand or solve. A meta-approach that takes as its foundation chaos, complexity and futures thinking is required.

From chaos theory, the key concept is that one event can destabilise or transform the entire system. From complexity theory, the key concept is that the whole is greater than the parts; the system can become unstable, and change dramatically. And from futures theory, two concepts are central. First, while there are deep patterns and cycles of social change, which, to some extent, can help us to make predictions, the future is open and humans create it by their actions; second, the wisest way forward is to understand alternative futures, clarify our vision of where we wish to go, and take steps to get there.

Change tends to be difficult even when the world is stable, uncertainty is low and perspectives on the future are shared; change is therefore even more difficult in complex and chaotic conditions where uncertainty is high and there is a great deal of disagreement as to next steps. This is made worse—that is, efficacy decreases—when we assume the world out there, the objective world, is unrelated to the world that comprises our various subjectivities.

Different mental processes require different strategies. As political and cultural commentator David Brooks notes, cognitive scientists “distinguish between normal risk-assessment decisions... and decisions made amid extreme uncertainty”.⁹ Economists and policy-makers trust that people will behave in the rational ways that economic models assume, but in this period of extreme uncertainty, behaviour becomes nonlinear, unpredictable, and stubbornly resistant to Keynesian rationalism. Thus, markets go up and down not on the fundamentals of a particular company, especially in uncertain times, or currency fluctuations, but on fear and greed and on what we think others think: an endless loop of foresight not into the real economy but into the psychological economy. Writes Andreas Hoefert, Chief Economist of UBS:

Modern economic theory generally assumes that investors behave rationally. But we know that in reality markets are driven much more by the enemies of rationalism: emotion and psychology. Analysing the patient—the market—since the 2008 financial crisis, a bipolar diagnosis, or as it used to be called, manic-depressive, is hard to resist. Giddy euphoria is followed by bouts of inconsolable melancholy. Rational behaviour is completely missing.¹⁰

To understand the global financial crisis, what is going on and what may result, it is, then, important to step back and deconstruct its underlying stories. The stories that explain the global financial crisis are multifold, but seven are foundational: (1) a mortgage crisis, (2) a global banking crisis, (3) creative destruction, part of natural cycles, (4) geopolitical shift, (5) God’s plan, (6) symptom of capitalism, and (7) a window of opportunity to a different, greener world.

Narrative 1: Mortgage crisis

The narrow view is that this is just a mortgage crisis; there was a lack of regulation as to who banks could lend money to—the famous sub-prime crisis. Rising stock and housing prices fuelled a bubble.¹¹ Banks were caught in the bubble, as were stockholders. During speculative bubbles, no one assumes the bubble will end, but as with all bubbles, the end comes in a swift and shocking way.

Within this narrative, the solutions are simple: (1) more oversight, and (2) more rules—covering levels of borrowing, down-payment requirements,

debt to net capital ratios that are sustainable (the long standing rules were that for every \$15 of debt, lenders needed to have \$1 of equity),¹² and use of money during the good times to ward off problems during the bad.

The underlying moral of this story is to “live within one’s means”. Systemic rules as to debt-equity ratios need to be in place to ensure this. As well, a new story—especially in America—of purpose needs to be told. The foundational story of “I shop therefore I am” needs to be challenged and replaced with “living within one’s means”. This can be difficult when everyone else is, or at least appears to be, splurging in party-town.

Table 1. CLA—The mortgage crisis story

	Deconstruction—the problem	Reconstruction—solutions
LITANY	Mortgage crisis	Down-payment, job required. Lend to those who can pay back
SYSTEMIC	Lack of regulation	Save those who may default, but generally regulate banks and other lenders. Stricter national and international rules
WORLDVIEW	Consumer debt-based Capitalism	Responsible spending, savings, even frugality
MYTH	I shop therefore I am	Live within one’s means

Narrative 2: Global banking crisis

Even if one believes that the core issue was the mortgage crisis, the sub-prime debacle has been and continues to be contagious, spreading throughout the banking and broader financial systems. Indeed, the mortgage crisis led to a financial crisis, which in turn led to an overall economic crisis.

Given the contagion, it is not just the USA and, more recently, Europe that must set their houses in order, but the entire world. While Americans may need to save more, Asian nations may need to rethink nirvana as defined by the rapacious American consumer. Global regulation and a change in global values are required. Former Prime Minister of the UK Gordon Brown went so far as to say that a new global organisation was needed to supplant both the World Bank and the IMF, creating a new financial world order.¹³ Those that hold to this type of analysis are globalists; they believe it is not less globalisation—protecting one’s financial boundaries—but *more* globalisation that is the solution. The key is to restore trust in the system. Credit, as Brown reminds us, comes from *credo*, the Latin for “I believe”.¹⁴

Globalists understand that if inequity was foundational in creating the problem (labour wages did not keep up with corporate profits) then more equity is the solution. Finding ways to enhance equity will regain

confidence. Capitalism has its ills but these can be controlled through sound governance. In an age of global capitalism, smarter and wiser global governance is required.

At the systemic level, specific projects that are part of the solution include: (1) infrastructure development—roads and other grand projects; (2) the protection of jobs via job sharing; and (3) limiting salaries in those corporations that receive government hand-outs. Without a doubt, Keynes is the hero, and the guiding story is that “we are all in the same boat”. Luckily we can see a beautiful future ahead; a city with jobs and a shopping centre ahead; so let’s spend, spend, spend. But do so wisely, this time around. The state as parent will dole out the dollars so this can be made possible. And there have been great successes. Indeed, the White House claims that “The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009—President Obama’s \$787 billion stimulus—saved or created three million jobs, helping avoid a depression and end a recession”.¹⁵ The question is what’s next?

Table 2. CLA—The global banking crisis story

	Deconstruction—the Problem	Reconstruction—Solutions
LITANY	Stock prices in decline	Government intervention
SYSTEMIC	Bank failures	New banking rules; purchase toxic assets and work on new international banking regulatory structure
WORLDVIEW	Untamed, unruly globalisation	Mature and equitable globalisation
MYTH	Loss of trust	Restore faith and trust in the system— <i>credo</i>

Narrative 3: Creative destruction crisis

In contrast are the true blue capitalists. For them, the global financial crisis is just the normal (if extreme) part of the business cycle. Yes, some more regulation is required, but endless stimulus packages are not the solution. They but transform private debt into public debt. And if productivity gains do not occur, inflation will be the result. The underlying story is: “The patient is ill and he needs bitter medicine”. While the entire financial system needs to be rescued, particular banks should be allowed to fail; “Let the weak fail and the strong emerge”, is one underlying myth. Destruction followed by consolidation is a normal process in business and technology cycles. One should never forget that, in this story, the market is always right. And the market quite correctly is punishing those who have “sinned” (the corrupt or, like Detroit car companies and large financial institutions, those who have not understood the changing business landscape). Bail-outs rarely

work as they allow the weak to survive, thus putting the entire pack in jeopardy.

The archetypal hero is Jack Welch. He was famous for telling GE that short term pain will lead to long term gain.¹⁶ When he was CEO at GE, he insisted that each division annually fire the bottom 10 percent. This way, the entire ship not only stays afloat but, like the Starship Enterprise, “Boldly goes where no one has gone before”. Unfortunately for GE, the darling of the company, the finance division, appears not to have been as disciplined as the others. Thus their mantra of lend, lend, and lend led to a karma kickback and a stock price that has plummeted dramatically.

In this process of creative destruction, it is crucial not to prop up the losers but to let them disappear, as new winners will emerge from the wreck. The new winners will innovate, create new products, find new markets and all will be well again. Saving those who have lost their homes merely rewards the lazy. Indeed, major crises lead to opportunities; for many the 2008–2009 crisis (like the 1987 market crash) has been the best buying opportunity in a century. For those ready to take risks and find solid, undervalued companies (for example, those who embrace ideas on the edge, who have great products, little competition in their area, lots of cash, research budgets that lead to innovation, and a vision of the future), everything will work out fine.

Table 3. CLA—The creative destruction story

	Deconstruction—the Problem	Reconstruction—Solutions
LITANY	Prices dropping, recession, perhaps depression	Buy low, new opportunities
SYSTEMIC	Banks are being propped up	Let banks fail, house ownership is not a right. Allow risk
WORLDVIEW	Markets are being distorted by governments and central bankers	Creative destruction—true markets
MYTH	Natural cycle of events	Time for strong medicine, invisible hand, no pain, no gain

Narrative 4: Geopolitical shift

Others see the GFC as not merely a crisis of housing and banking but also as signalling change in the geopolitics of the world economy. Former Premier of China Wen Jiabao squarely saw the global financial crisis as American made, based on incorrect macroeconomic policies and lack of savings. But, in a deeply interconnected world, the American problem is everyone’s. Said the Chinese leader:

The crisis is attributable to a variety of factors and the major ones are: inappropriate macroeconomic policies of some economies and their unsustainable model of development characterized by prolonged low savings and high consumption; excessive expansion of financial institutions in the blind pursuit of profit; lack of self-discipline among financial institutions and rating agencies and the ensuing distortion of risk information and asset pricing; and the failure of financial supervision and regulation to keep up with financial innovations, which allowed the risks of financial derivatives to build and spread.¹⁷

In contrast, as of September 2009, China had \$2.3 trillion in foreign reserves¹⁸ and by the end of September 2013 this figure had risen to \$3.66 trillion.¹⁹ A number of factors explain China's economic rise. These include an ethic of hard work and saving, low cost labour, the lack of a regulatory framework to protect labour and the environment, an undervalued currency, and an efficient mix of State control and free market. Metaphorically, China is the world's factory (and the rise of Germany is explained by their strategic decision to help build that factory). Indeed, five years back China overtook Germany as the world's biggest exporter and reported a near \$200 billion trade surplus for 2009.²⁰ It has also overtaken Japan to become the world's second largest economy.²¹

With the "day of reckoning" for the American economy having arrived,²² it appears that a China-led Asia can save the day and, in the process, Asia can rediscover itself. In the 18th Century, China and India accounted for nearly 50 per cent of the world's wealth²³ and it appears that we are moving in that direction again. By 2032, if current trends continue, China will be the largest economy in the world, and by 2050 China will be 20 per cent larger than the USA. India's GDP, is expected by many analysts to go from \$1.1 trillion in 2009 to \$17.8 trillion in 2050. For China and India together, GDP is projected to increase by nearly \$60 trillion.²⁴ In this scenario, the USA would remain a major player, but its relative power would certainly decline.

The new system would remain capitalist but with an Asian face. It would display more collectivism and family focus, more concern for equity, and a more authoritarian (as in Singapore "You will be Creative!") style, as well as far more government intervention with endless ministries of trade, investment, innovation, biotechnology, nanotechnology and genomics. Productivity would grow because of wise technocrats guiding the market, not the market guiding the state. "Chindia" will be like Japan Inc., but without the Japanese fear of immigration, and with a smaller ageing-related burden.

It is important to note that better control of inflation, lower deficits, increasing productivity, a demographic dividend, richer social programs and greater political stability have given the emerging giants more room for error at a time when the macro-economic environment in rich countries has been

deteriorating.²⁵ Thus conditions favour Chindia at this stage of the world economy. Their future is bright.

Table 4. CLA—The geopolitical shift story

	Deconstruction—the Problem	Reconstruction—Solutions
LITANY	High debt ratios	Low debt, \$3.8 trillion+ in Chindian savings; East Asia \$6.4 plus trillion in savings
SYSTEMIC	Ageing society, lack of savings	Savings plus hard work plus low cost labour plus demographic dividend
WORLDVIEW	Western corporate capitalism	Capitalism with an Asian face
MYTH	Day of Reckoning for the West	Peaceful rise of Asia

Narrative 5: God's plan

The fifth narrative has two dimensions. First, all agency for the crisis is laid at the feet of God. God has caused this crisis as He wishes to humble humans so that they return to thinking about Him and acting as He wishes. If humans do not, then the American system will collapse, eventually leading to the collapse of the world economic system. Humans can and should do very little except wait for the collapse.

Illustrative of this perception is American evangelical preacher Ronald Weinland, who prophesizes that “On Pentecost of 2012, the world will experience a final transition from mankind ruling himself to that of God’s government ruling over all nations”.²⁶ This heralds the end of false beliefs. This is not just a fringe view. American Tea party leader Michele Bachmann asserts: “We are in God’s end time... like the days of Noah”.²⁷

Table 5a. CLA—The God’s plan story

	Deconstruction—the Problem	Reconstruction—Solutions
LITANY	Physical disasters	Let the collapse begin
SYSTEMIC	Total collapse	Focus on God, prayer, help others
WORLDVIEW	Fundamentalist	Fundamentalist
MYTH	We have sinned	God will save the day, but first destruction

In 2009, when this chapter was first written, relevant were the predictions of the Mayan calendar that the world would end in 2012. However, critics pointed out that the Mayans’ inability to predict their own demise certainly challenged their forecasting credibility.²⁸ An alternative interpretation is

2012 as analogy for a shift in how we think, in consciousness, with the GFC as a leading indicator of this.

Linked less to the details of the Mayan prophecy, but more focused on cycles and the possibility for renewal, is the work of spiritual teachers like Eckhart Tolle. His approach does not focus on external litany events but suggests that we see external challenges as a way to deepen our selves, to move toward inner peace and even bliss. Losing one’s job can be seen as disastrous or as a chance to deal with the cracks in one’s life—a chance to rethink meaning and purpose, to understand what is truly important and what is trivial.²⁹ Yes, a financial crisis, as with any crisis, causes suffering, but this suffering can lead to inner transformation, suggests Tolle.* If one is present to the pain one feels, creativity and solutions can emerge naturally. If one remains in panic and pain then nothing is learned and old patterns continue to repeat themselves.

Taking a broader, and, if you will, a teleological view, this crisis is created by the collective unconscious. Tired of the breathtaking speed of hyper-capitalism, needing a rest from keeping up with what used to be the Joneses but is now the Changs and the Kumars, the system searches for a pause. We ask ourselves: how many phones, personal computers, iPods, DVD players, plasma televisions, houses and cars do we need; how many of the latest things do we need? Thus the recession is about a different dimension of who we are, challenging us to be present to our activities, to our daily habitual thoughts, and to move out of egoicmasculinist hyper-growth consciousness. It is our unconsciousness to other ways of knowing (slow time, cyclical time, spiritual time, nature time) that has led to the apparent victory of hyper-linear market time, and thus the need for a slowing down—a recession—to reflect, and redirect effort and purpose.

This is a time of transition.

Table 5b. CLA—The inner transformation story

	Deconstruction—the Problem	Reconstruction—Solutions
LITANY	Pain is horrible and meaningless	Pain—financial and emotional—can lead to life suffering, which can lead to change
SYSTEMIC	It is their fault: politicians, corporations, Asians, NGOs	Rethink purpose in life, rethink systems of support, rethink time
WORLDVIEW	Materialism	The great transition—inner abundance and many ways of knowing
MYTH	I am the victim	Awakening of the inner spirit

* See <http://www.eckharttolle.com/home>

However, for many, there is a tough edge to this. Being present, finding meaning, inner bliss, is far easier when communities are resilient, when more than money-making is the goal, when purpose is foundational and where an emphasis on equity is strong. When communities are vulnerable, and the loss of a job leads to the loss of health care, “being present” to pain takes on a much sharper edge.

Narrative 6: Symptoms of capitalism... even broader

Returning to the external level of reality, the mortgage and banking crisis is a reflection, a symptom of the deeper problem of world capitalism. Essentially the issue is a lack of equity, the highest since prior to the great depression.³⁰ Instead of increasing wages, debt has been the solution in the USA. This strategy worked in the short-run but—as the GFC testifies—enhanced economic imbalances.³¹ Moreover, valuable resources have been lost in the \$1–3 trillion war in Iraq.³²

But this is predictable behaviour. As nations at the core of the world system spend their money on weapons of war, seeing enemies everywhere as potential challengers to their hegemony, they tend to become the global police and use their military and financial power to remain at the core of the system. In the case of the US, this has been accomplished through the military-industrial-think tank complex on one hand and by having their dollar as the world currency, thus allowing them to print their way out of crisis on the other. In response, leftist organisations such as the World Social Forum make the claim that the end is in sight and a new world system will emerge from this and subsequent crises ahead.³³

Thus a worldview shift from capitalism to some other sort of economic system is required. This could be a democratic socialist system or a progressive cooperative system per the works of P. R. Sarkar.³⁴ What is needed are ways to enhance equity, to move from the corporatist model to a cooperative model far more focused on sustainability; that is, a guaranteed basic constitutional right to food, clothing, health, education and housing plus an innovative incentive-based economy.

In this narrative the system does not work for the majority of people on the planet, even if from time to time there are huge gains for the elite in rich and poor nations. To keep the world secure, as in Roman times, military force is used on one hand and *panis et circenses* (“bread and circuses”) on the other.³⁵ This is not to say that poor nations should continue business as usual; inequity cannot be an excuse for avoiding endogenous change. Poorer developing nations must become more transparent, encourage gender equity, focus on sustainability, use tradition to innovate, create governance structures where green tape, not endless red tape, rules the day, and invest in education systems that are person- and earth-tailored, not poor copies of the West. Challenging feudal oligarchies and communist hierarchies is equally

important. Economic democracy and global governance are necessary to overcome this crisis and make the transition to a new world system.

Table 6. CLA—The symptoms of capitalism story

	Deconstruction—the Problem	Reconstruction—Solutions
LITANY	Mortgage and banking crisis	Mortgage and banking crisis is the tip of the iceberg
SYSTEMIC	War economy, highly centralised, inequity	Economy needs to become localised, expenditures on innovation and education—refocus on the social
WORLDVIEW	Imperial over-reach, neo-liberalism	Democratic socialism, globalism with a human face
MYTH	It's not fair	Fair go for all

Narrative 7: Eco-spiritual—A window of opportunity

The last narrative combines aspects of the work of Tolle, Sarkar and the Left, integrating the spiritual with equity, sustainability and worldview change.

Historically 9/11 is seen as a window of opportunity that was wasted. No real change in the Islamic or Western worlds occurred: the Right carried the day throughout the world. Terrorism became an excuse to retreat from the positive aspects of globalisation; terrorism became an excuse to create a clash of civilisations. The main result has been clarity on who it is that we think is evil—Them.

As with the leftist view, capitalism is the problem; less that it creates wealth but that it creates inequity. Higher inequity leads to increased unhappiness and bad health outcomes. Capitalism is important for innovation but not for creating a good society. Wealth should be spread differently: on investment in peace and conflict resolution initiatives; on evidence-based preventive approaches, such as teaching mediation and meditation in schools; on reducing meat consumption, for example. War represents a failure of creativity, of the human spirit. However, in contrast to the Left, the political focus is less on what is wrong with the current system and more on how to create a new system. Spiritual practice is central here, as is an ethics of neo-humanism, on-going beyond identification with the nation-state, religion or even humanism.³⁶ In this future, policy is neither Left nor Right but balancing the inner and outer, what the Indian philosopher Sarkar has called *prama*, or dynamic balance.³⁷

There is a strong link between the crisis and sustainability. The crisis has shown that companies that are not energy efficient and effective will be punished by markets. All nations, cities and corporations need to make the transition to a greener world economy. The sooner there are global regulations for making the transition to renewable energy the better.

Some specific grand reforms include:

1. Speculation needs to be reduced, or at least taxed. Hazel Henderson argues that we should either terminate the \$3 trillion of daily currency trading or tax it less than 1% and use the proceeds to meet global millennium goals.³⁸
2. A new world currency is required, as are new global governance rules. This is an opportunity to do something different. James Robertson has suggested the creation of a new currency called the “Earth”.³⁹ We need to start all over again. Amazingly, while Robertson is a Left-oriented humanist thinker, China has also called for a new global currency.⁴⁰
3. There needs to be a shift from the corporatist model to the cooperative/partnership model, with stakeholders having a greater say, if not controlling, companies. Moreover, if bankrupt companies were to require federal funding, they would need to change their ownership structure.
4. New measures are needed to measure progress, not just GDP but triple bottom line measurement that takes into account prosperity plus social inclusion (all-important for health and wealth generation) and nature (the base of the economy). Over time even a fourth bottom line could be added.⁴¹

The metaphor is that of the great transition to another type of world economic system.⁴² Capitalism has spread all over the world and has led to incredible innovation, but it has not solved the challenges of nature and equity. A more democratic economic system is needed.

Table 7. CLA—The eco-spiritual story

	Deconstruction—the Problem	Reconstruction—Solutions
LITANY	Individualism disowning the collective	Individual and society
SYSTEMIC	Dollar, unfair trading rules, energy inefficiency	New currency, new global trading rules
WORLDVIEW	Capitalism, the nation-state, modernity and patriarchy	Progressive Utilisation Theory—Sarkar. Hazel Henderson
MYTH	The endless rise, growth forever	The grand transition to <i>prama</i>

These seven narratives provide an overall explanation of the global financial crisis. While for some, there is only one explanation, a case can be made that parts of each story are true or provide a useful understanding of the crisis. If the image of concentric expanding circles is used, the smallest story is that of the crisis being only a housing crisis. The next circle is that of a banking and financial crisis. There is certainly some truth to the story of creative

destruction. However, given that the entire system was unstable and that massive suffering would result if it fell apart, stimulus packages certainly have made sense. Also sensible is the story that this is a much broader shift to Chindia. And the problem of inequity, and the need for a more equitable system, cannot be denied, nor that the transition forward needs to be green, with major transformations in currency, global governance and our measurement of success. Perhaps the most controversial story is of God's plan; however, Tolle's idea of external crisis leading to inner presence and transformation seems a wise way to be.

Alternative Futures

What, then, is next? Using the prior analysis as well as exploring key drivers and emerging issues, five scenario sketches are offered.

1. Business as usual—*plus ça change, c'est plus la même chose*

The key drivers that create this alternative future are: the continuation of current economic trends, international realist geopolitics, and conventional inequitable class structures. Dramatic change is not posited; rather, it is argued that there are natural pendulum swings in national and world economic systems. These include from growth to equity, Left to Right, globalism to localism, and, as archetypes, Reagan to Obama. The swing happens because, as one moves too far in one direction, certain aspects of reality are ignored. Wall Street focused only on growth, on believing house price rises would go on forever. There is then a swing back to fundamentals. A focus on globalisation enhances wealth but generally for the few—concerns for local jobs, for local cultures then become dominant, and that is a swing.

However, the financial crisis has exposed the limitations of the American model; we can then anticipate that, as the West goes down, Hegel's *geist*⁴³ will turn up elsewhere. As many have been predicting for decades now—William Irwin Thompson,⁴⁴ Johan Galtung,⁴⁵ James Dator,⁴⁶ to mention three—it is in the Pacific that the rise shall occur. But it is not Japan that will lead the way; while they have the technology, there is no demographic dividend, nor is there immigration, the fuel of innovation. Instead, as in the earlier CLA, it is likely, as developed in the scenario below, that China or Chindia, or some version thereof, will revive capitalism.

2. Rise of Chindia and eventual creation of an Asian Union

While still plagued with problems, China (largely) and India (to some extent) survive the crisis; indeed, they prosper. US legitimacy continues to decrease and the US declines relative to Chindia. Over time an Asian Union with a new currency is created.

Why might Chindia rise? There are a number of reasons: (1) Savings rates and a massive domestic economy; (2) Lack of American baggage against inequity and thus can develop a fairer maxi-mini system; and (3) Chindia has a much longer timeframe to work with and does not suffer from Western short-term “quarteritis” financial reporting. In this scenario we can imagine the decline of the US dollar and the rise of Asian currencies. Indeed, a new currency may emerge.

While consumption will increase, there is a possibility that it may be sustainable. Green technologies with different measures of progress could lead growth. The great challenge for Chindia, or for China and India separately, is to rise and (1) to avoid becoming imperial like Europe in the past and the USA now, (2) to ensure equity and (3) to ensure that nature not only survives but thrives.

3. The quick and long road to global sustainability

However, the world economic crisis is only one of the crises the planet is facing. Climate change, global governance and the war against terrorism are other foundational crises. The shape of the future will be partly predicated on how these conflicts are resolved.

In this scenario, the shift to global sustainability becomes the only way forward. The sense of urgency created by climate change (not just global warming and sea level rise but the possibility of a major climate shift) is used by political leaders to invest in green technologies and create new carbon trading regimes.

Some characteristics of this scenario include: (1) a transition to a green economy, and the beginning of the solar age; (2) a new currency with most organisations committed to triple bottom line accounting; (3) a slow transition to global governance (finance, environment, trade, rights); (4) increased equity between regions and within regions; and (5) massive investment and innovation in green technologies. While initially sustainability will be shallow, overtime it deepens as the financial logic makes increasing sense and there is generational change.

Moving to sustainability requires real changes. These changes are possible when there are windows of opportunity. However, there are interests at play who prefer the oil nation-state era. The fear of pain could lead to a different future.

4. Long decline, depression and potentially the end game of capitalism

In this future, attempts to solve the financial crisis are shallow. After a period of stimulus packages and market rallies, things get worse. It just takes one trigger—the Chinese bubble bursting or a war or dramatic climate change.

The inability to kick-start capitalism leads to a great global depression. Eventually, like all systems, capitalism disappears. The impacts will be gut-wrenching, especially on the most vulnerable, but also on the richest who will find their investments going up in smoke.

In the final scenario, humanity is able to make the transition, seeing the global financial crisis and ensuing climate and governance challenges as not the end of time but the beginning of a new era.⁴⁷

5. A new era

In this last future, the crises are multiple and overwhelming and foundational changes occur. Climate change, the global financial crisis, the global security/terrorist challenge, to mention a few, coupled with profound changes in new digital technologies (creating flatter peer-to-peer networks), genomics (creating aged societies as humans live even longer), revolutions in our understanding of the brain (leading to dramatically increased use of technologies such as meditation) change the entire game.

In this future, then, there is a pendulum shift, from national to global, from patriarchy to gender partnership,⁴⁸ from materialism to an integration of spirituality and materialism, from individualism to a balance between the individual and the collective. And there are creative minorities, like the “cultural creatives”,⁴⁹ able to rise to the challenge and forge a new future with the following characteristics:

- A real global governance system (nations being unable to deal with crisis at their own level) that creates simultaneous global policy, coordinated and sensitive to local conditions;
- A United Nations Security Insurance Plan that allows many nations to reduce their expenditure on the armed forces;
- A real spiritual jump as humans focus less on the past and religious divides and more on what type of planet they wish to see;
- Far more gender partnership, with real inclusion of women and their ways of knowing;
- A shift from reality as described by history to reality as constructed and invented by humans;
- A far more sustainable planet where green technologies and ways of living, including vegetarianism, become the norm, perhaps even 50% of the world population is vegetarian by 2050; and
- Glo-cal economies.

Table 8. Alternative futures

Scenario	Characteristics
Business as usual	Swings back and forth. Growth and equity, Right and Left
Rise of Chindia	Competitive advantage of China and India with relative decline of the USA
Road to Sustainability	Sustainability is the only way forward. First shallow, but over time becomes the dominant discourse
Long decline	Current GFC reappears but with stronger shocks. End game of capitalism
New era	Sustainability with spirituality with creative global leadership

Conclusion

As to which scenario is the answer, the true future, the accurate forecast, we cannot say. Indeed, the future is partially created by forecasts, through making different decisions based on alternative choices. The future is not fixed, but changing as we change.

The main argument that has been made in this article is that the lenses we use to look at the real world can be narrow and shallow or broad and deep. The challenge is to use simultaneous strategies and tactics, meeting the needs of future generations and the needs of the present. Broadening our focus changes the possibilities of the future, expands what is possible. Deepening our focus by moving from litany to inner story, myth, allows for more potent and transformative change. As we go broader and deeper, the mistakes that created the current global financial crisis can be understood and alternative futures created.

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20. Exploring the Socio-Economic Aspirations of Singaporeans

Adrian W. J. Kuah, April Chin, and Bai Huifen*

This chapter describes outcomes from a 2013 workshop organised by the Singaporean Centre for Strategic Futures. CLA was chosen as a foresight methodology in order to address and attempt to reconcile the tension between growth and equity as it relates to Singaporeans' socio-economic aspirations. In addition to presenting findings from the workshop on this issue the chapter also outlines benefits and limitations of CLA as well as its overall potential as a public foresight tool.

Introduction

In March 2013, the Centre for Strategic Futures (CSF) initiated an inter-agency project to apply the causal layered analysis (CLA) methodology to uncovering and understanding Singaporeans' socio-economic aspirations.[†] Over the past year or so, there have been avid discussions among Singaporeans—in the “Our Singapore Conversation” (OSC) and other fora—on how Singapore society should evolve, and how the economy should grow.

The three main objectives of this project were to:

- Evaluate the effectiveness of CLA as a foresight methodology;
- Build capabilities in the Singapore Government foresight community through the actual application of CLA to policy issues; and

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† The Centre for Strategic Futures (CSF) was established in early 2009, as part of the Strategic Policy Office in the Public Service Division of the Prime Minister's Office, Singapore. The CSF serves as a focal point for futures thinking within the Singapore Government, and seeks to support a Public Service that operates strategically in a complex and fast-changing environment.

- Develop a whole-of-government appreciation of the socio-economic aspirations of Singaporeans through inter-agency collaboration.

The project involved over 10 officers in strategic planning/corporate planning roles across five ministries and agencies that are interested in socio-economic issues.*

In this chapter, we document how we designed and facilitated a workshop applying the CLA methodology to investigating Singaporeans' socio-economic aspirations. We hope it will be a useful guide for foresight practitioners, both in Singapore and elsewhere, wishing to apply this methodology to their own projects. Besides distilling "how to" lessons on running a CLA project, this chapter also highlights the insights from the workshop on the socio-economic aspirations of Singaporeans.

The CSF's Understanding of CLA

The CLA methodology is intriguing as a tool for public policy foresight for two reasons. First, it goes beyond the usual "if-then" analysis of actions and reactions, causes and effects; rather, it posits that there are multiple layers of "reality" underpinning thoughts, speech and actions, at both the individual and collective levels. The purpose of CLA is to uncover and examine these layers, particularly at the deepest, most elemental levels of the human condition. Second, CLA integrates the objective and the subjective: it assumes that reality is socially constructed, and therefore has to be deconstructed and critically interpreted. In analysing the multiple layers of the human experience, CLA leads to a fuller understanding of the present, and to a richer imagination of desired futures.

The ability of the CLA methodology to unearth the so-called "fourth layer", the myth/metaphor, was the most compelling aspect of this project. This level encapsulates the unconscious (or subconscious), emotive dimensions of an issue. The objects of analysis at this level take the form of images, stories, mantras and symbols. It was at this level that CLA distinguished itself as a uniquely insightful tool for uncovering Singaporeans' hopes for (and fears of) the future. To paraphrase Joseph Campbell, the late expert on mythology from *The Myths We Live By*: myths speak to us in terms we cannot deny; they are the stories, even lies, that we tell in order to justify ourselves to ourselves. In the words of the philosopher Richard Rorty, the language of the myth/metaphor constitutes a person's "final vocabulary": "It is 'final' in the sense that if doubt is cast on the worth of these words, their user has no noncircular argumentative recourse. Those words are as far as he can go with language; beyond them there is only helpless passivity or a resort to violence".¹

* The project team members included strategic foresight specialists from the Housing Development Board, the Ministry of Manpower, the Ministry of National Development, and the Ministry of Social and Family Development.

Project Process Outline

The project comprised four stages spread across four months.

Part one: Scoping the project

Through the OSC and other fora, many ideas have emerged about the directions that Singapore should take in terms of its social and economic development. ²Having reached a point where the tension between growth and equity has become very stark, we decided to focus on understanding the relationship between the prevailing economic imperative and the emerging social agenda that appears to oppose it. More importantly, we wanted to uncover alternative future socio-economic myths and metaphors that could reconcile this tension. The three specific aspirations we chose to address were the desire for ‘broader definitions of success’ and a ‘more fulfilling pace of life’, even as we build ‘a vibrant economy that continues to provide opportunities for Singaporeans’.

Part two: Designing the CLA workshop

CLA unpacks the world as it is today by diving deep into the worldviews, myths and metaphors that buttress our shared current reality. A deep appreciation of these visceral worldviews, myths and metaphors in turn helps us to imagine the future. In seeking to uncover these underlying assumptions and beliefs, we sought participants from a wide range of backgrounds with varied interests, to ensure that the views expressed would be diverse and to help mitigate biases and groupthink.

Prior to this project, CLA had only been taught in theoretical terms, as part of the CSF’s Futurecraft curriculum. In order to bridge the theory-practice gap, we spoke to leading experts in CLA, such as Marcus Bussey and Sohail Inayatullah, for advice on how to mount a CLA workshop in terms of design and process.

Once a draft facilitation process was drawn up, the team organised a trial internal workshop to test it. This was crucial given that it was the first time the Singapore Government foresight community had applied the full CLA methodology in a workshop involving members of the general Singaporean public. The trial workshop was important in tightening the facilitation process and in pre-empting possible questions from the actual workshop participants.

Part three: Running the workshop

An effective workshop makes participants feel engaged and comfortable so that they would want to candidly share their views; it should feel like a safe space. This required careful curating of the physical environment, from the selection of the venue to the lighting and configuration of the room. Careful

thought must also go into the grouping of participants so that constructively divergent conversations take place. During the workshop, all the team members were involved either as facilitators or note-takers, which provided valuable hands-on experience. Such experience is integral to the development of skills in facilitation and content synthesis for foresight practitioners.

Part four: Analysis of insights and implications

After the workshop, we consolidated the insights and used cluster analysis to identify the common themes that emerged from the workshop. We paid especial attention to the interconnections between the three areas of ‘definitions of success’, ‘the pace of life’ and ‘the state of the economy’. A summary of the insights was subsequently shared with the participants and the other invitees who could not make it to the workshop. The additional round of post-workshop discussions allowed for a deeper analysis of the issues, as the respondents built upon or challenged the insights raised. This gave us a more nuanced understanding of the issues. We hope these insights will contribute to a more sophisticated whole-of-government perspective on these issues. Finally, we also evaluated the benefits and limitations of CLA as a foresight methodology, and reviewed its potential for broader application to public policy.

Case Study: CLA workshop on Singaporean’s socio-economic aspirations

A half-day workshop was conducted on 8th May 2013 with a group of 13 participants from the public, private and people (voluntary organisations) sectors. The workshop used the CLA methodology to investigate the underlying assumptions, beliefs and motivations of Singaporeans’ socio-economic aspirations in three areas: ‘definitions of success’, ‘the pace of life’, and ‘the economy’. The workshop was divided into two parts:

- Understanding “The World As It Is Today”: Participants were divided into 3 groups to share their views on current definitions of success, the present pace of life, and the state of the economy today. The discussion started with their observations of the litany, followed by the systemic factors, worldviews, myths and metaphors.
- Imagining “The World That Could Be”: Participants were then placed into 2 groups to brainstorm alternative futures to achieve the desired aspirations for a society in 2030 with (1) broader definitions of success while having a strong and vibrant economy; and (2) a fulfilling pace of life while having a strong and vibrant economy. By starting with the articulation of new myths and metaphors, the assumption is that this would lead to lasting changes across the different layers.

Insights on “The World As It Is Today”

What do you think of how success is currently defined?

Participants were asked to write on post-it notes how they understood success in terms of the four layers. As can be seen above, success today continues to be measured in terms of the ‘material and tangible’, with an emphasis on the ability to ‘impress others’, for example, paper qualifications, and wealth objects. There remains an element of conservatism as ‘tried-and-tested pathways’ to success continue to be celebrated and actively pursued. Importantly, high value-added, specialist careers with hefty incomes are regarded as synonymous with success and prestige, for example, being a doctor or a lawyer. Nevertheless, ‘new measures of success’ have also emerged in the digital age, for example, gauging one’s popularity on social media platforms.




Figure 1. Participants’ thoughts on the current definition of success

The definition of success is shaped by extrinsic factors such as a ‘meritocratic system’ that streams individuals into different ability groups and academic/career pathways based on their performance; a strong national focus on ‘growth metrics’—rankings, benchmarking and other indices—as measures of success; ‘societal norms and parental aspirations’ which are projected onto children; and the impact of mental conditioning through aggressive ‘marketing and advertising’.

These factors have established a ‘culture of competition and comparison’ (locally known as a “*kiasu* culture” which means “fear of losing out”). This can be taken to an extreme when compounded by (1) a ‘herd mentality’ that derives security from following others, and (2) a ‘siege mentality’ undergirded by a profound sense of insecurity that narrowly defines success and happiness *in relation to others* (i.e. we cannot truly be happy or successful unless we are doing better than others).

Such success is based on the assumption that ‘life is a zero-sum game’. Furthermore, there is an inherent discomfort with the unquantifiable and the subjective. Hence, we have grown “obsessed with metrics and benchmarking” as gauges for success and for defining quality. As individuals and a society, our desires and personal aspirations are sharply influenced “by the expectations of others”. Some participants saw this “homogeneity of success as a strength”, whereby people derived comfort from the fact that their idea of success is similar to how others define it. The participants also identified a “postcolonial anxiety” in which Singaporeans have not overcome their insecurities about their own abilities and accomplishments. This discomfort at the national level has shaped both government rhetoric and the popular discourse, and permeated through to the level of the individual.

When uncovered, the “survival of the fittest” myth features strongly, shaping our belief that constant progress and societal evolution is critical for success. The predominant image is of an unforgiving, “dog-eat-dog world” of relentless competition, with no second chances to “catch the train”.

How do you find the current pace of life?

There is a general sense that a “relentless pursuit of a better lot in life” has led to the “hectic pace of life” today. Technology has begun to cut both ways. In multi-tasking to maximise efficiency, we have also overwhelmed ourselves with a glut of information. Driven in part by material wants, Singaporeans are working longer and harder to cope with the rising costs of living, at the expense of other pursuits and interests. Many Singaporeans have said they had no time to get married and have children, or to serve their community. However there is an emerging trend of individuals who have “chosen to opt-out of this system” (e.g. living a simpler life by privileging non-material interests).

The pace of life in Singapore today is in part attributed to the reality that Singapore is shaped by global political and economic developments beyond its control. Conversely, this has catalysed a “strong desire for control” domestically, as evinced by the institutional focus on “metrics-based performance evaluation mechanisms”. One example is the emphasis of key performance indicators (KPIs) in the workplace that focus on output rather than outcomes.




Figure 2. Participants' thoughts on the current pace of life

This is driven by an individual belief that maintaining the “status quo is unacceptable” and that one must always “strive for progress”. This is also perceived to be a zero-sum game, where individuals must “each compete for their place in society”. At a broader societal level, there is a perception that ‘rationality triumphs’, expressed by a belief in the innate fairness of the market and other systems that regulate critical social and economic processes and outputs. This interplay of systems and beliefs has created a feedback loop where individuals constantly struggle to attain new peaks of excellence in a society that narrowly recognises success in quantifiable terms, contributing to a ‘fast and furious’ pace of life and mindset.

As the Chinese idiom goes, “骑虎难下 (*qi hu nan xia*: “having mounted the tiger, it is difficult to dismount”)”; our society has progressed so far down this path that it’s now difficult to change the pace of life. Many have also internalised the chase for the “emperor’s new cloak (sic)” as a symbol of success defined by others, without necessarily thinking about the cloak’s actual value.

What are your thoughts about our economy?




Figure 3. Participants’ thoughts on the economy

Macroeconomic indicators such as GDP growth reveal an “economy that appears to be vibrant and strong”. However, there was a sense among the participants that this was an illusion, as small and medium enterprises (SMEs) were “not doing as well”. The local arts sector was cited as an example: the art scene in Singapore seemed exciting and lively, supported by strong funding from the Government, but “local artists were struggling behind the scenes”. In addition, the increasing income inequality and low productivity figures also point towards a ‘perception-reality gap’ when understanding the state of the economy and its impact on society.

At a systemic level, the privileging of ‘aggregative macroeconomic indicators’ in economic policymaking meant that policies tended to disproportionately take into account the interests and performance of large multinational corporations (MNCs). This has led to the perception that the Singapore economy favours MNCs over SMEs, in terms of the resources and attention given to promote and support these companies. The focus on “picking winners through industry niches” has also come at the expense of local entrepreneurs as the playing field is perceived to be tilted towards the larger players, giving rise to an “us versus them” mentality in which business owners are driven more by self-interest, and less by a desire to collaborate. This has also translated to a habit of cynically taking Government grants,

while “feeling no allegiance to Singapore or even [any desire] to contribute to Singapore”. The “lack of industry know-how within the Government” also limits the effectiveness of the help provided to businesses. This was likened to a “rope being lowered but stopping short of the person’s reach”.

This apparent emphasis on quantitative growth over qualitative growth can be traced to the belief in the “power of rationality”. But objective hard data do not always capture the non-quantifiable, organic developments that are crucial to entrepreneurship and innovation. There was also a sense that policies that privilege the larger companies over the smaller ones are shaped by the assumption that “size and hierarchy” matter, sending the message that companies should either “go big or go home”.

Singapore’s extreme sense of vulnerability as a small nation with few natural resources is a story that has shaped our perception of self. The “survival of the fittest” myth drives a ‘*kiasu* (“fear of failure”)' and ‘*kiasi* (“fear of death”)' behaviour, that gives rise to a deep-seated sense of atomism in which the individual exists for him or herself.

Analysis of “The World As It Is Today”

Across the three topics, some common myths and metaphors emerged which shed light on the interconnections that underpinned the individual’s experience of society. They include:

- **Survival of the fittest:** As a young city-state where human capital is our only resource, the Darwinian imperative of “survival of the fittest” has become a deeply embedded myth that shapes our mindsets, attitudes and behaviour at the individual, societal and national levels. The Olympic motto of *Citius, Altius, Fortius*, which is Latin for “Faster, Higher, Stronger”, encapsulates the relentless drive towards progress driven by this myth. However, when taken to an extreme, it has created a sense of competition, where the individual must constantly strive for his own success, often at the expense of others.
- **Size matters:** The epithet “little red dot” has had profound effects on shaping the Singaporean psyche. It highlights our vulnerability as a small nation, and has created a response in which Singapore compensates for its geographical size with economic clout. This is seen in our strategy of attracting MNCs, as well as in the individual definitions of success where “more is better”.
- **Rationality triumphs:** When facing the stark reality of our vulnerability, Singapore has thus far embraced pragmatism that focuses on “what works” at each point in time. This privileging of the rational has in itself become a myth that shapes the paradigms in which we make choices, such as the focus on quantifiable metrics to measure success, which in turn shapes the paths that we take to success.

- Money makes the world go round: Singapore is one of the world’s most open and connected economies. Our exposure to capitalism and belief in market principles have perpetuated the metaphor of “money makes the world go round”, that in turn drives our pursuit for material indicators of success (e.g., jobs that pay well, GDP growth).

In the second half of the workshop focusing on “the world that could be”, participants were asked how aspects of these current myths and metaphors could be transformed.

Insights on “The World That Could Be”

How might we achieve broader definitions of success, while achieving a strong and vibrant economy in 2030?




Figure 4. Participants’ thoughts on broader definitions of success and economic strength and vibrancy in 2030

In 2030, Singapore will be an “egalitarian society” where every Singaporean will be valued and enjoy an equal chance to succeed. Singaporeans will be supported to contribute to society in their own way, as society respects the inherent “dignity in every job and worker”. This is underpinned by the belief that “天生我才必有用 (*tian Sheng wocai bi you yong*: everyone can be good at something)”. This is epitomised in the imagery of electing the first female, single, minority-race prime minister. In such a society, any attempt to define success will be seen as moot and irrelevant, and any sense of achievement will be intrinsic rather than defined in relation to others. Singaporeans will

be liberated to pursue their passions, and will be motivated to “achieve more together”.

In order to sustain strong economic growth, there is also a shift in focus from being a “global city that is relevant to the world”, to a “global city that is part of a thriving mega region”. Instead of feeling like human digits in the economy where one has to be subservient to larger economic objectives, there is a desire for a more human-centric economy that values and prioritises the individual over the system, and provides the space for the individual to fulfil his potential. Coupled with strong community support for “longer, more sustainable routes to success”, Singaporeans will be driven to “take ownership of their own paths towards self-actualisation”, which encapsulates a broader range of pursuits beyond academic and material success. To support this, there will be flexible grants to lower the opportunity costs for Singaporeans to change education and career paths. A Singapore Open University of Life (SOUL) will also be established as a space to encourage Singaporeans to continue to learn and pursue their passions throughout their lives.

There will also be a “strong push towards entrepreneurship”, initiated by the Government and by citizens. SMEs hold the key to Singapore’s growth as the emphasis is no longer on size alone; instead SMEs will be an integral part of a more complex economic eco-system. Small entities become increasingly successful as they are more agile and able to respond faster in times of economic downturn, and to navigate the system through flexible business models. Schools will become “playgrounds for learning” and there will be community labs for Singaporeans to innovate and design new products and services in. Passionate citizens will take the initiative to drive change and proactively “co-create policies” with the Government.

How might we achieve a more fulfilling pace of life, while achieving a strong and vibrant economy in 2030?

In 2030, Singapore’s society is one that has embraced an “enlightened *kiasu*-ism” that continues to pride itself on doing well, but in a way that seeks the “survival of *all*”, rather than the survival of the *fittest*. Individuals derive their fulfilment from a broadened notion of success that recognises the value of allowing the individual to pursue different passions in order to “unlock their inner productivity”. This is shaped by a worldview of “the eternal present” or the “200 year present”, where failure is no longer frowned upon but celebrated as part of life’s ups and downs, and one can exercise greater control over the pace of life.

When success is pursued with others in mind, “relationships (rather than transactions) become more valued”. In addition to being freed from having to define success, the respect that one gets from others to pursue his interests in turn drives a deeper sense of belonging to the community, where “we want to help one another succeed”. The dichotomy between the individual

and the community is artificial, as every “Singaporean’s dream” is encompassed within the larger Singapore Dream. In this society where people matter, there is a healthy interaction between government and citizens, to understand citizens’ needs. In the workplace, KPIs take into account a holistic range of indicators, including the well-being of staff.




Figure 5. Participants’ thoughts on achieving a fulfilling life and a strong and vibrant economy in 2030

“Motivated citizens” form the bedrock of the Singapore economy. As citizens pursue different pathways to fulfilment and success, the inner productivity unlocks other “untapped potential in the areas of creativity and innovation”. For example, young people emerge as agents of change, and the elderly are valued for their wisdom which becomes the key to unlocking the wealth of knowledge in a big data society. There is a greater recognition of SMEs as the “seeds of growth”, with the Government playing a more facilitative role consulting and supporting start-ups as a key driver of a strong, vibrant and diverse economy.

Reflections on the Workshop

Through the workshop, CLA proved to be a useful tool to unpack the multiple layers of the human experience in the present and to spark ideas about the future. While the insights gleaned from a standalone workshop cannot be generalised to the broader national level, value was found in the

‘outlier perspectives that challenge our assumptions’ about how Singaporeans perceive the world of today and of the future.

While the OSC highlighted common perspectives that Singaporeans shared of the future, such perspectives remained largely at the litany level. The application of CLA helped to ‘deepen our understanding of these perspectives by uncovering the other layers’. For example, the desire for a “fulfilling pace of life” emerged as a subset of “broader definitions of success”, which helped to clarify that the former did not necessarily reflect sentiments that pointed towards a less driven society. While both aspirations are influenced to a large extent by economic policies and “realities”, a few participants stressed that by combining these two aspirations with the desire for a “strong and vibrant economy” in the “world that could be”, one might be unnecessarily limiting the scope of imagination. In other words, they questioned the primacy of the “economic” over all else.

By drilling down to the emotive dimensions of the issues depicted through myths and metaphors, CLA also served as a framework in which to understand shared narratives today, and as a tool to transform narratives. There were two alternative myths and metaphors that are worth highlighting in their potential to challenge existing approaches to socio-economic issues.

Alternative I: Human-centric economy

Despite starting from different questions, participants from both groups developed alternative futures centred on the concept of a “human-centric economy”. This was an interesting outcome, and revealed the underlying emotional resistance to the individual’s subservience to the demands of the economy today, which has long been an integral part of an economic globalisation strategy to mitigate the realities of Singapore as a vulnerable and small nation. Instead, a “human-centric economy” of the future would be one where Singaporeans are motivated and emboldened to achieve through a wider range of pathways that are either carved out by the individual, or cater to increasingly diverse aspirations. Instead of people existing for the system, *the system should exist for the people*. Hence, there is a longer term perspective in which fulfilled workers naturally lead to more productive and more innovative outcomes.

What are the implications for government?

For policy purposes, the emphasis will shift from measurable indicators of success such as GDP growth, to a more whole-of-society, qualitative notion of progress. The role of the Government in pre-selecting industries and shaping the work aspirations of Singaporeans will also need to be reviewed, to allow more space for start-ups to emerge.

Alternative II: Embeddedness of the individual within the community

Over time, the chase to secure success and security for oneself has cast doubts on the strength of communal relationships in Singapore, leading to higher levels of individual atomism. In the future, we want to see a society where individuals are deeply embedded within the community, even as each person pursues individual fulfillment. The dichotomy between an individual and the community is an artificial one, as there is a greater respect and celebration of the dignity and contributions of each person. There is a desire on the part of every person to seek each other's well-being.

What are the implications for government?

The role of Government will need to broaden from one of “regulator, arbiter and provider”, to a more facilitative role by convening and providing the platforms for citizens to explore, initiate and collaborate. The mindset will also need to shift from one of control to one of influencing for outcomes. While the government remains largely the steward of the public commons, there will be a need to rethink authority over and accountability of the collective interests of the community and country.

Narratives are ultimately derived from values and aspirations, and serve as a framework to define and communicate the vision. The two examples above hint at aspects of the current narratives that might already be out of sync with certain segments of Singapore's society. As counter-narratives, they could serve as early warning indicators to redefine the narrative, lest we run the risk of others framing it in undesirable ways. Even where there might be agreement that existing myths and metaphors are outdated, the alternative narrative is likely not going to consist of one definitive myth, given the increasing diversity of Singapore's society. For example, the idea of a human-centric economy may not resonate with low-wage workers who could have a more pragmatic view of their work aspirations and the importance of monetary compensation to meet the basic needs of life.

For many of the non-government participants, the levers of change lay in the realm of the worldview, myths and metaphors, which are clearly beyond the reach of the typical policy instruments, which work well at the level of social causation. The CLA workshop thus revealed what we know intuitively: that national narratives are not and cannot be monopolised by “civil servants”; rather, they are created by poets, artists, and by ideologues as well. For example, as an academic participant put it:

I hope this can be input to the Our Singapore Conversation process, especially the “alternative” myths and narratives that can be emphasised (because they are not new but [have been] de-emphasised) to create a different kind of world for the folks who want to look beyond GDP growth as a definition of success.

Assessment of CLA as a Foresight Methodology

Benefits of the CLA methodology

The defining characteristic of the CLA methodology consists in how causality is understood. Conventionally, causality is understood in linear, mechanistic terms, which typically leads to a search for a unique Archimedean point at which a lever can be applied in order to cause change throughout a system. Such a definition of causality has tended to resonate very well with policy-makers. Furthermore, it privileges one layer of “reality”—the systemic—over others. The policy-maker has typically chosen to privilege the layer of social causation over the others and to focus on the perspective at which she is most empowered to make changes. As another participating academic commented:

I like how you approach the layered analysis and I think it offers a comprehensive way to examine the various behavioral and attitudinal impetuses. Overall, the findings offer a convincing overview of the underlying tension and motivations.

In contrast, the CLA methodology consciously moves away from the assumption of linearly causal determinism and instead emphasises (and celebrates) the subjectivity and messiness that characterise social reality. By assuming that causality is specific to the context of a particular stakeholder, CLA suggests that the agency and power to shape the future always lies where the stakeholder stands and in the context she determines. As Marcus Bussey puts it: “Multi-causality empowers stakeholders by placing them at the centre of their world... Multi-causality leads to open futures”.³

In a place like Singapore, people tend to be reticent about discussing the more emotive aspects of the human experience. By providing a safe space for conversations to take place in a CLA workshop, *vis-à-vis* that of less structured dialogues in an open arena, participants could look beyond the day-to-day lived experiences and the cause-and-effect dynamics of systems, and to bring to the surface deeply buried and taken-for-granted worldviews, myths and metaphors that contribute to a richer design of alternative futures that incorporates the socio-cultural and psychological dimension, rather than merely the technocratic and rational aspects of the human condition.

The relationship dynamics between each of the CLA layers are also revealed, in terms of how they might reinforce, challenge or even contradict each other, when participants clarified and critiqued each other’s perspectives. As was borne out in the workshop, the notion of agency differs from person to person: the social activist locates her agency at the level of the worldview, the poet at the level of myth, the business owner at the level of litany, even as the policy-maker defines her power at the level of social causes.

Limitations of the CLA methodology

CLA seeks to move beyond the positivist superficiality of conventional social science research and forecasting methods, which focuses instead on the excavation of the present and past with a view to creating alternative futures. CLA creates space for many conversations to occur at multiple levels, which can then be shaped as scenarios. However, this very strength gives rise to the primary difficulty, which is that any CLA exercise is inherently messy.

There is an inherent subjectivity associated with the understanding and perception of each CLA layer, as one person's worldview could be another person's myth or metaphor. Given the interpretive subjectivity, it was critical for facilitators to maintain a neutral stance during the workshop and allow participants to locate their views within each layer, especially when the discussions evoke emotive responses that challenge one's beliefs and assumptions.

CLA also does not argue for excluding the litany and the social in favour of the worldview and the myth/metaphor. Instead, all layers are deemed necessary in order to conduct valid and transformative foresight research. This poses a difficulty for the running of a CLA workshop as well as for post-workshop analysis: the distinction between dependent and independent variables is meaningless because all the layers are considered in simultaneity. As a methodology, CLA not only emphasises the normative, but calls for a shift from "one centralising narrative" to "many different stories". Its contribution is as a descriptive tool, not as a prescriptive one. Public policy foresight practitioners may thus find CLA disconcerting, insofar as its insights do not immediately lend themselves to straightforward policy recommendations and solutions. For example, a director of an MNC said:

CLA is a comprehensive and refreshing approach which is different from the typical public policy approach that tends to focus on the 'litany' and 'systemic' layers. It is valuable as a sense-making tool, and the workshop questions were crafted in a thought-provoking way.

Potential of CLA as a public policy foresight tool

In an era of greater political participation and contestation, the need for government to set the pace in transformative leadership is more urgent than ever.⁴ As a foresight methodology, CLA stands out as one of the few tools that is capable of uncovering the assumptions and beliefs that drive the patterns of shared experiences that shape (and are shaped by) our lives, thus shedding light on the psychology of the future. The CLA methodology also fully fleshes out what Clifford Geertz refers to as "thick descriptions": descriptions of preferred futures that resonate with both the people who govern and those who are governed. This process of transforming the world

today—by getting at the heart of the issues—into a desired future, allows the policy-maker to “ride two paradigms” simultaneously and to lead in transformational change.

Where before worldviews, myths and metaphors had typically been overlooked as inputs into the traditional policy-making process, they are increasingly recognised as important variables in the policy-maker’s calculus. CLA challenges the prevailing orthodoxy in public policy of “solving the problem” at a systems level. The appreciation of how the “myth, worldview, and social context create particular litany problems ...”⁵ can inform the policymaker of the mismatches between the layers of systemic causation and the other deeper and more visceral layers.

In a complex world where we have to shift from causal determinism to a network-based approach, there is a greater need for sensemaking to monitor and adapt to emergent factors. There is an increasing interest in evolving the strategic foresight enterprise away from being an elite-driven exercise to being one of collaborative “public futures”. From the experience of conducting this workshop, we believe that CLA has demonstrated the potential to serve as a participatory foresight tool for public policy, and should be used in tandem with other traditional approaches such as scenario planning and backcasting to challenge groupthink amongst policy-makers. There is certainly scope to further explore and study ways to apply CLA with a more diverse group of participants (e.g., taking the methodology to the heartlands), to ensure better representation of Singaporeans.

¹ R. Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989, 73.

² Our SG Conversation, ‘Perspectives arising from our Singapore conversation’, retrieved 22 July, 2013, from https://www.oursgconversation.sg/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/OSC_newsletter.pdf.

³ M. Bussey, ‘Concepts and effects: Ordering and practice in foresight’, article under review for *Foresight*.

⁴ G. Leicester, ‘Rising to the occasion: Cultural leadership in powerful times’, retrieved 22 July, 2013, from http://www.missionmodelsmoney.org.uk/sites/default/files/23974676-Rising-to-the-Occasion-by-Graham-Leicester-2007_0.pdf.

⁵ S. Inayatullah, ‘CLA defined’, retrieved 15 June, 2013, from www.metafuture.org/articles/casualayeredanalysis.htm.

21. Demystifying the Hawala System using Causal Layered Analysis

Umar Sheraz and Nauman Farooqi*

This chapter explores the alternative futures of Hawala, a trust-based system used to transfer funds across countries and continents. This is done by using CLA along with P. R. Sarkar's theory of social change as a basis for critiquing the social construct of the Hawala system. The chapter is directed at policy-makers, bankers, economists, policing agencies and other stakeholders as they evaluate the role of informal value transfer systems in the global economy, beyond sectoral silo focus.

The History of the Issue

In Arabic, the root *h-w-l* signifies “change” or “transformation”. The word *Hawala* is derived from this root and is defined as a bill of exchange or promissory note that can be used as a *Hawala Safar* (travellers’ cheque).¹ Hawala is one of the primary forms of informal value transfer systems (IVTS) and its operation is based on trust with transactions rarely leaving an audit trail. IVTSs, such as Hawala, were established means of transferring valuables and money long before any of the formal value transfer methods were conceived.² This remittance system initially developed in Asia and the Middle East as a means for traders to operate without having to carry large sums of money. Modern Hawala networks emerged in the 1960s and 1970s to facilitate the transfer of the wages of expatriates to their families, called “home remittances”, and to circumvent official bans on gold imports in Southeast Asia.³ Conversion rates were usually more favourable than the government rates (often double), thereby providing a cheap, efficient, and smooth alternative to the often corrupt domestic financial institutions. By far the largest proportion of people who use these informal remittance networks are overseas workers who send money back home to their families.⁴ In

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many cases they distrust official institutions and/or simply cannot afford them.

Today, Hawala is a worldwide phenomenon commonly used by expatriates wanting to send money home, by businesses in import/export, for foreign exchange, travel, transporting jewellery and increasingly by those involved in money laundering and terrorism. Many of today's IVTSs originated among ethnic Asian peoples who based codes of conduct for value/money transfer on mutual trust within groups and between individuals.⁵ Ever since the growth of formal value transfer systems, informal systems have operated in the shadows, maintaining a devoted following. IVTSs are known under different names throughout the world: *Fei Ch'ien* (China), *Hui Kwan* (Hong Kong), *Phei Kwan* (Thailand), *Padala* (Philippines), *Hundi* (India) and *Hawala* (Pakistan).⁶

Hawala has been the target of US and international media since the 9/11 terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda. It is alleged that Al-Qaeda used Hawala to transfer money, undetected, across international borders to finance their terrorist activities. Although increasing regulatory regimes have been put in place, the use of IVTS continues due to its speed and cost effectiveness. As such many stakeholders question whether non-regulatory mechanisms dealing with Hawala should be further explored.

CLA Stakeholders in the Hawala Frame Work

In Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar's work, social reality consists of four classes and states in history. Sohail Inayatullah, an interpreter of Sarkar, writes that:

The worker/shudra (present oriented, dominated by the environment), the warrior/ksatriya (honour and past focused, seeks to dominate the environment through physical force), the intellectual/vipra (idea oriented, seeks to understand the world through religion, philosophy and science, the study of space and time) and the accumulator of capital/vaeshyan (future focused, uses the other classes to create economic value) Each era organically leads to the next, until the capitalist era dominates, and all classes find the heightening inequity unbearable. Since the needs of the other social classes are not met, a chaotic worker revolution or evolution results which is then followed by the discipline of the warrior-based state. However, the cycle can be changed, and the exploitation phases of the cycle can be shortened and the innovation phases enhanced through wise leadership that integrates all aspects of the social cycle: the service dimension of labour, the protective dimension of the warrior; the truth seeking dimensions of the intellectual and the economic value creating dimension of the trader/investor.⁷

Based on Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar's work, the social-economic reality of the Hawala system consists of four classes and states in the current time frame. The worker/*shudra* (represented by the expatriate workers who are

beneficiaries of Hawala), the warrior/*ksattriya* (represented by international and local policing systems), the intellectual/*vipra* (the economists, intellectuals and policy-makers who contribute to global value-transfer policy and debate) and the accumulator of capital/*vaeshyan* (Hawaladars* as well as formal value transfer systems like banks, money changers, etc., who use the other classes to create economic value).

Table 1. CLA—The ‘capital/*vaeshyan*’ zone (formal vs. informal value transfer systems)

	Societal Approach/Thinking (Formal Value Transfer System)	Societal Approach/Thinking (Informal Value Transfer System)
LITANY (what we say)	Hawala is illegal/against the system	Hawala is pro-poor and trust based
SOCIAL CAUSES (what we do)	Command and control	There is always a way around the system
WORLDVIEW (how we think)	We want a piece of the pie	Pariahs, Robin Hoods
MYTH & METAPHOR (who we are)	The world is our fortress	The higher the wall of the fortress, the deeper under the walls we will dig

In the *vaeshyan* zone, there is an intense tussle between the formal and informal financial systems. Insensitivity and indifference to the unique characteristics of the market served by IVTS and the cultural traditions in which it is embedded, forms the background to this conflict. The dominant formal system considers itself to have global dominance of the financial system (kings of the fortress) and views Hawaladars as its nemesis. There are multiple narratives behind this indifference.

With more than US\$300 billion worth of transactions globally, Hawala moves enormous sums of money around the globe. Major Western financial players are effectively cut out of such exchanges. If they could have a slice of this pie, they would stand to generate enormous profits. A Hawaladar usually charges between 2–5% to make a transfer; a traditional bank or value transfer agency could charge up to 25% to send the same remittance.⁸ When small amounts of money are involved, this daylight robbery occurs at a rate between 20% and 30% (e.g., a \$10 fee for a transfer of \$50).⁹ For Western financial institutions, the underprivileged population represents a novel

*A *Hawala* operator.

market opportunity and the Hawaladars unwelcome competition. They need to be kept out of the fortress.

Another underlying narrative is the difference in which trust is viewed by the two systems. Western societies have “evolved” to a point that trust, in complex societies, is vested primarily in institutions and their official oversight mechanisms.¹⁰ In the formal global financial sector, trust is “enforced” through regulation, the judiciary and bureaucracy. The Western regulatory paradigm assumes the absence of trust; the same is not true for Hawala, in which financial relationships are grounded on the trustworthiness and reputation of the individual rather than on a contract.¹¹ Religion-based or family-/clan-driven ethics motivate individuals to meet high ideals in their business conduct, preventing fraud, corruption, and questionable behaviour.¹² From this perspective, it is straightforward to argue that applying similar regulatory measures to formal and informal financial practices alike is a recipe for failure.

The most remarkable of all is the tenacity of the Hawala System to operate under extreme circumstances where the formal banking system has not been able to adapt or has ceased to operate altogether. In Somalia, after the Siad Barre government was toppled in 1991, commercial banking collapsed and Hawala was the only financial system in the country.¹³ Under Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the country’s formal banking system was dysfunctional and Hawaladars were the only active financial operators.¹⁴ In the event of institutional collapse, informal structures such as Hawala constitute a semblance of regulatory order and are used by various non-governmental organizations, donors, and aid agencies to move money for humanitarian, emergency, and relief projects in conflict-torn countries.¹⁵ More than a decade since all kinds of sanctions were imposed on it, the Hawala system has thrived because of its ability to dig deeper and circumvent the system.

Table 2. CLA—The ‘warrior/*ksattriya*’zone

	Societal Approach/Thinking
LITANY	Hawala is used for money laundering and terrorism support
SOCIAL CAUSES	Policing, lock and key
WORLDVIEW	People with hammers view everything as a nail (The formal financial sector is an exception)
MYTH & METAPHOR	To make the fortress stronger, we need to have higher walls

The *ksattriya* in the IVTS context are stuck in the “fortress mentality” which permeated the US response to the 9/11 events. This mindset of digging moats and raising walls has continued unabated, even when there is “no evidence that the 9/11 conspirators employed Hawala as a means to move the money

that funded the operation”.¹⁶ The Hawala system became stereotyped as an illicit financial structure linked to Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. The US Government’s first ever threat assessment of the problem of money laundering found that less than 1% of the suspicious activity reports (971 out of 1.5 million suspicious activity reports) filed by financial institutions involved potential terrorist financing.¹⁷

There is however a deeper narrative, which is missed out in dialogues about terrorist financing and money laundering. There was a “symbolic value” of singling out Hawala as the conduit for terrorist financing: it drew attention away from the uncomfortable truth that the 9/11 hijackers primarily transferred their funds through established Western financial institutions such as banks, credit card accounts and regulated remitters.¹⁸ As former US Treasury General Counsel David Aufhauser remarked: “It was almost comical. We just listed out as many of the usual suspects as we could and said, let’s go freeze some of their assets”.¹⁹ One of the first initiatives in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks involved closing the overseas channels of the Somalia-based al-Barakat remittance system, effectively destroying Somalia’s largest private employer. The remittance system in Somalia makes up about 40% of its GDP. The reason given was that al-Barakat was allegedly involved in funding terrorism, and was characterised as the “quartermaster of terror”. It is now known that al-Barakat was not involved in funding terrorists; something confirmed by the 9/11 Commission.²⁰ Ironically, even more than a decade after 9/11 and in spite of independent research that has found that Hawala is not a major player in financing terrorism;²¹ the official enthusiasm for documentation and accounting is still symbolically persistent.

On the other end of the spectrum, the international policing system has turned a blind eye to the fact that terrorists move funds through institutions that already conform to the documentation and accounting regimes now being imposed on Hawala. There is a strange silence as to why none of these “established” organisations has had to bear the embarrassment of being characterised as a “financer of terror”. Targeting finances (mostly in Muslim countries) has effectively normalised established financial practises, ignoring the ample opportunities for financial manipulation inherent in Western commercial systems.²²

So it does not come as a surprise that more than a decade since the start of the witch hunt on Hawala, it has emerged that the documentation and reporting requirements have created a huge burden for low income countries without the necessary capacity and resources.²³ Furthermore, these international regulations have produced the opposite-from-desired effects, including higher remittance costs, fewer options for remitters, unnecessary criminalisation of economic sectors and ethnic groups, etc.²⁴

Table 3. CLA—The ‘intellectual/*vipra*’zone

	Societal Approach/Thinking
LITANY	Hawala is illegal/against the system
SOCIAL CAUSES	Custodians of Legislation, Legitimation, Ethics and Morals
WORLDVIEW	Short-term, litany-focused, not transformative (painting over dirt)
MYTH & METAPHOR	When you live in a river, it is not wise to mess with the alligators

In the world of IVTS, two types of *vipra* (intellectuals, economists, policy planners) have emerged. On the one hand, a major part of the *vipra* group has been instrumental in tagging the cultural-financial practices of IVTS with labels such as “informal”, “underground”, or “alternative”. This has in turn contributed to their “delegitimation” and their demotion to an inferior or opposing position in relation to Western financial structures, which have been implicitly constructed as the normal and legitimate space in international finance.²⁵ There are two underlying myths/metaphors here: 1) the difficulty of explaining the trust-based system to a western audience which is well entrenched in their thinking on how such a financial system ought to operate: since Hawala fails to comply, it is considered an anomaly which needs to be brought into compliance with the “accepted norm”; and 2) The “you are with us or against us” slogan; after that it is an instinctive choice.

The second category of *vipra* has spoken about bringing change to the world financial order, but a plurality of dissent has generally been lacking. The future space is beautiful and brings hope because of its uncertainty and possibilities. But if these possibilities follow the route of convention and change to just one wheel of the vehicle, the future merely becomes an extension of the present. These intellectuals have thus tapered any futures discussion space by centring their conclusions around regulating Hawala on some point in the future. The minor matter of bringing the global financial leviathan to order is discussed, but only in passing. They are what Ashis Nandy talked about:

For we live in a world where the obvious has to be justified in ornate, almost baroque language of scientised social analysis or packaged in the esoteric analysis textual analyses to be legitimate to the intellectual community... No hegemony is complete unless the predictability of dissent is ensured, and that cannot be done unless powerful criteria are set up to decide what is authentic, sane, rational dissent and, then, these criteria are systematically institutionalized... This is the process that we are witnessing in the burgeoning intellectual fashion industry.²⁶

The *vipra-vaeshyan* nexus has come up with a new rhetoric over the past decade, to capture a slice of the “bottom of the pyramid” (BOP) market. The glorification of poverty in the form of inclusive and pro-poor policy has been making the rounds for a few years now. The litany is that mainstream economics has failed to serve the underprivileged and a new breed of thinking is required to better serve them. At the level of myth, it turns 180 degrees—mainstream economics has failed to properly exploit the BOP, it is time to get down to the roots and leech off the BOP. When you keep this theory in the background, it is not too difficult to understand why a social project like Grameen Bank was able to work wonders in Bangladesh, but the same concept of micro-finance is wreaking havoc in other parts of the under-developed world.

The *shudras* of the IVTS represent the beneficiaries of Hawala, and they have literally been treated like *shudras* (the lowest rung of the caste system). While the debates have raged about IVTS and financial systems, they have been the missing persons at the party. Their issues, like maximum value for hard-earned money, lack of identification documents and the chaos in which they survive, have been disowned. In true colonial style, they have been asked to leave a system that is a subtle, trust-based, culturally specific and local solution for the remittance of funds to loved ones in need. The system which intends to replace it is costly, culturally alien (interest-based finance system) and is under suspicion because it has let down the people in the fortress (Global Financial Crisis). In this sense, the regulation of Hawala money transfers does not fit with ideas of “making the best of globalisation” or “making globalisation work for the poor”.²⁷ It is no wonder that even after being hounded for the past two decades, Hawala has stood its ground and is in fact idolised by the people languishing at the bottom of the pyramid.

Table 4. CLA—The ‘worker/shudra’ zone

	Societal Approach/Thinking
LITANY	Maximum value for my money
SOCIAL CAUSES	E-money, IVTS
WORLDVIEW	If they let down their own, what will they do for me?
MYTH & METAPHOR	Financial apartheid; the missing men at the party

The logical way to bring it all together would be to find a middle path: a door in wall of the fortress. The problem is that such an approach has repeatedly failed over the past two decades: the regulation and licensing of Hawaladars, Hawala as an alternative to aid, codification and micro-banks for families of migrants, etc. The failure is based on the right of passage: it is just one-way. In this discourse, Hawala needs to change and the *shudras*

need to adapt to the demands of a changing world. The rules of the dominant global financial order cannot and will not change; the *vipra* and the *ksattriya* will continue to play their roles as stewards of the sacred cow.

Table 5. Integrating the narratives

	Formal Value Transfer Systems	Informal Value Transfer Systems	Warriors	Intellectuals	Bottom of the Pyramid	Integrated
LITANY	Hawala is illegal/against the system	Hawala is pro-poor and trust-based	Hawala is used for money laundering and terrorism support	Hawala is illegal/against the system	Maximum value for my money	Value Transfer without ID and tax deduction is now available to passengers at all major airports
SOCIAL CAUSES	Command and control	There is always a way around the system	Policing, lock and key	Custodians of Legislation, Legitimization, Ethics and Morals	E-money, IVTS	A melting pot of cultures and ideas
WORLD-VIEW	Want a piece of the pie	Pariahs, Robin Hoods	People with hammers view everything as a nail (The formal financial sector is an exception)	Short-term, litany focused, not transformative (Paint over dirt)	If they let down their own, what will they do for me?	Looking beyond predictable possibilities
MYTH & METAPHOR	The world is our fortress	The higher the wall of the fortress, the deeper you need to dig	To make the fortress stronger, we need to have higher walls	When you live in a river, it is not wise to mess with the alligators	Financial apartheid The missing men at the party	Build a door in the wall Why is there a wall in the first place?

So the situation requires a more radical approach and it begins with a fundamental question: why is there a fortress in the first place? Are economists supposed to serve economies or economic theories? Are the warriors supposed to protect the fortress or the people inside? By the way, who are they protecting the fortress-dwellers from? Themselves, or a glimpse of what lies outside the fortress? The custodians of ethics, morality and knowledge, who talk about the elusive American Dream and the now

much-publicised Indian Dream; have they themselves forgotten to dream and fantasise? A paradigm shift in thought is required and this will have to begin with a new dream. A suggested beginning would be to fantasise about a world outside the realm of predictable dissent. What does a world without Big Brother watching look like? Without databases, without taxes? Systems without third party audits—a true “world without walls”? With such a mindset a person would then be ready to explore Hawala as an economic and sociological institution which has something to offer in terms of learning, trust and resilience.

The Global Financial Crisis has presented a once-in-a-generation opportunity to the formal banking sector and related stakeholders for inward reflection and reform. Currently, the prospects of learning from Hawala have been dismissed in the name of a global witch hunt and an opportunity to correct some of the incentives and lacunae in the procedures and mechanisms of the formal financial sector is being squandered.

¹ P. Jost & H. S. Sandu, *The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and Its Role in Money Laundering*, Lyon, Interpol General Secretariat, 2000.

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22. The Role CLA Played for Change in a Large Global Financial Institution

Robert Burke*

This chapter describes the author's experiences during extensive use of CLA over five years with the Australian and Asian subsidiaries of one of the world's largest financial institutions as part of their strategic leadership program (SLP). This program was designed and run by the Melbourne Business School's Mt Eliza Executive Education and those responsible for organisational development in Australia and Asia from the financial institution in question (referred to as FI Australia in this chapter).

Introduction

FI Australia had undertaken a significant amount of leadership development over many years, including the Strategic Leadership Program (SLP) in partnership with Mt Eliza Executive Education, Melbourne Business School. A key intention of leadership development for FI was to prepare people to adapt to emerging futures.

FI was part of a very successful, well-run and effective global organisation. The organisation was rated in the top twenty Fortune 500 organisations in the world. Their strategy was to provide quality financial advice and financial solutions to customers in targeted segments through multi-channel distribution supported by a single wealth platform technology, a single platform for financial protection, and a single platform for adviser services. The CEO of the Asia Pacific financial institution made the statement that the following motto was set in stone: "We deliver quality financial advice for money and wealth creation". With the effects the global financial crisis (GFC) created this statement needed to be reviewed because, as with all other financial institutions, the return on investment for clients decreased during this period. The challenge for the organisation was: Given the effects of the GFC how can we improve on giving quality financial advice?

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Towards the end of this period the acquisition of FI Australia from its global European parent by another large Australian financial institution added significantly to the pressure created by the GFC and made it clear that the role of leadership at all levels of the organisation was essential for a successful integration.

I was responsible for the SLP program over the five years 2008–2012, which involved over 200 participants in senior executive roles. The program was run in Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore. This paper looks at:

1. How futures thinking and methodologies helped FI.
2. How CLA was used.
3. The result.

How Futures Thinking and Methodologies Helped FI

Futures thinking and methodologies helped FI by having the SLP participants form a cohort which resulted in what the organisational development leader from FI called “a mystical/mythical feel of being part of something special”.¹ This was partly achieved by futures thinking as an aspect of what we * call Leadership Insight Dialogue. Leadership Insight Dialogue allows more authentic futures to emerge once we shift our thinking to the ways in which we know the world. It’s the thinking that is needed to clarify shared meaning and purpose before any reframing and visioning can take place. The process helps us to unpack the future and to entertain and enter alternative cultures and perspectives. What emerged for the SLP was a shift from the current managerial technical transactional model of delivering quality financial advice for money and wealth creation by expanding that model to include advice and assistance for the common societal good as well. This was a shift from a transactional model (managerial/technical/rational) to include transformational qualities (leadership/adaptiveness/non-rationality).

Predominately the participants were graduates of economics, accountancy, and business studies, and many were actuaries used to a very transactional business model. The SLP program included mindfulness and conversations about corporate social responsibility, conscious business, and spirituality. At the beginning of the program the participants found this challenging but by the end of the program they felt it had been very rewarding and meaningful, not only for their work but for their lives more generally.

The programs and follow-up anticipatory action learning projects used futures tools, particularly Sohail Inayatullah’s six pillars methodology.² Inayatullah’s book *Questioning the Future: Methods and Tools for Organizational and Societal Transformation* was provided for each

*The author (Robert Burke) and his colleague on the SLP, Richard Searle.

participant as a reference and as the source of the futures tools and methods I used with them.

Personal interactions between the participants and their work colleagues resulted in the formation of a cohort of leaders (or potential leaders) who spoke the same language about leadership, values, and conscious business.

As for the takeover of FI, it was noted that in the early stages of integration the two organisations were focused on a “noble purpose business model” but that the cultural differences between the organisations could potentially create some issues about how the people from the new parent organisation perceived their new colleagues from FI and vice versa; the concern being that the practice of constructive feedback through open, honest discussions might be seen as “challenging” by the new parent because they had not participated in the SLP and had not experienced the same level of relational connectivity. The SLP encouraged constructive feedback in the here-and-now, which requires leadership capability and courage. Giving immediate feedback in the here-and-now, as constructive feedback, is designed to create authentic, effective relationships and is essential for the creation of caring positive change. Leadership Insight Dialogue is used for design and scenario development through dialogue to co-evolve desired emerging futures as insights occur to participants in the present. The primary focus is on the actual real world leadership challenges people face with as they work with others, their groups and organisations to adapt to new realities and emergent futures in striving to achieve effective outcomes. The approach is challenging and not always comfortable, but it is usually highly rewarding. Learning, like leadership itself, often requires us to shake up the current equilibrium in order to achieve a different and better result than was predictable. To do this, the LID method shines a light on the nature of interactions amongst the group as alternative futures emerge. Leadership Insight Dialogue was a skill we taught on the SLP. Leadership capability is different from leadership competency. Most executives have the leadership competency to perform well but many fail to use this competency when under pressure, such as during takeover and integration, as in this case. These are the times when leadership is most needed and can occur at any time, often unexpectedly. Davies wrote: “Capability is manifested in effectiveness under pressure. Knowing what to do as a leader does not mean that a person can lead. Knowing how to lead does not mean that a person will lead, especially in tough situations”.³ The challenge for the SLP participants was to navigate areas of potential conflict and anxiety productively and authentically.

How CLA Was Used

CLA benefited SLP graduates to get a better understanding of the deeper causation of duress under pressure. Creating a preferred future can cause duress because it necessarily involves change, always involves people, and is

always associated with the anxiety change invariably creates. Although it is, as a rule, acknowledged that change is needed, it is also what people are most resistant to and most anxious about.

CLA helped FI to address the possibility that their world view could potentially be part of problems they faced with the merger and with their new parents. The CLA process guided the participants into the realization that addressing their worldview and its underlying myths and metaphors had the promise of finding solutions to those problems productively. This had the effect of mobilising them into positive action.

The leadership challenge for FI lay in questioning their future strategy based solely on the technical knowledge that already existed and with which they were comfortable, from which they could extrapolate the future, and which was consistent with the worldviews and assumptions of existing financial institutions. The invitation to the SLP cohorts was to use CLA to help with the adaptive leadership challenges the merger created which required new learning and new innovation.

What Was the Result?

Ultimately the SLP participants realised that worldviews and their underlying myths are fundamental in creating effective strategy.

At the time, FI's strategic priorities were to significantly upgrade and expand their marketing capability in order to deliver integrated customer value propositions (advice, products and services) to their targeted segments. Their strategy was to continue to materially invest in automation and online technology in order to satisfy customer and adviser demand for availability, speed, clarity and accuracy in their service. They would further expand and differentiate their licensee services to drive outperformance relative to the market in relation to adviser productivity, and would continue to gain market share in the advised financial protection market whilst broadening the distribution of their financial protection product offer through alternative channels. In addition they would fully develop a new single wealth product and complete the migration of their existing offers onto this single wealth platform technology. This would have the effect of broadening their current investment offers, and better leveraging their capabilities principally via their partnerships (to reduce their cost to income ratio) and through further business simplification and migration to the single platform strategy. They also wanted to ensure FI was a great place to work.

For this strategy to succeed they had to have a critical mass of quality financial advisers, of which there was, at the time, a shortage. One group's project was working out how to overcome the problem of this shortage in Australia and New Zealand; they were required to present their findings to the CEO and senior executive team three months after the end of the SLP.

This group approached the skills shortage, through CLA, in terms of its limitation of FI's ability to meet its strategic objectives, acknowledging that their perception of the skills shortage was shaped by their current worldview and assumptions.

I listened to the conversations this group were having which seemed to be going around and around the fact that the pool of financial advisers in Australia and New Zealand was simultaneously shrinking and very competitive. Competition among financial institutions for the smaller pool of advisers was growing and FI's strategy was to increase the financial incentives of working at FI, making it "a great place to work". It was clear that they believed they already had the "right" model and, to them, the "only" model that would work. They had used this model as their strategy to some effect. The strategy was based on a "one size fits all" approach. The "rules of engagement" defined by their current strategy were based on a traditional western business model and their employment contracts were based on financial reward.

The observation I made was that they were right about the skills shortage in Australia and New Zealand, they were right about the increased competition, and they were right that their current recruitment methods had only limited success. They acknowledged that this was partly due to a reduced participation in the workforce in Australia and New Zealand, partly due to skilled Australian and New Zealand financial-advisers being highly prized in larger markets overseas, and partly due to the ageing population (existing financial advisers were slowly leaving the workforce).

Given these facts, I asked them why they were sticking to a model that would not resolve their problem. Why were they using the borders of Australia and New Zealand as the banks of their skill pool?

The result of using CLA to reconstruct a better outcome was that "a rich talent pool" of potential new advisers was created. The process of reconstruction revealed a fascinating insight into the extent to which FI's existing western worldview was limiting their opportunities. Western worldview prevented them from searching for financial advisers in non-western countries, as the west, to them, was 'overseas'. This led to fruitful conversations about racism, protectionism and elitism; thankfully it also led to powerful discussions about how to overcome these "hidden" prejudices, previously unmentioned, not because they weren't there, but because the participants were not aware of them. It also revealed that they needed to shift their existing worldview to a new, inclusive, global worldview based on equal opportunity and financial equity and equality regardless of country of birth.

During the reconstruction process strong emotions were brought out. These emotions had the effect of mobilising the team into action, creating new energy and a revised purpose, driven by the promise of the inclusive, global

worldview. They realised that there was not a shortage of quality financial advisers; if FI was prepared to seek them in non-western countries and from “under-developed” nations it would find an untouched pool of intelligent people in great numbers, desperate for meaningful careers and to join the workforce but who had previously been given little or no opportunity to do so.

CLA thus added significantly to FI’s existing strategy and created a result previously unimagined. By diving deeper than they had ever done before to worldview and myth/metaphor levels they were able to explore these alternatives. This challenged their assumptions about their company’s identity and brought about a transformation of their worldview.

It took a great deal of courage for the team to present their findings to the CEO and senior executives. However, they were generously received. They presented in a language not heard before at FI. They presented their findings with great sensitivity and emotion, an act of leadership in the here-and-now, and under pressure. They supported their findings with enough technical evidence to make their case. They proposed that by helping in the education and training in those countries identified as being of great need, not only were they doing a great service to the people of those countries and demonstrating an enhanced level of corporate social responsibility, they were also improving their economic situation which, in turn, would also financially benefit FI. Some of the group reported the very good reception was a “spiritual” moment for them: doing good, being good.

By looking beyond Australia and New Zealand for potential new financial advisers FI’s risk was greatly reduced. To ensure this became a strategic opportunity FI had to be active in the education and development of those overseas communities.

The strategies developed emphasised the importance of worldview, myth and metaphor for strategic, operational, cultural, and organisational change.

CLA was the tool of reflection, of dialogue, of insight, of change and of story-telling, creating a new standard of corporate social responsibility based on inclusiveness. Through this process “a mystical/mythical feel to being part of something special” developed. The following CLA emerged, which gave the participants a deeper and broader canvas on which to create their preferred future, and the energy needed to bring it about.

Table 1. Financial adviser skills shortage

Deconstruct from existing Western Worldview	Existing Story	Reconstruct to an inclusive Global Worldview
<p>Litany Intense competition for young, qualified professionals (first entrants to workforce, professionals in mid-career) Current A/NZ population mix (“western”) is FI A/NZ’s skill pool</p> <p>Systemic Causes Most of the world’s population is non-western, poor and in third world countries These countries have fast population growth— Population is NOT ageing Ageing population and workforce in A/NZ does NOT imply that the pool of useable business skills in our market is shrinking</p> <p>Worldview Current A/NZ population mix (“western”) is the only skill pool relevant to FI A/NZ Client-facing staff need to actually be in A/NZ FI’s current business model is the only way we can work</p> <p>Myth People cannot be replaced with technology Fear that FI’s current A/NZ skill pool could be totally replaced with cheaper offshore labour</p>	<p>Litany Shortage of skills/talent/people in Australia & NZ (A/NZ) Pool of skills is shrinking Competition for skilled advisers is increasing</p> <p>Systemic Causes Strong economic growth worldwide—developed countries Low unemployment worldwide—developed countries Reducing participation in workforce in A/NZ—ageing population, workers going abroad Stagnant population in A/NZ—reduced growth rate</p> <p>Worldview Skills = People FI’s current business model is the right/only model—sustainable Employers define the “rules of engagement” in our current business model People have to fit into our current business model— One size fits all Employment contracts</p> <p>Myth Current A/NZ population mix (i.e. “western”) is FI A/NZ’s skill pool Staff need to be in A/NZ to service clients in A/NZ—particularly “client-facing” staff Skills = People There is a shortage of skills in A/NZ</p>	<p>Litany There is no shortage of people and/or skills outside A/NZ, if we invest in skills, training & development More tasks across all professions (i.e. linear processes) are being automated through IT</p> <p>Systemic Causes Non-western, third world countries enjoy strong population and economic growth Unprecedented opportunity to tap into/source these skill pools—particularly in Asia, India & Africa Within A/NZ more “retirees” seek to re-enter workforce Incentives exist for retirees to continue work / careers (e.g. superannuation changes)</p> <p>Worldview No geographical boundary to the skill pool FI A/NZ can access—developing countries provide a rich talent pool Business model can be adapted to people’s changing lifestyles (e.g. baby-boomers/retirees, Generations X, Y & Millennial) Skills required for linear processing—increasingly automated Face-to-face “human” interactions are fewer and more targeted</p> <p>Myth No skills shortage Effective services can be provided through various channels—access to skills through traditional channels is reducing Any skill that is linear/routine WILL be automated</p>

Table 2. CLA unpacking financial services (FI)

Deconstruct from existing Western Worldview	Existing Story	Reconstruct to an inclusive Global Worldview
Litany “We deliver quality <i>financial</i> advice”. FI fundamentally understands the market and therefore understands society’s needs best	Litany We deliver quality Financial Advice for Money and Wealth Creation	Litany “We deliver quality <i>living investment</i> advice” covering STEEPLE, * including Wealth Creation but also understanding the deeper forces in institutions and communities
Systemic Causes Economic fundamentalism that believes in one language (money), one Truth (the market) and one collective (the top tier of economic development)	Systemic Causes Financiers know what’s best for the market based on consumption and economic competitiveness	Systemic Causes Embodying a multitude of coordination mechanisms (including the market, regulation, and stakeholder negotiation) and inclusive of all views of global affairs
Worldview Financial Institutions often see humans as consumers complying with the economic, political, and religious paths that are prescribed in their education and fundamental to their overt behaviour	Worldview One worldview (the West) strict adherence to one language (power) and Truth (the chosen-country syndrome), and one self and will	Worldview FI seen as minds that create new solutions. Inclusive rather than exclusive, responding creatively to major structural and social challenges providing an intellectual breeding ground for change for the better
Myth Growth is good, money is power and central to wealth creation which brings with it recognition of my importance and happiness	Myth Size is might and growth and capitalism in the market forms the basis of all power	Myth FI works to transform capitalism, creating new infrastructures for a more externally aware market economy inclusive of those on the “periphery” Redefining growth

FI’s development leader reported that the outcome had significantly increased their emphasis on building leadership capacity by providing programs that explore individual and collective mindsets, attitudes, assumptions and beliefs. The success of the outcome influenced FI’s ongoing direction and was used to bring together its different partners into one dialogue session to create a common space for understanding how capacity-building translates into capability and effectiveness, and to explore emerging trends and practices in leadership capacity development. This process also

* STEEPLE refers to Social, Technological, Economical, Ecological, Political, Legal, and Ethical.

included discussion of how using CLA can inform the work of leaders in considering their own careers, worldviews and life development.

¹ Email transmission to Robert Burke, March 2011.

² S. Inayatullah, *Questioning The Future: Methods and Tools for Organizational and Social Transformation*, Tamkang University, Taiwan, 2007

³ M. Davies, 'Unblocking the value of exceptional personalities', in R. B. Kaiser (ed.), *The Perils of Accentuating the Positive* (135–158), Tulsa, OK, Hogan Press, 2009, 138.

23. Uncovering Deeper Issues in Social Workers' Alliance with their Professional Association

Gilbert Fan*

This chapter traces the issues and challenges faced by the Singapore Association of Social Workers (SASW) in representing social workers in the country. By using the lens of CLA, deeper issues were uncovered and reconstructed. New meanings were conceptualised to help build new and targeted strategies for a probable future for the Association.

Introduction

The Singapore Association of Social Workers (SASW) is the only professional association for social workers in the country. Its primary mission is to promote the welfare of social workers and to advance social work as a profession.¹ The Singapore government has given SASW due recognition by inviting its officials for dialogue sessions, granting it representation in key committees and supporting funding for some of its training initiatives through its training arm, the Family Resource & Training Centre (FRTC).

Despite the fact that SASW had ample opportunities to grow as a significant professional body in its early years, there were many structural problems that plagued the Association from time to time, reducing its ability to do more for social workers. Its early efforts focused on the recruitment of members, the establishment of basic practice ethics, and on responding to emerging social needs and new services.²

This paper recollects the Association's troubles and reports key issues uncovered through a study undertaken by the author.³ For the Association, this is a landmark study, its second major study covering social workers' views of its relevance and professional standing; the first study was by

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Goh who studied membership issues prior to SASW's formation resulting from a merger of three of its predecessors.⁴ SASW could be one of the first social work professional associations to adopt a futures studies methodology, causal layered analysis (CLA), as its research framework. Most other studies undertaken by professional associations were in-house surveys on membership issues such as occupational titles, career pathways, salaries and perceptions of needs and expectations of professional associations.⁵

Background

The Singapore Association of Social Workers (SASW) has a history of over 40 years. For most of its history, SASW relied heavily on professional volunteers to manage its affairs. Office bearers usually stayed for one term. Succession planning was almost non-existent. Long-term planning proved to be difficult. The Association could adopt only a reductivist approach by responding to professional issues as and when they cropped up. The other critical problem faced was SASW's inability to inform its members and social workers at-large of the issues at hand, as these concerned public and social policy formulations.⁶ These compounding difficulties widened the communication gaps between the Association, its members and the general public.

It was also a challenge for the social worker to be actively involved with SASW and to be wholly committed to his or her employment at the same time. Both the Association and employers of social workers needed the social worker to initiate and expand their services and programmes. Sharing of common resources proved to be challenging when there were different goals, expectations and viewpoints. Whilst there were opportunities for partnerships, such as in organising seminars, conferences and training programmes, SASW could not claim as much credit as the employers of social workers who directly owned these professional resources. These problems were further compounded by the fact that not all employers of social workers operate wholly as social work agencies.⁷ These employers have other professionals in their employ; they are psychologists, counsellors, physical therapists, etc.

Voluntary welfare organisations (VWOs) have also matured over the years and they were ready to embark on an expansionist plan to include the professional training of social workers within their mission. They started with in-house training in areas within their expertise before embarking on nation-wide training programmes. The training programmes appeared to be profitable, in terms of revenue, and VWOs also earned themselves reputations as specialist training providers. VWOs had no difficulty involving their staff in training whilst SASW had many challenges getting specialist trainers. SASW had no human/professional resources to begin with, and thus had to compete with VWOs in obtaining trainers and in implementing training programmes.⁸

Social work in Singapore is still very much agency-focused. The professional development of social workers is still very much an agency-level responsibility and its importance varies from agency to agency.⁹ Blau and Scott opined that a professional is more likely to support an organisation that values them.¹⁰ In Singapore, social workers value their contributions to their organisations and the professional development opportunities offered by their employers. Mansbach and Kaufman noted that social workers' associations "function within organizational, political, cultural and other constraints".¹¹ There are indeed competing needs and demands between social work agencies and the profession as represented by the Association.¹²

Professionalising social work can only be achieved at the national level. Thus the current passive attitude of social workers towards their professional association has to change if an SASW-social workers partnership in furthering social work is deemed to be essential. Social workers and SASW are in fact interdependent. When SASW does well, it has a national impact greater than when an agency does well. Social workers in Singapore can be too tunnel-visioned in looking at their own survival needs and neglect the collective good of their profession. Social work associations like SASW may have to re-evaluate their role to better reflect today's rapidly changing and uncertain world. With the current emphasis by the Singapore government on developing the social service sector and strengthening the social fabric and defence of Singapore, SASW is now in a pivotal position to make significant contributions, both to the profession and to the social service sector.¹³

CLA Framework and Methodology

All four layers of analysis, namely Litany, Systemic (Social Causes), Worldview and Myth or Metaphor were deconstructed and reconstructed to uncover alternative ways of knowing and therefore generate alternative solutions.¹⁴ Russo used the word 'layering' to denote construction and reconstruction.¹⁵ Through layering the researcher questions how perspectives were developed to gain broader understanding of the issues in question. Layering or constructing/reconstructing was heavily utilised in the study.

In CLA, the challenge is to question the future by "undefining" it.¹⁶ Thus to question the future of the Singapore Association of Social Workers (SASW) is to undefine or reinterpret it, by deconstructing empirical evidence as to what a professional association is and to ascertain what SASW needs to meet its future mission.

In a systematic fashion, unquestioned views of reality are examined at the first layer of analysis of CLA, the litany level. Superficial and unquestioned views of reality for social work form the '**social worker identity**' at the Litany Level. These unquestioned views are easily verified comments that reveal whether a problem exists. These comments about the issue by specific individuals or the public may be fuelled by the news

media or popular literature.¹⁷ These comments “can be exaggerated, distorted and politicised, and usually present as discontinuous issues and ‘sound bites’. At this level, thinking is unchallenged, and the general sense is that ‘someone’ [e.g., Government] should do something about this”.¹⁸

The social worker identity issue is then interpreted at the second layer of analysis, the systemic level, where historical factors and other evidence are uncovered as possible causal variables. At the systemic level, actors, objects and their interrelations are identified to ascertain how social, technical, economic, environmental and political influences may be involved.¹⁹ The analysis at the systemic level is done through “rational analysis and the quantitative interpretation of data”.²⁰ Thus, at the systemic level lies the **‘development of social work discourse’** of what social work has been in the past and is at present. This discourse traces the essence and development of social work.

At the worldview level, the “world view that supports and legitimates the systems of social organisation itself is challenged. This worldview includes politicians and government having [a] vested interest in maintaining the status quo. The task here is to discern the assumptions, contradictions and prejudices and to find deeper social, linguistic, and cultural structures that are independent of the actors”.²¹ Thus, at the worldview level, the **‘professional discourse’** debates the essence of social work. It is at this level where such ideological and subconscious assumptions are differentiated and distanced from individual and systemic realities, and critically reframed by reconstructing alternative pasts and alternative futures.

At the fourth layer of analysis is the myth level. Myths are “the deep stories of experience and perceptions of reality. The unconscious dimensions of the problem or the paradox find expression—seeing it not in quantitative terms but in terms of community where people are creative resources and in terms of what ultimately sustains us”.²² At this level of analysis, myths are thus challenged and redefined in realistic terms by reordering knowledge; the **‘image of the social worker’** is challenged and redefined.

In CLA, the process of verification, which is checking, confirming and testing for accuracy, is in-built through the layers of analysis, deconstruction and reconstruction.²³ Textual information is analysed at each layer and cross-examined between layers.

Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Data

The study undertaken by the author explored the level of alliance of social workers with their professional association, SASW.²⁴ “Alliance”, in the study, refers to the extent of an individual’s identification and involvement with the professional association. The study involved a total of 27 participants: (1) eleven current registered social workers (RSWs), (2) seven

current non-registered social workers (Non-RSWs), and (3) nine former or inactive members (FM).

Drawing directly upon the analytical principles and approaches of the CLA framework and founded on the raw data of the study, themes that had surfaced from the participants' responses were further deconstructed and reconstructed into larger categories and coded. For example, the theme of 'not seeing the value or benefits of joining' was added to the Litany and was coded as 'no value in joining' in Table 1. A series of similar codes such as 'no time', 'lack of interest in the Association's activities' and 'social workers' inertia' were placed under 'no foreseeable benefits from joining' within the Litany. The theme 'having insufficient time to be involved' was extracted from respondents' comments about having other priorities (that might have more foreseeable benefits) and it was therefore interpreted and categorised under 'no foreseeable benefits from joining'. All themes arising from participants' responses were coded in this manner.

Table 1. Social workers' overall view on the level of alliance with SASW

LITANY	No foreseeable benefits from joining —no time; no value in joining; lack of interest in the Association's activities; social workers' inertia
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	Association has not achieved much; Association lacks opportunities to represent social workers —employers providing adequately for social workers; lack of support from employers; self-sufficiency of social workers; social workers not in unison; cost being a consideration; lack of bonding of members; limitations in representation by Association; weakness in advocacy and mentorship; limitations in representation; operational weakness of the Association
WORLDVIEW	A lack of professional identity and image; Association's lack of prominence —this is also resounding throughout the world as the recognition and the professional status of social work, social workers and the professional body are debated; governments intervened in the funding and development of social work services; the development of social work; social workers and the professional body become secondary to public and social policies
MYTH	Key players will ensure and support the Association and not allow it to be dissolved; Downplaying of professionalism by mass media —that registration or even licensing will keep SASW going; expectations that SASW will deliver what social workers want, and that SASW will not be dissolved; volunteers were often depicted to be social workers by the mass media, and that these volunteers were doing social work rather than volunteer work

At each level of analysis (that is, the litany, systemic, worldview and myth) of CLA, the initially constructed categories were reconstructed by comparing across issues within the same level of analysis, using a technique

known as horizontal gazing. For example, the category of ‘no foreseeable benefits from joining’ (alliance with SASW) was compared with other categories in other litanies such as ‘social workers must see the need’ (purpose of having SASW) versus ‘not all social workers need a professional association’ (need for SASW). Horizontal gazing helps to bring out major differences in respondents’ understanding of the issues at hand. Thus, alternative futures were explored using the CLA framework.

Generally, respondents felt that the Association did not provide any additional advantage over what they could have obtained from their employers (litany). Foreseeable benefits of joining were weighed against the cost and perceived commitment expected of the member. Some respondents were of the view that bonding with the profession would suffice. Many respondents believed that the Association fell short of serving the needs of social workers and the profession (systemic), particularly in outreach to its members and social workers at-large. Many respondents identified themselves as “outsiders” and “critics” of the Association rather than as actors and contributors. At the worldview level, respondents’ opinions blended well with mega-issues in social work as faced by social workers and social work professional associations worldwide. These mega-issues included professional autonomy, recognition of social workers and the prominence of social work associations. At the myth level, there appeared to be a recurrent theme of the “bystander stance”. The likely deep narrative of this stance is that there are more capable and experienced social workers who can transform SASW.

RSWs were generally more critical of the Association and faced more stress at their workplace, and thus had little time for the Association. Despite this, they expected recognition and benefits from the Association. Their registration with the Association affirmed their identification with the profession. This dichotomy in exercising their rights or entitlements as opposed to their lack of involvement with SASW reinforced further dissatisfactions with the Association. In contrast, a majority of the Non-RSWs were veteran social workers; they were divided in their views about the Association. They had witnessed the Association’s development since its founding. Former members, who were relatively younger than their RSW counterparts, had chosen to remain passive towards the Association by not renewing their memberships. They were likely to be beginning social workers who could have directly benefitted from the professional development and training efforts provided by their employers.

Table 2 outlines the key issues faced by SASW and their underlying ideologies.

Table 2. A critical analysis of key issues faced by SASW and their ideologies

	Problem Defined	Ideology (myth/image/story)
LITANY	Blind spots in expectations between social workers & SASW - in needs and service provisions	SASW is treated as a back-up resource by social workers and employers
SYSTEMIC	Competition rather than collaboration - SASW has to compete to represent social workers; its resources are external to SASW	Dependent on goodwill & reciprocal benefits; accreditation driven, not membership driven
WORLDVIEW	SASW is not fully autonomous - strong governmental influence; play down by public figures & the mass media	A semi-controlled social institution highly influenced by socio-economic & political climate of the day; government's focus is on social service sector and not on social workers <i>per se</i>
MYTH	SASW will not be dissolved - there are key players (backers); it will always have a role to play	It has a long history and it has survived; there is a strong belief that someone else will come to its rescue

Each level of analysis uncovered recurring ideological myths that were so pervasive that they constrained reasoning about SASW's future. The study affirmed that SASW's weakness as a professional body is not the result of its lack of strategies to promote change but rather of the fact that its political power was constantly weakened by social workers' dismissal of their need for a professional association. Table 3 draws out the deep narratives and metaphors that may not be immediately obvious to most social workers.

Table 3. Uncovering deep narratives and metaphors on social workers' alliance with SASW

	Key characteristics uncovered	Deep Narratives & Metaphors used or implied by respondents
LITANY	No foreseeable benefits from joining	'empty-shell' syndrome 'container-effect' 'no critical mass' 'in the doldrums' (implied)
SYSTEMIC	Association has not achieved much; Association lacks opportunities to represent social workers	no (political) power no mandate (rights) operational weakness redundancy (implied) workers as a back-as as a back-up resource—2nd class (implied)
WORLDVIEW	A lack of professional identity & image; Association's lack of prominence	not homogenous lack of collective identity weak professional boundary 'in the dark' not in the 'cutting-edge' no 'clout' no 'voice' no 'teeth' registration as image building
MYTH	Key players will ensure support for the Association and not allow it to dissolve	not in unison (having personal interest) 'guests versus host' mentality (implied) dissolve 'one foot in' (implied) parent-child relationship (implied) (mismatched) needs not met apathy amongst social workers professing only 'paper-loyalty' bystander stance (implied) self-fulfilling prophecy (amongst social workers, stakeholders & staff of SASW)
	Downplaying of professionalism by mass media	altruistic nature of social work a misunderstood profession (implied)

With the implementation of a new voluntary accreditation system by the Singapore government on 1st April 2009,²⁵ the voluntary registration of social workers by SASW was discontinued. The new accreditation system has impacted SASW negatively in that membership of SASW has started to decline sharply. Membership with SASW is no longer a prerequisite for accreditation. Though not in a constant and stable manner, SASW has strived to be as strong as it can be in the past 12 years in order to best represent social workers in Singapore. In spite of the increase in the number of bonding activities and special interest groups, turnout for events has remained poor. Judging on the ‘right timing’ issue raised by respondents, SASW could not have been their priority. What might be sustaining this ‘attitude’ among social workers and other stakeholders are the long-standing myths embedded in their minds. These myths and deep narratives were outlined in Table 3. SASW needs to create ‘new stories’ or ‘new images’ to turn things around (see Table 4).

Table 4. Reframing the issues

	Originally Framed	Reframed
LITANY	SASW not doing enough	Not all social workers need SASW (blind spots in expectations); few social workers responded to the call by SASW
SYSTEMIC	Competitive markets; self-sufficiency of agencies	Fair play; gaps in professional development; market for all
WORLDVIEW	Not fully autonomous; social control; low image	Limitations in advocacy & in representation; inadequate resources
MYTH	Will not be dissolved	Dependent on a few key players; belief in a ‘saviour’—probably higher authority

Respondents’ perceptions that SASW has not done enough are controversial, especially when one takes into account the various professionalisation initiatives mooted by the Association. Perhaps respondents were concerned with SASW’s capability of sustaining current programmes and in ensuring continuing improvements on a long-term basis. After all, SASW could not compete with resource-rich employers in kick-starting new services and training programmes.

Professional associations today are no longer the sole advocates of professions; registration and licensing boards, specialist bodies and the government also advocate for the same professions. Whilst historically professional associations dictated on professional matters, today statutory government boards have taken over this ‘mandate’ as they advise professional bodies on pertinent professional matters. In order to align with overall government policies and objectives, professional associations operate

within structural constraints in the country they serve. For its own survival, SASW needs to carve-out niches for itself (see Table 5, below).

Table 5. Recasting key issues and possible solutions

	Problem	Basis of Solution	Who might solve it?
WORLDVIEW	Not fully autonomous; social control	Advocate and lay claims where necessary - educate	social workers government mass media
SYSTEMIC	Competition; agency-focused and not profession-focused	Create niche markets; collaborate - consultative integrative & partner local & regional associations / institutions	SASW, employers and the government
LITANY	Blind spots in expectations	Proactive and targeted marketing mind-set change be current, be proactive and respond promptly	SASW, social workers

The layers in Table 5 were reversed to demonstrate the importance of reconstructing from mega-structural change to social and organisational change. It is necessary for SASW to collaborate with all its key stakeholders (including social workers, mass media and government) to advocate for the profession. Table 5 spells out the fundamentals of 3 key strategies that help to reveal the probable future of the Association: (1) advocate and lay claims in matters concerning the professional development of the social worker, (2) create niche markets in professional education and training through collaboration with other training providers (collaborative-competition), and (3) adopt proactive and targeted marketing and communication strategies.

Conclusion

This paper traces the CLA process in deconstructing and reconstructing raw data from a particular study; a study of the level of alliance between social workers and their professional association, SASW. The overall findings of the study suggested that SASW has been constantly plagued by broader personal (social worker), national and even global, structural and systemic issues on top of its inherent organisational weakness.

What seemed to be “obvious facts” were found to be superficial aspects that camouflaged deeper issues that required urgent attention. The study has

revealed one simple truth: that SASW has founded its strategies and solutions on these “obvious facts” for the past few decades. It obviously had not succeeded in resolving many of the fundamental issues it has faced.

To begin with, SASW needs to work on the different expectations held by social workers and their Association; their visions and values about professional development, professional representation and professional recognition are not in full alignment. The social workers’ willingness to professionalise may be being taken for granted. SASW’s responsibility to professionalise social workers may be over-emphasised and over-played such that social workers’ self-responsibility and self-discipline in their professional development is diminished. Other stakeholders’ visions and values also differ somewhat from SASW. For example, the Singapore government’s interest in enhancing the standard of service of the entire social service sector versus SASW’s interest in the standard of service of social workers per se.

A more difficult task at hand concerns the motivation of social workers to improve their image and status as a profession. This entails having all social workers performing at their very best, in providing the best standard of care to their clients. It is a myth that SASW can take over this role and function from social workers. SASW can only provide the avenues for professional development; the social workers themselves must be fervent in carrying out the necessary action.

SASW’s past strategies in growing its market share were to compete for resources; having to compete in providing training and in enlarging its membership. The traditional approach adopted focused on the membership of individual social workers. Today, it is worthwhile to consider organisational (i.e. VWO) and regional (i.e. South-east Asia) memberships. This can be done in two ways: either by according memberships en bloc to qualified social workers of a VWO/region and/or by engaging the VWO on professional matters concerning the social worker at their workplace. Thus, the notion of ‘collaborative-competition’ is mooted.

Many ideologies, deep narratives and myths uncovered through CLA in the study may not be immediately obvious if the study had adopted a non-futures studies approach.

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24. Causal Layered Analysis in Action: Case studies from an HR practitioner's perspective

Debbie Terranova*

This chapter presents two case studies where HR strategy workshops, focusing on the issues of ageing workforce and change in organisational direction, were designed and implemented using the CLA methodology. Employed at the beginning of a policy development or change process, CLA facilitates a broader and deeper collective understanding of a problem than is possible using traditional planning methods. The chapter shows that CLA is useful when the workshop group is homogeneous in age, life experiences, beliefs or attitudes, but also that the CLA process stimulates creativity and opens participants to collaborative play which can unite disparate groups.

Case Study 1: CLA and the ageing workforce debate

Introduction

Ageing is an issue that has received a lot of attention in Australia as policy-makers try to find solutions to an unsustainable dependency ratio (of government-supported age pensioners to wage-earners), predicted for when the numerous Baby Boomer generation exits the workforce.

Over the next fifteen years the majority of Baby Boomers will retire, taking with them valuable skills and earning capacity. Whereas once this demographic bubble held the promise of a nation, it is now set to become a financial burden as the cohort moves from middle age into old age.

While younger generations (Generations X and Y) may have different skill sets and higher levels of education, will they be sufficiently prepared to take the reins of companies?

Is the ageing workforce as serious a problem as governments and the media make out? In this case study CLA was used in a human resource management context to fathom the ageing workforce debate.

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CLA was used as the basis for a workshop for senior managers of the Brisbane City Council (BCC) to broaden and deepen discussion about workforce ageing.

Why use CLA?

Causal layered analysis¹ is useful for exploring the breadth and depth of collective understanding of an issue or problem. How a problem is defined and how it is framed affects policy responses.

Policy analysts often unintentionally frame policy problems from a narrow world view, and often it is their own. Government policy analysts in Australia are generally white, middle-aged and financially secure, so there is a tendency for policy responses to be designed accordingly. For a community that is increasingly multicultural and globally connected, the risks of this approach are obvious.

In Australia the problem of population ageing has been framed in negative terms around the projected cost to the working population² and skyrocketing government expenditure on health care and pensions.³ One policy solution was to reduce the inter-generational burden through superannuation reforms designed to extend working life beyond the traditional age of retirement, which was between 55 and 65 years.⁴ Was this the best solution? What other options could have been considered?

In the BCC case study, using the CLA methodology allowed issues and problems to be explored from broader perspectives and with deeper understanding. Broader perspectives were obtained by including a diversity of age, generational and gender viewpoints. Deeper understanding was obtained by working down through the layers of CLA, namely:

- Litany—the headlines
- Systemic causes—identified causes, supported by data or 'proof'
- Worldview—belief systems and social contexts, and
- Metaphor—the story behind each worldview

At the deepest layer participants created analogies or culturally-linked metaphors to describe how each worldview was experienced and how it felt. This might have been unfamiliar and challenging territory but it was critical to 'unfreezing' the thinking of the group and sparking creativity.

Outputs from CLA were developed into future scenarios, from which participants chose a desired future and identified actions to achieve it.

The context

CLA was used in a planning workshop facilitated by an HR practitioner for a group of senior managers in Brisbane City Council. The topic was workforce ageing.

Brisbane City Council is a large local government authority with a workforce of approximately 7,700, including professional, administrative, trade, manual and operational workers. In 2013, the average age of its workforce was 46 years. The oldest occupational group—machinery and vehicle operators—was an average of 52 years old. In BCC there is no mandatory retirement age and around 250 workers are now over the age of 65. Significant ageing of the workforce has occurred over the seven years from 2006 to 2013 (see Figure 1, below).




Figure 1. BCC workforce by age, 2006 and 2013

At the time of the CLA workshop, the average age of the workforce was around 43 years. The “blue collar” sector (trade and operational workers) had the highest proportion of workers aged over 45. This was problematic because the risk of injury and illness increased with age for manual workers, which meant cost hikes in sick leave, workers’ compensation and lost productivity. Other concerns were:

- Loss of organisational knowledge as employees retired
- Cost of replacing employees

- Difficulty in sourcing highly skilled replacements in a competitive labour market
- Lower retention rates for younger workers due to career blockages.

A selection of senior managers and HR professionals was invited to a two-hour workshop to examine the problem and develop interventions. The group was typical of senior public sector employees. An age scan revealed that all participants fell into the Baby Boomer generation. All were remunerated at the upper end of BCC's salary scales and all worked in professional or management roles. Of the original twelve invitees, only three were female.

A policy workshop with such a homogeneous group ran the risk that the problem would be framed from a middle-aged, middle-class perspective which might result in lacklustre or inappropriate solutions. The CLA methodology was chosen to expand the range of options that might be put up for consideration.

How CLA was used

One week prior to the workshop, the participants were given preparatory reading material about ageing workforce issues, which included workforce statistics, projections, and relevant literature which framed the issue in both positive and negative terms.

In order to improve age and gender diversity, two younger female HR professionals were invited: one from Generation X and one from Generation Y.

Generation X was born between 1965 and the early 1980s. According to the literature they were characterised by cynicism and disgruntlement, attributed to being overshadowed by the size and purchasing power of the preceding generation. In addition, the unfortunate timing of their entry to the labour market—in the midst of a deep economic recession—cruelled early career options.

Generation Y, the youngest generation in the workforce and the children of the Baby Boomers, had a reputation for questioning authority and dictating their own agendas. They were the best-educated and most tech-savvy of the generations in the workforce.

At the start of the workshop, participants were evenly divided into four groups. They were briefed about desired outputs but not informed of the CLA methodology that underpinned the workshop process.

In setting up the series of activities, the facilitator rearranged the order of CLA, commencing with the second layer, systemic causes. Analysis of litany, worldview, and metaphor layers followed, in that order. Development of scenarios and action planning were undertaken at a subsequent workshop.

Systemic causes layer

The first activity was designed to produce a common understanding of the systemic causes of the problem, including social, technological, economic and political aspects. Using Post-it notes (coloured squares of paper backed with a strip of adhesive) and working individually, participants were asked to write one issue per Post-it note. These were stuck onto a wall of the meeting room—the “issues wall”—in theme-related clusters. Examples of issues which appeared most frequently were:

- Financial capability of governments to support an ageing population and increased taxation to support non-workers
- Financial capacity of individuals to support their retirement
- Loss of knowledge, skills and organisational wisdom
- Safety of older workers
- Suitability of the types of work available for older workers
- Availability of flexible work options
- Ability of older workers to adapt to change and new technologies.

Litany layer

Working in four groups and referring to the issues wall, participants were asked to create a provocative newspaper headline and provide supporting points about the ageing workforce problem if no mitigating actions were taken. This activity was intended to reveal the litany layer of CLA. The following headlines and explanations were shared with the larger group:

- **Sewage in the Streets—Council powerless.** The people who know how to fix it have retired and gone fishing.
- **Spain comes to Brisbane.** Elderly employees now work part-time and have afternoon siestas.
- **Brisbane City Council’s Budget Balloons.** Council has lost the employees they want, huge costs to keep workers they don’t want.
- **Stay healthy and active with Brisbane City Council.** Free arthritis tablets, seminars about living with Alzheimer’s, pensioner discounts for employees.

Worldview layer

For the next activity each of the groups was assigned a “generation”. These were Generation Y, Generation X, Baby Boomer, and Mature Generation (pre-1946).⁵

Participants were asked to role-play people from their assigned generation. To facilitate exploration of their roles, participants were given a stimulus sheet, and used their knowledge of people in the age cohort, such as parents,

offspring or siblings. The younger invitees were placed at the Generation X and Generation Y tables to assist. The stimulus sheet covered current age, a description of the social contexts, defining events and culture, and “where were you when...?”

The stimuli given to the Mature Generation group are shown in Table 1, below.

Table 1. Example of cultural stimuli

Age Now	Social Context	Defining Events, Culture	Where were you when...?
>65	Extended families Morals, good manners Austerity, lean times Hard work Personal sacrifice for the common good Respect for authority Loyalty to the organisation	Bodgies/Widgies Brylcream Elvis Presley Buddy Holly Marlon Brando Marilyn Monroe FJ Holden cars Scholarship exams	The atomic bomb was dropped Stalin died The Suez crisis occurred Sputnik was launched JFK was assassinated

Metaphor layer

Once participants were comfortable in their roles, they were asked to discuss the following question from their generational group’s perspective: “How do the issues of an ageing workforce affect or impact your generation now and into the future?”

After discussion at their tables, a representative of each generation told their story to the larger group. A brief summary is given in Table 2, below.

The success of this exercise was its capacity to significantly broaden discussion about workforce ageing, and to turn the focus on the problem from being predominantly negative into a more positive one. Participants realised that ageing meant different things to different generations. The problem was no longer restricted to facilitating the retirement of old and ailing workers. Instead there was the potential to tap into benefits and opportunities for each generation of worker. For example, if employees of the Mature Generation were not interested in learning new skills themselves, they might be interested in transferring their know-how to younger workers, e.g., through mentoring programs.

Table 2. Metaphors of the four working generations

Generation	Metaphor
Mature Generation (aged 65 and older)	I'm out of here soon Let me be and don't teach me anything new
Baby Boomers (aged 49–65)	Cool runnings Let's change the world and work it out to suit ourselves.
Generation X (aged 30–48)	Squeezed and threatened How will we cope? We'll have to pay for the ageing population
Generation Y (aged under 30)	Opportunity knocks We'll dictate our own future on our own terms

Learnings

Firstly, CLA was an effective methodology to use in a workshop situation to expand discussion about a complex problem such as workforce ageing. In this case study, the homogeneous group of Baby Boomers was likely to have held similar worldviews. Alternate arguments from different generations and a range of creative solutions were unlikely to have been raised or considered without using the CLA tool.

Secondly, whilst it was vital that the facilitators had a good working knowledge of the methodology, participants needed neither awareness nor understanding of CLA. The tool provided a logical, step-by-step process to build a broader and deeper collective understanding in a way that was non-threatening and fun.

Thirdly, to maximise benefits, the CLA workshop needed to be followed up within a reasonable timeframe with other workshops to develop future scenarios and pathways to proceed.

Conclusion

CLA is more than a theoretical framework. It is a practical methodology which is easily adapted to a workshop process. For the facilitator, the strength of CLA lies in its ability to broaden and deepen discussion and understanding, to move from the obvious and superficial to the deeper levels of beliefs, experiences and emotions. This can be achieved in a non-threatening, non-judgmental manner that leads participants to a wider range of policy options than would otherwise have been possible.

Case Study 2: Using CLA to realign HR strategy

This case study shows how futures methodologies, and in particular CLA, led to a significant shift in the HR strategy for BCC and were a catalyst for significant improvements in the working relationship between Corporate and

Divisional HR professionals who had been operating as two disparate groups.

The programme of three one-day workshops was based on the six pillars,⁶ and structured around the futures landscape⁷ methodology.

Four metaphors were used to represent the futures landscape:

- Stars—the long-range future or vision
- Mountains—the medium-term future or big picture
- Jungle—day-to-day survival in the chaotic present
- Pathways—strategies to progress from the present to a desired future

The underpinning methodologies for each workshop are shown in Table 3, below.

Table 3. Methodologies for the strategic HR workshop series

Workshop	Six Pillars	Futures Methodologies
Pre-workshop preparation	Mapping Anticipating	Environmental scanning Futures landscape
Navigating by the stars	Mapping Anticipating Timing Creating alternatives	Shared history Futures s-curve Scenarios Visioning
Which mountains?	Deepening Transforming	CLA Backcasting
Choosing our path	Completed the mapping process	Traditional planning techniques: Where, now, how

CLA was the basis of the most critical session when participants realised the magnitude of change faced by the HR function. One participant commented: “It had a profound effect; like a curtain being lifted (to reveal) the huge leap we had to make... we realised we couldn’t just continue doing what we were doing”.

The context

The political leadership of BCC launched an ambitious twenty-year plan to transform Brisbane from a “big country town” into a vibrant world city, while attempting to maintain the city’s reputation for friendliness, accessibility for residents, and sub-tropical liveability. However with unprecedented population growth in the region, the Council was grappling with issues of low housing affordability, increased traffic congestion, and finite water resources.

The Human Resources function, consisting of approximately one hundred specialist and generalist HR practitioners, was responsible for ensuring the organisation had a workforce with the right capability, skills and flexibility to deliver both the long-term vision for the city and day-to-day local government services for residents.

Whilst the HR function had been operating under a strategic plan of its own, a change in political leadership refocused priorities from community development to infrastructure construction. The existing HR strategy leaned strongly towards learning and development, equity and diversity, community employment programs for the disadvantaged, and workplace safety.

There was a looming mismatch between the existing HR strategies and the staffing needs of the organisation. There was also a chasm in the relationship between the centrally-based Corporate HR people, who dealt with policy matters, and the Divisional HR people, who managed operational issues in workplaces. The groups tended to be at cross purposes and blamed each other for undermining their work.

The workshop series

One week before the first workshop, participants were given a pre-reading pack. *Forces of Change*⁸ was the product of an environmental scan of a range of sources such as demographic reports, journal articles, economic projections, futures scenarios, and statistical data.

Workshop 1 was called *Navigating by the Stars*. The stars represented the long-term future, around twenty years from the present. It was planned as a light and liberating day, offering participants the chance to imagine an ideal working world and create a shared vision of the future in HR.

Workshop 2 was called *Which Mountains?*, the mountains representing the medium-term future, around five years from the present. The purpose was to examine BCC's new direction and convince participants that a significant change in HR strategy and service delivery was necessary.

Workshop 3 was called *Choosing our Path*. The jungle represented the present chaotic working life in which survival was the main objective. It was a reference point which participants were asked to rise above in order to see the bigger picture. Pathways represented the actions and short-term plans needed to find a way through the jungle at the start of the transformational journey.

Workshop 1: Navigating by the stars

During this workshop participants gained a collective knowledge of issues that may have an impact on the city, BCC, and its workforce. Four major threats were identified:

- Declining availability of labour
- Increasing social dysfunction
- Rapid population growth in the region
- Access to transportation

Working in small groups, participants developed scenarios for twenty years into the future, based on the following archetypes:

- Business as Usual
- Positive and Plausible
- Worst Case
- Wildcard

To present the scenarios, each group performed a piece of street theatre illustrating the main points. Observers were issued with cue cards, labelled Must Have and Don't Want. As each scenario played out, they jotted down features desirable in a future workforce and features to avoid.

In the final session of the day, participants formed into groups again. Referring to the cue cards, they developed images or metaphors of an ideal workforce. One group drew a spider's web, a silken network in which every strand (person) was connected purposefully to another, and each strand (person) contributed to the pattern of the whole. This was a significant breakthrough, given the differences between the two HR factions that existed prior to the workshop.

Through a consensus vote, a preferred image/metaphor was chosen. Workforce as a Carnival showed a jumble of differing enterprises and activities that worked as a whole, a 'clever chaos'. The metaphor brought together such concepts as flexibility, rapid redeployment of staff, high levels of energy and commitment, community interaction, diversity, collaboration, and a balance between innovation and tradition. The image was sketched in colour and referred to in subsequent workshops.

In the words of one participant, the success of the day was "the non-cognitive creative process. It jump-started us out of our anxiety (about the future) and helped us find a way to a new future by sharing what we knew. And it was fun".

Workshop 2: Which mountains?

Workshop 2 employed the futures techniques of CLA and Backcasting. CLA was used to explore workforce implications from the perspective of workers' occupations. The session could have been expanded by repeating the process for age groups/generations, genders, ethnicities, disabilities, religions, etc.

Litany layer

The workforce issues identified in Workshop 1 were reviewed and discussed. The headlines included population increase, unmitigated housing sprawl, and a long expensive commute to work in the central city. The discussion was an easy warm-up and refresh of previous work.

Systemic causes layer

This session was designed to provoke recognition of a large-scale change in political direction after the election of a new Lord Mayor. Participants were provided with matched sets of published BCC documents such as budget speeches, strategic plans for the city, annual reports and public website announcements which had been produced at two points in time; one set under the current leadership, the other under the previous leadership. Participants analysed and noted the similarities and differences between the two sets of documents.

The outcome was a collective realisation that the city's problems were framed differently by the new Lord Mayor. Where the focus had been on the social issues of population growth such as unemployment, the new concern was about the physical issues of population growth such as traffic congestion. BCC's vision was still of an "accessible city", but the framing of accessibility had changed. Policy solutions had been switched from building communities to building roads.

The existing HR strategy was misaligned to the new corporate direction. HR was still delivering programs to boost community development, such as equity and diversity training and employment programs for disadvantaged youth, when what was needed was the capability to construct tunnels and bridges.

The defining moment was when the group realised that many long-established products, programs and relationships needed to be wound up. Things had to be done differently, and Corporate and Divisional HR people needed to work together. One participant commented, "the most visible thing was that we were all in the same boat".

Worldview layer

This session was designed to unpack the issues and problems from the perspective of four typical occupational families in BCC's workforce:

- Manual/trade workers
- Administrative workers
- Middle managers/professionals
- Senior managers

Internal research had shown that the working conditions and workplace cultures of each occupational family were quite different. For example manual/trades employees were field-based, highly unionised, and distrustful of management. They were critical of their working conditions, disgruntled, older and predominantly male, resistant to change, and had lower levels of education than the other occupational families. In contrast, middle managers/professionals were office-based, non-unionised, younger, gender balanced, and tertiary educated. They felt overworked and sometimes stressed, but achieved high levels of personal satisfaction from their jobs.

Workshop participants were divided into four groups and each group was allocated an occupational family. The task was to examine the impacts of BCC's directional change from the perspective of a worker in the allocated occupation. Findings were presented in a plenary session, by means of talk show-style interviews. Unsurprisingly each occupational family raised a different set of issues and opportunities.

The manual/trade group reported that the construction of traffic infrastructure would benefit them. Their skills and know-how would be critical to BCC and they would become the most valued employees. Moreover, there would be fewer manual/trades workers in the labour market because of retirements and fewer young people entering the trades. Physical disability due to age would be overcome by the use of technology for heavy and physically demanding work, for example robots would repair underground pipes.

In contrast, middle managers/professionals thought about the problem in terms of the daily commute to and from work. They argued that improved information and communications technology (ICT) would give them choice about when and where they worked. Reduced commuter travel would save time and they would be able to interact with the workplace seamlessly and effectively from anywhere.

Metaphor layer

This activity laid bare the cultural and belief systems typical of each occupational family. 'The world is my oyster' was the metaphor chosen by the manual/trade worker group. They were confident that their scarce skills would elevate their status, improve pay and working conditions, and make work easier as they aged.

'Connected and clever' was the metaphor of the middle managers/professional group. Their future was one of better work-life balance while maintaining professional effectiveness and productivity.

In both cases, the future was seen in a positive light.

Backcasting

Backcasting is the process of “deriving strategy by going backwards from the future... with the contours of the future already agreed on”.⁹

Using the metaphor of ‘workforce as a carnival’, derived from Workshop 1, and the ‘new mountains’ (BCC as a builder of infrastructure) as the medium-term goal, participants brain-stormed possible actions to move backwards from the desired future to the present. Ideas were sorted into ‘things to focus on or increase’ and ‘things to decrease or exit’.

Workshop 3: Choosing our path

Although Workshop 3 did not specifically use futures methodologies, it completed the conceptual framework of the futures landscape by mapping out pathways between the stars and mountains of the future and the jungle of the present.

Workshop 3 brought together the outcomes of the first two workshops to produce a preliminary annual plan for the HR Branch and strategic guidance for three significant corporate HR projects.

The workshop was structured around three questions:

- Where are we now?
- Where are we going?
- How do we get there?

By the end of the workshop, the two disparate groups of HR practitioners had re-established working relationships with their colleagues and agreed on their metaphorical future destination. Choosing pathways between the known present and the desired future was easy. In the words of one participant, “by the time we chose the pathways, my mind was settled on where we were needing to go”.

Outcomes

The series of workshops produced a revised HR strategy, which was properly aligned to the new corporate direction and endorsed by Executive Management. Several years later, it was still being used as a reference. The workshops aided the development of HR projects, budgets and business plans. One of the most important outcomes was the improvement in working relationships between the Corporate and Divisional HR groups.

Conclusion

The use of futures methodologies for this series of workshops was critical to their success. Participants from two different factions of the HR function came together, unlocked their thinking and derived workable plans for the future.

The series raised the planning process from the jungle of chaotic day-to-day activity to the vantage point of the stars where the broader picture became clear. According to one participant, the first two workshops “lifted all of us up together in a way that let us look down on the situation and see the commonalities”.

Through tools such as CLA, participants developed an understanding of each other’s perspectives and recognised that the chasm between them was repairable. The non-cognitive approach of futures methodologies freed them to create innovative solutions to difficult problems.

Once they “saw” the future, they could respond pragmatically and positively to a necessary change in organisational direction in order to deliver the political mandate.

¹ S. Inayatullah, *Questioning the Future: Futures Studies, Action Learning and Organizational Transformation*, Tamsui, Tamkang University Press, 2002.

² Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Intergenerational Report, 2002–03’, Budget Paper No. 5, Canberra, AGPS, 2002.

³ Commonwealth of Australia, *Australia to 2050: Future Challenges. The 2010 Intergenerational Report*, Canberra, AGPS, 2010.

⁴ P. Costello, ‘Australia’s Demographic Challenges’ (speech by the Treasurer to the Parliament of Australia on 21 February, 2004), retrieved 14 April, 2004, from www.treasurer.gov.au.

⁵ H. Mackay, *Generations: Baby Boomers, Their Parents and Their Children*, Sydney, Pan MacMillan, 1997.

⁶ S. Inayatullah, ‘The pillars of futures studies’, retrieved 18 October, 2007, from <http://www.metafuture.org/six-pillars-futures-studies.htm>.

⁷ S. Inayatullah, ‘Six pillars: Futures thinking for transforming’, email transmission from S. Inayatullah, 29 October, 2007.

⁸ Brisbane City Council, ‘Forces of change’, unpublished internal report.

⁹ S. Inayatullah, ‘Pedagogy, culture and futures studies’, retrieved 18 October, 2007, from <http://www.metafuture.org>

V

HEALTH, COMMUNITY AND WELLBEING

25. Ageing Futures: Using causal layered analysis to develop scenarios

Sohail Inayatullah

*Ageing is a fundamental issue for the future of the planet. An ageing society challenges basic assumptions of modern culture and political economy. Based on a project for the Queensland Government Department of Families, this chapter explores alternative futures of ageing. Through CLA and scenario planning, policy recommendations were developed for the Queensland government.**

Futures-Oriented Policy-Making

This chapter explores the alternative futures of ageing in Queensland. It is also focused on probable futures, and not on every possible future. Thus, the discovery of a “gene” or some other technological marvel that would, for all practical purposes, end death is not entertained.

While sympathetic to Woody Allen’s observation that “while some people want to die with dignity, I just want to live forever”, the intention of this chapter is to map the futures of ageing, with a particular concern that ageing not be seen to be linked exclusively to any specific generational age group.

In contrast to traditional policy approaches—cost-benefit, problem-oriented and political-oriented—that tend to focus on the short term, on economic and political issues, this chapter takes a futures-oriented view to policy. Futures-oriented policy-making redresses the temporal myopia of cost-benefit analysis by including the costs of the future. In this sense, the impact on future generations is a potential bottom line beyond the economic. It seeks to address the limitations of problem-orientation by anticipating issues before they *become* problems. Once issues become problems, government is often shackled by the emotive nature of those problems. Clear sides and positions have been chosen. Through futures-oriented policy-making, not only can issues be anticipated, the roots of issues can be addressed, since they can be tracked through their full life cycle. Futures-oriented policy challenges political-oriented policy by suggesting that the clarification of the desired future is required so that citizens can understand how current decisions will affect the future. Politics thus can become less about partisan issues and

* An earlier version of this chapter appeared as ‘Ageing: Alternative futures and policy choices’, *Foresight*, Vol 5, No 6, 2003, 8–17.

more about negotiating desired futures. Futures-oriented policy develops visions of the future that are shared and participatory, and is informed by changing events and trends. Visions need to both pull society forward but must also be flexible, having the capacity to accommodate change.

Futures-oriented policy thus expands, broadens and deepens the policy-making process by focusing on:

1. The implications of current decisions for the future
2. Anticipating emerging issues and trends before they become problems
3. Mapping alternative futures so that more effective decisions can be made today, that is, by using the future to transform the present
4. Extending the temporal horizon so that costs and benefits include those to future generations
5. Developing processes so that policy remains a living practice—anticipatory action learning
6. Deepening the policy-making process to include metaphors and worldview frames, that is, it is not just more information that leads to more effective policy-making, it is processes that help to change the underlying narratives of decision-makers.

However, when the issue of the future is raised, more often than not allusions are made to forecasting. Forecasting, however, is only one way to “use” the future. The future has other purposes.

Multiple Purposes of the Future

First, as **education/training** or **futures literacy**—that is, the future serves as a way to train government employees, Queensland leaders, and citizens about how to deal with an ageing society. This means using futures methods and tools—emerging issues analysis, the futures triangle, causal layered analysis (CLA), visioning, backcasting—to better understand the future.

Second, to develop **strategy**. Given the reality of an ageing Queensland, what should individuals, companies and Government do? What are the opportunities and challenges ahead?

Third, to ensure that the strategy is robust, **citizen input** and participation are necessary. Essentially this is the notion that moving toward an alternative future—a “Society for All Ages” for example—cannot occur merely by Government fiat, or, indeed, by a vision promulgated from high above. While leadership may offer the vision, the visioning process must be a participatory one, including all relevant stakeholders and worldviews. This not only ensures buy-in, but also assures that the variants—differences—within the vision strengthen the overall vision. This is especially important for ensuring that inter-generational views on a preferred vision of ageing are taken into account. Citizen input is thus also about worldview input. The

notion of worldview implies that ageing should not be seen in a uniform way. There exist gendered, cultural and life cycle dimensions to ageing. It is very important, too, that the aged should not merely be objects of research but should participate in the design of alternative futures. Their subjectivities are crucial to understanding the futures of ageing.

Fourth, **capacity enhancement**, that is, to develop the capacity to negotiate the many challenges brought on by an ageing society. Capacity enhancement takes the tools from the training exercises and uses them to empower. It is thus not about any particular goal, or even vision, but about creating a societal capacity to negotiate with change, even dramatic change (as for example with the possibility of significantly extended life expectancy). Essentially this is about a society that is a learning community (or communities), that reflects and learns from its mistakes and moves forward. A learning community has the following characteristics, as applied to ageing futures, it is:

1. *Flexible*—moving beyond the agricultural and industrial model of society. For the ageing discourse, there is the agricultural model of many dying young and the few who survive, by definition becoming wise elders. However, with many more people ageing, wisdom may not be guaranteed. In the industrial model, ageing was essentially the end of life, after retirement one slowly died (especially for men). For women, it was a time of loneliness but also of independence.
2. *Responsive*—adjusting to the needs of market, community and state, globally and locally. This means ascertaining new products and services for the ageing and new careers for the aged. This could mean asking: What are the most appropriate uses of digital technologies for creating more socially inclusive communities?
3. *Anticipatory*—develop models of thinking to envision and plan for alternative futures. This could mean asking: What alternative political frameworks are required for ageing? Does representative democracy still work in an age-divided world, or should the youth have a certain percentage of seats reserved in parliament?
4. *Innovative*—seeing ageing as an opportunity to rethink current institutions, to question our basic paradigms of health, life, and death.
5. *Leadership plus participation plus expertise*—any new problem faced by society needs all sorts of information and knowledge. It cannot be solved by one sector alone, rather, leaders plus citizens plus experts are required to move forward—that is, evidence-based policy with vision and participation.
6. *Learning plus healing*—a learning community cannot just be about information and knowledge; there is an emotive side to this—the heart as brain. Ageing must be seen as composed of embodied and engaged

issues. To begin with, this means facing head-on the fears of youth (of being denied their future) and of the aged (of being put out to pasture).

7. *Microvita* (that reality is idea and matter based)*—a learning community, of course, is more than just its members. It is the collective, including archetypes and unconscious fields of awareness.

Fifth, to use the future to move toward **emergence**, that is, toward the edge of order and chaos, where system transformation is possible. This means a societal conversation about ageing futures where foundational assumptions (as opposed to instrumental questions) are challenged, even if incrementally, and an alternative future is created.

Sixth, as **memetic organisational transformation**, that is, the future is used to enter new memes (an idea that replicates, moving from brain to brain)[†] in the organisations that challenge old memes. We are seeing this in city futures in the move from the city as defined by the roads, rates and rubbish meme to that of the smart-international-green city.

Further, if we examine the traditional organisation, the dominating meme was work 9–5, work hard, retire and then die. A few decades ago, this changed somewhat when, because of globalisation, up-skilling and retraining, along with adaptability and flexibility, began to define the organisation (downsizing was of course central to this). Most recently, the meme has become the learning organisation. The new meme may be the learning plus healing organisation (taking into account employees' health, the impact of the organisation on the environment and the organisation as a family—essentially, the triple bottom line approach). Whether it will be selected because of the advantages it offers is not clear at this stage.

New memes for ageing include the WHO's Active Ageing,[‡] the Omega Institute's¹ Conscious Ageing and Productive Ageing.² And more recently, turning ageing from a liability into an asset.³

None, however, has become currency.

* For more on this term, see S. Inayatullah, *Understanding Sarkar*, Leiden, Brill, 2002. *Microvita* assumes that reality is both mind and matter. It is a non-sensate view of life.

[†] See: <http://www.scholars.nus.edu.sg/cpace/infotech/cook/memedef.html>. See also R. Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989; and S. Blackmore, 'Imitation and the definition of a meme', *Journal of Memetics: Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission*, 1998, 2. The Oxford English Dictionary defines meme as: "An element of a culture that may be considered to be passed on by non-genetic means, esp. imitation."

[‡] For more on this, see: World Health Organization, 'Ageing and life course', retrieved 8 February, 2014, from <http://www.who.int/ageing/publications/active/en/>

Memes are thus ideas that *transform*, as opposed to ideas that inform (the educational perspective) or ideas that empower (strategy, capacity building, and citizen engagement).

The future can thus have multiple uses. There are alternative futures. It is not focused on any particular preferred future nor does it assume that the future is a given, even if the demographic trends may appear overwhelming. There are still choices to be made.

Causal Layered Analysis

To explore these choices, two methods, CLA and scenarios, will be employed. CLA seeks to deepen and broaden the debate, moving from conventional data on the increasing percentage of those over the age of 65, to the systemic causes (better sanitation, medical advances, more information and capacity to use that information to make different choices), to the worldviews (the technological optimist that believes ageing can be arrested; the traditional Asian worldview in which ageing is a natural step on the path to death; the spiritual, in which ageing helps us reflect on our life’s purpose; the “economistic”, in which ageing reduces competitive-ness by increasing health costs) and, lastly, to the deeper inner metaphors (from “respect thy elders” to the search for the fountain of youth).

Based on a literature review, four maps of CLA based on the four different images (images here functioning as foundational assumptions/worldviews) are developed.

Table 1. CLA 1—Dominant model

LITANY	Alone, sick and aged—powerless. Ageing is a problem
SYSTEMIC	Change Taxation Regimes. Import labour. Enhance Productivity. Reduce health costs, if possible. Establish offices of ageing. Fund commissions. Experts within government are required to accompany some partnerships
WORLDVIEW	Bureaucratic responses to the problem of ageing. Incremental changes
MYTH-METAPHOR	Baby boomers have stolen from future generations

Table 2. CLA 2—Emerging technological model

LITANY	We can win the war on ageing
SYSTEMIC	Funding for biotech companies. Funding for Ageing research
WORLDVIEW	State plus Corporations plus Universities
MYTH-METAPHOR	Techno-Utopian

Table 3. CLA 3—Emerging integrated model

LITANY	Productive, Conscious and Active Ageing. Ageing can be the second youth—revitalisation
SYSTEMIC	Whole-of-government with professional associations and activist organisations, locally and globally
WORLDVIEW	Use evidence-based information to develop proactive whole-of-life-cycle policies. This involves social inclusion, low-fat diets, exercise and meditation/relaxation, for example
MYTH-METAPHOR	Complexity, indigenous cultures, transmodern and preventive health care

Table 4. CLA 4—Worst case

LITANY	Inter-generational conflict—old people won't "go" and young people are "destroying the city"
SYSTEMIC	Gridlock as system cannot deal with crisis. Best jobs are held by the aged. Few entry level jobs for the young
WORLDVIEW	Conflict—class-based. Young versus old
MYTH-METAPHOR	Every age for themselves

These four maps of the future differ at all levels—the litany, the systemic causes and solutions, the worldviews and the deeper myths-metaphors. In the dominant model, more research is required into the future of ageing because of the potential loss of productivity. In contrast, the emerging technological model seeks to leapfrog social and economic issues and find medical solutions such that ageing ceases to be an issue. The emerging integrated model seeks to enhance economic productivity through preventive health care and a whole-of-life-cycle view of ageing measuring success in new ways. The last is the worst case, where nothing is done.

Scenarios

Based on the CLA, four alternative futures are developed. Each future has a different driver, and each captures different dimensions of what may happen. These scenarios are of utility for strategic purposes (what should be done) and for educational purposes (to map the future) as well as for cautionary purposes (what should be avoided). The scenarios are developed through the following archetypal structure: Best Case, Worst Case, Outlier, and Business as Usual (Continued Growth).*

The preferred scenario, Society for All Ages, is driven by strong and successful policy interventions. A society divided will emerge if current

* For more on scenario development, see S. Inayatullah, *Questioning the Future: Futures Studies, Action Learning and Organizational Transformation*, Tamsui, Tamkang University Press, 2002.

trends continue and policy interventions do not occur—i.e. the elderly as alone, depressed and poor. Virtual Worlds is the outlier scenario. It is unlikely unless developments in technology continue at their current pace. The Governmentalised scenario can come about if present modes of policy intervention and analysis continue, that is, failed interventions.*

A society for all ages: Smart and caring ageing

This is the preferred scenario of the Queensland Department of Families. It is driven by the demographic group “cultural creatives”.[†] These are individuals who prefer a future that is based on gender partnership, ecological sustainability, personal spirituality, and a caring interventionist state aligned along triple bottom line values. They contrast to “traditionalists” (focused on a strong nation-state and patriarchy) and “modernists” (focused on technology and materialism).

In this future, ageing is seen as neither a burden nor a foundational problem but rather as a resource for systemic and civilisational revitalisation. Thus, there is a high degree of acceptance of diversity (of all ages), creating a culture that moves past racism, sexism and nationalism. This diversity is evidenced by architecture that is designed for multiple generations (and economic incentives for this). The nuclear family is strengthened by the extended family. Other family forms are accepted. The key is a strong social fabric.

The aged are not marginalised, nor are they necessarily seen as wise. Thus, both notions of the “glory” of youth and the “wisdom” of age are challenged.

Government intervention uses technology to create a society of all ages. Smart houses, smart health and smart ageing become defining concepts. Smartness includes the use of genetic and artificial intelligence technologies along with softer technologies—exercise, meditation, social inclusion.

The context of this is a shift in the lifecycle from traditional notions of study-work-retirement to a range of alternatives, including life-long learning. Distinctions between life stages blur and, where they remain, transitions occur outside ageist paradigms.

* Other models can be used as well. These include the single and double driver methods (e.g. technological advances on the x axis and government policy on the y-axis, creating four scenarios: 1. High-tech with strong government intervention (Smart Ageing?); 2. High-tech with weak government intervention, letting current forces define ageing policy (Rich age well, others age with low quality and quantity of life); 3. Low-tech with strong government intervention (Quality of life and equity is central for all ages); 4. Low tech with weak government intervention (citizens move elsewhere for ageing cure, market forces define generations, superannuation falls apart).

[†] See: www.culturalcreatives.org; P. Ray and S. Anderson, *The Cultural Creatives*, New York, Three Rivers Press, 2000.

Funding for ageing research is extensive and is balanced: technology funding, social funding (social innovation) and quality of life funding (incentives for evidence-based interventions such as exercise, meditation, etc.) are all championed.

The underlying worldview is communities in harmony. It is a move away from the modern approach to governance and ageing, and towards a trans-modern approach.

The research style that emerges from this scenario is action learning-based. The aged are not the object of research. Stakeholders themselves develop what it means to be young and old, to age, to retire. Empirical, interpretive and critical research traditions are combined. The approach is multi-generational (even contesting this term).

The policy framework implications of this model are developed in the conclusion of this chapter, but generally, for this scenario to occur policy development must be at various levels—the litany of ageing, the systemic, the worldview and the deeper stories. This must occur on an inner (how do I feel about ageing) and outer (what can you and I do) level, and for the short and long term. Stories about ageing should be considered as important to biotechnology research as ageing and extended family ageing design. Care must be taken not to marginalise any group, thus research must be action learning-based, wherein all parties participate in creating desired futures.

A society divided by ages: Demographic challenges not met

The second scenario is based on inaction by government, allowing market and other drivers to continue unabated. This is the worst case scenario because class divisions ripen; indeed, age becomes a determining factor in access to power and wealth. Much of the futures literature is focused on this scenario: Peter Peterson's *Grey Dawn*⁴ and Paul Wallace's *Agequake*⁵ are two examples of this.

The drivers are the demographic imperatives coupled with a business as usual approach in and to governance. The proponents of this scenario are those with a vested interest in the current system: wealthy retirees, senior government and corporate leaders, etc.

In this future, divisions along class, age and gender lines heighten. Each class believes they are being discriminated against. The young are upset by the disproportionate power of the aged (they tend not to leave positions of power, that is, the traditional generational rotation does not occur). Women find it even more difficult to break the glass ceiling. Economic power is equally class-based. As young people age, they find that they cannot afford houses. The home ownership dream dies (and given the inverse relationship between home ownership and poverty in later life, the future looks bleak for

Australia's middle class) and the costs of public housing continue to increase. The young become more radicalised.

The social fabric is under attack. The nuclear family continues to weaken, and no alternative structure emerges. Social isolation increases. Ageing for most becomes a terrible experience as they live longer in poorer care centres. Of course, many of the aged live well in retirement homes. The poor move toward misery, having little access to community. They are depressed, eat poorly and have few social connections to fall back on.

Funding is for public housing, better retirement villages; however, gaps continue to widen. The costs of taking care of the aged become more difficult to meet. The young rally against heavy taxation, knowing full well that they will not be taken care of as they age if the tax burden is lessened.

It is a future of class conflict, the end of the Australian dream.

For the Queensland government, the goal would certainly be to avoid this future. This is possible through:

- Ensuring that institutional changes—governance—keep up with lifecycle changes, that is, business as usual cannot continue;
- Dialogue between ages so that inter-generational conflict is avoided;
- A much higher immigrant intake, especially of youth;
- Funding for families;
- Funding of projects that help individuals make the transition between phases in their life cycle;
- Changes in the superannuation and pension system; and
- Ensuring that the safety net for old and young is not destroyed as the worker to retiree ratio shifts from 4:1 to 2:1, either through increased productivity or lifelong learning and production.

Virtualworlds: Strangers in the night

The main driver behind this scenario is rapid developments in genetic and artificial intelligence technologies. Two groups spearhead this future: digital natives (those born into the computing world), who see the Internet as natural, and the aged, who fear death and seek technological intervention to allow them to live much, much longer. Double-helix children (born in the decade 2010–2020, when genetic engineering becomes natural) will further this scenario.

Risk management—in the form of presenting, at birth, one's life chances (based on genes) and adjusted for social, political and economic environment and diet/exercise as one ages—dominates. Indeed, the goal is to link quantity and quality of life with probabilities—life quantified by risk management tools.

In the short-run, there is higher productivity because of the science and technology revolution. This reduces and eventually eliminates the need for foreign migrants. Indeed, even caring for the aged can be automated through the use of personal robots. Medical technologies lead the way, from the current plastic surgery to the soon-to-be gene therapy. With nano-bots, surgery becomes far more precise, interactive and intelligent. Over time, age is technologically constructed; not only are we able to feel any age we want but we can be any age we want.

In the long run, the digital soul* is possible—brain uploading and soul downloading.

However, given that it is likely that technological changes will not go hand in hand with social and cultural changes, we are likely to see society divided along lines of access to technology. But as social inclusion is an indicator of health, endless technology may not be the “fountain of youth” as promised.

As the quest for a preventive and risk-free society continues, three types of social worlds are possible:

1. Totally electronic communities, where reality is mediated through the Internet and its successors;
2. Gated, intentional communities with anti-ageing regimes from the natural to the biological; and
3. Middle-class expatriate communities, living in poorer nations to make their money go further (drugs and gene experimentation of a variety of types is likely to be cheaper there).

The problem of meaning will also become more pressing as technocracy does everything. The post-industrial knowledge economy leads to few people working—only 20–30% work.

Youth as a category is treasured, sought after but never understood as a life phase. It is “museumised”.

The operating worldview is techno-utopian,† combining the fear of death with technological possibilities to reverse ageing. Research funding generally goes towards applied research.

The policy implications are based on the view that this future should be avoided or at least that its social, cultural and spiritual dimensions be developed so that it is more balanced. Given that the imperatives of science and the market will create this future before our very eyes it is crucial that

* See T. Georges, *Digital Soul: Intelligence Machines and Human Values*, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 2003,

† For more on this future, see also: R. Kurzweil, *The Age of Spiritual Machines*, New York, Penguin, 1999; M. Kaku, *Visions: How Science Will Revolutionize the 21st Century and Beyond*, Oxford, Oxford Publishing, 1998; and www.metafuture.org.

social funding (for technology design that creates virtual and touch communities*) be championed. This means ensuring that public space is not lost—this means architectural space along with community spaces; these must be built into current technological developments. They cannot be an afterthought. Doing so means a broad-based conversation on the new technologies, particularly germ line intervention and artificial intelligence. Connections within Australia are as important as connections with the outside world. The image of a rich, ageing Australia contrasted with a poor, young Asia is not too far off. The antidote is a policy framework that creates genetic, virtual and “real” agorae.

Governmentalised:† Ageing bureaucracies and bureaucracies for the aged

This scenario is driven by bureaucratic politics. Essentially this is a future of failed policies and successful language. The aged are used as a tool for re-election. Fear of ageing and the crisis that ageing brings on is also used for political purposes (changing the retirement age, changing the pension scheme, for example).

An entire industry around caring, monitoring and evaluation of the aged (and the future of the aged) develops, indeed ageing becomes the growth industry of the next twenty years and beyond.

Special interest groups develop around funding for the aged. The major political parties have strong divisions as to what should be done about ageing (market versus intervention).

While the nuclear family is heralded as the best kind for the nation, the social fabric weakens through the dependency created by continued government interventions. From birth to grave, government is expected to provide care. Given the crisis of ageing, power becomes concentrated at higher levels.

Funding increases for Departments of the Aged. Funding for social programs to ameliorate the excesses of globalisation (as in the privatisation of health) increases in particular. There is also funding for women to have more children. High intake of migrants to Australia is encouraged but only of certain types.

* For more on city design, life cycles and ageing, see P. Daffara, ‘Rethinking tomorrow’s cities: Emerging issues and city foresight’, *Futures*, Vol43, Nol7, 2011, 680–689.

† For more on this see the various works of Michel Foucault, in particular: M. Shapiro, *Reading the Postmodern Polity*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1992.

The worldview is that father knows best, and father is the state. The aged are the object of research. Research continues to be segmented between government and universities.

Public policy on ageing will be incremental and goal-oriented. There will be little flexibility. This future can be avoided by ensuring that:

1. There is rotation of the elite so that a particular party does not dominate the discourse;
2. Commissions on the aged have sunset laws so that they do not continue in perpetuity;
3. The voice of youth remains potent by including young people in policy-making;
4. Government does not dominate discourse by including and funding non-governmental organisations; and
5. Processes are put in place to transform government's vertical structures to a more spherical learning organisation style and learning community processes.

This chapter concludes with a range of policy recommendations. These fit most directly into the 'A Society for All Ages' scenario.

Policy Recommendations

1. Initiate a conversation on ageing futures among stakeholders. Different worldviews need to be built into this conversation. That is, the assumption should be that the traditional western model of the life-cycle is not universal and that there are real alternatives every step of the way.
2. Articulate the implications of the Queensland vision on ageing futures, e.g. smart ageing. This means using technology to prolong life spans as well as to design houses, communities and lifestyles that are ageing friendly.
3. Ensure that anticipatory action learning (asking questions of desired and probable futures through iterative cycles) is the main policy research methodology. Scenarios of ageing futures need to go beyond the academy to the media—television, Internet, focus groups. This means ensuring that the aged (and the young) are not the object of research but are part of a mutual dialogue on desired ageing futures.
4. Develop an inner dimension to ageing policy at the collective and individual levels. Essentially, this is about deep health.
5. Transform bureaucracy into learning organisations and then to learning communities, thus, far more important than forecasting demographic patterns, developing organisations and communities that have the capacity to accommodate change. This is necessary to avoid governmentalisation.

6. Ensure that the preferred vision of the future—2020: A Society for All Ages—has broad-based support. This means community consulting with experts managed by leaders from all sectors.

Conclusion

Ageing should be seen as a fundamental issue for the future of the planet. An ageing society challenges basic assumptions of modern culture and political economy. These challenges can be met as ways to transform the present and create different futures—ageing can be seen as a resource. If not, failed policies will lead to Governmentalisation, lack of intervention will lead to a Divided Society, and a focus on simple technological interventions will lead to Virtual Worlds. However, by acting now, there is a window to ensure that the future truly is “A Society for all Ages”.

Appendix—Scenarios in table format

Table 5. A society for all ages: Smart and caring ageing

Drivers	Values based—creating the good society
Leading Proponents	Cultural Creatives
Litany description	<p>Ageing as future capital—as a resource for systemic and civilisational revitalisation</p> <p>High degree of acceptance of diversity creating a culture of inclusion, moving past racism, sexism, nationalism.</p> <p>Shift from reified “glory” of youth and “wisdom” of age</p> <p>Shift from traditional model of study-work-retirement-death</p> <p>Architecture designed for multiple generations. Aged friendly</p> <p>Smart houses, smart health, smart ageing</p> <p>Care giving valued, culturally and economically</p> <p>Strong social fabric. Nuclear family strengthened by extended family. Other family forms accepted</p> <p>High migrant intake from nations with youthful populations</p> <p>Governance structures changed to accommodate needs of the young</p> <p>Government intervention succeeds</p>
System funding	Funding for ageing research, balancing technology funding, social funding (social innovation) and quality of life funding (incentives for evidence-based interventions e.g., exercise, meditation, etc.)
Worldview	<p>Inter-generational equity and communities in harmony</p> <p>Post-western</p>
Myth/metaphor	Healthy, wealthy and wise
Research implications	Action learning wherein categories of social and economic research are created by stakeholders. Integrating empirical, interpretive and critical research traditions
Policy implications	Broadening, deepening and temporally extending the policy framework. Anticipatory action learning

Table 6. A society divided by ages: Demographic challenges not met

Drivers	Demographic imperatives and business as usual
Leading Proponents	Elite—wealthy retirees and senior government leaders
Litany description	<p>Divisions along class, age and gender lines</p> <p>The young upset at disproportionate power of the aged</p> <p>Old people have political power as well as financial power</p> <p>Young people cannot buy into the Australian home ownership dream</p> <p>Leaders, as they age, become even more conservative (against change) while the young become more radicalised</p> <p>Families exhibit these generational tensions</p> <p>Social fabric under attack. Nuclear family weakened with no alternative available</p> <p>Within the aged demographic, there are two groups: The wealthy and the poor. The poor are also unhealthy, eat poorly and are generally depressed*</p>
System funding	Social welfare funding and funding for better retirement villages. Imbalanced tax structures favouring the aged
Worldview	Class conflict
Myth/metaphor	“The stolen future” and “each to their own age”
Research implications	Empirical research. Search for objective truth. Aged define the research agenda
Policy implications	<p>Avoid this future by:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dialogue between ages 2. Anticipatory action learning research 3. Funding of projects through each life-cycle 4. Ensure that institutional change keeps up with demographic shifts and 5. Ensure that future vision is broad based and flexible

* In Queensland, Australia the proportion of those over the age of 60 will increase from 15% in 1995 to 23% in 2031. Already, 25% of those over 65 demonstrate functional psychiatric disorders. From: *To a Queensland Disability Policy and Strategy*, DFFCC discussion paper 1997, page 12 quoted in I. Milojević, *Home and Community Care Services: Generic or Discriminatory*, HACC Action Research Project, report to Catholic Social Response, 1999, 35.

Table 7. Virtual worlds: Strangers in the night

Drivers	Technology and anomie
Leading Proponents	Digital Natives and Aged people afraid of death and decrepitude
Litany description	<p>At birth, life chances are presented. How one dies, how one suffers. Likely trajectory is predicted</p> <p>Medical changes—nano-bots, brain surgery, search for ageing change, plastic surgery and gene therapy</p> <p>Brain uploading and soul downloading</p> <p>Create the “age?” you desire</p> <p>Designer children—weak social fabric—nuclear family one of many family types</p> <p>Higher productivity through biological revolution</p> <p>A preventive and risk-free society</p> <p>Individuals live to 120–140, and much longer</p> <p>As they age, they enter virtual worlds. These are of different types. Type 1 communities are totally electronic (but real). Type 2 communities are gated, complete with anti- ageing regimes from meditation to plastic surgery. Type 3 communities are in cheaper nations for poorer aged</p> <p>Knowledge economy leads to few people working. Technocracy does the work. 20% of people work</p> <p>The young are treasured and envied. Generally, they are “museumised”, “theme-parked”</p>
System funding	Dramatic funding for research that combines genetics and artificial intelligence
Worldview	Techno-Utopian
Myth/metaphor	The fountain of “virtual” youth
Research implications	Applied research
Policy implications	<p>Avoid this future by ensuring that:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Material technology develops with social innovation 2. Society is seen as layered, as constituted by technology and socio-cultural meaning systems 3. Technological design develops in communal ways so that techno-isolation does not occur 4. Broad-based debate on nature of new technologies, particularly germ line intervention and artificial intelligence, occurs and 5. Design of agorae in physical space and time is undertaken

Table 8. Governmentalised: Ageing bureaucracies and bureaucracies for the aged

Drivers	Politics
Leading Proponents	Bureaucracies
Litany description	Special programmes to monitor and evaluate the aged Special interest groups develop around funding for the aged Policies fail but language for re-election purposes succeeds Nuclear family heralded as best kind for nation. Social fabric weakened through interventions Strong division between political parties on what should be done about ageing—market mechanism or intervention—however both sides will intervene Strong state with power of local regions reduced
System funding	Funding for departments of ageing. Funding for social programs to ameliorate the excesses of globalisation (privatisation of health). Funding for women to have children Only the “right” type of migrants are enticed to Australia
Worldview	Governmentality
Myth/metaphor	“We can solve the problems by ourselves”
Research implications	Aged as object of research. Research segmented between government, universities and other institutions
Policy implications	Policy will be incremental, fixed and goal-oriented. There will be little flexibility. This future can be avoided by ensuring: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The rotation of the elite such that government does not dominate discourse but voices of the aged, of community associations, of young people remain potent 2. That vision of the future and a range of alternative futures remain as important as plans and strategies and 3. That Commissions have sunset laws so they do not continue in perpetuity

¹ R. C. Atchley, ‘Conscious ageing: Nurturing a new vision of longevity—But is it a hard sell’, retrieved 8 February 2014 from www.asageing.org/at/at-231/Conscious.html. From J. Bartlett and S. Inayatullah (eds.), *Future Oriented Policy Planning: Skills Development Program*, Brisbane City Council, Strategic Planning and Policy, March 2003.

² N. Morrow-Howell, J. Hinterlong & M. Sherraden, *Productive Ageing: Concepts and Challenges*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.

³ M. Kenny, B. Smith & N. Towell, ‘Razor taken to CSIRO’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 8 November, retrieved 12 November, 2013, from <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/razor-taken-to-csiro-20131107-2x4fu.html>.

⁴ P. Peterson, *Grey Dawn*, New York, Random House, 1999.

⁵ P. Wallace, *Agequake, Riding the Demographic Rollercoaster Shaking Business, Finance and Our World*, London, Nicholas Brealey, 1999.

26. Hope and Cake: The contribution of causal layered analysis to community development practice

Lynda Shevellar*

This chapter brings together three unlikely bedfellows: the practice field of community development, the organisational context of bureaucracy and CLA. In Australia, community development practitioners increasingly find themselves located in the organisational context of bureaucracy. This is a difficult context for undertaking development work and creates a unique challenge for practitioners who are required to work both in and against the state. This chapter considers CLA as a possible means of understanding and working with the tensions faced by practitioners in this demanding context.[†]

Introduction: Causal layered analysis and the community development field

Causal layered analysis (CLA) will be familiar to regular readers of the futures literature, and has been embraced by futures scholars across an extraordinary array of fields. CLA draws largely from post-structuralism, macrohistory and post-colonial multicultural theory; a theoretical pedigree congruent with the field of community development.¹ However CLA is relatively unknown within community development practice as either a methodology or a new theory of knowledge.

Community development focuses on collective action for social change through participatory processes. It has traditionally been associated with social disadvantage and social justice through ideology and practice.² It sees that the purpose of community development is:

to re-establish community as the location of significant human experience and the meeting of human need, rather than to rely on the larger more inhuman and less accessible structures of the welfare state, the global economy, bureaucracy, professional elites and so on.³

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[†] An earlier version of this chapter appeared in the *Journal of Community Development Studies*, Vol 42, No 1, 2011, 3–15.

Thus the project of community development positions itself as essentially a moral activity, concerned with the “creation of a better and fairer world”.⁴ It is inherently future-focused.

At the same time, community development is powerfully rooted to the past. A romantic view of community predominates, and the primary focus upon geography is ever-present.⁵ In her analysis of the ‘spacialities’ of community, Gillian Rose concludes that imagining community as a three-dimensional space, with a centre and a margin, exacts violent costs and fundamentally creates exclusion.⁶ Ingrid Burkett contends that most everyday understandings of community are usually underpinned by modernist thinking and construct community as a noun. Such thinking describes community as a place or thing, something which can be created, built, lost or destroyed.⁷

Between the utopian vision of the future and the romanticised past of community, is the dramatically changing context of community development practice. Community development activities—including the suite of currently popular practices such as community capacity building and strengthening of community resilience—are increasingly set within the restrictions of the neo-liberal paradigm.⁸ Surveillance, accountability, risk management and reporting regimes are accompanied by performance initiatives and rewards, and a focus on outputs and outcomes rather than processes and relationships.⁹ Pusey claims that in the contemporary welfare regime, large bureaucracies, both of government and of non-profit organisations, are more concerned with managing the public sector of the economy than serving the public.¹⁰ Ife observes that this disparity has created a crisis for workers: “It has been a rude shock to discover that the vision of social justice and a caring society is shared neither by political leaders, nor, apparently, by the majority of Australian people”.¹¹

Community workers initially enter the field driven by their desire to work with and help people, and find themselves unprepared for a world of competitive tendering, budgetary, financial and staff management concerns, and outcomes evaluations.¹² The reconstruction of citizen as customer, the prioritisation of financial over personal relationships, and moral authoritarianism all create dissonance with the motivations that bring people into the development field in the first place.¹³ This research was therefore developed to probe the “dissonance” that community development practitioners are currently experiencing.

Approach to the Research

To explore the experience of practitioners located in the organisational context of bureaucracy a qualitative approach was employed. Twenty-two semi-structured interviews were conducted with community development practitioners from federal, state and local government and from large non-

government organisations in Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT).

The goal of the research was not to name a singular truth, but rather to build a rich picture of people's experiences that embraced complexity, ambiguity and contradiction. CLA was identified as a methodology that would not only assist analysis but could potentially bridge the past- and future-oriented discourses of community development, and elicit different ways of knowing.¹⁴

Results

Analysis of the litany

At the first layer of analysis, what CLA calls the 'litany', three major themes emerged from the interviews with research participants:

1. Community development work is difficult to do within bureaucracy.
2. Community development work is not well understood or supported within bureaucracy.
3. Being located within bureaucracy is an extremely negative experience for the majority of community development workers, due to violence, stress and isolation.

As Participant 6 [P6] explained:

It's very difficult to work in government in a prescriptive environment where, basically, you don't have any room to move and use your own judgment. So, you have to do everything this way, you have to communicate this way using this information. I mean, in a system like that I don't think there's a lot of scope for creative work. Re-shuffling paperclips is going to be it, and then you have a whinge to someone in the corridor.

Social analysis

At the social level of analysis, these litany findings are highly consistent with much of the literature on the culture of large organisations, which reports environments of violence, bullying and gender discrimination. The impact of this at the organisational level is the development of a culture of fear, a lack of critique and low morale. For individual workers this can lead to a challenge to their concept of who they are, and even to their sense of right and wrong:

It was learning how to work in an unfriendly, unsafe bureaucracy... It was unsafe personally because they treated you like you had nothing to say, you were treated as useless... It was unsafe professionally because even though I had a skill set, for example skills in

consultation, it was not valued. It didn't fit in with their view of the world. [P8]

While these findings appear to be consistent with findings for any worker who is located within a bureaucracy, what was striking in this research was the lack of preparedness of community development practitioners. Newer workers entering bureaucracies appeared to be unprepared for the challenge to them that emerged, and used highly emotive and negative words to describe the emotional and psychological impact this had upon them:

The first couple of weeks I was crying every night and "Why have I got into this job?"... I found it was such a huge shock. God if you'd spoken to me a month ago you would have got a very emotional, very, very, very, emotional kind of responses from me. I'm able to be a little bit more objective about it now: depending on the day and the time. I found myself in a little grey cubicle, staring at a computer, sort of in a fishbowl cubicle thing, with all these people kind of in ties, which I found strange... I tried to sort of swing in that direction for about a week, and then went "Fuck it! Oh I can't do this". [P21]

Even more experienced workers expressed surprise at how intense and frequent these challenges could be.

The dominant agendas of bureaucracy and the dominant agendas of developmental work are considerably different, and have different goals and processes for achieving these goals. Consequently practitioners reported that good developmental initiatives were often distorted into service delivery programs, or alternatively community development was seen as a means by which government programs could be delivered with minimal financial investment.

I came in here thinking, the goal is to deliver community capacity-building projects, now I'm thinking well, no that isn't actually the goal, and compromises on that are very difficult. It's still my goal but that's where the tension comes in for working there. I realise that the organisation's goal isn't about that. It's about looking good politically and meeting the quantitative indicators. [P20]

Discursive analysis

Using a discursive layer of analysis, the difficulties that community development workers face in large organisations can be understood as an effect of power relations. Whereas a social analysis can be seen as revealing the power in discourse, a discursive analysis reveals the power *behind* discourse. It demonstrates the "games of truth" between circulating discourses that compete for legitimacy.¹⁵ The dominant discourses of bureaucracies sit at odds with the discursive positioning of community development workers. The discursive analysis demonstrates that the negative experience of community development practitioners is the result of an

ontological struggle. It is indicative of a struggle between the legitimisation of positivism, economics, individuality and outcomes, over post-positivist knowledge, humanism, collectivism and process. This explains why the work of practitioners is discounted and why people reported feeling isolated, violated and compromised:

It was a framework issue, an age issue, and a gender issue that resulted in the devaluing of my knowledge, skills and language...
[Our work is seen as] all process and bullshit and having cups of tea.
[P8]

By understanding people's work as located within a context of circulating discourses competing for legitimacy and primacy, the forms of agency that people enact can be constructed as forms of resistance that sit upon a continuum from gentle/passive to volatile/active. One of the key ways in which they resisted the dominant hegemony was by invoking a discourse of groundedness:

Everything I do in here is informed by what I know is going on for homeless people. So sometimes that might be no more than I can say to people, "Well yes I know that response has been well evaluated. I'm telling you on the ground that's not what homeless people think about it". [P3]

Their agency was enacted by constructing the community as being 'other' than bureaucracy—not only as a place or space—but as a paradigm and a way of being in the world that is about ultimate authenticity and genuineness. This is not only an assumption about how things are, but a commitment to their being that way. As Bradley et al. argue, there is emotional investment in a paradigm because it defines one's world and oneself, shaping language, thought, perceptions, and systems and is thus reinforced daily.¹⁶ This emotional investment in a particular world view resulted in a fascinating paradox. Ironically what sustained many practitioners in their struggle was the struggle itself. By elevating their work to a virtuous cause, practitioners were renewed and attained a moral high ground that energised them in what they saw as an often unsupportive and bleak context:

I've many times tried to make commitments to make the world a better place and to do the little bits I can to work towards that. [P5]

Metaphoric analysis

At the fourth level of analysis, the analysis of metaphor and myth, these discursive struggles for legitimacy by community development practitioners manifest in particular forms of agency. While many mythic manifestations were present in the interviews, three archetypal patterns dominated.

Firstly, and most frequently, was the archetype of the warrior—as the community development practitioners constructed themselves actively fighting to change the way in which bureaucracy works. Participants spoke of “staying under the radar”, “holding the line”, “picking sides”, “choosing battles”, “knowing which battles to fight”, “navigating through minefields”, “lobbing grenades”, “drawing lines in the sand”, “knowing when to retreat”, “being tough”, “having courage”, “developing pre-emptive strikes and counter-attacks”, “getting blown out of the water”, “being in no-man’s land” and “sleeping with the enemy”.

Secondly, the archetype of the altruist/martyr emerged as people invoked religious imagery and references to sacrificing oneself to a noble cause. Practitioners referred to “finding religion” about community development, “tapping into the spiritual”, “having faith”, “walking on water”, the need for “discipline”, experiences that were “crucifying”, being “pure”, keeping the “soul strong”, not breaking “the covenant” and “being in ecstasy”.

Finally, an archetypal figure emerged that appeared to be an interesting combination of frontier wanderer and explorer—as practitioners rode through the borderlands of government and community organisations to discover, map, explore, interpret and trade between two cultures:

You move things from within and from without. And that requires a certain degree of boundary riding as well. You’ve ridden out from the opposite direction, you know? And those people, who can move to the edge, work out what the strategic opportunities are, appropriately nurtured and without getting blown out of the water and ride back into the middle and take with them those threads. [P18]

These three archetypal patterns all represent forms of heroic agency. Heroic agency is masked and often denied, but is ever present at the subconscious level, revealing itself through people’s language. These three heroic patterns of warrior, martyr/altruist and frontier explorer are useful in that they provide particular strategies for community development workers entering bureaucracy. Heroic agency carves out a space for undertaking developmental work and resisting the hegemonic discourses. It enables people to feel potent and effective and thus sustains them in difficult situations:

This is a courageous thing that I’m doing. [P21]

What a metaphoric analysis also reveals, however, is the shadowed side of these forms of resistance. These archetypal patterns contain their own counter-myths that collude with the very hegemonic powers workers seek to resist. The privileging of a rational and heroic stance of individual workers is also premised on a conception of agency which is most relevant to those positioned powerfully across discourses.¹⁷ This conception of agency also represents a point of tension for community development practitioners, as

heroism sits at odds with the value of humility that is espoused by and for community development practitioners:

“[The community members said] we know [P10] is wonderful.” Not that I’ve ever wanted to be anybody’s wonderful thing—that’s not what I set out to do. [P10]

What makes this particularly difficult for practitioners is the masking of these relations of power in the very things that draw people to community development: the hopeful discourses of peace, liberation, justice and “doing good”.

These discursive struggles are not unique to community development workers, as other human intervention workers may share this positioning and experience these same tensions. Such struggles reflect broader truth games within our society. Furthermore, some metaphors, such as war, are so profoundly naturalised within a culture that people appear to be unaware of them or cannot escape them. This helps explain why the imagery of war was present in *every* interview. Such images are inherent in Western culture. “We live in a culture where it is regarded as natural for some people to dominate others where hierarchies are ‘normal’ and the use of coercion and fear are seen as justifiable means of enforcing submission to authority”.¹⁸ The militarisation of discourse is thus militarisation of thought and social practice.¹⁹ As one practitioner ironically suggested:

If we use militarism, we’re walking through a minefield. [P13]

What *is* striking in these findings is the privileging of the discourse of “self” among community development practitioners, and the consequent construction of human agency that emerges from this through the various and often unconscious metaphors.

The starting place for community development methodology is the work of the ‘self’. Members of other professions, such as psychologists, are taught to work in multiple modalities. For example, they are taught to construct and maintain professional boundaries between themselves and their clients. By contrast the community development practitioners interviewed saw themselves as moving beyond the power dynamics of professionalism, working in relationship with others as their “true” selves. The consequence is the elevation of a pure and true “self”. As the following practitioner quote illustrates, to be anything less than “true” to this idealised self was seen as “compromising integrity”:

I’d never promote myself as an academic. I was just a person who knows... I had this fellow yell at me on the phone, he just was screaming at me on the phone. So I got off the phone... came back the next morning and thought, “Right, I’m going to be Dr [P3]—he can get stuffed.” So I ring up his receptionist and go, “I’m Dr [P3] I’d like to make an appointment with Mr so and so,” and she goes, “Oh yes Dr

[P3].” So I turn up to this thing, flip my card across the desk, “Dr [P3] here to see so and so.” And it worked! He came out of the office like really apologetic and—da-de-da—made me a cup of tea. So it’s been *doing things that haven’t always sat well with my sense of personal integrity and who I am*. But you suddenly go, “Look, if calling myself that, and throwing a card on the desk is going to get me six months, you know, is going to save six months work then I’ll do that as well.” [P3—emphasis added]

This analysis thus demonstrates that while people had a very good understanding of community development practice, what was missing was a critical analysis of the field and of themselves as workers. For practitioners such as these, the use of formal titles, roles, and credentials, was seen as disingenuous, being ‘just a person who knows’ was more highly valued in their own schema.

Figure 1, below, summarises these findings.




Figure 1. Summary of findings

At first glance it would be easy to dismiss CLA as little more than a neat re-badging of any number of other deconstructive techniques. The idea of 'layers' of meaning and multiple truths is certainly not new, and the techniques used to uncover these layers owe much to poststructuralist interrogations of texts. Indeed, Inayatullah refers to CLA as a "poststructural critical approach", explaining that the task is not one of description or prediction or comparison, but of making units of analysis problematic.²⁰ Thus it asks not simply: "what is the truth?", but rather: "which truths are privileged and which truths are silenced?" It disturbs present power relations by making problematic our categories. The task is to take what appears natural and normal and show it to be remarkable and problematic, "We contest the grounds of various problems by inquiring how a particular problem has come to be framed".²¹ Thus CLA shares with the constructivist paradigm the notion of subjective multiple realities that are individually and socially constructed.

Does CLA Offer Anything New to the Community Development Field?

But if the first three layers of CLA mirror traditional deconstructive tools, the gift of CLA is to provide a fourth layer of meaning that deepens analysis. This level of analysis is concerned with the deep stories and myths and the collective archetypes. It focuses on the unconscious dimension of the problem or paradox. Such myths and metaphors are usually hidden to the individual observer.²² It is also this fourth level of analysis, the level of myth and metaphor, which distinguishes CLA most starkly from other analytical methods.

Symbolism is an important part of our thought-structure. "The way in which we imagine the world determines what we think is important in it, what we select for our attention among the welter of facts that constantly flood in upon us. Only after we have made that selection can we start to form our official literal thoughts and descriptions".²³ Or as one research participant observed:

We have to go back to "How do people tell certain truths?" We have to go back to stories. We have to go back to mythology. [P16]

Kirmayer argues that myth, metaphor and archetype capture, respectively, social, psychological and bodily contributions to truth and meaning.²⁴ In their most simple form, myths contain archetypes, and are metaphoric in nature. They are not simply detached stories. They are "imaginative patterns, networks of powerful symbols that suggest particular ways of interpreting the world. They shape its meaning".²⁵

Historically, metaphoric thinking did not stimulate much interest or inquiry within philosophy or social sciences until the 1960s, and was, for the most

part, thought of as residual and decorative.²⁶ Metaphor and myth can be seen as belonging historically to the realm of poetry, stories, fables and fictions, which sit in opposition to the more culturally valued realm of facts, figures, truth and objectivity.

Poststructuralist theory helps us to rethink language as action and as event, as actively performative and not merely referential.²⁷ Consequently, metaphors are not merely literary turns, or “superficial stylistic adornments of discourse”.²⁸ Instead, when something is signified through metaphor, reality is actually being constructed in one way rather than another:

Metaphors construct the way we think and the way we act, and our systems of knowledge and belief in a pervasive and fundamental way. How a particular domain of experience is metaphorized is one of the stakes in the struggle within and over discourse practices.²⁹

Our ordinary conceptual system, in the terms of which we think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.³⁰ Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world and how we relate to other people. Hence our conceptual system plays a central role in defining our everyday realities.

However, as our conceptual system is something we are not normally aware of, we need to look to language to provide evidence of our conceptual system: “Since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use for thinking and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like”.³¹ In other words, metaphors are not simply an embellishment of language but a basic structural form of experience through which human beings engage with, organise and understand their world. People experience things and act upon them through a conceptual system which is largely metaphorical.³²

Moving understandings of metaphor from words and language into the realm of thought and action reveals another function of metaphor: that of exercising power. Cresswell contends that the creation and maintenance of metaphorical understanding is an inherently political process: “Power, at least in part, involves the ability to impose metaphors on others”.³³ It is for this reason that Inayatullah sees the fourth level of analysis as having the greatest potential for the transformation of human life.³⁴

However, mythologising events and behaviours into stories, accounts and explanations does not lead to more validity, to more certitude about what is. “The revelation of myth within events confirms ambiguity, it does not settle it”.³⁵ Thus CLA does not see the use of metaphor and myth as providing an ultimate answer, but simply informs and sits alongside the three layers of analysis previously provided:

By virtue of [archetypes’] inconceivability, their enigmatic and ambiguous nature, these metaphorical premises elude every literalness

so that the primary urge of seeing through everything fixed, posited and defined begins archetypically in these premises themselves. Here I am seeking to ground possibility in the impossible, searching for a way to account for the unknown in the still more unknown, *ignotum per ignotius*. Rather than explain I would complicate, rather than define I would compound, rather than resolve I would confirm the enigma.³⁶

The mythological form requires cognitive pluralism rather than the lure of simplicity.³⁷ Its value resides therefore in its anti-reductionist nature.

What the metaphoric analysis has found is that although the experience of the organisational context of bureaucracy is largely negative, by constructing themselves as residing in the margins and borderlands, workers renew their commitment to a heroic quest. They are energised and find a powerful sense of agency. However this quest creates a binary view of the world: a ‘them’ against which the ‘I’ can resist. The means by which they resist is based on being ‘true’ to themselves. Failure to be ‘true’ is to compromise their integrity. Yet the environment, in which they work, the organisational context of bureaucracy, is already compromised. As noted in the opening of this chapter, outputs and outcomes are privileged over processes, personal relationships are subservient to financial priorities.

The simultaneous construction and denial of heroic agency, blinds people to the means by which their own agency is undone. The refusal to compromise ‘self’ within a highly compromised context creates an idealised view of community development that can never be realised. It constructs an ideology of an ideal developmental practice that workers can never truly live up to, and it constructs a rarefied view of ‘self’ which ultimately limits people’s capacity to act. Ideologies such as the ‘true self’ and adherence to a static idea of integrity are, broadly, not helpful, as they construct a binary space.

In the compromised context of bureaucracies, community development practitioners need a strategy of existing in multiple and even competing spaces at once—and of knowing how to straddle these and in which space to be active:

[Good practitioners] always work with the powerless and disadvantaged to attempt to allow them or give them or support them in such a way that it has an impact on the organisation they work in, and they do that while remaining a loyal servant of their organisation.
[P2]

The challenge for community development as a field is to imagine alternatives to the myth of heroic agency. What is needed is an alternative sense of agency which, rather than evoking a true, authentic, uncompromising self, is able to operate in parallel ways depending on the context, without losing sight of workers’ own perception and perspective. It

is here in the realm of alternatives that CLA has most to offer the community development field—both in its teaching and its practice.

Inayatullah says that while it is part of the poststructural critical tradition, CLA is very much action-oriented.³⁸ As a futures methodology it embraces a range of specific human capacities and perceptions, utilising concepts and methods that are more productive in studying the processes of continuity and change.³⁹ Answers are not right or wrong; rather a dialogue between the different levels is sought. Interaction is critical. Reality is not simply constructed but co-created. Thus, while interesting and useful, a complex and layered analysis is not the goal in itself.

A complex layered analysis can create the possibility for real transformation of our empirical and ideational worlds and ensure deep participation in the transformation. “This is not merely better representation, but a genuine engagement with our others’ ways of knowing”.⁴⁰ Inayatullah suggests that creating what we know and changing the categories that define what we know, requires the creation of new myths, new stories of meaning.⁴¹ Further, he argues that in the loop of data-meaning-episteme-myth, reconstruction is not lost. Action is embedded in epistemology. Deconstructing conventional metaphors and then articulating alternative metaphors becomes a powerful way to critique the present and then create the possibility of alternative futures. In this way CLA also speaks to the Witkin and Gottschalk’s criteria for social interventionist research to be ‘useful in practice’.⁴²

Brenda Hall-Taylor acknowledges that futures methodologies provide not only tools for analysis but potent means of thinking, visioning and empowerment.⁴³ However she is critical of an overly liberal view of agency—that humans can transform institutions, avoiding the politics of bureaucracy. Such thinking is premised on a social ontology in which agency trumps structure.⁴⁴ Ivana Milojevic⁴⁵ echoes this concern. She questions the idea that future outcomes can be influenced by individual choice and critiques the idea that individuals are solely responsible for the future. Instead she suggests that individual autonomy must be put into a social context, reinforced with the concept of power and the availability of historical and social choices.

These layers of analysis suggest the need for a networked and relational view of agency within developmental practice. This is summarised creatively by one practitioner who invoked the metaphor of a “community development cake”. Describing his approach to his work he said:

It’s like a gateaux: there’s all these layers, and you’ve got to have the whole friggin’ thing to taste like a gateaux... you don’t eat the icing without the cake—it doesn’t taste very nice. It’s not the textural experience you’re after. The fork doesn’t go through it all—you’ve got to be able to feel the fork running through it and it folding over.

You know you've got to keep all those other layers in there, you can't just have the edifice. And that's the reality. [P13]

So while the litany analysis suggests that change is required at the level of individual practitioners—their toughness or their resourcefulness—social analysis provides an external understanding calling for changes within the organisational and social structures. And while the discursive analysis speaks to understanding how power is exercised, the metaphoric and mythic analysis tells the story of how individual units, organisms, persons, families, organisations, societies, even whole eco-systems co-create each other. The “self” can never reside outside of this, as the practitioner above acknowledges, “you've got to keep all those other layers in there”. If community development is to rise above its romanticised past it is here that more thinking and research is required: to create, enrich and share networked metaphors of the future.

Conclusion

Complex and layered analysis is not easy to engage in because “we generally do not desire to account for how our own worldview interests shape the future we predict or the alternative scenarios we posit”.⁴⁶ However such engagement is necessary for community development to move from a romanticised past into a hopeful, yet plausible, future. CLA provides a way forward for the teaching, practice and analysis of community development. The metaphoric layer enables hidden ideology to be exposed. In doing so, it encourages the conscious co-creation of new metaphors of connection and relationship. And because all participate in the construction of this new reality, all can participate in changing it.

This is similar to the thinking of philosopher Mary Zournazi who argues that hope is deeply embedded in relations of power: “Reflections, conversations and dialogues build new social and individual imaginaries—visions of the world that create possibilities for change”.⁴⁷ As one practitioner reflected:

It's not just one person responding to bureaucratic edicts or control but it's people talking about how to respond: so keeping the discussion alive! [P5]

This view of relationality shows that it is not a matter of deciding to become involved in the lives of others, but of recognising the ways in which one is inevitably a part of them: “In whatever actions I take I am making choices about how to act upon my relationality”.⁴⁸ By understanding the implicit connection not only between people, but also between our social structures and our eco-systems, relationality ascribes importance to qualities other than rationality, self-consciousness and consciousness. It transforms values by ascribing importance to temporality, authenticity, diversity, integrity and thoughtful practicality. As Paulo Freire suggests, it is about naming the

world together,⁴⁹ and this is not a methodology or process that can be learned, but an act of love.

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27. A Layered Approach to Horizon Scanning: Identifying future issues in military and veterans' health

Jane Palmer and Niki Ellis*

The Centre for Military and Veterans' Health, Australia undertook a horizon scanning process to identify issues in military and veterans' health services delivery for a series of future scenario workshops. Application of a critical futures framework, CLA and the futures triangle, produced a novel matrix which enabled a deeper and more critical review of factors across all content areas.[†]

Introduction

In 2007 the Think Tank at the Centre for Military and Veterans' Health (CMVH) established a two-year program of work on futures in the area of military and veterans' health service delivery. CMVH was a collaborative research centre funded by the Departments of Defence and Veterans' Affairs in Australia.

The program had the following components:

Preliminary horizon scanning by CMVH and identification of potential areas of interest:

- Consultation with senior thought leaders in the Departments of Defence and Veterans' Affairs, other government departments, non-Government organisations (NGOs), and organisations in the private sector with an

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interest in either defence or health or both to establish specific areas of interest for an ideas development process;

- Open-ended ideas development in a wider forum (breakfast/lunch-time series of talks and discussions); and
- A major Think Tank event to identify priority issues for planning and action.

The objectives of the program were to:

1. Describe the likely future environments (2020) in which the Australian military and veterans' health services delivery will occur;
2. Describe what health services delivery would look like in these alternative environments;
3. Determine the impacts on research and skills enhancement needs for future health services delivery, for use in planning research and professional development programs; and
4. Establish a mechanism for ongoing horizon scanning with regard to health and health services by CMVH in partnership with other organisations.

This paper describes how the Think Tank, working within a “critical futures” framework, applied and adapted causal layered analysis¹ to the horizon scanning and prioritisation of key issues for critical futures study.

Approach to the Think Tank futures project

We looked at work by a number of theorists in considering how best to approach the futures project.

Types of futures studies

We reviewed three main strands of futures thinking, described by Richard Slaughter:

- Forecasting (predicting);
- Scenarios; and
- Critical futures studies.²

We found forecasting and scenarios to be complementary and defined our two options as forecasting (including scenarios) and critical futures studies.

Forecasting, including scenarios

One major criticism of the process of projecting trends into the future is that it avoids addressing the fundamental causes of our problems. Slaughter suggests that “forecasting” or “predicting” now has very little to offer us about how we should solve the problems facing mankind: “Such questions are bound up with complex social and human issues, but forecasting is silent when confronted with the human predicament”.³ “Instead of future facts(trends or emerging issues), what is needed are new, culturally self-aware interpretations of the future”.⁴

Neither does the development of future scenarios necessarily ensure the most open approach to imagining possible futures. As Slaughter points out, standard approaches to scenario building accept current social reality as unproblematic, and bear little or no relationship to broader frameworks of understanding:

Many future scenarios skate around the (empirical) surface but fail to deal in depth with the problematics of people, organisations, cultures in stress and transformation.⁵

Thus in planning for market growth, for example, an organisation needs to look not just at scenarios which project greater or smaller numbers, but at its whole understanding of what it means by “growth”:⁶ “...most decision makers at all levels simply want information that can justify their pre-understandings of past, present and future...”⁷

Futurist Peter Schwartz works with scenarios to encourage people to examine their assumptions about the future. In *The Art of the Long View* he remarks that “people at resilient companies continually hold strategic conversations about the future”.⁸ Important factors in designing a strategic conversation process include:

- Beginning by looking at the present and the past;
- Evading the “Official Future” in organisational identity.

Critical Futures Studies presented us (the authors) with a way of both critiquing the past and stepping outside the official future.

Critical Futures Studies

To operate in an uncertain world, people needed to be able to re-perceive—to question their assumptions about the way the world works, so that they could see the world more clearly.⁹

...a futures method... should not merely be seen as a predictive method; it can also be seen as a critical one.¹⁰

In order to open up alternative futures for military and veterans’ health, we concluded that the best option would be a critical futures studies approach. This approach is concerned with gaining perspective on current reality in order to open up more options for the future.¹¹ One of the roles of the futurist in this approach is to make the way we do things now “remarkable” rather than “normal”,¹² and through this “distancing” process enable us to look anew at the present. While future scenario writing by CMVH could help provide this distancing from the present, we concluded that work needed to be done to ensure that the scenarios not simply use the same categories and structures that exist today.

CLA, described elsewhere in this volume, is an approach which allows us to look both critically and deeply, at a number of levels, at the way things are

done now. We describe below how we adapted CLA to deepen our approach to horizon scanning, so that it provided us with a deeper perspective on both current conditions as well as trends influencing the future.

Methodological Approach to Horizon Scanning

In undertaking the horizon scanning process for the Think Tank, we realised we needed an approach that would assist us in reviewing the information we collected from a fresh perspective and in identifying critical issues for the future. In particular, identifying areas of contradiction, synergy, and (dis)connection between the various factors would enable us to see which areas should be the focus of the Think Tank's attention.

The transdisciplinary enterprise of bringing together factors affecting both military futures and health futures (including social, geopolitical, environmental, economic and technological factors), meant that any horizon scanning needed to be ordered and layered in a way that allowed the connections between a wide range of factors to become visible. One type of order which could obviously be imposed on the data we collected was categorisation into STEEP—Social, Technological/Scientific, Environmental, Economic and Political.¹³ In addition, however, we needed to include specifically military-, veterans- and health-related factors. A combination of these categories (STEEP-plus) became our starting point.

Early in the data gathering process, and using a critical futures framework, we looked at what kind of information was going to be most useful to scan. The Push-Weight-Pull triangle used by Inayatullah¹⁴ set out the way in which futures were influenced by more than just the trajectory of existing trends:

- *Push* factors are the trends and wildcards which will push us into the future;
- *Weight* factors are the way things have been historically up to now; and
- *Pull* factors are our preferred futures which are pulling us forward.

To critically overview the past and present as well as scanning the horizon for possible futures, we decided to use the horizon-scanning process as a way of assembling data about Push, Weight and Pull factors.




Figure 1. The Push-Weight-PullTriangle¹⁵

CLA presented a layered way of ordering our Push-Weight-Pull data, in a way which would allow us to see contradictions and synergies between worldviews, between systemic factors, and within the surface litany. The comparisons drawn at each level and then across levels would turn out to be invaluable in gaining a clearer perspective and better description of Push, Weight and Pull factors.

For the purpose of horizon scanning, we combined the Push-Weight-Pull triangle with the deeper layers proposed by CLA. The outcomes in the centre thus became “Plausible Future Issues” rather than “Plausible Futures”:




Figure 2. The Push-Weight-Pull Triangle of factors in CLA futures analysis

Collecting and sorting the data

Over several weeks we collected information from major journals, annual reports, research reports, newspaper articles on:

- Global future trends and wildcards (social, technological, economic, environmental and political (STEEP)), health futures, military futures and veterans' futures (the Push factors)
- Where we are now in health, military and veterans issues (the Weight factors)
- Preferred futures in health, military and veterans issues (the Pull factors)

In all, 75 documents were collected and a content analysis was undertaken for any information on global (social, technological, economic, environmental or political), military and health trends; either predicted trends (Push), current trends (Weight) or preferred future trends (Pull). Each piece of information categorised from the documents was referred to as a factor.*

The factors we had assembled were tabulated within the Push-Weight-Pull groupings, by CLA level—Litany, Worldview, Systemic Causes (the Metaphor level was not used at this stage due to a lack of relevant data), and within the STEEP-plus categories. A representation of this matrix is shown in Figure 3, below.

First analysis of the data for possible future issues

Once the factors were tabulated it was possible to scan within and across the CLA levels to look for areas where there was either a significant conflict or a strong synergy between the factors in the various cells. For example, conflicts or disconnects were obvious between future technology (litany) and likely technology literacy (systemic causes), rising health costs (litany and systemic causes) and the priority given to prevention (worldview), resource or health workforce shortages (systemic causes) and rising demand (litany). Strong mutual reinforcements were noted between rising concern with post-deployment quality of life and health costs (worldview and systemic causes) and increasing focus on surveillance and early intervention (systemic causes), and between Australia's increasing commitment to international security agreements (worldview) and greater focus on training for interoperability (systemic causes).

* For a full list of sources, see: Centre for Military and Veterans' Health, Think Tank Report: Futures in Military and Veterans' Health Service Delivery, retrieved 9 February 2014, from <http://www.camvh.org.au/ThinkTank/CMVH2008ThinkTankReport.pdf>.




Figure 3. Mapping the data and first analysis: Matrix of factors by CLA, STEEP-plus and Push-Weight-Pull categories

As a result of this comparison process, a tentative list of futures issues for the Think Tank to focus on were drawn up for further review and verification.

Analysis check—factor-tagging by issue

Each factor listed in the table (Figure 3) was then tagged to identify it as belonging, at least primarily, to *one* of the fifteen tentative issues. All of the factors were then re-sorted by issue, so that Push-Pull-Weight, Litany, Systemic Causes, Worldview, social, technological or scientific, economic, environmental, political, military, veterans and health factors were itemised simply in one long list under the relevant issue heading. This factor-tagging process is outlined in Figure 4, below. It helped us to describe the issue in question and allowed a quick scan across all identified issues to see whether any anomalies appeared in the list of factors under each.

As a result of the factor-tagging process, two of the issues collapsed into one (the two lists of factors complemented each other and seemed to cover both sides of one issue), and one new issue emerged (the list of factors under one issue seemed to deal with too broad an area to be covered by one issue description).




Figure 4. Factor-tagging table: second analysis

Possible Future Issues

The fifteen possible future issues which arose from the horizon scanning process in 2007 are listed below. It can be seen that each issue description lies across more than one level of the litany-systemic-worldview layers of CLA:

1. Technology smart prevention
 - 1a *Designing out threats to health, designing in prevention*

Future trends e.g.in gene- and nano-technology showed great potential for technology in preventing illness and injury, as well as potential for harm. At present it appeared there could be more collaboration between the providers of health services and the

designers of equipment, clothing, food supply packaging etc. to reduce risks to health of military personnel.

Procurement, training and strategy were also areas where input from health providers would help with assessing and managing health implications.

1b Future technology literacy

There had been criticism of all governments that they have low scientific literacy, a lack of understanding of the role of science in policy and a lack of commitment to technology adoption. Health providers in particular needed a proactive, horizon scanning approach to new technology, changing environmental threats, new diseases and their impact on the delivery of health services.

2. New models of health care

2a Coordination and collaboration with other agencies

In view of limited funding, rising costs of health (see 2d, below), trends towards new models of delivery (see 2e and 2f, below) and new future working environments (see 5a and 5b, below), there would be pressure to work more cost-effectively with other government and non-government agencies including health providers, educators and trainers, aid agencies, in providing prevention and treatment services.

2b Quality

There was worldwide inconsistency in treatment and prevention programs, and currently only limited monitoring, feedback and review.

Changes in models of service delivery, including more consumer responsibility (see 2f below), changing health roles of personnel (2e below), and use of new technologies would require a greater focus on quality assessment criteria, monitoring and review systems.

2c Communications and information

Communications and information technology was changing more rapidly and globally than almost any other area of technology. This would continue to catalyse paradigm shifts in education and information dissemination, including health records and public health information. It would also have a huge impact on how health services operate in the field, in access to patient information, supplies, transport and provision of advice and counselling.

Health providers needed to be constantly assessing available technologies and having input to service-wide or department-wide decisions on technology, training and infrastructure.

2d Funding—“more bang for the buck”

Rising costs associated with new diagnostics, pharmogenomics and other new procedures, combined with the costs of an ageing population and potentially fierce competition for scarce resources, would mean service-wide, department-wide and whole-of-government review of cost-effectiveness and new models of health service delivery. Spending on public health and prevention was then only a very small part of government budgets. The balance between expenditure on prevention and illness was likely to be drastically reviewed in the future.

2e New health roles

The silos of current health professionals were already being broken down, despite strong professional resistance. In this future, it was likely that increased customer focus and customer responsibility would result in “blended” health systems with new jobs as “gatekeepers” of quality, advocates for local health services, and in research interpretation, health service brokerage.

This would also change education and training programs to cross professional boundaries and increase emphasis on customer interface.

2f Consumer focus, consumer responsibility

More educated consumers demanding value for money, more consumer-driven health plans, community-run health centres, an emphasis on wellness rather than illness, personalised gene-technology programs, and cost-shifting from stretched government health budgets to individuals were all likely futures. Quality (of treatments, information) would become an important issue (see 2b, above).

The planning and design of future prevention and treatment programs, customer interface, e.g. with clinicians and hospital administration, information and education programs would be radically different from current arrangements.

3. Health workforce

3a Recruitment shortages

Changing demographics in developed countries would mean severe shortages of skilled workers in-country, and fierce competition for a global labour force. There were already severe shortages of nurses and doctors in Australia.

The “war for talent” would mean mass movement of labour between nations, both to take up jobs and to obtain training and education offered by developed countries.

Employment conditions, organisational image, and cross-cultural acceptance were all likely to be important issues.

3b Training (for interoperability, new technologies, roles and environments)

New security and training alliances were constantly being formed and Australia was increasingly seeking joint training with the US, Indonesia and other countries.

Other factors in future training included the likely impact of nanotechnology on military and medical practice, increasing demand from the workforce for personal development and training, future changes in clinical roles and the many roles performed by one person during a complex deployment, new, more threatening environments, more environmental regulation of activities, more cross-cultural environments and the role of e-learning (see 2c, above).

3c Retention (morale, team-building and employment conditions)

There had been criticism of the ADF regarding its “psychological contract” with its personnel, organisational morale, the change by its workforce to situational, short-term commitment with a view to transferring quickly to the civilian sector, and the changes needed for the ADF to be seen as an “employer of choice”.

The health workforce in general had been described as depleted and demoralised. These broader issues would also have an increasing impact on military and veterans’ health providers in the future.

4. Pre-empting illness

4a Surveillance, hazard profiling and early intervention

Potential future funding limitations (see 2d above) on long-term care and reports on diminished post-deployment quality of life had resulted in recommendations for hazard profiling of each deployment and better health surveillance of ADF personnel and veterans upon transition from the ADF to allow for early intervention in any likely health condition. Mental health and chronic pain were examples of areas where systematic approaches to pre-emption could reduce long-term health complications for serving and former ADF members.

4b Support at home (social/community/family)

The Department of Veterans' Affairs was increasing its focus on family and community support for veterans. Statistics showed that there was a direct correlation between community and family support and positive health outcomes for veterans, and that many veterans had reduced quality of life post-deployment.

There was a disconnect between nongovernment organisations serving veterans, and the younger generation of former servicemen and women (from Vietnam onwards) who do not identify with WW2 veterans. There may have also been unintended consequences of contact with families while on deployment which have not been examined (for example the fracturing of roles resulting from contact with family during stressful deployments).

5. Future operating environments

5a Global resource shortages and infrastructure shut-downs

The forecasts for environmental and social conditions in the near future indicated potential serious shortages of resources, including energy, water, and metals needed for pharmaceuticals, machinery and infrastructure.

Shortages and shut-downs were likely to increase the pressure on delivery of health services both on overseas deployments and in Australia. A vigilant horizon scanning process needed to be in place to anticipate shortages and to investigate alternatives (see 1b, above).

5b International interoperability

Australia was increasingly engaging in formal security and training agreements with countries such as the US and Indonesia, and saw part of its future military role in joint operations overseas. It was likely to become increasingly interdependent with other nations economically and politically.

As the ADF moved towards greater interoperability in terms of equipment, communications and training, its health services would also need to be able to operate jointly with other nations' health services, in terms of command, equipment, clinical practice, education and training and health promotion. This was likely to have cost-saving as well as efficiency and humanitarian advantages.

Testing possible future issues

At a subsequent meeting of the Think Tank Steering Committee, comprising representatives from CMVH and from the military and veterans' health

sector, this list of fifteen issues was considered in the form of a draft Discussion Paper.

There was strong agreement that all of the issues were priorities for consideration in a futures process, and that there were no significant omissions. After some further discussion however, it was agreed that one more issue could be identified separately within the area “New Models of Health Care”. This became issue 2g:

2g Mandating health choices and standards

Escalating funding shortages and insurance costs would drive the emphasis on wellness rather than illness, and on an array of requirements and incentives for standardised, quality compliant health services and risk reduction/preventive health strategies.

Incentives and mandated requirements will apply to both the health services offered by providers and to the health choices of consumers.

Further circulation of the Discussion Paper for comment within the military and veterans’ community, the wider health community and among other government and non-government organisations indicated that the issues list was considered to be credible and useful.

Lessons Learned

Repeatability of the process

The three stage process described above (collection and identification of factors from written sources, first analysis for tentative issues and second analysis after tagging-and-checking of factors against tentative issues) relies on a synthesis of CLA levels, the Push-Pull-Weight triangle, and the STEEP-plus categories. Such a synthesis could prove useful for horizon scanning in other areas, especially where the factors are likely to cross many disciplines and sectors, and operate at different levels of influence. The matrix of categories not only divides a plethora of information into manageable portions, it also facilitates identification of the issues and enriches their descriptions—descriptions of conflicts and synergies within and across systemic causes, worldviews and base data.

The factor-tagging step acts to check the process. Scanning a list of factors without paying attention to future or present, political, economic or technological categories, or whether a factor reflects a worldview or a systemic cause, gives a “fresh look” at the factors and a way of detecting anomalies without other conceptual “distraction”. Again, this checking process could be usefully applied wherever the list of factors is complex, multi-layered, multi-disciplinary and trans-sectoral.

Framework for collecting and analysing data

This horizon scanning process is obviously a small version of many larger, and more automated processes, where the greater breadth of information gathered means less likelihood of omissions. In fact in a subsequent project in another sector, the authors used this framework to shape the search questions for a very large automated search. However, regardless of the quantity of data, adopting a taxonomy early in our project for sorting and analysing the information assisted greatly in ensuring that data was collected across a range of categories (STEEP-plus), and within at least the first three levels of the CLA model (litany, systemic and worldview). Data (factors) that we collected from the source documents before this taxonomy was finalised, tended to fall into a few categories only; later data collection became more systematic and more efficient. Once the factors had been sorted into the initial table the (in)consistencies, (dis)connections and threats or opportunities became evident and formed themselves into a list of possible future issues.

The second stage of analysis was a checking process and required a re-sorting of the factors, as well as a decision on how they should be tagged; this allocated each factor to one of the issues identified in the first analysis. The lists of factors thus generated under each tentative issue might be more informative if the tagging occurred at, say, two levels—a primary level, which was the main issue with which the factor was identified, and a secondary level, which also allocated the factor, albeit less strongly, to another issue. The factor lists thus generated would make it easier to compare the claims of different issues to significance—an issue with a very large number of secondary factors but few primary factors could be as significant (possibly as an emerging issue) as one with a larger number of primary factors and few secondary factors.

Process or product?

It would be interesting to test the horizon scanning process described in this paper by separating the “cataloguer” from the “reviewer”. The process of collecting and cataloguing creates familiarity with the data (the “factors”). Perhaps it was this familiarity, rather than the particular taxonomy and its outputs, which enabled us to identify emerging issues; if this were the case, one way of arranging the data might have been just as effective as any other.

In a future case, if the data were collected and catalogued by one person and then presented “afresh” to another for review and identification of issues, we would be able to test the usefulness of the taxonomy proposed above as an aid to seeing anomalies, contradictions and synergies, and hence to identifying important issues.

It is also possible that the process of familiarisation with the data is more effective with one taxonomy than another—the *quality* (sophistication) of

such familiarity may be a critical factor and one which is in part determined by the operations performed on the data, forexample, whether the taxonomy is layered in a way which requires the cataloguer to critically consider data items in a certain way (as a statistic or a systemic feature or a worldview).

Conclusion

The CLA approach to futures studies can usefully be applied to the preliminary activities of horizon scanning and issue identification. Along with the Push-Weight-Pull categories representing trends, preferred futures and history, and the STEEP categories, it provides a guide for data collection, increasing the likelihood of a set of data which is reasonably representative and ranges from “bigger picture” worldviews to the litany of published facts and figures.

Such a taxonomy also assists in comparing information within and across CLA levels, to find connections and tensions which give rise to the critical issues requiring consideration. The checking process, which lists the data by issue without regard to levels, content or Push-Weight-Pull categories, provides a “second glance” and a second chance to identify anomalies, additional issues or overlapping issues, as well as the opportunity to better describe the issues.

Responses from stakeholders to the list of issues generated above suggests that the CLA/Push-Weight-Pull horizon scanning process would be worthy of consideration for application in other complex or transdisciplinary areas of futures studies.

¹ S. Inayatullah, ‘Causal layered analysis: Poststructuralism as method’, *Futures*, Vol 30, No 8, 1998, 815–829.

² R. A. Slaughter, ‘From forecasting and scenarios to social construction: Changing methodological paradigms in futures studies’, *Foresight*, Vol 4, No 3, 2002, 26–31.

³ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁴ S. Inayatullah, ‘Deconstructing and reconstructing the future: Predictive, cultural and critical epistemologies’, *Futures*, March 1990, 115–141, 122.

⁵ R. A. Slaughter (2002), *op. cit.*, 29.

⁶ S. Inayatullah, 1990, *op. cit.*, 123.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 120.

⁸ P. Schwartz, *The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World*, Chichester, John Wiley and Sons, 1991 (1996).

⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁰ S. Inayatullah (1998), *op. cit.*, 9.

¹¹ R. A. Slaughter (2002), op. cit.

¹² S. Inayatullah (1990), op. cit., 129.

¹³ J. L. Morrison, 'Environmental scanning', in M. A. Whitely, J. D. Porter & R. H. Fenske (eds.), *A Primer for New Institutional Researchers*, Tallahassee, FL, The Association for Institutional Research, 1991.

¹⁴ S. Inayatullah (2008), op. cit.

¹⁵ Ibid.

28. Applying Causal Layered Analysis in Substantive Psychology

Peta L. Dzidic and Brian J. Bishop

*Psychology has long been concerned with the distinction between pure and applied psychology. These distinctions have been exacerbated by cultural differences in methodology. CLA offers psychological science opportunities to forge some degree of integration. It offers a rigorous approach to qualitative research and a depth of understanding. The process of applying CLA in a psychological framework is explored in the context of women's roller derby.**

Introduction

Doing CLA psychologically

The potential value that CLA as a methodology gives to the interpretation of complex psychological and social issues has motivated us to design a CLA approach tailored to qualitative data. Our approach is based on the meaning of each layer intended by Inayatullah in his seminal work, but he notes that the method's application depends on the setting it is applied to, stating there has been refinement of the original method over time. Our approach is also influenced by the cookbook approach proposed by De Simone.¹ We offer our evolution of the approach, namely CLA as a method for analysing complex (or wicked) social psychological issues using qualitative data. Wicker noted that psychological theory needed to be grounded in the substance or context in which psychological dynamics occur.² Given this, CLA provides opportunities to examine phenomena at a number of psychological and social levels and can be well placed to capture complexity.

In the following chapter we provide a procedure for conducting a CLA according to five steps; step one: considering your research question; step two: familiarisation; step three: coding between the Layers; step four: coding within the layers, and; step five: reconstruction of the issue/proposition of alternative futures. Step one requires definition of the research question and identification of the appropriate analytical method. This is not unique to CLA and is a critical step in rigorous qualitative analysis. Steps two to four

* Roller derby is a full contact sport played on roller skates. The strength, agility and aggression required to play roller derby makes it a sport that contrasts with those stereotypically played by women.

focus on deconstructing the data according to the causal layers. Step five focuses on reconstructing the now-interpreted data. Reconstruction is critical as it allows the interactions between causal layers and the deeper fundamental underpinnings of the issue to be identified and also provides the opportunity for the proposition of alternative futures.

Step one: Considering your research question

A sound research question should always form the basis of research design. Wicker emphasised the importance of conceptualising questions and having these questions grounded in human experience. He argued that substantive theory (context) and conceptual theory (abstracted theory) must be considered first. Once you have determined your question, ask what method will best help to answer that question.³ If the research question relates to understanding complex or wicked problems, requires data richness and depth in analysis, and is embedded in epistemology that accepts that there are multiple perspectives and multiple truths, then a CLA may be the approach to adopt.

Step two: Familiarisation

Familiarisation with the data is critical to any qualitative analysis. This generally entails reading and re-reading the data sources. The aim of step two is for the researcher to become familiar with the data set; note-taking is strongly encouraged. Notes taken should include any observations or nuances that the researcher anticipates may be useful in later stages of the analysis. Methodological familiarisation with the causal layers and the approach to analysis is also advised. This requires the researcher to have a sound understanding of the foci of each of the causal layers and to be familiar with the steps taken to conduct the analysis.

Step three: Coding between the layers

The aim of step three is to identify a text relevant to the focus of each causal layer. The focus is therefore *between* the causal layers, as opposed to within them. Analytical coding between the layers is a similar process to conducting a thematic analysis using axial coding. In this process the researcher reads, interprets and annotates the data using the existing codes of litany, social causes, worldview discourse, and myth/metaphor. The focus of each causal layer provides descriptive parameters of what excerpts of the text are applicable for coding. It is suggested that large excerpts of text be coded according to each causal layer so that the meaning or context of the excerpt is maintained for analysis and interpretation in Steps 3 and 4.

The following interview transcript is a vignette of a woman roller derby player reflecting on her experiences of the sport. The overarching aim of the research was to explore the experiences of women participating in roller derby.

The following interview extract has been coded according to causal layer. The Litany Layer is coded in CAPS, the Social Causes Layer is coded in *italics*, the Worldview Discourse Layer is underlined and the Myth Metaphor Layer is in **bold**. The participant reflects on some of the challenges that come with playing roller derby:

Interviewer: You mentioned that there were also some challenging aspects to playing roller derby, could you tell me a little bit about that?

Participant: If I really delved into it and was honest with myself I would say that it has, has some negative impact on my life um from external relationships (INT 1: OK) um because I don't have a huge amount of time for anything apart from my kid (INT 1: Yeah) my job and derby. **So that's kinda what my life revolves around in a lot of ways**, not that I'm. . . not that I'm unhappy with that myself. I feel at this point in my life, I feel like, it's my time to do this and whether it lasts a year or another two years or whatever, I know that, that it will get to a point where I can't sustain it and I'll have to pare it back because at the moment it is a huge amount of my life. And sometimes, sometimes I do prioritise derby over my kid, because she has a dad. So you know sometimes, I mean I suppose it's not prioritising roller derby over my kid but he. . . he does have a lot of responsibility for caring for her because of me doing other derby stuff (INT 1: Mm). I went to Adelaide a couple of months ago for three days and he had her three days in a row. (INT 1: Yeah) I mean I don't really think that that's too much to ask, but yes that has had some impact on my relationship with him as well. **So I guess that's the biggest um hurdle I've had to deal with, is my husband uh because he doesn't really understand it, he doesn't really get it** um and I mean I don't really expect him to, I suppose there would be some guys that are more understanding about what it means and how happy it makes me and he's not one of them. . . **I mean I get it, I do understand from his point of view as well, because he works full time and I work part time, and he just wants to get home at the end of every day and have his dinner cooked and have me look after him and put my kid to bed.** But twice or three times a week I don't; it's his job so I didn't expect that to be a problem, but it has been. But I'm not the only one, there has been a lot of relationships that have, I mean my relationship has been able to handle it, but **a lot of relationships have fallen apart because of derby and the women have probably let it.**

It is not uncommon for excerpts of a transcript to be relevant to multiple layers simultaneously. This indicates a particularly complex extract in that the same piece of discourse can manifest differently at different layers of analysis. For example, the statement, "**So I guess that's the biggest um hurdle I've had to deal with, is my husband uh because he doesn't really understand it, he doesn't really get it.**" Consider the word "hurdle". The term is relevant at the Myth/Metaphor layer because it *is* a metaphor, here used to describe the barriers that prevent her from participating in her sport.

The physical barrier of a hurdle symbolises the degree of difficulty she experiences. This term is also applicable to the Worldview Layer because the metaphor hurdle represents a difference in worldview between herself and her husband. The participant reflects that the value she perceives in participating in roller derby differs from that of her husband who, she reflects, “doesn’t get it”. This tension is explored further by the participant where she reflects that many romantic relationships have ended, which she attributes to women’s participation in the sport in spite of their partners’ disapproval.

Step four: Coding within the layers

The aim of step four is to identify emergent themes specific to each causal layer, the focus is therefore *within* the layers as opposed to between them. Using the excerpts coded in step three, the researcher thematically free codes the excerpts according to each causal layer. As a means of comparison to a Thematic Analysis it may be useful to consider the causal layers as themes, and the thematic analyses conducted within them as subthemes.⁴ It is at this point, that it is important to have a clear understanding of what is meant by the term “theme”; too often, what constitutes a theme is insufficiently defined in the literature.⁵

Coding themes is an iterative process, and requires the researcher to invest time and thought into the intricacies of each layer. Examples of text relevant to the Myth/Metaphor Layer have been extracted from the excerpt coded above and presented in Table 1, below. Themes are noted in the right hand column.

Table 1. Examples of myth/metaphor

Myth Metaphor Layer Excerpt	Theme
<i>So that's kinda what my life revolves around in a lot of ways</i>	Metaphor of the centrality of roller derby
<i>So I guess that's the biggest, um, hurdle I've had to deal with, is my husband uh because he doesn't really understand it, he doesn't really get it</i>	Metaphor of a physical barrier (hurdle) to illustrate relational barriers to participation Relational tension
<i>I mean I get it, I do understand from his point of view as well because he works full time and I work part time and he just wants to get home at the end of every day and have his dinner cooked and have me look after and put my kid to bed</i>	Mythology of the “housewife” Relational tensions
<i>...a lot of relationships have fallen apart because of derby and the women have probably let it</i>	Metaphor of relationships falling apart. Roller derby is attributed to be the cause Relationship tensions

The same process of thematically coding, as illustrated above, within each causal layer is used. It is not uncommon for the same or similar sub-theme titles to emerge across causal layers. This is to be expected as the layers are depicting the same phenomenon of interest. The point of departure however, is in the meaning of the sub-themes. Given the different foci of each causal layer, the same sub-theme may emerge, but it will manifest differently between the layers.

Step five: Reconstruction of the issues

The aim of step five is to find overall meaning from the deconstructed issue and present the fundamental underpinnings of the issue in reconstructed form. It is at this point that it is particularly important for the researcher to remind themselves of their research aim and research question and of the intent of conducting a CLA. From our perspective, the intent of conducting a CLA is to identify the complex underpinnings of an issue.

Fundamentally, step five requires the researcher to convey, in a consolidated form, what was found in the analysis and to provide their interpretation of what these findings mean. While this is dependent on the specific piece of research, the deconstruction of the issue according to the layers would commonly have resulted in increasingly complex accounts of the issue being investigated. In their reconstruction, the researcher would interpret how the issue manifested itself according to their deconstruction. For example, the researcher may give accounts of interactions across the layers that could explain how underlying worldviews, values, myths and metaphors manifest at the more proximate Social Cause and Litany levels.

It is at this point that the researcher may like to incorporate existing research or theory that is relevant to their research. Step five is arguably the most complex as it requires the researcher to identify and support their interpretation of the analysis. A brief example, based on the analysis of the text and the remaining data set of interviews, is given below:

Women's experiences in playing roller derby were deconstructed and found to be more complex than women merely participating in a group-based sport. The experiences reflected the interwoven and competing facets of the women's lives, and that what women want from their lives is growing and diversifying beyond gendered stereotypes. While at the litany level, training, competing and skills development were relevant to the day-to-day experiences of playing the sport, the same activities were observed to be far more complex at the other levels of analysis. At the social causes level, it was evident that there were tensions associated with the competing roles held by the women. The women reflected on their roles as professional, mother, partner, wife, daughter and roller derby player. The most common pressures related to negotiating the roles of romantic partner, of mother and of roller derby player. The most common

reflection regarded the tension that participation in the sport placed on their relationship with a significant other. At the worldview layer, it was evident that roller derby provided an alternative space for women to participate in. It was a space in which women were in positions of authority and power, where they were in a position to challenge traditional roles of participation. This however, came at a cost, as illustrated in the tensions expressed at the social causes level and in the different worldviews regarding the value of participating in the sport held by some participants and their romantic partner. A specific roller derby discourse also emerged, which appeared to act as a way of consolidating the community. At the myth/metaphor level of analysis, metaphors were used to illustrate the difficulties and tensions women experienced as they endeavoured to participate in the sport. These tensions appeared to emerge due to conflicts between derby and commitments outside the sport. Many of the participants reflected on their expected role outside roller derby; many described their roles and responsibilities according to gendered stereotypes of the role of woman in society. As such, it appears that roller derby presents an opportunity for women to live a life outside the stereotype; doing so, however, can come at a cost.

Note that in the process of reconstruction, there is an endeavour to identify connections between the layers. Doing so enables the reader to realise the true depth of the analysis.

It is this process of deconstruction according to multiple layers that gives depth beyond that of a typical thematic analysis. Further still, comprehending the meaning within *and* between the layers makes for an analytical process of deconstruction and reconstruction. This final step in conducting a CLA requires the researcher to consider the overall message or finding from the analysis in relation to their initial research question. This phase marks what futurists call “proposing alternative futures”, or in terms more readily accessible to psychologists, this is when the problem is summarised and strategies proposed for its resolution. It is the reconstruction stage of the analysis that is crucial to creating a more holistic understanding of the social dynamics. This is where the researcher is able to tie together their findings across the layers to give a consolidated and defensible response to their research question. This is akin to pulling together the features identified with each lens of the microscope to convey a holistic and deep account of the phenomenon being examined.

Reporting CLA findings

In qualitative methods, there is a degree of flexibility as to whether the research findings and discussion are presented independently. The reporting of CLA research is best-suited to separate findings and discussion sections. In the findings, the deconstructed issue (coding between and within the layers) can be reported. Typically, in the findings section, each causal layer

will be reported independently with sub-headings depicting the within-layer analysis. Quotations are selected from the text to support claims and examine the sub-themes identified within the layers. It is important here to note that while some layers may offer more to report on than others, it is critical that all layers are discussed. Not reporting the findings of each layer is antithetical to the method's foundational belief that deconstruction of the issue at each layer contributes to a holistic and deep understanding. In the discussion, the reconstruction of the issue can be reported. Typically, minimal or no sub-headings are included. This structure allows for greater transparency, and also celebrates the utility of analysing according to each causal layer.

The sections most suited to presenting alternative futures, would be the discussion (academic publication), and/or implications (professional publication) sections. It is at this point that we emphasise the need for the researcher to remind themselves of their overarching research question and to ask what the purpose of the research was. If it was, indeed, for the generation of potential alternative futures, doing so then makes intuitive sense. If however, the method was adopted as a means of deconstructing an issue, there is a need to ensure that the generation of alternative futures is critically appraised to determine if it is in fact appropriate. In the example we provide, we would deem that proposing alternative futures would be inappropriate, particularly as it was evident that the women engaged in roller derby were using the sport as a means of ensuring personal agency. Proposing alternative futures should, in this instance, be the role of the roller derby players themselves, if it is something they wish to do.

Analytical rigour

It is best practice to ensure rigorous research practices are adopted. The same good practices expected of good qualitative research are applicable to the analytical process of conducting a CLA; however, there are also specific strategies particularly pertinent to CLA.

Reflexive journaling

As with all qualitative research, data coding is discretionary and subjective. It is important that the researcher acknowledges their episteme, as this naturally shapes the research question and design. For example, we identify ourselves as social constructionists and believe that data and meaning is socially constructed. We also argue that our research can never be value free. Our epistemological assumptions will influence every element of the research—the research question, the method employed, the theory drawn upon, and the fact that research is being undertaken at all. The reflexive process needs to be a part of the analysis and is a process of refining not only research skills but understanding of the data. This is not just a mechanical

process, but an inductive and potentially confronting process in which you become aware of your own worldviews and values.

Peer coding

Peer coding is crucial for enhancing the rigour of CLA. We have tended to adopt two methods in this process. The first is for two researchers to code the data independently and then meet to discuss their findings. The second is for the two researchers to “workshop” the analysis and code collaboratively. In both instances it is crucial that the focus be not on whether the same *parts* of the text have been coded, but rather that the *meaning* behind the text has been coded. The researchers can feel confident if there appears to be a mutual understanding of the meaning emerging from the analytical process. It is also possible to reconvene towards the end of the analysis to discuss the naming of themes.

Conclusion

Given the methodology’s emphasis on identifying deeper and more complex underpinnings of social issues, we have adopted CLA in a range of research areas. However, while the philosophical underpinnings of CLA are rich and its application within the futures field extensive, until now there has been no formalisation of the process of conducting a CLA, let alone one that lends itself to the methodological expectations of sound qualitative psychological research.

CLA can be used in psychology to deconstruct complexity. It allows examination of complex issues at multiple levels. At the litany level, human experiences and behaviour is highly variable; when the social causes level is examined, some of the social dynamics of this complexity can become apparent. Examining worldviews and myths/metaphors can provide a reduction in complexity and allow identification of a set of psychological factors that give rise to the complexity that is evident at the litany and social causes levels, as advocated by Koltko-Rivera and Sarason.⁶

As a tool for deconstructing social issues, CLA provides a clear methodology that extends analysis and interpretation beyond a more rudimentary thematic analysis and, as illustrated, is well suited to the deconstruction of qualitative data sets. A clear process to the analysis can serve to strengthen and further legitimise the methodology and, as such, to further encourage cross-disciplinary adoption.

¹ S. De Simone, ‘Causal layered analysis, A ‘cookbook’ approach’, in S. Inayatullah (ed.), *Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) Reader*, Tamsui, Tamkang University Press, 2004, 485–494.

² A. W. Wicker, 'Substantive theorizing', *American Journal of Community Psychology*, Vol 17, 1989, 531–547.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ M. E. Koltko-Rivera, 'The psychology of worldviews', *Review of General Psychology*, Vol 8, 2004, 3–58; S. B. Sarason, *Psychology Misdirected*, New York, Free Press, 1981.

VI
EDUCATIONAL, LEARNING AND YOUTH
FUTURES

29. Futures Narratives, Possible Worlds: Causal layered analysis and the problems of youth

Cate Watson*

This chapter considers CLA as a narrative technique for constructing the past and present and imagining the future; a means for the construction and exploration of possible worlds. Through CLA current constructions of youth, as in “youth in crisis” and “at risk” are examined. This opens up space “for the articulation of constitutive discourses which can then be shaped as scenarios”.^{†,1}

Introduction

Attempts to imagine the future often depend on the production of scenarios, developed in response to questions of the ‘what if?’ kind. Scenarios, Booth et al. argue, “are inherently modal in nature”. Modal narratives (i.e. those concerned with highlighting “gaps or contradictions in belief or value systems”) “explicitly engage with, or are grounded in...topics of necessity and possibility” and their converses, giving rise to four main cases of modality: necessity, contingency, possibility and impossibility. The major role of modal narratives, Booth et al. suggest, “is to draw attention to differences between the actual world and various possible worlds, and not to actualize the possible’ but rather ‘to subvert belief in the real, or what is accepted as real”.² Modal narratives demand a sense of ‘cognitive estrangement’ in order to subvert what is currently accepted, yet this estrangement must operate within a “liminal zone, whereby knowledge is

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† This chapter has been adapted from C. Watson, ‘Futures narratives, possible worlds, big stories: Causal layered analysis and the problems of youth’, *Sociological Research Online*, Vol 14, No 5, 2009.

partial and we strive to understand something now just within, and formerly outside, our cognitive horizons”.³ The tension between cognitive estrangement and plausibility constitutes the narrative space within which critical futures studies are situated. It is this space that CLA can be used to explore. Here I use the four levels of CLA as an analytical toolbox to consider constructions of ‘youth’, in order to explore what the method may have to offer as a subversive tactic in the futures field. The aim is to produce different ways of knowing, to disrupt received wisdoms and the appeal to “common sense”, to see what happens when we do this and start to construct other possible worlds.

Causal Layered Analysis and the Problems of Youth

Level one: The litany

CLA starts off at the level of the litany: what gets reported in the headline press and the media generally.

The litany surrounding the ‘problem of youth’ is fairly straightforward—“Violent youth crime up a third”, exclaims the *Daily Telegraph*.⁴ The (simultaneously authoritative and rather meaningless) crime figures “up from 17, 590 to 24, 102” are given narrative force by means of a quote from Helen Newlove, widow of Garry Newlove, “father of three beaten to death as he stood up to a street gang”, who says, “for too long young thugs have got away with a slap on the wrist”. Similar headlining stories can be found in every UK newspaper on almost any day of the year: ‘Youth crime crackdown’ (*Daily Express*),⁵ ‘Youth crime soars in last five years as gang culture takes a grip’ (*Daily Mail*),⁶ ‘Shocking pictures of neds brandishing weapons on YouTube’ (*Daily Record*).⁷ (A “ned” is a certain kind of young, working class person in Scotland; it is a disparaging term.) But not only do the young present a threat to us adults they are also hell-bent on “slashing and shooting” each other (*The Sun*),⁸ with figures for teenage murders “likely to reach an all time high this year [2008]” (*Independent*).⁹ It is perhaps not surprising then, given this unremitting diet, that in a survey carried out by the children’s charity Barnardo’s:

- Just under half (49%) of people believe that children are increasingly a danger to each other and adults;
- 43% agree something has to be done to protect us from children; and
- 45% think that children are feral in the way they behave.¹⁰

Despite attempts to reassure us (Barnardo’s reports soberly that “most children and young people are not troublesome—they attend school, take part in activities and a significant number are volunteers”)¹¹ fear of the young is rampant.

But the young can also be portrayed as victims. *The Socialist Review* highlights the pressures on young people from advertisers: “Young people, struggling to find an identity, can be easy prey for the corporate vultures. They are sold images of independence, acceptance, success and power through consumption”.¹² Relatedly, Gidley warns that “we are seeing an unprecedented fragmentation of the social glue without which young people are rudderless in their social orientation”, and refers to “the colonisation of imagination” in which:

...the imaginations of children and youth has [sic] changed from the nourishment of oral folk and fairy tales to the poisoning of interactive electronic nightmares. Since the advent of TV, and video game parlors, followed by the use of computer games... western children and youth have been consistently and exponentially exposed to violent images... Is it surprising then that over the past decade in particular, symptoms have appeared among young people... of ever increasing violence and suicide.¹³

This argument concerning the impact of exposure to violent images is frequently appealed to, yet the duality constituted by: “oral folk and fairy tale” (nourishing) versus “interactive electronic nightmare” (poison) can be readily overturned. After all, many fairy tales are rather grim (m) and their moral purpose may not necessarily be benign.

The litany concerning youth goes along with other familiar news stories concerning the breakdown of the nuclear family, child abuse and the growth of the “feral” underclass.

The headlines generate feelings of helplessness, apathy and calls for government to “do something”. We succumb to “fear management” in which, Virilio says, our emotions are manipulated by “the Ministry of Fear—run by the movie industry and mass media as integral parts of the audiovisual continuum now replacing the public space of our lives”.¹⁴ This produces what Acland calls a “felt crisis” part of an “affective epidemic”. And, he goes on, we need to examine “the work evidence is made to do” in deconstructing ‘youth’.¹⁵ “How”, Acland asks, “is the “truth” of this felt crisis enacted and enforced and to what ends, to whose benefit, to whose disadvantage? How does it become a site around which various political agendas are organised?”¹⁶ In effect ‘youth’ becomes a repository for our fears. The media driven discourse of “wasted youth” becomes a public spectacle “creating a broad and open-ended terrain for intervention, both material and spectacular. Through this intervention the social order is produced, reproduced, maintained and given meaning”.¹⁷ But in the case of youth what resonates is not simply “social order” in the sense of orderliness, and the apparently (but only apparently) paradoxical idea that disorder contributes to the production of order, but the “natural” order of life, decay and death, too. For, while “youth is Other to the order of the adult world, it is

also an object of intense interest, desire, even longing, for the culture as a whole¹⁸—and a constant reminder of our loss.

Level two: Systemic causes

How government responds to the crisis of youth depends on the way in which the problem is framed, and this is shaped by the kinds of cause and effect analyses which are the focus of the systemic level of CLA. The systemic level examines the explanations and solutions for this apparent social meltdown as propounded in editorials in the broadsheets, policy documents, serious weeklies and so on; the “not quite academic” press, as Inayatullah puts it.¹⁹ In contrast to the often rabid responses of the “string ‘em up” kind evident in some sections of the popular press and increasingly on newspaper internet forums, blogs etc., here we get more serious comment (though still along a continuum of sophistication), generating a narrative which seeks to explain, but which remains within the discourse that constructs “youth” as a problem.

A short and fairly random search produces pieces such as: *The First Post*’s ‘Blame the killer kids on the middle classes’ which claims that, “British society, while getting richer, is becoming ever more primitive and savage”, and says, “The welfare state and the progressive attitudes of the 1960s unpicked the stitching that held the British working class together during two World Wars and the great depression of the 1930s”.²⁰ This is the underbelly of the utopian ideal of “cradle to grave” care exposed—a feral class created by the very policies and ideals that sought to address social inequality.

Two reports in the Joseph Rowntree Foundation’s *Social Evils* series place the blame on individualism, consumerism²¹ and the “absence of society”.²² This is the more scholarly end of the spectrum, but a more pervasive locus of blame is the family. Former UK Conservative party leader, Iain Duncan Smith’s policy think tank, the *Centre for Social Justice* says:

...in order to avoid tackling the symptom and not the cause, the spotlight has to be turned on the family. Most British families function well, nurturing children to become law-abiding citizens. Broken families, however, are often the places where the seeds are sown for future criminal activity.²³

In the *Economist*, Nicholas Phillips, Lord Chief Justice, is quoted as saying:

The fundamental point is that children who are brought up by loving parents who are themselves responsible don’t very often commit criminal offences. . . If you analyse those who end up in young-offender institutions and look at their backgrounds, you’ll find that they aren’t coming from solid family backgrounds and some of them haven’t effective parents at all.²⁴

And in the vacuum created by the meltdown of the nuclear family, a new kind of tribal grouping is being created, as elsewhere in the article Dawayne Gordon explains, “People are joining gangs to find belonging and protection. The family model’s got mucked up”;²⁵ an analysis that prompts a re-evaluation of “family”.

Scenario point: Sources of imaginings for an alternative future

Three alternative conceptions of ‘family’:

1. Stephenson’s study of street children in Moscow challenges the “paradigm of disaffiliation” which “assumes or even insists, that they live in disorganised, illegal misery”. Instead, the children attempt to “reconstruct the lost families and create self-supportive networks”.²⁶ One such network is the ‘Arbat System’, a self-regulating community of youth subcultures with a “complex social structure of extensive networks with a system of mutual obligations and trusts... sustained by a set of quasi-familial relationships”.²⁷
2. “History also casts light on who constitutes “family”. Despite current emphasis on legal or biological ties, families in eighteenth century England and North America were made up of whomever resided in the household, and it is notable that this is the current first definition in the *Concise Oxford Dictionary*. This usually included non-related individuals who might be boarders, distantly related family members and apprentices, while biological kin such as children often resided in other households and were regarded as members of those “families”. Private spaces for parents and children, whom we today regard as the legitimate family, were not considered important; houses being open spaces for everyone in the household”.²⁸
3. In Huxley’s *Brave New World*, babies are grown in-vitro in hatcheries and brought up in conditioning centres. They are subjected to a chemically controlled development designed to fit them into a caste system from alphas to epsilons.

The narrator explains that before this process was perfected: “The world was full of fathers, therefore full of misery; full of mothers—therefore of every kind of perversion from sadism to chastity; full of brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts—full of madness and suicide”.²⁹

Responses

While the litany creates the moral panic as the narrative space within which government is called upon to act, policy is informed by constructions of cause and effect, conceptualised within the discursive and political milieu,

which emerge at the systemic level. In an influential report Farrington identifies major risk factors for youth crime as:

- Low income and poor housing
- Living in deteriorated inner city areas
- A high degree of impulsiveness and hyperactivity
- Low intelligence and low school attainment
- Poor parental supervision and harsh and erratic discipline
- Parental conflict and broken families³⁰

The analysis of risk and “risk-focused prevention” has formed a key part of UK government responses since the 1990s.³¹ But Walters and Woodward argue that “risk”, and its management, constitutes a discourse in which “the identification of risk groups becomes wedded to processes of prediction and measurement” mobilised around certain desired or preferred adult futures.³² The discourse of risk therefore constitutes a form of colonisation of the future.

Responses to these risk factors are informed by “an ensemble of conservative and “middle-ground” ideologies ... that have become increasingly popular within western democracies”³³ and which focus on the individual, and the immediate social environment of the child, rather than the structures of society itself. This leads to responses which are “underpinned by stigmatizing and judgemental attitudes towards underprivileged parents and children”.³⁴ So we get “asbos” (antisocial behaviour orders) which exclude individuals from their communities, and Parenting Orders that require parents to attend counselling or guidance sessions for up to 3 months (and for which a parent may be prosecuted for failure so to do).

Policy therefore constructs youth and their parents of the “lower classes” as problems, while privileging the “middle class” which “makes rules the lower class must obey—in the schools, the courts and elsewhere”.³⁵ Meanwhile, the troubled and troubling offspring of the affluent are able to construct themselves as coming from solid family backgrounds and so find ways to hide their deviance from the pervasive gaze of social control. Moreover, it is part of the normalising effect of discourse that development of this policy itself is seen as unproblematic, indeed it makes the appeal to “common sense” a legitimising force.

Level three: Discourses and world views

Level three analyses the discourses within which these narratives are constructed. A key tool is deconstruction. In classic Derridean terms, deconstruction involves the overturning of binaries which poststructuralism suggests have a peculiarly invasive hold on western thought. The most obvious place to start in this context is the oppositions produced in

juxtapositions of childhood/youth and adulthood. Jeffs and Smith present a list of these “supposed contrasts”:³⁶

Table 1. Comparing young people and adults

Young Person	Adult
Not adult/adolescent	Adult/grown up
Becoming	Arrived
Presocial self that will emerge under the right conditions	Identity is fixed
Powerless and vulnerable	Powerful/strong
Less responsible	Responsible
Dependent	Independent
Ignorant	Knowledgeable
Risky behaviour	Considered behaviour
Rebellious	Conformist
Reliant	Autonomous

These are oppositions that we, as adults, use to construct youth as other, as lacking. Moreover, Jeffs and Smith point out the term “youth” is almost always “employed to signify discussion of a social problem or behaviour being portrayed in a negative light”. Thus, the authors argue, there is “an essentialism built around age like the equivalent discourses constructed around, for example, gender or race” (though in fact, ‘youth as problem’ is frequently conflated with issues attending both gender and race). Yet, Jeffs and Smith go on, “adulthood is no longer an identifiable destination”,³⁷—not even necessarily a one-way ticket. Katz points out a trend, in the US at least, but which to a lesser extent perhaps can also be recognised in the UK, in which adulthood is increasingly being viewed as “a transitory phase between modes of childhood”: “One of the prime lures of retirement replays the fantasy of childhood’s freedom”, and she quotes an advertisement for retirement with the tagline, “we don’t know when childhood ends but we know when it begins again”. “These ideas”, Katz writes, “raise boundary issues”.³⁸

Boundary issues are evident too in “the popularity of youthful fashions for adults”³⁹ which blur distinctions that once demarcated youth/adulthood—even the notorious “hoodie”, the very signifier of troubled youth, has now been appropriated by the fashion industry as “asbo-chic” hits the cat walks. And there has been a recent explosion in the growth of “bodywork” to keep us looking forever young.

Scenario point: Sources of imaginings for an alternative future

“What's the matter with him?” whispered Lenina. Her eyes were wide with horror and amazement.

“He's old, that's all”, Bernard answered as carelessly as he could. He too was startled; but he made an effort to seem unmoved.

“Old?” she repeated. “But the Director's old; lots of people are old; they're not like that”.

“That's because we don't allow them to be like that. We preserve them from diseases. We keep their internal secretions artificially balanced at a youthful equilibrium. We don't permit their magnesium-calcium ratio to fall below what it was at thirty. We give them transfusions of young blood. We keep their metabolism permanently stimulated. So, of course, they don't look like that. Partly”, he added, “because most of them die long before they reach this old creature's age. Youth almost unimpaired till sixty, and then, crack! the end”.⁴⁰

At the same time, Katz also notes “a growing predilection for adult-looking baby and children's clothes”⁴¹—as evinced, for example, in the marketing of “high heels for babies” by Heelarious.⁴² This spectacle is part of what Katz refers to as the commodification of child as ornament. But, there is also an echo here of earlier concepts of childhood. Ariès says that in mediaeval Europe the move from child to adult occurred early in life without an extended period of transition. Children were dressed as adults and expected to belong to the adult world from an early age.⁴³ The move to construct a part of the life span as the biologically determined (i.e. “natural”) period of adolescence in the 20th Century followed on from the development of the “modern family” in its private space in the nineteenth century and the institutionalisation, expansion and prolongation of education.

Aitken notes the rise of the “global child”, “contrived from fluid capital processes”.⁴⁴ In the global North, this child is constituted through “growth of an ideological predilection for individuation” and “increasing activity and power in the market” giving rise to the “twin social evils” of individualism and consumerism.⁴⁵ In this world to be a “flawed consumer”⁴⁶ is to be socially excluded. Meanwhile, in the global South the child is seen to lack childhood and to be the victim of exploitation in third world sweatshops (producing the goods consumed by the child in the global North), denied education and the essential experiences of childhood; a binary that is ripe for deconstruction.

From his analysis Aitken identifies three major phases in the concept of childhood/youth in the western world. These are: indifference (child/youth as

part of the collective life), difference (new forms of intimacy developed as the result of spatial changes in the family following industrialisation), and currently the death of childhood and adolescence in which, he argues, “the distinction between adulthood and childhood may... have begun to lose its edge”.⁴⁷ King attributes this in part at least to the discourse of children’s autonomy and “rights to self-expression and participation in decisions”. But he also points out that since it is adults who construct this discourse surrounding children the adult/child boundary or binary remains, however ambiguously and inconsistently it is applied.⁴⁸ This inconsistency becomes readily apparent when children/young people resist or breach the “plural, permeable” and “contested” boundaries and act in “unchildlike ways” not sanctioned by adults.⁴⁹

A genealogy of childhood/youth thus provides us with an example of what US sociologist Charles Tilly refers to as a really big story,⁵⁰ in which large patterns of change are apparent, from which we could make huge comparisons, in great swirls of history—though this might result in dangerous oversimplifications. In any case, what we can say is that what we regard as essentially normal and natural in terms of the life span and the family is clearly not that, and this provides us with scope for imagining different ways of being.

Scenario point: Sources of imaginings for an alternative future

Scenario 1: The boundaries between childhood, youth and adulthood disappear leading to an end to segregated education—that is education segregated by age. The power of the market with its focus on individualism and consumerism puts an end to secondary schools within which “youth” is so routinely constructed as a problem. Instead “Learning Supermarkets”, for the consumption (Transfer) of Knowledge, arise. Browse the shelves—on special offer today in the numeracy section “buy one get one half price!” (If you can work it out.)

Scenario 2: Following on from current moves to raise the school leaving age to 18⁵¹ legislation decrees that no-one is allowed to leave school at all unless they go on to further/higher education, get a job or train for a profession/trade. A (dys?)utopian vision that puts an end to the problem of the ‘NEET’ (those Not in Education, Employment or Training).

Level four: Myth and metaphor

This level burrows into the cultural psyche to examine the enduring stories that shape understandings.

In establishing futures studies as social science there are two key metaphors that shape thought in western society: Hobbes’ society as social contract in

which nasty, brutish (and short) man must “give up part of his freedom” and Durkheimian “society as organism and self-regulating system”⁵² concerned with achieving balance and equilibrium. The Hobbesian view is about self-interest, the Durkheimian, common interest. Each metaphor produces differently framed analyses and ‘solutions’ to the wicked problems that beset us. The social contract version is about controlling man’s baser instincts, the society as organism is about reaching consensus, an idea that rests on trust. While oscillation within and between these two positions is evident in the litany surrounding youth and in the policy responses offered, at present the Hobbesian position predominates.

These two metaphors rest on deeper cultural myths surrounding narratives of inherent goodness/badness of “man”, and innocence/sinfulness of children, that resonate in our collective consciousness. Children’s natural savagery, unless checked by adults, is the theme of *Lord of the Flies*,⁵³ and there is a chilling scene in *Barbarella* in which feral children release sharp-toothed clockwork dolls to attack Jane Fonda’s character.⁵⁴ Adults’ fear and fetishisation of youth is also apparent in *Logan’s Run*, a future world in which the law requires that at the age of 21 (though this is upped to 30 in the 1976 film version⁵⁵) citizens must report to the “sleepshop” for execution.⁵⁶

Fear of the young, and a belief in their inherent badness, leads to an ideology of punishment, an increase in surveillance of all kinds, and to the acceptance of responses such as the Mosquito, an “ultrasonic youth deterrent” aimed at dispersal of groups of young people which, claims the manufacturer, is “a completely benign non-physical deterrent system that has been specifically designed to annoy teenagers”.⁵⁷

Metaphors which attend youth specifically concern transition and development, thereby focusing on individual deficits in relation to desired adult future states. The modernist discourse of adolescence frames this transition in terms of turbulence, *sturm und drang* (“storm and stress”). These metaphors legitimise forms of control over youth, yet as Maira and Soep point out, the “taken-for-granted notion of age-based transitions masks the role of the state in organizing social relations in capitalist society”.⁵⁸

Youth Future?

“Any discourse about the future has to begin with the issue of youth because young people embody the projected dreams, desires, and commitment of a society’s obligations to the future”.⁵⁹ Perhaps this is why youth is currently conceived in such acutely problematic terms; young people carry the burden of a society beset with ontological uncertainties, from the credit crunch to Al Qaeda to global warming. A society, defined by Bauman in terms of its absence,⁶⁰ in free fall. In the face of this, the young become the “scapegoat generation”,⁶¹ providing a focus for our gaze, a spectacle, in the sense in which Debord uses the word: “not a collection of images” but “a social relation between people that is mediated by images”. “The spectacle cannot

be understood as a mere visual deception produced by mass-media technologies. It is a worldview that has actually been materialised, a view of a world that has become objective”.⁶² The spectacle of “Wasted Youth” distracts us.

So, what do we have here? A real crisis of youth or merely the perceptions of one, a felt crisis, with fragmented images of reality whipped up by the media to create moral panic, or a genuine breakdown in the social fabric? The answer is that this is not an ‘either/or’ but a ‘both/and’. The problem of youth is discursively constructed within and through the discourse that produces youth as an essentialising category. The spectacle of Wasted Youth is a very real construction of unreality.

Two questions that occur therefore are: who benefits from this discursive construction? And how might the discourse be constructed differently? Clearly, there is nothing inherently, biologically “natural” about youth as currently conceived; nothing that could prevent the reframing of “the problem”. But, similarly, we need to recognise that the wicked problems that beset us are never amenable to “a solution”. In reframing the problem there would inevitably be winners and losers, though this should not necessarily be thought of in stark terms as a zero sum game (though it might be one). How can the reconfiguration of discourse be conceptualised and what could this mean in practical terms?

Constructing the ethical spectacle?

Disrupting the colonialisation of the future involves re-organising the patterns of desire. One means to do this is to create what Duncombe refers to as an “ethical spectacle”.⁶³ Debord⁶⁴ says that “The Spectacle is capital accumulated to the point that it becomes images”. So, what if the capital accumulated in the formation of the ethical spectacle was *social* rather than economic? Duncombe argues that the same imaginary techniques that consumerism uses to construct reality can be appropriated for ethical ends to promote different agendas “transforming the techniques of spectacular capitalism into tools for social change”.⁶⁵ This, he argues, demands participation: “The people who participate in the performance of the spectacle must also contribute to its construction”.⁶⁶ In brief, then, a progressive ethical spectacle will be one that is directly democratic, breaks down hierarchies, fosters community, allows for diversity, and engages with reality while asking what new realities might be possible.⁶⁷

This prompts a final scenario point: one possible world has youth accumulating social capital, taking control of its own image (s), and creating its own spectacle. And what then...

Sleepshop anyone?

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30. Using Causal Layered Analysis to Explore the Relationship between Academics and Administrators in Universities

Maree Conway*

Since the last quarter of the 20th Century, when a separate administrative work jurisdiction began to emerge, academics and administrators have had to co-exist in universities. With growing pressures from government for accountability and transparency during that time, that co-existence has been increasingly characterised by a tension often described as a “divide”. This chapter reports on the findings of a research project undertaken in 2008 using CLA to explore the nature of this tension and to propose alternative solutions.†

Introduction

We often live in two different worlds. The academics feel that the administrator’s main drive in life is to push as much annoying paperwork as possible on to the academics... They do not feel that anything the administrators do is worthwhile for the student or them. The administrators feel that the academics are so removed from “real life” that there’s no point in trying to explain “logic” to them.

Comment by an Australian participant, 2008

Universities are complex organisations, requiring a range of skills, knowledge and expertise to operate effectively. With increasing pressures from government for accountability and transparency during the last quarter of the 20th Century a tension has emerged between two groups of university staff: academics and administrators. Some recent research has dealt with the academic-administrator “divide” and the generally negative characteristics of

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the relationship between these two core groups of university staff. Partnership is often cited as a way to bridge this divide, but there is little articulation of what that partnership might look like. Two assumptions underpin much of this research and the concept of partnerships: that the divide does in fact exist, and that it is part of the fabric of university life.

There is little research however, that investigates:

- The nature of the divide and why people think it exists or not, and what characterises it;
- The underpinnings of people's beliefs about the divide (for example: clashing values; different perspectives on the purpose of universities; or the lack of professional status for administrators),
- Whether the divide is built and maintained through stereotypes or whether it is a structural or systemic characteristic of universities, and
- Whether current solutions to bridging the divide, such as establishing partnerships, are feasible without first possessing an understanding of the factors that generated and maintain the divide in the first place.

A research project undertaken in 2008 used causal layered analysis to explore what lies beneath surface indications that the divide does exist, to identify whether it is more an inaccurate stereotype than a reality, and to determine the impact of the divide on the effectiveness of university management. It focused on how individuals experience the divide in their day-to-day work.

The Context: Why does understanding the divide matter?

The external environment in which universities operate has changed radically over the past 40 years, from a time where there was little survival pressure on institutions to a time in which the external environment is far more demanding on universities and what they do. Shifts in technology, "consumer" behaviour, demographics, social attitudes and government funding constraints have been driving universities towards a business model of operations and reporting for many years.

In an increasingly complex and uncertain external environment, the effective management of higher education institutions has never been more important, and the reason for this remains unchanged since it was first explored early in the 20th Century. As Stace wrote in 1984:

Effective management and leadership is of critical importance if our institutions are to make a significant contribution to their societies. This is not to place management and leadership of IHEs [institutions of higher education] on a plane higher than scholarship per se, but it does indicate that these two ingredients are of fundamental importance... Management and leadership is of critical importance if

the institutions which occupy such a focal position [in society] are to effectively discharge their responsibilities.¹

It may seem obvious that academic and administrative staff needed to work together to manage universities in ways that ensured they retained a strategic fit with their operating environment. If universities had been immune to external forces of change, the evolution of the relationship between academics and administrators would probably not have become an issue for discussion and reflection. The incursion of what is usually derisively called “managerialism” into universities in the 1980s, however, and the subsequent responses to shifting academic and administrative roles saw the divide deepen.

Both academic and administrative roles changed radically as a result of the same external forces, but research undertaken by the author in 2008 indicates there has been virtually no meaningful discussion about how the two roles fit together in the kind of university that has emerged over the past 40 years,² nor about who is best qualified to do the work that is now required to manage universities. Instead, we see academic staff who believe their role is being devalued and who are trying to keep core academic values at the heart of their work (note that this assumes that those values are still relevant in the 21st Century), counterpoised with administrators who increasingly see their work as inherently valuable because it enables the university to meet external demands for increased efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and transparency.

As academics were becoming more divorced from decision-making, it appears that administrators were becoming more removed from the academic core of institutions, and from the very teaching, learning and research activities they were managing. A gap emerged between the values and beliefs of the two groups about how universities ought to be managed. As McInnis wrote:

what we have now is a new level of underlying tension between two groups of ‘professionals’ within the universities, with the old (academics) perhaps losing ground in authority and status, and the new (administrators) making strong claims for recognition as legitimate partners in the strategic management of the university.³

The divide, once perhaps a myth, had become part of the reality of the experience of university work, and began to be reflected in the behaviour of, and interactions between, academics and administrators. Understanding the effect of this apparent gap in beliefs has not, however, been high on the agendas of university leaders—this research provides some data on the nature of the gap and offers some suggestions for closing it.

Methodology

There is a significant body of work on the ways in which academic work has changed over the past 40 years, and how academics are responding to the increasingly corporate way of managing universities. More recently, there has been work focusing on the views of administrative staff about this changing university workplace, their role within it, and how they connect to and integrate with academic work. For this research, a methodology was needed that would allow both the experience of work and perspectives about underlying drivers of change in university management to be identified and explored by those who manage universities. The aim was to determine how those changes had affected academic and administrator beliefs about university management.

The process used in this research was informed by the work of Inayatullah and De Simone.⁴ Each CLA level was explored with the participants through consideration of the following:

Litany

- How would you describe the relationship between academics and administrators in your institution and in universities more generally?

Social Causes

- What systemic factors (trends or drivers of change) do you believe are driving the relationship described by the Litany?

Worldview

- What assumptions are driving the social causes?
- Whose perspective is dominant? Whose voice is not being heard?

Myth/Metaphor

- What impact would the continuation of the relationship in its current form have on the management of universities?
- Create a quick snapshot of your discussion, using imagery/myth/metaphor.

The following questions then guided subsequent discussion:

- In your opinion, is the divide real or an inaccurate stereotype?
- If real, what action do we need to take to address the divide—if any?
- If merely an inaccurate stereotype, how do we dispel it, or do we ignore it?
- Consider:
 - *What assumptions need to change?*
 - *Which group can help the most?*
 - *How, and in what ways, can we reconceive the divide?*

During the period March to July 2008, a workshop and interviews were conducted in the UK, and focus groups and interviews were conducted in New Zealand and Australia. Approximately 150 people were involved in this stage of the data collection. Once preliminary analysis had been completed, it was decided to run a follow-up online survey to test some of the emerging themes. There were 23 respondents to the survey.

Participants

Participants self-selected to be involved in the research following an expression of interest process. Since this was exploratory research, the aim was to gather data to make an assessment of whether the divide was a phenomenon worthy of further investigation; therefore no restrictions were placed on who could participate, although it was intended that the focus be on administrative staff to provide them with a voice about their experience of the divide. However, academic staff also attended the UK workshop and focus groups in Australia and New Zealand. Approximately 90% of participants (135 people) were administrative staff, though they did not always specify which group they belonged to. Table 1, below, shows the main characteristics of the participants.

Table 1. Characteristics of participants

Gender	80% female 20% male
Location	47% in faculties 27% centrally (corporate) 13% academic support units 13% other
Classification	49% Senior Managers 44% Middle Managers
Contact with Academic Staff	83% have direct contact (daily) 15% have indirect contact
Length of time in higher education	42% up to 10 years 36% between 10 and 20 years 22% 21 + years

Results

This section reports on comments made by participants and identifies emerging themes. Where possible, responses have been grouped into three categories— (1) administrative perspectives, (2) academic perspectives, and (3) general perspectives.

The litany

Table 2, below, provides indicative responses to the question: How would you describe the relationship between academics and administrators in your institutions and in universities more generally?

The Litany is typically unchallenged and represents feelings about an issue—"I feel..." At this level, these responses are not questioned, they just "are"; they represent valid expressions of how the divide is being experienced.

Table 2. Responses to litany question

Administrative Perspectives	<p>When it all goes wrong, I have to bail them out</p> <p>We never question their expertise but they question ours</p> <p>If you don't do teaching or research, then you are just a parasite</p> <p>Academic ideal is alive and well even though we know it is dead</p> <p>They dump work on me that they should do</p> <p>I think Sir Eric Ashby describes it best. His speech in 1966 coined the term "necessary evil" to describe administrators, quoting advice given to him by a Professor: "in the eyes of all Professors, all administrators are an evil. Say to yourself every morning 'I am an evil, but I am a necessary one'"</p>
Academic Perspectives	<p>Administration is too important to be left to the administrators</p> <p>Administrators are high cost and low value, whereas academics are high value and the cost doesn't matter</p> <p>The enemy within</p>
General Perspectives	<p>Can be brutal</p> <p>Relationship is icy. Administrators do not respect or appreciate the stresses faced by academics nor the effect of policies on students. Academics do not understand the thinking or methods employed by administrators</p> <p>I would describe it as an unnecessary truce. In general I think that academic staff see administrators as either servants or controllers, depending on the level of power the administrators has in the institution. In general, I think that administrative staff see academics as being marginally competent in the realm of administration and the "sensible" things of life, but at the same time they can be leading thinkers in their discipline</p>

While most comments at this level were negative in tone, two participants in focus groups viewed their relationship with academics as positive and did not see any evidence of a divide. This suggests that the experience of the divide and acceptance of its existence depends on an individual's per-

spectives on their role. This was confirmed by the apparently conflicting words used by participants to describe the relationship:

- Undervalued, difficult, distrusting, exhausting, interesting, fragility, icy, not appreciated, daunting, disrespectful, bewildering, dismissive, strained, ineffective, tense; and
- Respected, positive, professional, supportive, invigorating, friendly, hierarchical, civil.

At the Litany level then, administrators were saying “value us and give us recognition”. In their view, their expertise and knowledge, necessary to manage universities, was being ignored or devalued and this was affecting how they interacted with academics in a mostly negative way.

Social causes

Table 3, below, provides indicative responses to the question: What systemic factors (trends or drivers of change) do you believe are driving the relationship described by the litany?

At this level, it was not possible to separate comments into administrative and academic perspectives because, as indicated below, the drivers of change are the same for both groups, but experienced differently.

Table 3. Responses to social causes question

Combined	Increasing compliance and reporting demands
Academic and Administrator Perspectives	Increasing separation of administration from core business
	[External] pressures and touch points have changed and exacerbated the divide
	Now a real tension between being a resource and a regulator
	Increasing demands for customer service
	Institutional cultures (and leadership) not supporting a positive culture
	Lack of understanding of nature of freedom for academics— tension between freedom and responsibility (move to managerialism)
	Political/economic drivers motivating academic behaviour (e.g. research performance)
	Lack of understanding of the nature of academic freedom, increased by managerialism

That both groups identified the same social causes or drivers of change highlights the fact that changes to both academic and administrative work have been shaped by the same external forces, but that the impact on their work, both individually and collectively, was being experienced differently. For example, one participant reported this divergent development of roles as

generating a tension between her wanting to be a resource for academic staff and being forced into the unwelcome role of regulator of their work. Participants in this research could see that a separation of administrative work from the “core business” of the university (teaching and research) had developed.

At this CLA level, participants had a clear understanding of the factors that had contributed to the development of a divide as they experienced it. At this level too, there were five comments about institutional leadership, generally about how senior managers who “walked the talk” and “messages from the top” influenced the relationship between academics and administrators at any university. The shift to using the term “professional staff” at some Australian universities was mentioned by one administrator as a positive step towards better defining the value of the administrative role; but terminology exists at the litany level, and will have little impact unless supported by corresponding worldviews.

Another participant saw the divide as being related to the type of institution—at her previous, traditional, university, she perceived the divide to be greater than at her current place of employment (a 1970s university). The work and issues were similar, so she attributed the greater visibility of the divide at the former to the perceptions and assumptions about academic and administrative roles held by senior leaders—that is, to different worldviews. This suggests that cultural and organisational norms also influence the degree to which the divide is perceived.

Digging one level deeper allowed the causes of the feelings expressed at the litany level to be identified. The comment about the disconnect between teaching and learning and administrative work as a result of increasing regulation and accountability demands suggests that participants also understand the secondary effects on both work and relationships of these social causes.

Worldview

Table 4, below, shows responses to the questions: What assumptions are driving the social causes? Whose perspective is dominant/privileged?

It was clear that academics and administrators feel that the other group’s worldview dominates attitudes about how universities should be managed. One participant commented that academics often feel that they are being treated as increasingly dispensable, and that they also feel ignored in the management discourse now operating in universities.⁵ Another participant related how, in their department, academic and administrative staff meet separately, and administrators are not permitted to be involved in decisions made at these academic meetings that affect their work. This type of situation, where the professional expertise of administrators is ignored during decision-making has the potential not only to generate ill-will, but

could also result in decisions that cannot be implemented effectively because of a lack of understanding of the implementation context.

Table 4. Responses to worldview questions

Administrator Perspectives	<p>Academic work has a higher value; the perspective of academics is paramount</p> <p>We assume academics are collegiate</p> <p>General staff are servants</p> <p>Academics have never been in the real world</p> <p>General staff have nothing worthwhile to say</p> <p>Have no say in decision-making about their roles</p> <p>Assuming that the role of administrators, even in senior roles, is to take notes at meetings</p>
Academic Perspectives	<p>Academic autonomy</p> <p>Academics are dispensable</p> <p>Pendulum has swung so far that academic work is being devalued</p> <p>Tertiary admin disassociated from workplace experience of research and teaching</p> <p>Admin has all the power and plays to a different set of rules to those to which academics abide</p> <p>Size of administration continues to increase</p> <p>Academics often assume that because support staff are there to support teaching and learning, they are therefore there to support academics, rather than both working to deliver teaching and learning in different ways</p>
General Perspectives	<p>Growth is good</p> <p>Contrasting ideologies</p>

One comment suggested that, while in most organisations there is a range of types of people, the normal distribution of people working in universities is skewed because of the nature of academic work and the diversity and number of (often eccentric) people on staff—this highlighted the effectiveness administrators in managing this environment to get things done. It may be that this ability to navigate an academic environment to achieve outcomes is an intangible and unique skill held by university administrators that is not needed in other organisations. This would be, however, a skill that requires a deep understanding of academic values and work and of academic worldviews. If there is now a perceived gap between management and academic work, then the lack of this intangible skill could explain frustrations felt by administrators in their interactions with academic staff, and vice versa.

Another participant commented that these assumptions were neither right nor wrong, but reflected the contrasting purposes of the two groups of staff; this statement is underpinned by an assumption that academics and administrators do not share a common purpose or goals. This assumption needs to be challenged, since many participants commented on how they had the same goals relating to teaching and learning and the student experience, but had been “forced” to pursue them in different ways.

This CLA level revealed a fundamental difference in academic and administrator worldviews about managing universities and who should influence and control that management. Even though it is widely acknowledged that the environment in which universities operate has changed significantly, with consequent changes to how universities need to be managed, no common ground appears to have emerged between academics and administrators as they interact to manage their workplaces.

What began to emerge at this level is that administrators may view their expanded roles as innately valuable, rather than as critical positions that manage work *within* an academic environment—that is, their roles are only valuable in the context of managing a university. While administrators use generic management skills, how those skills are deployed within universities is what gives value to the university manager role. This, of course, implies that there is something unique about managing universities that requires more than generic management skills. This is an assumption that ought to be tested. Participants had the most difficulty framing responses at this level. This is not surprising, since worldviews are deeply held and often unconscious ways of seeing and making sense of the world. For any change to happen, worldviews need to change, and this involves people recognising that their perspective on the issue may be limited or flawed. At this level, the assumptions that drive the patterned responses that emerge as the Litany need to be articulated and challenged. Some participants recognised this, while others reverted to a Litany reaction during discussion, but there was not sufficient time to draw out and explore these assumptions in a more robust way.

Myth/metaphor

This section presents answers to the question: What impact would the continuation of the relationship in its current form have on the management of universities?

For this research, participants were asked to articulate responses through the use of images or metaphors to explore the narratives underpinning their worldview.

The following is a list of the metaphors produced by participants. As with the Social Causes level, it was not possible to differentiate between academic and administrator responses:

- A cloud of administrators descending on academics who are drowning in a sea of bureaucracy.
- Car mechanics (administrators) driving cars (teaching and research) round in circles.
- Needing marriage guidance counselling—the relationship is not “firing on all cylinders”.
- Admin Mafia.
- *Enemy at the Gate.*
- *The Good, the Bad and the Ugly.*
- *Jurassic Park.*
- *War of the Worlds.*
- Parallel paths, never quite merging.
- A caste system inhabited by scholars and secretaries.
- A sheltered workshop.
- Interested professor and few helpful clerks.
- An (admin) missionary trying to get the point across.
- A decaying empire—a great monolithic thing on the landscape. Structures and processes to allow it to grow, but becoming stagnant on the inside and increasingly irrelevant. Choked by vines growing up and over it.
- An arranged marriage—you don't know what to expect and thereafter, are always struggling to know the other's values, goals and strengths.
- Delivery of a more impoverished “product”. One imagines two camps plotting against each other and attempting to subvert the efforts of each because of the absence of a shared commitment to quality teaching and learning provision.

The metaphors were overwhelmingly negative which, given previous discussion, was to be expected. Administrators who earlier indicated that they had positive relationships with academic staff were, significantly, also unable to develop a positive image or metaphor.

In all images, there is a sense of two things: one that administrators are imposing unreasonable workloads on academics (for example, *a cloud of administrators descending on academics drowning in a sea of bureaucracy*), and two, that the negativity of the relationship is having a negative effect on universities as a whole (for example, *a decaying empire*).

Frustration at the current situation underpinned many of the images created. The need to challenge the assumption identified at the Worldview level that academics and administrators have contrasting goals appeared here when

participants created images to describe a status quo future with perceived goal divergence:

- Would get in the way of goals,
- Everyone can sign up for goals—it is the subsets of behaviours that are destructive, and
- It would be a disaster.

Shared goals would seem to be an appropriate determinant of who does what work in the future rather than today's situation where work roles are determined by classification as academics or administrators. One participant commented:

What does the term academic really mean? More than just a teacher, a researcher, it includes deans and professors who are managers and who don't teach—aren't they administrators? But they are not paid as general staff.

The emergence of this academic manager class in universities is beyond the scope of this research and understanding this role in the context of academic and administrator roles in a topic for future research.

In 2011, this research was used in a UK conference presentation to identify a positive metaphor for the relationship.⁶ The metaphor identified was a zip—two sides coming seamlessly together—but this metaphor still has two sides. All metaphors identified are based on the idea of two sides, and none move beyond this to the idea of a single group doing university work. This suggests that assumptions and worldviews are university management are entrenched and need to be challenged if the gap between beliefs about university management is to be bridged.

Reframing the myth/metaphor

This final part of the methodology was designed to seek participant views about how the divide could be reframed so that both academic and administrative work was given parity of esteem in university management. Questions used to trigger discussion were:

- In your opinion, is the divide real or myth?
- If real, what action do we need to take to address the divide—if any?
- If merely a stereotype, how do we dispel it, or do we ignore it?
- Consider:
 - What assumptions need to change?
 - Which group can help the most?
 - How do we reframe the divide?

The results of this discussion are reported here in reverse CLA order, starting with the myth/metaphor level and building up to the litany level (Table 5, below). The responses highlight action that could reframe the divide.

Table 5. Reframing the myth

MYTH/METAPHOR	While participants did not identify a “new” myth or metaphor to define the relationship, the image of a phoenix rising from the ashes was identified by the researcher during analysis. This image implies that the old order has been destroyed and a new set of conventions about university work can be developed
WORLDVIEW	Identify shared values Change the terminology used to describe administrators: “just call everyone staff of the university” Take it back to students and core business... change behaviours and attitudes via that Reinvent the divide as a positive; a creative tension Identify and promote shared values It requires a cultural shift, the valuing of the contribution of all staff involved in the process of university education. Academics need to “relinquish” their attachment solely to their academic/discipline knowledge. Admin staff need to “value” the role they play
SOCIAL DRIVERS	Open up the discussion about work roles in institutions Challenge the assumptions about the value added by administrative staff Understand that professional staff are there to support teaching and learning, not academics Clarify who really holds the power (understand the difference between governance and management)
LITANY	Change the terminology used to describe administrators (education ministries, take note!) Standardise conditions [for both academic and administrative staff]

The participants in this research have, while not realising it, provided the characteristics of their preferred future university management model:

- An inclusive set of terminology to describe university staff;
- A single university workforce with the same conditions, promotional opportunities and rewards;
- A strategy with one set of goals with which all staff can align their work;
- One set of values focused on common learning and teaching goals;
- Co-creation of work rather than arbitrary divisions of labour based on arcane work classification systems; and
- Inter-dependence rather than separation in work.

The actions proposed focus on the concept of a single university workforce, not burdened by outmoded classification systems and work practices or by dysfunctional views of the divide. The concept of the third space,⁷ where academics and administrators move across traditional roles, working together on specific projects, and the androgynous professional,⁸ where appointment to positions is based on expertise not classification, begin to capture this desired or preferred future—a workspace where respect is based on competence, knowledge, behaviours and outcomes, rather than qualifications and stereotypes. A work space where, for example, the student experience or teaching and learning is used as the basic design principle for work roles and processes, and where cultural “rules of the game” are re-written.

Discussion

Is the divide real?

As one participant pointed out, it is dangerous to generalise about academics or administrators as single groups since both are heterogeneous, and the notion of a “divide” between professional groups is not confined to universities. From the perspective of administrators today, however, the academic-administrator “divide” is a real phenomenon, and it is multifaceted. It is experienced differently, depending on where a person works in an institution, the particular roles they perform at a given time and, possibly, the type of institution. The divide’s effect is mediated by individual relationships and the degree of good will; individual perceptions are also a significant factor in whether or not administrators believe there is a divide between themselves and academic staff. That is, how administrators perceive their professional identity⁹ and how they perceive their role will affect the degree to which they experience the divide. Some identities referred to by participants in this research included:

- An enforcer or regulator,
- A partner in the student experience,
- An ignored or invisible person, and
- A bucket to kick when the going gets tough.

Possible hypotheses emerge from this identity stance. If administrators believe that one of their roles is to enforce rules or regulations, then it may be more likely for them to have a negative relationship with academic staff. In the UK, in particular, this tension between supporting and enforcing, between being a resource and a regulator seemed to be felt keenly. Most administrators want to support the core academic business, but feel their roles are being shaped by external imperatives, which means that they are seen as enforcers or regulators, rather than as contributors to that academic business.

If, on the other hand, administrators view themselves as partners in the student experience, they may be more likely to believe that there is no divide, and/or that they have positive relationships with academics. The degree to which this role of “partner” is recognised by academic staff, and whether administrators are seen as having something of value to offer the student experience, however, has not been tested beyond individual case studies.¹⁰

Work location also appears to be significant. It may be that it is easier for a member of staff to be viewed as a partner in academic work after they have spent some time in a faculty context, working closely with academics on the “front line”. Responses from administrators suggest that in this context, particularly where they are seen as problem-solvers, the relationship is characterised by good will, even if the administrator then leaves the faculty for another position in the university. In contrast, an administrator working in a corporate department does not have the opportunity to establish good will in the same way, and participants in this situation reported that staff are often viewed as bureaucratic or managerial in approach, whether or not their worldview is aligned with that of academics.

What also emerged was an often strongly stated desire to rebuild or reframe the divide by thinking and talking about what needs to be done to run universities in the future rather than dwelling on how they are managed today; identifying how to do that, who should do it and what knowledge and skills they will need.

Are partnerships the answer?

One of the motives for conducting this research was to explore whether or not the concept of “partnership” as an option to address the “divide” proposed in conference and journal papers over the past decade was in fact realistic. The notion of partnership implies that each partner brings something of value to the relationship, and it is apparent from this research that many administrators believe academics see no value in the administrative role, and that, increasingly, academics feel burdened by ever-increasing administrative work which they see as being of little value. If this is the case, then any partnership between academic and administrator will always be unequal until the assumptions underpinning that relationship are challenged and changed.

Nevertheless,* this research showed that at the local level (in faculties and schools), the relationship between academic and administrative staff is generally positive, and this is supported by the literature, limited though it is. A survey of faculty managers in Australia suggested that 70% were satisfied with their role.¹¹ McMaster explored how deans and faculty managers work together, and identified different types of relationships that develop between the two roles in faculties, including nested, contiguous and segmented partnerships.¹² A higher degree of interdependence exists at this local level, while as one participant suggested, outside faculties there is less understanding of her role, and more stereotyping. As a result, beyond the local level, there is less trust, with the result that a new divide may be appearing between faculties/schools and central departments.

Partnerships could be one way for the divide between academics and administrators to be addressed. His approach, however, is akin to tweaking the existing model to relieve the symptoms, rather than addressing the worldview clash that appears to be the cause of the divide. Partnerships are also a litany response, when what is needed to move beyond the “divide” is a worldview-level response.

The value of CLA as a methodology for exploring and better understanding “the Divide”

CLA provided a valuable framework for moving beyond the Litany of the academic-administrator divide to reveal and explore aspects of it that participants were experiencing. The myth/metaphor level, in particular, generated some striking images to describe the relationship, and it was notable that all of these images were negative in tone.

The litany level was the easiest for participants to respond to, and it was comments at this level that were subsequently reported in *The Times Higher Education Supplement*.¹³ The best understood was the social causes level, since this involved the identification of issues, challenges and trends that were very much part of the everyday working life of the participants.

The CLA level most difficult for participants to engage with was the worldview. First recognising that there were different but valid perspectives on the relationship, and then attempting to define the assumptions underpinning

* For example, see: J. Gill, ‘Doing battle with the Dinosaurs’, retrieved 10 April, 2008, from <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?sectioncode=26&storycode=401375>; M. McMaster, ‘Partnerships between administrative and academic managers: How deans and faculty managers work together’, Paper presented at Tertiary Education Management Conference, Adelaide, 2003; J. Szekeres, ‘The invisible workers’, *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management*, Vol 26, No 1, 2004, 7–22; C. Whitchurch, ‘Shifting identities, blurring boundaries: The changing roles of professional managers in higher education’, paper presented at SHRE Conference, 2007.

those perspectives was challenging. While unearthing assumptions is never easy, the limited time available for participants to explore this level probably contributed to their difficulty, and highlights the need to spend more time in this space of the CLA model to allow deeper understandings to emerge and be discussed—particularly given that, in this case, a worldview clash is likely to be a primary reason for the strengthening of the divide in recent years.

The CLA process allowed both academics and administrators to have their say about how they worked with each other on a daily basis, and then to begin to place their perspectives in a wider context about work in universities in general. It allowed them to locate the divide in a way that moved beyond individual experiences, so that a somewhat deeper and more inclusive perspective could be taken on the relationship, rather than simply perpetuating a negative view from the academic or administrator “bunker”. Perhaps most importantly, the process allowed the participants to move to a more positive space—the reframing stage—where commonalities rather than differences were the focus of discussion.

However, the findings of this research are limited, particularly in terms of the time available to explore the worldview level, since this is the level where any change to address the divide will likely have its origins. Most participants believed that change was necessary, but because data was collected through a conference workshop, focus groups and interviews and because the research had to be completed by the funding body’s deadline, there was not enough time during the research itself to consider the exact nature of that change, and how a new, shared worldview might be developed over time.

Emerging Questions for Future Research

A number of questions have emerged which could usefully be explored in future research:

- Does institutional type (that is, traditional or new university) matter? Is the professional administrative role more acknowledged and accepted in one type than the other? If so, why?
- What are the characteristics of positive professional relationships, particularly at the faculty/school level?
- Does the appointment level of academics and managers matter? Is the relationship different at different levels of operation?
- What are the shared values that we want to underpin university management in the future?
- How does the emergence of the academic manager class ‘fit’ with the concept of the ‘divide’?

- Is the emerging “third space”¹⁴ a model for the future of university management?
- Is there increasing tension between faculties and central management areas, and, if so, is it likely to have a greater impact on university management in the future than the relationship between academics and administrators?

How individuals experience their relationships with colleagues is personal. This research focused on administrators, but it would also be valuable to explore how academic staff feel about their working relationships with administrative staff in more detail, in ways that move beyond the Litany. In the same way, how Vice-Chancellors feel about the way their staff interact with one another and the effect of those interactions on university management would also be instructive.

The use of CLA in this research demonstrated that we need to “re-write the unwritten rulebook” that currently determines how universities are managed in order to enable a reframing of the “divide”, and to reframe perceptions of the value that administrators bring to the management process. There is an opportunity to shape this reframing if we can let go of the old paradigm that informs thinking about how universities “should” be managed, and by whom, and about the stereotypes that now underpin how academics and administrators relate to and work with one another. For new management models beyond the “divide” to emerge, it is at the level of worldviews that our ways of making sense of how universities should be managed today and into the future need to shift, and quickly.

¹ D. A. Stace, ‘Management and leadership in higher education’, *Journal of Tertiary Educational Administration*, Vol 6, No 1, 1984, 69–78, 71.

² G. Moodie, ‘Leaping tall organisational boundaries in a single bound’, paper presented at Association for Tertiary Education Management Conference, Adelaide, 1994.

³ C. McInnis, ‘Academics and professional administrators in Australian universities: Dissolving boundaries and new tensions’, *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management*, Vol 20, No 2, 1998, 161–173, 171.

⁴ S. Inayatullah (ed.), *The Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) Reader*, Tamsui, Tamkang University Press, 2004; S. De Simone, ‘Causal layered analysis: A ‘cookbook’ approach’, in S. Inayatullah (ed.), *The Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) Reader* (485–494), Tamsui, Tamkang University Press, 2004.

⁵ R. Winter, ‘Academic manager or managed academic? Academic identify schisms in higher education’, *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management*, Vol 3, No 2, 2009, 121–131.

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- ⁶ H. Fearn, 'Zip code: AUA searches for the right metaphor', retrieved 9 August 2012 from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/higher-education-network/story.asp?sectioncode=26&storycode=415962>
- ⁷ C. Whitchurch, 'Beyond administration and management: Reconstructing the identities of professional staff in UK higher education', *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management*, Vol 30, No 4, 2008, 375–386.
- ⁸ G. Moodie (1994), op. cit.
- ⁹ C. Whitchurch, 'The changing role and identities of professional managers in UK higher education', *Perspectives: Policy and Practice in Higher Education*, Vol 11, No 42, 2006, 53–60.
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- ¹³ J. Gill, 'Doing battle with the dinosaurs', retrieved 10 April, 2008, from <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?sectioncode=26&storycode=401375>; J. Gill, 'By the role divided', retrieved 22 June, 2009, from <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?sectioncode=26&storycode=406078>
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31. Learning English in Taiwan's Elementary Schools

Tzu-Ying Wu*

This chapter explores the English-learning policy of New Taipei City in Taiwan, by reference to both its external and internal parts, in order to discover alternative futures in English learning. CLA is used to uncover the unconscious stories and uncover the preferred future of “Gaming English”, with the learning focused on students and on using English in daily life. Lastly, policies are suggested to help bring this preferred future about.[†]

Introduction: English-learning development in Taiwan

Because of convenient, high speed transportation and globalisation, as well as the internet and programs/applications such as Skype and others, there are increasing opportunities for communication between people all over the world. English is the most widely spoken language in the world today, being the “common currency” for most international transactions and communication. Taiwan’s Ministry of Education has as its policy that students learn English from elementary school onward to improve their ability to communicate. Each of the core aspects of language learning is emphasised—reading, writing, listening and speaking.¹ The Ministry has therefore started to administer English proficiency tests to make sure students obtain basic English ability. The tests put parents, students and teachers under pressure.² However, many students are encouraged to take the tests to prove they are learning well.³

The former mayor of New Taipei City insisted that the ability to write and speak in English is an international core competency. Pursuant to this, every school in New Taipei City had to add three different types of English-oriented classes for students to the original standard English classes. However, fifth and sixth grade students’ learning hours are now longer than those of junior high school students, and these longer hours have created heavy stress for students and teachers to the point that about four thousand students, parents and teachers demonstrated against the policy on 16th May, 2010.

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† This essay is based on a term paper originally prepared while the author was a student of the Graduate Institute of Futures Studies. A version of this article appeared in the *Journal of Futures Studies*, Vol 16, No 2, 2011, 35–46.

They argued that children should spend their time at school on activities other than learning English.

The aim of policy-makers in Taiwan was to help students improve their ability to use English to communicate with others in daily life. Students try hard to get better grades to show their success in learning. But can English-learning policy in Taiwan help students create a better communication future?

Mapping the Future

Inayatullah's model of the futures landscape may help us to see the level at which Taiwan's policy is operating. The first level is the jungle, a competitive world in which the only goal is to survive. The jungle level focuses on size, speed, smartness and external technologies. The second level is the chess set; strategy, including core competencies and capacities, helps us to know which future is the most appropriate. The third level is the mountain tops, the "big picture" through which alternative futures can be explored. The fourth level is the stars, the vision of the future.⁴

Achieving better grades is a jungle level concern. Analysing the core competencies is at the chess set level of the futures landscape. Taiwan used to compete with other countries in education rankings. The English-learning policy in New Taipei City tried to progress to the second level. However, a better policy will do more. It is important to have several futures scenarios in which to see something different and new; this is at the third level, the mountain tops. Building on these scenarios, we can move to the fourth level, the stars, the vision of the future. This final level helps us to develop long-term goals through which to create the preferred future.

After analysing the external factors of English-learning policies, we need to consider their internal aspects: this internal part concerns the people who are to be most affected by these policies—that is, students and teachers.

Digital Natives

Students in Taiwan play computer games, watch lots of TV and like to surf the net. They learn a great deal from these media, and they like to discuss what they learn. Sometimes they share their ideas or feelings on their blogs. Instead of face-to-face communication, students ask questions and chat using electronic platforms.⁵

These are people who were born into a digital environment. They gather information from TV, computers, the internet, video-games, cell phones, and other digital tools. They like to multi-task: learn things online, chat with their friends (using programs like MSN) and listen to music at the same time. When they are interested in a particular topic, they prefer to collect information from websites: Facebook, personal blogs, and microblogs.⁶

Digital natives prefer graphics-first to text-first, and games to serious work; and they receive information fast by networking. Their brains and thinking patterns develop differently from those who are not digital natives. Digital natives are accustomed to speed and interactivity. Their cognitive structures are parallel instead of sequential, and their attention spans for old ways of learning are short.⁷ Students need more fun, more activity, more graphics, non-text learning styles and immediate feedback. They can do deep research on the internet instead of reading books in the library. However, most students in Taiwan have more elaborate and detail-filled English classes, perhaps more appropriate to older, lengthier teaching styles.

Digital Immigrants

Those who were not born in the digital environment but came to it later in their lives are called digital immigrants. They learn things step-by-step, one thing at a time, and seriously. Most educators or teachers today are digital immigrants, who did not think that the human brain would ever change. They use old thinking styles, based on the ways they learned in the past, to teach the digital natives, who have different thinking patterns.⁸ Some digital immigrants even distrust modern technology. They think that memorising is the best way for every learner.⁹

In Taiwan, most teachers are digital immigrants and have to learn to adapt to the digital environment. Some of them are afraid of using computers and try to avoid using technology whenever possible.¹⁰ Some of them learn to use technology well, but they still demand that students learn in traditional ways, such as memorising. For these teachers, it is easier to teach in traditional ways because they don't have the time or skills to design an information-integrated curriculum.¹¹

Before developing the futures vision, we need therefore to generate/consider alternative futures in order to broaden the concepts of learning and teaching and to help us prepare for unforeseen contingencies.

Alternative Futures

Scenarios are used in the process of creating alternative futures. The double variable matrix is a method in which two critical uncertainties must be identified to develop four "worlds".¹² In using this model to develop scenarios for Taiwan's English-learning futures, I take the external and the internal factors as the two critical uncertainties. These are:

1. Internal: would education be teacher-centred or student-centred?
2. External: would policy-makers in the Ministry of Education focus on communicating in daily life (learning-based) or on getting higher grades in tests (test-based)?

Building on external and internal factors, the matrix in Figure 1 (below) was developed.




Figure 1. Matrix of learning English

Regarding the internal variable: student-centred education is focused on developing learning methods which students enjoy and find useful. Otherwise, students are taught as the teachers think best. The second variable is the external factors; whether the goal of learning English is to be able to use it in life or merely for passing tests. There are four scenarios:

1. **Black hole:** Teachers try to help students develop English skills in real life. They teach students in traditional ways, under which students learn slowly. Because of inefficiencies, teachers need to increase learning hours, to allow for more practice, while trying to help students use English fluently in writing, reading, listening and speaking.
2. **Gaming English:** Teachers use game-based learning styles to help students learn well and happily, using high-technology to help students fulfil their potential. The aim is to create an English-embedded environment in which English is used for communication as much as possible.
3. **Number one:** To make their students “number one” in the education rankings, teachers focus on students’ grades in English tests and only care about the global rankings. Students practice tests to gain better grades, and teachers teach students how to get good grades.
4. **Test machine:** Teachers use high-technology to attract students’ attention. Students learn English and practice to get higher grades by using high-tech materials.

An additional scenario of learning English is the “Chinese new world”: Students stop learning English because people in Taiwan think Mandarin will be the most widely spoken language in the future. In looking to the preferred future, we need to understand the deep parts of futures first. In the next section, I use causal layered analysis to deepen these possible futures.

Causal Layered Analysis

Causal layered analysis (CLA) is a method used to deepen futures. CLA consists of four levels: the litany, systemic causes, discourse/worldview, and myth/metaphor. The litany level is quantitative trends, short-term solutions which are easy to grasp. The systemic causes level usually needs experts who can give technical explanations and perform academic analysis. Deeper is the discourse/worldview level: the task here is to unpack unconscious worldviews and cultural structures. The deepest level is the myth/metaphor; the unconscious emotive dimensions of the issue.¹³

To deepen the possible futures of the English-learning policy, I use CLA to unpack the five scenarios I proposed in the previous section.

1. Black hole

Teacher-centred, and students learn English for use in daily life. Teachers add learning hours so that students can practice more, and to make sure students develop each of the four aspects of their English skills. Division of a complete curriculum into several parts comes at the systemic causes level. At the worldview level, teachers use a standard teaching method and learning is from 8 to 5. The myth is that people who put in more effort will gain more.

Table 1. Black hole

LITANY	Increase English-oriented classes
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	Divide English-learning into discrete parts, such as writing, reading, listening and speaking, and practice all of them at school
DISCOURSE/WORLD VIEW	Industrial education: students will have good English ability after long hours of learning; and learning done in a standard way
MYTH/METAPHOR	More is better

2. Gaming English

Student-centred and students learn English for use in daily life. At the litany level students are helped to use English in their daily lives. Students are now digital natives; they are comfortable with using technology. Teachers use technology to help students learn English. At the worldview level international education means students can use English to learn and to communicate with people around the world. At the myth level is the concept that life is the source of education—that it is unnecessary to sit in the classroom to learn. Students can learn English in their daily lives.

Table 2. Gaming English

LITANY	Use English as much as possible in students' daily lives
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	E-learning: Use different, high-tech tools to stimulate students' interest
DISCOURSE/WORLD VIEW	International education: Communicate and learn all over the world in English
MYTH/METAPHOR	Life is education

3. Number one

Teacher-centred, and students learn English for tests or exams. Teachers use traditional methods and ask students to memorise for the purpose of taking tests. At the systemic causes level, teachers emphasise test materials only. It does not matter whether students use English in their daily lives or not; highest grades equals the best. The worldview is focused on competency (in a global marketplace) and on Taiwan reaching a higher ranking in the world. The unconscious meaning, the myth level, is that Taiwan has a successful English education system. In other words, Taiwan excels in world competencies.

Table 3. Number one

LITANY	More tests, more cram learning
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	Teachers teach students test materials in order for them to get better grades
DISCOURSE/WORLD VIEW	Globalisational competency. Compete with other countries to have higher grades
MYTH/METAPHOR	Taiwan is good

4. Test machine

Student-centred, and students learn English for tests. The first level is to help students to practice for tests in order to get higher grades. At the systemic causes level, teachers build online test systems for students to practise. Students respond well to the digital environment, and they can practise with many different test systems or websites in order to get better grades. The worldview is market capitalism. Students with higher grades in English can compete with other people for good jobs in the wider world. Therefore, at the myth level, students who have high grades will have a good job or may be more successful in the future than those whose test-demonstrated English skills are poorer.

Table 4. Test machine

LITANY	More practice and tests
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	E-testing: Use high-technology to practice more and improve test ability
DISCOURSE/WORLD VIEW	Market capitalism: Compete with other countries' graduates for good jobs
MYTH/METAPHOR	Grades predict level of success in the future

5. The Chinese new world

People in Taiwan think Mandarin will be the most widely spoken language in the future, so learning English is not important. People all over the world will increasingly learn Mandarin for communicating with Chinese and Taiwanese people. At the first level, teachers gradually stop teaching English and students gradually stop learning English. Taiwanese people speak and publish books in Mandarin only. The worldview is imperialist education. China will be a strong nation in the world. The myth here is that China is the strongest country in the world.

Table 5. The Chinese new world

LITANY	Stop learning English
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	Speak and publish only in Mandarin
DISCOURSE/WORLD VIEW	Imperialist education: Every country gives up its own culture and language, and just learns Chinese
MYTH/METAPHOR	China as a central kingdom

Vision

In the following discussion, I try to identify which vision is the preferred one of English-learning.

More tests and longer hours of practice make students, teachers and parents feel more anxious. Students have fewer opportunities to speak and listen, and they may feel frustrated when paper tests are more frequent.¹⁴ The “number one” and “test machine” visions emphasise testing and practice as means to get better grades; however, they may cause anxiety and frustration for students, and therefore are not good solutions for learning English.

Images and language presented in digital multimedia material make learning more effective for students. Digital technology can attract students' attention and inspire their learning through interactive feedback.¹⁵ Yeh and Che found that students may learn English, willingly and efficiently, by using game-based learning via digital technology.¹⁶ They can use computers and learn at home and discuss what they are learning with their classmates online. They can learn while enjoying games together. Therefore, “gaming English” leads

to better learning than the “black hole”. Teachers need to change their mindset to face the future, and they need to use digital technology tools instead of text alone in order to help students learn well and happily. However, teachers in Taiwan seldom integrate information technologies (IT) into teaching. Teachers need more support;¹⁷ they need more educational software, accessible hardware, computer integration knowledge, and skills to apply computers to teaching.¹⁸

The Chinese new world is not an appropriate vision to present a better future: people need diverse cultures and values to help create a sustainable future. Multiculturalism, on the other hand, may help people think outside their culture and create a richer society.¹⁹ Cultural diversity can help human society to survive, and to understand things in different ways.²⁰

From all of the above, the preferred vision (of the author) is “gaming English”: student-based and for real-life application. Students learn English so they can use it in life and not simply to pass tests. However, the government is currently making policies that resemble the “black hole” and “number one” scenarios. These two scenarios are opposed to the preferred vision of “gaming English”.

Transforming

Where there are two conflicting visions, Johan Galtung’s transcend method is a good way forward (Figure 2, below). It can help us create a win-win situation. First, two different visions should be detailed. An integrated vision is created after a process of brainstorming and alternative-creating. In one case study, undertaken by Inayatullah, one group chose the green city and another group chose the modern glamour city: visions which are in obvious conflict. Through the transcend process, those who preferred the green city realised that the city they wanted would be boring and that they needed a modern dimension to their city to help them innovate. On the other hand, the modern city proponents knew that there would be no development without sustainability. Each needed the other.²¹

Applying the method to the “number one”, “black hole” and “gaming English” scenarios, a different situation is created. Using traditional teacher-centred pedagogy for students may result in heavy pressure and inefficient learning. Students, as digital natives, want something fun which uses technology as a friend to help them learn. More paper tests also make students, parents and teachers feel anxious. Using student-centred pedagogy may cause heavy stress for teachers. Though students like the digital environment, and teachers need digital technology to improve students’ learning, students also need traditional paper-reading skills to acquire different thinking styles.²² Learning is not just for tests, but tests are a convenient way to assess students’ learning. Each pedagogy needs the other.




Figure 2. The transcend method²³

Policy

To balance learning for life and for tests, teachers could encourage students to use English in their life when students are younger than third grade. After fourth grade, students have to learn grammar and phrases which can help them in their lives but which are also useful for tests.

To balance student-centred and teacher-centred pedagogies, teachers could try to use technology in some classes. Instead of simply increasing learning hours, however, teachers need support to change pedagogies. First of all, teachers need to understand the differences between digital natives and digital immigrants. The Ministry of Education, in collaboration with IT companies, could provide training programs for teachers once a week, instead of adding three English classes at that time. The companies could provide instructors to teach teachers how to use IT tools, while the teachers would design curricula and communicate with those companies. Companies could then develop e-books or games connected to learning materials for students and combine those materials with cloud computing technology so that they were available to teachers and students everywhere. Teachers could use the materials developed in class, and students could practice or do homework online after class. Third, the Ministry of Education could provide platforms where teachers could share their teaching plans and ask for help in a supportive and non-judgmental learning environment of their own. Fourth, there could be ongoing development of training programs for teachers so that they could learn from each other and continuously improve. These steps can help teachers reduce their anxiety and the pressure they are under to use technology. Teachers may save much time preparing learning materials if e-learning systems were set up. The e-learning systems might include some grammar and phrases for helping to improve students' English ability.

For the sake of students, teachers could have a communicative platform with English games, songs, videos, e-books and other learning materials; students might, for example, need to read the contents and listen to the songs in English on the web. Teachers could also introduce some hardcopy books for students and encourage them to share their thoughts and homework in English on a joint blog. Every student could communicate with every other via MSN or Skype, and learn from each other's homework. Teachers may also offer some web hours with students and check the platform to assess students' learning. Teachers and students could discuss what students share on the blog in class. Instead of putting a lot of effort into achieving good grades, students would use English freely in daily communication: reading, writing, listening and speaking. Students' English ability will improve if they use English as much as possible.

Conclusion

Learning English is likely to remain important in Taiwan, the "Chinese new world" vision notwithstanding, so a long-term learning project is necessary. Increasing learning hours may be useful as a transitional stage, but is not a sustainable solution. Adding classes exhausts students and teachers. Language skills are likely to improve if people use them as much as possible in their daily lives. Since today's students are interested in digital tools, teachers can use technology to create an environment where students can learn English in a natural way without pressure, using interactive technologies that can inspire digital natives. Teaching English through games, instead of adding classes, means teachers may spend their time better—on designing curricula and on self-improvement. The win-win situation is a curriculum designed for achieving the required language skills. Helping students get used to an English environment is a sustainable way of learning for both students and teachers.

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32. Exploring Barriers Hindering Vietnamese Teachers from Adopting Learner-Centred Pedagogies

Pham Thi Hong Thanh*

This chapter applies CLA as a framework to examine factors that hinder Vietnamese teachers from adopting learner-centred pedagogies. The four layers of CLA help to disclose weaknesses in the current traditional teaching approach, as well as hidden beliefs that maintain traditional perceptions about teaching. CLA also helps to propose more viable solutions: changes which are more likely to be implanted successfully in the local context.†

Introduction

Today's employers expect employees to have varied skills to be able to adapt to different situations and to communicate with people from different cultural backgrounds. Therefore, teaching students how to communicate effectively, to cooperate with others and to learn independently has become the basic goal of education.¹ Newly-required skills are beyond the focus of traditional ways of teaching and learning (e.g. teacher-centred and passive learning approaches) because they emphasise individual achievement and the transmission of information. These traditional ways of teaching and learning have failed to provide students with opportunities to maximise their potential to be active, creative and reflective self-directed learners in an innovation-driven and rapidly changing world.²

Therefore, in recent decades Vietnam has implemented various educational reforms with the main purpose of calling for the change to learner-centred pedagogies. In many ways, such advanced approaches can be considered

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† This chapter was previously published as 'Implementing a student-centered learning approach at Vietnamese higher education institutions: Barriers under layers of casual layered analysis (CLA)', *Journal of Futures Studies*, Vol 15, No 1, 2010, 21–38.

simply a fashion. However, learner-centred pedagogies require many changes in terms of instructional approaches and infrastructural conditions. Also, student-centred learning approaches appear to be hindered by various local infrastructure conditions and cultural barriers. Consequently, many reforms were introduced very impressively at the beginning but quickly failed. Resistance to change occurred mainly because Vietnamese teachers often found it hard to accept Western-developed student-centred practices that contrasted with their deeply held beliefs about teaching.³ For instance, the main philosophy of learner-centred pedagogies is to encourage students' participatory and active learning,⁴ to empower students to think independently, construct their own knowledge and draw their own conclusions^{5,6,7,8} and develop students as critical thinkers.^{9,10} In contrast, Vietnamese teachers are, to a large extent, still influenced by Confucian philosophy, which constructs teachers as authority figures who can decide what and how students should learn; students should accept and follow teachers' authoritative knowledge.^{11,12}

It is proposed that for learner-centred pedagogies to be accepted and implemented successfully in the Vietnamese context thorough understandings about how the initiatives mismatch the local teachers' perceptions and beliefs and how the local context hinders local teachers from adopting the new practices are needed. The present study applies CLA as a theoretical framework with which to investigate these issues.

It is noted that although "Confucian heritage culture" (CHC) countries (e.g. China, Malaysia, Korea, Vietnam) may hold different cultural values due to their own geographic locations and levels of social and economic development, generally speaking CHC countries still share main cores of Confucian cultural values. In the case of Vietnam, the country was dominated by China for almost two thousand years (from 111 BCE to 1858 CE). During this long period, the Vietnamese were deeply inculcated with Chinese cultural values, among which Confucian philosophy was predominant. This explains why in Vietnam the Confucian philosophy is still very much alive and has set a powerful interpersonal norm for daily behaviour, attitudes and practices, demanding reflection, modernisation, persistence, humility, obedience to superiors, and stoic response to pain.¹³ Vietnamese students consequently share a common Confucian heritage. Therefore, throughout this paper the term 'CHC' also describes the Vietnamese.

What is Causal Layered Analysis (CLA)?

CLA is a futures theory and methodology developed by Sohail Inayatullah,^{14,15} and inspired by the works of P. R. Sarkar¹⁶ and Johan Galtung.^{17,18} CLA has become a method with which to conduct inquiry into the nature of past, present and future. However, CLA is not a tool for predicting the future. Rather, it is a logical analysis used to open up the

problem and its causes in the present and the past; after that, alternative futures can be developed. The functions of each component of CLA are summarised in Inayatullah¹⁹ and in the introductory chapters of this book. Briefly, CLA has four main components, each of which investigates a level of the problem, from the surface to the depths. Such a step-by-step examination allows researchers to learn deep meanings embedded in what they read and to acknowledge other ways of knowing.²⁰

Tensions, Contradictions and Invisible Drivers of the Learning Approach Reform in Vietnam Under the Framework of CLA

Litany level

At this level, I discuss the identified weaknesses of conventional teacher-dominated learning. These discussions show that this conventional approach has become inadequate in providing students with newly-required thinking and learning skills. Therefore, it needs to be replaced with more effective methods.

The literature on CHC students' approaches to learning is comprehensive. At one end are constructions that see CHC learners as being obedient to authority, passive, dependent, surface/rote learners prone to plagiarism, lacking in critical thinking and adopting inadequate learning strategies.^{21,22,23,24,25} At the other end of the continuum, many researchers believe that Chinese learners have positive attributes such as valuing active and reflective thinking, open mindedness and a spirit of inquiry.^{26,27,28,29} However, there is a general agreement that the teacher-student relationship in CHC countries is hierarchical.³⁰ CHC teachers tend to perceive that they have authoritative knowledge that can be transmitted to students and refuse to accept that constructing knowledge is a creative and individual voyage of discovery.³¹ The literature documents many criticisms of this passive, one-way transmission of knowledge because it is inadequate in preparing students to meet the challenges they face in today's globalised economy.³² These conventional practices have made a significant contribution to hindering Vietnamese students from developing higher-order and critical thinking skills, in-depth conceptual understanding, real-world problem-solving abilities, and communication skills.³³

Consequently, since the nineties, the call for teaching and learning reform has permeated CHC countries. In the case of Vietnam, after conducting a yearly examination and evaluation of Vietnamese education, UNESCO suggested that teaching practices at Vietnamese institutions needed to change so that students could be trained with new working skills such as activeness, cooperativeness, creativity and argumentativeness.³⁴ Facing a lot of pressures, finally, at the outset of implementing student-centred learning, the education minister asserted that:

Learning by rote needs to be eliminated from all school levels and replaced with student-centred learning... Any teachers found failing to change their teaching style would be listed and provided with video-tapes showing new teaching techniques. If they still failed to improve, they would be sent for intensive training.³⁵

In attempting to achieve the goal of renovating teaching, it is clear to see that every year the Vietnamese government spends millions of dollars on staff development, such as organising workshops and conferences to train teachers with a variety of learner-centred pedagogies. It has also sent thousands of teachers overseas to learn about student-centredness. It is not an exaggeration to say that during the last two decades CHC teachers have been through the “school wars”, in which they have faced constant demands to change what they are teaching and how they are teaching it.

Systematic causes

Discussions above reveal that there has been much criticism of the current teaching practices at Vietnamese education institutions. However, it is not easy to implement any change because learner-centred pedagogies face various barriers in terms of both infrastructure and resources in the local context. At this level, issues of class size, material limitations and curriculum coverage are discussed as systemic causes that hinder the introduction of learner-centred pedagogies.

Class size

Big classes are one of the principal reasons which maintain the teacher-dominated practices. Kirkpatrick claims that on average, classes in Vietnam contain 50–70 students (in China 50–60, in Japan 45, and in Korea 43).³⁶ In such big classes, if students are divided into groups of no more than four (an effective size according to Johnson and Johnson,³⁷ there would be 13–14 groups working simultaneously and teachers would not have enough time to examine/monitor each group. This places Vietnamese teachers in a situation in which they have no choice but to adopt low level teaching strategies such as lecturing. This is the only method which makes them feel that they are distributing knowledge to all students fairly. As a result, teachers become the only ones talking and instructing.

Material resources

Limited reading resources are another factor preventing the implementation of independent learning practices at Vietnamese institutions. Materials are generally in short supply at all Vietnamese education institutions. Text books are still the main information resource for students. This puts students in a situation where they are implicitly told that the required text for a particular subject is the definitive written resource for that subject. The limitation in materials creates two sources of pressure for students to become rote and

surface learners and for the teacher to become the knowledge provider. First, as the readings are very limited (one or two textbooks for a given subject), teachers usually tell students exactly what to read and what needs to be paid more attention, if not memorised carefully, as these sections are likely to be questioned in the exams. Second, limited readings turn CHC classes into places where it is usual for only one point of view to be presented. There are no other perspectives for comparison, so students do not have the ability to question and discuss any point of view presented by the teacher or written in the textbook. In other words, CHC teachers do not respect casual and analytic skills.³⁸

Curricula

Last but not least, Biggs claims that curricula in CHC schools are designed in a particular quantitative format which makes “any topic as important as every other topic, so that everything is taught and the student is grossly overloaded”.³⁹ Due to such coverage, Vietnamese teachers have just enough time in class to go through all materials but not enough to investigate students’ deep understanding or to touch on any topics outside the curriculum. As a result, all students can do at the end of each semester is to try to memorise what is covered in the curriculum or what teachers say in the class so that they can pass the exams. The consequence of this quantitative curricula and “didactic spoon-feeding” approach is that students are limited in their opportunity to develop a deep approach or critical thinking as they proceed through the program.⁴⁰ This situation is obviously detrimental to learning because a deep approach should be “a systematic goal for all students, not the fortuitous happenstance for a lucky few”.⁴¹

Discourse/worldview

This level is seen as a deeper level which underpins the belief system and hidden assumptions. At this level, particular cultural perceptions of Vietnamese teachers and students about teaching and learning are brought into discussions. This deeper analysis helps explain why Vietnamese teachers still dominate the class. These perceptions are a big challenge for any reform.

Teacher’s perceptions about teaching and learning

According to the Confucian philosophy, teachers should always know better than students. They are considered to be the main sources enriching people’s knowledge. Once teachers obtain enough knowledge from books, they only need to interpret, analyse and elaborate on these points for students. As a result, Confucian students only need to accept knowledge from teachers as a truth rather than try to think independently, contradict teachers’ knowledge and draw their own conclusions.⁴² Because individuality and uniqueness are deemed to be relatively unimportant, individual interpretations of content are discouraged,⁴³ and students find it unnecessary to find alternative knowledge

about a particular topic. In essence, the focus of teaching is not on how students can create and construct knowledge, but on how extant authoritative knowledge can be transmitted and internalised in the most effective and efficient way.⁴⁴ These perceptions challenge the principle of the student-centred approach to learning because the approach only allows the teachers to intervene when students need clarification in instructions, or when the teacher thinks that students have not understood.

Also, according to Hofstede and Hofstede, Vietnam is one of the CHC nations scoring high on the Power Distance Index (Malaysia scores highest with 104, China 80, Singapore 74, Vietnam 70, Hong Kong 68, Korea 60, Taiwan 58 and Japan 54).⁴⁵ It is generally asserted that nations high on the Power Distance Index place greater emphasis on hierarchical relationships. Different from the teacher-equals-student teachings of Socrates, who is thought to be the father of Western philosophy, Confucius's teachings instruct learners to respect and obey authority figures⁴⁶—in the education realm this means that students should obey and listen to teachers. Teachers in CHC nations are not only teachers but also models of correct behaviour. The Teacher is ranked just below the King and above the Father.⁴⁷ Teachers should be respected not only when they are teaching, but in every aspect of their lives.⁴⁸

Such respect makes it difficult for Vietnamese teachers and students to accept any pedagogical practice that tends to put them on a par with one another and detracts from teacher authority. In particular, it is against Vietnamese expectations to adopt a pedagogy that may put teachers at risk of losing face. As such, the principles of learner-centred pedagogies (which allow students to begin developing their knowledge with the students themselves, then to exchange information within the group to get collective knowledge which may exceed the knowledge of the teacher, and finally to bring the teacher's knowledge into question) seem unrealistic. It seems really hard for Vietnamese teachers to "lower" their role from that of instructor to facilitator, moving from group to group to observe and motivate learning.

In sum, these beliefs underpin the way teachers teach and the way students learn. They have become standard values at Vietnamese schools. They appear hard to remove because they have become cultural characteristics. However, since the country opened its doors to welcome Western thoughts on teaching and learning in the 1990s, to some extent these values are being challenged by a new emerging view: constructivism. Since the 20th Century, constructivism, with its views of learning being mediated by the individual's active involvement and participation in situated social practices and not as the result of knowledge transmission, has become a popular theoretical perspective underpinning education studies. As a result, interest in the socio-cultural views of Vygotsky has brought the issue of social interaction to the centre of recent educational reforms.⁴⁹ From Vygotsky's perspective, teaching and learning are socially negotiated and constructed through

interaction, modifying the roles of teachers and students as communicators and learners. Social learning contexts promote explanations of others and self-explanations that lead to cognitive gains,⁵⁰ and social modes of working create effective learning environments in which students are able to express, discover and construct knowledge.⁵¹ As such, the sociocultural points of view imply that today an effective teaching and learning approach should be the one which can create a context in which students have opportunities to exchange information and, in so doing, develop new understandings and learning.

Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, under the influence of this perspective, several educational reforms have been carried out in Vietnam such as:

(1) *Establishing a new globalised and knowledge-based economy in the early 1990s.* This reform put forward the idea that:

Students must be Learners, Creators and Communicators to meet the demands of the next century—Learners in the sense that they must view education as a life-long process and develop a passion for continuous learning; Creators who not only have the measure of discipline found in our current workforce but display independent and innovative thinking; and Communicators who are effective team players, able to articulate their ideas confidently.⁵²

(2) *The planned establishment of constructivist-oriented schools in the early 21st Century.* Through this project, Vietnam intends to introduce a new approach to teaching and learning called “learner-centred”. This approach requires students to work cooperatively and collaboratively with each other on their classroom tasks and assignments with some guidance from the teachers, and teachers to use techniques of cooperative learning such as preparing group activities, playing the role of a “guide by the side” rather than a “sage on the stage”, and giving up the position of sole knowledge provider while taking the role of coach and facilitator.⁵³

(3) *The establishment of the Centre for Learning Enhancement and Research in 2000.* Since its establishment, the Centre has hosted several professional development programs on how to use cooperative learning in the classroom.⁵⁴

There are also many other reforms in different parts of the country. This implies that the traditional worldview about learning in Vietnam is being challenged by new thoughts. It is expected that when the implementation of learner-centred pedagogies succeeds there would be changes in both teaching and learning as clarified in Table 1.

Table 1. Differences between a teacher-centred learning approach and learner-centred pedagogies

Teacher-centred Pedagogies	Learner-centred Pedagogies
Learning	
No individual accountability	Individual accountability
Student is responsible for themselves	Responsible for each other
Only task emphasised	Task and maintenance emphasised
Passively receive information and instruction from the teacher	Actively involved in one's own learning and in learning processes of peers
Teaching	
Follow the course profile	Select and divide the lesson for group work
Try to keep students in their own seats	Arrange the classroom and assign roles
Provide detailed instruction	Facilitate learning

Myth/metaphor

Constraints arising either from the institutional system or the current education reforms may be more volatile than the cultural factors because they represent norms and values that are deeply embedded in the cultural and everyday life of Vietnamese teachers and students. To a great extent, most of the issues raised as cultural factors are common characteristics of Confucianism—a philosophy that has prevailed in Vietnam since the year 1000.⁵⁵

According to Confucius, societal stability is based on unequal relationships between people. In the family, the father is always considered to be the leader, managing the whole family. Vietnamese people have a saying “Children who do not listen to parents are always spoiled children”; in the educational realm, the teacher should be treated with the highest respect because the teacher is always seen as having much greater knowledge than students. Confucian philosophy claims that a good sample of teachers must be shaped according to the maxim that “to give students a bowl of water, the teacher must have a full bucket of water to dispense”.⁵⁶ Therefore, students should not question the teacher but always respect them at all costs.

In Vietnamese literature, there are many proverbs mentioning the role of the teacher in enriching and transferring knowledge to students.

- One does not dare step on a teacher's shadow.
- Without a teacher, you are unable to do anything.
- If a child wants to learn how to write, he/she must love the teacher first.
- Children are only successful if they are instructed by a teacher.

All in all, from generation to generation, in Vietnamese people's eyes the teacher is a *guru* who is supposed to satisfy learners in their search for the truth (in knowledge) and virtues (in life).⁵⁷ Such myths have been imbedded in the culture for generations, making it easy to understand why Vietnamese students are very comfortable with accepting knowledge received from the teacher and feel reluctant to express their own ideas in discussions. To change the traditional worldview, new thoughts about the role of the teacher in transforming knowledge are needed.

Under the framework of CLA, the tensions, contradictions and invisible drivers of the traditional learning approach of teacher-centeredness in Vietnamese education institutions are briefly summarised in Table 2, below.

Table 2. Tensions, contradictions and invisible drivers of the traditional learning approach in Vietnam under the framework of CLA

Layers of the learning approach reform in Vietnam	
LITANY	<p>Vietnamese learners are claimed to be 'rote', surface, passive, quiet learners who always use text as the definitive source of knowledge and do not participate in class</p> <p>Vietnam needs to change its education system</p> <p>West is best? How would the criticisms and alternatives read as headlines?</p> <p>Various educational reforms have been carried out to change the situation</p>
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	<p>Big classes: the student-centred learning approach is not supported by crowded classes</p> <p>Individual and self-learning is limited by materials</p> <p>Too much content</p>
DISCOURSE/ WORLDVIEW	<p>Teachers' perceptions about teaching and learning: Confucian students only need to receive knowledge from teachers</p> <p>Culture of Power Distance is predominant. Students should obey and listen to teachers</p> <p>New worldview: Sociocultural views of Vygotsky</p>
MYTH/ METAPHOR	<p>Confucius sayings:</p> <p>"One word said by the teacher is worth tons of gold"</p> <p>"If you want to become a teacher, you first need to respect your teachers"</p>

If the reform succeeds, the desired future of new teaching and learning approaches in Vietnamese education institutions would be seen at all four levels, as in Table 3, below.

Table 3: The desired future of the new teaching and learning approaches in Vietnam under the framework of CLA

Layers of the learning approach reform in Vietnam	
LITANY	<p>Students shift from passive to active learning</p> <p>Teacher instruction would not be the unique and key resource of knowledge</p> <p>Assessment criteria shifts from measuring knowledge and understandings based on memorised knowledge to assessing students' learning based on analysis and synthesis skills</p>
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	<p>Distance courses are developed so that students can choose to either attend classes physically or study remotely</p> <p>Class size is reduced. Electronic libraries are developed so that students can access different sources to read</p> <p>Lessons are not based only on textbooks but include practical exercises so that students can open their minds to diverse perspectives</p>
DISCOURSE/ WORLDVIEW	<p>The teacher, as the only one who can deliver knowledge, would be replaced by peer-to-peer and independent learning</p> <p>Students should be encouraged to have their own view</p> <p>Inaccurate points of view should be appreciated as a new perspective, not seen as "wrong"</p>
MYTH/ METAPHOR	<p>New sayings about the importance of learning from friends and the surrounding environment should be popularised. For instance, some of the following sayings may happen:</p> <p><i>The teacher is someone who stuffs children with knowledge. Instead, the teacher needs to know how to encourage and motivate students to learn by themselves</i></p> <p><i>Learning from friends is easier and more practical than learning from the teacher</i></p> <p>Regarding order in the family, people are used to sayings like "If children are better than parents, the family is very fortunate"</p> <p>Also, the hierarchical culture that classifies the positions of the young and the old in the society is challenged to change</p>

Conclusion

After applying CLA as a framework through which to discuss the situation of the present learning and teaching approach in Vietnamese education institutions and the implanting of Western-developed approaches, the analysis reveals that the traditional learning method in Vietnam is becoming outdated and inadequate; it needs to be replaced by new ideas. However, the learning approach reform is hindered by local infrastructure conditions and resource limitations.

More importantly, the Vietnamese culture of learning and the principles of the student-centred learning approach are potentially in conflict in several important respects; the two approaches embody different, even opposing, philosophies about the nature of teaching and learning. For instance, while

student-centred learning strongly encourages interactions between students in order that they might come up with new ideas, the Confucian approach does not encourage face-to-face discussions. The key values of these two approaches also show contrary assumptions about the respective roles and responsibilities of teachers and students (e.g. learner-centredness versus teacher dominance/control). They encourage different learning strategies (e.g. verbal activeness vs. mental activeness). They reward different qualities in students (e.g. independence and individuality in student-centredness and receptiveness and conformity in the Confucian culture of learning) and value different classroom etiquettes.

Due to these fundamental differences, it would appear to be hard to sweep away the traditional practices and implant a student-centred approach in their place. Before implementing any change, education policy-makers should bear in mind that a methodology is only effective to the extent that teachers and students are willing to accept and implement it in good faith, and that whether it is accepted or not is largely determined by the set of values and beliefs that these teachers and students have been socialised into. This problem may have arisen because Vietnamese educators are mostly concerned about imposing learner-centred pedagogies on students and expecting them to change their way of learning accordingly rather than with providing students with the experiences that will help them to change. A large amount of literature on educational change has argued that such approaches to learning should not be imposed because they would most likely be too easily rejected.⁵⁸

Instead of imposing a collection of the principles of the new approach on students and teachers, researchers need to address possible mismatches between the principles of learner-centred pedagogies and local culture and infrastructure conditions. The suggested theoretical framework would include the upgrading of infrastructure to make the local context more supportive of the new learning approach. Furthermore, professional development needs to be provided to local teachers so that they are aware of the disadvantages of the traditional teaching approach and begin to appreciate the advantages of the new approach. Lastly, some principles of the new approach need to be modified to become better adapted to the local context.

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33. Applying Causal Layered Analysis in Order to Rethink Work/Play

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This chapter explores possible futures for an Intercultural Work Integrated Learning (WIL) through the application of scenario profiling and CLA. The immediate context is the course on Intercultural Entrepreneurship for Sustainable Development at University West at Trollhättan which took place in 2009.

Introduction and Context

We seek to explore a way of learning that relates to the growth of a rhizome: learning webs of conviviality/playgrounds for new stories in relation to an annual seminar focusing on Interculturality and Sustainability at University West. The webs of conviviality we theorise, following Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari,¹ as rhizomes. For Deleuze and Guattari, the rhizome is an organic analogue for how the cultural process unfolds, folds and patterns in the most creative and unpredictable ways. Cultural encounters are definitely

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rhizomic, so we chose the theme of Collaborative Playgrounds In-between for our 2009 seminar. In this seminar, we incorporated divergent voices from Tanzania, Bolivia, India, Australia, Uganda and Sweden.² As these voices flowed together a chorus emerged in which biographies, as lines of flight across both space and time, wove together.

The Intercultural seminar in June 2009 started off with a three day session (Monday–Wednesday) on rural education. The theme *A Collaborative Playground In-between* was investigated in an Open Space³ manner in which participants created their own content for discussion without prior planning and without expectation of “success”. The topics covered varied widely and included sessions on “Proverbs”, “City soil—on growing in cities”, “A silent walk in the forest”, “Footsteps to sustainable energy”, “An intercultural play about ideas of learning”, “Storytelling—a tour around Ed looking for traces of old and new stories”, “Cooking”, “Meditative dance”, “Reasons for optimism” and “Costume design”.

The last two days of the seminar (Thursday-Friday) were more formal and were held at University West. On the first day participants were met by Professor Sven-Eric Liedman who, through a TV screen, told a mysteriously growing number of teddy bears about the importance of play. On the following day, Intercultural Communication based on various projects that have emerged within the networks and as a result of previous seminars was investigated.

In the middle of the seminar we opened doors to a spacious and quiet “inter-space” room with its walls covered with blank paper. In the afternoon we met in this open space “in-between” and focused on the recurring themes that had emerged in earlier discussions. After a physical warm-up, the walls were filled with themes from the discussions, networking ideas, etc. People wrote, drew, corresponded in an attempt to capture fragments of the process. Cotton threads were used to connect elements and physically represent the myriad connections involved in sustainability work. All this activity was accompanied by music that moved from soft improvisation into joyous and energetic kletzmer. Participants danced and wove around the space.

The “word cloud” (Figure 1) captures something of this outpouring. It consists of a selection of words that were written on the paper that covered the walls of this “inter-space” room. The bigger the font, the more frequently the word was used. The “cloud” can be seen as mirroring the collective consciousness that evolved during the seminar.

These premises capture our commitment to a vision of work-play that is well beyond the pragmatic frames of reference of institutional reasoning. This is not simply an inversion of the common logic of vocational education but an extension of it to its expression as a macro-social process of citizen empowerment. To further such work we turn to futures studies and explore the context of WIL as an ongoing and creative series of context-bound experiences.

Unpacking WIL

As noted in Premise 1, it is common to take the present as a stable field of existence. Education, from this perspective, is designed to maintain and further this stability into the future. The authors argue, however, that any sense of stability is an illusion. This is not a bad thing; it allows us to engage with the present as a dynamic and open set of possibilities. This in turn opens up the future to a wide range of alternatives. Futures thinking is about engaging the present by thinking about these alternatives. In this way the Future is in fact a principle for present action. Futures work is not at all intended to predict the future but rather to stimulate individuals, communities, organisations and institutions to creatively engage with the present in order to generate preferred futures.⁴ Futures thinking is therefore a partisan process driven by value assumptions about the real and about our place in the world.*

This section applies two futures tools to the question of Work Integrated Learning. It does so in order to disturb the present by providing us with some distance from it.⁵ The tools will be used in tandem as they mutually reinforce one another. The first tool is the scenario. Scenarios are essentially thumbnail sketches of possible futures. They can be generated by any individual or group seeking to understand possible trajectories for any current situation. They are a fascinating and multifaceted tool as the scenario symposium hosted in 2009 by the *Journal of Futures Studies*, for example, attests.[†]

With the scenario we will use CLA. CLA will be used in this context as a device for decoding and deepening the scenarios.⁶ This taxonomical application suits the purpose of this analysis. It is worth noting, however, that in workshop encounters CLA is also highly useful as a *process* in which participants work to generate depth within context and to identify points for intervention.

Four Scenarios for WIL

The following four scenarios seek to capture some of the diversity of WIL. They also move from narrower to broader possibilities, taking the reader on

* This line of thought is developed in M. Bussey, 'Concepts and effects: Ordering and practice in foresight', *Foresight*, Vol 16, No 1, 2014.

† See *Journal of Futures Studies*, Vol 13, No 3, 2009, 75–156.

a journey of the imagination and the heart. The authors are committed to expanded futures for WIL and have used scenarios and CLA here to explore some features of a deepened and creative engagement with educational culture. This work links up with our thinking about the intercultural possibilities for WIL and underpins the values work that occurred as we (Bjurström and Sannum) developed both the course on Intercultural Entrepreneurship for Sustainable Development and the Intercultural encounter held in 2009.

Each scenario is followed by a brief outline, which is then translated into a CLA table for added clarity.

Scenario 1: Utilitarian (jobs and cheap labour)	
WIL appears in numerous higher education institutions as a response to a range of drivers:	
1. Students, as pragmatists, want to take courses that increase their employability (nothing new there), so institutions remain creatively competitive in offering courses that integrate workplace learning into the students' learning package.	
2. This process of self-selection for WIL is further encouraged by employers pushing for inexpensive labour, experience, relevant practice and knowledge that is not impeded by abstract (irrelevant) learnings.	
3. As these threads are popular in the press and mainstream media, policy is also shaped to encourage WIL courses that are seen to be relevant and market-oriented.	

This scenario focuses on the practical concerns of institutions and the markets they serve. The emphasis is on job placement and the institutional and funding relationships that facilitate such pragmatic concerns. There is no big picture at work here, rather a practical desire to match students with jobs and to maintain market share. Education is seen in functionalist terms as meeting societal needs and relies on a largely anti-intellectual and vocational mythos linked to simplistic readings of meaning such as that epitomised by the British children's programme *Bob the Builder*.

Table 1. CLA 1—Utilitarian (jobs and cheap labour)

LITANY	Jobs, unemployment, competition, headlines in news
SYSTEM	Vocational education, job-focused curricula, institutions and funding, policy, politics, unions, unemployment, immigration
WORLDVIEW	Education should be practical, work is the true learning, abstract thinking is a waste of time, people are a societal resource
MYTH/METAPHOR	Schools are knowledge factories; life is the best school, " <i>Bob the Builder</i> "

Another possible reading is available to us. That is of the hardened academic engaged in research. Theory building and testing are central concerns for such individuals yet they are also institutional beings with responsibilities for education. For them education is simply the tool with which to build theory. Thus we have scenario 2.

Scenario 2: Idealist (trial theories)	
Academics committed to theories of praxis and experiential learning design courses that place students in work places of their choice. Courses are developed that:	
1. Reflect an ideological commitment to experiential learning and the practical acquisition of skills.	
2. Allow for the testing of such theoretical assumptions through the trial and error of placements and student feedback (both anecdotal and researched).	
3. Explore a range of theoretical assumptions about learning and identity formation in a range of cultural and institutional settings.	

This scenario focuses on academic and disciplinary concerns that underpin course building and delivery. In this context, theory drives the process and students and their experiences afford opportunities to reflect on and develop theory. Pedagogy here is a field in which learning encounters are the laboratories of theorists. The drivers for this are research money and institutional accountability. Theory facilitates understanding of life and students are essentially the blank pages that disciplinary experts draw on. In a funding-driven world the myth here is publish or perish.

Table 2. CLA 2—Idealist (trial theories)

LITANY	Theories, students, employers, workplaces
SYSTEM	Research = money, justification of existence, learning laboratories
WORLDVIEW	Students are blank pages, life-world exists for research, theory enables understanding
MYTH/METAPHOR	“Publish or perish”

Theory is of course necessary for thinking about learning and its encounters, but we argue that it needs to be grounded in wider concerns. The potential for WIL to foster egalitarian and democratic possibilities thus forms the focus of scenario 3.

Scenario 3: Egalitarian-Structuralist (democratic, participatory)

Visions of deeper learning possibilities drawing on the works of Ivan Illich and Paulo Freire lead to the development of learning contexts within student's life-worlds that are expansive and self-affirming. Thus the WIL experience actively fosters a critical appreciation of how we are all implicated in the maintenance of power relationships. Students are held to be co-creators of their learning and hierarchies both educative and work-based are challenged in an effort to enhance the learning potential of any WIL experience.

The focus in this scenario is students and their communities. The system develops decentralised modes of delivery while fostering democratic values and inclusive learning contexts. Learning is seen to be life long and participatory, the individual learner engaging creatively with context. This conscious embracing of student and context is deepened by a commitment to a triple bottom line that validates the social, economic and environmental dimensions of context. The mythos for such a scenario is aptly summed up as "All for one and one for all!"

Table 3. CLA 3—Egalitarian-structuralist (democratic, participatory)

LITANY	Students, community
SYSTEM	Democratic, co-learning, centralised decentralisation, context-specific, triple bottom line
WORLDVIEW	Learning is life long, collaborative, co-creative, participatory; popular authoritarianism
MYTH/ METAPHOR	"All for one and one for all!"

This progressive vision of the potential of engaged and participatory work is taken yet another step forward in our final scenario, which considers the cultural domain of learning to be open, creative and trans-structural in nature. While acknowledging the structural imperatives of context, it suggests that we also need to be conscious of the cultural process in the construction and maintenance of such structures. Thus we have scenario 4.

Scenario 4: Rhizomic Playground (transformative, open)

Realising that students and their teachers are all products of structure, course leaders and participants actively conspire to generate learning contexts that seek to reach beyond the confines of structure and allow for transformative encounters with settings that challenge assumptions and nurture new pathways. Institutions thus act as crucibles of possibility rather than as mediators of dominant social visions. Students become both critically self-aware and co-creatively engaged with their own learning processes. Collaboration is rhizomic with room for surprise and a trust in open ended systems.

As this situation promotes a cultural lens it is alive to the humanness of interaction. Its focus is on individuals and collectivities in co-creation. This is the level of true intercultural encounter where decentralised processes facilitate open-ended structure and a commitment to quadruple bottom line values in which the spiritual domain is included in thinking about the social, economic and environmental dimensions of context. Thus multiplicity defines reality and process is thought of rhizomically. Surprise and openness are underwritten by a mythos that is captured in the famous phrase “Life is like a box of chocolates”.

Table 4. CLA 4—Rhizomicplayground (transformative, open)

LITANY	Many hands, surprise, laughter, tears
SYSTEM	Decentralised and community-based learning, taking risks, quadruple bottom line, creative open structure
WORLDVIEW	Multiplicity defines reality, process is rhizomic, structure always contingent
MYTH/ METAPHOR	“Life is like a box of chocolates”

Reflection

It is easy to think of scenarios like the above four as mapping out alternatives, but to do so would be a mistake. Such scenarios are in fact more like maps of belief systems or archetypes in the constellation of society. The four scenarios are possibilities along the social continuum which traverse an ideological spectrum from the utilitarian and the idealist to the egalitarian and the transformative. We think that education must be pragmatic and that it is designed to meet social needs, thus the utilitarian dimension is a valid one. But on its own it offers a brittle and regressive social practice that disempowers students and their institutions. There is so much more to Work Integrated Learning than such a scenario suggests. In such a view students are simply pawns of capital, knowledge is reduced to information and learning is mistaken for the student’s ability to reproduce information on demand. In essence, the student becomes a piecemeal learner in a world lacking cohesion and larger meaning.

The second scenario looks at WIL from a course coordinator’s perspective. It suggests that students and the learnings they encounter are all part of an academic field trip in which the students are specimens and workplaces are habitats. The academic’s job is to theorise the world and then test their theories on the students. This somewhat improbable setting is, however, a reality in that academics are learners too and all grand encounters in learning are consciously theoretical in nature. Academic disciplines do have something to contribute to learning encounters and need to be consciously invoked in any development of new learning contexts for students. But again, on its own this scenario is overly narrow, with disciplinary knowledge

focused on control and mastery of context and information. The student and indeed the teachers all become goal-oriented and lose sight of the bigger picture.

Is there a bigger picture we ask? Well we hope so; thus scenario three invites us to consider learning as life long and collaborative. This is where theory and practice merge in a socially informed embrace. Praxis, as argued by educator Paulo Freire⁷ is about developing the consciousness of learners—*Concientisation*⁸—it is democratic, inclusive and empowering. It is both an extension of the practical utilitarian concerns of scenario 1 and the theoretical and disciplinary need to understand and shape that are intrinsic to Scenario 2. Both senses of theory and discipline, the epistemological (how we make knowledge and meaning) and Foucauldian (how we internalise this work), are intended here.⁹ Thus Scenario 3 suggests a future for WIL that is critically reflexive in nature and actively committed to empowering both student and context. The learning is interactive and involves students coming to understand that structure is not hegemonic but constructed. The purpose of learning responds to this realisation by actively inviting students to engage with context to build better, individually and collectively emancipatory futures.

Yet beyond structure lies the rhizome, or at least Deleuze and Guattari would have us consider that possibility.¹⁰ Scenario 4 invites us to examine this idea. This scenario reads the utilitarian, the idealist and the egalitarian as processes all constantly in flux. The learner in such a context is becoming conscious of the process-orientation of learning, context and self as self-referential and mutually constructive. The goal of learning here is to transform structure and self—to keep both alive to process and to the becoming nature of learning. Thus learning is based on encounter, openness and an inclination towards playfulness.¹¹ WIL in this scenario facilitates such an outcome by incorporating the transformative possibility of process into students' learning pathways. Thus the practical is moved to the theoretical, which in turn shifts to the participatory and then allows for the immanence of inversion—in which the roles of student, teacher and context are all challenged.¹²

Table 5, below, maps this process and the relationships described above. Essentially it describes pathways to the various levels of learning we just outlined. In this we use CLA to map some of the rhizomic relationships available to us when thinking about WIL—this list is of course but a small sample of a wide range of possibilities. In this Table **Form** refers to how learning appears to the learner whilst **Indicators** are the modality against which a learner measures their success. **Agency** describes how the learner sees themselves as an actor: it points to how identity is expressed/realised. Agency is thus found at all levels of the CLA learning continuum but understood and experienced differently at each level.

In this table we see that information has a place as litany and that learners replicate knowledge, becoming piecemeal learners because they lack context. This context is supplied in the first instance by system in the form of disciplinary bodies of learning such as science, mathematics and history. At this level students are invited to master a body of coherent and self-sustaining knowledge. This is the goal of their studies and thus they are driven to become goal-oriented learners. What drives them are assumptions about learning and its role in the life of the student. Such understandings are epistemological in nature. This is drawn from the level of worldview and relates to the purpose of learning.

Table 5: A CLA of the learning continuum

	Form	Indicators	Agency
LITANY	Information	Replicate	Piecemeal Learner
SYSTEMIC CAUSES	Disciplines	Control/Mastery	Goal-Oriented Learner
WORLDVIEW	Purpose	Building/Change	Interactive Learner
MYTH/METAPHOR	Story	Transformation	Reflexive Learner

Learning in this context is about building a coherent and stable world of meaning. To do this the student interacts with their learning, intuitively understanding that as they learn they become—thus learning is an act of work that shapes and confirms identity. This identity is located in acts of narrative attribution. Here story functions as the ontological root of our being in the world. It generates the microvita that orders identity and purpose.¹³ To change the story (the mimetic patterns that configure meaning) opens the reflexive learner to transformation.

Conclusion

None of these scenarios is likely to be the eventual future but they help us immensely when it comes to formulating questions about current practice. It is important not to let our own incredulity blunt scenario generation. We need to take risks when imagining the future in order to free the mind from its innate conservatism and to create spaces to think about the issues we face, to let them cross pollinate in order to generate richer, more plausible futures. Plausible futures enable our hopes and fears to come into play without suppression. Suppression leads to disowned futures and the diminution of agency. We aim to let our values out to “flex their muscles”. All positive futures are possible futures, so hope is a key resource in this process.¹⁴

Linking the process of scenario building with a CLA methodology allows the researcher to expose existing narrative threads and generate new ones. CLA

is an important tool in the futures field as it helps practitioners develop positive images of the future that are anchored in the real-life aspirations of those stakeholders engaged in the work of social change. CLA recognises that human consciousness itself is the main agent in social change. Institutions, too, as a working product of many consciousnesses, have the capacity to develop foresight in order to best cater to future needs—be they economic, social or personal. As Sohail Inayatullah points out, it is through the interaction of self, other and environment that innovation “from the edge” can occur.¹⁵

The intercultural work promoted in the course at University West attempts to promote such innovation from the edge by affirming non-linear and non-hierarchical rhizomic processes. This work is called forth as the result of intercultural encounter. It is based on a commitment to sustainable development. The rhizome is a broad church and the ways in which this work can be done are limitless. For us it lies in playfulness and the possibilities immanent in context.¹⁶ We believe that creative and open process loosens the bonds of habit (the weight of context) and creates the heart space for such immanence to begin to emerge.

¹ G. Deleuze & F. Guattari (B. Massumi, trans.), *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, London & New York, Continuum, 1987.

² M. Bussey, Å. E. Bjurström, M. Sannum, A. Shambushivananda, M. Bernard, L. Ceruto, M. Denis, A. K. Giri, A. Mukherjee, G. Pervyi & M. V. Pineda, ‘Weaving pedagogies of possibility’, in A. E. J. Wals & P. B. Corcoran (eds.), *Learning for Sustainability in Times of Accelerating Change* (77–90), Wageningen, NL, Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2012.

³ H. Owen, *Open Space Technology: A Users Guide*, San Francisco, Berret & Koehler Publishers, 2008.

⁴ R. A. Slaughter, *Futures Beyond Dystopia: Creating Social Foresight*, London and New York, Routledge/Falmer, 2004.

⁵ S. Inayatullah, ‘Epistemological pluralism in futures studies: The CLA–integral debates’ (eleven articles), *Futures*, Vol 42, No 2, 2010, 99–176.

⁶ M. Bussey, ‘Resistance is not futile: Eescaping the integral trap’, *Futures*, Vol 42, No 2, 2010, 110–114.

⁷ P. Freire (1972), op. cit.

⁸ P. Freire, ‘Cultural action and conscientization’, *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol 68, No 4, 1998, 499–521.

⁹ P. Lather, ‘Research as praxis’, *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol 56, No 3, 1986, 257–277.

¹⁰ G. Deleuze & F. Guattari (1987), op. cit.

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- ¹¹ M. Bussey, 'Causal layered pedagogy: Rethinking curricula practice', *Journal of Futures Studies*, Vol 13, No 3, 2009, 19–32.
- ¹² J. Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1991.
- ¹³ M. Bussey, 'Microvita and other spaces: Deepening research through intuitional practice', *Journal of Futures Studies*, Vol 16, No 1, 2011, 137–150.
- ¹⁴ M. Bussey et al. (2012), op. cit.
- ¹⁵ S. Inayatullah (ed.), *The Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) Reader: Theory and Case Studies of an Integrative and Transformative Methodology*, Tamsui, Tamkang University Press, 2004.
- ¹⁶ M. Bussey, 'Six shamanic concepts: Exploring the *between* in futures work', *Foresight*, Vol 11, No 2, 2009, 29–42.

34. Futures Theatre and Causal Layered Analysis

Sabina Head*

In this chapter it is argued that storytelling and live performance are useful for communicating futures content and for engaging the audience through a greater variety of the senses; thus showing future scenarios existing in real time, with real people, in a concrete, functioning world, if a temporary one. It also shows ways in which CLA reveals a performed story's depth of innovation, offering spaces to examine dialogue and action that display behaviour informed by discourse and underlying beliefs and metaphors. Encouraging playwrights to add to the examples of dramatic works examined here is a project worth pursuing if they can initiate and inform debate about our possible futures as part of a broad democratic process.[†]

Introduction

One function of futures studies, according to Arthur C. Clarke is to “stretch the mind”.¹ This feature of futures studies can be exploited in creating and sharing “concrete” visions of the possible in a theatrical performance.

Clarke’s description of mind stretching is one aim of Futures Theatre, a genre dedicated to presenting performances of scenes from scenarios on stage, for audiences to consider and debate as they ask the question “how are we to live?”[‡] It is possible to explore the extent of mind stretching in a performance by using causal layered analysis on the dialogue and action. The CLA matrix can be used to reveal at what depth of thought we may feel the stretching. It may be felt when ideas challenge the beliefs and framing metaphors that we are comfortable with—how we see the world; or if it suggests power struggles between discourses that we represent and have internalised.

This paper is partly in response to issues outlined by futurists Jarratt and Mahaffie in communicating their work to their clients and the public.²

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† A version of this article was published as ‘Forward theatre and causal layered analysis’, *Journal of Futures Studies*, Vol 17, No 1, 2012, 41–56.

‡ For more on Futures Theatre, see Head, S, ‘Forward theatre, an introduction’, *Journal of Futures Studies*, Vol 16, No 2, 2011, 17–34.

Thompson describes the ability of great communicators to “build bridges, or create common ground” with audiences.³ Stories are an effective bridging device. In this article I examine some storytelling techniques, as well as a particular type of storytelling, or “story showing”: live theatrical performance, examining three examples through the lens of CLA to discover levels of “stretching” provided by the playwright in the performance.

Storytelling

The value and relevance of stories to futures work with the public is partly due to the observation that “we more easily identify with events unfolding than we can with philosophical principles”, according to Thompson, who adds that people remember material if they are told stories rather than hearing abstract content.⁴ McCarthy and Hatcher go further, advising speakers to use stories as “strategies for committing pieces of their presentation to listeners’ memories”.⁵ Thompson emphasises that “...parable, anecdote and storytelling are really the most powerful form of communication, in the sense of the audience being most easily able to project itself right into the story”.⁶ Author Stephen King agrees: “When the reader hears strong echoes of his or her own life and beliefs, he or she is apt to become more interested in the story”.⁷

Furthermore, Jarratt and Mahaffie recognise that there are already powerful stories “lodged in people’s subconscious”, suggesting that the notion of reframing take this into account, proposing that “we need to have equally powerful new stories to gain people’s attention”. These stories need to “make strong enough connections to people’s worldviews, that they succeed against the frames and stories that people already have”.⁸ Then it is possible to encourage people to think differently. In working with clients, Jarratt and Mahaffie have made the story more central to communicating about the future.

McCarthy and Hatcher emphasise the need to lead the listener clearly “from word to image, image to idea, idea to concept”,⁹ reminding us that “verbal images also have emotional power”.¹⁰ Similar structures may be used in storytelling. Thompson suggests that if a “well-told story” involves feelings, then “people will remember what you say”.¹¹ He regards emotional energy as a main ingredient in the historical success of “great social movements, great businesses and great ideas”.¹² Kenny advises setting up an “emotional field or tone” in order to “arouse people”,¹³ outlining the broad emotional smorgasbord available: “all the way from irritation, anger, resentment and conflict on one end, down to the nice emotions like sentimentality, patriotism, goose bumps; the sort of things which happen in soap opera. Any kind of emotion will do”.¹⁴ McCarthy and Hatcher advise: “do not be afraid to explore any emotional appeals you can incorporate”,¹⁵ since not only do listeners respond with feeling to ideas, but also “as we all suspect at certain

times, most important decisions are made on the basis of emotional, not rational, commitment”.¹⁶

But stories should not be complicated, particularly if the audience is only listening and viewing without repeated access to a written copy. Thompson suggests that “the simpler the story, the clearer the point you make”, and furthermore, that “the right story can make the profound simple, not simplistic”,¹⁷ a point worth considering since some futures content tends to the abstract.

Thus stories encourage people to relate more closely to the scenario presented, creating new frames of reference for audiences to experience them imaginatively and emotionally. They offer descriptions of events that unfold in front of the audience; emotion is an essential ingredient. Stories appear more solid when demonstrated in three dimensions and in motion, with people interacting and showing the story rather than telling it, but still the events presented in the story are not unstructured or irrelevant: they have been created; crafted and chosen for the presentation. The stories we can actually view, use the visual unfolding of the event “as it happens” to richly engage us in the narrative—a more concrete, personal, theatrical event.

Stories as performance

Putting futures stories on stage for audiences is a way of building a bridge to them, partly because such presentations contain specific and concrete elements, like those described by Klaic: “live protagonists, spatial organisation, a determined duration, and the degree and kind of lighting”. He stresses the physicality of stage performance, showing the situation presented as a “functioning world” on stage.¹⁸ It achieves a temporary realism. But although the situation may suggest a functioning world, this realism needs help to reach an audience. As Shurtleff says, a dramatic performance must have “heightened reality, selective truth, made dramatic by... the actor”.¹⁹ The stories shown could be scenes from a futures scenario; they may present innovations that require new ways of thinking at different depths. CLA creates a space in which to examine any new thinking, and offers levels for categorising depth of thought.

CLA for analysing performance

CLA may be used in a dramatic context to analyse the actions, reactions and dialogue of characters (individual and group) in a crafted performance. Characters are recognised as taking part in, and being affected by, *events* at the litany level. Their actions, past and present, may be part of the level 2 individual and social *causes* that influence the events at level 1. The characters also have at level 3 their own various *worldviews* (often in conflict with each other), allied to power structures that are institutionalised or struggling, depending on which discourse is dominant in the storyline. Supporting these worldviews are the characters’ own separate beliefs at the

fourth level: *metaphor*. The institutions with their belief systems portrayed and represented by individuals in any drama, may bear no resemblance to actuality: therein lies the possibility of challenges, offering new ways of building human relationships, behaviours and organisations.

Here CLA is applied to three pieces—two short plays and one extract from a longer work. Each play may be seen as a future scenario in action, offering a picture of new possibilities to audiences at the time of their first production. CLA is used to examine the level of critique and challenge made to the existing social context, as well as the presented future, if it happens. The plays critique partly because their situations are new, suggesting that change is possible, and partly through inviting contrast to the status quo at the time. The chosen plays explore change at deeper levels of the CLA matrix, rather than merely including some new technology, unexamined in its implications, alongside current patterns of thought, behaviour and beliefs, as is often the case in futuristic films currently screened.

That said, the application of CLA has been modified a little for use in the analysis of dramatic action: level 3 is seen as active in that, during the movement and speech of a performance, we see not only the characters' discursive assumptions but the physical and verbal enactment of these assumptions of power unfolding before the eyes of the viewer, causing effects and reactions at other levels as we watch. Thus at level 3 CLA we see the display *and use* of power as each individual employs it to gain their own ends, enacting the conflict that arises when discourses clash, as they often do.

Power—The engine of discourse at level 3

Inayatullah suggests creating new CLA categories “if a discussion does not fit into our neat categories of litany, social causes, worldview, and metaphor and root myth”.²⁰ He also states that “CLA, as developed, is a sociological tool. However, it can be used to unpack individual perspectives”.²¹ Terminology more closely related to individual perceptions and behaviour (real or fictional) includes “precipitating action” for level 2²² and “actionable steps [that]... are easy to note at the first two layers”;²³ these being the litany of events and their social causes that are easily identified. The level of worldview/discourse has also been labelled here as ‘power/influence’ to include more specific reference to the actions of the individuals and their wielding of power in the story. According to Weedon—“power is a relation. It inheres in difference and is a dynamic of control, compliance and lack of control between discourses and the subjects constituted by discourses, who are their agents”. Performers clarify and simplify the relations for the sake of the audience's understanding, not necessarily in the abstract, but through action on stage. We see what Weedon describes enacted by individuals: “power is exercised within discourses in the ways in which they constitute and govern individual subjects”.²⁴ The term power/influence is useable in the

CLA matrix because it applies to individuals who are influenced personally by the social forces of discourse, and who make efforts to influence others. It seems more practical, applicable to action than the societal term ‘discourse’, which includes the broader field of ideological assumptions. Foucault suggests that power relations may be understood as “a means by which individuals try to conduct, to determine the behaviour of others”.²⁵ In this article power is accepted as an integral part of discourse, the energy by which discourse acts towards others. In terms of human interactions, Shurtleff states that “competition is the life and breath of all relationships”.²⁶

Power as status transactions between individuals

Sawicki notes that “Foucault defines discourse as a form of power that... can attach to strategies of domination as well as to those of resistance”.²⁷ The use and display of power by individuals in relation to one another is described by Johnstone as “dominance and submission”, or rather, fluid levels of “status”.²⁸ He states: “in reality status transactions continue all the time. In the park we’ll notice the ducks squabbling, but not how carefully they keep their distances when they are not”.²⁹ Power relations between individuals or groups, according to Johnstone, are so much a part of human interaction, that “there (is) no way to be neutral”;³⁰ that in human behaviour, “every sound and posture implies a status”.³¹ Power relations as described by Foucault, then, are echoed in Johnstone’s status transactions, which continually demonstrate what he terms the ‘see-saw’ principle: “I go up and you go down”.³² Similarly, Johnstone says, one should “understand that we are pecking-order animals and that this affects the tiniest details of our behaviour”.³³ Status transactions between individuals are a basic feature of character relationships, and are constantly changing; the gaps are sometimes small, sometimes large. Maximum status gaps (and their swift reversals) are highlighted in broad comedy, featured in the third play analysed here.

Thus the term power/influence is used to describe the actions, reactions, and dialogue of characters in scripts, as representatives of different discourses. It is used for individual application and perception of the effects of discourse as they are felt and seen by characters, and as they are felt and seen by audiences who watch individuals constantly moving on the see-saw of status transactions, continually rising and falling, engaging audiences through the longitudinal portrayal of Foucault’s strategic power ‘games’³⁴ in action, the ever-changing flow of energy among personalities.

The ingredients of character include status, purpose, and attitude. Status may refer to the broader social class and related discourse of the character, but also the way a character behaves towards others in personal interaction; their personal sense of self-importance relative to others.³⁵ High-status behaviour (usually a firm voice, upright stance, direct eye contact, deliberate movements) demonstrates the superiority of one person relative to another; similarly, low-status behaviour (a downcast head, hesitant speech, infrequent

eye-contact, slumped shoulders, and fidgety movements) shows the person as under-confident, treating the other as more important—but only in that particular situation. Later, the same people may swap behaviours, if events warrant it. Thus the shy apprentice lacks confidence with a workmate, but assumes a higher status than the same person when showing considerable expertise in a sport outside the work environment, demonstrating Johnstone's "see-saw".³⁶ In life and in performance, assumptions of status govern how a character 'plays the game'; how they relate to others in their games.

If I am glowing with success after a well-received presentation, my status is raised relative to my colleagues. If, on the way home in my car, I am pulled over by a police officer, my status is considerably lower relative to the officer. If I only get a warning instead of a fine, my status rises a little in relation to the officer, but is not higher than theirs, and so on. Our personal status is constantly changing, usually only by small increments throughout the day. Audiences are interested in seeing characters affect each other's status, even if the difference made is only slight. We are interested in watching the ebb and flow of power, the competition for gaining it, and the swing of the seesaw as characters vie for a higher position in their activities. Status itself may or may not be the main story topic, but it is always involved in human interaction, and status transactions (the competition for higher status) are a vital ingredient of many stories.

I will now apply CLA to three different works to show its flexibility in performance analysis. Status is given particular attention as a focal point of discussion relating to level 3 (discourse/worldview). The analysis in this chapter is done only with reference to the written script of the plays rather than a viewing of a performance, but here a script is assumed to be a set of instructions for a performance; dialogue plus action (stage directions). All scripts function as demonstrations of future scenarios. Stage directions are physical events specified by the playwright.

CLA applied to the final scene of *A Doll's House*

This play, written in 1879 by Henrik Ibsen, focuses on Nora, who awakens to her previously unexamined situation as wife to Torvald and mother of three children. During the play she becomes disillusioned and dissatisfied with his controlling patriarchal attitudes, and her own naïveté.

CLA is used to analyse the progress of the final climactic conversation between Nora and Torvald; as the scene progresses, their discussion deepens, travelling down from the upper CLA layers until finally the fourth level of metaphor is employed by the playwright. Nora and Torvald begin exchanging their contrasting interpretations of events at the litany level. Nora describes her view of the cause of her complaints (Torvald's control over most aspects of her life). Although these pertain to her in particular, her

story was a universal one in their social context at the time (late 19th Century middle-class Norway). Thus level two, social causes, acts as their arena. Neither understands the other here either; the discussion then progresses to level 3, worldview. At this point, the dominant patriarchal discourse Torvald embodies is newly challenged by Nora's fledgling feminist discourse, as she questions his authority and that of the legal system and church which support it. However no mutual understanding is reached until each describes their beliefs at level 4: she sees herself first as an individual; he sees her as a wife and mother. To complete the picture, they discover that they are emotionally at odds with one another; she does not love him anymore, and he understands the marriage is over in spite of his love for her. There is no more to discuss; she leaves him immediately. This analysis does not delve into the complexities of their arguments, but it does serve to demonstrate the application of CLA to this short section. It could be applied to other aspects of the work, perhaps one character's behaviour and attitudes; perhaps the entire plot; perhaps Norway's legal system at the time. The possibilities with CLA of furthering an understanding of the play and its considerable effect on the social context are rich.

Status in *A Doll's House*

Status in this chapter is seen as continually changing power behaviour in relationships. The status transaction see-saw shows Nora at the start of the play, placating and submissive (playing low status) while Torvald (playing high status), treats her as his adorable but silly minion. The audience watches the see-saw reversing in the final scene as Torvald's status sinks; he grows more submissive as Nora's status goes up, culminating in her final act of very high status—his complete exclusion from her life, which he neither wants nor expects.

The characters' status is drawn from the playwright's observations of middle class society, though he uses the precepts that would be identified by Shurtleff a century later and heightens reality, presents selective truth, and aims for believability, at least until he smashes this interpretation by having Nora stand up for herself and question Torvald's authority. This action was unbelievable to most contemporary audience members. Status as portrayed in the play reflected real life marital power relations, which in turn portrayed a larger scale patriarchal discourse. Thus at CLA level 3, power is embodied and brought into focus by the dominant discourse and its challenger. The play raised a storm of controversy in its first production, and was banned in at least one country; another insisted the ending be rewritten with Nora repenting and remaining. However, this kind of impact is now rare in theatre, especially in a highly mediatised postmodern climate.

The play's futuristic features are limited to the final scene, when Nora takes the shocking (in 1879) step of valuing her individuality above that of her role of wife and mother, making the metaphor powerful by acting upon it and

leaving the entire family, probably for ever. This kind of discussion had never been made public in her social context, and certainly had never been performed in a theatre to be shared with audiences. In this regard, too, it was futuristic, and certainly the extreme reactions to it showed its radical effect in ‘stretching’ the middle class mentality at a deep level. The fact that it happened in a naturalistic domestic setting does not detract from its futures impact.

CLA applied to *A Number*

In the 1991 play *A Number* by Caryl Churchill,³⁷ cloning has been carried out using a human boy as the original. Multiple copies have been made, with varying effects on the willing (or unknowing) participants. At level 1, the litany of events begins the play as the 35 year old Bernard (B2) confronts his father Salter with his discovery from hospital records that he is one of a number of clones, and that he is not Salter’s original son but a copy, apparently created in a deal between Salter and the hospital. In scene 2, the original child, 40 year old Bernard (B1) visits his father to discover the reason for his rejection (it transpires that Salter was a neglectful and at times abusive parent) and subsequent emotional difficulties that made him resentful, vindictive and violent. Salter gave up B1 as a four year old, and paid to have a copy of him made using the new cloning process. B1 calmly announces that if B2 were to have any children he would kill them. In scene 3, B2 plans to run away because after meeting B1, he is afraid that his life is in danger. He discovers that his mother killed herself, leaving the two year old B1 with Salter, who couldn’t manage the child, gave him away, and tried again with a new clone. This time Salter’s parenting was more skilful and B2 developed a healthier personality. In scene 4, B1 visits Salter to inform him that he has in fact killed B2. Salter confesses his poor parenting and contempt of B1 as a child, and that he had an alcohol problem at the time. In scene 5, B1 has now killed himself as well and Salter meets another clone of B1, 35 year old Michael, who cheerfully welcomes him, happy with his own life and origins.

At level 2, the social causes (newly emerged) are advanced technology with the capacity to create that makes for healthy genetic copies of complex organisms, and the passing of laws that permit multiple human cloning by individual request (regardless of inadequate parenting history, as Salter demonstrates). He changes his story frequently, but claims that “one was the deal” and that he had been “ripped off”.³⁸ At level 3, it appears that human replication is simply a matter of money; legal and medical systems in the social context permit and perform it. At level 3 too, we see status transactions between the characters as they grapple with the consequences of the cloning. These are on a personal level, and are not closely linked to the discourse, as seen in the previous play; they are, however, part of the fallout as Salter’s sons come to terms with their father’s actions. For each clone, the

answer is different. How they deal with the futuristic scenario forms the focus of the drama.

The status transaction seesaw shows Salter constantly playing lower status to his two sons as he tries to avoid admitting the truth about his complicity in rejecting B1 and then cloning him. Salter is submissive towards both B1, who threatens violence to raise his own status, and B2, whose knowledge of Salter's guilt raises *his* status. The status gap between Salter and Michael is not as wide as it is with the others; Salter has no guilt about his actions, only a need to know that others have suffered as he has suffered. He allows himself to show anger (a high status behaviour) because Michael does not understand his questions. Human behaviour is shown to be realistic, at times selfish, ignorant, and lacking insight, much as Kenny in Thompson describes the kind of emotions that are shown in soap operas³⁹—the story is interesting and engaging when emotions are involved. However status transactions here are not a key part of the future scenario suggested by the playwright; but are used as part of a story that demonstrates some of the possible effects if the depicted scenario should come to pass. There is no particular challenge to any dominant discourse, but questions are raised about the innovation portrayed—its effects are given strength and meaning through a story. What kinds of questions does the performance raise? The value of human individuality? The rights of replicated humans? The rights of clones? The financial implications of the process (clearly available in the play to a person who is not rich)?

At level 4, we see new metaphors that show the replication of individuality as being purchasable by another (and not necessarily the person being replicated). Human beings are seen as commodities in this context; the human rights issues raised include the right to create clones for research, rights of access to other clones and the right to refuse cloning, among many. The future is seen as ordinary in its setting, a living room. At levels 3 and 4 the audience is given fuel for discussion about the implementation of a legal system that supports medical involvement in the process of artificially creating new humans, and about the metaphors presented above. The playwright has given the audience an opportunity for thinking, sharing their responses, perhaps even taking action to encourage this new technology, prevent it, or shape its management.

In terms of futures thinking, the final scene turns the dystopian message upside down when Salter meets the third clone, Michael. Salter expects a similar litany of tragic consequences, but Michael contentedly describes his love for his wife and family. He is “fascinated” at the news of his origin, finding it “funny” and “delightful”,⁴⁰ and he is pleased that he shares all but a fraction of his genetic makeup with other humans, as well as 90% with chimpanzees, and 30% with lettuces—“it makes me feel I belong”. He realises Salter misses his other sons. Though Michael jokes about the number of clones, “there’s nineteen more of us”, he feels the need to

apologise when asked if he is happy and likes his life: “I do yes, sorry”.⁴¹ For him, the scene ends on an optimistic note; the word “dystopia” is not applicable to his life. A balance of viewpoints in the scenario is shown in the playwright’s choice of characters: the weak money-hungry father, who rejected his first son, probably made money out of the cloning and misrepresented his actions and selfish motives (which the audience sees clearly); the unsuspecting clone B2 shocked by the news; the resentful and vindictive original B1; and the placid, easy-going Michael, excited and charmed at the discovery of his origins. The futures aspects lie mainly in the viability of cloning rather than in the matters of day to day living; this is presented as a simple western lounge room in an unspecified country, and references to the outside world offer nothing out of the ordinary in terms of setting.

CLA applied to *Socks Go in the Bottom Drawer*

In the half-hour comedy *Socks Go in the Bottom Drawer*, two women and their daughter visit a zoo to see a fascinating exhibit—a man.⁴² He shows off for them and flirts with the girl, who is curious but unimpressed by his attempts at seduction. The man’s keeper then tells him a story of the distant past; “Once upon a time, the world was ruled by men”.⁴³ She tiptoes out, leaving him to sleep.

The following discussion focuses on the play’s links with sexual mores twenty years after its 1991 production, as an example of a futures play that, with the benefit of hindsight applied today, has demonstrated its futures orientation with regards to same sex parenting. The plot does not progress through the levels of CLA in its futuristic aspects; rather, the audience is presented with detailed visual information about the new situation at all levels before a word is uttered. The play opens with this image: a man in a business suit, with chair, table, wardrobe and exercise bike; all in a cage under a sign reading “Homo Sapiens (male)”, and another reading “Do not feed the animals”.⁴⁴ The visual metaphor at level 4 is startling, even shocking, but easily comprehensible. Men in this world are rare curiosities, controlled and kept apart from the rest of the (presumably female) population. The implication is that they are powerless yet a matter of sufficient interest for public display. Which audience members would be amused and entertained by this vision? Who would be deeply insulted, even before the dialogue begins? What would be the audience response if the gender of this character was reversed? In what social contexts would the image be acceptable, or banned, or laughed at? Certainly the litany of events would give many men cause for complaint. Furthermore, he shares the cage with a life-size inflatable doll, which he patronises in a one-sided conversation, in one scene inventing her contribution (apparently she has complained about his holiday plans) and he responds to it with impatience: “Oh for God’s sake don’t sulk Samantha. You know it gets right up my

nose... It's my money. Get it? Mine. (*puffs himself up*) I'm the one who wears the trousers, see. I'm the breadwinner, I'm the bossman, I'm... (*triumphant pause*)... God. (*a self-indulgent tone*) A benevolent God. A God who cares".⁴⁵ The contrast of metaphors is extreme, perhaps even offensive. However, the overriding mood is comic, making the content ridiculous and light-hearted. At the metaphor level, his belief in his own superiority is publicly voiced, but inside a cage, the verbal and the visual are placed in clearly drawn opposition; and the visual metaphor is the more powerful for it. Adam (the man) is trapped; all his posturing will not allow him any freedom. His discourse is made to appear ridiculous by exaggeration.

The causes of the disappearance of the male population are not specified in the play; questions about any history of the situation remain unanswered. Adam himself accepts it but, at level 3, childishly maintains the fiction that he is "in charge". The keeper panders to this perception and comforts him after Lucy good-naturedly rebuffs his advances. He is upset: "She thought I was harmless". The keeper replies, "Of course you're not, Adam. Why else do we keep you in a cage?" He seeks reassurance: "I am dangerous, aren't I?" She agrees: "Yes, petal; you are".⁴⁶ Adam clings to his traditional patriarchal discourse, using it to subdue his wife/doll, and also to attempt to seduce Lucy. His behaviours are thrown into strong relief by Lucy's unexpected responses; she has a detached and curious attitude towards him. His keeper punishes him and mothers him as though he were a small child. Their responses to him portray a matriarchal discourse in which he is kept firmly controlled. He must give up his doll before the visitors arrive, and when he refuses, he is zapped into submission by remote control. The status transaction see-saw here shows great status gaps; the see-saw moves to extreme highs and lows, but within the context of being caged. Adam shows high status behaviour towards the doll and occasionally towards the keeper. The keeper shows high status behaviour towards him, threatening physical retribution if he does not comply. He demonstrates maximum gaps as he changes from ultra-boss to pathetic little boy and back again at dizzying speed. The visitors show high status as they treat him like a caged animal. He shows high status to them by ignoring them or flirting with them, though they trump this by regarding his behaviour with mild curiosity. In this play, the status transactions have everything to do with the story, which is based on maximum status gaps and a reversal of the patriarchal discourse. Adam's behaviour is tightly controlled by his female keeper, who "patronises" or "matronises" him, offering small rewards for good behaviour, though he is expected to exhibit masculine superiority behaviours for the entertainment of the (female) zoo visitors. In this play, the status transactions are intended to be comic, to make the audience laugh.

The metaphor throughout is one of man as a quaint curiosity, of no actual use but as a pet to be occasionally indulged in small ways, including the pretence that he is powerful and dangerous. Clearly women control this world; they

are beings of power and influence, functioning without men. The metaphors are thrown into contrast in an extreme reversal of traditional male and female roles, pushing macho male behaviour into the spotlight. The effectiveness of any metaphor in carrying meaning directly from the heart of an issue depends on the audience. Metaphors are contextual entities; whether historically established and widely accepted, or ephemeral and created for a particular occasion, visual or verbal (often all of these types appear in a single story), they form a bridge between the presenter and the audience, but the interpretation of their meaning can be a free and individual process. A feminist audience may interpret Adam's incarceration as anything between a humorous critique of patriarchal behaviour, and a sort of utopia, as women clearly lead their lives fully, without reference to men at all.

According to Mackay, in laughter audiences are giving an emotional response "almost in spite of themselves" as they are "caught up in the message" through comedy. He recommends humour for "unlocking the emotions", and beginning with amusing touches to "get people into the mood of relaxation". Telling a story with humour in it, "finding the absurd in ourselves and the world" works well because it is "the most infectious communication technique. It bonds the speaker to the audience through the sharing of laughter", and more: it can also function as "our way of dealing with problems".⁴⁷ Along with the emotional response of laughter, a comic distance is maintained and the thereby audience can more easily appreciate the social comment and critique.

Distance renders the content of communication less challenging for audiences, allowing access to ideas without necessarily involving them personally. They are merely listening to a speaker or viewing a performance, and need not get too close. Klaic reminds us that if a play is set in the future, this uses the "time of action as a distancing device, so that already a future setting may become less confrontational and further from 'reality'",⁴⁸ though it may also invite "questions about the quality of this future and its nature"⁴⁹ and questions about current situations if they are compared to this future. In Booker's play, the parents are gay females. If the situation is more extreme in its difference from today, the greater will be the distance between the story and the audience. Comic distance makes the future literally laughable—audiences see it as worthy of ridicule. The ideas are still presented, however, and the audience has responded emotionally to them, even if satirically. Thus humour has a twofold function: it provides distance between the audience and the portrayed situation through laughter, and it creates an emotional bridge with it at the same time.

Distance and bridging in the plays

Bridging elements invite emotional responses and interpretation; distancing places the action under scrutiny for observation and comment. The bridging devices in Ibsen's play are those elements familiar to audiences of its time.

The play was set in contemporary times, containing no innovations but reiterating the familiar ground of the domestic social context through incidents within the audience's experience. Ibsen did not set the play in the future, and this gives the sense that the situation presented could arise any day from the time of that first production. Distancing devices include the theatrical frame, the proscenium arch behind which the action happens, and the "missing" "fourth wall" of the scene which renders the characters and their actions visible to the audience, though not vice versa. Distance is also provided by the presentation of two characters' different viewpoints on the same issue, so the audience may choose where their sympathies lie. In the play *A Number*, bridging devices include mundane domestic settings which do not suggest a future time or exotic location. Distancing devices include the progression of existing cloning technology, new ways of achieving human reproduction, considerations of the rights of human clones, and offering more than one viewpoint on the situation, so that the audience can compare viewpoints. Some bridging aspects of Booker's play as first presented in 1991 include familiar (though heightened) stereotypes of masculine sexual behaviour towards women, probably accepted as 'normal' in an English-speaking, western context, with females as carers for males in a domestic setting (though not in complete physical control), and mundane characters with matter-of-fact attitudes about the situation which they accept as an everyday one in this functioning world. Distancing aspects (comic or otherwise) include bizarre juxtapositions such as the domestic setting contained in a zoo cage, having the male accept this while living his domestic fantasy with a doll, and using a female zookeeper as a professional carer who provides information on the species' "habits". Booker also uses extravagant comic elements in dialogue and action, implying that the writer is not really serious about wiping out half of humanity; rather, she is isolating some of its sexual and domestic behaviour for critical examination by placing it behind bars and putting it under quasi-scientific examination.

Finding a Balance

The performance must find a balance between bridging, which encourages audience involvement, and distancing, which invites a cool appraisal of the events portrayed issues and the issues they raise. Once the audience is armed with knowledge and understanding, based on their involvement and interpretation of the performance, the job of the performers is done. After this, as Mackay says: "It's what the audience does with the message that determines the outcome, not what the message does to the audience".⁵⁰ Mackay separates the intellectual and emotional *effect* on the audience from any subsequent *action* they choose to undertake as a result of viewing the performance, and describes the influence of the performance in terms of what the audience chooses to do if inspired by the message to initiate action to achieve *outcomes*. For example, the initial effects of *A Doll's House* on audiences impelled some people to ban the play, some to force the author to

rewrite the ending, and others to be guided by Nora's example in their own lives.

Futures plays may make the *present* appear remarkable, and if they do, the audience is invited to see the present as not necessarily 'normal'; Booker's play draws attention to stereotyped aspects of male behaviour, and through doing so, invites critique, which may open a space for alternative choices in behaviour. Equally important, the plays make the future debatable; Churchill's play presents a variety of viewpoints on human cloning, and Ibsen's play could still generate a variety of reactions if performed in repressive societies, while Booker's play presented an alternative lifestyle in a social setting that, at the time, was not supportive of same-sex parenting. The story ideas in futures plays generate public responses; whether condemnation, approval, or simply "stretching the minds" of audiences, the key aim is debate about where we are heading.

¹ A. C. Clarke, *Profiles of the Future: An Inquiry into the Limits of the Possible*, London, Orion Books, 2000, 2.

² J. Jarratt & J. B. Mahaffie, 'Reframing the future', *Journal of Futures Studies*, Vol 13, No 4, 2009, 5–12.

³ P. Thompson, *The Secrets of the Great Communicators*, Sydney, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2001.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 37.

⁵ P. McCarthy & C. Hatcher, *Speaking Persuasively*, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 2002, 104.

⁶ P. Thompson, *op. cit.*, 38.

⁷ S. King, *On Writing: A Memoir*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 2000.

⁸ J. Jarratt & J. B. Mahaffie, *op. cit.*, 8.

⁹ P. McCarthy & C. Hatcher, *op. cit.*, 70.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 31.

¹¹ P. Thompson, *op. cit.*, 36.

¹² *Ibid.*, 28.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 29.

¹⁵ P. McCarthy & C. Hatcher, *op. cit.*, 191.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 192.

¹⁷ P. Thompson, *op. cit.*, 47.

¹⁸ D. Klaic, *The Plot of the Future: Utopia and Dystopia in Modern Drama*, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 1991, 46.

¹⁹ M. Shurtleff, *Audition: Everything an Actor Needs to Know to Get the Part*, New York, Bantam Books, 1980, 249.

²⁰ S. Inayatullah, 'Causal layered analysis: Theory, historical context, and case studies', in S. Inayatullah (ed.), *Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) Reader: Theory and Case Studies of an Integrative and Transformative Methodology*, Tamsui, Tamkang University Press, 2004, 44.

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- ²¹ *Ibid.*, 530.
- ²² *Ibid.*, 12.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, 16.
- ²⁴ C. Weedon, *Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1997, 110.
- ²⁵ M. Foucault, 'The ethics of care for the self as a practice of freedom: An interview' (J. D. Gauthier, S. J., Trans.), in J. Bernauer & D. Rasmussen (eds.), *The Final Foucault*, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1987, 18.
- ²⁶ M. Shurtleff, *op. cit.*, 250.
- ²⁷ J. Sawicki, 'Identity politics and sexual freedom: Foucault and feminism', in I. Diamond & L. Quinby (eds.), *Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance*, Boston, MA, Northeastern University Press, 1988, 185.
- ²⁸ K. Johnstone, *Impro: Improvisation and the Theatre*, London, Methuen Drama, 1981, 36.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, 33.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, 37.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, 72.
- ³² *Ibid.*, 37.
- ³³ *Ibid.*, 73.
- ³⁴ M. Foucault, *op. cit.*, 18.
- ³⁵ K. Johnstone, *op. cit.*, 37.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*
- ³⁷ C. Churchill, *A Number*, London, Nick Hern Books, 2002.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, 28.
- ³⁹ P. Thompson, *op. cit.*, 29.
- ⁴⁰ C. Churchill, *op. cit.*, 60.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 62.
- ⁴² C. Booker, *Socks Go in the Bottom Drawer*, revised edition, retrieved 13 April, 2012, from [http://www.bookerplays.co.uk/pdfs/PDFSocksGoInTheBottomDrawer\(Adult\).pdf](http://www.bookerplays.co.uk/pdfs/PDFSocksGoInTheBottomDrawer(Adult).pdf)
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, 15.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.
- ⁴⁷ P. Thompson, *op. cit.*, 47.
- ⁴⁸ D. Klaic, *op. cit.*, 71.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 47.
- ⁵⁰ P. Thompson, *op. cit.*, 29.

Conclusion

Ivana Milojević

The thirty two chapters of this book have dealt with various understandings and applications of CLA, a research method that has so far predominantly been used in the area of futures studies. In this concluding chapter main insights about the method are summarised.

What is CLA?

CLA has been described as a *theoretical framework* which seeks to “problematise existing future oriented thinking” and to explore “the assumptions, ideologies, worldviews, epistemes, myths and metaphors... already... embedded in images, statements or policy-oriented research about the future” (Ramos).^{*} CLA enables more awareness of how futures discourse influences the present and how present actions influence emerging futures. By linking narratives and assumptions to actions, CLA assists in the development of higher level mindfulness about what we do and why we do it. CLA also helps identify ‘used’ and ‘default’ futures, continuations, essentially, of past discourses about the future, which may no longer be valuable or relevant to current or emerging issues. By doing so, CLA creates new spaces wherein preferable and more innovative futures visions and strategies can take hold.

Influenced by post-structural and critical theory, the CLA framework exists within *constructivists’ paradigmatic spaces* in which “subjective multiple realities” are understood as individually and socially constructed (Shevellar). Consequently, CLA enables the insight that how one understands and frames the “problem” in question limits access to the breadth of “solutions” and depth of awareness. CLA also proposes that such limitations can be minimised by the inclusion of multiple worldviews and stakeholder perspectives.

The assumption behind CLA itself is that apparent reality is not discerned from some objectivereality “out there”, but created, co-created and re-created. Things do not exist merely in themselves—meaning that even the strongest trends about the future may not eventuate in a particular future—‘the future’. And even the strongest trends will affect different people and places differently—certainly the meanings people give to trends differ based on their own location in particular discourses. Therefore, occurrences only

^{*} All in-text references are to chapters of this book.

exist once certain actions (or in-actions) take place; future events are premised on actions taken today. This does not mean that “anything is possible” or that “anything goes”; rather, there are limits to what is possible and doable. Ideation—a “pull” of a desired future—is not enough, the ‘weight’ of history and social structures as well as “pushes” towards the future also play an important role.* We and our present moment exist in a particular social and historical context, and this context includes the depth and breadth of futures visions we have inherited. CLA is an *integrative method*, as it provides a structure for the investigation of subjective/objective, past/present/future, agency/structure, and dominance/multiplicity dualisms. It does so by taking into account a multiplicity of discourses, from empirical to symbolic, from dominant to marginalised.

In many ways, CLA confronts and works with *power*. It exposes existing power relationships (Farooqi & Sheraz, Sykes-Kelleher, Hoffman, Vola, Wahi, Kelly) and provides greater clarity about “who is privileged and who is silenced” (Curry & Schultz). While the future is indeed in many ways “an open space”, a “not yet”, a “becoming”, and what “is to come or be”, it is also a space—or a series of numerous and diverse spaces—filled with our ideas and images of it. Commonly, certain images and ideas become “hegemonic” or dominant, and in such ways “colonise” future spaces. These processes then limit actions taken in the present, as people’s behaviour in many ways reflect dominant expectations about the future. Where it gets more complicated—i.e. goes beyond simple causality—is in the realisation that many of those expectations are unconscious and out-dated. Not uncommonly, expectations are more in tune with what has happened or is happening rather than with what may happen—i.e. with a whole range of future possibilities ahead, only some of which are desired. Even more complex is the phenomenon of people behaving in accordance with futures they actually wish to avoid; this too is a result of beliefs about the inevitability of particular futures or of “auto-pilot” actions based on used futures.

The application of CLA exposes these dynamics: tensions, contradictions and vagueness in our collective dealings with futures discourses. It assists us in investigating “power struggles between discourses that we represent and have internalised” (Head). The CLA framework allows for the *challenging of dominant assumptions* about how the world is perceived today and how it will be perceived in the future (Kuah, Chin & Huifen). The task is to take “what appears natural and normal” and show it as “remarkable and problematic” (Shevellar). This is done in order to “critique the present and then create the possibility of alternative futures” (ibid.). By challenging “chronological imperialism”, or the use of particular narratives of the future as a colonising attempt to maintain the status quo (Watson), CLA becomes a

* These forces are identified via another method: the futures triangle.

means to construct narrative futures of truly different possible worlds. It is a “*subversive tactic in the futures field* aiming to ‘produce different ways of knowing... [to] disrupt received wisdoms and the appeal to “common sense” (Watson).

And, if applied as intended, CLA *not only critiques* or exposes dominant imaginings, it also gives space for the *expression of genuine alternative futures*. In other words, it provides a theoretical framework and an opportunity to hear what the previously “unheard... voiceless, marginalised and excluded” (Sykes-Kelleher) bring into conversations about the future. Often, it is what is commonly “not said that is reflective of culture and community” (Bishop, Dzidic & Breen). And what is not said—an “elephant in the room” or the “unknown known”—may indeed hold crucial information about an issue in question. CLA therefore represents a “useful tool in policy development as it allows acknowledgment of what is explicit, but also the implicit and tacit aspects of local and broader culture” (Bishop, Dzidic & Breen). Such a process becomes easier if marginalised people and cognitive frameworks are intentionally included and considered.

In sum, by its “opening of the present and past to create alternative futures”, CLA *moves us beyond “simply predicting a particular future* based on a narrow empiricist viewpoint” (Hoffman). And yet, despite being firmly linked to post-structural, critical and constructionist theoretical influences, CLA does not disown the empirical. Rather, it embraces the empirical as “true” within its own frames of reference; as “accurate” within its own understandings of reality. Theoretically then, CLA *combines and integrates “empirical, interpretative and critical research traditions”* (Inayatullah, ‘Ageing futures’) within social sciences and futures studies.

The integration of such diverse and often even confrontational theoretical and research traditions is possible by the structure of CLA—the organising of statements and ideas about the future within four layers of analysis.

The Four Layers of CLA

The CLA structure consists of four layers of analysis: litany, system/structure, worldview and myth/metaphor.¹ It can be visualised as both an iceberg and a “cake” (Shevellar). The *iceberg metaphor* focuses on the degree of *visibility* or *invisibility* of each layer of analysis: the litany is more visible within mainstream public discourse than system/structure, which in turn is more visible than the worldview and myth/metaphor layers. Because it is more visible, the litany level also appears more “*real*”, whilst the deeper levels, especially worldview and myth/metaphor, appear more “*imagined*”. Further, the iceberg metaphor is also helpful to understand the *duration* of the discourses analysed: from *shorter term* litany to *longer term* myth/metaphor, and social system/structure and worldview somewhere in between. Lastly, the iceberg metaphor suggests the *depth* of analysis: “The Level of Litany and Systemic Cause narratives can be viewed as *shallow*

empiricist and anecdotal expositions of the *deeper* worldviews” (Wahi). CLA can thus “be aimed to prevent surface level interpretation of an issue, as the layers of analysis facilitate critical thought as to what the deeper, underlying causes of an issue are” (Bishop & Dzidic).

The *cake* or *gateaux metaphor* is best summarised by a community development practitioner quoted in Shevellar:

...there’s all these layers, and you’ve got to have the whole friggin’ thing to taste like a gateaux... you don’t eat the icing without the cake—it doesn’t taste very nice. It’s not the textural experience you’re after. The fork doesn’t go through it all—you’ve got to be able to feel the fork running through it and it folding over. You know you’ve got to keep all those other layers in there, you can’t just have the edifice. And that’s the reality.

As Inayatullah has himself pointed out on numerous occasions, CLA does not argue for excluding the top level of the iceberg or cake. Whilst the litany is indeed more “shallow” or visibly obvious, “all levels are required and needed for fulfilling—valid and transformative—research”.² CLA may place a “higher” value on depth, but [it] does not call for ending up at the deeper levels”.³ Rather, “Movement—up and down levels—is the key. Remaining at the worldview or myth level without giving attention to the systemic causes or to the litany is just as likely a recipe for disaster” (ibid.).

It is by analysing these “multiple layers of the human experience [that] CLA leads to a fuller understanding of the present, and a richer imagination of desired futures” (Kuah, Chin & Huifen). To go beyond “the usual “if-then” analysis of actions and reactions, causes and effects” (ibid.) it is indeed important to go deeper and uncover those more “elemental levels of the human condition” (ibid.), which “Inayatullah sees... as having the greatest potential for the transformation of human life” (Shevellar). Or, in Inayatullah’s words, “deepening our focus by moving from litany to inner story, myth, allows for more potent and transformative change. As we go broader and deeper, the mistakes that created the current...crisis can be understood and alternative futures created” (Inayatullah, ‘Global Financial Crisis’). However, it is once again important to restate that CLA does not argue that the use of metaphor and myth will provide an ultimate answer (Shevellar) or for “excluding the litany and the social in favour of the worldview and the myth/metaphor” (Kuah, Chin & Huifen), Rather, “all layers are deemed necessary in order to conduct valid and transformative foresight research” (ibid.). Therefore, even the deepest layer “simply informs and sits alongside the three [other] layers of analysis” (Shevellar). The best way to visualise CLA is therefore as both an iceberg and a cake, or perhaps as a tree: the litany corresponding to the leaves, system and structure corresponding to branches, trunk to worldviews, and roots to myth and metaphor. All are connected, interdependent and relational; the disparate parts are truly intelligible only as elements of an integrated whole.

Whichever way is chosen to visualise it, CLA's layers are as follows:

Layer 1: Litany

In *Questioning the Future* (2002) and in the 2004 *CLA Reader*, Inayatullah describes the litany in the following manner:

The first level is the 'litany'—quantitative trends, problems, often exaggerated, often used for political purposes— (overpopulation, for example) as usually presented by the news media. Events, issues, and trends are not connected and appear discontinuous. The result is often either a feeling of helplessness (what can I do?), or apathy (nothing can be done!), or projected action (why don't they [i.e. government] do something about it?). This is the conventional level of most futures research that can readily create a politics of fear: this is the futurist as fear-monger, warning: 'the end is near'. However by believing in the prophecy and acting appropriately, the end can be averted. The litany level is the most visible and obvious, requiring few analytic capabilities. It is believed, rarely questioned.

Litany therefore refers to "facts", figures or statements about "empirical reality". Examples include: "10 Profound Ways the World will Change in your Lifetime", "Violent Youth Crime up a Third" (Watson), or, India and Pakistan as "sworn enemies" (Wahi), and "terrorism as constant and ever expanding threat" (Kenny). Solutions to these problems at the litany level may then include: purchasing of new technology, disciplining of unruly youth, nuclearisation and security.

Presented as a-contextual statements or news media headlines about empirical reality, litany statements are most commonly used for political purposes and/or to support a particular worldview. For example, 'The Compelling Link between Autism and the Vaccination Program' headline will not be found in scientific or medical literature but is rather common amongst "alternative" healthpractitioners. Whilst the link between this litany and the worldview—the values and beliefs behind it—is obvious to those outside the particular (anti-immunisation) worldview, it is not to those who hold it. In a similar manner, 'Asylum Seeker Handouts Scrapped: Australian Taxpayers to Save \$25 Million a Year' also reflects a particular (nationalistic, xenophobic, socially conservative, materialistic) worldview but is presented as a purely "factual" statement. Different worldviews and myth-metaphors will, therefore, produce different litany statements (detailed examples of this are presented in Inayatullah's chapters on the futures of ageing and the GFC).

But while there is a multiplicity of litany statements, some are hegemonic: "common sense" and normative approaches as defined by the worldview that dominates. Litany is therefore also about "a buzz of common wisdom and events around an issue" (Curry and Schultz), a "popular imagination... often undifferentiated and monolithic... an impervious understanding of a contrary

viewpoint which psychologists call a self-fulfilling prophecy, feeding into itself to become stronger and more unchangeable” (Wahi). Litany statements are “hard to challenge because they are presented as the “truth” on which the system, worldview or myth rests” (Hoffman). They also centre “on the present and [are] about behaviours” (Bishop & Dzidic).

The trouble with the litany is that it tends to be “somewhat simplistic, a very polarised, rule-based... view of the world” (Graves). It is in general about an “Other-oriented view of the world—they [should/]shouldn’t... and so on—a relentless litany of complaint... an endless blaming of “the Other” without any form of self-reflection or self-analysis, and knee jerk responses via over-simplified categories” (ibid.). Consequently, litany descriptions and analyses produce a perception that the responsibility for change is in the hands of others (“them”, government etc.), or that change is impossible (due to the magnitude of the problem and disconnection from the causes and social/cultural context). Consequently, litany statements commonly generate anger (“why are they not doing something about the problem”) or apathy and helplessness (“nothing can be done”). Alternatively, litany statements may suggest that “change is required at the level of individual—[and is dependent on] “their toughness or their resourcefulness”” (Shevellar). Another issue with the litany is that much “discourse at the litany level contains what Inayatullah calls the “used future””, (Anthony)—one’s own personal view of the future, including the desired future, which has unconsciously been borrowed from someone else or somewhere else but has since been discarded by them.

Nonetheless, the litany is where energy is spent on strategy: “It is surprising how much time and energy is spent by organisations at the “tip of the iceberg” when attempting to solve... dilemma[s]” (Spencer and Salvatico). This is probably due to “the litany level [being] the easiest for participants to respond to” (Conway). It is the ease of understanding and apparent objectivity of evidence behind litany statements that makes them so powerful, despite its problem solving value being rather limited.

As a first step of CLA, it is important to identify the litany and the solutions to the “problem” proposed at the litany level, though it is almost certain that productive solutions are not going to be found at that level. The goal of CLA analysis is therefore to move beyond the litany, after it has been identified and analysed.

Layer 2: System/structure

The second level of CLA takes in the systemic perspective and social causation (Inayatullah, 2004). It focuses on social causes, including “economic, cultural, political and historical factors” (ibid.). These may include: the ageing of the population, rising birth-rates, lack of family

planning, existing technological and transport infrastructure, cultural factors, etc. As Inayatullah further explains, at this level:

Interpretation is given to quantitative data. This type of analysis is usually articulated by policy institutes and published as editorial pieces in newspapers or in not-quite academic journals. If one is fortunate then the precipitating action is sometimes analysed (population growth and advances in medicine/health, for example). This level excels at technical explanations as well as academic analysis. The role of the State and other actors and interests is often explored at this level. While the data is often questioned, the language of questioning does not contest the paradigm in which the issue is framed. It remains obedient to it.⁴

For example, whilst fuel consumption is a problem because of its ecological consequences and the risks associated with peak oil, existing road and transport infrastructure (for example, the number of cars and car factories) influences the continuation of “more of the same” practices. To change the litany of, for example, traffic congestion, the structure of transport must be changed (i.e. beyond the building of more roads and towards the development of alternative traffic patterns).⁵ Another example is provided by Black (in this book) about the link between emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) and systemic factors known to influence their emergence—such as “microbial adaptation and change, human demographics and behaviour, technology and industry, economic development and land use, international travel and commerce and the breakdown of public health measures”. Here too, a change in systemic/structural factors is needed in order to change the litany on EIDs—the litany here composed of the emergence of specific new diseases, the number of infected animals and humans, the severity and duration of infections etc. Yet another example is related to education, wherein issues at the litany level can be linked with systemic causes such as lack of resources, large class size and curriculum coverage (Thanh) or to globalisation, high speed information transformation, existing policies, curriculum design, the generational shift in relation to technology, education systems being teacher-centred, testing, etc. (Wu). As the system/structure changes so does the litany of education, but only some changes at this level are deliberate and even fewer are in line with students’ and educators’ preferred visions of education.

Analysis at the social causes level tends to be “a bit more nuanced, more aware of real-world complications” (Graves). Any sense-making and decision-making at this level will take time (Graves) as the “inter-linkages between the political, cultural, societal and historical factors of an issue along with some empirical evidence are examined” (Wahi). The social causes-related analysis is important because it influences how individuals, organisations and governments respond to an issue. The social causes analysis is intended to reveal the deeper causality behind the litany; it

represents cause and effect analysis in a similar vein to STEEP (Social, Technological/Scientific, Environmental, Economic and Political) measurements (Palmer & Ellis). This is important because policy is also informed by constructions of cause and effect, “conceptualised within the discursive and political milieu, which emerge at the systemic level” (Watson). In working with clients in the academic sector, Conway found that the social causes level was “best understood... since this involved the identification of issues, challenges and trends that were very much part of the everyday working life of participants”.

Analysis at this level also has limitations. For example, “all that can be questioned is the data but not the paradigms” (Wahi). This level is also usually about “first level causes” (Spencer & Salvatico). First level causes address types of causality most commonly understood in “linear, mechanistic terms, which typically leads to a search for a unique Archimedean point at which a lever can be applied in order to cause change throughout a system” (Kuah, Chin & Huifen). Whilst such an understanding of causality “has tended to resonate very well with policy makers” (ibid.), as this is where they feel the most empowered to make changes, it often leads to privileging of “one layer of “reality”—the systemic—over others” (ibid.). Not only that, but, most commonly, a self-referential system is created. That is, whilst social system/structure level analysis is used to identify the causes of certain issues usually presented through quantitative data, once those causes are identified they are then in turn supported by data or proof: by quantifiable “evidence”. In other words, causes explain data and then data confirms causes, without any way out of certain simplistically conceptualised causalities. Like the litany-level analysis, this too will significantly limit efforts to create genuine—meaningful and workable—alternative futures.

Layer 3: Worldview

Whilst the first and second layer analyses— are the most commonly applied and shared and the best understood, an analysis at the third level, worldview, is challenging. This is because most people “do not believe they have a worldview” (Inayatullah, personal communication). Instead, they believe themselves to be rational agents whose views are based on “common sense” and have very little to do with their own historical, spatial and social setting. Organisations also act as if they do not have a historical and cultural framework, “they are blind to their own paradigms” (Inayatullah, personal communication). In other words, awareness of one’s own temporal and spatial “situatedness” is lacking. Further common assumptions behind this lack of awareness are as follows: 1) my/our narrow experience of reality is “the reality”, and, 2) my/our own cognitive frame is sufficient to see “reality as it is”. What is perceived as “reality” is also believed to be “the way of the world”. Alternative interpretations are invisible or seen as inaccurate, and to be corrected with more “data”.

Such a view is prevalent amongst the general public and within most organisations but is also held by many academics and futurists. Academics trained in empirical research, for example, consider scientific method to be neutral and objective, a way of distinguishing between beliefs and facts. Futurists focused on trend analysis, whether this analysis leads to a prediction of “the future” or to multiple futures (scenarios) may also struggle with connecting their “truths” to certain worldview conditioning. This does not mean that the scientific method and trend analysis are not valuable and useful, they are, but only within the discourse/worldview that “supports and legitimates” them (Inayatullah, *CLA Reader*, 2004). For example, the “White Plague” or sub-replacement fertility, may be an issue for persons/cultures informed by nationalistic worldviews (i.e. concerns about the disappearance of particular nations or races), but it is hardly a problem for those informed by an ecological worldview and discourse on over-population. Each worldview then focuses on its own set of data: 1) data on nations with sub-replacement fertility, 2) data on global human population growth. The causes and effects that are investigated will sometimes differ and sometimes overlap: education, economic development, changes in the nature of paid labour, poverty, urbanisation, migration, violent conflict, contraceptive technologies, medical advances, increases in longevity, changes in gendered social roles, government policies, degree of religiosity, and so on, but the causes will be linked in different ways to the data and the data will be used in different ways to further support the chains of causality in question. Crucially, the policy solutions proposed will dramatically differ, as will the framing of the “problem”. *So whilst the data may be accurate and the social causes analysis impeccable, the implications of any research findings will serve merely to reinforce the worldview behind the framing.* Occasionally, if data and social causes dramatically differ from what is expected to be found by researchers, some adjustments in the worldview may result. For example, the feminist worldview expanded over a span of a century to include radical, multicultural and ecological variants, which it added to the initial, predominant “liberal” feminist position.

The task of an analysis at the level of the worldview is then to “find deeper social, linguistic, and cultural processes that are actor-invariant (not dependent on who the actors are) and to some extent system-invariant”.⁶ Understanding these processes and “discerning deeper [worldview] assumptions behind the issue”⁷ is crucial because that helps to explain how “different discourses (ideologies, worldviews as expressed through civilisations, and epistemes, for example) do more than cause or mediate the issue, but constitute it”.⁸ Analysis at the third level of CLA, investigates and helps to explain how the discourse we use to understand [a problem/ issue] is complicit in our own framing of that issue.⁹

The easiest way to understand worldview framing of an issue is perhaps not by analysing “deeply held positions on how the world is and should be”, i.e.

ideological, civilisational and the epistemic orderings of knowledge; for most people, including futures practitioners, the easier path to this third layer is certainly via an analysis of stakeholder perspectives and positions on an issue (for examples of analyses that do both see the chapters by Farooqi & Sheraz, and Kelly). Different individuals, organisations and institutions will have different vested interests: patients may want easier access to their doctors, while doctors may want more protective/impenetrable time/place barriers between them and their patients. Parents will see a particular situation in one light, their teenage child in another. Engineers will want to build roads, ecologists to protect nature. Most commonly, instead of such dualisms there will be a menagerie of many perspectives, sometimes even held by one actor simultaneously. And sometimes these deeply held perspectives may be contradictory, for example wanting a healthy society with preventative public policy measures but not wanting a “nanny state”.

Although it is challenging, the analysis at the worldview level is invaluable. Authors in this collection have found that worldview-level analysis helped their participants to move away from default positions and to seek solutions previously unavailable. For example, Burke found that the CLA process helped workshop participants “to address the possibility that their world view could potentially be part of the problem they faced” (Burke). The process challenged participants’ “assumptions about identity and brought about the transformation of their worldview” (ibid.). Consequently, the analysis at the worldview level created “a result previously unimagined... [and enabled participants] to explore these other alternatives” (Burke). Curry and Schultz found that deepening of analysis helped to escape archetypes and evade the “sinkhole of wholly western worldviews”. It enabled and generated “conversations that [dug] deep into the worldviews, mental models and cultural structures that inform how we perceive both issues and possible future outcomes” (Curry & Schultz). And while conversations in workshop settings may indeed slow down and the energy become “more thoughtful” due to the depth of an analysis, participants also found “the resulting output more significant” (Curry & Schultz). For Palmer and Ellis, CLA enabled ordering of data in a way that allowed participants “to see contradictions and synergies between worldview, between systemic factors, and within the surface litany” (Palmer & Ellis). This turned out to be “invaluable in gaining a clearer perspective and better description of push, weight and pull* factors” (ibid.).

Inayatullah (‘Ageing Futures’), too, argues that inclusion of “all relevant stakeholders and worldviews” assures “that the variations of the vision—differences—strengthen the overall vision” (ibid.). By including all relevant stakeholders and worldview perspectives the understanding of an issue is

* The pull of a desired future, weight of history and social structures and pushes towards the future.

broadened, uniformity of issue perception is avoided and preferred futures visions are enriched. In a nutshell, despite some difficulties in conducting analysis at the worldview level, the rewards are many and tangible.

Layer 4: Myth/metaphor

It is perhaps this fourth level of analysis, the layer of myth and metaphor, “which distinguishes CLA most starkly from other analytical methods” (Shevellar). In other words, it is the “gift of CLA” (ibid.) to go beyond traditional deconstructive tools by providing this “fourth layer of meaning that deepens analysis” (ibid.).

As defined by Inayatullah, the myth/metaphor layer deals with the unconscious and emotive dimensions of an issue. Myths and metaphors “organise the deep beliefs, the traumas and transcendence that over time define identity—what it means to mean and to be” (Inayatullah, *CLA Reader*, 2004). “Origin stories of education” provide an example: a student as an empty vessel to be filled by the teacher, a blank slate to be chalked in, or “a seed to be watered... a flower to be nurtured”.¹⁰ If the foundational myth is that of an empty vessel—“One does not dare step on a teacher’s shadow” (Thanh)—interventions at the litany and even systemic levels that aim to bring in student-centred education processes are almost bound to fail (Wu, Thanh). Education seen as “a serious business” will create different litany and system requirements compared to education that is seen as playful (Bussey, Bjurström & Sannum). Educational institutions seen as “knowledge factories” that must “publish or perish” will almost certainly not facilitate egalitarian, democratic, participatory, transformative and open education processes (ibid.). For this to happen, the unconscious mythology of education needs to be transformed as well: perhaps towards community creating “all for one and one for all” or more magical education as a part of life, with life seen as “a box of chocolates” (ibid.).

A thorough exposition about the magic of metaphors is presented in this collection by Larif. The author reminds us that “the less conscious we are of a metaphor as a metaphor, the more literal it becomes”. Metaphors are deeply entrenched, hardly noticed, and effortlessly used means of naturalising a particular worldview and justifying certain behaviours (ibid.). For example, war metaphors in business, sport and politics have “become so ubiquitous they work to naturalise (and perpetuate) the militaristic, aggressive and competitive behaviour, values and structures commonly enacted within those domains” (Larif). Deep-seated stories—myths and metaphors—such as that “human ingenuity can always unlock new sources of energy” (Lowe) blinds us to the possibility of seeing “inconvenient truths”. Metaphors such as “progress is inevitable”, “the economy above all else”, “(certain) jobs mustn’t be lost” and “growth is the most desirable” create a sense of “duty” even on citizens to consume (ibid.). By analysing these myths and metaphors CLA provides “not just insights, but a rational

explanation for the continued failure of decision-makers to see the “inconvenient truth” of such problems as climate change, peak oil, environmental decline and the most fundamental issue of the limits on the scale of human resource use” (ibid).

The metaphor and myth layer can be seen as “belonging historically to the realm of poetry, stories, fables and fictions”, which have, within western thought, been juxtaposed with “the more culturally valued realm of facts, figures, truth and objectivity” (Shevellar). CLA, however, places this construct on its head. The deeper layer consists of narratives which “speak to us in terms we cannot deny; they are the stories, even lies, that we tell in order to justify ourselves to ourselves” (Kuah, Chin & Huifen). The language of the myth/metaphor seems to constitute a person’s “final vocabulary”; “final” in the sense that if doubt is cast on the worth of these words, their user has no non-circular argumentative recourse... they are as far as [one] can go with language” (Rorty and Campbell in Kuah, Chin & Huifen).

Outside CLA, metaphors are most commonly invoked rather than made explicit. But they tap into “the collective archetypes that give the underlying culture its face” (Bishop & Dzidic). By imposing one’s metaphors on a culture a person or a group gets to decide what is considered to be true (Lakoff & Johnson in Larif). This brings us back to the issue of power and to the recognition that the creation and maintenance of metaphorical understanding is an inherently political process (Shevellar). Power, “at least in part, involves the ability to impose metaphors on others” (Cresswell in Shevellar). “Who has the power and why is revealed more clearly within the worldview and myth/metaphor layers”, argues Black (in this collection).

In addition to helping expose power relationships (i.e. Farooqi & Sheraz), power struggles (Head), and individuals’ own temporal/historical and spatial (cultural/structural/power) situatedness (Ramos) articulation of narratives within this layer also enables the empowerment of the marginalised. “Deconstructing conventional metaphors and then articulating alternative metaphors becomes a powerful way to critique the present and then create the possibility of alternative futures” (Shevellar). Metaphors and the stories that carry them have the power to both shift mindsets and change hearts (Spencer & Salvatico). As mentioned earlier, movement from litany to inner story, myth and metaphor assists in “deepening our focus” and allows “for more potent and transformative change” (Inayatullah, ‘Global Financial Crisis’). It is at these deeper levels that “ideological and subconscious assumptions are differentiated and distanced from individual and systemic realities, and critically reframed by reconstructing alternative pasts and alternative futures” (Fan).

CLA is therefore about epistemology in action or “action [being] embedded in epistemology” (Shevellar). As Kenny has shown in this collection, the

governing metaphors shape “not only public opinion and policy, but also, potentially, research agendas”. Academic literature is “replete with knowledge at the litany and systemic levels, often [but usually without awareness] reinforcing Western thought” (ibid.). The worldviews and myths govern our knowledge systems and inevitably set the direction of policy (ibid.). And so a failure to challenge “the mind-closing metaphors... will keep humanity blind to the paths towards alternative futures and the positive manipulation of them” (Kenny). In contrast, CLA is based on the premise that the deconstruction “of the underlying four layers of assumptions, narratives, worldviews (zeitgeist) and metaphors/myths” enables that “the future may not just be perceived but also be moulded” (Wahi). In this way CLA also meets the criterion for social interventionist research by being “useful in practice” (Shevellar). CLA is therefore as much an action-oriented research methodology as it is a theoretical framework.

In workshop settings, CLA opens up the possibility for participants to realise that addressing their worldview and its underlying myths and metaphors holds the promise of finding solutions to those problems (Burke). Burke also found that this then had the effect of mobilising participants into “positive action”. Changing what we know, and changing the categories that define what we know, requires the creation of new myths, new stories of meaning (Shevellar). For any change to happen, worldviews, myths and metaphors need to change as well and this “involves people recognising that their perspective on the issue may be limited or [even] flawed” (Conway). “By drilling down to the emotive dimensions of the issues depicted through myths and metaphors, CLA also served as a framework to understand shared narratives today, and a tool to transform narratives’ for the future” (Kuah, Chin & Huifen).

To reiterate, at this layer of analysis, the question is not which foundational myth-metaphor stories are “true”. Because myth is understood as a meaning-making narrative it is first and foremost used for insight. In the tradition of the scholarship of Carl Jung and Joseph Campbell, myth within CLA refers to “stories without specific authors, cultural narratives [which] help give meaning to social practices that cannot necessarily find a basis in rational logic”.¹¹ But some of these stories may be “pathological”, in the sense that they are deeply unconscious and/or not aligned with desired futures visions or preferred policy strategies. Myths are also used to advantage particular groups over others, indeed, to eliminate and “demonise” the “other”. CLA seeks to not only democratise the future, but to democratise mythology; indeed, these aims go hand in hand.

The main function of CLA at this fourth layer and as an action research methodology is therefore to: 1) Unveil the unconscious, deep stories, and; 2) Ensure their alignment with positive, preferred futures visions. More information on its own does not change behaviour.¹² Stories, on the other hand, let us know if strategies for change are possible within existing

narrative frameworks.¹³ Therefore, the CLA process can help to ensure that constructive inner stories are aligned with targeted strategies, and vice versa.

The How of CLA: The CLA process

CLA can be used as a stand-alone process as well as in conjunction with other futures methodologies. Lederwasch, for example, reports in her contribution to this book on a process in which CLA was combined with scenarios and scenario art, the futures wheel, the futures triangle, visioning, backcasting, strategic questioning, and strategy and policy development. In workshop settings, CLA is most commonly used to “bring depth” into an analysis, and thus it can be used “just after scenarios to ensure that scenarios have depth”.¹⁴ Curry and Schultz, however, propose in their chapter that “the scenario development process (and the development of alternative futures) does not begin until after the worldview and/or metaphor layers have been first constructed and then inflected to disrupt the prevailing view”. Thus CLA can be used both before and after the scenario development process, depending on the needs and context of the futures practitioners and participants.

Likewise, CLA has been found to work well in complex spaces (multi-cultural, multiple diverse stakeholder positions, multi-civilisational, multi-generational, multi-gendered, etc.). In this context it works to acknowledge and negotiate differences. It could also be used as a way of mediating conflict, because the CLA process stimulates creativity and opens participants to “collaborative play which can unite disparate groups” (Terranova). CLA has indeed been “designed to integrate different ways of knowing and understanding the future” (Curry & Schultz), and to identify and negotiate “the complex underpinning of an issue” (Bishop & Dzidic). Terranova also found that through tools such as CLA, participants developed “an understanding of each other’s perspectives and recognised that the chasm between them was repairable”. But CLA is also “useful when the workshop group is homogeneous in age, life experiences, beliefs or attitudes” (Terranova). In places of homogenous or hegemonic worldview CLA functions differently, and in disruptive ways, as it challenges the prevalent though partial underlying assumptions of the dominant worldview. As Terranova argues: “CLA was an effective methodology to use in a workshop situation to expand thought and discussion about a problem, in particular when a group was likely to have similar world views, or when a vocal majority was likely to eclipse contrasting minority perspectives”.

The aim of CLA is to move participants away from “zero loop” learning wherein they feel overwhelmed and even away from “single loop” learning where the focus is on “take aways”. The goal of CLA is to move towards reflective “double loop” learning, which is outside of paradigm learning and is a means of entering the unknown. Beyond this there is “narrative learning”, which is about finding archetypal stories and creating preferred

narratives. CLA pushes participants to get in touch with the unknown but does not necessarily force them to leave their comfort zone.

A comprehensive overview of futures methods, including CLA, and how they are used in workshop settings has been described by Inayatullah in his *Six Pillars: Futures Thinking for Transforming*. In summary, Inayatullah's approach to futures studies is based on the following six pillars:

1. Mapping the present and the future through methods and tools such as shared history, the futures triangle and the futures landscape
2. Anticipating the future through methods such as emerging issues analysis and the futures wheel
3. Timing the future, understanding the grand patterns of change (linear, cyclical, pendulum and spiral), macrohistory and macrofutures.
4. Deepening the future through methods such as CLA and metaphors
5. Creating alternatives to the present through methods such as scenarios and nuts and bolts
6. Transforming the present and creating the future through visioning, backcasting, action learning and the transcend conflict resolution method.

As can be seen, CLA is most commonly used in conjunction with other methods, but the exact number and order of methods used depends on time frames and on the research/students'/clients'/participants' needs. Whether as part of a package or as a stand-alone method CLA starts with:

1. An explanation of the method and its levels is given. Examples of previous case studies (such as those published in this book and in the 2004 *CLA Reader*) are provided in workshop settings. Examples which show that policy responses are affected by how a problem is defined and framed are also given. In this edited collection, Larif describes metaphorical framing of crime as either a predator or a virus, an example often used by Inayatullah during workshops. Participants are shown that when crime is metaphorically described as a virus, study participants were more likely to suggest social reform (31%) than if they were given crime-as-predator framing (20%).
2. Participants are then asked to individually, in small groups or collectively identify an issue or a problem at hand. The ideal size for the application of CLA is of 4–5 small groups with 5–6 participants each, although CLA can also be done individually or in larger groups. Ideally, participants would come from diverse backgrounds (i.e. reflecting age, gender and cultural diversity), as this would facilitate articulation of different stakeholder/worldview positions. Problems or issues are sometimes decided in advance, in which case a facilitator undertakes preparation, gathering as much information as possible about the group

and the organisation and conducting horizon scanning for the particular issue. Other usual, beneficial preparations (previous research, inquiry into participants' backgrounds and their previous exposure to futures or CLA, composition of participant group, etc.) fall under the general guidelines needed for good facilitation. Some of these aspects are described in this book by Lederwasch; a specific process along those lines is also described by Terranova. For example, participants working individually were asked to write one issue per Post-it note. These were then "stuck onto a wall of the meeting room—the *issues wall*—in theme-related clusters" (Terranova). Sometimes integrated computer programs and white boards have been used for the same purpose—to identify an issue. Or, in less technological environments, a butcher's paper chart was prepared and displayed by each sub-group and discussed with the whole group.

3. Preparatory reading material can be provided before the workshop in order to speed up the in-workshop CLA process. Reading materials could cover previous CLA case studies or information about the issue in question (statistical data, demographic reports, economic and other projections, futures scenarios, media coverage, policy documents, strategic plans, annual reports, public announcements, comparative analyses, environmental scans, journal articles, and other relevant material). Facilitators of CLA workshops, however, found that "whilst it was vital that the facilitators had a good working knowledge of the methodology, participants needed neither awareness nor understanding of CLA. The tool provided a logical, step-by-step process to build a broader and deeper collective understanding in a way that was non-threatening and fun" (Terranova).
4. Litany identification comes after the general introduction to the workshop (i.e. getting to know the participants and their level of exposure to futures) and selection of an issue (individually and collectively). Curry and Schultz report regarding this step that "CLA begins with energy and humour: our participants found generating the 'litany' or buzz of common wisdom and events around an issue easy and at times amusing". Litany-generating starters may include: "What has been reported in the headline press and in the media generally about the issue or problem at hand?"; "Create a provocative newspaper headline about the issue", "The litany, by and large, generates feelings of helplessness, apathy and calls for government to do something. Are there any concrete manifestations of this regarding the issue/problem?" or "Imagine an article penned about [your] organisation today. What would the subject matter be? What publication might it be found in? Would it be positive or negative? And, ultimately, what carefully crafted words would be chosen for the title that would accurately convey the organisation's story?" (Spencer and Salvatico).

5. After identification of an issue and litany statements (including facts and figures; ‘the data’) participants are asked to identify the causality behind the litany, by using the STEEP method (Palmer & Ellis) for example. Questions generating social causes-level analysis include: “How is the litany, or the problem/issue at hand, usually explained? What are some of the more common and some of the less common interpretations of the underlying causes of the issue? What systemic factors (trends or drivers of change) do you believe are driving the [issue] described by the litany?” (Conway) This activity will generally identify “initial (and potentially superfluous) first-level causes” (Spencer and Salvatico) but may also generate discussion on multi-causalities. Analysis thus may go deeper and wider, depending on the participants’ background knowledge and previous training.
6. The third layer of CLA may focus on identifying stakeholders’ positions, generational perspectives or worldview perspectives. For example, in her chapter Kelly has identified the worldviews (as well as the litany, systemic causes and myths) of four key stakeholders in the film *Avatar*. Also in this book, Sykes-Kelleher has identified “worldviews and discourses behind the current global governance system” and “unrepresented nations’ and peoples’ preferred global governance future”. Other examples include: 1) Vola identifying the western worldviews that frame perception of a photograph of a scene of violence; 2) Anthony identifying two competing worldviews on China’s future (global-tech/the west and the disowned Taoist/Confucian worldview); and, 3) Absar identifying worldviews on human-water relationships in six distinct (socio-economic and hydro-geological) zones within the Muslim world. Questions generating worldview analysis may include: “What assumptions are driving the social causes? What would be some key stakeholders perspectives on the issue? How does the issue affect various generations now and into the future? Whose perspective is dominant? Whose voice is not being heard?” (Conway).
7. The last layer of CLA is also sometimes difficult for participants to uncover; for example, they may struggle with differentiating between the worldview and myth/metaphor layers. As this level is about the unconscious dimensions of the problem or issue it lies more in the domain of the artists and storytellers or of those who “normally live close[r] to Chaos” rather than in the domain of “truth-holders” who maintain order (Graves), such as, perhaps, policy-makers. Still, myths and metaphors can be identified through the presentation of images, symbols and stories and/or through artistic interpretation by the participants (drawings, drama, evoking of fables and archetypes). Almost “everyone understands the power of images, needing little convincing of the old adage “a picture is worth a thousand words””

(Spencer & Salvatico). Spencer and Salvatico report in their chapter that “attaching visual meaning and expressions to an organisation’s unfolding story allows teams to deepen and strengthen the guiding narrative” and that “representing information in a visual or graphic form has been proven to deepen learning and help participants make large-scale connections”. CLA can also be used (and has been used) in a drama context to analyse the actions, reactions and dialogue of characters (individual and group) in a crafted performance (Head). Myth/metaphor-generating questions may include: “Can you come up with deep stories, archetypes or popular fables that relate to the issue in question? How does the issue feel? Can you create analogies or culturally-linked metaphors which describe how each worldview is experienced and felt?” (Terranova), “Can you come up with some images or symbols that best represent the issue and how you feel about it? What other myths and metaphors might we employ?” (Spencer & Salvatico). The process often leaves participants surprised and sometimes even with “a mystical/mythical feel to being part of something special” (Burke). Not uncommonly, it is this fourth layer of the myth/metaphor analysis that remains “the most compelling aspect” of projects and analysis (Kuah, Chin & Hufien).

8. Inayatullah often leads participants through a role-playing game as well. In this process, the participants are divided into four groups, each of which is assigned to one of CLA’s layers: the litany, the system, the worldview and the metaphor. An issue is selected, either future or current. The litany group articulates a number of headlines. The system group articulates causal explanations of the issue. The worldview group is broken down into the relevant worldviews of stakeholders. The last group is responsible for developing metaphors that explain the issue or challenge it, thus creating a new litany. The game goes back and forth between the groups with the intention of finding new strategies and scenarios. The facilitator asks each group, in real time, “Does the system support the strategy?” and “Is there a supportive metaphor?” Then, as a new strategy or narrative emerges, the varied stakeholders are questioned. They are asked to respond. The process goes through a number of rounds until either the litany headlines are accepted or new litanies based on new metaphors and supportive systemic strategies emerge. This gives participants a real-time understanding of CLA. They then go through a more rigorous academic analysis of the issue.

Benefits and Limitations of CLA

CLA “had a profound effect, like a curtain being lifted (to reveal) the huge leap we had to make... we realised we couldn’t just continue doing what we were doing”. (CLA workshop participant, quoted in Terranova)

“For the facilitator, the strength of CLA lies in its ability to broaden and deepen discussion and understanding, to move from the obvious and superficial to the deeper levels of beliefs, experiences and emotions. This can be achieved in a non-threatening, non-judgmental manner that leads participants to a wider range of policy options than would otherwise have been possible”. (Terranova)

“CLA provides a valuable interpretive framework for the deconstruction and reconstruction of complex social issues. As a tool for deconstructing social issues, CLA provides a clear methodology, which extends analysis and interpretation beyond a more rudimentary thematic analysis and as illustrated is well suited for the deconstruction of qualitative data sets. A clear process to the analysis can serve to strengthen and further legitimise the methodology and as such further encourage cross-disciplinary adoption”. (Bishop & Dzidic)

“CLA process allows the development of strategy across all four levels. This gives back to me a sense of agency”. (Black)

“In analysing the multiple layers of the human experience, CLA leads to a fuller understanding of the present, and a richer imagination of desired futures”. (Kuah, Chin & Huifen)

“CLA is an important tool in the futures field as it helps practitioners develop positive images of the future that are anchored in the real-life aspirations of those stakeholders engaged in the work of social change. CLA recognises that human consciousness itself is the main agent in social change. Institutions, too, as a working product of many consciousnesses, have the capacity to develop foresight in order to best cater to future needs—be they economic, social or personal. As Sohail Inayatullah points out, it is through the interaction of self, other and environment that innovation “from the edge” can occur”. (Bussey, Bjurström & Sannum)

“CLA is a great entry pathway for developing a more comprehensive appreciation of the need for a new global consciousness which is backed up by new ways of thinking and behaving”. (Black)

These and many other benefits of CLA have been reported in this collection and elsewhere.* Further, CLA adds to the academic literatures, which is predominantly “located within the litany and social causes level” (Black), or, “replete with knowledge at the litany and systemic levels, often [but usually unaware of] reinforcing Western thought” (Kenny). On the other hand, CLA enables the exploration of multiple causalities, which is crucial in “a complex world where we have to shift from causal determinism to a network-based approach [and wherein] there is a greater need for sense-making to monitor and adapt to emergence” (Kuah, Chin & Huifen). CLA

* See, for example, <http://www.metafuture.org/causal-layered-analysis/>

has justified its claim that by surfacing “deeply buried and taken-for-granted worldviews, myths and metaphors... a richer design of alternative futures that incorporates the socio-cultural and psychological dimension” (Kuah, Chin & Huifen) can be developed. It has also justified the claim that moving up and down the four layers encourages “an appreciation of different ways of knowing and alternative responses” (Lederwasch). Years after it was “offered as a new futures research method” CLA has, above all, proven its “utility... in creating transformative spaces for the creation of alternative futures”.¹⁵

Like any other method, CLA has limitations. Those most commonly reported relate to the *complexity* of analysis which “is not easy to engage in” (Shevellar). Especially at the third and fourth level of analysis, some participants may “become quickly *frustrated*” (Spencer & Salvatico). Conway had the same experience: the CLA level “most difficult for participants to engage with was the Worldview level”. She found this “not surprising, since worldviews are deeply held and often unconscious mental models of ways of seeing and making sense of the world” (ibid.). Also, recognising that there were “different but valid perspectives on the relationship, and then attempting to define the assumptions underpinning those perspectives was [also found by participants to be] challenging” (Conway). Black also outlines challenges present at the worldview layer of analysis: “Investigations at the worldview level require a broader understanding of the cultural milieu from which each of us draws our opinions and assumptions. This is not about facts. At this level, it is about why we seek certain facts and not others; what are the contradictions and prejudices that emerge; and whether we can discern cultural structures that are independent of the actors. There is the implicit recognition of accepting that you do not know what you do not know. This is not a skill most scientists are taught even now, and most certainly were not in 2003” (Black).

Terranova and Conway found *time* to be an issue—i.e. more time was needed to apply CLA compared to other methods. Conway proposes that more time be specifically given to the third layer because it is critical for allowing “deeper understandings to emerge and be discussed—particularly given that a worldview clash is likely to be a primary reason [behind the issue]” (Conway). The basic *structure* of CLA has also been questioned. Curry and Schultz, for example, have found that it did not appear to be necessary to reach the metaphor layer in any detail: “There was no noticeable difference in the quality of the scenarios where we had developed a good understanding of the prevailing worldview, but had not identified a persuasive metaphor, and those built from both worldview and metaphor”. Facilitators of CLA (personal communication and observation) also report that it is sometimes *difficult to differentiate some of the layers*, for example, between worldview and myth/metaphor level analysis or between myth/metaphor and litany level analysis. “There is an inherent *subjectivity*

associated with the understanding and perception of each CLA layer”, argue Kuah, Chin and Huifen, “as one person’s worldview could be another person’s myth or metaphor”. Given this interpretive subjectivity, they recommend that facilitators “maintain a neutral stance during the workshop and allow participants to locate their views within each layer, especially when the discussions evoke emotive responses that challenge one’s beliefs and assumptions”. Other critiques of CLA have been addressed by Inayatullah in the *CLA Reader* (2004)¹⁶ and those will not be repeated here. Suffice it to say, the main limitations mentioned in this collection (difficulty with and complexity of analysis, time/structure and subjectivity) are surpassed by the many benefits reported by the theorists and practitioners of CLA published in this book and elsewhere.

Final Commentary

So far withstanding the test of time, CLA has been used by researchers, academics, workshop facilitators, educators, artists and policy-analysts and -makers. It is a theoretical framework but also a practical methodology easily adaptable to academic research and for workshop processes. It is about insight but also about real individual and social change. It is about the exposing of power relationships but is simultaneously integrative of multiple views. It is non-judgmental in the sense that it inquires not about what is “true” but about what is valuable and useful for a given purpose (Graves). Answers are not “right or wrong; rather a dialogue between the different levels is sought” (Shevellar). CLA is also about creation of preferred, value-laden futures, and yet it does not foreclose futures by providing a stark blueprint; it simply asks: is your story in line with your preferred vision for the future and is that vision in line with your strategies and if not, what needs to change?

CLA is a method that succeeds in opening up spaces for alternative futures whilst simultaneously unearthing policy approaches “more likely to succeed” (Absar). It reveals structure in complex realities whilst simultaneously embracing “ambiguity and contradiction” (Shevellar). It is part of the post-structural critical tradition but is very much practical and action-oriented (ibid.). CLA is a research method that works both *with* and *within* the issue. Unlike methods that explore simple causalities and paint the picture one dimensionally (A to B) or at best two dimensionally (2x2 tables), CLA is a tri-dimensional method, exposing the inner and the deeper aspects commonly hidden from view. In other words, CLA enables discussions about, systematising and integrating of inner/outer, individual/collective, personal/structural, feeling/rationality, what is explicit/implicit and facilitator/participant perspectives. CLA does not claim a neutral and omniscient “god’s-eye” view that guarantees impartiality through distance and yet it validates *all* perspectives, cognitive frames and perceptions of reality. It requires a certain level of impartiality by facilitators whilst simultaneously enabling the “coming out” of the facilitators and presenters

with their own unique “story”. So perhaps, and in light of the science fiction and esoteric mystical traditions that influenced Inayatullah, CLA may even work at a fourth-sixth dimension, as a mythic key to “parallel universes”. It is a credit to Inayatullah that the engagement with these uncontained, multi-variant and never-ending universes of our postmodern/globalised times* is structured and brought back to the “here and now”, and so enables specific, actionable steps.

Given all this, it is not surprising that so many researchers and futures practitioners have taken up the challenge of applying CLA. Perhaps contrary to the spirit of CLA, which is not about prediction and certainty, it is paradoxical that its future application seems to be all but guaranteed.

¹ S. Inayatullah, S. Ihas & L. Obijiofor ‘The futures of communication’, *Futures*, Vol 27, No 8, 1995, 897–903; S. Inayatullah, ‘Causal layered analysis: Poststructuralism as method’, *Futures*, Vol 30, No 8, 1998, 815–829; S. Inayatullah (ed.), *Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) Reader: An Integrative and Transformative Method*, Tamsui, Tamkang University Press, 2004; and articles in this collection.

² S. Inayatullah (2004), op. cit.

³ Ibid., 11.

⁴ S. Inayatullah, *Questioning the Future: Futures Studies, Action Learning and Organizational Transformation*, Tamsui, Tamkang University Press, 2002.

⁵ Inayatullah (2004), op. cit.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Inayatullah (2004), op. cit.

¹¹ B. Thomas, *Civic Myths: A Law and Literature Approach to Citizenship*, Chapel Hill, NC, The University of North Carolina Press, 2007, 6.

¹² S. Inayatullah, personal communication.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Inayatullah (2004), op. cit.

* The engagement which perhaps lead some to conclude that CLA is ‘ethereal’, ‘not practical’, ‘idiosyncratic’, ‘anti-empirical’, ‘falsehood promoting’, ‘too difficult to understand’, and ‘impossible to do’, see Inayatullah’s ‘Responding to critics’ chapter in *Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) Reader: An Integrative and Transformative Method* (2004).

¹⁵ S. Inayatullah, 'Causal layered analysis: Poststructuralism as method', *Futures*, Vol 30, No 8, 1998, 815–829, 815.

¹⁶ S. Inayatullah, 'Responding to the critics', in *Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) Reader: An Integrative and Transformative Method* (2004), op. cit.

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