Causal Layered Analysis (1998)

Poststructuralism as method

Sohail Inayatullah[1]

Causal layered analysis is offered as a new futures research method. It utility is not in predicting the future but in creating transformative spaces for the creation of alternative futures. Causal layered analysis consists of four levels: the litany, social causes, discourse/worldview and myth/metaphor.  The challenge is to conduct research that moves up and down these layers of analysis and thus is inclusive of different ways of knowing.

In the context of using poststructuralism as a research method, this article introduces a new futures research method – causal layered analysis (CLA). Causal layered analysis is concerned less with predicting a particular future and more with opening up the present and past to create alternative futures.  It focuses less on the horizontal spatiality of futures – in contrast to techniques such as emerging issues analysis, scenarios and backcasting – and more on the vertical dimension of futures studies, of layers of analysis. Causal layered analysis opens up space for the articulation of constitutive discourses, which can then be shaped as scenarios.  Rick Slaughter considers it a paradigmatic method that reveals deep worldview committments behind surface phenomena.[2]  Writes Slaughter, “Causal layered analysis … provides a richer account of what is being studied than the more common empiricist or predictive orientation which merely `skims the surface’. But because mastery of the different layers calls for critical and hermeneutic skills that originate in the humanities, some futures practitioners may find the method challenging at first.[3]

This article hopes to reduce the difficulties involved in understanding and using causal layered analysis by providing a methodological perspective to the context of critical futures research, namely, poststructuralism.

Causal layered analysis has been successfully used in a variety of workshops and futures courses in the last six years. It is especially useful in workshops with individuals either of different cultures or different approaches to solving problems.  It is best used prior to scenario building as it allows a vertical space for scenarios of different categories.

Some of the benefits of CLA are:

(1)        Expands the range and richness of scenarios;

(2)        When used in a workshop setting, it leads to the inclusion of different ways of    knowing among participants;

(3)        Appeals to and can be used by a wider range of individuals as it incorporates non-textual and poetic/artistic expression in the futures process.

(4)        Layers participant’s positions (conflicting and harmonious ones);

(5)        Moves the debate/discussion beyond the superficial and obvious to the deeper   and marginal;

(6)        Allows for a range of transformative actions;

(7)        Leads to policy actions that can be informed by alternative layers of analysis;

(8)        Reinstates the vertical in social analysis, ie from postmodern relativism to global ethics;

Causal layered analysis can be seen as an effort to use poststructuralism, not just as an epistemological framework – as developed by thinkers such as Michel Foucault – but as a research method, as a way to conduct inquiry into the nature of past, present and future.

Types of futures research

In earlier articles, among other mapping schemes,[4] I have divided futures studies into three overlapping research dimensions: empirical, interpretive and critical.[5] Each dimension has different assumptions about the real, about truth, about the role of the subject, about the nature of the universe, and about the nature of the future.[6] My own preference has been approaches that use all three – that contextualize data (the predictive) with the meanings (interpretive) we give them, and then locate these in various historical structures of power/knowledge – class, gender, varna and episteme (the critical).

Causal layered analysis is well situated in critical futures research.[7]  This tradition is less concerned with disinterest, as in the empirical, or with creating mutual understanding, as in the interpretive, but with creating distance from current categories.  This distance allows us to see current social practices as fragile, as particular, and not as universal categories of thought – they are seen as discourse, a term similar to paradigm but inclusive of epistemological assumptions.

In the poststructural critical approach, the task is not prediction or comparison (as in the interpretive) but one of making units of analysis problematic. The task is not so much to better define the future but rather, at some level, to “undefine” the future.  For example, of importance are not population forecasts but how the category of “population” has become historical valorised in discourse; for example, why population instead of community or people, we might ask?

Taking a broader political view, we can also query why population is being predicted anyway? Why are growth rates more important than levels of consumption? The role of the state and other forms of power such as religious institutions in creating authoritative discourses – in naturalizing certain questions and leaving unproblematic others – is central to understanding how a particular future has become hegemonic.  But more than forms of power, are epistemes or structures of knowledge which frame what is knowable and what is not, which define and bind intelligibility.  Thus, while structures and institutions such as the modern state are useful tools for analysis, they are seen not as universal but as particular to history, civilization and episteme (the knowledge boundaries that frame our knowing). They too are situated.

The poststructural approach attempts to make problematic trend or events or events given to us in the futures literature and not only to discern their class basis as in conventional neo-Marxian critical research.  The issue is not only what are other events/trends that could have been put forth, but how an issue has been constructed as an event or trend in the first place as well as the “cost” of that particular social construction – what paradigm is privileged by the nomination of a trend or event as such.

Using other ways of knowing, particularly categories of knowledge from other civilizations, is one of the most useful ways to create a distance from the present. For example, in our population example, we can query “civilization”, asking how do Confucian, Islamic, Pacific or Indic civilizations constitute the population discourse? Scenarios about the future of population become far more problematic since the underlying category of the scenario, in this case population, is contested. At issue is how enumeration – the counting of people – has affected people’s conception of time and relations with self, other and state.[8]

The goal of critical research is thus to disturb present power relations through making problematic our categories and evoking other places or scenarios of the future.  Through this historical, future and civilizational distance, the present becomes less rigid, indeed, it becomes remarkable.  This allows the spaces of reality to loosen and the new possibilities, ideas and structures, to emerge.  The issue is less what is the truth but how truth functions in particular policy settings, how truth is evoked, who evokes it, how it circulates, and who gains and loses by particular nominations of what is true, real and significant.

In this approach, language is not symbolic but constitutive of reality.  This is quite different from the empirical domain wherein language is seen as transparent, merely in a neutral way describing reality, or as in the interpretive, where language is opaque, coloring reality in particular ways. By moving up and down levels of analysis, CLA brings in these different epistemological positions but sorts them out at different levels.  The movement up and down is critical otherwise a causal layered analysis will remain only concerned with better categories and not wiser policies.  By moving back up to the litany level from the deeper layers of discourse and metaphor, more holistic policies should ideally result.

Central to interpretive and critical approach is the notion of civilizational futures research. Civilizational research makes problematic current categories since they are often based on the dominant civilization (the West in this case). It informs us that behind the level of empirical reality is cultural reality and behind that is worldview.

While the postmodern/poststructural turn in the social sciences has been discussed exhaustively in many places,[9] my effort is to simplify these complex social theories and see if poststructuralism can be used as a method, even if it is considered anti-method by strict “non-practitioners”.[10]

The poststructural futures toolbox

The first term in a poststructural futures toolbox is deconstruction. In this we take a text (here meaning anything that can be critiqued – a movie, a book, a worldview, a person – something or someone that can be read) and break apart its components, asking what is visible and what is invisible?  Research questions that emerge from this perspective include:

DECONSTRUCTION

Who is privileged at the level of knowledge? Who gains at economic, social and other levels? Who is silenced? What is the politics of truth?

In terms of futures studies, we ask: which future is privileged? Which assumptions of the future are made preferable?

The second concept is genealogy. This is history; not a continuous history of events and trends, but more a history of paradigms, if you will, of discerning which discourses have been hegemonic and how the term under study has travelled through these various discourses.  Thus for Nietzche, it was not so much an issue of what is the moral, but a genealogy of the moral: how and when the moral becomes contentious and through which discourses.

GENEALOGY

Which discourses have been victorious in constituting the present? How have they travelled through history?

What have been the points in which the issue has become important or contentious?

What might be the genealogies of the future?

The third crucial term is distance.  Again, this is to differentiate between the disinterest of empiricism and the mutuality of interpretative research.  Distancing provides the theoretical link between poststructural thought and futures studies. Scenarios become not forecasts but images of the possible that critique the present, that make it remarkable, thus allowing other futures to emerge. Distancing can be accomplished by utopias as well – “perfect”, “no”, or far away places – other spaces.

DISTANCE

Which scenarios make the present remarkable? Make it unfamiliar? Strange? Denaturalize it?

Are these scenarios in historical space (the futures that could have been) or in present or future space?

The fourth term is “alternative pasts and futures”. While futures studies has focused only on alternative futures, within the poststructural critical framework, just as the future is problematic, so is the past. The past we see as truth is in fact the particular writing of history, often by the victors of history.  The questions that flow from this perspective are as below:

ALTERNATIVE PASTS AND FUTURES

Which interpretation of past is valorized? What histories make the present problematic? Which vision of the future is used to maintain the present? Which undo the unity of the present?

The last concept – reordering knowledge – brings a different dimension to the future and is similar to much of the work being done in civilizational futures research.[11] Reordering knowledge is similar to deconstruction and genealogy in that it undoes particular categories, however, it focuses particularly on how certain categories such as “civilization” or “stages in history” order knowledge.

REORDERING KNOWLEDGE

How does the ordering of knowledge differ across civilization, gender and episteme? What or Who is othered? How does it denaturalize current orderings, making them peculiar instead of universal?

These five concepts are part of a poststructural futures toolbox.  There is a strong link, of course, to other futures methods.  Emerging issues analysis, [12] for example, at one level predicts issues outside of conventional knowledge categories but it does so by disturbing conventional categories, by making them problematic; it reorders knowledge. For example, the notion of the “rights of robots” forces us to rethink rights, seeing them not as universal but as historical and political, as hard fought political and conceptual battles. It also forces us to rethink intelligence and sentience – posing the question what is life? Thus, a futures method such as emerging issues analysis, conventionally used to identify trends and problems in their emergent phase, should not merely be seen as a predictive method; it can also be a critical one.

A civilizational perspective

From a civilizational perspective, it is crucial to explore the guiding metaphors and myths we use to envision the future. This perspective takes a step back from the actual future to the deeper assumptions about the future being discussed, specifically the “non-rational.” For example, particular scenarios have specific assumptions about the nature of time, rationality and agency.  Believing the future is like a roll of dice is quite different from the Arab saying of the future: “Trust in Allah but tie your camel” which differs again from the American vision of the future as unbounded, full of choice and opportunity. For the Confucian, choice and opportunity exist in the context of family and ancestors and not merely as individual decisions.

In workshops on the future outside of the West, conventional metaphors such as a fork in the road, the future as seen through the rearview mirror, or travelling down a rocky stream, rarely make sense.  Others from Asia and the Pacific see the future as a tree (organic with roots and with many choices), as a finely weaved carpet (with God as the weaver), as a coconut (hard on the outside, soft on the inside) or as being in a car with a blindfolded driver (loss of control).[13]

Deconstructing conventional metaphors and then articulating alternative metaphors becomes a powerful way to critique the present and create the possibility of alternative futures. Metaphors and myths not only reveal the deeper civilizational bases for particular futures but they move the creation/understanding of the future beyond rational/design efforts. They return the unconscious and the mythic to our discourses of the future – the dialectics of civilizational trauma and transcendence become  episodes that give insight to past, present and future.[14]

Causal layered analysis includes this metaphorical dimension and links it with other levels of analysis.  It takes as its starting point the assumption that there are different levels of reality and ways of knowing. Individuals, organizations and civilizations see the world from different vantage points – horizontal and vertical.

Causal layered analysis

Causal layered analysis is based on the assumption that the way in which one frames a problem changes the policy solution and the actors responsible for creating transformation.  Using the works of Rick Slaughter, P.R. Sarkar and Oswald Spengler,[15] I argue that futures studies should be seen as layered, as deep and shallow. Its textured richness cannot be reduced to empirical trends.

The first level is the “litany” – quantitative trends, problems, often exaggerated, often used for political purposes –  (overpopulation, eg) usually presented by the news media.   Events, issues and trends are not connected and appear discontinuous. The result is often either a feeling of helplessness (what can I do?) or apathy (nothing can be done!) or projected action (why don’t they do something about it?). This is the conventional level of futures research which can readily create a politics of fear. This is the futurist as fearmonger who warns: “the end is near”. However by believing in the prophecy and acting appropriately, the end can be averted.[16] The litany level is the most visible and obvious, requiring little analytic capabilities. It is believed, rarely questioned.

The second level is concerned with social causes, including economic, cultural, political and historical factors (rising birthrates, lack of family planning, eg). Interpretation is given to quantitative data.  This type of analysis is usually articulated by policy institutes and published as editorial pieces in newspapers or in not-quite academic journals.  If one is fortunate then the precipitating action is sometimes analysed (population growth and advances in medicine/health, eg).  This level excels at technical explanations as well as academic analysis. The role of the state and other actors and interests is often explored at this level.  The data is often questioned, however, the language of questioning does not contest the paradigm in which the issue is framed. It remains obedient to it.

The third deeper level is concerned with structure and the discourse/worldview that supports and legitimates it (population growth and civilizational perspectives of family; lack of women’s power; lack of social security; the population/consumption debate, eg.).  The task is to find deeper social, linguistic, cultural structures that are actor-invariant (not dependent on who are the actors).  Discerning deeper assumptions behind the issue is crucial here as are efforts to revision the problem.  At this stage, one can explore how different discourses (the economic, the religious, the cultural, for example) do more than cause or mediate the issue but constitute it, how the discourse we use to understand is complicit in our framing of the issue. Based on the varied discourses, discrete alternative scenarios can be derived here.  For example, a scenario of the future of population based on religious perspectives of population (“go forth and multiply) versus cultural scenario focused on how women’s groups imagine construct birthing and childraising as well as their roles in patriarchy and the world division of labor. These scenarios add a horizontal dimension to our layered analysis.  The foundations for how the litany has been presented and the variables used to understand the litany are questioned at this level.

The fourth layer of analysis is at the level of metaphor or myth.  These are the deep stories, the collective archetypes, the unconscious, of often emotive, dimensions of the problem or the paradox (seeing population as non-statistical, as community, or seeing people as creative resources, eg).  This level provides a gut/emotional level experience to the worldview under inquiry.  The language used is less specific, more concerned with evoking visual images, with touching the heart instead of reading the head. This is the root level of questioning, however, questioning itself finds its limits since the frame of questioning must enter other frameworks of understanding – the mythical, for example.

Causal layered analysis asks us to go beyond conventional framing of issues.  For instance, normal academic analysis tends to stay in the second layer with occasional forays into the third, seldom privileging the fourth layer (myth and metaphor).  CLA however, does not privilege a particular level.  Moving up and down layers we can integrate analysis and synthesis, and horizontally we can integrate discourses, ways of knowing and worldviews, thereby increasing the richness of the analysis. What often results are differences that can be easily captured in alternative scenarios; each scenario in itself, to some extent, can represent a different way of knowing. However, CLA orders the scenarios in vertical space.  For example, taking the issue of parking spaces in urban centers can lead to a range of scenarios.  A short term scenario of increasing parking spaces (building below or above) is of a different order than a scenario which examines telecommuting or a scenario which distributes spaces by lottery (instead of by power or wealth) or one which questions the role of the car in modernity (a carless city?) or deconstructs the idea of a parking space, as in many third world setting where there are few spaces designated “parking”.[17]

Scenarios, thus, are different at each level.  Litany type scenarios are more instrumental, social level scenarios are more policy oriented, and discourse/worldview scenarios intend on capturing fundamental differences. Myth/metaphor type scenarios are equally discrete but articulate this difference through a poem, a story, an image or some other right-brain method.

Finally, who solves the problem/issue also changes at each level. At the litany level, it is usually others – the government or corporations. At the social level, it is often some partnership between different groups. At the worldview level, it is people or voluntary associations, and at the myth/metaphor it is leaders or artists.

These four layers are indicative, that is, there is some overlap between the layers. Using CLA on CLA we can see how the current litany (of what are the main trends and problems facing the world) in itself is the tip of the iceberg, an expression of a particular worldview.[18]  Debating which particular ideas should fit where defeats the purpose of the layers. They are intended to help create new types of thinking not enter into debates on what goes precisely where.

Case studies[19]

(1)        The Futures of the United Nations

If we take the futures of the United Nations as an issue, at the litany level, of concern is news on the failure of the United Nations (the UN’s financial problems and its failures in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda).

Causes, at the second level in the UN example, include lack of supranational authority; no united military, and the perspective that the UN is only as good as its member nations.  The solutions that result from this level of analysis are often those that call for more funding or more centralised power.  In this case, the UN needs more money and power. Often, deeper historical reasons such as the creation of the UN by the victors of WW II are articulated as factors impeding structural change.

At the third level, the analysis of current UN problems then shifts from the unequal structure of power between UN member states to the fact that eligibility for membership in the UN is based on acquiring national status. An NGO, an individual, a culture cannot join the National Assembly or the Security Council.  Deeper social structures that are actor-invarient include centre-periphery relations and the anarchic inter-state system. They are the focus at this level.  The solution that emerges from this level of analysis is to rethink the values and structure behind the United Nations, to revision it. Do we need a superordinate authority or are market mechanisms enough to manage our global commons? One could at this level, develop a horizontal discursive dimension investigating how different paradigms or worldviews frame the problem or issue. How would a pre-modern world approach the issue of global governance (consensus, for example)? How might a post-modern (global electronic democracy)?

At the fourth layer of myth and metaphor, in the case of the UN, some factors that could lead to an exploration of alternative metaphors and myths include issues of control versus freedom, of the role of individual and collective, of family and self, of the overall governance of evolution, of humanity’s place on the Earth. Are we meant to be separate races and nations (as ordained by the myths of the Western religions) or is a united humanity (as Hopis and others have prophesied) our destiny?  At the visual level, the challenge would be to design another logo for the UN, perhaps a tree of life or a circle of beings (instead of just flags of nations as currently outside the UN headquarters).

(2)        UNESCO/World Futures Studies Federation course

While the previous example was logically derived, the following are based on actual futures-visioning workshops.[20]  A CLA was conducted at a 1993 UNESCO/World Futures Studies Federation workshop in Thailand on the futures of ecology, where the issue of Bangkok’s traffic problem was explored. Here were the results.

At the litany level, the problem was seen to be Bangkok’s traffic and related pollution. The solution was to hire consultants particularly transportation planners at local and international levels.

At the social cause level, the problem was seen as a lack of roads with the solution that of building more roads (and getting mobile phones in the meantime).  If one was doing scenarios at this stage, then there would be scenarios on where to build roads, which transportation modelling software to use.

At the worldview level, it was argued that the problem was not just lack of roads but the model of industrial growth Thailand has taken.  It is the big City Outlook that had come down through colonialism. The city is better and rural people are idiots. Wealth is in the city especially as population growth creates problems in the rural area.  The solution then becomes not to build more roads but to decentralize the economy and create localism ie where local people control their economy and feel they do not have to leave their life and lifestyle. Psychologically it means valuing local traditions and countering the ideology that  West is best and that Bigger is Better. New leadership and new metaphors on what it means to be Thai emerged as the solutions.

(3)        Faculty of Work, Education and Training, Southern Cross University, Australia

When used at a seminar to the Faculty of Education, Work and Training at Southern Cross University in 1994 on the future of enrolments, the results were as follows.

At the litany level, the problem facing the University was declining enrolments. University professors saw it as an external problem. It was believed that the government should do something about it, for example, increase the number of scholarships.

At the social level, a range of alternative positions were explored.  Among them that the faculty was too busy doing research, that there was a job boom and students preferred to work rather than sit in institutions. It could also be that the pool of students had declined, suggested participants. The solutions that result from this level of analysis are often those that call for more research to investigate the problem – or to create a partnership with industry.  A precipitating action in this case study was the changeover in government from Labor to Liberal, with the government seeing education less as a social concern and more in economic terms.

At the next level, we explore how different discourses (the economic, the social, the cultural) do more than cause the issue but constitute it, that the discourse we use to understand is complicit in our framing of the issue.  At this third level, participants discussed how conventional education no longer fits the job market and students’ experience of the world that they might get from community associations or high-tech TV.  The solution that emerged from this level was the need to rethink the values and the structure of the educational institution, to revision it – quite different from the litany level where the issue was more student aid or different than the second level where the solution was partnerships between the university, government and industry.

At this level, one could develop a horizontal discursive dimension investigating how different paradigms or worldviews (and related ways of knowing) would frame the problem or issue. How would a premodern world approach the issue of teaching and learning?[21] How might a postmodern?[22]

At the fourth level of myth and metaphor, issues that arose are: does schooling free us or is it merely social control? Should education still be based on the Newtonian Fordist model of the factory or is education about transcendence, the return to mission, the re-enchantment of the world?  At this level, the challenge is to elicit the root myth or metaphor that supports the foundation of a particular litany of issues. In this case, the metaphors used were that of the university as prison versus that the university as a garden of knowledge.  This latter root metaphor was then used to aid in the visioning process, of imagining and creating futures participants desire.

(4)        Senior Management, Southern Cross University

Later at the same university but at a workshop with senior management, the issue again was financial, this time a drop in funding for education from government. The solution that emerged from the social analysis (focusing on the history of the state and education) was to diversify the funding source, to ask where else can we get money.  This is in contrast to the litany level where the focus was on how to convince the government not to change its policy or to hope that the Labor government would once again be elected. At the discourse/worldview level, discussions revolved around the changing nature of education – on the decreasing importance of traditional education, and increased emphasis on skills for a global economy.  It was the change in worldview from knowledge as sacred, the idea of the scholar, and the idea of the scientist, to that of the education to create better skilled workers in a global competitive marketplace that became the focus of discussion. It was believed that it would have to be people that lobbied the government to rethink its educational policy, not just universities. At the last level, the issue became that of rethinking money and exchange as well as finding other ways to manage and fund a university.

Of all the many causal layered analyses done, this was the most difficult and least satisfying, largely because it was hard to see money in layered terms. It was nearly impossible to move outside the administrative-capitalist discourse – the jobs and futures of all in the rooms depended on that discourse.  In this sense, spending more time on emerging issues that might change the funding nature of the university (or on what-if questions) might have been a better approach. Still, some important scenarios were developed from the analysis: (1) the collapse of the university system in Australia; (2) a corporate/industry aligned university, (3) a virtual university (expanding its customers and reducing its overhead) and (4) a return to core enlightenment values.  These helped clarify to alternative futures ahead as well gain consensus on the preferred vision held by participants (a mix of a virtual university and core enlightnment values).

(5)        Queensland Advocacy Incorporated

The final case study was a seminar conducted on the Queensland Advocacy Incorporated, Australia, a systems advocacy organization for people with disability. The broad issue under discussion was the practice of housing people with disabilities in institutions.  At the litany level, the issue was framed as abuse and neglect within institutions. The solution by the state is often prosecution of offenders and the creation of better institutions for those with disabilities, said participants. The locus of action has been government with the media providing images of positive actions the state is doing for people with disabilities.

At the social causes level, it has been the anxiety and frustration resulting from an imbalance of power within institutional settings that has been the key issue facing the disabled. The solution is thus focused on the individual rather than the social structure, taking the form of therapy for individuals with professionals providing the solution.

At the worldview level, it is fear of difference and individualism that is the central problem. People with disability are “othered”, seen as separate from “normal” communities.  At this level, the solution offered was consciousness raising, a softening of individualism and a strengthening of community. The actors who could make this change are people with disabilities themselves – particularly through their various organizations.

Finally, at the myth and metaphor level, it is the story of inclusion/exclusion, of who is normal and who is abnormal that was paramount, said participants. The negative story is that of the cyclops – the image of the one fundamentally different from us thus to be feared and loathed.

The scenarios that resulted were: (1) society changes so that people with disability feel welcome, (2) genetic technology eliminates “disabilities” – a negative scenario for people with disability since this continues the location of their body in the space of non-acceptance; and (3) continued ghettoization with occasional feel good media-led campaigns.

Difference as method

While there are numerous other examples, hopefully, the above give an indication of the possible beneficial uses of CLA. The utility of causal layered analysis is that it can categorize the many different perceptions of realities while remaining sensitive to horizontal and vertical spaces. Often individuals write and speak from differing perspectives. Some are more economistic, others are concerned with the big picture; some want real practical institutional solutions, others want changes in consciousness.[23] CLA finds space for all of them.

The key methodological utility is that it allows for research that brings in many perspectives. It has a fact basis, which is framed in history, which is then contextualized within a discourse or worldview, which then is located in pre and post-rational ways of knowing, in myth and metaphor. The challenge is to bring in these many perspectives to a particular problem, to go up and down levels, and sideways through various scenarios.

Like all methods, CLA has its limits. For example, it does not forecast the future per se and is best used in the conjunction with other methods such as emerging issues analysis and visioning. It could lead to a paralysis of action ie too much time spent on problematizing and not enough on designing new policy actions. For newcomers to the futures field, it may dampen their inner creativity, since it categorizes reality instead of allowing for a free for all visioning. For others, it is too difficult. This is especially so for empiricists who see the world as either true or false (who insist on being right instead being located in layers of reality) or postmodern relativists who reject the vertical gaze CLA implies.  CLA endeavors to find space for these different perspectives.  It does not reject the empirical or the ideational but considers them both along a continuum.

In this sense CLA, while part of the poststructural critical tradition, is very much oriented toward action learning.  Answers are neither right nor wrong. Rather a dialogue that uses multiple ways of knowing is sought between the different levels. Interaction is critical here.  By moving up and down levels and sideways through scenarios, different sorts of policy outcomes are possible and discourse/worldviews as well as metaphors and myths are enriched by these new empirical realities.

Of course, if at a workshop, a discussion does not fit into our neat categories of litany, social causes, worldview and metaphor and root myth, it is important to work with the individuals to create new categories.  However, in general, these categories work because they capture how we think and categorize the world – they capture the differences that are us.

Appendix A:

The table below offers a systematic presentation of CLA as a method. It can be easily used as an overhead transparency.

CAUSAL LAYERED ANALYSIS

1.         CONTEXT

*          How one frames the problem, creates the solution

*          Language is not neutral but part of the analysis

*          Wisest inquiry goes up and down levels of analysis and across constitutive         discourses

2.         Horizontal Levels

*          Identification of Problem (what is the problem)

*          Associated Solution (what is the solution)

*          Associated Problem-Solver (who can solve it)

*          Source of Information of problem (where is the problem/solution textualized)

3.         Vertical Levels

*          The “Litany”  official public description of issue

Problem seems unsolvable or it is up to government or power to solve it

Little personal responsibility

Often appearing as News. Mediated by interstate system and conventional        accounts of reality.        Short term approaches. Government solves the problem.

*          Social Science analysis

Short term historical factors uncovered

Attempts to articulate causal variables (correlation, causation, theory and critique           of other theories)

Often State or monopolistic interest group has ownership

Solution often in Civil society in interaction with other institutions (values with     structures) – partnerships.

Often appearing as Op-Ed piece or in conservative journal

*          Discourse analysis/Worldview

Problem constituted by frame of analysis

Strong focus on genealogy of problem

Many frames: paradigms, mindscapes, discourses

Solution often in consciousness transformation, in changing worldview, in           rethinking politics of reality.

Solution long term action based on the interaction of many variables

Often appearing in fringe/peripheral journals

*          Myth/metaphor analysis

Problem constituted by core myth (unconscious structures of difference, basic    binary patterns)

Solution is to uncover myth and imagine alternative metaphors

Often appearing in the work of artists and visions of mystics

Solution can rarely be rationally designed

Notes

[1].         Dr. Sohail Inayatullah is Professor of Futures Studies, International Management Centres. He is also Professorial Research Fellow, Tamkang University, Taiwan and Visiting Academic at the Communication Center, Queensland University of Technology. Box 2434, Brisbane, 4001, Australia. Tel: 61-7-3864-4200. Fax: 61-7-3864-2252. Email: s.inayatullah@qut.edu.au Associate editor of New Renaissance and co-editor of the Journal of Futures Studies.

[2].         Rick Slaughter, “Developing and Applying Strategic Foresight,” The ABN Report Vol. 5, No. 10, December 1997, 7-15.

[3].         Ibid., 11.

[4].         See, for example, Harold Linstone, “What I have Learned: The Need for Multiple Perspectives,” Futures Research Quarterly, Spring 1985, 47-61. He divides futures into the technical, organizational and personal. Also see, Eleonora Masini and Karin Gillwald, “On Futures Studies and Their Social Context with Particular Focus on West Germany,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 38, 1990, 187-199. They take Linstone’s model and apply it historically to Europe and the US, seeing futures as going through technical, organizational and personal phases. See also, Zia Sardar, “Colonizing the future: the ‘other’ dimension of futures studies,” Futures, Vol. 25, No. 2, March 1993), 179-187. Sardar argues for a colonization/decolonization dialectic. The classic map of futures studies remains Roy Amara’s division into preferred, possible and probable. See his, Roy Amara, “The Futures Field,” The Futurist, February, April and June 1981.

See also, Clement Bezold and Trevor Hancock, “An Overview of the Health Futures Field”. Institute for Alternative Futures, Washington DC, 1993. 29 pages. Bezold adds a the plausible to Amara’s three categories.

[5].         Sohail Inayatullah, “Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Future: Predictive, Cultural and Critical Epistemologies,” Futures, Vol. 22, No. 2, March 1990, 115-141.

[6].         Sohail Inayatullah, “From Who am I to When am I?: Framing the Time and Shape of the Future,” Futures, Vol. 25, No. 3, April 1993, 235-253.

[7].         For the classical treatment of this, see Rick Slaughter, “Towards a Critical Futurism,” World Future Society Bulletin, July/August and September/October 1984 and Wendy Schultz, “Silences, Shadows, Reflections on Futures,” in Jim Dator and Maria Roulstone, eds. Who Cares? And How? Futures of Caring Societies, Honolulu, World Futures Studies Federation, 1988.  Rick Slaughter writes that “critical futures study is itself an approach to futures questions that arises from a deep understanding of the dysfunctions of the Western worldview.  This can seem threatening to those whose professional interests are bound up with … the industrial growth ideology. But, in fact, the analysis of dysfunctions at this deep level is only a ground-clearing exercise. Beyond this the task of exploring new domains of cultural possibility and potential.” See Richard Slaughter, “Developing and Applying Strategic Foresight,” 11.

[8].         See, Manas Ray, “India, Fifty Years On: Revisiting Modernity,” research paper, School of Media and Journalism, Queensland University of Technology, Research paper quoting Sudipto Kaviraj, “Religion and Identity in India” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1997, 331.

[9].         For the best discussion, See Michael Shapiro, Reading the Postmodern Polity, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, 1992.

[10].       Postmodernists would reject the idea that deconstruction etc should be seen as a method. It is considered an anti-method, focused on problematizing not on providing recipes for policy.  Moreover, there are no practitioners of postmodernity, if at all, the episteme of postmodernity practices on us.

[11].       See, for example, the works of Ashis Nandy and Zia Sardar.  Short essays by these two can be found in Futures. Ashis Nandy, “Bearing Witness to the Future,” Futures, Vol. 28, No. 6/7, 1996, and Zia Sardar, “Natural Born Futurist, Futures, Vol. 28, No. 6/7, 1996. Also see the special issue of Futures on Futures generations thinking, which takes a Confucian approach to futures studies, Futures, Vol. 29, No. 8, October 1997.

[12].       Emerging issues analysis is a method which identifies issues before they reach the trend or problem phase. It makes the assumption that issues follow an s-pattern growth curve from emerging to trend to problem.  For more on this method, see the path breaking work of Graham T.T. Molitor, Public Policy Forecasting, 9208 Wooden Bridge Road, Potomac, Maryland 20854, USA.

[13].       See, Sohail Inayatullah, “The Futures of Communication,” Futures (with Samar Ihsan and Levi Obijiofor), Vol. 27, No. 8, October 1995, 897-904 and Sohail Inayatullah, “Futures Visions of Southeast Asia: Some Early Warning Signals,” Futures, Vol. 27, No. 6, July/August, 1995, 681-688;

[14].       Johan Galtung, “Enactment of a Universal Drama – Ethnic Conflicts,” New Renaissance, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1996, 13-15.

[15].       See Richard Slaughter 1989, “Probing Beneath the Surface,” Futures, October 1989, p. 454 (Slaughter offers the brilliant idea of different types of futures studies from the litany- based to the epistemological-based. Indeed, it was Slaughter’s presentation at the World Futures Studies Federation conference in Budapest in 1990 that I noticed that his division of futures studies into levels was more than a typology but a potential method). P.R. Sarkar (Shrii Shrii Anandamurti), Discourses on Tantra – vol. 1 and 2. Calcutta, Ananda Marga Publications, 1992 (Borrowing from Tantra, Sarkar argues that the individual mind is composed of layers. The first layer is the body, then the conscious mind followed by three layers of superconscious mind).  See, Sohail Inayatullah, “Oswald Spengler: The Rise and Fall of Cultures” in Johan Galtung and Sohail Inayatullah, Macrohistory and Macrohistorians. Westport, CT. and London, Praeger, 1997 (Spengler argues that reality should be seen as deep and shallow, not as truth or false).

[16].       The Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth and other studies is a modern example of this.

[17].       In Pakistan, for example, parking spaces are rare – parking as a regulatory discourse is not active there.

[18].       Most policy thus merely reinscribes the modern capitalist worldview. However, by noticing how a particularly litany is shaped by a particularly worldview, this allows us to enter alternative worldviews and articulate different policy statements based on them.  At the same time, CLA in itself is part of a worldview – one committed to methodological eclecticism but in the framework of a layered, post-postmodern view of reality. It thus not only challenges the “totalizing nature of the empirical paradigm” (to use Paul Wildman’s phrase) but as well the horizontal relativism of postmodernism.

[19] Five are presented but there are many more. Currently three doctoral dissertations are using Causal Layered Analysis as their research framework/method.

[20].     See, Sohail Inayatullah, “Teaching Futures Workshops: Leadership, Ways of Knowing and Institutional Politics” Futures Research Quarterly. (Vol. 14, No. 4, Winter, 1998), 29-36;

[21].       Perhaps: community learning, through more spiritual approaches that revive the ideas of initiation into meaning and culture systems that current educational institutions lack, wherein merely an application form suffices.

[22].       Perhaps: Focused on distant learning or interactive learning where boundaries between student and teacher, text and context disappeared.

[23].       For an exploration of these differences, see Paul Wildman and Sohail Inayatullah, “Ways of knowing, culture, communication and the pedagogies of the future,” Futures, Vol. 28, No. 8,  October 1997, 723-741.

Pedagogy, Culture and Futures Studies (1998)

By Sohail Inayatullah

Queensland University of Technology

Through case studies of futures workshops and courses, the importance of decolonising the future and creating authentic alternative futures is highlighted.  Futures studies, it is argued, is about understanding the human condition, what it has become, and how we can participate in changing it.  An ideal futures studies is multi-leveled, empirical, interpretive, and critical in its research focus. Offered in this article is causal layered analysis, a futures method which takes a multicultural and multidisciplinary approach to the future.

FUTURES STUDIES IN SEARCH OF A DOXA

In traditional disciplines, even as postmodernity undoes defining and organizing narratives, there is a doxa–certain classic texts that must be read and must be adhered to. Futures studies does not yet have these boundaries. It is trans-disciplinary, in search of an interpretive community, its knowledge base just being defined.[1] Who the futurists are is still in contention.[2] Is futures studies a science? An appendage to strategic planning? Should futures studies be technical, concerned with forecasting, or culture-based, concerned with recovering the futures from the instrumental rationality of modernity? Or is futures studies primarily a movement, an attempt to keep futures pluralistic, to keep the future open, less concerned with academic treatises, and more with social action? Or should futures studies be specific in its orientation, as in “future generations studies”, which seeks to sustain and transform social conditions on behalf of the rights of future generations (humans, animals, plants, as well as metaphors)? Or should futures studies primarily be concerned with deconstructing hegemonic images of the future held by the powerful, thereby creating the spaces for the emergence of authentic alternative visions and social designs? That is, should futures studies essentially be about decolonizing dominant views of time/space and perspective?

While there have been many attempts to map the field,[3] it still remains contentious with no hegemonic paradigm defining it. In earlier articles, among other mapping schemes by thinkers such as Linstone, Masini, Gillwald, Sardar, Amara and Bezold,[4] I have divided futures studies into three overlapping research dimensions: empirical, interpretive and critical.[5] Each dimension has different assumptions about the real, about truth, about the role of the subject, about the nature of the universe, and about the nature of the future.[6] My own preference has been approaches that use all three–that contextualize data (the predictive) with the meanings (interpretive) we give them–and then locate these in various historical structures of power/knowledge–class, gender, varna and episteme (the critical).

In the predictive/empirical, language is assumed to be neutral; that is, it does not participate in constituting the real. Language merely describes reality, serving as an invisible link between theory and data. Prediction assumes that the universe is deterministic so that the future can be known. By and large this view privileges experts (planners, policy futurists, economists and astrologers). The future becomes a site of expertise and a place to colonize. In general, the strategic discourse is most prevalent in this framework with information valued because it provides lead time and a range of responses to deal with the enemy (a competing nation or corporation). Linear forecasting is the technique used most. Scenarios are used more as minor deviations from the norm instead of alternative worldviews.

In the cultural/interpretive, the goal is not prediction but insight into difference with the hope of creating unity. Truth is considered relative, with language and culture both intimately involved in creating the real. Through comparison–through examining different national or gender or ethnic images of the future–we gain insight into the human condition. This type of futures studies is less technical, with mythology as important as mathematics. Learning from each model–in the context of the search for universal narratives that can ensure basic human values–is the central mission for this epistemological approach. While visions of the future often occupy center stage in this interpretive view, the role of identity is also important, whether based on class, gender, or other categories of social relations.

In the poststructural/critical, futures studies aims neither at prediction nor at comparison but seeks to make the units of analysis problematic, to undefine the future, to seek a distance from current understandings and epistemological agreements. Of concern in this perspective is not forecasting, say, the futures of population, but how the category of population has become valorized in discourse. “Why ‘population’ instead of ‘community’ or ‘people’?” we might ask. The role of the state and other forms of power in creating authoritative discourses is central to understanding how a particular future has become hegemonic. Critical futures studies asserts that the present is fragile, merely the victory of one particular discourse, way of knowing, over another. The goal of critical research is to disturb present power relations through making problematic our categories and evoking other places, other scenarios of the future. Through this distance, the present becomes less rigid, indeed, remarkable. The spaces of reality loosen, the grip of neo-realism (of the bottom line, of the predictive approach) widen, and the new is possible. Language is not symbolic but constitutive of reality. While structures are useful, they are seen not as universal but as particular to history and episteme (the knowledge boundaries that frame our knowing).

Ideally, one should try to use all three types of futures studies. If one makes a population forecast, one should then ask how different civilizations approach the issue of population. Then, one should deconstruct the idea of population itself, defining it, for example, not only as an ecological problem in the third world but relating it to first world consumption patterns as well. Empirical research then must be contextualized within the science of the civilization from which it emerges, and then historically deconstructed to show what particular approaches are missing and silencing.

TEACHING FUTURES STUDIES

My own pedagogy in the area of futures studies has focused on the interpretive and critical. I have been particularly concerned with decolonizing the future–examining how we buy other’s used futures; how we disempower ourselves by accepting the futures of others as ours. But once the purchased future is deconstructed, it is equally essential to offer alternatives. In my own work, I ask: what are alternative imaginations of the future? How can we learn from those who have suffered? What are the images of the future of those we consider outside history? What are other ways to “time” the world instead of the dominant scientific model, such as, women’s, spiritual, or cyclical time. Thus, crucial to a liberation pedagogy is a concerted effort to identify dissenting authentic images of the future.

My own inspiration to engage in alternative futures has come from classical Tantra as redefined by P. R. Sarkar; from indigenous Pacific islander’s visions of time and family; and from the range of social movements–the spiritual, the environmental, the womanist–all dedicated to creating a global ohana, being part of a global samaj, a planetary civilization.

Teaching and learning about the future then is centrally about understanding the human condition, what it has become, and how we can participate in changing it (and understanding the structural limitations of change, i. e., the deep cycles and trends of history that create our own subjectivities).

My own experience in the last fifteen years has been in conducting workshops for university administration and departments, non-governmental organizations, corporations, local governments, research institutes, international organizations and advocacy groups; participating in international courses in futures studies (usually sponsored by the World Futures Studies Federation [WFSF] and UNESCO) and more formal teaching at the University of Hawaii (wherein I used a futures perspective to frame the topic being taught, Hawaii Politics in this case), and public lectures at numerous universities and institutes throughout the world (Yugoslavia, Greece, Denmark, Pakistan, Hungary, India, Australia, to mention a few).

The style that I use in formal courses is to have students/participants search for alternative ways to define the past, present, and future. Not only is the future considered probable and makeable, but so is the past and present. The idea is to open up the present, to give different readings of political events and trends. In one course, a student developed scenarios of Hawaii’s future by rewriting history. He asked: “What if Captain Cook had never landed on the Hawaiian Islands? What if contact with the West had been on the terms of the Islanders?” This historical questioning led to the creation of scenarios in which Pacific islands–instead of a history of disunity and imperialism–unite, recognizing that they are a liquid continent, and creating something akin to the Federated Cultures/Regions of Oceania.

In conducting workshops–where I work with a specific group aiding in the development of their vision/strategy for the future–my own method has been to first create a shared identity, to explore why each person is at the workshop, and what history they bring with them, and then I seek to open up the workshop. The opening up process occurs through methods such as emerging issues analysis–which identifies areas of sudden transformation, of unexpected futures–and what-if questions, which again call into question the present and projected future.

This is followed by a sorting of positions in vertical layers, from the most obvious litany to the deeper metaphorical layers–the method of Causal Layered Analysis (CLA), which is explored more in depth later in this essay. Information from these methods is used to create alternative scenarios,[7] pictures of possible and probable futures. Of these scenarios, agreement is often reached on a vision of the future. This can occur through small working groups or strategic questioning, in which the elements of the group vision emerge. In strategic questioning I ask selected individuals to imagine–in detail–a day in their life in their desired or plausible future. I ask questions like: What do you see out the window? How do you get to work? Do you walk, use virtual technologies, or …? Do you work? What do you eat during the day?

These stories create shared meanings among participants and they legitimate the future since imaginations are owned by the individuals relating them. Detail is crucial here as this forces participants to select from a range of possibilities what they desire or believe will occur in the future. Thus, from individual scenarios of the future, a shared vision comes to be articulated.

The final stage is backcasting, of deriving strategy by going backwards from the future, and asking individuals to remember the historical events and trends that created the present. At this stage, with the contours of the future already agreed on, the issue is remembering the past, not engaging in debates about whether a particular future could or could not have occurred. Backcasting can result in a strategic plan or, even better, a range of organizational experiments with real funding and faces behind who does what, when, and with whom.

While this is a general model, there are, of course, many variations depending on the local culture of the participants, their worldview, and how they imagine the future. Being sensitive to local perspective on the future, I believe, is a crucial skill in teaching futures studies. Listening to the language others use to talk about the future is also essential. Finally, while it is important to honor others’ views of the future, thinking about the future, as Dator has argued, is an unnatural act –it requires years of training. The teacher should not be shy about prodding others towards more imaginative, creative, and plausible futures. Thinking about the future is more than fantasy fulfillment. There are real rigorous methods, from the most to the least mathematical, that can aid in this process.

Finally, as in all pedagogical situations, there is a process of politics. This includes conventional understandings of the politics of planning–the role of participation and hierarchy; of who gets to speak, and who listens; who is expert and who is lay–as well as more subtle issues as to the appropriateness of using futures studies for organizational learning and transformation.

What follows are case studies of workshops and courses selected to illustrate the above.

EXPERTISE AND UNCERTAINTY[8]

While one would normally expect expertise to be the most important criteria in determining the success of a workshop, in a day-long visioning workshop for an Australian university, we found that the most important determinant in the workshop’s success was our own uncertainty as to how to run the workshop. Deans, professors and administrators were initially resistant to participate in a visioning workshop. They feared that the workshop would be used by management to gain points over labor. They were also uncertain of the academic respectability of futures studies.

Our[9] first goal was to ensure commitment from top management. Our second goal was to locate futures within macrohistory, within the large patterns of social and civilizational change. This was important in that the future was seen less as fantasy and more as part of a knowledge base. Our third goal was to keep the workshop fluid, to constantly change directions as our perception of participants’ needs changed. This fluidity on our part was central to allaying fears that we had a hidden agenda (for management). The result was that since we were unsure of ourselves, the future ceased to be an authoritarian space. Rather, it became an open space that could be shared, where expert knowledge had not colonized alternatives.

Academics afterwards agreed to continue the visioning process in their own departments. Earlier, they had worried that we would be crystal ball gazers, but the issues we raised at some level fit their world views but also challenged them. For example, we asked them to explore the challenge of multiculturalism in the university (not just in terms of better and equal opportunity for minorities but of using non-western models of knowledge and of the university to define their future), to explore the end of the university because of the Web; to explore a more corporatized university (as current globalization trends suggest), and to explore a return to core values. These issues later emerged in scenarios and shared agreement was reached in the visioning part of the workshop–i. e., the desirability of a more mentoring role than a strict “I am smart and you are not” role–and of faculty having concurrent contracts with different universities. The ideas that came forth most likely would not have emerged if the day had been spent discussing current issues–matters of office space, of access to better computers, of labor contracts–all critically important, but all reinscribing the present instead of creating or even imagining alternative futures.

Thus, while technically the workshop was problematic (miscues, and, in general, a trial and error learning process), in terms of its outcomes–a shared vision, a shared backcast, and a shared strategy of transformation, as well as an openness towards the process of creating alternative futures–the workshop was highly successful. Besides our tentativeness, central to this success was an opening speech by the university president in which he showed his commitment to the process, as well as vigorous participation by hard-headed academics, once they saw that we were not there to “workshop” them, to con them. This latter point is crucial since futures studies, even while it has grown by leaps and bounds in academia, still remains for many a “pop” consulting tool i. e., as change management, as a manipulative device.

MULTICULTURAL FUTURES[10]

More satisfying and challenging than conducting workshops for specific organizations/institutes have been international futures courses sponsored by WFSF (often with seed money from UNESCO). Whether in Dubrovnik, Andorra, Thailand or the Philippines, these courses begin with cultural difference and conclude with cultural difference. While introducing futures studies, these courses usually also have specific themes, such as the futures of development, communication, ecology, and policymaking and education.

These courses are challenging to teach in that not only does one have to teach a new field of knowing–futures studies–but one has to do so in ways that make sense to how individuals from different cultures know the world. Not only is the future constructed differently, but there are a range of diverse expectations of pedagogical style. Some prefer more formal lectures, others prefer informal small group sessions. Some expect that information about the future should be given to them, while others believe that any fantasy about the future is an appropriate scenario. Some resist the idea that the future is at some level open. For example, they may be committed to religious worldviews in which the future is God-given. Others believe that the future should be explored only through statistical-modeling methods and not through “softer” metaphorical approaches.

Teaching futures is already challenging, more so is teaching futures in cross-cultural contexts, wherein the knowledge, style, and forms of presentation are all open (and not) for negotiation. What I have found most noteworthy is that futures studies must be localized in the language of participants, in their ways of knowing and experiences.

Some years ago, Draper Kauffman developed an exercise, since widely used by some futurists, which asks people to say whether they think the future is more like a roller coaster ride, paddling down a river in a canoe, sailing on an ocean, or throwing dice in a game of chance (as in the American board game, “Monopoly”). People who choose “roller coaster” or “game of chance” are considered to have restricted, fatalistic images of the future, while those who say “river” have a more open image, with “ocean” being the most optimistic and “can do” image of the future of the four.

During a presentation of these four images to students at a futures workshop held in Islamabad, Pakistan in March of 1995, one student responded: “But who would want to live in a future which was entirely open.” She added: “An ocean has no direction.” She proceeded to offer the daily Muslim prayer while facing toward Mecca as an appropriate metaphor for Islam and the future–united and facing in one direction.

Earlier in a UNESCO/WFSF sponsored workshop on the futures of education held in Suva, Fiji in 1993, Pacific islanders had offered two metaphors they believed more adequately represented their traditions. The first was a coconut tree. One had to work hard to climb up the tree, but at the top were ample rewards. This was clearly the influence of Protestant Christianity on the Islands, the participants agreed. The second imaged they offered was of being a passenger in a car driven by a man with a blindfold. This of course represented the Island’s interaction with modern Western capitalism, a perception that they were not in control of their own destiny.

In contrast to these metaphors, an Indian participant at the second WFSF Bangkok Asia-Pacific futures course in 1993 suggested the onion as a more appropriate image. Reality, in this view, has many layers. Our task as humans is to peel away the layers, discovering new levels of reality, until all is revealed, and the empty infinity of the atman is revealed to us. A Filipino participant suggested a less spiritual metaphor, the coconut. A coconut is hard on the outside (in response to the cruelty of the world) but soft on the inside (our inner tender spiritual selves). The coconut also has many uses: it can be eaten, its juice drunk, and its husk used and recycled for a variety of agricultural and industrial purposes. It was a metaphor for all seasons, all futures.

Staying within the ecological discourse, an Australian participant at a Southern Cross University/WFSF course in 1995 suggested the seed. For her, the seed was most appropriate for expressing future generations and the future since it embedded alternative futures within an organic unity. As with children, the seed needs nurturing but as it grows it can provide nourishment for others. Once a tree, there are many branches–alternative futures–all arising from our common humanity (the trunk). Finally, the seed privileges ontology over epistemology, being over knowing.

These and other examples have made it clear to me that our language, our metaphors of the future, are culture- and gender-bound. To only use the models found in western futures educational books is severely limiting.

At a 1994 futures visioning workshop in Penang, Malaysia,[11] these limitations were further exposed. The dice, while adequately representing randomness, misses entirely the role of the transcendental as a type of super-agency. The roller coaster, while appearing to represent predestination, does not capture the importance of the group or larger community Asians and Africans are embedded in. The ocean, while representing unbounded possibilities, misses the role of history and deep social structures, of fate and power. While the image of river with its dangerous submerged rocks well represents the need for information and swift decisionmaking so as to avoid risks and take advantage of opportunities, it does not provide metaphorical entry for guidance from others: leadership, family, or God. Surprisingly, the metaphor that did emerge from discussion with Malay Muslims was the “snakes and ladders” game, that is, life’s ups and downs are based on chance, and when one goes up, one should be ready to fall at any moment. While appearing to be fatalistic, the resolution of this metaphor of the future was faith in Allah, as the deeper reality on which one must rest one’s self.

In this workshop, participants had little interest in the future until we asked them to think of the future in their own cultural categories. Once this question had been asked, there was an abundance of discussion. Participants searched within their own civilizational history to imagine the future. They took their future-oriented metaphors from their recent agricultural past and sought to understand if these still made sense within Malaysia’s new role in the world economy. This led to the creation of new types of future imaging and a call for Malays/Muslims constructing futures and futures studies.

They thus sought to decolonize the future and make it their own. Myths and metaphors were the central tools of empowerment that they used in this process. However, not neglected were issues of social design, of articulating futures that dealt with the realities of the world economy; nonetheless, they did so in the context of Islamic economics, devising and creating new financial instruments that did not violate Islamic ethics.

As mentioned at the outset of this essay, my view of the best futures studies would ideally bring in all these different perspectives, being able to move in empirical, interpretive, and critical frames, all the time touching on theory, data and values, while being sensitive to the different ways we learn from each other and know the world.

One method that is exemplary in this regard, in moving in and out of different types of meaning, is causal layered analysis.

CAUSAL LAYERED ANALYSIS[12]

Causal layered analysis takes as its starting point the assumption that there are different levels of reality and ways of knowing. Individuals, organizations and civilizations see the world from different vantage points, horizontal and vertical.

The first level is the “litany”–quantitative trends, problems, often exaggerated, often used for political purposes–(overpopulation, for example) usually presented by the news media. Events, issues and trends are not connected and appear discontinuous. The result is often either a feeling of helplessness (what can I do?) or apathy (nothing can be done!) or projected action (why don’t they do something about it?). This is the conventional level of futures research which can readily create a politics of fear. This is the futurist as fearmonger who warns: “The end is near! But if you believe my prophecy and act as I tell you to, the end can be averted.”

The second level is concerned with social causes, including economic, cultural, political and historical factors (rising birthrates, lack of family planning, for example). Interpretation is given to quantitative data. This type of analysis is usually articulated by policy institutes and published as editorial pieces in newspapers or in not-quite academic journals. If one is fortunate, then the precipitating action is sometimes analyzed (population growth and advances in medicine/health, for example). This level excels at technical explanations as well as academic analysis. The role of the state and other actors and interests is often explored at this level.

The third deeper level is concerned with structure and the discourse/worldview that supports and legitimates it (population growth and civilizational perspectives of family; lack of women’s power; lack of social security; the population/consumption debate, for example.). The task is to find deeper social, linguistic, cultural structures that are actor-invariant. Discerning deeper assumptions behind the issue is crucial here as are efforts to revision the problem. At this stage, one can explore how different discourses (the economic, the social, the cultural) do more than cause or mediate the issue but constitute it, how the discourse we use to understand is complicit in our framing of the issue. Based on the varied discourses, discrete alternative scenarios can be derived here. These scenarios add a horizontal dimension to our layered analysis.

The fourth layer of analysis is at the level of metaphor or myth. These are the deep stories, the collective archetypes, the unconscious dimensions of the problem or the paradox (seeing population as non-statistical, as community; or seeing people as creative resources, as life, for example). This level provides a gut/emotional level experience to the worldview under inquiry. The language used is less specific, more concerned with evoking visual images, with touching the heart instead of reading the head.

Causal layered analysis asks us to go beyond conventional framings of issues. For instance, normal academic analysis tends to stay in the second layer with occasional forays into the third, seldom privileging the fourth layer (myth and metaphor). CLA, however, does not privilege any one particular level. Moving up and down layers, we can integrate analysis and synthesis, and horizontally we can integrate discourses, ways of knowing and worldviews, thereby increasing the richness of the analysis. What often results are differences that can be easily captured in alternative scenarios; each scenario in itself, to some extent, can represent a different way of knowing. However, CLA orders the scenarios in vertical space.

For example, taking the issue of parking spaces in urban centers can lead to a range of scenarios. A short term scenario of increasing parking spaces (building below or above) is of a different order from a scenario which examines telecommuting, or a scenario which distributes spaces by lottery (instead of by power or wealth), or one which questions the role of the car in modernity (a carless city?), or deconstructs the idea of a parking space, as in many third world settings where there are few spaces designated “parking”.[13]

Scenarios, thus, are different at each level. Litany-type scenarios are more instrumental. Social level scenarios are more policy-oriented, while discourse/worldview scenarios intend to capture fundamental differences. Myth/metaphor type scenarios are equally discrete but articulate this difference through a poem, a story, an image, or some other right-brain method.

Finally, who solves the problem/issue also changes at each level. At the litany level, it is usually others–the government or corporations. At the social level, it is often some partnership between different groups. At the worldview level, it is people or voluntary associations, and at the myth/metaphor it is visionaries or artists.

These four layers are indicative; that is, there is some overlap between the layers. Using CLA on CLA, we can see how the current litany (of what are the main trends and problems facing the world) in itself is the tip of the iceberg, an expression of a particular worldview.[14]

USING “CLA” AT A UNESCO/WFSF COURSE

I have used CLA in a variety of situations. One notable example was at the 1993 UNESCO/WFSF workshop in Thailand on the futures of ecology, where the issue of Bangkok’s traffic problem was explored. CLA was pivotal in breaking out of a conventional understanding of transportation futures.

At the litany level, the problem was seen to be Bangkok’s traffic and related pollution. The solution was to hire consultants, particularly transportation planners at local and international levels.

At the social cause level, the problem was seen as a lack of roads with the solution that of building more roads (and getting mobile phones in the meantime). If one were doing scenarios at this stage, these would be based on where to build alternative routes and which transportation modeling software to use.

At the worldview level, it was argued that the problem was not just lack of roads but the model of industrial growth Thailand had taken. It is the Big City Outlook that had come down through colonialism: the city is better, and rural people are idiots; wealth accumulation is only possible in the city, especially as population growth creates problems in the rural area. The solution then becomes not to build more roads but to decentralize the economy and create localism–where local people control their economy and feel they do not have to leave their life and lifestyle. Psychologically it means valuing local traditions and countering the ideology that West is Best and that Bigger is Better. New leadership and new metaphors on what it means to be Thai emerged as the solutions.

The key methodological utility is that CLA allows for research that brings in many perspectives. It has a fact basis, which is framed in history, which is then contextualized within a discourse or worldview, which then is located in pre- and post-rational ways of knowing, in myth and metaphor. The challenge is to bring in these many perspectives to a particular problem, to go up and down levels, and sideways through various scenarios.

Like all methods, CLA has its limits. For example, it does not forecast the future per se and is best used in conjunction with other methods such as emerging issues analysis–which even while it offers forecasts of nascent issues, disturbs the present through its exploration of the absurd–and visioning.

KNOWLEDGE AND WAYS OF KNOWING

Teaching futures studies or conducting futures workshops has numerous challenges. The process must be sensitive to each individual’s cultural framework, to skepticism about the appropriateness of studying the future, as well as to a failure of imagination in thinking about the future, not to mention the complex ways we know the world. For example, Paul Wildman[15] argues that there are at least five ways of knowing: (1) practical, technical knowledge, skills development; (2) scientific theoretical knowledge, knowledge to explain the world; (3) experiential knowledge to change myself or the world around me; (4) metaphorical knowledge or insight, deeper understanding of self and others (at heart and head level) and (5) relationship knowledge, knowledge so as to better relate to others, be they lovers, friends, God or the environment. A course or workshop thus must find methods and processes that meet these various ways of knowing. Those focused on relationship often prefer small group exercises, where they can share perspectives and directly learn from others. Those concerned with metaphorical knowledge might prefer personal stories about how one has done futures studies or what one has learned from years of experience or conversations with elders and children. An experiential knowledge type would be far more concerned with ensuring that the time spent at a workshop would help change the world–making a difference is far more important than the accumulation of information. Those focused on scientific knowledge might prefer technical descriptions of forecasting. Finally, individuals representative of the first knowledge cluster focused on practical knowledge might want to learn how to do the workshop themselves or would be engaged in a cognitive assessment to discern if these workshops could be applied to their day-to-day work.

For a presenter, the task then is certainly challenging. At issue is not just the particular academic text on the future, but how each human learns about others, how each person imagines her own role on the planet, and what she intend to do about the problems facing humanity. As Martha Rogers argues,[16] teaching and learning about the future raises issues of the heart, head and soul–all three combine to create powerful forces of discomfort, and individual and social transformation.

One of the great strengths of futures studies is its openness towards its self-definition. Futures studies fortunately has a rapidly evolving knowledge base, thus allying fears that it is merely about fantasy or steeped in non-rigorous discourses. It is trans-disciplinary, having a leg in scientific analysis and a leg in cultural studies. This perhaps gives it an advantage. Its lack of institutionalization allows it to remain undomesticated. One can both be expert and student; one can lecture and can create spaces for participatory workshops. Whereas a traditional academic would need to feel that the lecture was perfect, for the futurist, there is more space for making mistakes, for laughter, for play, for experimentation, and thus for authentic and successful pedagogy. Indeed, that the future is not immediate and thus less urgent allows creativity to be explored. That the future is about alternative futures and not fixed history allows different interpretations, thus opening futures studies to more participation.

Finally, those who actively participate in teaching the future exist in global educative space, as futures studies is one of the few global disciplines, living and flourishing outside of conventional national and international boundaries of state and knowledge. The “how” of teaching the future then forces one into many academic, cultural, and historical frameworks. This is enriching for practitioners–and problematic, since all certainties are undone by the varieties of frames that create the process of what it is that is taught and learned.

To conclude, engaging in futures-oriented pedagogy requires sensitivity to the different ways women and men, civilizations, class, people with disabilities and those without–among other conditions–know the world. While all teaching situations have these concerns as well, in futures studies, the question of what you (as individual or as representative of your civilization) desire the future to be like is pivotal. This is especially so if one wishes to explore layers of responses, decolonize dominant visions of the future, and create authentic alternative futures.

And if this is all too much, there is always statistics and other fantasies to fall back on.

I would like to thank Dr. Levi Obiifor of the Communication Center for his editorial assistance in the preparation of this article.

END NOTES

1. Through efforts such as R.Slaughter, ed., The knowledge base of futures studies-Vols. 1-3. Melbourne, Futures Study Centre, 1996. Volume 4 titled Futurists: Visions, methods and stories  is forthcoming in 1998. See, also, R.Slaughter, (November, 1996). The knowledge base of futures studies as an evolving process. Futures , 28(9), 799-812.

2. For one effort at identifying the full range of futurists and what they think, see the special issue of Futures  titled What futurists think. 6(7), August/September, 1997.

3. The most recent effort is May, G. (1996).The future is ours. London: Adamantine. (See, in particular, his section on futures workshops, pages 194-199). Also, Bell, W. (1997). The foundations of futures studies. Two volumes. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. And, Kurian, G. T. and Molitor, G. T. T. (1996). Encyclopedia of the future. Two volumes. New York: Macmillan Library Reference.

4. See, for example, Linstone, H. (Spring 1985). What I have learned: The need for multiple perspectives. Futures Research Quarterly, 47-61. He divides futures into the technical, organizational and personal. Also see, Masini, E. and Gillwald, K. (1990). On futures studies and their social context with particular focus on West Germany. Technological Forecasting and Social Change , 38, 187-199. They take Linstone’s model and apply it historically to Europe and the US, seeing futures as going through technical, organizational and personal phases. See also, Sardar, Z. (March 1993). Colonizing the future: the “other” dimension of futures studies. Futures , 25(2), 179-187. Sardar argues for a colonization/decolonization dialectic. The classic map of futures studies remains Roy Amara’s division into preferred, possible and probable. See Amara, R. (February, April and June 1981). The futures field. The Futurist . See also, Bezold, C. and Hancock, T. (1993). An overview of the health futures field. Washington, DC: Institute for Alternative Futures. Bezold adds the plausible to Amara’s three categories.

5. Inayatullah, S. (March 1990). Deconstructing and reconstructing the future: Predictive, cultural and critical epistemologies.Futures , 22(2), 115-141.

6. Inayatullah, S. (April 1993). From “who am I” to “when am I?”: Framing the time and shape of the future. Futures , 25(3), 235-253.

7. The method I use to make the scenario more real is called “nuts and bolts.” This is a strutural-functional analysis of the organization. If, for example, a current function of an organization, say, the courts, is to resolve disputes, I ask: what are some other ways to resolve disputes. What are some other sites instead of court buildings? If currently judges resolve disputes, what are other ways to resolve them? This method forces one into very specific structural-functional changes.

8 .Some of the following material is drawn from, “Teaching futures workshops: Leadership, ways of knowing and institutional politics,” Futures Research Quarterly (forthcoming, 1998).

9. Working with Dr. Paul Wildman, Fellow in Futures Studies, International Management Centres, Pacific Region. Email: pwildman@powerup.com.au

10. Some of this material is drawn from, Inayatullah, S. and Wildman, P. Communicating Futures in Cross-Cultural Pedagogical Environments. Paper presented at the Conference on Teaching and Learning about Future Generations, OISE, University of Toronto, October 1995.

11. See Inayatullah, S. (October 1995). Futures visions for southeast Asia: Some early warning signals. Futures , 27(6), 681-688.

12. The material on Causal Layered Analysis is drawn from, Causal Layered Analysis: Poststructuralism as method, Research Paper, The Communication Centre, Queensland University of Technology, 1998.

13. In Pakistan, for example, parking spaces are rare. Parking as a regulatory discourse is not active there.

14. Most policy thus merely reinscribes the modern capitalist worldview. However, by noticing how a particular litany is shaped by a particular worldview, this allows us to enter alternative worldviews and articulate different policy statements based on them. At the same time, CLA in itself is part of a worldview–one committed to methodological eclecticism but in the framework of a layered, post-postmodern view of reality. It thus not only challenges the “totalizing nature of the empirical paradigm” (to use Paul Wildman’s phrase) but as well the horizontal relativism of postmodernism.

15. See Wildman, P. and Inayatullah, S. (1997). Ways of knowing, culture, communication and the pedagogies of the future. Futures , 28(8), 723-740.

16. Rogers, M. (October 1997). Learning about the future. From the learner’s perspective. Futures , 29(8), 763-768.

[1]   Through efforts such as Rick Slaughter, ed., The Knowledge Base of Futures Studies-Vols. 1-3. Melbourne, Futures Study Centre, 1996. Volume 4 titled Futurists: Visions, Methods and Stories is forthcoming in 1998. See, also, Rick Slaughter, “The knowledge base of futures studies as an evolving process,” Futures (Vol. 28, No. 9, November, 1996), 799-812.

[2]   For one effort at identifying the full range of futurists and what they think, see the special issue of Futures titled “What Futurists Think.” (Vol. 6, No. 7, August/September, 1997).

[3]   The most recent effort is Graham H. May’s The Future is Ours. London, Adamantine, 1996 (See, in particular, his section on futures workshops, pages 194-199). Also, Wendell Bell’s The Foundations of Futures Studies. Two Volumes. New Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction Publishers, 1997. And, George Thomas Kurian and Graham T.T. Molitor, Encyclopedia of the Future. Two Volumes. New York, Macmillan Library Reference, 1996.

[4]   See, for example, Harold Linstone, “What I have Learned: The Need for Multiple Perspectives,” Futures Research Quarterly (Spring 1985), 47-61. He divides futures into the technical, organizational and personal. Also see, Eleonora Masini and Karin Gillwald, “On Futures Studies and Their Social Context with Particular Focus on West Germany,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change (Vol. 38, 1990), 187-199. They take Linstone’s model and apply it historically to Europe and the US, seeing futures as going through technical, organizational and personal phases. See also, Zia Sardar, “Colonizing the future: the ‘other’ dimension of futures studies,” Futures (Vol. 25, No. 2, March 1993), 179-187. Sardar argues for a colonization/decolonization dialectic. The classic map of futures studies remains Roy Amara’s division into preferred, possible and probable. See his, Roy Amara, “The Futures Field,” The Futurist (February, April and June 1981).  See also, Clement Bezold and Trevor Hancock, “An Overview of the Health Futures Field”. Institute for Alternative Futures, Washington DC, 1993. 29 pages. Bezold adds the plausible to Amara’s three categories.

[5]   Sohail Inayatullah, “Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Future: Predictive, Cultural and Critical Epistemologies,” Futures (Vol. 22, No. 2, March 1990), 115-141.

[6]   Sohail Inayatullah, “From Who am I to When am I?: Framing the Time and Shape of the Future,” Futures (Vol. 25, No. 3, April 1993), 235-253.

[7]   The method I use to make the scenario more real is called “nuts and bolts.” This is a strutural-functional analysis of the organization.  If, for example, a current function of an organization, say, the courts, is to resolve disputes, I ask: what are some other ways to resolve disputes. What are some other sites instead of court buildings? If currently judges resolve disputes, what are other ways to resolve them? This method forces one into very specific structural-functional changes.

[8]   Some of the following material is drawn from, “Teaching Futures Workshops: Leadership, Ways of Knowing and Institutional Politics,” Futures Research Quarterly (forthcoming, 1998).

[9]   Working with Dr. Paul Wildman, Fellow in Futures Studies, International Management Centres, Pacific Region. Email: pwildman@powerup.com.au

[10]  Some of this material is drawn from, Sohail Inayatullah and Paul Wildman, “Communicating Futures in Cross-Cultural Pedagogical Environments,” Paper presented at the Conference on Teaching and Learning about Future Generations, OISE, University of Toronto, October 1995.

[11]   See Sohail Inayatullah, “Futures Visions for Southeast Asia: Some Early Warning Signals,” Futures (Vol. 27, No. 6, October, 1995), 681-688.

[12]  The material on Causal Layered Analysis is drawn from, “Causal Layered Analysis: Poststructuralism as method,” Research Paper, The Communication Centre, Queensland University of Technology, 1998.

[13]  In Pakistan, for example, parking spaces are rare – parking as a regulatory discourse is not active there.

[14]  Most policy thus merely reinscribes the modern capitalist worldview. However, by noticing how a particularly litany is shaped by a particularly worldview, this allows us to enter alternative worldviews and articulate different policy statements based on them.  At the same time, CLA in itself is part of a worldview – one committed to methodological eclecticism but in the framework of a layered, post-postmodern view of reality. It thus not only challenges the “totalizing nature of the empirical paradigm” (to use Paul Wildman’s phrase) but as well the horizontal relativism of postmodernism.

[15]  See Paul Wildman and Sohail Inayatullah, “Ways of Knowing, Culture, Communication and the Pedagogies of the Future,” Futures (Vol. 28, No. 8, 1997), 723-740.

[16]  Martha Rogers, “Learning about the Future. From the learner’s Perspective.” Futures (Vol. 29, No. 8, October 1997), 763-768.

Alternative Futures of Korea: Beyond the Litany (1996)

By Sohail Inayatullah[1]

Final days but hedge your bets

In Papua New Guinea, farmers are refusing to plant numerous crops, convinced that the world will end in two years. In the year 2000, when the world will not end, not only will they face humiliation, they will face starvation.

Lee Jan-Rim, 44, leader of Mission for Coming Days, was sentenced to two years for swindling $4.4 million form his followers.  It was one of several sects to predict that the world would end in October, 1992.  Lee, however, had bought large amounts of bonds and maturities that extended beyond the October 28 date which was to mark the end of civilisation.

Either Lee was practicing alternative futures or hedging his bets. 20,000 Koreans were caught up in this doomsday craze. Several killed themselves and others deserted their homes, schools and jobs.

The future matters

The future does matter, we constantly act on our views of the future.

Another obvious example is the world economy, our explicit and implicit belief in progress, in the upward rise of economies leads us to invest in certain ways.  When things do not quite turn out the way we envision, fear results.

While few believe they can predict the future, there is general agreement that

(1)        One can often discern emerging issues or trends;

(2)        One can predict the future by creating it, by colonising it;

(3)        Unless one interrogates the future, unless one decolonises the future, others will control and create it;

(4)        A range of alternative futures, scenarios can be posited, which can (a) bound and reduce uncertainty, (b) provide a distance from the present and thus allow for the creation of a new present.

Future generations

In recent times, the study of the future has undergone a tremendous transformation through the paradigm of future generations studies. Instead of predictive-technical concerns, the approach is focused on the

  1. (1)        Family, particularly the extended family,
  2. (2)        Time is seen as repeatable, as cyclical – taking care of ancestors is thus considered critical seen they have ensured that present generations are alive – the future in this sense is very much past based, and not linear as in conventional Western futures
  3. (3)        As important as ancestors are futurecestors or future generations
  4. (4)        The moral/ethical basis of what the future can or might be like are crucial.
  5. (5)        Moral leadership is seen as central in creating a different future

This type of futures studies I believe will be far closer to the East Asian sensibility. Part of the lack of the growth of thinking about the future has been that it has been located in narrow economistic readings and power based international relations perspectives – ie only state configured futures and scenarios are real, issues of culture, gender, myth are avoided.

But future generations thinking allows us to consider the future of the family, the role of cyclicity in human and social systems, the role of the wise leader, and the role of ethics/morality in creating desired futures.

Research on the future of Korea

The literature on the futures of Korea is surprisingly not immense. Whereas a web search  (through yahoo, hotbot and excite) normally lead to dozens to thousands of findings, entering the phrase “the futures of korea” leads to nothing.

A search in the literature in futures studies leads to similar results.

The type of articles that do appear only use the 21st century as an inspiring signifier or forecast narrow and short term economic trends.

There is a UNESCO report titled Korea 2000 but that too is mostly concerned with immediate trends.

Papers on south korea in general focus on economic trends, pointing to growth in its economy, its rise from underdeveloped nation to industrialised nation, all in one generation, with Japan’s present as South Korea’s likely future.

There exists an implicit view of the future of Korea. It is based on the belief that the following: Unification will occur; Korea will continue to development economically, becoming a fully developed nation in not to distant future.  The key to creating a bright future is hard word, strong family ties, sacrifice for the nation or collectivity and han – both as beauty and as resentment against the other. Finally, there is a belief that the future can be modern without being western – there can be an asian way to progress.

Scenarios of Korea’s Futures

Of peculiar interest is a paper by international relations writer Susmit Kumar[2] – quoting the director of the CIA, Kumar argues for three scenarios for the future of North Korea. (1) Peaceful existence, (2) Explosion and (3) Implosion.

The first scenario is the most hopeful and the dream of South Koreans and possibly many North Koreans. The issues in this scenario that are to be resolved are largely economic. They include the following questions: Will the south be willing to allow economic investment in the north if it became too obviously exploitative of wage differentials?  Can the south live with the enslavement of relatives for 10‑20 years `while living standards approach those in the south’?

In the second scenario, North Korea explodes onto South Korea, leading to a full scale war, the devastation of Seoul, and concluding with the total annihilation of North Korea – its removal from the world geographical map.

In the third implosion scenario, the current crisis expands to the degree where the state breaks down and South Korea takes over. The costs to south korea will be high.  Kumar write that it will not follow the West Germany/East germany model since North Koreans have no knowledge of the outside world, or even other parts of their own country. But while many believe, the costs will be too difficult for the south korean, the Confucian “nature” and idea of extended family will make sacrificing for the long term more bearable.

Keun Lee, professor of Seoul National University writes that unification will have to be a slow process – partial unification (some type of federation), economic integration and then complete unification. He calls this the soft landing scenario. He believes this will take about 15 years or so.[3]

Other shorter editorial pieces point to the changing nature of the Korean political- economy – more transparency, more democracy, less corruption, to mention the more obvious trends, and the problems associated with moving to a more western culture. However, these perspectives, more than say anything about the future, say more about the present.

Indeed, the entire unification discourse is very much about the present.  There is already a growing army of political scientists and government officials trying to deal with the nuts and bolts of unification, however, what is not asked is: what will Koreans from the south do when their distant cousins from Pyongyang appear on their doorstep one morning, unannounced.

World futures

Part of the problem in thinking about “out of the box” scenarios is being overly focused on trends.  I argue that we need to take a grander historical perspectives. We need to take  a step back and (1) locate this speculation within a model of forecasting and (2) locate korea’s futures within broader world futures.

At the World Futures level, the most important trend or scenario is that of an asian renaissance led partly through the economic miracle but also through the leadership of ecumenical thinkers as Anwar Ibrahim.[4] He and many others take a perspective of critical traditionalism. They imagine an Asian Century but are not committed to modernism, rather they see religious tradition as the centre point for a postmodern non-european world.  They also do not have an emotional gut reaction against the West or indeed, against any particular civilisation as they have not undergone any personal trauma.  They remain committed to creating a new future that is not a simplistic reaction to the West nor do they play identity politics with dogmatic traditionalists/nationalists.

The counter to this scenario is deep social maldevelopment – as in the case of Thailand, leading to an asian schizophrenia.[5] In this scenario, the costs of hyperdevelopment – loss of tradition, move from traditional society to postmodern society – are internalised.  Identity is no longer anchored, there is nothing to hold on to, only inferiority towards the West and towards others. The result is violence towards others and when that is difficult, violence towards the self and weaker societal members, nature, women and children.

Some questions that can be derived from this scenario include the following.  They are offered by Professor Jay Lewis.[6] What are the costs of the antidote offered by excessive narcissistic nationalism?  Does an over emphasis on `Korea first and best’ lead to distortions in relations with other nations?  Can we expect that the Korean identity is already so strong that we need not worry about schizophrenia, but rather, free people to engage with the emerging world cultures and give them creative license to develop new contributions that are not strictly Korean but hybrid, such as we’re seeing already in fashion?  Is that where the future Korean Nobel Prizes are to be found?

A third scenario is based on the rise of China, not just another market player, but the biggest player in human history. Jay Lewis,[7] asks the following. How will Korea’s world view, its security position, its manufacturing (including sources of leading, value-added technologies) and trading strategies change when China is the largest manufacturing and consuming market in the world?  Will Korea (say, reunified) be willing to `offer tribute’ to China?  Will sadae (`serving the greater’ or paying ostensible tribute to a hegemonic power to pacify it and keep it out of your domestic affairs) re-emerge as Korean policy towards China?  What will that mean for Korea’s relationship with the rest of the world?  Will China’s economic hegemony produce a cultural hegemony?  What would that look like and what would be Korea’s role in that hegemony?  Would it be similar to its traditional role of taking Chinese culture and fashioning something even better or at least purer? Where is the Korean identity then?

In contrast, Professor of Urban Planning, Karl Kim argues that the road to peace, to peaceful reform is through China – the north-south border is too militarized and in a cold war vise – through projects such as the Tumen River project. Unfortunately the US needs a militarized North Korea so that it can keep its own military there.

The fourth scenario is perhaps overly influenced by the current crisis – it is the collapse and the transformation of the world capitalist system and a return to more localised economies where growth is more nature based, more local based, more concerned with meeting basic rights – housing, food, identity and less with the dazzle of bigger is better.  This is a localised world at the economic level and a globalized world at the political level – at the level of governance.  Given this possibility, what will happen to Korea Inc. then?

Beyond the litany

While scenarios reveal horizontal space, they do not give us insight into levels of reality. To do so, we need to move outside of the litany of forecasts. My own method is less to forecast the future and more to create spaces within current discourse to open up the future to alternatives.[8]

(1)        Litany – economic trends and in Korea’s case the vision of surpassing Japan as well as unification.

(2)        Social levels – social and cultural development – issues of social cohesion, education, health (diet, alcohol, cigarettes)

(3)        Worldview – will the idea of Korea change – ie how will it redefine itself – also what is the role of confucianism, shamanism, buddhism and christianity.

(4)        Myth and Metaphor. What is the significance of Han and other central metaphors[9] Will `han’ be used as a reactionary concept that might lead to exclusivism and xenophobia just when Koreans need more contact, openness, and interaction?  What are some other metaphors that differently define Korea’s futures.

Another very important point here is to remind ourselves of how an absurd future can quickly become an obvious one (the fall of communism being the obvious overused one) and how a desired future can become a nightmare.  Dator writes in his work on the futures of Korea that since the unification of Germany, Korean unification is seen more fearfully now ie since North Korea is far poorer.

And even more significantly, what is not thought of, is after unification – what then, what will and should be the desired image propelling us forward. To move forward, we need to go deeper, into worldview and myth and metaphor.

Deep transformations

Tae-chang Kim,[10] a leading korean futurist, believe that the most important way to understand the futures of korea is to not focus on the surface level, but at the deep transition Korea and other asian nations are part of – this is the post-postmodern shift.

This includes a questioning of:

1. Westernism (and favoring the non-West)

2. Monism (and favoring an ecology of faiths)

3. Rationalism (and favoring humanism)

4. Centrism (and favoring the peripheries)

5. Logicism (and favoring values)

6. Anthropocentrism (and favoring the environment)

7. Patriarchy (and favoring gender balance and cooperation)

8. Technologism (and favoring human creativity and innovation).

While Kim sees Confucianism as the wave of the future – ie as the vision of the future he favors, he is quick to point out that the treatment of women is its achilles heal. Lewis argues that equally damaging is its conservatism and willingness to sacrifice present and future generations to preserve the past.  A living sage is not nearly as important as a dead one.

In my own work on dramatic trends changing the future, I focus on four epistemic changes.[11] These are (1) changes in reality (with the drivers being advances in virtual reality,  and postmodernism), (2) changes in nature (with the drivers being advances in genetics and poststructural thought critical of essentialism), (3) changes in truth (with the drivers being deep civilizational multiculturalism, feminism, and the discovery of the other) and (4) changes in sovereignty (with the drivers being global capitalism and cultural capitalism).

These interrelated epistemic changes, I believe, are more important than global demographic changes in favor of the Third World; globalism in favor of capital; and environmental destruction created by presentism; the delinking of the financial economy with the real economy; among other megetrends.  The obvious question is how will these trends impact the futures of Korea? What will Korea look like in a postmodern world? Or can Korea leapfrog this end stage of modernity and offer a non-exploitive Confucian/global ethics?  These and other similar questions remain pivotal if we are to gain any understanding the complexity of the future ahead of us.

Macrohistory and macrofutures

Lastly and most importantly, we need to look at the deep waves of the past, the patterns of history.[12]  They can help structure the trends we see creating the future ie the contour what is possible.

(1)        World systems perspectives would see East Asia as the new centre with the new technologies creating the next long wave of growth (through genetic, nano and other technologies)

(2)        Sarkar sees history as the rise and fall of particular ways of knowing – these include the worker, the warrior, the intellectual and the merchant. History moves through each era, and then the cycle ends when there is a worker revolution at the end of the merchant era.  But instead of leading to a classless society, the cycle keeps on moving.  In Korean history, this is evidenced by the ancient era of communal living, when wealth accumulation was difficult.  The ksattriyan era came about with the rise of the first states and their unification in the 7th century when dynamic and authoritarian leadership was the only way to achieve military success. The vipra domnation was from the 7th-19th centuries when unification was not in question. The warrior classes were diaparaged and buddhism and then neo-confucianism were central. In this century, this has led to the merchant worldview which while bringing untold riches have also barbarized the other classes.

Next then for Sarkar is the shudra era, with a return to collective/cooperative     ownership.  Most likely this will come about through a global depression and      linked environmental disastors. In contrast to this historical dynamic, Eisler             focuses on gender and power.

(3)        Eisler sees history as a pendulum of dominatorship and partnership. For her, Asian cultures are now moving out of their dominator mode and entering a world where women and men work in partnership together. There is of course just a nascent movement, but within 50 years, it should be the main wave.

The importance of these perspectives is they give us a much broader brush to imagine and think about the future – they give us new variables and a new shape of the future instead of just the linear arrow of progress.  They give us the cycle and the pendulum.  They also do not reinforce the hierarchy of nations worldview.  For example, part of current Korean future thinking is the goal of surpassing Japan.  However, this reinforces the idea that the future of another country represents one’s own present, either it has to be followed as in development thinking or somehow surpassed, in either case, the future is fixed – nation-centred and without authentic creativity.

Thus in thinking about the future, we need to not only create alternative scenarios in horizontal space but as well vertical scenarios, that move from the litany to the myth level.

Conclusion

Essentially these tools are to help us not just forecast the future but to imagine a different future.

Certainly if Lee Jan-Rim took such an eclectic view of time and the future, he would not be in prison today. He might argue instead that the world will not come to end, even if we are in the final days of the modern world.

What is needed:

Primary research on: images Koreans have of the future; empirical forecasts/expert forecasts of the future; group visioning exercises – empirical and interpretive research on Korea’s futures.


Notes

[1].         Sohail Inayatullah is senior research fellow at the Communication Centre, Box 2434, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, 4001. Tel: 617-3864-2192. Fax: 617-3864-1813. Email: S.inayatullah@qut.edu.au.  This speech was prepared for the conference, Understanding Korea Society and Culture, Korea Studies Centre, University of Auckland, November 18-19, 1997.

[2].         Susmit Kumar, “North Korea’s Fragile State,” Global Times (July/August, 1987), 27-33.

[3].         Keun Lee, “South and North Economic Integration and New Economic System for the Unified Korea,” in National Development Strategies Toward the 21st Century and Choices for Korea (Seoul, NDI, 1997).

[4].         See Anwar Ibrahim, The Asian Renaissance. Singapore, Time Books, 1997.

[5].         For more on this, see Sohail Inayatullah, “Frames of Reference, The Breakdown of the Self, and the Search for Reintegration” in Eleonora Masini and Yogesh Atal, eds., The Futures of Asian Cultures. Bangkok, Unesco, 1993.

[6].         Email Transmission, October 29, 1997 from Jay Lewis, Oriental Institute, Oxford.

[7].         Email transmission, November, 1, 1997.

[8].         See, Sohail Inayatullah, “Methods and Epistemologies in Futures Studies,” The Knowledge Base of Futures Studies, Vol. 1. Melbourne, Futures Study Centre, 1996, 187-203.

[9].         Han is a difficult term to translate into English as its meaning has not undergone extensive analysis.  Its definition is continuously evolving and the meaning of han remains controversial.  Nevertheless, han has been translated in numerous ways: for example, it has been seen as resentment, lamentation, hatred, and regret.  According to the noted professor of Women’s Studies and Korean Literature, Kim Yong-suk, the fundamental factors that contribute to han can be grouped into five: (1) predominance of men over women and the way of samjong ; (2) inequality of education; (3) emphasis on virtue in women and prohibition of remarriage; (4) concubinage; and (5) the kisaeng system.

Han is more than merely the lack of fulfillment in an unhappy situation.  Han can also bring delight or joy in an unhappy situation.  Han is like an instrument which transcends grief, which comforts oneself.

[10].       Tae-Chang Kim, “Toward a New Theory of Value for the Global Age,” in Tae-Chang Kim and Jim Dator, eds., Creating a New History for Future Generations. Kyoto, Institute for the Integrated Study of Future Generations, 1995, 319-342.

[11].       See, for example, Sohail Inayatullah, “Islamic Responses to Emerging Scientific, Technological and Epistemological Transformations,” Social Epistemologies (Vol. 10, No. 3/4, 1996), 331-349

[12].       See Johan Galtung and Sohail Inayatullah, Macrohistory and Macrohistorians. Westport, Praeger, 1997.