An Introduction to Futures Studies Alternative Global and South Asian Futures (1994)

By Sohail Inayatullah

Introduction

The task of this article is to introduce futures studies methods using as data, alternative global and regional futures.  I will first touch upon the history of futures studies, compare futures studies to planning and policymaking, propose a typology of futures studies, present a range of methodologies and then conclude with scenarios for the futures of the world and South Asia.

In most cultures humans have had a deep interest in what will happen. Glossing over human history, we can identify three types of attempts to understand the future.

(1)  Astrology: In this view, life has patterns as evidenced in the stars.  The basic ontological position was: as above, as below; heaven and earth should match.  Not only could the world within be predicted but so could the world without.  By and large, astrology helped individuals avoid dangerous circumstances by providing an early warning system.  However, it helped to believe in the system since warnings and forecast as well as psychological analysis were of a general nature.

(2)  Prophecy: Prophecy assumes that certain individuals have access to deeper levels of mind, thus allowing them to see the future–to give glimpses of not only might be but more importantly, the seer as social change activist, of what can be. The world for the few, those with higher, or more complete mind, can be predicted. Unlike astrology, prophecy was not based on the relationships between stars or other criteria, rather it was visionary in nature, used to create new systems, new worlds, rather than predict specific events. Prophecy was often located in one individual or a group of individuals.

(3)  Forecasting:  While astrology and prophecy are given less credence by the moderns, it is forecasting that has become the technique par excellence of planners, economists and social scientists.  Behind this is a perspective that desires to make the world more stable, to control the future.  The assumption behind forecasting is that with more information particularly more timely information decisionmakers can make wiser decisions.  Having more information is especially important now since technology has broken with or cultural life; since the rate of change has increased; and since the world is controlled by powers that seem larger than us. Because of these factors, we need to determine what might be, the strategic future environment.

In recent times, futures studies has particularly grown. It has been modernised and adopted by corporate planners, policy institutes and government planning bureaus.  Futures studies has become linked with short and long range planning. But there are some real differences between futures studies and planning.

Planning and Futures

When compared to planning, in general, the futures approach is (1) longer term, from five to fifty instead of one to five (2) more concerned with creating the future instead of predicting the future, (3), committed to authentic alternative futures where each scenario is fundamentally different from the other while planning uses the language of alternatives but scenarios are often mere deviations from each other, (4) is less located in a particular bureaucracy, for example, in the Ministry of Economic Development; (5) committed to multiple interpretations of reality (role of unconscious, of national mythology, of the spiritual, for example, instead of only views of reality for which empirical data exists); (6) futures is more participatory attempting to bring in all types of stakeholders instead of only powerbrokers; (7) futures is more concerned with working together with different stakeholders so as to build legitimacy in a plan and the planning process, which is, if not more so, as important as the elegance of the plan itself; (8) is less instrumentalist, concerned with more than just profit or power; and, (9) while a technique, like planning, futures studies is also very much action oriented. It is as much an academic field as it is a social movement.

From the planning discourse, futures studies is merely one approach among many in creating a good plan. Planning can have many dimensions of which four are critical: Problem Orientation (challenges ahead), Goal Orientation (what we want, objectives), political orientation (to assuage the administration or leader) and futures orientation (long term). Futures studies is useful as long as it aids in planning for the future and not in making problematic the politics of planning and policymaking.

Policy Analysis, Planning and Futures Research

The growth of futures studies is also a result of the desire of government to find information that can aid in making better policy, specifically toward the long term and toward projects that might have second or third order affects.  For many, futures research is merely long term policy analysis or research.  But from our perspective, there are real and important distinctions between futures research and policy research/analysis. Some of these are: (1) While policy analysis is short range, futures studies is long range in its theoretical and action orientation; (2) Instead of choosing one policy, examining the range of futures is the focus of futures studies.  However, as with policy research, the goal is not only to create new organisational directions but clarify current management decisions.  While we may not know the future, we can determine what we want; (3) Futures studies is much more concerned with making basic assumptions problematic. Through what-if questions and scenarios, the intention is to move us out of the present and create the possibility for new futures. Policy analysis is concerned with analysing the viability of particular policies not calling the entire discussion or the framework of decisionmaking into question.  Like planning, policy analysis is more technical in its orientation; (4) Futures studies is more vision oriented than goal oriented (which is central to policy analysis and planning). Futures studies attempts to move from goals to visions.  Visions work by pulling people along. They give individuals and collectivities a sense of the possible. They also inspire the noble within each of us by calling individuals to sacrifice the short term for the longer term, for the greater good.  Finally, they help align individual goals with institutional goals. Moreover, while goals or objectives can be operationalized, visions cannot. An organisation or nation or civilisational will decline without a vision as Fred Polak as argued in his The Image of the Future.  A vision thus must be extra-rational, must include a leadership dimension, a spiritual dimension and a material dimension. This clearly is more than the traditional planner or policy analyst is willing to consider in his or her planning process. (5) The role of the policy analyst/planner and futurist in an organisation often differs. Within most planning exercises, plans are written so that the nation or organisation can appear modern, so it can give the appearance that the future is under control.  The futurist might want actual fundamental transformation while the planner might want to fulfil economic targets that the Leader or Chief Executive Officer has set out to reach. (6) While futures studies attempts to acknowledge the different ways individuals construct the world, policy analysis often takes a limited view of knowledge approaches. For example, individuals behave quite differently in learning situations, whether at conferences or boardroom meetings. Some are creative; some are critical; some are practical; and others are passive.  Different strategies mean different things to different people.  There are different knowing styles and different leadership styles.  To gain consensus in any policymaking process it is crucial to acknowledge these differences.  This is especially important when placed together in one room are those who want to get something done today; those who want create a new future; those who want to criticise past, present and future; and those who want to do nothing.  Good planning, policy analysis and futures research needs to acknowledge contributions from all these sorts of people.

In general, in planning and policy analysis, the future is often used to enhance the probability of achieving a certain policy, the task is to make the future less certain.  The future becomes an arena of conquest, time becomes the most recent dimension to colonise, to institutionalise and domesticate.  Futures research, however, intends to liberate time for strict technique, from instrumental rationality.  It asks what are the different ways one can “time” the world?  How, for example do different cultures, groups, organisations imagine time?

Of course policy analysis itself is a dynamic field.  For example, new models of policy development have attempted to go beyond muddling through (as needs or problems come up), rational-economic decisionmaking (material goals) and satisficing (do what you can given limitations), arguing primarily that these strategies are not useful during times of rapid change and dramatic crisis.  Muddling through, in particular, is not useful during times of rapid change since incremental policy change does not help the organisation or nation transform to meet dramatic new conditions.  The rational-economic model is useful at setting and achieving objectives but it does not into account extrarational efforts. It is overly dependent on quantitative factors, reinscribes self-interest and national self-interest (balance of powers). Satisficing, while getting the job done, does not ask was the job worth doing?  Interest in finding ways to include the possibility of discontinuous change, of forecasting trends before they emerge, has been a natural progression in the evolution of the policy sciences.  Futures studies fits well into the effort of finding better ways for government and business to incorporate the unknown within dicisionmaking.

Policy researchers and planners believe that the forecasts and visions of futurists are often not useable.  Among other suggestions, the following are given to make forecasts more useful.

(1)  The forecast must be credible, the policy must be achievable or if apparently unachievable, research into what shifts might increase the probability of the event occurring need to be determined.

(2)  Forecasts need to give adequate time for the desired      outcome to be achieved or the undesired event to be avoided–enough lead time is a crucial criteria for a useful forecast.

(3)  Feedback and monitoring need to be including in the policy impact cycle so as to be able to judge the accuracy of forecasts as well as to determine if organisational responses to emerging issue were effective.

(4)  The forecaster needs to be aware of the limitation of the methodology employed.

(5)  Forecasts must be clear and in language that the policymaker can understand.  The language should be accessible to the policymaker.

(6)  The structure of the forecast should be compatible with the politics and the culture of the organisation.

(7)  The forecast must create an image that will inspire and challenge the organisation or nation if it is to be of use to more than those in the Planning Office.

However, by and large, futures research is often less concerned with predicting the future than with attempting to envision novel ways of organising how decisions are reached and who participates in these decisions.  It does this by asking participants to envision their ideal organisational world, and then aid in creating strategies to realise that world.

The Politics of Forecasting

Moreover from a critical view, to suggest that policy futures statements must be clear to the policymaker is at some level, just banal.  Institutions create obscure language because that language serves particular interests.  It is the analysis of those interests (and the mechanisms which they employ to seek and maintain power) which becomes the vehicle for investigating what images of the future are possible and which likely to achieve reality.  In this sense, how to make better policy or more future oriented policy without investigating the political interests of certain policies is equal banal.  Organisations stay focused in the present as bureaucrats and others are served by the present structure.  Attempts to create new futures can undermine present power structures.  Administrators agree to consider the future only to gain new political alliances or to achieve modernity (gain funding or prestige)  but rarely to make structural or consciousness changes.

Furthermore to assume that better forecasts, or more information, will lead to better decision and policymaking forgets that policies are often made irrespective of the “facts.”  Often what is needed is a will to decisionmaking not a ingenious plan or forecast.  When decisions need to be made, a consultant, provides the legitimacy or the information to make that decision because of lack of legitimacy, courage or for local political reasons.  Thus futures studies and policy analysis needs to be located in a discourse that makes problematic information and its distribution and not in one that posits that information is neutral or that its circulation in institutional settings is apolitical.

To summarise the above positions, it is useful to envision policymaking, planning and futures process as having three dimensions or types.  The first is predictive, the second is cultural/interpretive and the third critical.[ii]

In the predictive, language is assumed to be neutral, that is, it does not participate in constituting the real, it merely describes reality serving as an invisible link between theory and data.  Prediction assumes that the universe is deterministic, that is, the future can be known.  By and large this view privileges experts (planner and policy analysts as well as futurists who forecast), economists and astrologers.  The future becomes a site of expertise and a place to colonise.  In general, the strategic discourse is most prevalent in this framework with information valued because it provides lead time and a range of responses to deal with the enemy (a competing nation or corporation).  Linear forecasting is the technique used most.  Scenarios are used more as minor deviations from the norm instead of alternative worldviews.

In the cultural, the goal is not prediction but insight.  Truth is considered relative with language and culture both intimately involved in creating the real.  Through comparison, through examining different national or gender or ethnic images of the future, we gain insight into the human condition.  This type of futures studies is less technical with mythology as important as mathematics.  Learning from each model–in the context of the search for universal narratives that can ensure basic human values–is the central mission for this epistemological approach.  While visions often occupy centre stage in this interpretive view, the role of structures is also important, whether class, gender, or other categories of social relations. Planning and policy analysis rarely practice an interpretive cultural form of goal setting or impact analysis.

In the critical, futures studies aims not at prediction or at comparison but seeks to make the units of analysis problematic.  We are concerned not with population forecasts but with how the category of population has become valorised in discourse, for example, why population instead of community or people, we might ask?  The role of the State and other forms of power in creating authoritative discourses is central to understanding how a particular future has become hegemonic.  Critical future studies asserts that the present is fragile, merely the victory of one particular discourse, way of knowing, over the other.  The goal of critical research is to disturb present power relations through making problematic our categories and evoking other places, scenarios of the future.  Through this distance, the present becomes less rigid, indeed, remarkable.  The spaces of reality loosen, the grip of neo-realism, of the bottom line, of the predictive approach widen, and the new is possible.  Language is not symbolic but constitutive of reality.  While structures are useful, they are seen not as universal but particular to history and episteme (the knowledge boundaries that frame our knowing).

Ideally, one should try and use all three types of futures studies.  If one makes a population forecast, for example, one should then ask how different civilisations approach the issue of population and finally one should deconstruct the idea of population itself, relating it, for example, to First World consumption patterns.  Empirical research then must be contextualised within the civilisation’s science of which it emerges and then historically deconstructed to show what the particular approach is missing and silencing.

In the first type of futures studies (most comfortable to planners and policy analysts), by and large techniques such as linear regression, multiple regression, factor analysis and econometrics are used.    All these assume that the future is based on the linearity of the past.  They all assume that the empirical world can be known and that the universe is fundamentally stable, with reality primarily sensate.     But given that specific events can throw off a forecast, futurists re-invented Delphi, or expert forecasting (done in many rounds so as to gain consensus and done anonymously so as to reduce the influence of a particular opinion maker).[iii]      To link events and trends, futurists developed cross-impact and policy impact analysis, to see how trends might change the probability of particular events. These are run numerous times.  Policy impact examines how the legislation of a new policy, special economic advantages for certain groups, for example, might impact other social or economic trends.

Values

While these models can be useful, they do not include values.  They also assume research is conducted in an isolated setting, that is, research is divorced from the institutional and epistemic framework all of us exist in.  Researcher disinterest becomes critical.  However, what questions one asks, how one asks them, as well as the larger issue of what one considers of value are much more important in understanding the future.  Moreover, as participatory action research informs us, subject and object, theory and data, should be interactive, dynamic. We cannot and should not remove ourselves from the research environment.

Chaos

As general agreement has been reached that the empirical is not stable, chaos theory has become paramount as an attempt to manage disorder as well. The goal is to create a stable world, with the hope to transform social structures by a precise effort, by acting upon a few attractors, a few variables. Even though chaos theory appears to be a break from traditional social sciences, in fact, chaos is a version of ordered empiricism. Chaos has become important not because its metaphors make more intuitive sense or because it validates classic myths, Siva dancing, for example, but because it can be used as a forecasting tool to predict the future.[iv]

Thus, most forecasting remains technically rich not meaning rich. It continues the vision of instrumental rationality, the metaphors of modernity, of the West but not only the West as provider of wealth, but also as owner of time itself.

Using the cultural framework, to expand our vision of how we can think about the future, we need to try some other avenues.  To begin with, if we assume that how we think can influence how we act, then we need to investigate what our basic concepts of space, time, self and value are.

Guiding Metaphors of the Future

One way to open up the future, to investigate preferred and possible futures is to examine the metaphors cultures and individuals use to describe the future.  In this method, one begins with conventional Western (because they are “universal”) metaphors of individual choice and rationality.

The first image is that of the dice.  It represents randomness but misses the role of the transcendental. The second is the river leading to a fork.  It represents choice but misses the role of the group in making decisions. The third image represents the ocean. It is unbounded but misses the role of history, deep social structures, and direction. The fourth image is that of a rapid emersed with dangerous rocks.  It represents the need for information and rapid decisionmaking.  It does not provide for guidance from others: leadership, family, or God. Less tied to Western images, other useful metaphors (from Fiji, the Philippines, India. among other sites) include the coconut tree (hard work to gain rewards); coconut (useful in many ways and having many purposes); onion (layers of reality with the truth invisible); snakes and ladders game (life’s ups and downs are based on chance, the capitalist vision); and being a passenger in a car where the driver is blind (sense of helplessness).

What is important in this method is to find relevant metaphors based on the policy community’s own cultural and historical experience and use these metaphors to construct an authentic vision of desirable and dystopic futures.

Emerging Issues Analysis

While metaphors help create an indigenous futures, they are less useful in predicting what might be ahead and in disturbing conventional views of what is likely.  Most futures researchers use trend analysis to determine what issues are about to become public.  However, prior to becoming a trend, is it possible to identify a nascent issue, an emerging issue?  According to James Dator,[v] emerging issues are those that have a low probability of occurring but if they emerge, will have a dramatic impact on society.  However, since these issues are often undeveloped, Dator argues that one indicator of knowing that an issue is really an emerging issue instead of a trend or problem, is that it should appear ridiculous.  Issues should thus be disturbing, provocative, forcing one to change how one thinks, especially in challenging assumptions about the nature of the future.  Besides searching for emerging issues among those individuals and groups outside of conventional knowledge boundaries (the periphery, for example), to identify emerging issues it is first important to scan the available literature.

Scanning

In scanning one has to digest vast amounts of literature and be able to determine what is within the paradigm, and what is outside, and what can transform the paradigm.  Where are the leakages? What doesn’t it make sense?  Issues that straddle these boundaries, that are outside conventional categories often have the potential of becoming emerging issues.  Some examples of emerging issues are:  Rights of Robots; genetic engineering ending sexual reproduction rights; denial of sovereignty to certain nations; a new UN (house of nations, house of NGOs, direct citizen election, house of world corporations and a world militia); the end of capitalism. All these issue are generally seen as unlikely but if they occur they will have a dramatic impact on society.  But merely being unlikely or having a high impact are not sufficient conditions, there also must be seeds, drivers, reasons as to why one thinks the issue is emerging.  Emerging issues analysis is different from fantasy production, it is searching for small ripples that might one day become grand waves, tsunamis.

What-if Questions

Equally useful in breaking out of conventional categories are “What-if” Questions.  These questions ask one to develop implications of an issue that most would currently think is unlikely or absurd.  It is useful that there is some element of possibility for the issue especially if one is concerned in its predictive value.  Even so, the most useful issues are those that create new categories of thought.  For example, what-if Genetic engineering developments led to the banning of sexual reproduction?   What-if South Africa became a world economic and cultural centre? What-if Pakistan became a world intellectual centre? But more important then the actual possibility of becoming a centre is that it begins to call into question the universality of the West as the educational base for the rest of the world. In addition, the implications of this possible event force one to examine issues of culture, travel, and self-understanding.  They also force one to think of alternatives to traditional models of education.  Should Pakistan be a centre in all fields or only in Islamic education, for example?

Age-Cohort and Age Grade Analysis

Equally useful in forecasting the near term future is age-cohort analysis.  This method begins to touch upon the idea that the future is cyclical, not linear, that is, more like a pendulum, than a race track or a highway with offshoots.  One asks what are the main age grades that constitute a business, organisation or nation?  How might institutions change as a particular age group matures and gains status and power?  How will the volume and type of crime change as a group matures. Like class, age grades serve as an organising concept.  For example, we know that Japanese and Western populations are mostly aging while third world populations are much younger.  By 2050 some estimate that less than 10% will be “white” in the world.  Clearly that will have an influence on world culture, politics. Will current Western institutions continue their domination?  Has the rest of the world internalised their categories?

Layered Causal Analysis

However, the methods above do not adequately explore the levels or layers of an issue.  Layered causal analysis asserts that how you frame problem changes the policy solution and the actors responsible for creating transformation.  Borrowing from the work of Rick Slaughter[vi], we argue that futures studies should be seen wholistically and not just at the level of trends.

The first level is the Litany (trends, problems, often exaggerated, often used for political purposes) usually presented by the news media. In the case of global politics it might be news on the Failure of UN  (the UN’s financial problems and its failures in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda).  Events, issues and trends are not connected and appear discontinuous. The result is often either a feeling of helplessness (what can I do?) or apathy (nothing can be done!) or projected action (why don’t they do something about it?).

The second level is concerned with social causes, including economic, cultural, political factors (and short term historical).  It is usually articulated by policy institutes and published as op-ed pieces or in not-quite academic journals.  Causes in the UN example include lack of supranational authority; no united military, and the perspective that UN is only as good as its member nations.  The solutions that results from this level of analysis are often those that call for more funding or more power.  In this case, the UN needs more money and power. Often, deeper historical reasons such as the creation of the UN by the victors of WW II are often articulated. If one is fortunate then the precipitating action is sometimes analysed.  At this stage, taking a critical view one could explore how different discourses (the economic, the social, the cultural) do more than cause the issue but constitute it, that the discourse we use to understand is complicit in our framing of the issue.  This adds a horizontal dimension to our layered analysis.

The third level is deeper concerned with structure and the discourse/cosmology that supports and legitimates it.  The task is to find deeper social, linguistic, cultural structures that are actor-invariant, such as centre-periphery relations and the anarchic inter-state system.  The analysis of current UN problems shifts to not the unequal structure of power between UN member states but to the fact that eligibility for membership in the UN is based on acquiring national status. An NGO, an individual, a culture cannot join the National Assembly or the Security Council.   The solution that emerges from this level of analysis is to rethink the values and the structure of the UN, to revision it. One could at this level, develop a horizontal discursive dimension investigating how different paradigms or worldview would frame the problem or issue. How would a pre-modern world approach the issue of global governance (consensus, for example)? How might a post-modern?

The fourth layer of analysis is at the level of metaphor or myth.  These are the deep stories, the collective archetypes, the unconscious dimensions of the problem or the paradoxes.  In the case of the UN, it is the issue of control vs. freedom, of the role of individual and collective, of family and self, of the overall governance of evolution, of humanity’s place on the Earth. Are we meant to be separate races and nations (as ordained by the myths of the Western religions) or is a united humanity (as Hopis and others have prophesied).

Layered causal analysis asks us to go beyond conventional framings of issues.  However, it does not privilege a particular level.  Moving up and down layers, and horizontally across discourses and worldviews, increasing the richness of the analysis.  In addition, what often results are differences that can be easily captures in alternative scenarios.

Grand Theories of Social Change

This dimension begins to touch upon the grander issues of social change.  Among the most useful approaches to futures studies are grand theories of social change. Of interest is how macrohistorians from different civilisations have attempted to answer the question: what changes? what is constant? As well as questions that ask if the drivers of change are internal or external to the system? And, what are the stages of change? What is the shape of history? Is it cyclical or linear or a combination of both?[vii] Of particular use are the following writers.[viii]

Pitirim Sorokin, for example, believes we are in-between historical stages and about to enter an integrated phase of human history where both the spiritual and material co-exist.

From Ibn Khaldun we are reminded that over four generations power declines. Those in power lose the sense of unity they gained from the struggle to enter into leadership positions. Over time, leadership degenerates and new groups, often in the periphery make a claim to power.

From P.R. Sarkar we are reminded that there are four types of power: worker’s, military, intellectual and economic. Each power represents different types of social classes and stages in each history. From a worker’s era, follows a martial, and then an intellectual, concluding with a capitalist. Each era has a rise and fall. Each class exploits the others which leads to its downfall. During the capitalist era, exploitation is at its worse. This eventually leads to a worker’s revolution or evolution followed once again by a centralisation of power in military elites.  But more than power, these phases represent our “collective psychology” the dominant mental wave (to use non-empiricist language).

For Toynbee, the most important variable is how the creative minority responds to civilisational challenges. Are they met? Moreover, are we about to re-enter a world State or a world church or is there some other global configuration of power ahead.

From Comte we are lead to believe that modernity is the final stage in history. That science will solve all the problems, ideology is a premodern idea that hinders the creation of a good society.

Spencer as well confirms this and believes that it is world corporations that will bring on the next ladder of human evolution.

And finally from Marx, what is important is how new technologies change social and power relationships.  Clearly these grand thinkers change the locus of discussion, away from trend analysis or five year plans to grand civilisational patterns. The project is not to determine if there work is  empirically true but to ask how they can lead us in the right direction for social research.

The Politics of Time

As we can see forecasting has political and value oriented dimensions, particularly in terms of the politics of time.  What images are valorised? Who owns it?  How it circulates in society?  Central to cultural colonisation is adopting the time of another culture?  Different visions of time lead to alternative types of society.  Classical Hindu thought, for example, is focused on billion year cycles. Within this model, society degenerates from a golden era to an iron age. At this juncture, there is spiritual leader who revitalises society.  Classical Chinese time is focused on the degeneration of the Tao and its regeneration through the sage-king.

Much of current debates is how about the ownership of visual space and temporal space.  One important futures method is to ask how different individuals and cultures “time” the world.  For example, women’s time is often seasonal and lunar. Bureaucratic time is based on the ability to make others wait. Educational time is divided into a nine month and three month pattern. There is also the stages of life time: from birth to death, with in-between stages devoted to the accumulation of knowledge, wealth, enlightenment, or pleasure depending on one’s cultural location. For example, the Indian vision of student, householder, social service, and  sanyassi is considerably richer than the vision of study, work and die or retire in Florida that represents mainstream American culture.

In Corporate time, the higher the one is in an organisation, the grander the vision of time. For example, the CEO is responsible for 25-50 years; the VP for 25 years, the branch president for the next year; the branch manager for monthly quotas, the plant or office manager for weekly projects, the clerk for daily activities and the secretary for hour to hour projects.  The level of activity is also more precise the lower one goes down in the pay scale.  Many misunderstandings occur among individuals and groups when they have different temporal expectations of each other.  At the global political level, power is about convincing the other to adopt one’s notions of time, whether this is AD or BC or GMT. Time then is not universal but largely particular.  Futures research attempts to investigate different visions of time, asking how they are constructed and politicised and what is the organisation’s or group’s preferred view of time.

Futures and Deconstruction

Continuing to make the future less universal are techniques drawn from poststructuralism. As alluded to earlier, the task in critical futures studies is to make the universal particular, show that it has come about for fragile political reasons, merely the victory of one discourse over another, not a Platonic universal.  To do that one needs discursive genealogies which attempt to show the discontinuities in a history of an idea, social formation or value. Through genealogy and deconstruction, the future that once seemed impenetrable is now shown to be one among many. As such it is replaceable by other discourses.  Deconstruction then becomes a method of unpacking a text (broadly defined) and showing  the discourses that inhabit it. Genealogy historically traces how a particular discourse has become dominant at the expense of other discourses. The shape and type of future (instrumental vs. emancipatory for example) is often different in each type of discourse.

Scenarios

To help in this process, scenarios are the favourite tool in futures studies.  For some they help predict the future. For others, the clarify alternatives. For us, scenarios are useful in that they give us distance from the present, allowing the present to become remarkable, problematic.  They thus open up the present and allow the creation of alternative futures.  Genealogy and deconstruction not only open up the future and present, they also open up the past, showing history to be interpretation. The task then is to create alternative histories, to show histories that did not come about, that could have come about if a certain factor had changed.

Scenarios also have an important visionary task, allowing us to gain insight into what people want the future to be like–the desired future. These are important in that instead of merely forecasting the future, individuals create the future.

Often scenarios have four dimensions. The first is the Status-Quo. This assumes that the present will continue into the future. More of the same, then.  The second is the Collapse scenario.  The results when the system cannot sustain continued growth, when the contradictions of the first model lead to internal collapse.  The third scenario is a Return or Steady State.  This is a return to some previous time, either imagined or real.  It is often framed as a less industrial, quieter, slower, and less populated society–the good old days, if you will.  The fourth scenario is Transformation, or fundamental change.  This can be spiritual, technological, or political and economic.

For Third World nations, in contrast to the First World, Continued growth usually means a dual society, where one part grows and the other stagnates. Collapse refers to either natural disasters, or wars with neighbouring nations, or from too quick modernisation.  Ultimately, the collapse scenario is the failure of nation-building.  The Return scenario means  going back to a simpler village, communitarian, religious, life-style, often before technocracy and imperialism destroyed the local. Transformation means true sovereignty or nationhood, joining the world’s wealthy on one’s own terms.

But we can also devise scenarios with different assumptions. For example, we can create scenarios of world politics based on alternative structures of power. The first would be a unipolar world, a continuation of the present.  The second would be a collapse of the inter-state system, leading to anarchy within States and between states. The third would be the creation of a multi-polar system, with numerous hegemons, such as the US, Europe, Japan, China, India, Turkey or Indonesia.  A corollary would be a return to a bio-polar world but with different actors.  A fourth would be a world government structure.  Policies would be created at the global level while implementation would be local.

We can choose other drivers as well. In the following scenarios for South Asia we look at levels of integration, at the tension between the local, regional and global.

(1) South Asia becomes an integrated regional economy.  Privatization leads to a flourishing of corporate and small scale capitalism.  This bourgois revolution weakens the power of the feudal class.  The Other ceases to be less frightful as friendship between NGOs and businesses develop.  NGOs continue to work on softening the contradictions of export-led growth. (2)    South Asia continues wasting wealth on military expenditures. Politics continues to become criminalized.  Not only Kashmir but Sindh and Kalistan vie for independence.  The nation-state project totally breaks down. Poverty and extremism remain.

(3)  Power and economy move to the village throughout South Asia.  Traditional models of problem-solving, of health, of argiculture begin to flourish.  The feudal class becomes more enlightened in its policies towards the landless, but still remains in power.

There are thus a range of ways in which one can construct scenarios. Besides having clarity in consistency of actors, one should ensure that contradictions within scenarios are not left out. Scenarios are not meant to be perfect places but possible places.

Scenarios should not only focus on nations but on individuals, communities and peoples associations. Using the ideas of layers of reality, what is missing are the role of ideas, of the Earth itself, of women, of alternative ways of seeing the world, of non-statist nominations of reality.  Scenarios then should not only find alternative routes out of the present, they need to configure the present differently, using radically foreign and unfamiliar notions of the future.  This is what makes future research different from routine social science or policy research.  The task is not only, for example, to imagine alternative futures for the United Nations but rethink governance, power and structure, to call into question current notions of how we organise our social and political life.

From this perspective we can imagine an alternative model that is (1) Sensitive to the role of the transcendental (in terms of inspiration and in providing a direction); (2) Includes a range of economic organisations (coops, small businesses, and large state/private run efforts); (3) is committed to a layered theory of representation, a third world vision of democracy, that has vertical (authority) and horizontal (participatory) elements; (4) has a different balance between the individual and group; (5) creates a culture that locates the environment as nested within human consciousness; and (6) attempts to balance spiritual and material factors believing both are basic factors in creating a good society including as social change drivers.

To conclude, futures research should then only ask what is missing from a particular analysis and it should–through metaphors, emerging issues analysis, layered causal analysis, deconstruction and genealogy–create the possibility of alternative worlds.

Notes

[i].   Dr. Sohail Inayatullah, The Communication Centre, Queensland University of Technology.

[ii].  For an elaboration of this theme, see Sohail Inayatullah, “Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Future,” Futures (March 1990) and Richard Slaughter, Recovering the Future (Clayton, Australia, Monash, 1985). For the more conservative position, see Roy Amara, “The Futures Field,” The Futurist (February, April and June 1981).

[iii]. For an excellent delphi study (in the South-East Asian context), including its limitations, see Pacita Habana article “Building Scenarios for Education in South-East Asia,” Futures (Vol. 25, Number 9, 1993).

[iv].  For more on this see, Mika Mannermaa, Sohail Inayatullah, and Rick Slaughter, eds. Chaos and Coherence in Our Uncommon Futures, Turku, Finland Society for Futures Research, 1994.

[v].   Jim Dator, Emerging Issues Analysis in the Hawaii Judiciary. Report published by the Hawaii Judiciary, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1980.

[vi].  Richard Slaughter, “Probing Beneath the Surface,” Futures (October 1989), p. 454.

[vii]. Sohail Inayatullah, “From Whom am I to When Am I: Framing the Shape and Time of the Future,” Futures (April 1993).

[viii]. See, for example, Johan Galtung and Sohail Inayatullah, Macrohistory and Macrohistorians. Forthcoming, 1995.

Evolution and Complexity (1994)

Sohail Inayatullah

Originally published as a review “Life, the Universe and Emergence,” Futures (August 1994), 683-696.

EVOLUTION AND COMPLEXITY

Biochemist and former deputy editor of New Scientist and Research News Editor of Science Roger Lewin gives a tour of theories of complexity based on interviews with leading exponents of this new theory of everything.  Primarily focused on biological and evolutionary theories, Lewin interviews such leading scientists as theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman, biologist James Lovelock, Artificial Life expert Chris Langton, sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson, geologist Stephan Jay Gould, biologist Brian Godwin, philosopher Daniel Dennett, physicist Murray Gell-Mann, mathematician Norman Packard, and ecologist Tom Ray.

Complexity theory claims to resolve the classic conflict between vitalists who believe evolution is externally caused by spirit or other vital forces and mechanists who believe evolution is bottom up based with survival of the fittest or adaption as the key variable.  In contrast, complexity theory argues that evolution occurs through emergence. New variables naturally develop over time. Organisms, individuals and societies self-organize, that is, they do not need an outside force to guide their growth.  Thus from simple conditions emerge complex conditions.

Complexity takes a dynamic view of life. Indeed, dynamism comes from life itself.  “Biological systems are dynamical, not easily predicted, and are creative in many ways,” argues Chris Langton.[i] “In the old equilibrium worldview, ideas about change were dominated by the action-reaction formula. It was a clockwork world, ultimately predictable in boring ways,” says Langton.[ii]  While boring, such predictability did allow humans to land on the moon.  If these where non-linear systems, Lewin warns us, we would clearly be still on the Earth unable to leave it since our trajectories could not be predicted.

But this does not mean that complexity throws us in a world where prediction is impossible? Not at all. Rather, since all complex systems are based on simple origins, or all simple systems generate complex patters, we can understand these deep patterns and thus better understand biological, environmental and even social change.  While this is obvious to physicists, it is not so obvious to biologists. The thrust of Complexity is a dialogue with the leaders in the field on how complexity theory is changing our understanding of traditional evolutionary theory.

Up to now, through computer modeling complexity theorists have managed to show that emergence can naturally occur, that from a few simple species, a host of evolutionary possibilities can occur.  But for those biologists less enthused with computer simulation, Darwin still reigns supreme.

While some believe that Complexity theory moves towards a theory of everything, others are rightfully more cautious since within different systems–from cellular automata to Gaia itself–there might be different types of complex relationships.

While Lewin attempts to remain objective, it is clear that the one variable that scientists fear is the mystical–that is, an external source that is fuzzy, that cannot be operationalized.  And this many see is the problem with vitalism, the belief that an elan vital somehow plays a role in our biological and social development. The response to this position has been reductionism, as per the work of ant theorist and sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson, who believe that genetic causes are primary in understanding human behavior.

Complexity theory, however, borrows more from ecological theory and the view of the interrelatedness of life as developed by James Lovelock.  The view, for example, that there are links between tropical forests and climate. “No rain, no trees, but equally, no trees, no rain,” argues Lovelock.[iii]  It is this interrelated view that Norman Packard speaks to.  When asked what the implications of complexity theory would be, he answers: “We would see the world as having more unity.”[iv]

Complexity theory attempts to make links between evolutionary systems and social systems as well, albeit in a simplistic way.  Nonetheless they are instructive.  It primarily supports the view like species, societies rise and fall.  There are periods of stasis and then periods of rapid change, or punctuated equilibrium.  In reference to the fall of the Soviet Union, Chris Langton tells us to expect a period of global instability.  “You can see these two species coexisting in a long period of stability; then on of the them drops out and all hell breaks loose. Tremendous instability.  That’s the Soviet Union.”[v] He adds, “I am no fan of the Cold War, but my bet is that we’re going to see a long of instability in the real world now that it’s over.”[vi]   Moreover, what happened to the Soviet Union will happen to liberal capitalism as well, unless of course, one believes that different organizing principles are at work or that the US and USSR were different species.

Complexity theory’s great contribution is showing that the Second Law of Thermodynamics is only part of the story, since some systems tend toward order, not disorder. Within nature, then, there is a deep order. But this order is not caused by the hand of God, complexity theorists are quick to point out.   For physicists this is quite natural but for biologists self-organization still appears mystical, a return to pre-Darwinian theories.

But even as Complexity theory develops its new science, modern molecular biology might make Complexity theory useless, since they believe that with the ability to manipulate and analyze DNA, the process of evolution will be finally completely understood.  In Lewin’s words: “Simply read the messages in the genes, and all would be revealed. …No nod in the direction of the complexities of development. No indication that population biology may play a role in the fate of a species. No suggestion that species are part of ecosystems, which themselves are components of evolutionary history. And, of course, nothing at all about the immanent creativity of dynamical systems.”[vii] Through genetic research our history will be available to us, the causes of the rise and fall of nations will be obvious, right there in our genetic structure.  But while we wait for these remarkable developments in genetics, complexity theorists believe that it is the science of complexity that will lay bare history and the Mind of God. Physicist Heinz Pagels writes: “I am convinced that the nations and people who master the new science of Complexity will become the economic, cultural and political superpowers of the next century.”[viii] Quite a claim and a clear indication that science is not merely about research but about power and control, about comparative advantage.

These grand claims have been made before by Catastrophe theory, developed by Rene Thom, which is now no longer seriously investigated, and by chaos theorists.  Chaos, for complexity theorists, is focused on order and disorder and merely one dimension of complexity since Chaos theory does not explain the mechanisms of change.  Complexity theory is concerned with systems that produce order. However, it is similar to chaos in that both are concerned with non-linear systems, both focus on interrelatedness, both seek for an underlying pattern to all physical and social phenomena.  But the key to understanding Complexity theory is emergence.  Lewin writes, “For an ecosystem, the interaction of species within the community might confer a degree of stability on it; for instance, a resistance to the ravages of a hurricane, or invasion by an alien species. Stability in this context would be an emergent property.”[ix] That is, it arises naturally from the conditions present.  It is not there in the realm of ideas nor can it be merely understood from a part thereof (the platonic and aristotelian positions), rather it emerges.  This is true for economic systems, biological systems, cultural systems, and so forth.  For example, according to physicist Gell-Mann, “In biological evolution, experience of the past is compressed in the genetic message encoded in DNA … in the case of human societies, the schemata are institutions, customs, traditions, and myths.”[x]  Complex systems thus learn from their environment, coding this information in different ways.

Is there Progress?

Complex systems exhibit organizing factors, structures in which the system is drawn to. In cultural evolution these might be bands, tribes, states, and empires, and now nation-states.  Within this model, structures would move towards these various . Sociality is also an attractor, for humans as well as insects. But for ants, for example, the biological attractor of sociality is not dynamic as it is for humans, which have a range of social structures (tribe to nations).    History then has patterns.  But then is it purposeful, is there progress?

For complexity theorists, more complex, more ordered does not necessarily mean the same thing, however.  A complex system might be more likely to collapse, for example. A watch is more complex than a sun dial but less likely to break down. This then counters the Spencerian and Darwinian of the great chain of being, from the simplist to the most complex with humans at the head.  The problem becomes how to measure complexity, by the number of vertebral column among species, perhaps? By this measure, according to biologist Dan McShea, there has been no change at all.[xi]

Are there then better measures of complexity? There is some agreement in the field that computational ability is a measure of complexity.  “There has been a general increase in information processing over the last 550 million years, and particularly in the last 150 million years.”[xii]  Computational ability, where survival is contested, gives the species an advantage.  But then isn’t this progress? Those societies that have a higher intelligence, more information, are not they higher up on the chain of evolution, one could ask.  Normam Packard sidesteps this return of social Darwinism by arguing that “people don’t believe it for sociological, not scientific, reasons. …I don’t impute a value judgement to computational superiority.”[xiii]

But for others, progress is a noxious idea that is not operationalizable and thus not testable.  Progress is noxious not only in the sense of a hierarchy of societies but also in the sense of a hierarchy of species.  For current biologists, the idea of progress brings back racism, the 19th century Western view of life.  At the same time, Lewin argues that “just because a scientific idea is imported into social values–however improperly used–doesn’t invalidate the original idea.”[xiv]

Thus if computational ability does mean progress than Complexity theory might be returning the idea of progress in Western society and science. Indeed, Spencer is believed to be a proponent of Complexity theory. While Spencer had an internal theory of complexity, that is, emergence, he was missing the external factors, such as natural selection, which provide the external variable.  In this sense, Complexity theory unites both Spencer and Darwin, Lewin argues. “The pure Spencerian view of the world, therefore, is that increased complexity is an inevitable manifestation of the system and is driven by the internal dynamics of complex systems: heterogeneity from homogeneity, order out of chaos.”[xv]   This, of course, is the classical position, that history is linear and rational and progressive. It is Man who has the ability to transform nature.  Lewin continues.  “The pure Darwinian view is that complexity is built solely by natural selection, a blind, non-directional force; and there is no inevitable rise in complexity.”[xvi]  Natural selection removes teleology from the scheme of history. However, while biologists may cling to this perspective, most have adopted a neo-Darwinian view, merging Spencer and Darwin.  Complexity theory takes a third approach, however.  According to Lewin, “the new science of Complexity combines elements of both: internal and external forces apply, and increased complexity is to be exacted as a fundamental property of complex dynamical systems.”[xvii]  Through natural selection, adaption and evolution occur. Computational ability increases as species become more complex.  Consciousness then becomes a bottom-emergent phenomena.

This, of course, should be obvious is good dialectical materialism as well.  As Marx reminded us in his laws of dialectics, the complex arises out of the simple.  Consciousness emerges from the material factors of history. There is no God arranging the world nor does consciousness exist hidden in evolution. It is an emergent property.

But from the perspective of Complexity theory, while derived from matter, Consciousness is not central.  Complexity theory does not argue for a brain-centric view of history.  There are degrees of consciousness, of computational ability. In Norman Packard’s words. “The way I see the science is that it’s concerned with information processing throughout the entire biosphere; information processing is central to the way the biosphere evolves and operates. Consciousness is just one part of that larger puzzle, and it’s important to remember that.  Most studies of consciousness focus just on the phenomenon itself, and that’s solipsistic.”[xviii] What then is the unique contribution of Complexity to the study of Consciousness. Again according to Packard, “it is to place consciousness into the larger puzzle of information processing in the biosphere.”[xix]

Gaia:

But what of the planet itself, isn’t it conscious as some proponents of the Gaian theory argue? According to James Lovelock,  the earth itself is a dynamic, self-regulating complex mechanism.  To attempt to prove this Lovelock invented computer models such as Daisyworld which show that there are homeostatic regulating principles at work in the Earth’s evolution–that is that Life, or the biosphere, regulates or maintains the climate and the atmospheric composition at an optimum for itself.”[xx]  The stability of the system, however, does not emerge from Consciousness or some other teleological principle but from the system itself, from its ability to adapt and survive.

While most believe Gaia to be a stable system, from Complexity theory, we learn that given certain conditions (changes in solar radiation for example) there are periods of rapid change, of punctuated equilibrium.  This is in contrast to conventional evolutionary theory which would predict gradual change. In this sense Gaia while its maintain Life at the global level, at the level of particular species, there is stasis and rapid change.  There is dynamic change.  But most important this change is emergent not based on a goddess but emergent properties which act as though they are moving towards fitness or survival.

But then is emergence always the same or are there an infinite number of species and societal possibilities? Simon Conway Morris asks what if the Cambrian explosion  (the beginning of complexity after three billion years of simplicity in which in a matter of a few millions years life exploded on the scene) was rerun? How would creatures look like this time around. According to Morris, the same development would occur and herbivores, carnivores and insectivores would result.[xxi]  But they would not look anything we have experienced.  In this view, our present world is simply one of an infinite number of possible worlds.  For others such as Brian Godwin, the mechanics of embryological development are constrained.[xxii]  Writes Lewin, ” In the language of complex dynamical systems, the space of morphological possibilities is thinly populated by C.”[xxiii] There are only certain possibilities. There are not an infinite range of C.  In this sense if one reran the Cambrian explosion, the world today would not look that different. In this sense there are not an infinite number of possible pasts or possible futures. These are constrained by C, by structures.

THE GRAND UNIFICATION AND THE SEARCH FOR THE NEW LAW

Stuart Kauffman goes far more into scientific and mathematical detail than Lewin’s story. The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution is Stuart Kauffman’s life work; a work he hopes will unify self-organization with Darwinian evolutionary theory.  It is the search for the new second law of thermodynamics, one that takes into account the ability of life to self-organize and now move towards entropy. “It is the search for a general law of pattern formation in non-equilibrium systems throughout the universe.”[xxiv] It is the belief that woven into the very fabric of nature is a deep undeniable creative order.  It is a journey  for Kauffman that is based on love, on the Einsteinian view of science–“that science was a search for the secrets of the Old One.”[xxv]  Indeed, as N. Katherine Hayles her nearly brilliant Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science argues we cannot separate the metaphysics of scientists from their physics.[xxvi]  In this sense both complexity and chaos continue classical physics as the world remains orderly, even chaos now has deep patterns.  It remains a fundamental classical and religious view of the world, a world where God has given us the secrets, we just need to go explore. And at every step of the way, we are given directions. Yet this God is no longer active, he is the blind watchman. Truth is found through connections, serendipity, but the task remains the same, to discover the beauty and elegance of the universe.

Written very much for the scientist and not for the layman, still Kauffman does his best to be communicable by providing succinct intelligible summaries of chapters. In addition, The Origin of Order does attempt to find links to the social and policy sciences.  His goal is simple. “Simple and complex systems can exhibit powerful self-organization. Such spontaneous order is available to natural selection and random drift for the further selective crafting of well-wrought designs or the stumbling fortuity of historical accident.”[xxvii]  And yet self-organization has not yet been incorporated into evolutionary theory. For Kauffman, self-organization is the flip side of natural selection.

But while Kauffman is ever the rigorous scientist, as the case with other complexity theorists who are constantly on the search for new metaphors, for allies in other fields, for lessons learned from other disciplines, he does not suffer from scientism.  Nor he is afraid of sounding mystical.  Indeed the task for his book is to answer the question, “what are the sources of the overwhelming and beautiful order which graces the living world?” [xxviii] Kauffman believes that if his autocatalytic set story is true then he would have a plausible explanation of life.  Life could have emerged through self-organization, life was not an accident.  But it is the aesthetics of it that is the theoretical clincher. Writes Mitchell Waldrop, “The whole story was just too beautiful, Kauffman felt. It had to be true.”[xxix]

But Kauffman is not here to bury Darwin merely to expand upon him, to include the rise of spontaneous order within biological theory.  To do so Kauffman attempts to delineate the sources of order that evolution has to work with, to show how “self-ordered properties, permit, enable, and limit the efficacy of natural selection.”[xxx]

But while the individual scientist may have a moment of awe, theories that evoke non-material factors governing evolution remain inappropriate ala Rupert Sheldrake[xxxi] who postulates morphogenic fields or P.R. Sarkar[xxxii] who believes that our larger Mind, or Cosmic Mind plays almost a Lamarckian role, as species desire themselves into new forms.  Less Sheldrake, more Sarkar, in either case, these theories are problematic not only because they are extra paradigmatic but because they are not testable, that is, operationalizable.  Moreover these theories imply order and structure, something Darwinists cannot understand.  The rise of Darwin has been the rise of a view of organisms as ultimately accidental and historically contingent. More for Sheldrake than Sarkar, while there is emergence, it is Consciousness that is still the key–It is consciousness that communicates not the social organization of species.

The  way out for traditional scientists has been time.  Anything is possible, that is, in terms of questions of the origin of life, if we have two billion years. In traditional theory, time is then the hero, that allows anything to happen.  This allows the variable Consciousness to be controlled for.    Self-organization, while being holistic, does not sponsor non-material approaches to evolution, but it does search for universal laws.  Complex systems are selected because they harbor behavior which is the most flexible and adaptable.  Poised between the boundary of chaos and order, they can best respond to changes in the environment.  Kauffman puts this in the form of a hypothesis, and hopefully for complexity theorists, a law:  “Living systems exist in the solid regime near the edge of chaos, and natural selection achieves and sustains such a poised state.”[xxxiii]  In contrast, writes Kauffman, “systems deep in either the ordered regime or in the chaotic regime are probably neither capable of complex behavior nor highly evolvable.”[xxxiv]  In the ordered regime, mutations cause only slight changes. Conversely in the chaotic regime, slight changes cause dramatic changes in behavior.  It is on the edge of chaos that evolution then is possible.

But for this to happen, organisms at the edge of chaos, they must “Know their worlds. Whether we consider E. coli swimming upstream in a glucose gradient … or a hawk diving to catch a chick, organisms sense, classify, and act up their worlds.”[xxxv]  But how do they know their worlds.  Here Kauffman takes an expanded definition of the word, classify. “The capacity to know a world requires that sufficiently similar states of that world be able to be classified as ‘the same.'”[xxxvi] It is this definition that allows Kauffman to generalize his argument to Boolean networks and even business firms. E. Coli it knows its world because a wealth of molecular signals pass between a bacterium and its environment.  In this, Kauffman and other complexity theorists are looking at systems and structures, attempting to find similar classification schemes, much as Parsons has done for sociology.  We see this clearly in his jump from bacteria to the economic sphere. Just as

a colony of E. coli integrates its behavior … the organisms of a stable ecosystem for a functional whole.. The niches occupied by each organism jointly add up to a meshwork in which all fundamental requirements for joint persistence are met. Similar features are found in an economic system. The set of goods and services making up an economy form a linked meshwork of transformations. The economic niches occupied by each set allow the producers of that set to earn a living and jointly add to a web in which all mutually defined requirements are jointly met. Both biological and technological evolution consist in the invention of slightly or profoundly novel organisms, goods and services which integrate into the ecological or economic mesh and thereby transform it.  Yet at almost all stages, the web retains a functional coherence.”[xxxvii]

At this point we can be mislead into thinking that this is Spencerian evolutionism or Parsonian structural-functionalism, but as well shall see, it is the ecological metaphor where the individual is nested in the larger environment that provides the framework to Complexity theory.  Self-organization allows for a dynamism that is missing from traditional evolutionary thought.  The metaphors and policy implications of complexity theory are not those that favor equilibrium oriented politics; rather, they favor transformation and change, they favor variety and diversity, they favor interconnectedness not reductionist isolationism.

It can thus be argued that changing one part of the system can radically transform the entire system. While this is used to understand the fall of communism, in Waldrop’s Complexity, the same argument is used to predict that the US system might transform itself as well, since one of the functions of Americanism was to stem the Soviet tide.  With the fear of the enemy gone, either Americanism must transform or find a new enemy. Clearly, however, Iraq and South Korea have functioned as a way to keep the equilibrium of the US going.  But we should expect disequilibrium since the world itself is in chaos.  After chaos then what. Complexity and evolutionary transformation, what else.

The Social and the Biological:

Instead of moving to poststructural thought and the larger framing category of episteme, Kauffman use the term regimes of grammar.   To answer the question, what is a functional whole and how does it transform when its components are altered, Kauffman develops this alternative metaframework. In grammar regimes, “the objects of the theory are strings of symbols which may stand for chemical, goods and services, or roles in a cultural setting.”[xxxviii] Remember, we are searching for an overall language for a theory of everything from the smallest to the largest, from the biological to the societal to the astronomical. Using this model, Kauffman hopes to lay down a theory of that is appropriate for the biological and social sciences.

Among the features we shall find are phase transitions between finite and potentially infinite growth in the diversity  of symbol strings in such systems.  As we have seen, the phase transitions may well underlie the origin of life as a phase transition in sufficiently complex set of catalytic polymers. Similar phase transitions may underlie “takeoff” in economic systems, such as the Industrial revolution, once the systems attain a critical complexity of goods and services that allows the set of new economic niches to explode supracritically, and may provide models for the conceptual explosion wrought by the redevelopment of science three centuries.[xxxix]

The critique should be obvious, and this is not only because of the obsessive search for links between the biological and the social–again we saw this earlier in Spencer–but the problem is obvious.  How to explain the necessary exploitation that was needed for the industrial revolution? How to explain the slave trade, the massive appropriate of wealth from India, the extensive plundering of the colonies; in two words: brutal exploitation.  But while complexity theorists are concerned about the environment, exploitation and of the colonies of the other does not enter their dialogue. But within the evolutionary framework they can explain take-off.  That is England was poised at the edge of chaos while India was either too chaotic or too stable–too many regions vying for power after the weakening of the Delhi Sultanate or too stable after centuries of fatalistic Hinduism.  In either case the conditions that were ripe for self-organization were not there.  But perhaps more accurately, they already lived in ecological communities that were locked into positive cycles.  It was military and cultural power that destroyed them, and thus allowed for the Industrial revolution.  But this is merely survival of the fittest. India deserved to lose because she could not adapt but now not only could she not adapt she could not self-organize and lock into positive cycles of increasing returns.  Again this is the central problem of all evolutionary through that has progress immanent in it. Progress forces one to create a great chain of being from the lowest to the Highest.  While the scientific bases for this great chain of being is no longer valid, the image maintains its mythic influence on us. But instead of species we have nations.  This is what those committed to the Complexity model cannot understand;  That information does not always lead to the best possible result, that there is a qualitative difference between information and wisdom, between knowing what is possible and doing the right thing, that is, ethics.  Fortunately, as we see from Waldrop’s Complexity when one is less focused on evolution, we can make arguments for diversity and not linear progress, not selection and adaption.  Kauffman while brilliant at biology and mathematics, does not consider the politics of his epistemology, and of theory building.

Planning:

However, He does give us some useful insights into planning He shows that since the risk for planning far into future is greater than the risk for short term planning (since there is a greater chance one can be wrong). And yet the planner needs to think into the future, “the further she thinks ahead, the more an optimal plan can take account of the highly valuable goods and services which can be constructed from the renewable resources.”[xl]  Thus, rather than thinking too far into the future, it pays to only plan so far ahead where risks and rewards are met. This is what he calls bounded rationality.

For forecasting what this means is having overly complicated models does not allow for generalization while overly simple models with too few variables and data points overgeneralizes.  Kauffman also includes the idea of self-fulfilling prophecies.  He writes “adaptive agents may persistently alter their models of one another’s behavior. Once an agent adopts a changed model of another agent, then his own decision rules, and hence behavior, will change.” [xli]  Now comes the key: “it follows that such agents much coevolve with one another using changing models of one another’s behavior.” [xlii] What this means is that evolution, research, indeed, all activities are done in an holistic integrated sense. This coevolution can be orderly, chaotic or at the edge of chaos, that is, self-organizing.  The site of emergence is at the edge of chaos.  The edge of chaos is more than a simple boundary become disordered and ordered system, indeed it is  a special region to itself.  It was Chris Langton through his computer simulation programs that convinced Kauffman of this.  This realization allowed Kauffman to say that “living system are not entrenched in order systems but are in the area of phase transition, where things are looser and fluid.”[xliii] Natural selection then pushes systems to the edge of chaos, forcing them to adapt, to emerge, to find new solutions as they move around in their fitness landscape.

But forecasting, adaption, transformation is different at the three phases.  As the amount of data increases of other agents (again: political systems, economic agents, or organisms), models of the behavior of other agents becomes more complex.   In evolutionary language, they live on more rugged fitness landscapes.  These models drive agents into more chaotic regimes. More complex models are better able to predict small alterations in behavior.  But in chaotic regimes, models are less complex because change is prevalent, thus moving agents into more ordered regimes. Thus instead of the invisible hand or rational expectation models of behavior, Kauffman posits a model based on coevolution. Agents coordinate their behavior based on the phase they are in and in turn move to other system phases.  “If correct, [this model] may help us understand that E. coli and corporate executives build optimally complex, boundedly rational, models of the other agents constituting their worlds.”[xliv]  Thus Kauffman’s grammar models allow the study of linked processes, he believes, thus turning biology into a science that is law-like.  In his words: “Coevolving adaptive agents attempting to predict one another’s behavior as well as possible may coordinate their mutual behavior through optimally complex, but persistently shifting models of one another. Again, we suspect, the deluge of chaos will be obtained. we may find that E.coli and IBM do indeed know their world in much the same way.”[xlv]

As it has turned out IBM did not know its world well.  It did not move towards a chaotic phase nor to a complex phase.  New revolutions in technology merely forced IBM into an ordered stable organization, that did not lock into changes in computer technology. Instead of increasing returns as the case with Microsoft, it had diminishing returns. It stayed as the large hierarchical organization that did not lock into the future, it did not know its environment.

But Kauffman is not arrogant in his attempt to create a physics of biology, yet his wanderings into a sociology of biology are often trite and overly burdened by the system paradigm. By removing values and ethics at one level but keeping the linear, progress, equilibrium base values of Spencerian systems theory, Kauffman does not add to discussions in the sociology of knowledge or grand system building. His contribution is his effort to develop grammar regimes, to show how self-organizing systems can mathematically emerge, and to expand the discourse of Darwinian biology.

But Kauffman’s main thrust is to show that one can have self-organization without Creationism. We do not need a divine watchmaker.  His effort is to find the laws of biology, “to suspect with quiet passion that below the particular teeming molecular traffic in each cell lie fundamental principles of order any life would reexpress.”[xlvi] But again this does not mean that Kauffman ia religious. Indeed, once his computer model showed the possibility of emergence, he knew he had come “face to face with the secret of the Old One.[xlvii]  In Kauffman’s words, “I had a holy sense of a knowing universe, a universe unfolding, a universe of which we are privileged to be a part….I felt that God would reveal how the world works to anyone who cared to listen..I knew that God had revealed to me a part of how his universe works.”[xlviii]

INCREASING RETURNS AND SYSTEM DYNAMICS

Unlike Kauffman’s detailed accounts, Waldrop’s narrative is similar to Lewin’s in that it is a story of a group of male scientists (with an occasional female colleague but usually wife) discovering the world.  As with Lewin the story is written like a detective novel, where we see how initial assumptions and expectations change over time. We read about the personal frustrations of these men in their search for legitimacy, fame, and acceptance.

In between long discussions of economics, biology, and computer simulation, Waldrop follows the careers of Brian Arthur, Stuart Kauffman, John Holland and others telling stories of academic life, as for example the case of Warren McCulloch, Kauffman’s mentor.  “Former students who had lived with McCulloch told stories of leaving the house through the upper bedroom window to avoid being trapped. McCulloch would habitually follow Kauffman into the bathroom while he was taking a shower, flip down the toilet seat, and sit there happily discussing networks and logical functions of various kinds while Kauffman was trying to get the soap out of his ear.”[xlix]  A men’s club indeed.  But Waldrop does not a paint a picture of emotionally imbalanced scientists or only of happy times. Waldrop shows Kauffman’s suffering when he loses his daughter through an accident.  He also devotes considerable time to Chris Langton’s accident and how through it he suddenly understood that the universe was alive, that self-organization did exist.

Unlike Gleick’s Chaos [l] where discoveries are made in solitary settings, Complexity is a story of an institute, the Sante Fe Institute.  Waldrop traces how it began as a dream of multidisciplinarian institute with the aim putting complexity on the map, its struggles to obtain funding, to keep its research agenda open from any one person’s  politics. The goal was to create “a kind of 21st Century Renaissance Man … starting in science but able to deal with the real messy world, which is not elegant, which science doesn’t really deal with.”[li]  But as we might expect, the goal was not a universal renaissance–even if founders believed it to be–as we can tell by the fact that they wished to call it a new Athens, or par with the city state that gave the world Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.  The problematic nature of that old Athens (the role of females, slaves, young boys) would be something one would hope a holistic perspective like complexity could account before, but these are, after Western scientists, deeply entrenched in their own mythology even as they attempt to deny it.  Nevertheless, the story is exciting as ideas from economists, geneticists, biologists, information specialists all bounce off each other, and from the simple emerged the complex.

While Lewin, like Kauffman, is more concerned with biology, Waldrop follows more closely the life of the Institute, the lives of George Cowan, the long time president of the Sante Fe Institute, Murray Gell-Mann, and John Holland.  But the central figure in this tale is Brian Arthur, an economist who brings back into economic discourse the idea of increasing returns.  Of course those of us in the social sciences or students of political economy are struck by the idiocy of most economists, especially the ones who have won noble awards. But increasing returns does not make sense if one lives in conservative economistic world where the market does work, where monopolies do not emerge. But if the economist were merely to leave his office, he would see how new firms create new goods and ideas–often inefficient–and how these become locked in structures.  But for Arthur finding colleagues who knew something about the real world, instead of merely about that which could be mathematized was nearly impossible.  It was at the Sante Fe Institute however where he found his home.  It is here that Arthur eventually finds himself moving into philosophy and metaphysics. Indeed, in the final section of Waldrop’s Complexity, Arthur concludes comparing complexity to taoist thought in contrast to traditional science and economics which he compares to Newtonian Christian thought.

But while the end of the book is impressive for its metaphysics, the first hundred pages is stunning for its naivety.  Waldrop describes a major revolution in thought when Arthur and colleagues discover on a trip to Bangladesh that women have many children to increase their life chances, that is, that there are social and cultural reasons to population growth and control. Fortunately, he was not awarded a noble for this miraculous discovery.   He also discovers the politics to his and his field’s approach to modeling, that is, let us make the world less messy and use science and mathematics to run the world more rationally.  “Most people in development economics … believe that they are missionaries of this century. But instead of bringing Christianity to the heathen, they’re trying to bring economic development to the Third World,” says Arthur.[lii]  The trip to Bangladesh confirmed Arthur’s view that neo-classical economics had nothing to say to the real world most women and men live in.  The obvious truth that economics is intertwined with history and culture was not made available to Arthur.  But he is humble enough to say that even though the lesson is obvious, “I had to learn it the hard way.”[liii] Arthur, like futurists, began to understand the importance of models that bring in variables from many perspectives yet have deep underlying patterns.  Indeed after reading the struggles of those within classical disciplines one develops a deep appreciation for futures studies–its temporal focus, its attempt to be multidisciplinarian, to find patterns in social, cultural and evolutionary processes and systems.  But what is so obvious to the futurist is not so for the economist or the systems engineer.  Culture is soft, it cannot be mathematized and is thus not real.  Fortunately for Arthur, he went to Bangladesh to meet real people, who do not live in the computer simulations of scientists or the rational irrationality of economists.

The Economy as a Self-Organizing System:

After reading Prigogine, Arthur understands that the economy is a self-organizing system.  While neo-classical theory assumes that there is a negative feedback, the tendency for small effects to die away, system dynamics theory, Chaos, assumes that small effects get magnified under certain conditions.  Diminishing returns means that no monopoly can result, that market conditions can lead to the ideal system, to equilibrium (and if there are problems the State can always step in and fix things).  But increasing returns is based on the idea that a slight chance, a random occurrence, allows a particular product to get more buyers, which then locks in self-producing cycles, until the product has huge advantages over other products.  The VHS versus Beta for vcrs is one example. This was also the case with the QWERTY typewriter. It was designed to reduce type speed but eventually became the standard. As it was mass produced, more people learned it, and thus more were sold and produced–until the industry became locked in.  Microsoft’s operating system is another example.  New software may not be better but if by chance results, or  a few people see a commercial and buy (clever marketing), soon it becomes the standard.

In Arthur’s vision, the new economics would be based on biology, the system would be constantly unfolding, there would be no externalities since all would be part of the system, and the economy would be constantly dynamic, with structures constantly coalescing, decaying an changing. Individuals in this new economics would be part of the economic ecology, where they were complex.

But this type of economics would not be able to accurately predict the future, since one variable could through the equations off. In this sense the legacy of Chaos theory is that although their are deep patterns, these are in effect unknowable, the world is more unpredictable.  But we can understand the world. Good theory helps us explain how we act, how ideas relate to each other, helping us search for similarities in structures and fields.

But as might expect in the Reagan years, these view were not popular and Arthur was challenged to show examples of technologies that humans are locked into. That the question was even asked is part of the problem.  The example that best showed this is the gasoline engine. In its infancy, gasoline was considered the least promising source of energy, with steam the most likely, it was safer and familiar. But as it turned out, gasoline won largely by accident.  Because of the breakout of hoof-and-mouth disease in North America, which led to the withdrawal of horse troughs, where steam cars could refill, gasoline power became locked in, and we lost the chance to have a world with considerably less pollution, argues Arthur.[liv]  Of course, when Arthur gave talks in Russia, economists there countered that this would be impossible in communist countries.

Where Waldrop is useful to the social scientist–if one can still read on and not be amazed at the simple mindedness of biologists, economists and physicists–it is his policy implications, which are full of insight.  For example, according to standard economics theory,  Japan has been successful because of it low cost of capital, powerful cartels, the need to use technology in the absence of commodities.  However, low cost of capital means a low rate of return, and thus no reason to invent, cartels are inefficient, and most economies are weakened when raw materials are scarce. At the same time theories that look at culture and social structure also do not suffice, collective decisionmaking can slow action down, for example.  Japan has been successful because, “increasing returns make high tech markets  unstable, lucrative and possible to corner, and Japan understood this better and earlier than other nations.”[lv] Unfortunately, for the US high tech industries were treated like low-tech industries and thus no industrial policy was articulated.

The next step for Arthur was to develop computer programs to show dynamical economic systems, to show how different set of historical accidents can cause radically different outcomes to emerge.  However, even with this information increasing returns remained antithetical to the politics of the free market since saying that maximizing individual freedom might not lead to the best possible result but to monopolies and inefficient systems was unacceptable for non-Marxists economists since it made problematic the entire neo-classical framework.

From Arthur, Waldrop moves to many of the themes that Lewin discusses, focusing on proofs of emergence at the level of cellular automata. Initial workshops at the Sante Fe institute were full of excitement and the beginnings of a shared language.

In particular, the founding workshops made it clear that every topic of interest had at its heart a system composed of many, many’ “agents.” These agents might be molecules or neurons or species or consumers or even corporations. But whatever their nature, the agents were constantly organizing and reorganizing themselves into larger structures through the clash of mutual accommodation and mutual rivalry. Thus molecules would form cells, neurons would form brains, species would form eco-systems, consumers and corporations would form economies, and so on. At each level, new emergent structures would form and engage in new emergent behaviors.[lvi]

The challenge, of course, as we see from Kauffman’s The Origin of Order, was to find the fundamental laws of emergence. To do this one could not have just physicists or biologists or economists, one needed experts in many fields. Bringing them together was the purpose of the Sante Fe Institute.  For futures studies the lesson is obvious, we need agreement on some larger project of futures studies. Thus while conferences are wonderfully multidisciplinarian they have no focus, no problem to solve, no vision to make law-like.

But it is this multidisciplinarian perspective that makes the writing of complexity rich. We learn how Kauffman is stunned at how static the neo-classical world is. We see how when physicists and economists meet at the Sante Fe Institute, it is hard for physicists to take the dismal science seriously, how so little of what they do relates to reality.  But we also learn about how similar technological systems are to ecological systems.

Moreover, these technological webs can undergo bursts of evolutionary creativity and massive extinction events, just like biological ecosystems. Say a new technology comes in and replaces and older technology, the horse. Along with the horse go the smithy, the pony express, the watering troughs, the stables, the people who curried horses, and so on. The whole subnetwork of technologies that depended upon the horse suddenly collapse … But along with the car come paved roads, gas stations, fast-food restaurants, motels, traffic courts and traffic cops, and traffic lights. A whole new network of goods and services begins to grow, each one filling a niche opened up by the goods and services that came before it.[lvii]

Unfortunately instead of seeing these as isomorphisms among different metaphorical systems, Complexity theorists often fall into the trap of misplaced concretism and confusing metaphor with objectivity.  They forget to take the language of one theory within its own complex context.  The larger cultural context for each theory, each discipline is inaccessible to them.  As is culture in general.  Complexity theorists do not understand that cultures too are destroyed by new technological systems. And like the horse which become ceremonialized in weddings and coronations or reduced to leisure, cultures become museumized. But some cultures do fight back. Fundamentalism is one cultural form that sees its niche being taken away. Its agents–mullahs and priests–attempt to find ways to battle these new technologies.  National sovereignty too can be seen in this light, as a system which, while on the verge of disappearance is trying to find ways to reassert itself. But this part of the problem, for both physics and neo-classical economics have agents that do not make decisions, do not suffer, one is merely following universal laws, the other rational greed, neither exists in a web of cultural complexity, as complexity theory suggests. It is culture that then that is the variable that remains silent in the language of Complexity theory; and paradoxically, it is Complexity theory that show how culture emerges.  Indeed, emergence is about the creation of culture.  The numerous systems that theorists hope to find a general law–evolution, economy, physics–for are all culturally nested within each other. And as Arthur astutely points, the method of investigation is founded on a cultural metaphysic as well as a psychological type of scientist.

Still there are useful policy implications.  With respect to global economic policy, Complexity theory does not restate liberal economics but it does not throw out the idea of growth either.  Indeed, innovation leads to innovation, and after a certain level of complexity, a new economy emerges that is autocatalytic.  The policy prescription is diversity, manufacturing and not dependent on the selling of raw materials.  Trade then between economies can leader to higher complexity but not if one system is undeveloped and the other developed. In the latter case, the developed or more complex nation will merely feed of the former. The former will go extinct, it will not be able to move up the fitness landscape.  But the problem of exploitation is not one that Waldrop discusses rather the issue for them is transformation. For example, how “injecting one new molecule into the soup could often transform the [system] utterly in much the same way that the economy was transformed  when horse was replaced by the automobile.”[lviii]

But John Holland does have a place for exploitation in his theory of complex adaptive systems. For him, complex adaptive systems–the brain, the economy, the ecology, computer programs, firms, individuals, nations–have more than one niche, which can be exploited by other agents. Thus the economic world has a place for programmers and plumbers and the rain forest has a place for crocodiles and butterflies. “The act of filling up one niche opens up more niches–for new parasites, for new predators and prey, for new symbiotic partners,” writes Holland.[lix]   Each change creates new opportunities and failures.  Complex adaptive systems are always in a state of flux, equilibrium is death.  Agents can never optimize a system, they cannot optimize their utility, their fitness. Finding an optimum is impossible, all one can do is change, and one cannot predict this change since agent is part of a larger ecology, a web of interrelationships.

It is this type of talk that has led Arthur to write that the metaphysics of Complexity theory is based on Taoism. God is not the watchmaker, there is no inherent order–as postmodernists as well argue–what is, is always in a state of flux–as Marxists would tell us.  In Arthur’s words, The world “is like a kaleidoscope: the world is a matter of patterns that change, that partly repeat, but never quite repeat, that are always new and different.”[lx] The neo-classical world view is a world of ordered order, fundamentally Christian.

What results then is a worldview based on accommodation and coadaption. There is no duality between humans and nature since human are part of nature.  We are part of the system, although an arrogant part. Optimization assumes that humans are first, as in the case of environmental cost-benefit studies.  They assume that we are outside nature, and nature is inside a store–the shopping center model.   More productive are institutional-policy analysis, where the actors are interactive and where culture, environment and intrinsic to the system not externalities.   In this sense typically phrases like “the optimization of policy decisions concerning environmental resources” become absurd.  They assume a static hierarchical world.

Amazingly, this type of think leads traditional economist Arthur as well as others of the Sante Fe Institute into the realm of much of what is current in futures studies: the politics of metaphor.   They argue that bad policymaking usually involved a poverty of metaphors, of ways of constituting reality.  For example, it may not be appropriate to think of a drug war, with assaults and guns, since each nation is complicit in drug use, drug production, drug culture, and the definitions of drugs themselves.

For Arthur, while one way to understand the new science of complexity is to look at metaphysics, the other is to look at psychological types. One type of scientist needs order and stasis, the other is comfortable with messiness and process.  The first spend their effort trying to make systems go back to equilibrium, the second are less Platonic and Newtonian and more influenced by Heraclitus who argued that the world is in a constant flux. What complexity adds to Heraclitus, is that this flux can become self-organized, allowing consciousness to emerge.

For biologist and artificial intelligence specialist Chris Langton, the metaphor is not the clock but the growth of a plant form a tiny seed or, more specifically the unfolding of a computer program from a few lines of code (indeed, much of this book is about  the effort to create such a program where life is not deigned in the program but emerges spontaneously).  It is the emergence of lifelike behavior from a simple rules.   This is the realization that reality cannot be captures by simple minded logic, that messiness–or metaphor–is intrinsic to the system, this is what Kurt Godel, Alan Turing in computer programming, chaos theoreticians, and postmodernists with respect to language have managed to suggest, if not show.

Thus instead of optimal solutions or utopias are viable solutions or eutopias, good places.  The task is to focus on robustness in the face of an ill-defined future.  That, believes Arthur, “puts a premium on becoming aware of non-linear relationships and causal pathways the best we can.”[lxi]  It is thus attempting to bring economics from the 18th century of Darwin and Newton to the 20th century.

What is needed then for Holland, is to understand how to adapt in conditions of constant change and unpredictable, conditions at the edge of chaos.  In this the debate about sustainability is a mistake from the view of complexity theory. A sustainable society can become a dystopia where our lives are controlled, with few freedoms, and a loss of cultural diversity. What is needed. believes Murray Gel-Mann, is a “society that is adaptable, robust and resilient to lesser disasters, that can learn from mistakes, that isn’t static, but that allows for growth in the quality of human life instead of just the quantity of it.”[lxii] But this then is the paradox, what is needed are general principles on a world solution to pressing problems, that allows for mistakes and cultural tolerance.  We have to find ways to avoid the large avalanches of change (to use the language of Chaos theory), such as nuclear disaster, world war 111 or environmental or economic disasters.

Specifically, Complexity theory allows us to understand and explain (not predict, and in this sense it is a departure from traditional sciences and social sciences) why the Soviet Union collapsed.  The system was not flexible enough and got locked into negative cycles, not positive lock ins. It was too ordered. Anarchy on the other hand is to chaotic, too fluid. But unlike Alex Argyro’s, A Blessed Rage for Order: Deconstruction, Evolution, and Chaos[lxiii] in which he concludes that the American system of checks and balances, of liberal economics of individualism, is the best of all worlds (since it is self-regulating and self-learning system that combines chaos and order), theorist Farmer argues that laissez faire systems also fail as they are too chaotic.  “Like a living cell, they have to regulate themselves with a dense web of feedbacks and regulation, at the same time they need to leave plenty of room for creativity, change, and response to new conditions.”[lxiv]  Evolution thrives at the edge of chaos, where neither chaos or order are dominant, this allows for gradual controlled change, where flexibility can emerge. It is learning and evolution that pushes a system to the edge of chaos, into complexity.  Perpetual novelty is about moving around at the edge of chaos.  For many this might be too much, what is needed is periods of transformation, and then new levels of organization and order.  Stasis and transformation not just continuous revolution.

Clearly then complexity is a slippery concept with some general agreement but with theorists using it in different ways, some from a Spencerian-Darwinian background, some from a more Taoist perspective, and some from an artificial intelligence background.  They come at from different areas as well: from computer simulation models, through years spent studying a fruit fly, and through economic analysis.  What is missing are perspectives from the humanities, from myth.  Arthur begins to make these connections as he investigates the metaphysics of complexity and the scientific enterprise they are caught in. But in their effort to make the analysis of emergence less focused on the divine hand of God, they forget that their efforts to are part of a political-historical web. That is not an accident that chaos and complexity are central topics in the late 20th century, as modernity has exploded from within and without. Indeed, they too are part of the pattern of evolution, a natural emergence from previous scientific enterprises.

But all said and done, the problem of Consciousness remains.  All self-organization gives us is a free lunch, from nothing, again something arrives. Even Spencer had his absolute principle, the end of evolution.   It is this that perhaps they miss. The attraction of the Great, or the divine, or the idea of paradise, the idea of perfection.  Their contribution of complexity theory is to show that life no longer is in the material nor in the spiritual but in the social organization of organisms. If one posits a prior principal, whether consciousness or an initial programmer, one has not explained anything, merely pushed the analysis elsewhere. “This is Darwin’s …insight, that an agent can improve its internal models without an paranormal guidance whatsoever.”[lxv] Clearly elegant, clearly part of the story, an important part of it. But the key is that complexity does not require a strict theory of progress, new systems are not necessarily better since this definition is problematic. And given the fluid nature of the real, we can go back in past and pick up past forms, and adapt them to novel conditions.  Politically, it gives up to those battling the status quo, those hoping for change. The task for them is to move the system they inhabit to the edge of chaos, where new social structures can emerge.

At the same time, complexity is also about understanding the future of life on the planet. While much of research into emergent systems is based on computer simulations, wherein one can argue that computer virus may indeed be alive (they can reproduce, they can store a representation of themselves onto another computer, “they can command the metabolism of their host to carry out their own functions”[lxvi] (such as real viruses), it is the creation of artificial human life that the new sciences must address.  Chris Langton writes that “Not only the specific kinds of living things that will exist, but the very course of evolution itself will come more and more under our control.”[lxvii]  Of course, since changes in initial conditions may dramatically change outcomes, as Chaos theory would assert, what new life forms might emerge at the edge of Chaos is not clear.  As other Complexity theorists, Langton believes that these issues must be publically, and globally, debated. Yet he remains positive.  “With the advent of artificial life, we may be the first creatures to create our own successors…. It is quite possible that, when the conscious beings of the future look back on this era, we will be most noteworthy not in and of ourselves but rather of what we gave rise to. Artificial life is potentially the most beautiful creation of humanity.”[lxviii] A new type of emergence, a new level of complexity that emerges from the present chaos.

But as we might expect, this new open world where new life is being created is fundamental Western. Even as it approaches integrated Taoist perspective–Arthur’s vision but clearly not Langton’s–it is linear.  The Sante Fe Institute would gain by opening up their definition of science and asking what isomorphic theories might emerge from alternative conceptions of science.  Examine an alternative Indian view which also attempts to reconcile emergence with evolution.  In this view, evolution is cyclical beginning with infinite Consciousness to Cosmic Mind and then to matter. We quote extensively from psychologist and physicist Rudreshananda. “From matter, individual mind emerges, evolves and finally merges back into Cosmic Mind and the Consciousness, completing and “cosmic cycle of creation.”[lxix]

But exactly how is matter formed from Cosmic Mind, and how does individual life and mind emerge from matter? In this perspective, there is an intelligence that links Cosmic intelligence to the world of relativity of time, space, and form.  Microvita are responsible for the creation of matter, life and individual minds in the universe.  They are conscious, living entities, so small that millions of microvita form a single electron, while billions form a carbon atom. Microvita move throughout the universe creating bodies and minds. Microvita are responsible for organizing energy to create matter with mass and its other properties.  Energy requires intelligence to become organized and that intelligence is supplied by microvita. Microvita are responsible for the origin and evolution of life as well. Evolution is not random but guided by desires, the environment and cosmic intelligence, which guides any changes desired collectively by a group of organisms. Microvita provide the genetic information to create species evolution by organizing new genetic chemicals such as DNA and RNA required for evolutionary transformations. The emergence of mind from matter (composed of microvita originated from cosmic intelligence) is also guided by microvita which help organisms express greater physio‑psychic potentialities during their evolutionary development.[lxx]

Merits aside of the truth of these statements, they are clearly contentious and problematic–for example how are created? To assert that the Infinite creates them merely pushes back the problem–is that here is another attempt to rethink evolution that does not lead to simple Creationism, nor does it attempt to maintain a secular view of the world, in fact, one can see how dialectics, emergence, and microvita can combine together.  However, as science it is not acceptable since its hypothesis can not be presently tested.  But what is important is that from an Indian thinker we gain a cyclical view of the universe and evolution.  Metaphysics gives us our physics.  But the task for those involved in microvita research is to develop some type of tests, proofs, arguments that move microvita from mere cosmological speculation to a theory with some agreement among a community of scientists.

Still Waldrop’s Complexity should be lauded even though it is myopic in its inability to understand the cultural and political, and for its naivete in taking seriously the neo-classical economic discourse.  Nonetheless there is an attempt to examine the metaphysics of complexity. There is an attempt to examine the lives of the men who have founded this new field.  And as we see from Kauffman’s The Origins of Order this effort is one based on humility.  Lewin shows us the exactness, the rigor, the grand debates within this area. At the same time, he attempts to tackle the problem of progress, as well as the links between Complexity theory and Gaia theory.  All writers also attempt to develop the policy implications of this new science, they understand that science exists with an policy environment, a policy community.  What makes both Waldrop and Lewin especially interesting is that they tell a story, and succeed in making science a story as well.

Notes

[i].   Roger Lewin, Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos (New York, Macmillan, 1992) page 190.

[ii].  Ibid.

[iii]. Ibid, page 118.

[iv].  Ibid, page 192.

[v].   Ibid, page 196.

[vi].  Ibid.

[vii]. Ibid, page 180.

[viii].     Ibid, page 10.

[ix].  Ibid, page 13.

[x].   Ibid, page 15.

[xi].  Ibid, page 135.

[xii]. Ibid, page 138.

[xiii].     Ibid, page 139.

[xiv]. Ibid, page 143.

[xv].  Ibid, page 148.

[xvi]. Ibid, page 148.

[xvii].     Ibid, page 148.

[xviii].    Ibid, page 171.

[xix]. Ibid, page 170.

[xx].  Ibid, page 114.

[xxi]. Ibid, page 72.

[xxii].     Ibid.

[xxiii].    Ibid.

[xxiv].     M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Chaos and Order (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1992) page 299.

[xxv]. Ibid, page 103.

[xxvi].     N. Katherine Hayles, Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1990), pages 91-102.

[xxvii].    Stuart A. Kauffman, The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993) page v11.

[xxviii].   Ibid, page xiv.

[xxix].     Waldrop, op cit, reference 24, page 125.

[xxx]. Kauffman, op cit, reference 27, page xiv.

[xxxi].     Rupert Sheldrake, The Presence of the Past: Morphic Resonance and the Habits of Nature (New York, Times Book, 1988).

[xxxii].    P.R. Sarkar, Microvita in a Nutshell (Calcutta, Ananda Marga Publications, 1993).

[xxxiii].   Ibid, page 232.

[xxxiv].    Ibid.

[xxxv].     Ibid.

[xxxvi].    Ibid, page 233.

[xxxvii].   Ibid, page 370.

[xxxviii].  Ibid.

[xxxix].    Ibid, page 371.

[xl].  Ibid, page 399.

[xli]. Ibid, page 401.

[xlii].     Ibid.

[xliii].    Waldrop, op cit, reference 24, page, 303.

[xliv].     Kauffman, op cit, reference 27, page 402.

[xlv]. Kauffman, op cit, reference 24, page 404.

[xlvi].     Ibid, page 645.

[xlvii].    Waldrop, op cit, reference 24,  page, 133.

[xlviii].   Ibid, page 133.

[xlix].     Ibid, page 115.

[l].   James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York, Viking, 1987).

[li].  Waldrop, op cit, reference 24, page 68.

[lii]. Ibid, page 26.

[liii].     Ibid, page 27.

[liv]. Ibid, pages 40-41.

[lv].  Ibid, page 43.

[lvi]. Waldrop, 88.

[lvii].     Ibid, page 119.

[lviii].    Ibid, page 126.

[lix]. Ibid, page 147.

[lx].  Ibid, page 330.

[lxi]. Ibid, page 334.

[lxii].     Ibid, page 351.

[lxiii].    Alex Argyro, A Blessed Rage for Order: Deconstruction, Evolution, and Chaos (Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 1991).  Also see Sohail Inayatullah, “Chaos in Myth, Science and Politics,” in Mika Mannermaa, Sohail Inayatullah and Rick Slaughter, eds., Chaos and Coherence (Turku, Finland, Finnish Society for Futures Studies, 1994).

[lxiv].     Waldrop, op cit, reference 24, page 294.

[lxv]. Ibid, page 198.

[lxvi].     Ibid, page 283.

[lxvii].    Ibid, page 283.

[lxviii].   Ibid, page 285.

[lxix].     E-mail transmission. Based on Rudreshananda, Ac., Microvita: Cosmic Seeds of Life (Mainz, Germany, Microvita Research Institute, 1988).

[lxx]. Ibid.

Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos

by Roger Lewin. New York, Macmillan, 1992, 208 pages.

The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution

by Stuart A. Kauffman.  New York, Oxford University Press, 1993. 709.

Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos by M. Mitchell Waldrop. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1992. 380 pages.

Frames of Reference, the Breakdown of the Self and the Search for Reintegration (1993)

By Sohail Inayatullah

Some Perspectives on the Futures of Asian Cultures

Published in Eleonora Masini and Yogesh Atal, eds., The Futures of Asian Cultures (Bangkok, UNESCO, 1993

March 15, 1993

ABSTRACT

Using culture in a variety of ways–culture in opposition to neo-realist views of economism and power; culture as essentially alive, always more than our definition of it; culture as fundamentally an essence, the original state of affairs; culture as an original state of affairs that declines over time and culture as a social practice–we explore a variety of cultural futures: (1) The unravelling of the traditional Asian self, (2) The breakdown of the self and culture, the schizophrenic model of reality, (3) Women’s cultural futures particularly the role of resentment as the emotion of future; (4) A new cultural renaissance from the periphery; (5) the rise of East Asian sensate culture; (6) Technological cultures from virtual reality, genetic engineering, and robotics; and, (7) Conflicts between types of time and a search for a cultural frames that incorporate a diversity of “times.”

Introduction:
Now considered the last unified discourse, culture is believed to be the voice of community, of a coherent set of meanings and relationships, the core of the Good Society, of humanity. Culture appears to be the last hope standing in counter point to the inequity of the market and the obtrusive power of the State. Through the language of civil society–globally and locally–culture presents us with the ideals of love and tolerance; peace and beauty; hope and vision. In this humanist model of society, culture is the last remnant of the past not infiltrated by technocratic capitalist market relations. Culture is then the voice of the past and the hope of the future.

Living cultures put on the way side of the linear march of history are now studied and celebrated (from Ladakh to Indian tribals) because we believe them to have a coherent voice and vision, to exist in a society where social relations stand before instrumental relations, where the transcendental is placed before the secular, and where the body has yet to have been placed in the surveillance grid of modern society. Asian cultures (south, east and south-east) in particular are believed to represent this traditional or ancient relationship with earth and heaven. But this may no longer be the case, for the Asian voice has begun to unravel. Travel, television, video, Westernization, modernity, and independence–as well as the reaction to the oppressive strength of feudal and hierarchical forces of the past, whether Confucianist, Hindu or Muslim–all have made problematic a unified Asian self. New technologies, forms of music, patterns of resistance and post-Asian visions of the future may make Asia’s contribution to the future of culture far more unexpected in form and content, more like a novel (a text of many voices) than a serious piece of non-fiction (a consolidated text, often a sermon, with a clear author). To begin our analysis we need to first distinguish between local, Center and pseudo culture. Local culture is often strong at providing identity but weak at intellectual, social, capital and physical mobility. Center culture (the culture of the dominant power) in contrast is weak at identity but strong on capital and individual mobility, that is economic growth. Local culture has survived because of its relationship to the land, in helping members meet basic needs. However, local culture has not been able to compete with modernity’s promise of providing economic rewards, of the glitter of city life, where one always hears of someone winning the lottery. Communism provided basic needs but not identity and mobility. Modernity, however, provides unity and identity in the idea of Man–Man as consumer and producer. Instead of the logos of God standing benevolently above the skies, it is the new symbols of Coco-Cola and McDonalds that provide global participation.
Modernity succeeds largely by creating a bridgehead based on pseudo-culture between Core and local culture, leaving local culture ridiculed, weak, and most importantly–inferior. Local’s judge their beauty, mind, history from the eyes of the foreign culture. Bengali activist and social philosopher Sarkar says it like this (1982: 53-54).
The subtler and sweeter expressions of human life are generally termed “culture.” Human culture is one, but there are some local variations in its expression. That particular community which is motivated by socio-sentiment (race, groupism, nationalism) to exploit others tries to destroy the local cultural expressions of other communities. It forcibly imposes its language, dress and ideas on other communities, and thus paves the way for exploitation by paralysing those people psychologically. So if some people by virtue of their wealth impose (their culture) on others, this will break their backs, they will become paralysed … If the cultural backbone is broken then all their struggles will end in nothing.

This is pseudo-culture. However–and this is where we differ from traditional humanists–efforts to transform pseudo-culture or to criticize colonial culture are often based on an idealized past not an ideal or alternative future. These are attempts to resurrect myths before the changes wrought by colonialism. But rarely are there efforts to envision alternative futures (that take dimensions of traditional and modern yet yearn for a different voice, a post-Asian voice, if you will), except, of course, for more recent efforts by the peace movements, the ecological groups, the women’s groups and a few spiritual movements–the anti-systemic movements.

Culture then as the voice of humanity against the technocratic State machine of late capitalism may tell us more about a particular idealized past then the futures ahead. While culture as a coherent voice of sanity–the voice of humanity against the technocratic State machine of late capitalism–may be the illuminated side of the darkness of the present, reflecting the bold vision of the renaissance humanists, of the moral philosophers, it tells us very little of the chaos ahead, of the new forms of cultures emerging, of transformations ahead. As Frantz Fanon (1967) has written, culture often deteriorates into custom losing its critical innovative edge, its spiritual vision and inspiration. Paradoxically, it is after culture has lost its edge that it is glorified and then “museumized.” However, even as a particular form of culture may lose its critical edge, there are always new forms of culture challenging dominant models of reality, of political-economy, of State power. Living culture then is often a step ahead of our mapping abilities, our attempts to rationalize and locate it.

In discussing the futures of Asian cultures, we take a variety of approaches. Beginning with an epistemological approach in which we look at how the “cultural” is constituted, particularly official culture, we move to an analysis of culture, gender and structure. We then examine the futures of cultures from the model of schizophrenia, using it as a way to comment on peripheral challenges to center and pseudo-culture. We also examine the impact of new technologies on traditional images of culture. We conclude with an analysis of the cultural construction of time.

Towards a Critical Futures Studies:

Before we can enter into a discussion of the futures of cultures, we need to ask as a preliminary, what are the frames of reference, the meaning boundaries from which this question, this investigation gains eligibility into our discourse? How is it that we can ask that question: what is the futures of cultures, specifically in a socially imagined place called Asia?

Futures studies itself, to begin with, can be understood in many ways. Roy Amara, for example, uses the division of preferable, probable and possible (1981). We take an alternative route and use the division of: predictive, interpretive and critical (Inayatullah, 1990).

The first aims at controlling and taming the future and thus making uncertainty less fearful. Finding empirical–accurate, valid and repeatable–indicators of culture and cultural futures is the task in this approach. Culture in this perspective is segmented, merely one more variable in a complex cross-impact scenario analysis, that is, culture along with economy and polity. The second is not concerned with predicting the future but with understanding the meanings we give to the future. This view assumes that the future is constructed in distinct ways by different cultures; cultural comparison and diversity in interpretations is the key here. The task for research is not to know one particular future but to explore a range of alternative futures–to expand the discourse on what can be and what has been! The third view goes perhaps a step further and asks, what are the knowing boundaries of what can be? From this view, futures research aids not in shedding more light, in giving more answers, but in making events, trends, scenarios and others tools of the future problematic, by asking how is that we accept conventional categories of analysis in the first place. Michel Foucault (1984), for example, did not seek to predict the future of societies but instead asked how is that we have become a population instead of a subject or a community or a people. The task is not so much to compare or predict, that is to conduct an analysis based on a prior agreed upon definition, but to bring into the discourse different possible meanings. Culture then ceases to be an essentialized reified category but becomes a particular way of knowing that has historically come about at the expense of other possible cultures. Even though we may construct culture in humanist terms as our possible savior, no culture is innocent, every reality displaces another possibility.

This third view then looks for the social costs, the politics of a particular culture. In exploring the futures of cultures, we could then ask what knowledge interests does a particular social formation serve? How does one vision of the future or one view of the future privilege a particular episteme (historical boundaries of knowledge) and favor a particular interest group or particular class.
Most important even while most discussions of the future of cultures rightly attempt to move culture outside of economistic categories, “culture”–within this critical framework–exists centrally in the “political,” the ability to define what is important and what is insignificant; what is real. This takes culture out of frivolous discussions of eating, dress, and smell (although these too can tell us a great deal) or even values and habits, to culture as resistance.

Defining culture as resistance leads to a more critical analysis of the location of culture in social change. In Hawaii, for example, local people have developed a language of resistance called pidgin-English. While ridiculed by U.S. Mainland Americans as poor English, more than anything else, pidgin-English serves to differentiate outsiders and insiders and to help insiders gain some advantage in an Island that has increasingly lost control of its own future through integration into the world capitalist system (particularly US Mainland culture). Through local resistance efforts–language, music and dance, as well as efforts to regain lost land–Hawaiian culture intends to return to its traditional cosmology, and thereby cease to represent a romanticized Orientalist narrative of cultural harmony, the land of swaying coconut trees and hula girls. The recovery of Hawaiian cosmology then becomes the best defense against modernity’s commodification of the native (Agard and Dudley, 1990).

Within the critical framework, we do not abandon scenarios, focusing only critical analysis. Rather, scenarios become textual strategic tools to distance us from the present, to gain a fresh perspective on cultures. This is important for as Franz Kafka has warned us, our consciousness may be more our enemy than our ally, since there is no world out there waiting for us to apprehend. Rather, we are complicit in creating the reality that is us. In Kafka’s story “The Burrow,” the creature digging the burrow cannot tell to what extent the danger it experiences is created by outside enemies or by its own digging.

Eventually, the creature becomes aware that the sole evidence of the existence of its enemies is noise. Beginning in a romanticized state of silence and tranquility, as its efforts to create an impregnable burrow proceed, the creature draws disparate conclusions about the whistling it begins to hear in the walls. Its inability to determine whether noises are produced by its own burrowing or by a predator can be read allegorically as pertaining to interpretation in general (Shapiro, 1992: 123).

How then to distinguish the act of knowing from that which is to be known? One cannot simply look up culture to find its definition. There is no transparent encyclopedia in which the real is cataloged for us. Indeed, the catalog, the index, in itself frames that which we are in search for; the index is complicit in our definition of culture. Ultimately there is no culture existing out there for us to discover, we are part of the process of discovering, even though we are often ignorant of our own site of understanding.

The humanistic response to this has been a plea for creating the conditions for enhancing cultural diversity, for situations wherein the Other culture can reveal things in us that have remained hidden. While this is important, two additional perspectives are needed. One is that “we” ourselves within this plea for cultural diversity exist in a larger (unknowable to us even as we self-deconstruct) matrix of the real–the historical boundaries of knowledge, the societal constructs of intelligibility that frame our questioning and knowing. At the same time, we need to find an anchor from which to interpret, from which to focus our gaze lest we become lost in a sea of endless relativities with no knowing or positive action at all possible. The futures of Asian cultures, for this essay, will be our ground, the landscape in which we hope to create some cultural fruits.

Within this critical framework, we can then attempt to imagine alternative societies (and create) not merely to predict or forecast the future but to gain distance from the present, so as to see it anew. We can ask a range of what-if questions to loosen the bounds of the present, to shift through our terrain and find different spaces of intelligibility. For example, what would a society look like that had no culture? What would a society look like if it was entirely cultural ? Or entirely acultural? What would a culturally rich society look like? Culturally poor? We could also more specifically ask: what would world culture be like if Manila instead of Paris was the cultural capital of the world? These types of questions could lead to a range of dialogues and useful scenario building. At the same time, the empirical view is important in that we have a context from which to enter the future lest scenarios be idiosyncratic reflections of the future. History and structure should guide but not bind our explorations into the future.

State/Airport Culture: Korea’s Intangible Asset Program

In our attempts to examine the futures of cultures, we often assume that culture is discernable through our rational mind. But if we assume culture has unconscious mythological/epistemic aspects, that is, culture is an unconscious process–less visible to official Power and more evasive the closer we seek to define it–then we need to find other avenues of inquiry into the futures of cultures.
As an important case study, both North and South Korea are conscious of the possibility of losing their culture. Japanese imperialism and Westernization (pseudo-culture) have made it imperative to save culture, to collect it for the future.

Culture has become a central strategy in moving forward and competing on the world stage, the Seoul Olympics as the most obvious example. As with other third world nations (conscious of becoming significant actors on the world field) culture has been given official status, sponsored much as in the feudal era when a wealthy merchant would sponsor an artist. But in Korea this is more than merely creating an Institute for the Arts, to spur creativity, rather culture is seen as a national asset, part of the drive towards full sovereignty.

South Korea has gone even further having established an Office of Cultural Assets which designates certain individuals as Intangible Cultural Assets. Upon designation a numeral is assigned to them. Upon death of the asset, the senior most student is given intangible asset status (Howard, 1986).

If we examine a brochure from a recent performance in Hawaii, we gain insight into one dimension of the future of Asian culture. For example, Ms. Yang studied with the grand master Kim Juk-Pa, who was recognized as the Intangible Cultural Asset No. 23 by the government of Korea. After the death of her teacher, Ms. Yang was assigned by the Korean government in 1988 as the Exclusive Candidate for Intangible Cultural Asset No. 23. She is expected to be officially named an Intangible Cultural Asset when she turns 50″ (Center for Korean Studies). Also from the same performance brochure, we learn of Mr. Bark who is designated as “the preserver of the Important Intangible Cultural Asset No. 5” (Center for Korean Studies).

It is the State then that bears the onus of cultural preservation. Of course South Korea believes that it is only in North Korea where culture has been “officialized;” in the South it has tradition that is being kept alive. Yet the contradictions are obvious. Pansori, for example, or story telling cannot be preserved through State power. It is a living form of entertainment–community culture–based on ridiculing authority, uncovering duplicity in morality, and of frank sexual talk. Attempts to make it eternal do so at the risk of losing the edge, the creative innovativeness, of the art. Art and culture as vehicles of limiting power or enhancing cultural resistance become resituated in the context of the State. In addition, while traditional Confucian culture was community based, in the Intangible Asset Program culture has become individual based, the group dimension of the art having been re-represented as the Korean State. Ultimately, this is not that different from North Korean efforts to develop an art and culture based on the glorification of Kim Il Sung.

In defense of South Korean preservation efforts, without State support there is fear that culture will become modernized–fast music and commodified culture–and local dress, food, and music marginalized.

Even if official recognition preserves the past it does so at a cost for it forces artists to endear themselves to the special board that decides who will become a cultural asset. Art becomes technical, patterned itself after recent successes, not creative but imitative. Thus, intangible assets remove themselves for that which they claim to represent, the history of the people. Culture becomes museumized even as individual artists gain recognition. Culture then is seen either as Western or traditional Korean, efforts to develop other forms of art have no space in this binary opposition–moreover if a Post-Asian art or culture developed would we be able to recognize it as art or culture?

The logical extension of State art is what is commonly seen as Airport Culture: a few icons representing past, present and future, to be consumed quickly before one’s flight is called. Hawaii has excelled at this with hula girls, leis and music to greet disembarking passengers (far more indicative of actual culture would be not the hula but immigration warnings, custom’s procedures, dogs in search of contraband, as well as other entry requirements).

Commodification and officialization then are the two main trends in the future of Asian culture. In the first recent Western categories of beauty and culture are imported and Asian categories of thought denied. In the second, culture is controlled by official boards, art is necessary to unify a nation, to use to cast a distance, a measure of sovereignty from other cultures. Extrapolating we can imagine a scenario in which all the world’s cultural assets are lined up and numbered. With instant access video technologies, we will then be able to easily locate a nation and call for Intangible cultural asset number 4500 and have it played for us. But then by that time, real culture will again have spontaneously developed outside of conventional discourse, in other places. Culture then is not State owned or State run, it is resistance, constantly slithering out of attempts to capture it and escaping the Official discourse. The Korean word for that is “chôki.” It means somewhere else, a place we don’t quite know where, but somewhere else. Intangible. Not realizable nor quantifiable. Quite different from the State Intangible program which in its attempt to preserve that which is considered intangible–art, beauty–has left the world of metaphor and interpretation and entered the economic and political discourse. Even dissidence might find itself being allocated an cultural asset number. Of course, the positive side is that culture is protected from the commodification of capitalism, from the market–a market which would prefer electric guitars to kagyam. But which cultural period, which Korea, should be protected. Korea, for example, was matriarchal (shamanistic), then Buddhist, then Confucian and finally modern. During the Japanese occupation, traditional Korean ways were sloganized but these were of the medieval Chôson period, a time of considerable oppression of women. Nationalist leaders did not choose to recover the social relations of the shamanistic or Buddhist period, rather they took the more State oriented and hierarchically rigid Chôson period to use as a defense against Japanese imperialism. Each nation or collectivity then has many pasts, many cultural histories which can be appropriated in the creation of a future. While through the recovery of the Confucian Chôson, a strong nation based on “Korean ways” was created, the cost was the suppression of women’s rights and labor participation in the political-economy: the championing of one cultural history meant the suppression of another.

Dorothy and the Return to Oz:

We learn more about the problematic nature of culture from the American movie Return to Oz. In this movie Dorothy of Kansas returns to Oz finding it captured by the Gnome King (who is made of solid rock, indeed, is a mountain). To rescue her friends she must go through a range of hazards. In one scene she tries to escape the wicked witch. To do that, her friend the pumpkinhead tells her of a mysterious life creating potent he has seen the witch use. By using a moosehead, some palm leaves, a old couch, she creates a flying mooseplane. To bring it to life she sprinkles the magic potent on the moosehead. Nothing happens. She asks the scarecrow what has gone wrong. He says there must be a word that enlivens the potent. She asks what is it. He responds how could he know since he wasn’t alive at the time that it was used on him. And that is the problem, much of what we want to know, the secrets of life, the grand philosophical questions, the nature of God, the structure of the superconscious are outside of our knowing boundaries (or answers to them are bounded by the episteme that formulates the rule of eligibility). Dorothy’s resolution of the problem of Being and Knowing (We are always more than we know ) is simple. She reads the ingredients and says the magic word. The mooseplane takes off. For us as well, the answer to our desire to transcend our problems, to remove our fears is obvious. We read the magic words of Text and the world is made right. Evil disappears and Truth stands firm. Whether Bible, Talmud, Quran, Sayings of Mao-tse Tung or Mantra, reading re-represents the world to us, we enter the flight of the metaphor and reality no longer appears as concrete. We can fly! We have entered cultural space.

After Dorothy defeats the witch, she travels to the mountain of the Gnome king. It is he who holds the others in captivity, in concrete. Again, she uses the mantra, the magic word of “OZ” to bring the kingdom to life. The Gnome king is defeated when he accidentally swallows a chicken egg. As biological life enters him, he falls apart and the world comes alive again. The word represents her Being and when uttered the battle is won and the earlier conditions, the earlier romantic biological–indeed women’s culture–is regained. All is fine. Culture has defeated evil, metaphor has defeated literalism, and women’s biological power has defeated male power.

Structure, Gender and Culture:

While Dorothy raises issues of Being and Knowing, metaphor and literalism, providing us with a way out of our quandaries, in a recent Chinese movie it is structure (patriarchy) that overwhelms culture. In Raising the Red Lantern, we gain further insight into the interrelationships between culture, gender and structure. Sold by her poor countryside father, the newly married wife finds herself as mistress number four. During the first nine days of marriage she has the husband all to herself, but on the tenth day, like the other wives she must stand outside in the courtyard to find out who will receive the red lantern. Not only does the red lantern mean a night with the husband as well as a foot massage but the right to choose the menu for the next day as well. When she asks why things are done in this way, the new mistress is told by the elderly first wife that these are the family traditions, the family culture. In the span of two hours we see how the architecture of the house and the structure of four vying for one creates competition between the women. Hysteria results. The husband keeps all the women in line by switching the red lantern to whomever is most obedient. But above the visible household structure is another invisible room. Located on the side of the roof, near where the women can meet away from the man, is hidden a small room, where other women who attempted to reverse the patriarchal structure have met their violent death. The new wife tries to look inside but the door is padlocked. Access to this reality is denied. Meanwhile, wife number three having understood the male structure develops a secret lover. This is her only way out of the competitive world the husband has created (she increases the supply of men). Wife number two–who has gained the confidence of the other wives by pretending to be sweet and nice–discovers the affair and tells the husband, hoping to gain some leverage. Wife number three is immediately hanged. The newly married mistress upon seeing this cannot keep her self together and she breaks down, unable to explode outwardly (to change patriarchal relations) and unable to violate morality by finding her own lover (as she is the from the traditional village), she implodes spending the rest of her life aloof from her previous self, the self created by the male structure. She is now free in the misery of her madness. We are vividly shown the points where culture and structure meet. Culture ceases to be self-evident and is shown to be mediating through various social forces, in this movie, male social and architectural structures. The movie ends with wife number five arriving asking who is that mad women there. We should not be surprised at this ending as in male culture there is an endless supply of vessels of pleasure. More rooms can always be built, although only room is needed far above to keep the entire structure concrete. Resistance then is impossible; cooption to patriarchy is the only possible future. But in the long run, the costs of cooption is the breakdown of the self.

Schizophrenia as the Model of the Future:

This movie then gives us insight into the most important trend of the future: the rise of cultures of schizophrenia, of madness. This the breakdown of any coherent self, leading to a variety of selves that are not integrated by any sense of culture, history or any imposed structural self, the self of the modern world, for example. As a metaphor, schizophrenia helps in deconstructing the real and opening up spaces that the modern world has closed. However, while romanticized by movies and by postmodernists, as a disease it remains one of the most painful human conditions known to humanity, AIDS appears like a relief when compared to schizophrenia. An epistemologically open pluralist self or system with some level of integration is still distant.

An example of a movie that romanticizes mental illness (while making some very important points about work and play, violence and peace) is The King of Hearts. In the opening scene a French town is abandoned by the retreating Germans. The townspeople rush out as well when they find out that the Germans have left behind a bomb that will explode at midnight. A Scottish officer is sent by the liberating allied forces to remove the bomb. When he gets there, the lunatic asylum has been opened and now the schizophrenics have taken the roles of the townspeople (showing again that it is structure that creates selves). One is a duchess, the other a Madame, the third the General, the fourth a barber. Life to them is a game. Time is immediate. Play is central. The Scottish officer desperately tries to warn them of the impending danger, their death. They respond by showing him the whimsical nature of life, its fleeting nature. Finally, when the British and Germans march back into the town, discovering each other, they immediately open fire and all the soldiers are killed. At that point, one of the schizophrenics comments: “They seem to be overacting”– taking their roles too seriously forgetting that the Self is liminal not solid. It is only when the townspeople return, that the lunatics rush back to the asylum understanding that they can no longer freely create time and space, the social construction of reality now has fallen back to normalcy, the rigidity of common sense has returned. The Scottish officer now must decide to stay with the army and continue fighting (have a fixed self) or enter himself into the asylum. He strips off his clothes leaving behind the self of society and joins the alternative self of the mad. While others have phrased this battle between the self of the desert and the self of the city, the self of the mystic versus the self of the institution, in King of Hearts it is the schizophrenic who has seen modernity and rejected it. The Scottish officer leaves the modern world, the modern self, to an earlier historically playful self (or indeed a post industrial self outside of the bondage of work). However, as he walks into the asylum we see him holding a bird in a cage, reminding us that the soul is still imprisoned even in the relative freedom of madness.

While apparently a European movie, the story told is equally valuable for understanding Asian culture. However in the Asian setting, the schizophrenic has been located less in the medical discourse and more in the mystical discourse. Like classical Hindu and Buddhist texts, the schizophrenic has understood that life is suffering but instead of transcending the suffering and creating a new self that is enlightened, the self breaks down neither normal nor enlightened. In the Asian version of the movie, there would be an enlightened soul pointing out the third alternative ; neither the world of madness nor the world of normalcy but a third supramental consciousness where reality is viewed as layered–shallow and deep–the deeper layers less gross, less material, more ideational and spiritual. The enlightened individual would not remark that killing was overacting but comment instead that death is temporary for the souls lives on with killing a result of ignorance, greed and fear. The schizophrenic unable to transcend ignorance and fear, yet critical of conventional models of Reality, opts out for an earlier time when life was simple (our mythological vision of traditional society) and everything was play acting. Thus the final scene in an Asian rendering–Taoist, Buddhist, Hindu, or Sufi–would have the Scottish officer suddenly realize the incompleteness of both worlds–the world of the insane and the world of the normal. Furthermore in the Asian view, more open to many ways of knowing, schizophrenia would be able to find a place to stand in the world with many possible paths, with the 99 names of Allah and a 1000 renderings of Brahman and the eternal return of the bodhisattva.

While this movie shows the contradictions of the neo-realist paradigm –of individuals and nations seeking to maximize self-interest–the mistake it makes is to believe that schizophrenics would be able to create a conflict-free community of the mentally ill. Like the humanist vision of culture, it is constructed with a coherent past based on a romantic voice of the Good. This perspective reiterates the image of the native or of traditional Asian culture where man lived in harmony with each other. Unfortunately, outside of the movie world there would be many kings (and sovereign nations) with no consensus creating so as to create a community of the mentally different. Each would make claims for leadership and fear the other, at least in the short run. In the long run with no concrete Self to provide a persistent and consistent Self, peace and non-violence would reassert itself. In any case, in romanticized renderings of mental illness (as with renderings of the traditional Asian self) while the pain of normal society is laid bare, the pain of mental difference, the pain of mental illness is not. The asylum then becomes our representation of culture outside of the instrumental and violent voices of the modern world.

Moving away from this treatment of schizophrenia, we can speculate on what the world would be like if schizophrenia was the dominant psychological model. To begin with, like the future, we are uncertain as to the nature of schizophrenia, but we know that it demands our attention. There are many discourses that are used to describe both schizophrenia and the future: the technocratic, the biological, the genetic, the spiritual, the social, the political and the economic (Torrey 1988, 1992).

Schizophrenia then can be seen in many ways. Most people view it as a brain disease, something that can be cured with the right drug, the technological discourse. Others see it as a dietary problem, previously many saw it from the psychological discourse–bad parenting, conflicts between parents and so forth. While there is a great deal of literature in this area it appears that the biological-chemical discourse has won out. But despite this victory, schizophrenia can also be viewed from a cultural perspective, helping us see what each culture thinks as normal and as abherent behavior. Schizophrenics, for example, confront us with our fears. Sensitive, misunderstood, with nothing to lose, they remind us that the king and queen are naked. Unfortunately for those of us in polite society, they show us by undressing themselves.

But while they show us our reality, they do some from a position of paranoia (an exaggeration of fear) not metanoia (a transcendence of fear). For example, they believe they are God and the rest of us are not. At the same time the breakdown in the self of the “mentally ill” is (as shown in the King of Hearts) is partly a response to the irrational self of the modernity or Westernization from the Asian perspective. The self breaks down for it cannot make sense of irrational paradoxes: why is there is so much wealth amidst so much hunger; why is there democracy within nations but not a world democracy; why do some people achieve so much wealth so quickly and others don’t; why is there is so much killing by those who claim the Good, the True and the Beautiful; why don’t the poor rise up and smite the rich? While most of us can find rational(ized) explanations to give meanings to these paradoxes, schizophrenics do not. They remain caught, trapped and instead of breaking apart the problem through logic, or living the sensate existence of “eat, drink and be merry,” many of them find their self breaking apart, thereby becoming many people. As Asia continues to modernizes and Westernizes we can but expect increased occurrences of this type of lunacy. And with traditional knowledge systems breaking down (or modernizing and adopting Western scientific models) thereby reducing epistemological pluralism and the family losing its strength, schizophrenia will become “medicalized” as in the West. Urbanization, unemployment, cultural penetration from the http://aic.org.uk/cialis-generic/ West will further unravel the Asian self creating the broken down mind; a mind that can be described by schizophrenia, as in the following quote from Louis Sass’ Madness and Civilization.

Schizophrenia results in detachment from the rational rhythms of the body and entrapment in a sort of morbid wakefulness or hyperawareness. Schizophrenic individuals often describe themselves as feeling dead yet hyperalert–a sort of corpse with insomnia; thus one such patient spoke of having been ‘translated’ into what he called a ‘death-mood’ yet he also experienced his thoughts as somehow electric–heated up and intensified (Sass, 1992: 7-8).

Colonialism has created the feeling of death while modernity has created intensity, and when put together has led to a culture of corpses with insomnia. Traditional time, cyclical time has broken down yet modernized time in Asia remains a caricature of the Westernized model. Few have attempted to create a post-Asian model of time, one that includes cyclical, spiritual (timeless), structural, linear, efficient, and women’s time (Inayatullah, 1993).
Like postmodernists, schizophrenics understand that the real world is one particular construction of the universe, having no order, fundamentally unintelligible. They contest the real world, the bottom line, the final cut, making reality much more mysterious, unclear, uncut and unfortunately for them frightening and horrifying. Like eskimos, who answer, “we do not believe, we fear”–that is, fear is not mediated by external forms such as a global media, pop futurists and other fear mongers (Shapiro, 1992: 126). Fear becomes an epistemological category not something one experiences on the news. For schizophrenics, as well, who might spend a week locked in a mortal combat with a cockroach, fear is not an indulgence, it crawls into one’s back, up the urethra, and into one’s eyes.

While historically schizophrenics had their space–existing in the cultural ecology of the Asian village–now in the city, we fear them. Their laughter is not in step with our humor. Often for long minutes they may break out into uncontrollable laughter. We can only withdraw our gaze, hoping that they will fall back into conventional behavior, before we are confronted with our own proximity to madness. If common sense is culture then their defiance illuminates the rational. Laughter is fine but only in reference to another’s comment. There is a regime or discipline to laughter that we unconsciously follow. As he or she does with other daily events, a schizophrenic makes that regime problematic, often leading for calls to have the mentally ill “policized,” to be removed from the premises. Those in any society, whether feudal or bourgeois, have rules of where we can stand, how we should act, what type of questions one should ask (questions must be coherent within an intellectual framework, for example). But schizophrenics do not exist in that regime of common sense and culture, they exist in alternative intellectual and social space. They might, for example, respond to “would you leave” by wood ewe leaf, thus speaking intelligently but from a different way of knowing.

Through colonialism and modernization, the historical Asian self has broken down, adopting a foreign self, foreign categories of reality. More than from the anthropologist or the philosopher it is from the schizophrenic that we can learn a great deal; we can learn about our cultural norms by watching how they disturb us. Among other insights, they show us the tightening grid of the State, of the straitjacket of conventional reality.

But from the viewpoint of modernity, schizophrenics exist in a world of metaphor not burdened with day to day data. Living in a world without boundaries, they are postmodernists with a vengeance, moving in and out of metaphor until the metaphor ceases to relate to the empirical world or the ideational world, merely become an extravagance until itself.

If the battle between the future is between those that exist in metaphor and thus search for “better” (more peaceful or more enabling) not truer model of reality and those that exist in the literal world (living in the objective and true) then schizophrenics offer a third alternative outside of metaphor and literalism. They exist in both but with an extremism, outside the edges of our reality, living in and out of metaphorical relativity and literal truth.

Are we moving to such a global culture where there is no one model of reality but many individual models with no way to communicate, with inter-subjective reality terminally delinked? Schizophrenics when denied their reality, however, do not merely smile. They attack our reality often with anger and violence, at the same time, they create new versions of their own reality. If the schizophrenic is a king, after our denial, he becomes an emperor.

Like the international relations model of the nation-state, each denial leads to an escalation of demands, of desires for further power over reality and the territorial and epistemic expansion of our own particular reality (Shapiro and Der Derian, 1989; Walker and Mendlovitz, 1990). Imagine then the world if schizophrenia was the model of social relations. Or is it already? Don’t we already exist in common sense theories of this reality: realism, neo-realism, political science, economics, that makes sense of this world such that its extremism, its particularity, its utter madness is inaudible to us.

What voices are we hearing? What are our hallucinations? Leaders fear other Presidents, each thinking they should rule the world. The other nation becomes the enemy. It is the structure of the world system that creates a schizophrenia wherein one can be democratic inside ones borders but totalitarian outside. One can practice voting inside but war outside. The hallucinations of the schizophrenic become isomorphic with the desire of State leaders for power over others. Increasingly in this structure of power, it becomes difficult to distinguish what is cockroach, what is dragon. All is inflamed and nothing is left but terminal madness.

Within this world system the rational comes to be defined by the epistemological model of the dominant powers, as one goes down the scale from core to periphery, knowledge systems are increasingly seen as irrational. Just as in the present world economic system, where the periphery provides raw material to the core, in the world cultural system, the periphery provides the cultural, the exotic, to the Core. The Core uses culture then to devise theories of existence and humanity, to explain its sordid past to itself. Semi-peripheral regions are those then that have elements of the irrational and the modern, the rapidly developing East Asian nations, for example.

But most people do see through the ability of the powerful to define the rational (to see Asian cultures as irrational or in loyal opposition as the seat of all wisdom). The common response to international relations and world politics is, “It is all crazy.” Is the system to difficult to understand or does it defy common sense leaving only conventional theories of politics (or rationalizations) to buttress it? Or does the international system violate our basic sense of decency and human culture? Clearly it is crazy. We feel the chasm between the ideal and the world we live, between our theories and world they contend to explain.
Instead of a world capitalist system, we can also talk (loosely) about a world system based on schizophrenia. Each nation sees paranoia all around, delusions of fear and delusions of grander, voices of all around–the idea of an integrated self or an integrated world system without individual selves or nations, but a unity of humanity or even Gaia remains unreal, instead the real world remains the world of the schizophrenic, fragmented, filled with unintelligible voices and flooded with illusions and delusions.

One possible scenario for the future then is a world where we are all schizophrenic. Without any dominant model of the real, and in the midst of the end of the modern world, with the post-Asian yet shaping (ideally an integrated schizophrenic perspective), no coherent vision of self, culture or future exists. Unlike other eras where there was a authoritative discourse (a agreed upon worldview), there exists a plethora of discourses of selves, each vying for supremacy. At one level the end of Stalinism reduces the hallucinations, at the same time the global self is less focused as that which give unity–the binary structure of East-West relations-has disappeared. For the patient the villain has disappeared, either one can search for a new enemy or implode within–structural transformation, reintegration at a higher lever, is of course the preferred by elusive dream.

Crime and Self:

At the level of the individual, Richard Ball (1985) has argued in “Crimes Problems of the Future,” that the key trend of the future is the lack of a responsible self, the end of any integrated set of experiences and functions. For Ball there is a direct relationship between criminality and individuation. Early women and men lived in a condition where the group was more real than any self. Indeed according to Julian Jaynes in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, the brain in itself was not joined, early man located his or her thoughts not as internal voices but as external sounds of Gods and Goddesses. It is in modernity that the self has become integrated causing Michel Foucault (1971) to argue that we are more recent than we think. It was with Freud that criminality became biological with social constraint largely concerned with sexually deviant behavior. In the media dominated modern world, instant gratification has created people without any essential self. Without an essential self, any combinations of beliefs can be readily be abandoned for another are being created. The real self of antiquity (the communitarian self of the voice of culture) has been displaced by temporary selves of modernity. Communications becomes impression management, law and order cease to provide social limits since the self conducting the illegal act is disconnected with the other self–in one word: cultural schizophrenia. Within this context, with the breakdown of the self and no self to apprehend, the key problem for society in the future is that of criminality. Self anyone? The Asian self, as we have argued above, is particularly susceptible, as it is caught between conflicting cultural demands (tradition, colonialism, nationalism and globalism), between rapid economic growth and rapid impoverishment, between the breakdown of the traditional Asian self and the lack of a new self. Of course we would expect this to resolve itself differently in East Asia, China, South Asia, South East Asia, and West Asia as the cultural forces are varied in these regions.

But while Foucault (1971) argues that we are recent and like a sand castle likely to disappear with the next epistemological wave, grand social theorists like Sarkar or Khaldun or Sorokin or Ssu-Ma Chien remind us that a breakdown in the self (and a search for the self of the prior era) is a predictable occurrence when a society is in between eras–there is no reality to hang on to, total skepticism or agnosticism hardly being an integrated worldview (Galtung and Inayatullah, 1993). For Sarkar (1984) the world is at the end of the capitalist system and waiting for the next social cultural cycle. No authoritative discourse exists rather there is a struggle for the creation and acceptance of a new worldview. For Sorokin (1957) as well we are in-between his stages of ideational, sensate and idealistic, the break when the sensate world disintegrates, when the world is turned upside down, and the new synthetic era begins. For 14th century macrohistorian Khaldun (1967), unity among and within groups disappears and the world awaits a new authoritative discourse, usually from the periphery not from core political economic or social structures, or selves that are centered, rather from those outside the vortex of the immediate and of the powerful –the social movements, the women’s movement, in our interpretation. For ancient Chinese philosopher Ssu-Ma Chien (1958), this cultural decline is part of the natural decline in dynasties when learning and tao disengage and loose opinions spread, that is, when there no longer exists a unified theory of knowledge. Thus the future consists of breakdown at all levels: self, epistemology, economy and polity and the search for a new integrative model; whether this model will be the recovery of a particular past–ancient, classical or feudal–or the creation of a Post-Asian model remains to be seen.

Han and Resentment:

An alternative to the schizophrenic breakdown at the individual level or at the global level of humanity is internal repression, a path followed largely by women, especially Korean women. In Women and Han in the Chosôn Period, Young-hee Lee (1992) argues us that the rigidity of the neo-Confucian structure of male dominance did not give females an escape valve–what resulted was han, or deep resentment. This is the inability to transform present conditions leading to deep inner resentment towards Power, particularly male dominance. With further justification from Buddhism, women were told to accept their suffering and live with their karma, while men could escape the rigid family structure through kisaeng (dancing girls) and mistresses, women could not. Like the wives in Raising the Red Lantern they had no way to express their frustration. While Korea is known as the land of the morning calm, underneath this calm lies centuries of han. Men too enter the han discourse but not from the problems of daily life but from the shame of many defeats to the Chinese and Japanese; it is a territorial han based on lack of national sovereignty (now further exacerbated by the division of the Koreas).

Out of this han, this sustained suffering, came new fields of women literature and women’s expression. Because women had no way to stay in touch with their families they developed letter writing (also they were compelled to by their in-laws) and special literature and songs called naebang kasa (court songs) and minyo (popular songs). Because of han, a great albeit invisible cultural renaissance resulted.

Is this then the world future, not structural change or implosion but deep repression and resentment?. Even Shamanism (which has allowed for occasional individual transcendence) and Christianity (which has energized women into social groups but without changing the male neo-confucian social structure) has not succeeded in transforming han in the Korean context. The feminist women movement has often been sidetracked by nationalist efforts, as the case in Korea, where women’s resistance to the Japanese became far more important than the transformation of patriarchy (Bonnie Oh, 1982). Moreover in the larger Asian context, feminism has been seen as a Western force, the search for a women’s movement authentic to the history and categories of Asian women is still in its formative phase (Jayawardena, 1986). With further Westernization (in the form of East Asian capitalism) we should expect increased han, especially for women, unless an Asian women’s perspective (a post-feminist voice) combining ancient shamanistic principles and modern social organization can transform women’s condition.

From the Asian women’s perspective, han then is the dominant cultural formation of the future. Han could also be a precursor to the breakdown of the self especially as Westernization and travel intensify the resentment women experience. While a united Korea might lead to an attempt to undo thousands of years of han for male Koreans, a transformation of patriarchy still seems far off.
In any case the main point is that any discussion of the futures of Asian cultures must deal with women’s experience of their social reality and their efforts to negotiate patriarchal social relations. In addition, Asian strategies in dealing with power–whether colonialism and developmentalism–have a strong han component: the face shown, for example, to the colonialist (the lazy worker image in the Philippines) is markedly different than the face shown to one’s same class and ethnicity.

Part of the return to the shamanistic past will be a recovery of not spirituality (the search for unity of the self with the cosmos) but of spiritualism, a search for connectedness with the dead. This alternative then is the search for new forms of association. With the breakdown of modern society and with the inability of modern spaces and categories of thought to give answers, it is then too other worlds where we will flock. Whether these are ancestral spirits, souls claiming to represent the Anointed One Him or Herself, or nature spirits is unclear, but as the self breaks down and as answers to change and transformation and our world problems become increasingly immediate and pressing–channeling (not changing channels as in the modern response) will be one of the waves and the ways of the future. While this has begun in California and throughout Asia, we should expect new sources of self-sustenance, primarily those from the spirit world. At the same time, we should anticipate increased and more potent women’s movements working alone and tied into ecological, cooperative, and consumer associations. A new Asian women’s culture might emerge from these efforts.

Culture as Resistance:

If it is through resistance that new cultural forms will rise, then we need to look at the periphery to better understand the future of cultures. These are the anti-systemic movements, the counter civilizational projects, the spiritual, ecological and social movements that hold the keys for our potential futures. One former periphery is East Asia. While previously Western culture was paraded before the rest of humanity as the standard, oriental culture has received high marks in recent years. Considered closer to the Nature, less rigid then Western epistemology–more open to contradictions existing in an ecology of truth statements–and closer to traditional culture when the cosmos, society and individual were in harmony, before commodification, developmentalism and center-periphery structures were not the universal drivers.

But what aspects of Oriental culture might become universal in the next century? Vegetarianism (most likely because of the politics of health and food production), taking shoes off at the door (again likely as ceremonialized politeness), complex social relations in which discourse is understood not by what is uttered but by who utters it and when it is uttered (far less likely, too difficult for others cultures to gain entry into this social network), spiritual practices (from zen to yoga, again likely, since they can be easily appropriated). Finally, what type of icons might become universal? Most likely stories from the village, the Indian cow (instead of the American mouse), the village well (instead of the shopping mall), and the bodhi tree (instead of the highway). One can imagine a drama with all these symbols coming to life, interacting with each other, creating an East Asian form of universal cultural representation. How quick Disney will buy these Asian experiences out is easy to guess.

But what are some less likely scenarios? One can easily imagine a Manila-Calcutta-Bombay-Dubai link as a next major center of culture in the next century. Besides having been oppressed (and thus creating the possibility for the return of cultural pendulum), factors such as sophisticated and deep mysticism, a rich artistic heritage, an advanced intellectual climate providing the high culture; in addition there is Bombay, as the center of movie audiences, providing the mass culture. For instance, on one side there is someone like the late P.R. Sarkar–developing on Gandhi and Tagore–with his thousands of spiritual songs, a range of new indigenous theories of science, society and culture, numerous social movements as well ecological centers to create a new society, and artists and writers associations to legitimize and enliven in and on the other side the filmi mass culture that provides a voice counter to the “pop” of the West. All these combine to provide the necessary ingredients for cultural revival.

The other contender would by Hong Kong and Star TV, basically some level of Asian creativity but still developed within the overarching cultural categories of the West. The question then is: Hong Kong or Calcutta?

A resurgent Philippines also is a possible scenario. Centuries of resistance, of failed revolutions, of cultural eclecticism, of mysticism and pseudo-culture make it a potential cultural center. This is more likely than the present rich Asian states, where modernity and the victory of the official discourse has produced wealth but at the expense of trimming of deviance–Singapore as the obvious example. Islam as a cultural force is possible but again since politically it is in a decline, this may force a rigidification of culture, a straightening of diversity so as to uphold the State and the Text. Conversely, if decline leads to inner reflection and self-criticism then cultural renewal and creativity is possible. Islam then would have to reconstruct itself as a cultural epistemological force and not as a political Statist force. With the breakdown of the USSR and the potential breakdown of China, we could then easily see a cultural renaissance in three areas: an Islamic south-west, a Westernized Hong Kong (or Taiwan after 1997) and a Manila-Calcutta-Bombay-Dubai crescent.

Fitting into the Hong Kong Star TV scenario, is the rise of a sensate Asia. Lee Kuan Yew wondered if there was any solution to the rampant sexuality of East Asians. With a new Hong Kong Chinese MTV (music television) developing, we can assume that sex is the future of East-Asia. This is possible with Confucianism providing the commodification of women, (women as servers of men), Buddhism removing any guilt related to sex. Instead of 1 billion consumers of coke, we can well imagine one billion sexually repressed Chinese waiting for a modernist China with fast time, fast sex, and fast music. East Asia then would be the center of modernist music, art, and sexuality for the next century, taking over the exhausted West. Only AIDS and virtual sex stand in the way. With developments in the latter, we could see dramatic transformations in both Bangkok and Manila, sex having moved to the virtual mind instead of the bodies of young village girls.

Technology:

So far we have focused on social and political forces, but how mights advances in technology transform asian cultures? Developments in Virtual Reality, Genetic Engineering and Robotics all promise to dramatically alter our perceptions of culture and the cultural. These new technologies will have far wider impact then television and video. In some ways they will intensify Westernization and in other ways they will transform it. These technologies to begin will transform our understanding of social reality, Nature (or mother nature) and human culture, displacing all three. New forms of resistance against the technologies will also result. As with electronic culture where faxes, videos and electronic viruses can be used again official government sponsored reality, these technologies will lead to attacks on the “artificial” world they have created and of the way that life will be managed through genetic engineering, for example. At the same time, just as television and the video bring us the new electronic family hearth, united not by conversation but by viewerism, but at least still united, these new technologies will create their own paradoxes. We will first review these potential transformations and then discuss the cultural implications resulting from them and embedded in them.

Through Virtual reality we can don a helmet and practice safe travel, safe sex (indeed it is this that will bring computers in our homes in the next century, not banking, nor games, but virtual reality sex). Technology will have finally captured nature–making it obsolete. The problem of the original text especially for fundamentalists will be further complicated since distinctions between types of reality will be blurred. Will religions then offer virtual reality experiences of their image of God? Perhaps the redeemer, whether Jesus, the Mahdi, the taraka brahma, is returning and will be available to all, at all times. Will culture then become miniaturized and available to us all in our virtual reality cassettes–Travelog but with the sensual experience of the place we are traveling to. It would be real since we would (could) not distinguish between the two. Of course, the important job will be creating the miniaturized culture. And the most important question for futures researchers is: what will be the resistance to “virtualized” cultures–a return to natural cultures? But how? And will virtual reality centers be the next museums, the final effort to carry the seeds of the past into our journey to strange new world ahead?

While experiments in genetic engineering will start out quite harmless since all of us want to avoid abnormalities, or various genetic diseases, we will soon all want to be checked by our family genetic engineer. This will soon lead not only to disease prevention but to capacity enhancement. Intelligence, memory, body type and beauty will all be open for discussion and interpretation. Birthing will eventually be managed by State factories and we will be the last generation to produce children the old fashioned way. It will be the final victory of the feminists and their final defeat. The biological cycle will have been terminated by technology and women will essentially be not any different than men once their reproductive capabilities become unnecessary. The causes of alarm are there (and the negative scenarios almost infinite: increasing inequity between north-south, between rich-poor and the tightening grid of the surveillance State and the managed genetically engineered self) but perhaps when everyone can be beautiful it will be moral and spiritual potential that will matter the most. With fewer genetic diseases our differences will become once again charming instead of attributes that keep us from uniting as humans. Perhaps genetic engineering will paradoxically lead not to sameness but to difference and to a greater humanity. Of course, as developed within the present regime of science and center-periphery nations, genetic engineering means only one thing–the final end of peripheral culture–and the reversal of demographic patterns that are seeing the rise of Asian and African population and a decrease in American and European populations.

But cultures need not be human, they can also be robotic, robots can be sentient creatures potentially living with humans and potentially displacing humans. Japanese society, for example, already has glorified Mr. Roboto. Often seen as friendly, a helper, it would not be too long before we are engaged in discussions of the rites and rights of robots. Concomitant with ways of thinking that see everything as alive (quantum physics, Hawaiian cosmology, Buddhism, animism and Indian thought) and with advances in artificial intelligence, we can envisage a time when robots will be seen as alive. Their utility value will be surpassed by their existential value. While a robot uprising is unlikely, the move from robots as represented as machines, to be seen as dumb but lovable animals and then to gaining similar rights as children is quite easy to believe. Conversely, it may be that the robot mind will become the metaphor for our brain, and thus the despiritualization of the self. While it is doubtful if robots will pray five times a day, facing Mecca will be easy but will they feel the unity that this act implies?
For capitalists these new technologies promise a renewal, a rejuvenation from the exhaustion that has set in. They promise to revive the idea of progress and push back cultural revival, ethnic history, and local knowledge. Thus, it is not cultural humanists who will provide the vitality to the dying modern world but the new technologies and the cultural codes embedded in them. These new technologies pose the most dramatic problems for those who consider the natural as fixed instead of as constantly changing and in the process of recreation. Fundamentalists, in particular, will find the next twenty or thirty years the best and worst times for their movements. The best because the forces of tradition will flock to them; worst because the technological imperative and humanity’s struggle to constantly recreate itself (and thus nature) will not be easily reversed. Even biological spills will most likely not be controlled by State regulations but by new technologies themselves. However, the answer to these type of problems may be in newer advanced–physically, mentally and spiritually–technologies. It is important to remember that technologies in themselves will be redefined in this process as not merely material processes but mental and spiritual processes embedded in particular cultures. This redefinition will come about from non-Western renderings of science (Inayatullah, 1991; Rudreshananda, 1993; Sardar 1984; Sheldrake, 1992).

Genetic technology or biological technology could yield new viruses, new types of life that end our life. The planet itself, however, might not care, Gaia, argues James Lovelock (1988) is a self-regulating mechanism that keeps life alive, humans might not be needed, just an experiment that went wrong. She might “choose” rabbits instead of monkeys this time, thus ending human culture as we know it or removing the supremacy of humans, making us just one more sentient life form that quietly inhabits the planet with all other creation (Jones, 1989). But this fate is unlikely, as “humanity” then will be caught in a battle against its new creations, the West now competing not only with its own social periphery, but with its own created periphery.

But while the values behind genetic engineering and robotics are based on competition–on linear models of evolution and time–we can hope for models of the future coming from cooperation. Scientist Lynn Margulis writes that while competition might be natural at the level of mammals, at the microlevel of the cell, an ecology of cooperation where differences lead to higher unity is normal. The cells need each other, through each other they can transform. The success of our cellular system might be a far better model for giving us cultural hope than the failure of the war and competition model. In her words: “Destructive species come and go but cooperation increases through time. Mitochondria peacefully inhabit our cells, providing us with energy in return for a place to stay. Evolution either evokes challenge or cooperation” (Margulis, 1992: 27). Once again, while the model of cooperation provides an alternative more hopeful vision of Asia, new technologies promise to continue the process of the unraveling of the Asian self and Asian society and to create the conditions for a Post-Asian culture as well as new forms of cultural resistance. Among the forms or resistance we can expect is a return to the classical life-cycle or seasonal aspects of Asian time. Part of the recovery of culture project is regaining the traditional sense of time–time as friendship, of sitting around a tree and placing relationships ahead of economic gain or personal ambition, of living in the way God meant the world to be. New technologies, however, enter traditional time disrupting local culture. The automobile is an excellent example. Pakistanis drive as fast as they can to reach a place–even as far as driving on the sidewalk–where they then wait for hours for friends to show up or for a bureaucrat to arrive. Or one rushes to get to tea time where one ritually relaxes. In the car then modernity becomes pervasive, the signifier of miles per hour stares at the driver (there is no sun dial or images of the seasons or other historical symbols), the car is a an imported technology with no local meanings to it.

With modernization we should expect decreased emphasis of the classical model of time, of the degeneration of time from the golden era to the iron age. In this model society degenerates with differentiation (as opposed to modernity wherein differentiation leads to evolution) eventually resulting in the iron age of materialism. Time then decreases in value from the golden era characterized by unity and spiritual development to the iron age characterized by materialism, chaos and confusion. At the end of the dark iron age, the redeemer sets the world right and the golden era begins again. The search then is for a redeemer to end the darkness of the present, to create a new future. Decolonization and political independence was to be the beginning of the golden age with the national founders the redeemers. But this has not turned out, leaving the individual unto him or herself.

In recent news, Jesus was to return on October 1992, according to Bank-ik Ha, one of the young prophets allegedly predicted by the Bible (Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 1992: A-39). The mark of evil is the computer bar code for it mathematically represents the Beast (666) with the unification of Europe as the final sign before Judgement Day. In Korea, the State in itself attempted to intervene as households left the work force in preparation for the final days. While these might be the final days of the modern world, claims that this is the end of the world are far more problematic. In any case, we still have until 1999 before Judgement day. As it turns out the Prophet was arrested for even though he claimed that the world was to end in October 1992, he had recently purchased bonds that would expire in the year 2000.

Modernity then emphasizes quantitative, linear time. Instead of the appearance of the redeemer to bring on the golden age, it is Confucian capitalism that will herald the new era. Time then in this model cannot be repeated or reversed otherwise we could remember the future. Instead of degeneration there is forward development. Culture as a response to the economism of modernity is precisely about time pluralism, about living in many types of time without allowing any one to dominate, particularly linear time. Others see cultural revival as part of a return to a more natural type of time cognizant that all societies rise and fall, all economies go up and down, what is most important then is one’s relationship to nature, community and the transcendental.

When thinking about the futures of cultures, particularly Asian cultures, we should expect increased diversity in the models of time. For the schizophrenic, modern linear time ceases to be important, seasonal and timeless time are far more central to his or her worldview. We should also expect increased conflicts between types of time and efforts to synthesize different constructions of time. Clearly an ideal society would be able to find ways to negotiate the many types of time: seasonal, rise and fall, dramatic, mythological, expansion/contraction, cosmic, linear/efficient, social-cyclical as well as the intervention of the timeless in the world of time. These must be associated with notions of social structure: individual and transcendental agency. In what ways is time personal, in what ways do macrostructures give us time, and how does the role of the transcendental reshape time? The ancient cycle alone leads to a culture of fatalism and the linear pattern alone leads to cultural imperialism wherein particular collectivities can be placed along the ladder of economic success. Transcendental time alone leads to focus on the cosmos and neglect of economic progress and social development. While it is joyous, the bills must still be paid. For an empowering theory of the future, all three are needed.
But few manage to include all these characteristics ; rather, we privilege certain types of time and avoid or marginalize others. Developing a theory of society that coherently integrates the many types of time alluded to above is not any easy task and would be an important task in a global emerging culture. Having an enriched theory of time would be a necessary criteria in an alternative theory of cultural development.

If we wish to understand the futures of cultures than among the most important areas of investigation is conflicts and contradictions between types of time. Modern time versus traditional time; spiritual time versus deadline time; cosmic time versus linear time, for example. We also need to imagine new forms of time as well.

Conclusion:

Finally to conclude we have used culture in many different ways: (1) Culture in opposition to neo-realist view of economism and power (competing individuals and states);
(2) Culture as always changing, creating new forms of society and technology, as essentially alive, always more than our definition of it;
(3) Culture as fundamentally an essence, the original state of affairs;
(4) Culture as on original state of affairs that declines over time (whether because of internal reasons, creativity to imitation or external reasons, conquest by colonial forms); and,
(5) Culture as a social practice, we “culture” the real; there is not intrinsic “culture” to be found.

We have also discussed many possible cultural futures, to list the important: (1) The unravelling of the traditional Asian self, (2) The breakdown of the self and culture, the schizophrenic model of unending differences, (3) Women’s cultural futures particularly the role of resentment as the emotion of future, (4) A new cultural Renaissance from the periphery; (5) The rise of East Asian sensate culture; (6) Technological cultures from virtual reality, genetic engineering and robotics; (7) Conflicts between types of time and a search for a cultural frames that incorporate a diversity of “times.”

But when we move away from our critical analysis, what is important is a vision of new cultures, not visions that take away the possibility of new cultures, but visions like the Renaissance which created ever new visions. In this sense finding unity within our differences still remains crucial: the imagery of roses in a bouquet (with some of the roses virtual, some genetically grown, and others grown through the soil) symbolizing individual cultures and planetary culture still remains an important integrative dream–a Post-Asian dream perhaps.


 

[i]. Sohail Inayatullah is an independent political scientist. Recent articles on the futures of cultures include, “Why I Hate Visas and Passports,” and “Sex, Mullahs, and Bureaucrats.” Among others, I would like to thank Noman Inayatullah for the observations contained in this paper.

[ii]. For more on this, see Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” Journal of Peace Research (Vol. 27, No. 3, 1990) and Development: Goals and Processes (forthcoming).

[iii]. I have benefitted greatly from conversations with Peter Miller of the University of Hawaii on this subject.

[iv]. I am indebted to Ashis Nandy for this insight. Certainly it makes readings of culture far more interesting than the Orientalist anthropological discourse they have traditionally inhabited.

[v]. American culture is believed to be non-existent according to the rest of the world, but it could also be argued that American culture–food, efficiency, language, music icons and, in general, a sensate worldview–has become universal such that we are all American now. Americans are believed to have culture-less because their culture is ubiquitous.

[vi]. Perhaps the Balinese saying best describes this formation: “We have not art; We do everything the best we can.”

[vii]. Perhaps, modernity.

[viii]. Unfortunately, in their efforts to become important they are forced into a situation where they adopt the categories of the Core cultural power, defining importance not within their own tradition or creating new forms of significance but staying within the structural boundaries of Core definitions.

[ix]. Indeed, in one American television show, Cheers, one of the main characters spends his week of vacation at the airport since that is the hub of cultural interaction.

[x]. From these we can learn how a nation sees the Other and discover who can enter freely and who is searched.

[xi]. I am indebted to Marshall Pihl of the University of Hawaii for this term.

[xii]. I am indebted to Ashis Nandy for this intriguing point.

[xiii]. Traditional Korean instrument–a zither.

[xiv]. Cultural historian, William Irwin Thompson’s works have developed this. His titles give us a sense of the direction of his work: At the Edge of History, Evil and World Order, and The Time Falling Bodies Take to Light.

[xv]. Ashis Nandy in his “Shamans, Savages, and the Wilderness: On the Audibility of Dissent and the Future of Civilization,” Alternatives (Vol. 14, No. 3, 1989) points un in the direction of the shaman. The shaman exists on the fringe of respectable society and respectable models of knowledge. His or her existence itself is subversive to institutionalized power.

[xvi]. Neo-realism assumes that we are self-interested individuals and nations seek to maximize our interests at the expense of others. Real hard headed economics and politics is the only possible result. The voices of the spirit, of the future, of peace, of the movements outside of the nation-state are immediately silenced–they have no space in this hegemonic paradigm. See Sohail Inayatullah, “Subverting the Hegemony of the International Relations Paradigm in Pakistan,” (forthcoming, 1992).

[xvii]. The symbols of modern time might be there, for example, an airline office claiming to open at a specific time yet rarely doing so. Or a post office having special windows for electronic mail but few employees to handle the postage window even though most of the business is for stamps. Both these cases are explained by the traditional feudal structure for it is only office clerks that have to wait and their time is not highly valued, so why be efficient. The “saabs” do not do such menial tasks.

[xviii]. As one schizophrenic put it: “All I see is the verisimilitude of reality, not reality itself. I’ve lost access to reality … my memories are just memories of themselves … memories of memories of memories … I no longer have the original (Sass, 192: 336). And another: “My gaze is fixed like a corpse, my mind has become vague and general; like a nothing or the absolute; I am floating, I am as if I were not (Sass, 1992, 68). Or as stated more theoretically by Jean Baudrillard, “Illusion is no longer possible, because the real is not longer possible (Sass, 1992: 291).

[xix]. Confucianism providing the basis for modernization and taoism/shamanism providing the irrational.

[xx]. As the case with the counter-culture.

[xxi]. The bedouins in his social history.

[xxii]. Conversely, William Irwin Thompson has argued that it is from the secular that the spiritual takes birth. It is from discoveries of scientists such as Margulis and others that the bases of a new cooperative transcendental civilization is possible. See William Irwin Thompson and David Spangler, Reimagination of the World. Sante Fe. New Mexico, Bear and Company, 1991.

[xxiii]. Of course neo-Confucianism and its oppression of women might have something to do with this. The exact quote is “the libido of the sex crazed yellow races.” I am indebted to John Cole for providing this surprisingly racist quote, although the source has yet to be confirmed. But for more on Lee Kuan Yew, see his speech, “The Vision for Asia,” The Muslim (20 March 1992).

[xxiv]. Susantha Goonatilake (1992) argues that these technologies are now merging becoming one evolving whole and thus, “the historical sequence of biology giving rise to culture, giving rise to artefact (information associate with machines) … becomes changed. The artefact now reaches back and changes culture or gene, the glove turns back and changes the hand. Instead of a unilinear sequence, a recursive loop is established. … An entirely new history begins (11-12).

[xxv]. See James Dator, “Its Only A Paper Moon,” Futures (December 1990). He writes, “We must understand that we already live in a largely, and increasingly, irreversibly, artificial world. “Nature” and the “natural world” (in the sense of an environment, or parts of an environment, uninfluenced by human activity) scarcely exist anywhere and cannot possibly be “preserved” or “restored” (indeed, to attempt to do so would of course itself be to render “nature” artificial), (1086).

The title of this very important article is from “an old 1940s song which went something like this:

It’s only a paper moon

Floating over a cardboard sea.

But it wouldn’t be make-believe

If you believed in me,” (1096).

[xxvi]. For Jean Houston, the cell membrane is a metaphor for how we differentiate the world, the basic binary distinction between me and the other. In her hopeful model this is breaking down and “we are about to join into one collective organism, planetary humankind … We have allowed our complexity to create another form of culture.” Jean Houston, “Stretched Tight to Breaking,” Edges (Vol. 4, No. 3, 1992), 23.

[xxvii]. Historian Sarkar (1987-1991) is useful in that he uses many types of time in his theory. There is the cosmic cycle at one level, the generation, degeneration and regeneration of time; and at another level, there is the individual escape from time and entrance into no time or infinite time. Finally there is social time (his spiral) where the time of exploitation can be reduced through social transformation thus in the long run allowing for the increased possibility of individual escape from time. Sarkar is on the right track attempting to build a model of time that has multiple avenues, that gives meaning at different levels.

[xxviii]. Other criteria would be: (1) a growth dimension (2) a distribution dimension (3) gender balance, (4) ecology balance (5) epistemological diversity (6) a cooperative organizational structures and the (7) central role of social and civil movements.

Aladdin: Continued Violence Against Islamic Culture (1993)

By Sohail Inayatullah

Aladdin perhaps is among the most culturally violent movies recently made.

Lulled by brilliant animation, classic images of good and evil and internal battles of egoist self-image and truth, one forgets the cultural rape of the Islamic people.  Taking a classical Muslim and Arabic myth, the story is transformed into a Hollywood cartoon.

Simply put, in the beginning he is Aladdin, the servant of God but by the end of the story having now realized truth and beauty, he says, “just call me Al.”

Unfortunately it is the comic genius of Robin Williams who does the most damage. Instead of trying to find humor within the Islamic tradition, within the terms of the story, we are barraged with imitations of mockeries of Jack Nicholson, William Buckley, Arsenio Hall and others.  Mythology is taken over by current humor.  The only thing that finally separates Aladdin from a normal midwestern caucasian boy is his the slight brown coloring. Aladdin could have easily grown up in an American city or 19th century British city.  From muslim children, this movie however will complete the colonization of the mind. Islamic categories of thought will seem meaningless in the onslaught of Disney.

The examples of Orientalism are numerous and obvious. The good guys are all clean shaven, the bad guys have facial hair typically associated with Easterners and other evil characters. The streets are lined with bartering arabs and hindu fakirs. Araby is the land of the exotic. Women are portrayed as erotic, swaying about, wearing the briefest of harem costumes.  The only interesting and developed character is the genie, largely because of Williams but also because the genie is full of cultural richness, This is unfortunate since even though the genie was trapped in the Arab world, he only knows Western culture.

But we should not be surprised at the Orientalist nature of the movie, we know this from the beginning. The story teller begins with the secular Salaam (peace) not the appropriate asalaam alakum (may god be with you). The story is secularized and westernized with Allah thrown out and Al thrown in.  While cultures appropriating each others myths can enrich the world and help create a new culture, in this case cultural sharing leads to cultural cannibalism.  A bit of history reading, a few attempts to understand Arabian mythology in its terms not in the terms of 1990’s America could have created a universal fable, authentic to history but innovative in its ability to speak to the West and East, to create a cultural dialog.  Instead we are given vicious pornography.

Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses comes out as pious literature compared to Disney’s Aladdin.  Movies rarely depress me as this has.  I remember Aladdin from my childhood.

Hoping to be taken back to dreams and fantasies of a time gone, instead I was transported to the future–I future I know I will have no part of since I do not have a Western name nor am willing to have “sohail” transformed to “Sam” or some other derivation.

What Bush could not do to the Islamic and Arab world, Disney with the help of the genius Robin Williams certainly has.  By all means see it.

Images of Pakistan’s Future: Possible Scenarios (1992)

By Sohail Inayatullah*

Introduction

Exploring current images of Pakistan’s futures is the task for this essay.  Based on a literature review of Pakistani magazines, newspapers and journals as well as conversations with Pakistani scholars and interviews with members of the general public, we develop and evaluate five images or scenarios of the future.  This essay concludes with suggestions for designing alternative futures for Pakistan.

Before we articulate these images of the future, let us first examine the “futures approach” to the study of social reality.  A futures view focuses primarily on temporality.  Where are we going?  What are the possibilities ahead? What strategies can we use to realize our goals?   How can the image of the future help us better understand and change today?  Who are the losers and winners in any particular articulation of time?  The futures perspective is initially similar to traditional political analysis in that it begins with an exploration of economic, international and social events and the choices made by actors that make these events possible.  However, the futures view also attempts to place events and choices within an historical dimension; that is, the larger and deeper structures that make these discrete events intelligible, such as core-periphery, urban-rural, gender, caste, and macro patterns of social change.  Also important in the futures view is the post-structural dimension; the larger meaning system or the epistemological ground plan of the real as embedded in language that constitutes events and structures.

Unfortunately, most efforts to understand the future remain in the predictive mode.  It is often asked, what and when will a particular event occur and how can we profit or increase our power from a specific prediction?  Economists and strategic analysts claim to excell at this task.  Our efforts here–sensitive to the richness of reality and the need to decolonize the study of the future from narrow models of reality–is to explore images or scenarios of the future.  Our task is not to predict and thereby make this essay political fodder for technocrats but to use the future to create real possibilities for change.  We thus do not intend to give a familiar reading of Pakistan’s future, as might be available in a five year plan, rather we enter into a discussion of alternative futures, of the many choices ahead as contoured by the structure of history and the modern boundaries of knowledge that frame our identity.

In the images or scenarios that follow it should be remembered that  these images are meant as tools for discussion and dialog; they are intended to clarify the futures ahead not to reify social reality. Our goal is insight not prediction.  As an initial caveat, an important failing of this essay is that the textual sources and conversations were entirely in english–one might get different images with local Pakistani languages.

Disciplined Capitalistic Society  

The first image of Pakistan’s future has many anchors, the  most version recent uses S. Korea as a compelling image of the future.  Both countries were underdeveloped thirty years ago but now S. Korea has joined the ranks of the developed, it is become an integral part of the “Pacific Shift.”  Through state managed industrialization with strong private spin-offs (and the economic activity caused by the Vietnam war) Korea has dramatically raised its standard of living. Along with a strong confucian ethic (respect for hierarchy, family, hard work, and an emphasis on education) Korea was a strong national ethic.  However, given Pakistan’s social structure perhaps North Korea is a better example of  Pakistan’s possible future as both have strong militaries.  However, while North Korea has a strong totalitarian ideology, Pakistan does not.  Islam is in many ways a legal/social doctrine and in that sense that it defies any particular  authoritative interpretation rather it is up for grabs by a variety of ideologies. While a theocratic military state is possible so far this mixture has not occurred nor has a one-man state managed to succeed. The best way of stating this model of the future is the “disciplined capitalistic society.”   The military rules directly or indirectly under the guise of “law and  order.”  Not only is civil society disciplined but so is labor.  Labor exists to aid capital in its national and  transnational accumulation.  The Islam that is used is one  that aids in societal discipline at the individual and social level. The head of the nation is then the strict father who knows what is best for the children.  The mother is in this image is apolitical, remaining at home to take care of the nation’s children so they can work for the larger good of capitalist development.

However there is an important contradiction here.  Among the reasons of the rise of East Asia was women labor.  Females are thus essential for for export oriented strategies that lead to capital accumulation; at the same time the Islamic  dimension of this model demands their continued “home-ization.”  They are to provide care to labor.  This is the semi-proletarian  existence which in the long run cheapens the cost of labor for capital since the informal sector helps support the formal “monied” capitalistic sector.  Females are integral to this semi-proleterian structure.

The other obvious contradiction is the role of the military.  Besides the role of women, confucianism, the historical particular juncture in the worldeconomy, East Asia developed because of low military expenditures and high social expenditures.  Is Pakistan ready to put health and education before military expansion, that is, to redefine security?  We have yet to see.  In the meantime, the hope is that through discipline and privatization Pakistan can join the ranks of the rich.

Islamic Socialism

This image is partially influenced by interpretations of Islam that give weight to the syncretic personal dimension of Islam; that is, an Islam that does not the become the facilitator of the mullah’s rise–not rote discipline but revelation.  The rendering of Islam is populist as for example in the view that the land is perceived as belonging to the tillers not the landlords.  This image is also partially influenced by the third world movement which has attempted to follow an alternative development path not based on multinational West run capitalism or on soviet party/military run communism.  This view was  made famous by  Z.A. Bhutto in Pakistan.  But let us be clear:  this view is still industrial and growth oriented like the previous model, however, it has a strong emphasis on “roti, capra, makan,” on basic needs and distributive justice.  Nehru attempted a similar model but without the Islamic overtones as have numerous other third world leaders.  In this model, the state softens the impact of local and transational capital on individuals.  At the macro level, import substitution and nationalization become key strategies.  However, the larger problem of the world economic system as essentially capitalistic and politics nation-state oriented with Pakistan near the bottom of the global division of labor remains.

The meaning of this image, however, does not come only from the economic as central is the religious.  It is Islam that unites, it is Islam that gives direction, it is Islam that integrates individual, family and nation.  And although Islam is pervasive, it remains open and committed to distributive justice and individual spiritual growth–a soft Islam, if you will.  National allies in this image come from other third world countries with collective self-reliance the long run goal–south/south cooperation on economic, cultural and political levels.

Among other writers, Syed Abidi’s writes that these two images take turns dominating Pakistan’s politics.   Exaggeration of one leads to individual and social frustration and then the rise of the other and visa versa.  However, revisionist historians, such as Ayesha Jalal, argue that both are unsuccessful because of the nature of the Pakistani state, molded along authoriatarian lines due to the circumstances of partition.

A third image, based on individual and national identity attempts to transcend the earlier two, using the past as its gateway into the future.

The Return of the Ideal and the Search for Identity

The original image of Pakistan was that of a safe heaven and haven for muslims: safe from both the hindus of the east and  later on from the  jews of the west (in Israeli and  American forms).  It was derived–at least in its popular  myth–as the territory wherein muslims would not be  oppressed by the hindus of India.   While Jinnah’s intent may have been political power (a share in the action when  India was to be divided) for the Muslim League and later the  creation of a secular state, it quickly became a state for  muslims of muslims.   Pakistan’s self image was to a large degree defined by India.  India has been the enemy that gives unity.  Even after three  devastating wars, military strategists still believe that Pakistan can defeat India.   In this view, India has  many gods, is bent on destroying Pakistan (the empirical  evidence of the Bangladesh war), has nuclear weapons and is  allied with godless Russia.  But would Pakistan retain any sense of its identity without India since Pakistan knows itself through the other of India? Indeed, is Pakistan but not-India. India has survived thousands of years  with and without muslim domination, but Pakistan is still struggling  to complete a half-century, to imagine itself as a nation, to find a coherent self.

This image exists in many ways outside our earlier  dimensions in that internal identity is more important than external reality.  The image is that we reside in the land of the Pure, the  place where there is no threat from the outside, wherein the  purity of Islam can flourish.  Other variables such as the type  of political-economy, culture and geo-politics are less important.  The moral dimension of Islam is central.

Questions that arise from this view is: has Pakistan achieved this  level of purity?  Some muslim scholars argue that each Islamic nation attempts to recover the polity of the initial Islamic state, the ideal of the  original promise of the time of the Prophet–the revolution  had occurred, prophecy had been delivered, the rightly guided  caliphs ruled, and there was social justice and economic  growth in Arabia.  This ideal is then the image of the  future for Pakistan; this is the time of partition when there was  promise in the air, a great deal had been achieved through  sacrifice, the British and the hindus had been thrown back, and the Quaid lived.    The image of the future then is a return to a time of hope  and dreams; of victory over struggles and of purity, before the politicians in the form of the military and the  landlords coopted the future.  In this sense this image of the future is a search for an ideal past, a mythic past.

But while this image may be glorious, revisionist historians point out that the birth of Pakistan was already steeped in power politics, in feudal domination: there was never any purity to speak of, to begin with.  If this is true then perhaps what is needed is a reimagination of Pakistan.  A  search for a new vision, a new purpose that makes sense of the last forty years of frustration and creates real visions of the future not dreams based on a past that is but a lie.  This reimagination task could occur through a democratic process of collective future envisioning or it could come from the words or images of great artists or others marginal to the present established power structure.  But while we await this reimagination of the future, in the meantime the present disintegrates.

The End of Sovereignty

This images is the most pervasive and has many variants and levels.  The first is conquest by India leading to a greater India.   This is possible through military conquest or through  economic imperialism if the doors of trade are left wide open.

The second is more sophisticated and deals not with military  or economic imperialism but with cultural domination.  The  main villain is  the West, especially the United  States.  Irrespective of US AID and other ties to Pakistan, religion and their distant locations in the world economy make Pakistan and the USA naturally antagonistic.   Recent desires of the US to inspect Pakistan’s nuclear development exacerbate this tension.  But cultural domination comes in  many forms: technology transfer from the green revolution to  the microcomputer revolution–technology is not neutral but  has many cultural codes and messages embedded in its  hardware (the actual physical technology) and software (the  rules that make it sensible).  For example, certain  technologies might promote individualism and the expense of  family.  Others might promote mobility.  Education transfer  also leads to cultural penetration, the widespread  emigration to the USA for education and then for work is the  obvious example.  Electronic technology even in the  ostensibly neutral form of CNN can but spread foreign views  of what is significant and what is unimportant; that  Pakistan is rarely covered is not inconsequential to  cultural self-images.  Travel to the West for tourism,  conferences, and medical reasons is another example.   While  certainly there is a bit of cultural transfer mostly it is but one-way communication.  Sovereignty then is clearly  violated; the idea that a nation can exist given this level  of cultural penetration is highly problematic.  For instance, just as  there is a world division of labor there is a world division  of culture and news with some supplying modern culture others  providing exotic or traditional culture.  We provide the data for their theories of the traditional.  The responses to this form of penetration are obvious:  fundamentalism in its strongest forms–a return to the historic text, a denial of physical and mental mobility, and a critique of all things foreign even those which increase the freedom and life chances of individual and family.   This is the famous  call by the ruling elite for a local form of “democracy” in  which basic “universal” freedoms are denied so as to save traditional local culture.  Liberals, thus, argue that the defense of cultural sovereignty of the  nation is but the denial of the sovereignty of the  individual and the reaffirmation of the  power of the State.  In the name of tradition, all sorts of injustices can be committed and rationalized.  Other responses to Western penetration could be further  Islamic penetration, for example, by Iran.  This could lead  to a Pakistan-Iran partnership with an increased Shia influence in Pakistan.  It would increase the power of ulema  in that they would have the power to define and narrate  legitimate cultural and political activities. Conversely the end of sovereignty could become a positive image in that Pakistan could be forced to become an international blend of many cultures and technologies: a place where the future resides, a place where sovereignty finds itself renewed at a higher plantery or spiritual or cultural levels not at a myopic national or local level.  This is then a reaffirmation of the idea of the ummah but extended to the entire world in the form of a global community.  Pakistan could then become a compelling image for other places to emulate. A receiver and sender of social technology and a creator of postmodern culture. But this direction would take a great deal of daring and courage as there are no models to follow only vague possibilities to explore.

As problematic as cultural sovereignty is the loss of the sovereignty of the self.  The self was previously constructed around familiar lines: heaven was above, hell below, and God all around.  One knew what one was to do with one’s life: class and caste were clear.  But with the world continuously being recreated by the science and technology revolution and with the problem of West continuously staring at the Pakistani “self,” there no longer exists any clear cut self.  Am I Sindhi first?  A woman first? A Pakistani first? A wife first?  A muslim first?  A feudal first?  Where do my loyalties lie?  Can I integrate these often contradictory fragments of identity?  And where do these categories stand in the larger scheme of things?  Moreover, the problem of the self can but become increasingly problematic with the feminist movement, increased exposure to the outside world through travel and the development of an overseas Pakistani community.  Instead of one mutually agreed upon authoritative construction of self we may see many Pakistani selves all vying for individual and national dominance.

The next layer of sovereignty that is made problematic is internal territorial sovereignty, that is, the provinces increasingly  wanting more autonomy and in some cases secession.  The  calls for an independent Sindh is the latest case in point.   The image of this future is of all the provinces going their separate ways with Pakistan finally only being Punjab. The north-west might join with Afghanistan or the Phaktoons might form  their own country.  In addition, Baluchistan might join Iran, become its  own nation, or join a loose confederation with Sindh.  And in this image, Azad Kashmir would either join Punjab or unite  with the rest of Kashmir to form its own nation.  While  this might lead to conquest by India most likely the same forces that would lead to end of national integration in Pakistan would also lead to the disintegration of India, from one India to many Indias. Also possible after a period of disintegration is reintegration into a united states of south asia with Punjab as the most likely center of this loose regional federation.

No Change: the Continuation of the Grand Disillusionment

The last and we would argue most pervasive image of the  future is that of the present continued or “no change.”   This is a general malaise, a grand disillusionment with the  ideal of Pakistan, with the promises of the rulers, with the  intentions of politicians.  In this view, the power structure–so obviously unjust–appears unchangeable to individuals and groups.

Given this malaise, there are then a range of strategies available. The first is individual  spiritual development, an escape from the social and material worlds.  The second is to flee the  country to brighter horizons outside: “Dubai Chalo” or the  fabled green card.  The poor and middle class go to the Middle East and the rich and the upper middle class leave for the United States.  Within the country the strategy is to  find a job and then use one’s personal influence to help  others find work thus allowing the family as a whole to  move up the economic ladder.  Of course this is more  difficult in times of contraction.  During economic expansion, movement is easier.  Another tactic is politicization in the  form of joining political parties for the purpose of social transformation.  However, this strategy is often quickly abandoned  once the enormous weight of the  historical structures at hand are made obvious (the military, the landlords, and the interpretive power  of the ulema, mentioned earlier).  What remains is politics as patronage.

This regression from politics as social transformation to politics as patronage has a devastating influence on the national psyche.  Individuals  are forced into corruption and dishonesty (within their definitions of these two terms) and must live with their own moral  failures in a land where morality is central to personal and social valuation.   Violence–individual, institutional and state–becomes routine and acceptable.  Cities disaggregate; the rich secure themselves and the rest either form separate communities or create their own armies.  What emerges is cynicism and pessimism, a breakdown in the immune system of the political and social body–a world ending with a whimper not a bang.

For those in the position of leadership or responsibility  the contradictions are even stronger and inasmuch as the local, national and international structures are too difficult to transform others are blamed: the  foreign elements, the bad local elements, or the undisciplined youth, to name a few enemies. The oppression of the present bares down on leader and follower alike; both lose their humanity, both lose hope in any collective image of the future.  Worse, there is no savior ahead: all models have failed; leaders have failed; religion has failed; capitalism has failed; socialism has failed; political parties have failed.

Conclusion: Designing the Future

The need for reimagination of purpose, of identity, of vision from this dismal final vision is glaring.  Part of revisioning is creating alternative structures.  Among the points of departure for these new structures should be the centrality of difference. Pakistan has placed its strength on unity; a unity that has proved elusive.  Perhaps we need to create institutions and models of change that use difference to create strength, that celebrate our uniqueness among each other and in the world. From an embracing of difference, a unity of self, family and a larger group identity then might be possible.  As important as difference is decentralization, the creation of local practices to solve local problems, that is, endogenous development.  Finally, we should not forget democracy, not in the trivial sense of voting–which has historically but strengthened statist politics–but in the more important sense of individual empowerment and community participation in the creation of preferred futures as contextualized by the social designs of others. In any case, designing the future at local and community and broader levels (through local and nternational social movements, for example) might be a more promising task than waiting for a politician or some other central authority to solve the problems ahead.  Imagination does not mean, however, a forgetting of the material world and the real interests–structural, institutional and individual–that impede attempts to transform the present.  The future must then be a sight that one moves toward as well as a site wherein the material and the creative meet. The future–like politics, economics and culture–must be decolonized and reappropriated by each one of us.  Today.  While the above represents an initial exploration of Pakistan’s  images of the future, dimensions within these images have  yet to be explored: the role of the environment, structural and direct violence, the role of children, images of health, the possibilities of growth and distribution, and the relative powers of various actors, such as nation-states, political parties and social movements.   To conclude, one might ask: what is my image of the future for myself?  for my family? for my community? for my nation? for the planet?  And what am I doing to realize my personal and social image of the future?

*(Dr. Sohail Inayatullah is a member of the executive council of the World Futures Studies Federation and is currently editing a book on the Futures of South Asia.  In the preparation of this essay, Dr. Inayatullah, the author’s father, provided a wealth of insights and made helpful editorial comments)

Towards a Proutist View on the Gulf War (1991)

Sohail Inayatullah (Written in 1991)

Coming to terms with the present Gulf crises is a difficult task for an inhabitant of this planet as well as for the planet and her eco-system as well.  It is especially difficult for Muslims and those sympathetic to civilizations who have found their meaning systems cannibalized by various colonialists.  To even begin to understand this crises in the Gulf one must, I believe, approach it from multiple perspectives.  The Proutist perspective1, in particular, offers a richer explanatory scheme then either the Iraqi, Arab, or American/Allied positions.

First, is the obvious factual level of the present.  Here Iraq has attacked and occupied another nation.  Whether Iraq was justified is not the issue: the issue is that naked aggression has occurred. This aggression has caused untold suffering on Kuwait citizens. From a Proutist view, this action must be deplored: ahimsa has been transgressed.

But this is not the only level of analysis.  There is the historical level.  And it is this level that the analysis becomes far more complicated.  Salient factors are the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the Western promise to give Arabs nationhood if they fought against Germany, the arbitrary division of borders by Western powers and, of course, the creation of Israel (an ethnically, religiously exclusive state).  Given this history then understanding the Iraq-Kuwait conflict is far more problematic.  While American foreign policy finds these variables spurious, from the Proutist view they are critical in that even while Iraq has committed violence against Kuwait (and earlier Iran) at the same time, the situation Iraq has been placed in is directed related to a history of colonialism and Orientalism (in which Arabs and others see themselves not through their eyes but through the eyes of the colonial masters).  Here Prout as a social movement against colonialism is far more sympathetic to the Arab cause, especially the goal to be heard, to be of significance to the world community.  And while Prout does not endorse any particular religion as it intends to support and nurture the spiritual dimension of all religions while discouraging the “ideological” dimensions, it does understand that Islam while at one level is an ancient religion that must be reconstituted to make it relevant to the next century, Islam is, nonetheless, an important balancing voice to the materialism, nationalism, and anti-ecological industrialism of the West.

However, while sympathetic to Islam as an anti-systemic movement–and this brings us to our next point–Prout does recognize the right of Israel to exist.  And, given, this history of this struggle, Prout also recognizes the right of the Palestinians to their homeland.   The way out of the contradiction moves us to the next level of analysis.  The Future level.  While the Gulf crises certainly is reinforcing the nation-state has a unit of organization, this war is partly about the end of the nation-state.  Among the possible new Gulf orders that might emerge from this is the redivision of these nations along geographical, bioregional and cultural lines not along religious lines.   Besides their own history it is the structure of imperialism that makes Jews and Muslims see the other as enemy.  They do not speak to each other rather they speak through other superpowers: powers who have constructed these boundaries themselves.  Thus while Prout acknowledges the nation-state and its present boundaries, it makes contentious their historical creation, and urges a new order based on alternative divisions.  It while recognizing the three religions that have developed from the Middle-East, seeks to encourage the spiritual similarities between the three (spiritual practices, universalism, global fraternal outlook, family/cooperative oriented economies).

How does Prout view the actions of the allies.  To begin with, Proutist thinking makes analytic differences between types of Peace–static peace and sentient peace.  This first is embedded in injustice while the latter emerges from a struggle in which injustice and oppression are rooted out.  Thus, while it is admirable that the world community is aiding Kuwait in rooting out the imperialism beset on them at the same time are justice and peace the motives of the Allies, particularly the US and Great Britain or are the true motives Oil, support of the Arms industry (in terms of testing out products) and the creation of new economic and cultural zones for future economic and political colonialization.   Given the history of these two nations (their own invasions, their rather global definition of their own national interests, their historical war mongering throughout the world), it appears that it is not sentient peace that the Allies want but a new static peace; one that favors their cultural, political and economic interests.  Saudi Arabia is also complicit in this.  The untold wealth created in the Middle-East in the last thirty years did not go towards third world economic development rather it went to stock markets in the West and in luxury consumptions.  Some trickled down to South Asian countries through labor imports.  Prout favors intervention in nations when the the goal is sentient peace, however, often the reasons for intervention are merely the replacement of one static peace, one imperial colonialist with another.  In addition, should the United Nations be used to legitimize this effort.  While Prout supports a world government and a world militia, it does not support the present inequitable power structure of the United Nations (favoring the superpowers).  It supports an internal transformation of the United Nations leading to a more equitable global system of governance.

Thus, the Proutist view does not merely support the Arab or the Allied rather its examines the present Gulf war from a multiplicity of perspectives.  The Proutist view looks forward to a new world order emerging from this crises; one that encourages a redrawing of present national boundaries, one that encourages peace with justice; one that while addressing historical issues attempts to comes to term with them through the development of economic, cultural and spiritual similarities.  At the same time, Prout understands the need for a world militia (or peace keeping forces) and the need for strength to ward off aggression of one individual, nation or nations be they Iraq or the Allies, small or large nations.

Finally, central to Prout is empathy for individuals who are hurt by war as Sarkar has stated “war is the darkest blot in humanity’s history.”  This empathy also includes the planet and her ecological system, that is, plants and animals and other life forms.  War is waged by powerful humans against other humans but it is the weak in the form of children and the environment that are hurt the most.  War is also a male practice.  As one feminist recently wrote: “there is a toxic level of male testosterone on the planet today.”  Solutions to the crises should come from outside of male hegemonic voices; from voices where the care of human beings is central.  The feminist view reinforces the spiritual view that this crises has many levels, most of them structural, geo-political and historical, but some also personal.  At one level it is a battle of egos: of leaders of State who are spiritually imbalanced within their own minds.  Their own inner violence and fears are outwardly expressed into the social world causing fear and violence to millions.

Given the tendency of war to produce such violent results even while Prout insists of peace with justice (sentient peace) it hopes for non-violent agreements and negotiations (cultural, economic, political) among and within individuals, small groups, associations, and economic organizations and nations instead of war.  Solutions to these crises exist at many levels then; the present, the historical, the desired future at individual and social sites.

The above analysis has been an attempt to develop a Proutist view on the Gulf crises.  While we analyze this other crises to come, it is also important to remember the metapicture, to not remain merely in the geo-political discourse.  We need to remember that we are in revolutionary temporal times in which the nature of time itself changes, when human evolution is disjunctive; when reality and the meanings we give to it is transformed.  From the Proutist view, the transformation of the Gulf geo-political map is but one indicator of the emerging new global order.  There are many more indicators to come.  Unfortunately, in the short term those in the periphery will feel the brunt of these indicators.

1.       PROUT (the Progressive Utilization Theory) was articulated by the late P.R. Sarkar in 1959.  In the 1960’s and 1970’s numerous Prout social movements were initiated throughout the world.  Prout seeks to develop an alternative political-economy in the context of an alternative spiritual and social ecology.  See the numerous writings of P.R. Sarkar for further elaboration.

Cycles of Power (1990)

Sohail Inayatullah

“Cycles of Power,” first published in Edges (March 1990)

I left work early last Friday, largely to go home and watch an amazing event. No it was not star American basketball player Michael Jordan soaring through the sky, rather I went home to watch the Chinese revolution. Like many other developments in telecommunications technology, I was suddenly made part of this awesome event, but the space that I was watching had now been transformed from entertainment space to juridical space, meaning that this age of video had now included me in judging the goodness or the rightness of the events. My eyes could then decide whether the official words of the Chinese government or the American government were true, I could judge myself. I could, for example, compare this revolution with the earlier Aquino People’s power. And as the Chinese bureaucrats tried to force Cable News Network (CNN) to leave, I again could decide who was correct. Was Chinese national territory and culture being violated by this foreign presence or did CNN have a larger global right to provide information.

In the end CNN did not try to evoke a universal right to telecommunicate, rather they avoided the philosophical issue and settled for the bureaucratic discourse. They agreed to pull the plug only when a letter signed by the Chinese government was given to them. The Chinese were of course puzzled by this. The official tried to explain to the newsperson that these were obviously extraordinary times, why the evocation of official stationary? But with CNN unwilling to evoke rights, all that was left for them to buy time was procedure, due process, and when the letter–written in Chinese–was produced, the live revolution was over. The basketball game too was over and as there appeared to be no revolutions in the offing : Aquino was already stable and Marcos appeared to not want to die Friday evening; Zia had died last year and Noriega has his own timeline, I turned the age of video off, walked onto the street and pondered the fantastic nature of the real world we live in.

THE ANCIENTS SPEAK

Ssu-Ma Chien ancient Chinese historian had written–without access to live real-time revolutions–how new dynasties are born from the actions of the sage-king and how they rise in virtue, but eventually over time there comes squandering, laziness and pride and then the tyrants step in; virtue is gone and the dynasty ends. This cycle is repeated over and over. The Tao is present; it then disappears. In virtue all gain; in decline all lose.

Ibn Khaldun, the 13th century founder of sociology and modern history, too outlined this cyclical view of history. But to him it was not the rise and fall of virtue, it was the rise and fall of asabiya or unity. He studied the Bedouins and saw that their success was a result of their solidarity; a closeness derived from their struggle against the elements. In the desert, they had a remarkable level of communications among themselves and a low degree of noise, of disunity. But with power, over generations, usually four, unity disappeared and people’s mind turned to wealth and to expectations without hard work. Each succeeding rulership did not have to work for leadership, it was routinized. Thus, the empire fell and asabiya passed on to some other group; usually someone from the provinces, from the desert who still had unity and a collective vision of the future–he would then on a camel ride into power.

For these two historians and others like Indian philosopher P.R. Sarkar all things rise and fall. Leaders come into power, they exaggerate their power and in this exaggeration their is exploitation and there is thus a circulation of elites as Italian macrohistorian Pareto would say. And as Sarkar would say, power always centralizes to some group on the wheel: it goes to the warriors (the military or those who try to deal with the real world through physical domination), to the intellectuals (the priests and technocrats who deal with the real through theories, myths and ideologies) and the acquisitors who deal with the real world through accumulating wealth, through making greed into a social good. And of course, in this cycle there is the group who causes revolutions but rarely gets to enjoy them–this is the people, the students, the workers, the women, the groups who do the work. They bring about a new world, but power quickly centralizes to other groups and although each new era brings about increased rights for the previously rightless, power quickly congeals and the cycle of power continues. The wheel is eternal.

From this macrohistorical perspective, even if the Chinese students succeed, there is larger deeper structure which will reemerge. It is the cycle. The ancients noticed this cycle everywhere: in nature, in our breathing, in the moon; it was this cycle that led women to create mathematics (mother-wisdom according to writer Barbara Walker ); it was this cycle that reminded the great that one day they would fall and it reminded the impoverished that they would one day rise–everyone knew they would have their turn. It is this cycle that gives hope to the third world, to the Pacific Islanders, to women and to the environment itself–to Gaia. And to use another sports metaphor, mother earth always has the last bat. Nature always wins. This is then the world of the rise and fall. Here, there is no linear progress, rather there are fits and starts, moments of glory and episodes of betrayal.

And as I walked outside seeing the sea and looked above at the near full moon of May, the self-evident truth of the cycle seemed utterly obvious. For when Michael Jordan rises he falls. When great teams win, eventually they lose. People are born and then they die. They cycle speaks to that which is irreversible; that which is ancient; it is the story of creation; the story of who we are.

THE CHALLENGE

But all stories are challenged and the European Enlightenment was precisely a radical challenge to the ancients. The enlightenment brought forth reason and made it natural. It brought forth the linear arrow of time and made it a necessity. It brought forth greed and made it divine. And finally it brought forth nature and made it human. This was the end of the cycle; with reason and industrial technology, God and the cycle of nature could forever be vanquished and in its place would emerge the city of heaven on Earth. A city where power was curbed through the written word, where despots could not claim the divine mandate instead they were forced to exist in a mutual contract with the people. The world was now not god-centered or nature centered or myth centered, rather it was man centered. In fact as Michel Foucault brilliantly argues humans have only epistemologically existed for a few hundred years, knowledge was ordered differently in feudal and religious eras. Man is thus a recent category and soon as we enter a postmodern world, whether the spiritual recovery of enchantment or a technological creation of the evernew, man will once again disappear to the sidelines–the gods of magic or the robots of the future will become the focus of thought.

Now when the enlightenment faltered, when the cry of equality, liberty and fraternity only ended the reign of the clergy and the aristocrats (the british and french revolutions), but not the bourgeois technocrats, there came another challenge–that of Marxism, but it too continued the project of rationalism, after all historically speaking liberalism and Marxism are minor deviations from each other: they both believe in empiricism, materialism, prediction, domination and separation from nature, and technological progress. Marx however saw the cycle but believed that if ownership could pass to the people, then new technological developments would not create contradictions, rather they would generate greater levels of wealth. The wheel of history would end and the heaven promised by the people of the book–the jews, muslims and christians–would descend. The secret of knowledge would be forever gained.

But, we all know where that project ended. Power centralized, new wealth went to the Party and instead of the priests of religion, the ideologues of the Party watched over the braindeath of creativity. Just as the priests took away all spiritual insight, the partycrats took away all individual initiative. The grid of partocracy succeeded but at a cost that led to its own demise. The cycle of history was not so easily defeated.

But the liberals put something else at center stage that could once and for all solve the problem of poverty: this was technology. Tools removed us from the monkey and they would provide the next jump in human history; one where the myths of the past, the myths of scarcity, of the rise and fall, of the stranglehold of irreplaceable, nonrenewable commodities such as oil, would keep us from realizing the good society that was possible.

But the technology of the industrial revolution did not do this, although incredible wealth was created; it destroyed the family, raped the environment, impoverished the colonies, and denigrated women.

THE NEXT REVOLUTION

But there is a new revolution that will culminate the project that was begun a few hundred years ago. For this revolution has as its base something that when used becomes better and when shared increases. It promises to bridge the distances between individuals, cultures and nations. It promises to join the isolated into a community and to take the best from the historical and the modern world: to create a global village and an electronic cottage. This world will have highways but not polluted ones, rather they will be of light; instead of seaports or airports there will be teleports. We will have resolved the historical contradictions of the urban and the rural; between self and community; between worker and manager.
This will have been resolved not by the Pacific Shift, not in the Japanese method of miniaturizing nature and including it in the city (the Bonsai tree, for example); making meditation as a corporate activity; or giving lifetime employment, but it will be resolved by creating a postscarcity society. The up and downs of history, the rise and falls will then disappear once basic needs such as food, health, shelter, medicine and education-information are plentiful and natural, not for the few, but for all.

Through these new technologies poor countries will be able to jump past the industrial era and quickly and painlessly enter the Age of Video. Villagers won’t need to go to cities as the Mango (the Pakistani clone of the Apple computer) will allow them to stay at home and work from there. Families will remain united and the rumor that in the big city streets are made of gold will forever be gone from history. Population will stay evenly distributed and with increased wealth, population rates will continue to decline. Businesses will no longer be site specific; they can move here and there, and even labor will be free to move from region to region and both business and labor will be able move through history, from one culture to another, then and now, for the cycle of time will have been vanquished.

And to those critics who argue that these new technologies are prohibitively expensive, can anyone not afford to invest in them comes the reply. Moreover, perhaps it is too late anyway.

Among other technologies, the VCR is already a global phenomenon. Within minutes of a release of any movies, pirated copies are available throughout the world. In Pakistan, for example, any movie from any country is available. And those that try and remove this new technology from the home are quickly rebuked. While there a few years back, I saw an amazing television show. A village family found there fortunes changed by the addition of a tv and a vcr from a brother who had made it as an engineer in Saudi Arabia. These new technologies attracted more and more people to the house of the family. Every day, all the neighbors would gather to watch. And of course, the host family would have to provide food and drinks. The father would complain that he missed the old peaceful days, but others in the family loved their new centrality. One night the tv/vcr was stolen. The man saw it happening but kept his eyes closed. His nemesis and the villagers’ prized possession was gone. The police quickly captured the thieves. But the man would not admit that the new technology was his. His meal were prepared on time, his house was quieter; he had never liked his relatives anyway. But finally the chief of police begged the man to claim the tv and vcr, his family would stay home and make life hell for him; his wife refused to cook for him. The technology was back in the man’s house and all was normal again. All was natural again. In this story there are numerous codes; the extended family finds unity not through the fireplace but through the electric; the search for individuality and community, all are there, but the key is in the nature of the normal. For suddenly these new technologies have become the natural, it is not the flicker of wood that evokes images of the mystical, but the flicker of the screen that leads us into other worlds. In my parent’s village which became wired for electricity in the early 70’s and still has no toilets, they have these new video technologies. Soon they will have satellite dishes and will have access to more information in a few years then in the last hundred thousand or so, it seems. And even while the streets are still made of mud, they have access to texts and images from everywhere and everytime.

Thus these new information technologies, according to many, do not have the contradictions of previous industrial technologies, for they allow one to live at a ancient stone age level. They do not open and close, nor expand and limit at the same time; rather they allow the past, present and future, real and unreal, to exist simultaneously.

Thus what the best minds of Europe failed to do in the enlightenment, what the Marxists failed to do this century, is about to be accomplished by the technological revolutions–the cycle is about to end.

Will this mean that the moon will no longer shine above us at night. That crickets will no longer sing at night. Yes! For this era of information is also about other related technologies. According to Eric Drexler –not Portland basketball player Clyde “the Glide” Drexler who too defies gravity–the most significant breakthrough in history is about to become real. It is the molecular assembler or nano-technology. Combined with artificial intelligence, we will soon be able to rearrange the molecules of what ever and create food, materials and what have you. The capital base of the world will continue to double in minutes; it will truly be the end of work. Coupled with this will be the flight into space, but this flight will not be through conventional materials, through genetic engineering, according to Freeman Dyson , respected professor of physics at Princeton, these new spacecrafts will weigh a kilogram instead of the present Voyager’s ton. They would be grown and integrate animal and electronic components. He calls this the Astro-Chicken and if truly the next century is the Pacific Era, then it will certainly be the Chinese Astro-chicken.

Thus genetic engineering, artificial intelligence, telecommunications are in the process of creating a new world, a faster more intimate world, a good world. In the meantime, instead of Hot Dog stands there will be Hot Doc stands (not meals on wheels but documents, information on wheels); instead of one way novels and information we will have hyper text where the mind of the universe will be available to us. We can move from article to article, past to future, language to language; it will be the final unity of man with machine, the spiritual liberation that the ancients really meant to tell us about. The ancients of course did not understand that light meant fiber optics, that the word of God meant hyper text, and that ascension to heaven was space travel.

Thus, the age of video of information of the post industrial society is about the end of myth, about the end of the cycle of misery and injustice that has plagued humanity, and it is about the reconstruction of the world in any shape and form that humans want, not just in terms of the way they see the world–that is, philosophically–but also the reconstruction of the material world. It is also about the end of humans, for we will soon exist along with robots, clones, cyborgs and not only will we sue other humans, once robots have rights, we will sue them as well, and of course we will do this through video arraignment and of course trials will be available for all to see and just as there will be direct electronic democracy, there will be direct electronic judging, but instead of the upward or downward thumb of the Roman trials, there will be the touch or the voice of the electronic key.

THE RESPONSE

But there remains a fear among us all. What if we have gone too far. What if the new technologies are not creating a new world, but simply reproducing old inequalities. What if there are limits; what if there really is a natural state of things that we humans in our desire for control and power are upsetting. Have we have gone too far? The myth of the cycle thus lurks underneath all who claim to have defied the laws of nature. In this fear, what lies ahead is a catastrophic depression. This depression will result in the end the era of liberalism and capitalism; it will be the reclaiming of earth; it will be the conclusion of greed; the revenge of Kali or Pele–Mother Earth as destroyer. Those individuals and nations who are linked with the present whether intellectually, materially or spiritually will be devastated by the massive depression. Those islands that depend on tourism or on economic aid from the Core powers will see their existence ravaged. Those places that remain self-reliant, that still have traditional ohana (extended family) structures will survive; that is, the high will fall and those that have bought into the liberal/capitalist or technological worldview will pay for it. The dream of the last few hundred years of progress will vanish before their eyes as the Tokyo, New York, and London markets begin their slide. We gave ourselves a warning in 1987 but did not listen. And in a matter of years, just as communism is ending before us, capitalism too, will disappear. However, there will be many that will have their life meanings decimated such that they will be caught between a future that has disappeared and a past that no longer exists. But how can that happen, every thing seems to be going so well, even the feared recession might be merely a soft landing. There is more wealth then ever before; peace and democracy are breaking out every where. Six hundred years ago, Ibn Khaldun said it best: “At the end of an era, dynasty, there often appears a show of power that gives the impression that the senility of the era has been made to disappear. It lights up brilliantly just before it is extinguished, like a burning wick the flame of which leaps up phenomenally a moment before it goes out, giving the impression it is just starting to burn, when in fact it is going out.”
The 1990’s will bring in an end of an era, but it will be a difficult end; capitalism has not survived five hundred years by accident. It will take the collapse of the speculative bubble that has fueled the markets; it will take the realization that the debt game is really a pyramid scheme, and it will take, say, a minor earthquake in Tokyo, a flood here, sealevel rise elsewhere, a nuclear explosion or two, and soon the project will be over. And within moments the rational world of liberalism and Marxism will have met its end.

THE OTHER MYTH

But there are others who have been described by the Enlightenment project as people outside of history and thus outside of the future, who view things quite differently. To them they have been in a depression for centuries; they have lived without a self, without a home. These were the people in the colonies who provided the labor, these were the regions from which the raw materialism emerged from. These were the people who lived and rejoiced in the cycle. And it was only brutal force and the promise of joining the world of progress that convinced them to join forces with the liberals and the Marxists. But this joining did not make things better for them. Each time the flame of power passed, from riverene to Mediterranean to Atlantic and now to the Pacific Rim, they were left behind, for the system of expansionist power always needs something and someone to be the resource, to be the difference, the inequality, from where wealth can emerge.

Thus again as we look all around the world at the feminist movements, at third world efforts to renegotiate the terms of technological trade, at the spiritual movements, at the peace and green movements, we see a counterproject that is emerging. While many of these groups are anti-technological, others have become more sophisticated and want to create conditions where they can create their own technologies based on their local histories and conditions. From this view, the world has been created by the West and all of us see ourselves through this Western view: the culture of the self itself has been conquered. What then is needed are ways to recover the self that existed before the modern world. This is the view of the recovery of the past. The recovery of historical ways of seeing the world before Contact with the expansionist West. It is for example the effort to keep alive the language of the oral traditions presently being done in Vanuatu by the Vanuatu culture center. And it is not letting Western cultural institutions have copies so that oral history can be economized and transformed into the additive intellectual knowledge of the West. It is also the Prime Minister of Papua and New Guinea, Paias Wingti attempting to stop the Australian dreams of a Pacific tv empire. In his words, “we are being asked to sacrifice our cultural heritage for passing material gain. No money can buy back our languages once they are lost.”

It is also groups like PROUT (Progressive Utilization Theory) who are attempting to create a new cycle. Sarkar the founder of this movement is among the few spiritual activists and mystics who is basing his vision on a merger of spiritual and physical technologies. Although he believes the cycle of rise and fall will continue forever, through spiritual wisdom and intellectual information, it is possible to keep the cycle moving, to through evolutionary intervention significantly reduce the phases of misery. And unlike humanists who still believe that there is dignity to work, he looks forward to the day when we will not have to work. For him, to bring about this new world, we must think beyond left and right. There must, for example, be ceilings and floors on wealth, and there must be ways to reward excellence. Instead of bureaucrats, technocrats or partycrats, there must be people’s organizations, that of course could work best with the new telecommunications technologies. Instead of corporations, there should be local and eventual global cooperatives. In addition, even while new cultures are constantly being created, he has started cultural, linguistic, bioregional, local self-reliance movements to counter the liberal/Marxist paradigm. Yet at the center of this counter movement is a spiritual universalism, lest the movements become particularistic.

This universal, he hopes, will come about largely from spiritual practices, but also from the fall of the national community, the nation-state–brought about by travel, videos, and of course, pollution and the fear of nuclear destruction for they do not respect boundaries of nation or body. For indeed, we are forced outside of ourself not only by awe but by pain and fear. In our agony, the agonies of the Other becomes real. Universal cultures and individuals who partake in this worldview do not arise painlessly, it is a life task for an individual and a civilizational task for a culture. Becoming cross-cultural, as everyone here must know, arises through the force of confrontation, not the banality of liking Thai or Chinese, or Indian food.

This spiritual view is also expressed by the Greens who claim they are neither left nor right, but in front. Central to them is the natural world. This world must be given rights not for our sake, but for its sake. They are not interested in information, nor knowledge, but in that which comes from understanding the cycle of life–wisdom. For wisdom cannot be commodified; the power of the king or the market cannot control it. This the yogis and the martial artists of past knew well–thus, they learned to fast, to think, to live with few clothes, to master the elements, and to live outside of wealth, such that the soldiers and the priests could not control them. They lived with the natural world. In this view, the real communications is not among humans, but in the planet itself, and the messages she receives about us, are no longer positive. We are perhaps incidental to the needs of the global project, that is the survival of the planet, the recovery of the garden before God and humans.

The Feminist movement too is reminding us who has done the real work for the last thousand years and that new technologies must be developed that lead to cooperation not dominance among groups. Otherwise, although men prefer the image of the virgin and the mother, creation and preservation, there is also the Crone–the image of power and destruction that descends upon all, and forces us to remember the temporality of that which we thought was eternal.

But while Sarkar’s PROUT and to some extent the Green and the Feminist focus on ownership of technology as central to the social good, they also speak about other technologies. For Sarkar, the future is not about molecular assemblage or genetically engineered chickens, but it is about the Age of Microvita. He posits that the smallest building blocks of life are emanations from Pure Consciousness. These emanations however can be understood not by more refined microscope, but by refined minds, for they exist outside our sensate world, yet provide the bridge between the mind and the brain. They are the silver lining between perception and conception. They can be used to spread ideas throughout the world, they can be used to heal bodies, and they can be used to spread information throughout the stars. According to him, the rediscovery of these “mind waves” will soon radically change physics and chemistry and biology, for these microvita impact our thoughts, our food, and our social movements. One goal, then is to find ways to refine the mind so that it can perceive these seeds of life and use them to increase economic productivity, intellectual awareness and spiritual well being.

There is also the theory of Rupert Sheldrake articulated in his A New Science of Life . For him too, this is the end of the materialistic age of science. The new telecommunications technology are not physical but fields of awareness that are invisible but organize behavior. Some of these fields over time have become almost eternal, others are more malleable. They explain how once one group of humans learn a behavior or receive an insight, this spreads to others. His institute has conducted numerous experiments which show partial validity. Among other experiments, they have found children in England could more easily memorize an ancient rhyme in a foreign language instead of a recent one or a gibberish one since the ancient rhyme has a stronger field as it has existed longer. The point is that there exists fields of awareness that explain how ideas are unconsciously transmitted; how ideas become powerful and resonate among us. He provides a scientific reading of myth and of social change. Thus, this means that humans can learn from the past, and they can learn at quicker and quicker rates. The exact conclusion that telecommunications experts believe that telematics will lead to. More information means more learning, means a better world, eventually. The wheel then is just a reflection of everything we have seen for the last thousand of years, but this structure with learning and new ways of thinking can be overcome. New structures can gain force.
Of course, the movements mentioned above would focus on access to these new technologies, while the liberals the growth of them, and the Marxists would argue that through a central authority, they can better distribute the benefits of them.

THE END OF THE REALLY REAL

But the theories of Sarkar, Sheldrake, and others who write of a postmodern era, where the materialistic rationality has been made contentious, are being attacked by another group as well. For them, the liberal/Marxist project believes that there is a real world that can be managed, controlled and predicted. In the liberal view, through science and the discovery of laws, the world can be made more rational and understandable; tomorrow can be in fact known; uncertainty can be reduced and better policy decisions thus made. Eventually, all will be able to join in this project–even the colonies. Most of the work by futurists falls into this realm–to them the goal is the prediction of the empirical world, the search for the elusive truth of tomorrow.
The challenge so far has been by those who seek to recover the best of the world prior to rationality of the science and technology revolution. It is about capturing meanings, economic systems, polities that existed before capitalism destroyed time and culture. It is about recovering the natural–the spiritual and the cultural.

But this third group believes nothing is natural–everything is human creation, whatever we know is perceived. We cannot know anything as it really is. And every theory whether Platonic or Aristotelian, earth centric or sun centric puts at center one way of knowing over another way. In this view, there is nothing to predict; there is nothing to recover or remember; there is no self to prop up, to save from technology–the self is created by society. For when we perceive we must describe in language and in this representation the world is created. Thus the Rushdie/Khomeni affair. For Rushdie nothing is really real, there is no truth that appeared in the middle east and all words, texts, must be made relative. For Khomeni, there is a text, a piece of information that is more real; it cannot be attacked for it is the direct word of the Real. To attack the text is to attack God, thus the only appropriate punishment is death to Rushdie.

For this group, we must look at our language and our categories of thought and see who gains from them, what is lost, what is silenced. We must look at the cycle and see what this construct does–does it liberate or oppress. For them, nothing is really real, everything is description–power is that of making one description seem more real or natural than others. Thus time is a category, not a reality. The purpose of talking about the future or the past is not to predict or to recover, but to make the present remarkable; to thus make the status quo contentious and thereby create the possibility for change, for creation.

In this view we must also live on the edges of reality, always testing to see if have made a representation really real–ontologically real–always seeing the power of our descriptions of the world. In this view, the new technologies will create more and varied texts and the present notion of the separation of the empirical-physical world and the world of text or video will forever be gone. Television creation Star Trek will really be more interesting and thus real than the landing of humans on the Moon. Fiction and non-fiction will become one and focus of the text or the video will not be the writer, the producer, the manufacturer, but the reader, the interpreter, the consumer, or in the world of the telecommunications discourse, the user. There will then really be as Roland Barthes argues an infinite number of interpretations to everything.

And what exists beyond language, perception, interpretation? from the cultural and spiritual view, a world of mystery and bliss, of the divine. For the empiricist, the material physical world–tables and chairs but no inherent meanings. And from the third view, beyond interpretation are other interpretations waiting to describe what is, for both the divine and the physical are simply imposed meaning structures, we cannot really know if anything really exists–the key question is who gains and who loses by every description of the world.
In the meantime, I look forward to being ever at home and seeing the myriad of worldviews that exist past, present and future. I look forward to watching the live revolution continue, to watching the Chinese students create a new world, and attempt to recover that which they believed was true in the past and as these images enter my eyes, I have no idea what appears to be real and what is really real: are the Chinese restructuring their world because positive microvita has entered them, or because they have more knowledge of things, more information, or because new fields of awareness have been created by the Filipino non-violent demonstrations. I do not know, but will more information, microvita energy waves, or fields of awareness help me slam dunk a basketball after watching Michael Jordan this week?

Perhaps there are limits!

As it turned out, the Chinese student’s hope for celebration that could transform the bureaucratic party structure of the past fifty years did not turn out to be. Perhaps it was that Deng did not wish to be humiliated again in Tiananmen square, or perhaps their turn will come another day, perhaps a video image of crumbling of the Berlin Wall will be catalytic leading to a transformation in the Great Wall.

But more central than video images themselves, however, are individuals who can transform these images into myths and visions. These larger stories of who we are provide the link between the routine day to day activities of the present and the personal sacrifice, the episodes of bravery, needed to create a new tomorrow.

To create this new future, these stories will, I believe, have to speak to the cycle and speak to a notion of progress. Effective leadership will have to do more than simply deconstruct the epistemological basis of history or merely provide a blueprint of technological change. While deconstructing history is important since leadership casts the new vision in stone forgetting that “yesterday dissent is often today’s establishment and, unless resisted, becomes tomorrow’s terror” and while technological development is essential, the former does not speak to the “where to now” question and the latter forgets that it exists in a cultural historical framework–mythology.

To meet the challenges ahead, leadership will have to speak to and balance humanity’s spiritual, knowledge and material dimensions. Here Sarkar reminds us that while the cycle will continue, through spiritual–intellectual, servant, protective, and entrepreneurial–leadership the phases of exploitation and human misery can be reduced thus creating a vision that dialectically embraces the ancient, enlightenment and postmodern.

SELECTED REFERENCES
Roland Barthes, Critical Essays trans. Richard Howard. Evanston, Ill.,Northwestern University Press, 1972.

James Dator, “The Futures of Cultures and Cultures of the Future,” in Marsella et al (eds.) Perspectives on CrossCultural Psychology. New York, Academic Press, 1979.

Eric Drexler, Engines of Change. New York, Anchor Press, 1986.

Freeman Dyson, Infinite in All Directions. New York, Harper and Row, 1988.

Michel Foucault, The Order of Things. New York, Random House, 1973.

Liz Fell, “Poor Reception for TV Moguls,” Pacific Island Monthly (May 1988).

Chris Jones, The Politics and Futures of Gaia. Doctoral dissertation. University of Hawaii, 1989.

Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967).

Ashis Nandy, Tradition, Tyranny, and Utopias, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1987.

Ed Rampell, “Hi-Tech on the High Seas,” Pacific Island Monthly (May 1988).

Avadhuta Rudreshananda, Microvita: Cosmic Seeds of life. Berlin, Ananda Marga Publications, 1989.

Nicolas Rothwell, “Keeping the Language Alive,” Pacific Islands Monthly (May 1988).

P.R. Sarkar, PROUT in a Nutshell, Vols. 1-22. Calcutta, Ananda Marga Publications, 1988.

Michael Shapiro, The Politics of Representation. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1988.

Rupert Sheldrake, A New Science of Life. London, Blong and Briggs,1981.

William Irwin Thompson, Pacific Shift. San Francisco, Sierra Club 1985.

Barbar Walker, The Crone: Woman of Age, Wisdom and Power. San Francisco, Harper and Row, 1985.

Sarkar’s Theory of Social Change (1990)

By Sohail Inayatullah

PERSONAL HISTORY

Prabhat Rainjan Sarkar was born in May of 1921 in Bihar of an old and respected family that had its roots in regional leadership and in ancient spiritual traditions.  Sarkar’s early life was dominated by fantastic events, spiritual miracles and brushes with death.  He was nearly killed in his early years by a religious sect who believed that Sarkar was destined to destroy their religion (as astrologers had predicted about Sarkar).  Surviving this event and many other similar ones, by the 1950’s he had become a spiritualist with many followers.  In 1955, he founded the socio-spiritual organization Ananda Marga. Soon after, he articulated a new political-economic theory and social movement called the Progressive Utilization Theory or PROUT.

Ananda Marga and PROUT grew quickly in the 1960’s and managed to attract opposition from numerous Hindu groups, they believing Sarkar to be an iconoclast because of his opposition to caste (jhat) and his criticism of orthodox schools of Indian philosophy. By the late 1960’s his followers were in key positions in the Indian civil service. The government argued that it was a politically subversive revolutionary organization and banned civil servants from joining it. Ananda Marga asserted that it was being harassed because of its opposition to governmental corruption.

In 1971, Sarkar was accused of murdering his disciples and jailed. Before Sarkar’s eyes his movement was decimated and publically labelled as a terrorist organization.  In 1975 with the onset of the Indian Emergency his organizations were banned and his trial conducted in an atmosphere where defense witnesses were jailed if they spoke for Sarkar. Notwithstanding reports by the International Commission of Jurists and other associations of the partial judicial conditions making it impossible for Sarkar to receive a fair trial, Sarkar was convicted.1  When the Gandhi government was removed, his case was appealed and reversed. During those difficult years, Sarkar fasted in protest of the trial and the numerous tortures committed by the police and intelligence agencies on his workers and himself.  By the 1980’s his movement grew again expanding to nearly 120 nations.

Until his death on October 21, 1990 Sarkar remained active in Calcutta composing nearly 5000 songs called Prabhat Samgiit (songs of the new dawn), giving spiritual talks, giving discourses on languages, managing his organizations, and teaching meditation to his numerous disciples, especially his senior monks and nuns, avadhutas and avadhutikas. His most recent project was Ananda Nagar or the City of Bliss and other alternative communities throughout the world.  These communities have been designed with PROUT principles in mind: ecologically conscious, spiritually aware, socially progressive and embedded in the culture of the area.

THE PERSONAL AND SOCIAL

Sarkar places the rise, fall and rise of his movement in the same language that he uses to explain aspects of history.  For him, whenever truth is stated in spiritual or material areas of life, there is resistance.  This resistance eventually is destroyed by the very forces it uses to destroy truth.  “Remember, by an unalterable decree of history, the evil forces are destined to meet their doomsday.”2

For Sarkar movements follow a dialectical path: thesis, antithesis and synthesis.  A movement is born, it is suppressed and oppressed (if it truly challenges the distribution of meanings of power), and if it survives these challenges it will be victorious.  The strength of the movement can be measured by its ability to withstand these challenges.

Sarkar’s own life and the life of his organizations follow this pattern, although at this point the success of the PROUT movement has yet to be determined.  In our interpretation, it is this mythic language that is also perhaps the best way to understand his theory of history, for it is myth that gives meaning to reality, that makes understandable the moments and monuments of our daily lives and that gives a call to sacrifice the moment so as to create a better tomorrow.

Sarkar’s universe is the habitat of grand struggles between vidya and avidya: introversion and extroversion, contraction and expansion, compassion and passion.  This duality is an eternal part of the very metaphysic of the physical and social universe.  Unlike the Western model where social history can end with the perfect marketplace or the conflict-free communist state, for the Indian, for Sarkar, social history will always continue.  Only for the individual through spiritual enlightenment can time cease and the “mind” itself (and thus duality) be transcended.

SARKAR’S LARGER CIVILIZATIONAL PROJECT

Sarkar’s intent was and is (his organizations continue his work) to create a global spiritual socialist revolution, a renaissance in thought, language, music, art, and culture.  His goal is to infuse individuals with a spiritual presence, the necessary first step in changing the way that we know and order our world.  Unlike the socialists of the past who merely sought to capture state power–forgetting that the economy was global and thus in the long run strengthening the world capitalist system–or the utopian idealists who merely wished for perfect places that could not practically exist or spiritualists who only sought individual transformation at the expense of structural change, Sarkar has a far more comprehensive view of transformation of which his social cycle provides the key structure.

His theoretical offerings include a range of new approaches to understanding social reality.  His theory of neo-humanism aims to relocate the self from ego (and the pursuit of individual maximization), from family (and the pride of genealogy), from geo-sentiments (attachments to land and nation), from socio-sentiments (attachments to class, race and community) from humanism (man as the center of the universe) to neo-humanism (love and devotion for all, inanimate and animate, beings of the universe).  Paramount here is the construction of self in an ecology of reverence for life, not a modern/secular politics of cynicism.  Spiritual devotion to the universe is ultimately the greatest treasure that humans have; it is this treasure that must be excavated and shared by all living beings.

Only from this basis can a new universalism emerge which can challenge the national, religious, class sentiments of history. The first step, then, is liberating the intellect from its own boundaries and placing it in an alternative discourse.  Sarkar then seeks to make accessible an alternative way of knowing the world that includes yet steps beyond traditional knowledge points; reason, sense-inference, authority, and intuition.

The central framework for his neo-humanistic perspective is his Progressive Utilization Theory.  PROUT encompasses Sarkar’s theory of history and change, his theory of leadership and the vanguard of the new world he envisions, as well as his alternative political economy.

THEORY OF HISTORY

His theory of history constructs four classes: workers, warriors, intellectuals, and accumulators of capital.  Each class can be perceived not merely as a power configuration, but as a way of knowing the world, as a paradigm, episteme or deep structure, if you will.  In Sarkar’s language this is collective psychology or varna (here, dramatically reinterpreting caste). At the individuals level there is varna mobility, one can change the influence of history and social environment!  At the macro level, each varna comes into power bringing in positive necessary changes, but over time exploits and then dialectically creates the conditions for the next varna.  This cycle continues through history and for Sarkar is indeed an iron law of history, true irrespective of space/time and observer conditions.  It is a law because it has developed historically through evolution and because the cycle represents a universal social structure.  For Sarkar, there have been four historical ways humans have dealt with their physical and social environment:  either by being dominated by it, by dominating it through the body, dominating it through the mind, or dominating it through the environment itself.

While the parallel to caste is there (shudra, ksattriya, brahmin and vaeshya), Sarkar redefines them locating the four as broader social categories that have historically evolved through interaction with the environment. Moreover, varna for individuals is fluid, one can change one’s varna through education, for example. Caste, on the other hand, developed with the conquest of the local Indians by the Aryans and was later reinscribed by the Vedic priestly classes.3

Sarkar believes that while the social cycle must always move through these four classes, it is possible to accelerate the stages of history and remove the periods of exploitation.  Thus Sarkar would place the sadvipra, the compassionate servant leader, at the center of the cycle, at the center of society (not necessarily at the center of government).  In his life, Sarkar’s efforts were to create this type of leadership instead of building large bureaucratic organizations. He sought to create a new type of leadership that was humble and could serve, that was courageous and could protect, that was insightful and could learn and teach, and that was innovative and could use wealth–in a word, the sadvipra.

These leaders would, in effect, attempt to create a permanent revolution of sorts, creating a workers’ revolution when the capitalists begin to move from innovation to commodification, a warriors’ revolution when the workers’ era moves from societal transformation to political anarchy, an intellectual revolution when the warrior era expands too far–becomes overly centralized and stagnates culturally–and an economic revolution when the intellectuals use their normative power to create a universe where knowledge is only available to the select few, favoring non-material production at the expense of material production.  Through the intervention of the sadvipra, Sarkar’s social cycle becomes a spiral: the cycles of the stages remains but one era is transformed into its antithesis when exploitation increases. This leads to the new synthesis and the possibility of social progress within the structural confines of the four basic classes.  Sarkar’s theory allows for a future that while patterned can still dramatically change. For Sarkar, there are long periods of rest and then periods of dramatic social and biological revolution.  Future events such as the coming polar shift, the possible ice age, increased spiritual developments in humans due to various spiritual practices, and the social-economic revolution he envisions may create the possibility for a jump in human consciousness.4

Sarkar’s theoretical framework is not only spiritual or only concerned with the material world, rather his perspective argues that the real is physical, mental and spiritual.  Concomitantly, the motives for historical change are struggle with the environment (the move from the worker era to the warrior era), struggle with ideas (the move from the warrior to the intellectual), struggle with the environment and ideas (the move from the intellectual era to the capitalist eras) and the spiritual attraction of the Great, the call of the infinite.  Thus physical, mental and spiritual challenges create change.

Table: Sarkar’s Stages

Shudra / Worker / Dominated by Environment

Ksattriya / Warrior / Struggle with and dominates Environment

Vipra / Intellectual / Struggle with and dominates Ideas

Vaeshya / Capitalist / Struggle with and dominates Environment/Ideas

The key to Sarkar’s theory of history, thus, is that there are four structures and four epochs in history.  Each epoch exhibits a certain mentality, a varna.  This varna is similar to the concept of episteme, to paradigm, to ideal type, to class, to stage, to era and a host of other words that have been used to describe stage theory.  Sarkar, himself, alternatively uses varna and collective psychology to describe his basic concept.  Collective psychology reflects group desire, social desire.  There are four basic desire systems.  The four varnas are historically developed.  First the shudra, then the ksattriya, then the vipra, then the vaeshya.  The last era is followed either by a revolution by the shudras or an evolution into the shudra era.

The order is cyclical, but there are reversals.  A counter evolutionary movement or a more dramatic counter revolution which may throw an era backwards, such as a military ksattriyan leaders wresting power from a vipran-led government.  Both are short-lived in terms of the natural cycle since both move counter to the natural developmental flow.  But in the long run, the order must be followed.

Significantly–and this is important in terms of developing an exemplary theory of macrohistory–Sarkar does not resort to external variables to explain the transition into the next era.  It is not new technologies that create a new wealthy elite that can control the vipras, rather it is a fault within the viprans themselves.  Moreover, it is not that they did not meet a new challenge, or respond appropriately, as Toynbee would argue.  Rather, Sarkar’s reasoning is closer to Ibn Khaldun’s and other classical philosophers.  They create a privileged ideological world or conquer a material world, use this expansion to take care of their needs, but when changes come, they are unprepared for they themselves have degenerated.  While changes are often technological (new inventions and discoveries of new resources) it is not the significant variable, rather it is the mindset of the vipran, individually and as a class, that leads to their downfall.

ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL-ECONOMY

Embedded in his social theory is Sarkar’s alternative political economy.  In this project he designs his ideal theory of value.  For Sarkar there are physical, intellectual and spiritual resources.  Most economic theory privileges the material forgetting the intellectual and especially the infinite spiritual resources available to us.  Secondly, his theory uses as its axial principle the notion of social justice, the notion of actions not for selfish pleasure but for the social good.

Society is perceived not as an aggregate of self-contained individuals nor as a mass collectivity designed for the commune, but rather as a family moving together on a journey through social time and space.  Within the family model there is hierarchy and there is unity.  Newly created wealth is used to give incentives to those who are actualizing their self, either through physical, intellectual or spiritual labor, and is used to maintain and increase basic needs–food, clothing, housing, education and medical care.  Employment, while guaranteed, still requires effort, since central to Sarkar’s metaphysics is that struggle is the essence of life.  It is challenge that propels humans, collectively and individually, towards new levels of physical wealth, intellectual understanding and spiritual realization.  Sarkar speaks of incentives not in terms of cash, but in terms of resources that can lead to more wealth.

Finally, Sarkar would place limits on personal income and land holdings for the world physical resources are limited and the universe cannot be owned by any individual since it is nested in a higher consciousness, the Supreme Consciousness.

THE INDIAN EPISTEME AND THE INDIAN CONSTRUCTION OF HISTORY

Following the classic Indian episteme, reality has many levels; most ideologies only have accentuated the spiritual (Vedanta) or the material (liberalism), or the individual (capitalism) or the collective (communism), the community (Gandhism), or race (Hitlerism) or the nation (fascism).  Sarkar seeks an alternative balance of self, community, ecology, and globe.  Yet the spiritual is his base.  In his view Consciousness from pure existence transforms to awareness then to succeeding material factors (the Big Bang onwards) until it becomes matter.  From matter, there is dialectical evolution to humans.  Humans, finally, can devolve back to the inanimate or evolve as co-creators with consciousness.  For humans, there is structure and choice, nature and will. There is both creation and there is evolution.  With this epistemic background, we should then not be surprised at his dual interests in the material and spiritual worlds and their dynamic balance.

Placing Sarkar in an alternative construction of the real is central to understanding his social theory.  Every macrohistorian and thinker who creates a new discourse evokes the universal and the transcendental, but their grand efforts also spring from the dust and the mud of the mundane.  They are born in particular places and they die in locatable sites as well.  Sarkar writes from India, writes from the poverty that is Calcutta.  The centrality of the cycle then can partially be understood by its physical location.  The cycle promises a better future ahead; it promises that the powerful will be made weak and the weak powerful, the rich will be humbled and the poor enabled.  The cycle also comes directly from the classic Indian episteme.  In this ordering of knowledge, the real has many levels and is thus pluralistic; the inner mental world is isomorphic with the external material world, there are numerous ways of knowing the real, and time is grand.  According to Romila Thapar, “Hindu thinkers had evolved a cyclic theory of time.  The cycle was called the kalpa and was equivalent to 4320 million earthly years.  The kalpa is divided into 14 periods and at the end of each of these the universe is recreated and once again Manu (primeval man) gives birth to the human race.”5

In this classical model (ascribed to the Gita) the universe is created, it degenerates, and then is recreated.  The pattern is eternal.  This pattern has clear phases; the golden era of Krta or Satya, the silver era of Treta, the copper era of Dvapara and the iron age of Kali.  At the end of Kali, however, the great redeemer whether Vishnu or Shiva or Krishna, is reborn, the universe is realigned, dharma or truth is restored, and the cycle begins again.

Now is there a way out?  An escape from the cycle? Classically it has been through an alchemical ontological transformation of the self: the self realizing its real nature and thus achieving timelessness–the archetype of the yogi.  Concretely, in social reality this has meant the transformation of a person engrossed in fear to a mental state where nothing is feared, neither king nor priest; all are embraced, lust and greed are transcended and individual inner peace is achieved.  To this archetype, Sarkar has added a collective level asserting that individual liberation must exist in parallel and in the context of social liberation.  Spirituality is impossible in the context of the social body suffering in pain.  For him the world has a 6  defective social order…. this state of affairs cannot be allowed to continue.  This structure of inequality and injustice must be destroyed and powdered down for the collective interest of the human beings.  Then and then alone, humans may be able to lead the society on the past of virtue.  Without that only a handful of persons can possibly attain the Supreme Perfection.

But Sarkar too uses the redeemer concept to provide the way out of cyclical history.  This is his taraka brahma.  The first was Shiva who transformed the chaos of primitive life to the orderliness of humanity. Next was Krishna who restored the notion of national community.  And, for Sarkar, another redeemer is needed to transform the fragmented nation-states into a world community.  However, paradoxically the concept of the redeemer for Sarkar is  also metaphorical: it is meant to elicit devotion by making the impersonal nature of Consciousness touchable in the form of a personal guru.

Sarkar thus develops ways out of the cycle: individual and social. In contrast Orientalist interpreters like Mircea Eliade believe that the theory of eternal cycles is “invigorating and consoling for man under the terror of history,”7 as now man knows under which eras he must suffer and he knows that the only escape is spiritual salvation. Sarkar finds this view repugnant, for people suffer differently and differentially in each era, those at the center of power do better than those at the outskirts, laborers always do poorly.  Indeed throughout history different classes do better than other classes, but the elite manage quite well.8

Oftentimes, some people have lagged behind, exhausted and collapsed on the ground, their hands and knees bruised and their clothes stained with mud.  Such people have been thrown aside with hatred and have become the outcastes of society.  They have been forced to remain isolated from the mainstream of social life.  This is the kind of treatment they have received.  Few have cared enough to lift up those who lagged behind, to help them forward.

Hope lies not in resignation to but transformation of the cycle–it is here that Sarkar moves away from the classic Hindu model of the real–of caste, fatalism, and mentalism–most likely influenced by fraternal Islamic concepts, liberal notions of individual will, and by Marxist notions of class struggle.

For Sarkar there are different types of time.  There is cosmic time –the degeneration and regeneration of dharma; there is individual liberation from time through entrance into infinite time; and there is the social level of time wherein the times of exploitation are reduced through social transformation, thus creating a time of dynamic balance–a balance between the physical, social and spiritual.

This differs significantly from other views of Indian history. In the Idealistic view history is but the play or sport of Consciousness.9  In this view the individual has no agency and suffering is an illusion.  In the dynastic view history is but the succeeding rise and falls of dynasties and kings and queens; it is only the grand that have agency.  In contrast is Aurobindo’s10 interpretation, influenced by Hegel, in which instrumentality is assigned to historical world leaders and to nations.  For Sarkar, making nationalism into a spiritual necessity is an unnecessary reading.  God does not prefer any particular structure over another.

Following Aurobindo, Buddha Prakash has taken the classic Hindu stages of gold, silver, copper and iron and applied them concretely to modern history.  India, for Prakash, with nation-hood and industrialism has now wakened to a golden age that “reveals the jazz and buzz of a new age of activity.”11  But for Sarkar, the present is not an age of awakening, but an age “where on the basis of various arguments a handful of parasites have gorged themselves on the blood of millions of people, while countless people have been reduced to living skeletons.”12

Sarkar also rejects the modern linear view of history in which history is divided into ancient (Hindu), medieval (Muslim), and modern (British-nationalistic).  In this view, England is modern and India is backward.  If only India can adopt rational, secular and capitalist or socialist perspectives and institutions, that is, modern policies, it too can join the western world.  India then has to move from prehistorical society–people lost in spiritual fantasy and caste but without state–to modern society.13  Sarkar’s views are closer to Jawaharlal Nehru14 who thought that history is about how humanity overcame challenges and struggled against the elements and inequity.  Sarkar’s views are also similar to the recent “Subaltern”15 project in which the aim is to write history from the view of the dominated classes, not the elite or the colonial. However, unlike the Subaltern project which eschews meta-narratives, Sarkar’s social cycle provides a new grand theory.

SARKAR’S HISTORIOGRAPHY

Sarkar’s stages can be used to contextualize Indian history.16  Just as there are four types of mentalities, structures or types, we can construct four types of history.  There is the shudra history, the project of the Subaltern group.  However, their history is not written by the workers themselves but clearly by intellectuals.  There is then ksattriyan history; the history of kings and empires, of nations and conquests, of politics and economics.  This is the history of the State, of great men and women. Most history is vipran history, for most history is written and told by intellectuals, whatever their claims for the groups they represent.  Vipran history is also the philosophy of history: the development of typologies, of categories of thought, of the recital of genealogies, of the search for evidence, of the development of the field of history itself.  This is the attempt to undo the intellectual constructions of others and create one’s own, of asking is there one construction or can there be many constructions? Finally, there is vaeshyan history.  This is the history of wealth, of economic cycles, of the development of the world capitalist system, of the rise of Europe and the fall of India.  Marxist history is unique in that it is written by intellectuals for workers but used by warriors to gain power over merchants.  Sarkar attempts to write a history that includes all four types of power: people’s, military, intellectual and economic.

For Sarkar, most history is written to validate a particular mentality. Each varna writes a history to glorify its conquests, its philosophical realizations, or its technological breakthroughs, but rarely is history written around the common woman or man. For Sarkar, history should be written about how humans solved challenges.  How prosperity was gained.  “History… should maintain special records of the trials and tribulations which confronted human beings, how those trials and tribulations were overcome, how human beings tackled the numerous obstacles to effect great social development.”17  History then needs to aid in mobilizing people, personally and collectively toward internal exploration and external transformation.  Thus history should be a “resplendent reflection of collective life whose study will be of immense inspiration for future generations.”18 History then is a political asset.  Here Sarkar moves to a poststructural understanding of the true.  Truth is interpretive, not rta (the facts) but satya (that truth which leads to human welfare).  History then should not be placed solely within the empiricist view, but within an interpretive political perspective.

Sarkar’s own history is meant to show the challenges humans faced: the defeats and the victories.  His history shows how humans were dominated by particular eras, how they struggled and developed new technologies, ideas, and how they realized the atman, the, the eternal self.  It is an attempt to write a history that is true to the victims but does not oppress them again by providing no escape from history, no vision of the future.  His history then is clearly ideological, not in the sense of supporting a particular class, but rather a history that gives weight to all classes yet attempts to move them outside of class, outside of ego and toward neo-humanism.

CONCLUSION

History then is the natural evolutionary flow of this cycle.  At every point there are a range of choices; once made the choice becomes a habit, a structure of the collective or group mind.  Each mentality, with an associated leadership class comes into power, makes changes, and administers government but eventually pursues its own class ends and exploits the other groups.  This has continued throughout history.   Sarkar’s unit of analysis begins with all of humanity, it is a history of humanity, but he often refers to countries and nations. The relationship to the previous era is a dialectical one; an era emerges out of the old era. History moves not because of external reasons, although the environment certainly is a factor, but because of internal organic reasons.  Each era gains power–military, normative, economic or chaotic–and then accumulates power until the next group dislodges the previous elite.  The metaphysic behind this movement is, for Sarkar, the wave motion.  There is a rise and then a fall.  In addition, this wave motion is pulsative, that is, the speed of change fluctuates over time.  The driving force for this change is first the dialectical interaction with the environment, second the dialectical interaction in the mind and in ideologies, and third the dialectical interaction between both, ideas and the environment.  But there is also another motivation: this is the attraction toward the Great. The individual attraction toward the Supreme.  This is the ultimate desire that frees humans of all desires.

While clash, conflict and cohesion with the natural and social environment drives the cycle, it is the attraction to the Great, the infinite, that is the solution or the answer to the problem of history.  It results in progress.  For Sarkar, the cycle must continue, for it is a basic structure in mind, but exploitation is not a necessity.   Through the sadvipra, exploitation can be minimized.

To conclude, Sarkar’s theory uses the metaphor of the human life cycle and the ancient wheel, that is, technology.  There is the natural and there is human intervention.  There is a structure and there is choice.  It is Sarkar’s theory that provides this intervention; an intervention that for Sarkar will lead to humanity as a whole finally taking its first deep breath of fresh air.

NOTES

1.         See Vimala Schneider, The Politics of Prejudice. Denver, Ananda Marga Publications, 1983.  Also see, Tim Anderson, Free Alister, Dunn and Anderson. Sidney, Wild and Wolley, 1985. And, Anandamitra Avadhutika, Tales of Torture. Hong Kong, Ananda Marga Publications, 1981.

2.         Ananda Marga, Ananda Vaniis. Bangkok, Ananda Marga Publications, 1982.

3.         For various interpretations of caste in Indian history and politics, see Nicholas Dirks, The Hollow Crown. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987; Rajni Kothari, Caste in Indian Politics. New Delhi, Orient Longman, 1970; Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus.  Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1979; and, Romila Thapar, A History of India. Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1966.

4.         See Richard Gauthier, “The Greenhouse Effect, Ice Ages and Evolution,” New Renaissance (Vol. 1, No. 3, 1990).

5.         Romila Thapar, A History of India, 161.

6.         P. R. Sarkar, Supreme Expression. Vol. II. Netherlands, Nirvikalpa Press, 1978, 16.

7.         Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return. New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1971, 118.

8.         P. R. Sarkar,  The Liberation of Intellect–Neo Humanism. Calcutta, Ananda Marga Publications, 1983.

9.         Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, “History: An Idealist’s View.”  K. Satchidananda Murti, ed. Readings. See  K. Satchidananda Murti, “History: A Theist’s View.” K. Satchidananda Murti, ed. Readings.

10.       Sri Aurobindo,  “The Spirituality and Symmetric Character of Indian Culture,” and “The Triune Reality,” K. Satchidananda Murty, ed. Readings in Indian History, Philosophy and Politics. London. George Allen and Unwin, 1967, p. 361. Also see Vishwanath Prasad Varma. Studies in Hindu Political Thought and its Metaphysical Foundations. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1974.

11.       See Buddha Prakash, “The Hindu Philosophy of History.” Journal of the History of Ideas (Vol. 16, No. 4, 1958).

12.       Shrii Anandamurti, Namah Shivaya Shantaya. Calcutta, Ananda Marga Publications, 1982, 165.

13.       See Ronald Inden, “Orientalist Constructions of India.” Modern Asian Studies (Vol. 20, No. 3, 1986). See also Edward Said, Orientalism. New York, Vintage Books, 1979.  And, Ashis Nandy, Traditions, Tyranny and Utopias. New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1987.

14.       Jawaharlal Nehru, “History: A Scientific Humanist’s View.” K. Satchidananda Murti, ed. Readings.

15.       Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Selected Subaltern Studies. New York, Oxford University Press, 1988.  See also D.D. Kosambit, “A Marxist Interpretation of Indian History.” K. Satchidananda Murty, ed. Readings, 40.

16.       See also Sabyasachi Bhattacharya and Romila Thapar, eds. Situating Indian History. Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1986.

17.       P. R. Sarkar. A Few Problems Solved. Vol. 4. trans. Acarya Vijayananda Avadhuta. Calcutta, Ananda Marga Publications, 1987, 64.

18.       ibid, 66.

The Rights of Robots (1988)

Technology, Culture and Law in the 21st Century

By Phil McNally and Sohail Inayatullah*

INTRODUCTION

In the last five years, the Hawaii Judiciary has developed as part of its comprehensive planning program, a futures research component.  Initially futures research was largely concerned with identifying emerging issues; that is issues that are low in awareness to decision makers and high in potential impact.1

At present the Courts futures program is engaged in a variety of activities.  Researchers study the impact of possible legislation on the Judiciary, forecast future caseloads, publish a newsletter of emerging issues, trends, and research findings2, and provide research information to decision makers as to the future of technology, economy, population, management and crime.

However in the past few years of concentrating on short and medium term futures, we have remained fascinated by one long term emerging issue‑‑the Rights of Robots.

The predictable response to the question: should robots have rights has been one of disbelief.  Those in government often question the credibility of an agency that funds such research.  Many futurists, too, especially those concerned with environmental or humanistic futures, react unfavorably.  They assume that we are unaware of the second and third order effects of robotics‑‑the potential economic dislocations, the strengthening of the world capitalist system, and the development of belief systems that view the human brain as only a special type of computer.

Why then in the face of constant ridicule should we pursue such a topic.  We believe that the development of robots and their emerging rights is a compelling issue which will signficantly and dramatically impact not only the judicial and criminal justice system, but also the philosophical and political ideas that govern our societal institutions.

In the coming decades, and perhaps even years, sophisticated thinking devices will be developed and installed in self‑propelled casings which will be called robots.  Presently robots are typically viewed as machines; as inanimate objects and therefore devoid of rights.  Since robots have restricted mobility, must be artifically programmed for “thought,”lack senses as well as the emotions associated with them, and most importantly cannot experience suffering or fear, they, it is argued, lack the essential attributes to be considered alive.  However, the robot of tomorrow will undoubtedly have many of these characteristics and may perhaps become an intimate companion to its human counterpart.

We believe that robots will one day have rights.  This will undoubtedly be a historically significant event.  Such an extension of rights obviously presupposes a future that will be fundamentally different from the present.  The expansion of rights to robots may promote a new appreciation of the interrelated rights and responsibilities of humans, machines and nature.

With such an holistic extension of rights to all things in nature from animals and trees to oceans comes a renewed sense of responsibility, obligation and respect for all things.  Certainly these concepts are foreign to the worldview of most of us today.  The burden of this paper is then to convince the reader that there is strong possibility that within the next 25 to 50 years robots will have “rights.”

CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 

The definition of rights has been historically problematic.  In part, it is an unresolved problem because there are numerous disparate definitions of what constitutes “rights.”  These fundamentally different views are largely politically, institutional and culturally based.  Those in or with power tend to define rights differently then those out of or without power.  In addition, cultures with alternative cosmologies define notions of natural, human, and individual rights quite differently.

Historically, humanity has developed ethnocentric and egocentric view of rights.   Many notions of “rights” reflect the 16th century views of Newton’s clockwork universe and Descarte’s rationality as well as the emerging Protestant ethic.  The impact of such views upon thinkers of the Enlightenment like John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau and Thomas Hobbes was profound.  In Leviathan, Hobbes vividly illustrated the problem of existence.  For Hobbes, life without legal rights (as provided by governing institutions) was one of “continual fear, of violent death; with the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”3  With the development of Western capitalism and rationality, suddenly man assumed dominance over nature and replaced God as the center of the universe.  Thus natural rights of man became institutionalized, bureaucratized and formalized and like legal systems developed along rational lines so as to provide the necessary stability and predictability for the growth of market capitalism.

In addition, this Western capitalistic notion of governance led to the loss of individual efficacy as well as the elimination or subjugation of rights of nature, women, non‑whites, and religious groups.  For capitalism to thrive, for surplus to be appropriated, a division of capital, labor and resources must exist; that is there must be capitalists who exploit and the underclass‑‑the environment, the internal proleteriat and the external colonies‑‑who must be exploited.  To provide an ideological justification of exploitation, it was necessary to percieve the exploited as the “other” as less than human, as less then the agents of dominance.  Thus, nature, those in the colonies and the underclass within industrialized nations (women and the proleteriat) had to be deined certain rights.  The denial of rights for nature, in addition, found its ideological justification from Christianity and the classical Cartesian separation in Western thought between mind/body, self/environment and self/nature.   Similarly and unfortunately from our persepective, the possibility of robotic rights in the future is tied to the expansion of the world capitalist system.  Robots will gain rights only insofar as such an event will lead to the further strengthening of the capitalist system.  Most likely they will gain rights during a system crisis; when the system is threatened by anarchy and legal unpredictability‑‑a condition that paradoxically may result from developments in artificial intelligence and robotics.

Other cultures however provide a different if not fresh perception of the meaning and purpose of rights that is in marked contrast to the historical and present Western position.  For example, American Indian Jamake Highwater states in The Primal Mind, “whites are extremely devoted to limiting the rights of individuals and preventing anarchy, which is greatly feared in individualized cultures…by contrast the Indian, generally speaking, does not recognize the individual and therefore has not formulated strict regulations for its control”4

The Indian recognizes the collective.  This collective is more than the aggregate of individuals in his his tribe.  It is rocks, trees, sacred grounds, animals‑‑the universe itself.  Thus for the Indian, there exists a harmony between Nature and the individual; a relationship characterized by sharing, caring and gratitude, not dominance.

Social philospher, activist and mystic P.R. Sarkar states in Neo‑Humanism: The Liberation of the Intellect5 that we must develop a new humanism that transcends the narrow outlooks of the ego.  We must transcend our attachments to our nation, to our religion and to our class.  In addition, humans must include animals and plants and all of life in definitions of what constitutes “real” and ” important.”  We cannot neglect the life of animals and plants.  Of course, this is not to say there should not be hierarchy among species especially as human life is rare and precious; still our economic development decisions, our food decisions must take into consideration plants and animals as participants. The rights of technology is a legitimate concern from the Eastern perspective because all‑that‑is is alive. The universe is alive.

Sarkar also forecasts the day when technology will have “mind” in it.  While this may seem foreign to the Western notion of mind, for Sarkar “mind” is in all things.  Evolution is the reflection, the development of this mind towards total awareness, towards Godhood, Self‑realization.  Humans in general have the most developed mind, animals less, plants even lesser and rocks the least.  Once technology can develop and become more subtle, then it, like the brain, can become a better carrier of the mind.  Mind is constantly “looking” for vehicles to express itself.  Nothing is souless, although there are gradations of awareness.6

The Buddhist notion is similar to this.  For the Buddhist, the self is always changing: evolving and deevolving.  Defining humans as the sole inheritors of the planet at the expense of other sentient beings leads to hubris and evil.  Again, the Buddha, nor any of his future disciples, developed an explicit rights for robots; however, his perspective certainly involves seeing All as persons not as things.

From the American Indian, Yogic Sarkarian and the Buddhist perspective, we must live in harmony with nature, with technology‑‑things do not exist solely for our use as humans, life exists for itself, or as a reflection of the Supreme Consciousness.  Animals and Plants, then, as well as robots, should have rights not because they are like humans, but of what they are, as‑themselves.

Chinese cultural attitudes towards the notion of rights also offer a decidedly different approach than that of the West.  From this perspective, the legal norms of rights, established by man, are held as secondary to natural rights.  Clarence Morris in The Justification of the Law argues that for the Chinese, harmony instead of dominance is more important.7  For example, “few Chinese scholars prize law in general or the imperial codes in particular: most of them hold that proper conduct is consonate with the cosmic order and therefore is determined not by law but by natural prppriety.”8

Morris continues in the vein of natural law noting that “we live in an unsuperstitutious world‑‑in which enforceable legal obligations (are) human artifices, and the laws of nature, in themselves, (do) not indicate where earthly rights (lay)‑‑man inevitably (has given) up the primitive practice of prosecuting brutes and things.  So beasts and trees no longer (have) any legal duties.  Westerners who gave up the conceit that nature had legal duties also became convinced that nature has no legal rights.”9

Morris believes that nature should be a party to any case, not for man’s purpose but for its purpose.  Nature should have rights.  “Nature should no longer be dislocated on whim or without forethought about the harm that may ensue; he who proposes dislocation should justify it before he starts.”10  Certain authorities should then be designated as nature’s guardians in the same way that children who cannot represent themselves have guardians.  In addition, writes Morris:11

When legal rights are, by statute, conferred on feral beasts, green forests, outcroppings of stone, and sweet air, and when these legal rights are taken seriously, men will respect these duties in much the same way as they respect their other legal obligations.

NATURE AND ROBOTS

This neo‑humanistic type of thinking can and, we believe, should apply to robots as well.  Eventually humans may see robots in their own right, not only as our mechanical slaves, not only as our products, as ours to buy and sell, but also entities in their own right.  Of course, at present the notion of robots with rights is unthinkable, whether one argues from an “everything is alive” Eastern perspective or “only man is alive” Western perspective.  Yet as Christopher Stone argues in Should Trees Have Standing?‑‑Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, “throughout legal history, each successive extension of rights to some new entity has been, theretofore, a bit unthinkable.  We are inclined to suppose the rightlessness of rightless “things” to be a decree of Nature, not a legal convention acting in support of some status quo.”12

Stone reminds us of the obvious but easily forgotten.  Human history is the history of exclusion and power.  Humans have defined numerous groups as less than human: slaves, woman, the “other races”, children and foreigners. These are the wretched who have been defined as, stateless, personless, as suspect, as rightless.  This is the present realm of robotic rights.

The concept of extending right to nature represents a dialectical return to a holistic sense of natural rights. Once a renewed respect of the rights of all things to exist is established then an understanding of the legal dimensions of human‑made creations, such as robots, can emerge.

As we enter a post‑industrial technology‑driven society, we need to ressess our interconnected relationship with nature and machines as well as the notions of rights associated with this new relationship.

Computer and robotic technology are not only modernizing traditional industries, they are also creating numerous new opportunities and problems in space, genetic engineering, and war and defense systems.  The adaption of these new technologies in education, healthcare and in our institutions as well as in our models of thought are inevitable and may, through proper forecasting and control, be positive.  Any continued attempt to ignore the needs of technology or to deter its use would be foolish and impossible.  Yet, in many ways that is pricisely what we continue to do.  Presntly, the foundation of the American Constitution and the Bill of Rights, “obviously reflects the technological and political issues of 18th century English society…what we continue to do is restructure and reinterpret it to fit an ever more rapidly evolving technological society.”13  Perhaps, what we really need to do, is to rewrite, or video, the Constitution in the light of future trends and issues.

The Constitution could be rewritten to include the rights of trees and streams, robots and humans.  Of course, we are not aruging that robots should have the same rights as humans, rather, that they are seen as an integral part of the known universe.  In addition, although we are not advocating the worship of technology, yet with ” the genie of technology having been let out the bottle and (as it) can be force(d) back in,” 14 social planning for robots must be attempted.

ROBOT TECHNOLOGY

The rapid impact of computers upon the world since the development of the first computer, UNIVAC in 1946, has been profound.  As little as ten years ago, the thought of having a personal computer at one’s office desk, home, or grade school seemed far‑fetched indeed.  Now personal computers are accepted complacently as part of our modern world.  Computer brains run cars, stereos, televisions, refrigerators, phone systems, factories, offices, airplanes, and defense systems, to name a few examples.  The next progression of the computer as a mobile unit, robot, may like the personal computer, become a common and essential companion at home and in the workplace.

At the vanguard of computer technology is the development of artificial intelligence (AI) and the creation of living computer circuitry called “biochips.”  The development of “AI” requires the computer to make a jump in inference, a quantum leap over miscellaneous data, something a programmed machine has been unable to do.  Literally, the computer must skip variables rather than measure each one.  It is not quite a mirror of the human gestalt “aha” illunimation of a decision but similar.

One of the essential difficulties in developing such a thinking computer is the problem of converting the holistic process of thought into the linear description of written language.  Common sense reasoning does not conform to the logic of computer languages as FORTRAN.  “For instance there is no program around today that will tell the difference between a dish and a cup.”15  What is needed is the development of a new language for programming which combines the multiple meanings of Chinese pictography with the preciseness of Western script.

The development of living “biochips” will further blur the definition of a living machine.  By synthesizing living bacteria, scientists have found a way to program the bacteria’s genetic development to mimic the on and off switching of electronic circuitry.  Many scientists presently feel silicon miniturization has reached its limit because of the internal heat that they generate.  The “biochip” is then expected to greatly expand the capabilities of computerization by reaching the ultimate in miniaturization.  “Biochips” also will have the unique ability to correct design flaws.  Moreover, James McAlear, of Gentronix Labs notes, “because proteins have the ability to assemble themselves the (organic) computer would more or less put itself together.”16

In the creation of a living computer system “we are, according to Kevin Ulmer of The Genex Corporation, making a computer from the very stuff of life.”17  Eventually it is expected that these systems will be so miniturized that they may be planted in humans so as to regulate chemical and systemic imbalances.  As these chips are used to operate mechanical arms, or negate brain or nerve damage the issue of man‑robots, cyborgs, will arise.  The development of such organic computers is expected in the early 1990’s.  This new technolgical development will force a redefinition of our conception of life.

During this explosive era of high‑tech innovation, contact between machine with artificial intelligence and humans will rapidly increase.  Computer intelligent devices, especially expert systems, are now making decisions in medicine, oil exploration, space travel, air traffic control, train conduction, and graphic design to mention a few areas of impact.

The greatest attribute of an expert system is its infinite ability to store the most minute information and its tremendous speed at recalling and cross referencing information to make instantaneous conclusions.  The greatest drawback will be in convincing people to trust the computers decisions.  This, mistrust, however, will be signficantly reduced as robots in human form (voice, smell, sight, shape)‑‑androids‑‑are developed.

In deciding if computers can make experts decisions, we must first delineate the attributes of an expert?  Randall Davis of MIT provides the following definition: “(1) they can solve problems; (2) they can explain results; (3) they can learn by experience; (4) they can restructure their knowledge; (5) they are able to break rules when necessary; (6) they can determine relevance; and (7) their performance degrades gracefully as they reach the limits of their knowledge.”18  Presently computers are capable of achieving the first three stages but cannot reprogram themselves or break rules, a decidedly human trait.

ARE ROBOTS ALIVE?  

Robots presently are construed to be dead, inanimate.  However, an argument can be made that with advances in artificial intelligence, robots will be considered “alive.”  Sam N. Lehman‑Wilzig in his essay titled “Frankenstein Unbound: Towards a legal definition of Artificial Intelligence”19 presents evidence that Artificial Intelligence (AI) machines already created or theoretical possible will be by most definitions alive.  We quote extensively from this landmark article:

By any definition the present powers of AI machines are both impressive and worrisome.  Cyberneticists have already created or proven that AI constructs can do the following:20

(1)  “Imitate the behavior of any other machine.”21

(2)  Exhibit curiosity (ie are always moving to               investigate their environment); display self‑recognition (ie react to the sight of themselves); and manifest mutual recognition of members of their own machine species.22

(3)        Learn from their own mistakes.23

(4)        Be as “creative” and “purposive” as are humans, even to the extent of “look[ing] for purposes  which they can fulfill.”24

(5)        Reproduce themselves, in five fundamentally different modes, of which the fifth‑‑the “probabilistic mode of self‑reproduction”‑‑closely  arallels biological evolution through mutations (which in the case of [machines] means random changes of elements), so that “highly efficient, complex, powerful automata can evolve from inefficient, simple, weak automata.”25

(6)        “Can have an unbounded life span through self‑repairing mechanisms.”26

In short, “a generation of robots is rapidly evolving,  a breed that can see, read, talk, learn, and even feel  [emotions].”27

But the essential question remains‑‑can these machines be considered to be “alive?” Kemeny presents six criteria which distinguish living from inanimate matter: metabolism, locomotion, reproducibility, individuality, intelligence, and a “natural” (non‑artificial) composition.28  In all six, he concludes, AI servo‑mechanisms clearly pass the test.29

Even a critic of AI such as Weizenbaum admits that computers are sufficiently “complex and autonomous” to be called an “organism” with “self‑consciousness” and an ability to be “socialized.”  He sees “no way to put a bound on the degree of intelligence such an organism could, at least in principle, attain,” although from his critical vantage point, not in the “visible future.”30

Viewed from this perspective, robots are indeed “alive.”  However, we should note the worldview behind this perspective; it is based on the assumption that we can compare a human brain to a computer brain, that creativity is something that is not divinely inspired, it is simply the “juxtaposing of previously existing information”31‑‑thus humans and computers can be equally creative.  “Humaness” then is defined by aliveness, the ability to make decisions, to reflect, learn and discriminate‑‑reflective awareness, to ask the questions, Do I exist? Who am I?

AI enthusiasts seriously argue that not only do robots have the theoretically possibility of “life” but inevitably will be perceived as alive.  It is only our “humancentricness,” our insistence that life must be judged strictly on human terms as evidenced, for instance, by the structural bias in our language, that prevents us from understanding the similarity of robots‑‑now and in the future‑‑to humans.  Of course, there are numerous arguments against this perspective.  From the Western religious view, Man’s soul is given directly by God; robots are souless, thus, dead and thereby rightless.  From a humanistic perspective, only by the clever use of language‑‑comparing our brains to robot’s memories, and other reductionist arguments‑‑can it be argued that robots are alive.  Aliveness is flesh and bones, aliveness is blood.  Thus, robots remain dead complex machines that can be made to act and look like humans, but will always remain as robots, not humans.  As the case with B.F. Skinner’s pigeons who were trained to hit a ping‑pong ball back and forth, we should not be fooled to believe that they are really “playing” ping‑pong.

However compelling these arguments against robots‑as‑humans, they may lose some of their instinctive truth once computers and robots increasingly become a part of our life, as we slowly renegotiate the boundaries of us and them.  We have seen this with household pets, who certainly are perceived as having human traits and who have certain rights.  Of course, the notion that dogs and cats have rights is contentious, since it can be argued that cruelty to animal statutes only confer a right on the human public, represented by the State, to have a culprit punished.  Conversely, it can be argued that humans are simply acting as agents of interest and that animals themselves are the real parties of interest.  We will further develop the contours of the definition of a rightholder later on in this paper.

In addition, arguing from the perspective of robot’s rights, AI and robotics are relatively new innovations.  If we assume that growth in computermemory continues, we can safely forecast that computers and robots by the year 2100 will only differ in physical form from humans.

Already, computers that preform psychotherpy cannot be distinguished from doctors who do the same, although clearly computers are not thinking.  For example, in the 1960’s MIT Professor Joseph Weisenbaum invented a computer program ELIZA to parody a therapist in a doctor‑patient format picking up key phrases, making grammatical substitutions and providing encouraging non‑committal responses.  “Weizenbaum was soon schocked to see people become emotionally involved with the computer, believing that ELIZA understood them… the computer program had properties and powers that he had not anticipated.”32  Nor had he anticipated the needs of humans to attribute human characteristics to gods, animals and inanimate objects.

Programs such as ELIZA, however, are only a beginning.  Far more complex programs will be developed untill distinctions between human thought and computer‑generated thought become impossible.  Our perceptions of thinking, life, will continue to change as a response to changing technology and changing beliefs of what is natural.  These perceptions may change to such a degree that, one day, robots, may have legal rights.

DEFINING RIGHTS

But what does it mean to have legal rights?  At present, but not necessarily so in the future, an entity cannot have a right “unless and untill some public authoritative body is prepared to give some amount of review to actions that are colorably inconsistent with that “rights.”33  However, according to Christoper Stone, for a thing to be a holder of legal rights, the following criteria must be satisfied: (1) the thing can institute legal actions at its behest; (2) that in determining the granting of legal relief, the Court must take injury to it into account; and the relief must run to the benefit of it.  If these conditions are satisfied then the thing counts jurally, it has legally recognized worth and dignity for its own sake. 34

For example, writes Stone, the action of an owner suing and collecting damages if his slave is beaten is quite differently from the slave instituting legal actions himself, for his own recovery, because of his pain and suffering.35  Of course, a suit could be brought by a guardian in the subject’s name in the case of a child or a robot, for the child’s or robot’s sake, for damages to it.

This is equally true for Nature as well. We cannot always rely on individuals to protect Nature, as they may not have standing and as it may not be cost‑effective for an individual owner to, say for example, sue for damages for downstream pollution. However, a stream may be protected by giving it legal rights.  If Nature had rights, Court’s then would not only weigh the concerns of the polluter with that of the individual plaintiff but the rights of the stream as well.  With Nature rightless, Courts presently can rule that it is in the greater public interest to allow Business to continue pollution as Industry serves a larger public interest.  “The stream,” writes Stone,” is lost sight of in a quantitative compromise between two conflicting interests.'”36

Similarly, we can anticipate cases and controversies where the needs of robot developers, manufacturers and users will be weighed against those who are against robots (either because they have been injured by a robot, because of their religious perspectives or because of their labor interests). Judges will have to weigh the issues and decide between parties.  But, unless robots themselves have rights, they will not be a party to the decision.  They will not have standing.  They will not be legally real.

But certainly as robot technology develops, as they are utilized to increase humanity’s collective wealth‑‑albeit in a capitalistic framework, robots will only increase the gap between rich and poor, between employed and unemployed‑‑their future will be inextricably tied to our future, as is the case with the environment today.

EMERGENCE OF RIGHTS

As important as defining legal rights is developing a theory on how rights emerge.  They, of course, do not suddenly appear in Courts.  Neal Milner has developed a useful theory on the emergence of rights from a synthesis of literature on children’s rights, women’s rights, right’s of the physically and mentally handicapped, rights to health, legal mobilization and legal socialization.37

His first stage in this theory is imagery.  Here imagery stressing rationality of the potential rights‑holder is necessary. From this perspective, the robot then must be defined as a rational actor, an actor with intent. This, however, is only true from the Western perspective.  From the Eastern perspective, previously outlined, rationality does not define life.

The next stage of rights emergence requires a justifying ideology.  Ideologies justifying changes in imagery develop.  These, according to Milner, include ideologies by agents of social control and those on the part of potential rights holders or their representatives. These ideologies would be developed by scientists, science fiction writers, philosophers and perhaps even futurists. They would have to argue that robots are a legitimate category of life.

The next stage is one of changing authority patterns.  Here authority patterns of the institutions governing the emerging rights holders begin to change.  It is not clear what institution directly control robots‑‑the intellectual/academic university sector, or business/manufacturers, or government/military?  Howevers, as rights for robots emerge we can forecast conflicts between various institutions that control them and within those institutions themselves.  Milner next sees the development of “social networks that reinforce the new ideology and that form ties among potential clients, attorneys and intermediaries.”38 We would see the emergence of support groups for robots with leading scientists joining political organizations.  The next stage involves access to legal representation.  This is followed by routinization, wherein legal representation is made routinely available.  Finally government uses its processes to represent the emerging rights‑holders.

Of course, this is just a general model.  The initial step will be the most difficult.  Arguing that robots have rationality, especially from the Western perspective which reserves rationalities for self‑directed, individual, autonomous adult persons will be difficult.  Given the dominance of the West, it may be that robots will not gain rights until there are seen or imaged in the above manner.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

However, eventually, AI technoloy may reach a genesis stage which will bring robots to a new level of awareness that can be considered alive, wherein they will be perceived as rational actors.  At this stage, we can expect robot creators, human companions and robots themselves to demand some form of recognized rights as well as responsibilities.  What types of rights will be demanded?  Basic human rights of life, friendship and caring?  The right to reproduce?  The right to self programming (self expression)?  The right to be wrong?  The right to intermarry with humans?  The right to an income?  The right to time off from the job?  The right to a trial by its peers (computers)?  The right to be recognized as victims of crimes?  The right to protection of unwarranted search and seizure of its memory bank?  The right to protection from cruel and unusual punishments such as the termination of its power supply?

In a brief play script Don Mitchell vividly illustrates the future image of the blue collor industrial robot on the assembly line as one of danger, monotony and despair.  Here the exploitation of robots is a reflection of the human exploitation incurred during early 20th century industrialization.  However, unlike their human counterparts these robots have no way to voice their suffering.  This situation raises these types of questions; “How do you measure value?  By the price tag?  By the need?  By the blood and sweat that goes into making something?  Robots do not produce labor value, though.  There is no mechanical Karl Marx to save them.”39

Obviously, in the discussion of robot rights questions like the above are difficult to answer.  Yet robots continue to replace their human counterparts on the assembly line and at the factory in a rapidly increasing pace.  They are replacing humans because of their high productivity and low cost. Faster robots do not tire, more reliable robots do not have family problems, drink or do drugs, cheaper to maintain robots do not strike for wages and fringe benefits, for example.

Soon the initial question that will be raised is: How are robotic generated goods and services to be distributed in the community?  The distribution of this wealth requires a new conception of ownership, production, and consumption.  In a potential world without work some form of redistribution of wealth will be necessary.  “In Sweeden employers pay the same taxes for robots that they do for human employees.  In Japan some companies pay union dues for robots.”40  Supporters of robotic rights might say that computers are paying these taxes and dues from their labor and should derive rights for such labor.

Following questions of distribution of wealth come questions of ownership.  In the very near future it is expected that computers will begin to design their own software programs.  Considering the fact that, “the Copyright Act limits copyright protection to the author’s lifetime,

which is clearly inappropriate for a computer, it would then seem that a change in the law may be needed to provide proper protection for programs with non‑human authors.”41

Legal rights and responsibilities will then be needed to protect humans and robots alike.  This need should give rise to a new legal specialty like environmental law, robotic law.  With this new specialty we may find lawyers defending the civil rights of self‑aware robots which could take the following form: “to protect the super‑robot from total and irreversible loss of power (LIFE); to free the robot from slave labor (LIBERTY); and allow it to choose how it spends it time (THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS).42

NEW CASES

We will then see an avalanche of cases: we will have robots that have killed humans, robots that have been killed by humans, robots who have stolen state secrets, robots who have been stolen; robots who have taken hostages, robots who have been held hostage, robots who carry illegal drugs across boarders, and robots themselves who illegally cross national boarders.  Cases will occur in general when robots damage something or someone or a robot itself is damaged or terminated.  In addition, robots will soon enter our homes as machines to save labor, and as machines to provide child care and protection.  Eventually these entities will become companions to be loved, defended and protected.

Robots that are damaged or damaged or break other human laws will raise various complex issues.  Of course at present, robot damage will be simply a tort case, just as if ones car was damaged.  But an attorney will one day surely argue that the robot has priceless worth. It is not a car. It talks, it is loved and it “loves.”  The robot, then, like a human, has been injured.  Its program and wires damaged.   In this scenario, we will then need to have special tort laws for robots.

The legal system is today unprepared for the development of robotic crimes.  Recently, the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report  cited the first death caused by a robot.  This accident occurred when a machinist at a Michigan company entered a robots work envelope.  Apparently not programmed to take human frailty into account the robot used its arm to pin the man to a safety pole killing him with the force.”43  This case is considered an industrial accident and could have possibly been avoided if the robot had an improved sense of sight and more careful programming.  In the future, robotic legislation may require laws similar to Issac Asimov’s First Law Of Robotics that prevent the injury of humans by robots.  These laws could be coded into the robots memory such that robots will have to terminate themselves if a conflict arises.44 However, we can easily imagine scenarios where a robot will have to choose betwen one and many humans or situations wherein its own termination may cause injuries to humans.  These issues and conflicts will task programmers, the legal systems, and robots themselves.

Once (the computers within) robots begin to program themselves according to external stimuli the robot may begin to commit crimes completely independent of earlier human programming.  If a robot can commit a crime

then a number of problematic questions will arise.  “Can a robot intend to commit a crime?  How is a robot to be punished?  Is it sufficient to reprogram it?  To take it apart?  To penalize its owner?  Its designer?  Its manufacture?  Its programmer?”45

Such questions also raise problems concerning criminal trials that involve robots.  Many court procedures will need to be adapted to accommodate the needs of such cases.  This situation will be exacerbated by the development of robots who serve as witnesses for robots or provide expert testimony.  Certainly, “a trial by a jury of peers seems inappropriate and certainly the 6th and 14th amendments guarantees to such a trial do not apply to robots.”46  Or do they?

To understand the legal principles that can be applied to robots we must first have an understanding of the emerging electronic Judiciary.

THE ELECTRONIC JUDICIARY

Also relevant in developing scenarios is the future of the Judiciary and the legal system itself.47  Courts themselves in the next fifty years may be robot‑computer run.  Judges are faced with a rapidly expanding caseload where the must analyze legal documents, settle plea bargains, determine sentences, keep abreast of social, economic and political issues as well as act court administrators.  Furthermore, as the Courts continue to act as political and social decisionmakers, judges must cope with complex scientific and technological issues.  Of this situation critics note “judges have little or no training or background to understand and resolve problems of nuclear physics, toxicology, hydrology, biotechnology or a myriad of other specialties.”48  Computer technology should then be incorporated into the judicial process to aid in decisionmaking.

The first step will be judges using computers to aid in searching out the most appropriate precedent to fit the present case.  The development of a legal reasoning robot could serve as a valuable adjunct to a judges ability to render fair decisions.  “As computers grow more elaborate and versatile (they) can better cope with the complexities of law, judgements and precedence.”49  A legal reasoning robot could “serve as a repository of knowledge outlining the general parameters of the law…assisting in the reasoning process necessary to reach a conclusion.”50  As logic oriented companion and a massive knowledge bank with the ability to instantly recall legal facts, precedent and procedure a legal robot would greatly assist the judicial system by speeding up court procedure, minimizing appeals based on court error, and preventing legal maneuvering resulting in fewer cases brought to court.

Eventually, as enough statistics are compiled, judges may not be that necessary except at the appellate level.  Judges could then be free to vigorously pursue the legal and philosophical dimensions of societal problems.  Of course, initially during the pre‑trial phase, humans would be necessary.  Attorneys would enter the facts into computers (manually, through voice‑telecommunications) and a motions judge could monitor discovery and fact finding.  Computers would then decide the case outcome.51  In addition, as most cases are negotiated (only about 5 percent ever end up in trial,52) we will see the continued development and sophistication of negotiation and mediation programs.  Disputants would enter their side of the problem, the computer‑robot would interact with each side and aid in reaching a settlement.  Computers might inspire trust as they can instantaneously and annonymously provide relevant previous cases to both disputants.  They can inform the disputants how the case might be settled (in terms of probabilities) if they went to trial or if they settled, that is they could provide a range of alternative choices and solutions.  In addition, AI programs, as we are seeing in computerized psychotherapy, allow individuals to relax and “open up easier.”  Besides being impressed by the “intelligence of robot‑judges” we might gain trust in the machines because of the magic they invoke and they authority they command.  This magic and authority may lead to an increased belief in the fairness of the Judiciary.

Of course, fairness is not a given; it is a political issue.  Law, unlike mathematics is laden with assumptions and biases.  Decisionmaking is an act of power.  Intitially the use of comptuers will shift power in the court system from judges to programmers.  Judges of course, if they allow AI to enter their courtroom, will do their best to keep control of the law and programmers.  However, given the anticipated development of robotics, eventually we may see computers changing the programming and developing novel solutions to cases.  If computers can develop creativity then judges and other experts will have to find new roles and purposes for themselves.

Finally, although it is presently ludicrous, a day may come when robots attorneys negotiate or argue in front of a robot judge with a robot plaintiff and defendent.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

To understand in more concrete terms the legal future of robots, we must understand what legal principles will be applied to conflicts that involve robots.  Lehman‑Wilzig’s article on the legal definition of artificial intelligence is extremely useful.  He presents various legal principles which may be of relevance to robot cases.  They include:  product liability, dangerous animals, slavery, diminished capacity, childeren, and agency.53

Product liability would be applied as long a robots are believed to be complex machines.  Not only will the manufacturer be liable, say in the case when a robot guard shoots an intruder, but so will “importers, wholesalers, and retailers (and their individual employees if personally negligent); repairers, installers, inspector, and certifiers.54  Thus those that produce, regulate, transport, and use the robot will be liable to some degree.  Certainly, as caseload for robot liability cases mount insurance companies will be cautious about insuring robots.  Moreover, we can imagine the day when manufacturers will argue that the robot is alive and that the company is not liable.  Although the company may have manufactured the robot, they will argue that since then the robot has either (1) reprogrammed itself or (2) the new owner has reprogrammed it.  The argument then will be that it is the robot which should suffer damages and if it has no money, other parties who are partially liable under the joint severibility law should pay the entire bill‑‑the deep pockets principle.  When the first attorney will call a robot on stand is difficult to forecast but not impossible to imagine.

Product liability will be especially problematic for AI, because of the present distinction between hardware and software.  For the robot that kills, is the manufacturer of the arms liable, or the software designer, the owner, or is there no liability‑‑Human beware, computer around!  Will we see no‑fault computer insurance law?

The danger that robots may cause would logically increase as they become auto‑locomoative, that is, once they can move.  At this stage law relating to dangerous animals may be applicable to robots.  Like animals, they move and like animals they give a sense of intelligence, although whether they actually are intelligent is a political‑ philosophical question. Lehman‑Wilzing writes:55

While the difference in tort responsibility between product liability and dangerous animals is relatively small, the transition does involve a quantum jump from a metaphysical standpoint.  As long as AI robots are considered mere machines no controversial evaluative connotations are placed on their essence‑‑they are inorganic matter pure and simple.  However, applying the legal principle of dangerous animals (among others) opens a jurisprudential and definitional Pandora’s Box, for ipso facto the “machine” will have been transformed into a legal entity with properties of consciousness, if not some semblance of free will.  Once begun, the legal development towards the “higher” categories will be as inexorable as the physical expansion of robotic powers.  In short, the move from the previous legal category to the present one is the most critical step; afterwards, further jurisprudential evolution becomes inevitable.

It is important to remember here that as important as legal rights, those rights that can resolved or judged by a public authority, there are human rights.  These often cannot be resolved by any judicial authority.  The right to employment, the right to minimum basic necessities, and other United Nations Charter human rights although stated morally and unequivocally cannot be guaranteed given that rights are politically won and lost.  Rights, thus, are gained through ideologically‑‑philosophical as well as militant‑‑battles.

Given the structure of dominance in the world today: between nations, peoples, races, and sexes, the most likely body of legal theory that will be applied to robots will be that which sees robots as slaves.  They will be ours to use and abuse.  Of course, as Stone has pointed out, this means that they will have no legal status. The slave and the robot cannot institute proceedings himself, for his own recovery, wherein damages are recovered for his pain and suffering.  Will errant robots have to be responsible for their actions, or will owners who argue that the slave understood the intent of his or her actions make the slave responsible?  If the manufacturer or owner is liable in civil cases and guilty of wrong doing in criminal cases, then he will certain argue that the robot understands intent, understands its programming.  If this line of argument succeeds, then the robot can then pursue his own case.  Most likely as mentioned earlier, it will be the programmer or group of programmers who will be responsible.

The problem of punishment is also problematic.  Robots have neither money nor property.  One way would be to give the robot to the injured party for his economic use.  Another would be to eliminate the robot or to reprogram the robot.  This may be analogous to the present debate on the right of the foetus: is it alive, do we have the right to terminate it?  Also, who has the right to terminate a robot who has taken a human life, or a robot who is no longer economically useful?  We would not be surprised if in the 21st century we have right to life groups for robots.

Lehman‑Wilzeg argues that another category for robots would be that of diminished capacity‑‑”used for those individuals who are legally independent but have a diminished capacity for initiating actions or understanding the consequences of such actions at the time they are being committed.”56  Of course, what is important here is intent.  However, robots will not be the stupidest of species‑‑more likely they will be the most intelligent‑‑at question will be their morality, their ethical decisionmaking.

Far more useful of a category is that of children, or the whiz kid.  High in brain power and low in wisdom.  Moreover, more useful, yet also ultimately problematic is that of the law of agency.  As Lehman‑Wilzeg writes:57

To begin with, the common law in some respects relates to the agent as a mere instrument.  It is immaterial whether the agent himself has any legal capacity, for since he is a sort of tool for his principal he could be a slave, infant, or even insane.58 …”it is possible for one not sui juris to exercise an agency power.”59  Indeed, the terms automation and human machine have been used in rulings to describe the agent.60  Nor must there be any formal acceptance of responsibility on the apart of the agent[.]…The only element required for authority to do acts or conduct transactions61…is the communication by one person to another that the other is to act on his account and subject to his orders.  Acceptance by the other is unnecessary.  Thus, …[g]enerally speaking, anyone can be an agent who is in fact capable of performing the functions involved.  Here, then, is a legal category already tailor‑made for such a historical novelty as the humanoid.

While, it is true that the law of agency may be tailor‑made, given that law is itself changing, given that in the next ten years there may emerge a science court to deal with questions of science and technology (questions that lawyers and judges devoid of scientific and technological training can rarely adequately understand), and given rapid changes in robotics and computers, is it all possible to forecast the legal principles in which AI robots can be understood?

Thus, although the legal categories presented‑‑from product liability to agency‑‑are useful heuristics, the fantastic notion of the robotic rights behooves us to remember that development in robots may result in (or may need) entirely new legal principles and futures.

Another perspective and useful heuristic in understanding the rights of robots involves developing two continuums at right angles with each other.  At one end of the x‑axis would be life as presently defined: real live, flesh and bones, reflective consciousness and soul.  At the other end would be robots in much the way that many see them today‑‑a mechanical‑electronic gadget that runs programs designed by humans.  Along this continuum we can imagine humans with a majority of robotic parts (artificial limbs, heart, eyes) and robots with human‑like responses and reactions (creativity, ability to learn).  We would also have robots that look like humans and humans that increasingly look like robots.

On the y‑axis we can also develop a rights dimension.  At one end of this continuum would be a condition of total “human rights” and at the other end, a state of rightlessness.  Along this continuum, we can visualize robots representing themselves and robots represented by guardians.  Finally we can develop a moving‑stationary dimension as well as various economic dimensions (household robots to military robots).  By juxtaposing these dimensions (flesh‑mechanical; rights‑‑rightless; moving‑stationary) and visualizing them across time, we can develop various alternative scenarios of the future of robots

Along these times line and dimensions, we can imagine the day when a bold lawyer rewrites history and argues that robot should be treated legally as a person.  On this day an entirely new future will emerge.

CONCLUSION

Technological change is growing at an exponential rate.  Genetic engineering, lasers, space settlement, telecommunications, computers, and robotics are bringing economic, social and political changes like no other period of human history.  Unfortunately it is difficult for individuals and institutions to keep pace with such change.  In order to minimize the stress causes by the expansing role of robotics it is vital that the judiciary and legislators make proactive decisions and plan for the eventual development of robotic rights before the issue reaches a crisis point.

We feel the issue of robotic rights and responsibilities to be an eventuality.  Considering the “question of rights” in this new dimension offers the unique opportunity to reconceptualize our very notion of “rights” and what the will mean in a global society.  This issue generates a larger question of mans relationship with his world.  As a quantum change in our perspective of ourselves it signals a new understanding and appreciation for the concerns of everything.  This is the underlying theme of this paper.

John Haught, professor of theology at Georgetown, has identified a higher spiritual dimension to the growing planetary interconnectedness that the computer age is establishing.  He likens “the spread of satellites and computer networks over the Earth as comparable to the complexification of the primate nervous system as the condition for the birth of thought.  Now the complexification is taking on a planetary demention.  So the whole planet is being prepared by technology for the eventual birth of a far higher form of consciousness…we are participating in a magnificent process of bringing about a physiological base for a higher and dramatically novel form of consciousness.”62 It is with such a global transformation in mind that we should consider the rights of robots as well as rights for all things.

Someday robots will be in our houses as playmates for children, servants for adults.  They may become sex surrogates.  They will be in the courts as judges.  They will be in hospitals as caretakers.  They will proform dangerous military and space tasks for us.  They will clean pollution, save us from numerous hazards.  The child who loses her robot because of malfunction will when she grown up always remember her robot.  She may, at the insistence of her parents, relegate robots as persons of the world of fairies, goblins and ghosts, the unreal and the impossible.  Or she may decide that her robot like her family, friends and pets is part of her, is part of life itself.

We must remember that the impossible is not always the fantastic and the fantastic not always the impossible.

NOTES

*Phil McNally and Sohail Inayatullah are planners/futurists with the Hawaii Judiciary.  Both are active with the World Futures Studies Federation.  Mr. McNally, in addition, provides strategic planning advice to the YMCA.  Mr. Inayatullah provides strategic planning advice to Mid‑Pacific Institute and various self‑reliance, spiritual associations.

The authors would like to thank the Judiciary for research time to complete this article.  Research by Sally Taylor and an earlier paper on the history of Robots by Anne Witebsky was also helpful.

The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily shared by the Judiciary or any other organizations and assocations the authors are affliated with.

1.  See Gregory Sugimoto, Comprehensive Planning in the Hawaii Judiciary (Honolulu, Hawaii, Hawaii Judiciary, 1981); also see Sohail Inayatullah, “Futures and the Organization,” Futures (June 1984), pp. 302‑315.

2.  See the Hawaii Judiciary Newsletter, Nu Hou Kanawai: Justice Horizons for the most recent reviews and comments on the legal impacts of emerging technologies and social changes.

3.  Thomas Hobbes, “Leviathan,” Social and Political Philosophy, Eds. John Somerville and Ronald Santoni (Garden City, New York: Double Day & Co., Inc., 1963). p. 143.

4.  Jamake Highwater, The Primal Mind (New York: Harpers and Row Ins., 1981), 180.

5.  P.R. Sarkar, Neo‑Humanism: The Liberation of Intellect (Ananda Nagar, Ananda Press, 1984).  See also Sohail Inayatullah, ­”P.R. Sarkar as Futurist,” Renaissance Universal Journal (forthcoming 1987) as well as 1985 and 1986 issues of Renaissance Universal Journal for articles by P.R. Sarkar.

6.  See Michael Towsey, Eternal Dance of Macrocosm (Copenhagan, Denmark: PROUT Publications, 1986).

7. Clarence Morris, The Justification of the Law (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 192.

8.  Morris, The Justification of the Law, p. 194.

9.   Ibid, p. 196.

10.  Ibid, p. 198.

11.  Ibid, p. 199.

12.  Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing: Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects (Los Altos, California: William A. Kaufman, 1974).

13.  Joseph Coates, “The Future of Law: A Diagnosis and Prescription,” Judgeing The Future, Eds. James Dator and Clem Bezold (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Social Science Research Institute, 1981), p.54.

14.  Francis Allan, “1984: The End of Intimacy,” Human Rights (Winter 1984), p.55.

15.  Joel Shirkin, “The Expert System: The Practical Face of AI,”  Technology Review (Nov/Dec 1983), p.78.  See also Margarate Boden, “Impacts of Artifical Intelligence,” Futures (Feb. 1984).  Clark Holloway, ­”Strategic Management and Artificial Intelligence,” Long Range Planning (Oct. 1983).  Richard Bold, “Conversing With Computers,”  Technology Review (Feb./March 1985).  “Artificial Intelligence is Here,” Business Week (July 9,1985).

16.  Stanley Wellborn, “Race to Create A Living Computer,” U.S. News and World Report (Dec. 31,1984/Jan. 7, 1986), p.50.

17.  Ibid, p.50.

18.  Shirkin, “The Expert System: The Practical Face of AI,” p.75.

19.  Sam N. Lehman Wilzeg, “Frankenstein Unbound: Towards a Legal Definition of Artifical Intelligence,” Futures (December 1981), pp. 442‑457.

20. Ibid, p. 443.

21. J. von Neumann, The Computer and the Brain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974) quoted in Ibid.

22. W.G. Walter, The Living Brain (New York: W.W. Norton and Co, 1953) quoted in Ibid.

23. N. Wiener, God and Golem, Inc (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966) quoted in Ibid.

24. N. Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings (Garden City, NY: Dobleday, 1954) quoted in Ibid.

25. J. von Neumann, Theory of Self‑Reproducing Automata (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966) quoted in Ibid.

26. M. Arbib, Brains, Machines and Mathematics (New York: McGraw‑Hill, 1964) quoted in Ibid.

27. D. Rorvik, As Man Becomes Machine (New York: Pocket Books, 1971) quoted in Ibid.

28. J. G. Kemeny, Man and the Computer (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1972) quoted in Ibid.

29. Kemeny, Man and the Computer quoted in Ibid.

30.  J. Wesizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co. 1976) quoted in Ibid.

31. Lehman‑Wilzeg, “Frankenstein Unbound,” p. 444.

32. Marion Long, “Turncoat of the Computer Revolution,” New Age Journal (Dec. 1985), p.48.

33.  Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?, p. 11.

34. Ibid, p. 11.

35. Ibid, p. 13.

36. Ibid, p. 15.

37. Neal Milner, “The Emergence of Rights, ” Proposal to the National Science Foundation (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Department of Political Science, 1980).

38. Ibid, p. 4.

39. Don Mitchell, “Metal Lunch,” Whole Earth Review (Jan. 1985), p.4.

See also Jerry, Mander, “Six Grave Doubts About Computers,” Whole Earth Review (Jan. 1985).

40. Edith Weiner and Arnold Brown, “Issues For The 1990’s,” The Futurist (March/April 1986), p. 10.

41. Robert Anderson, “Piracy and New Technologies: The Protection of Computer Software Against Piracy,” (London: American Bar Association Conference Paper 7/17/85), p. 176.  See also the following conference papers; Robert Bigelow, “Computers and Privacy in the United States,” David Calcutt, “The Entertainment Industry, Piracy and Remedies,”  Colin Tapper, “From Privacy to Data Protection,” Arthur Levine, “Piracy and the New Technologies.”  Stewart Brand, “Keep Designing,” Whole earth Review (May 1985).

42. Mike Higgins, “The Future of Personal Robots,” The Futurist (May/June 1986), p. 46.  See also James Albus, “Robots and the Economy” The Futurist (December 1984).

43. “Death by Robot,” Science Digest (Aug. 1985), p. 67.

44.  See Issac Azimov, The Naked Sun (London: Granada Publishing, 1975).

“The Second Law of Robotics: A robot must obay the orders given it by Human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law; The Third Law of Robotics: A robot must protect its own existance as long as such protection does not conflict with either the First or Second Law.

45.  Ramond August, “Turning The Computer Into A Criminal,” Barrister (Fall 1983), p. 53.  See also Don Parker, Fighting Computer Crime (New York: Charles Scribners and Sons, 1983.  Ted Singer, “Controlling Computer Crime,” Security Management (January 1984).

46.  Ibid, p. 54

47. See Sohail Inayatullah, “Challenges Ahead for State Judiciaries,” Futurics (Vol 9, No. 2, 1985), pp. 16‑18; see also James Dator and Clement Bezold, Judging the Future (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Social Science Research Institute, 1981); and, Orville Richardson, “A Glimpse of Justice to Come,” Trial (June 1983‑‑November 1983, a six part series on law in the future).

48. David Bazelon, “Risk and Responsibility,” Science Technology and National Policy, Eds. Thomas Keuhn and Alan Porter (New York: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 358.

49. Issac Azimov, “The Next 20 Years For Law and Lawyers,” American Bar Association Journal (Jan. 1985), p. 59.  See also Anthony D’Amato, “Can Should Computers Replace Judges,” Georgia Law Review (Sept. 1977).  According to D’Amato such a computer would work in this fashion.  The computer program is essentially that of a multiple regression analysis.  The dependent variables are plaintiff wins (+1) and defendent wins (‑1); the facts of the case are independent variables.  The computer recieves all the facts and performs a complex multivariate analysis of them.  The facts will be regressed to fit other clusters of facts previously programmed into the computer.  The fit will never be exact: the only question the computer then decides is whether the new facts as programmed fit more closly or cluster around the dependent variables “plaintiff wins” or “defendent wins.”

50. Gary Grossman and Lewis Soloman, ” Computers and Legal Reasoning,” American Bar Association Journal (Jan. 1983), p. 66.  See also Larry Polansky, “Technophobia: Confronting the New Technology and Shaping Solutions to Court Problems,” State Management Journal (1984).

51. See Guy M. Bennet and Signa Treat, “Selected Bibliographical Material on Computer‑Assisted Legal Analysis,” Jurimetrics (Spring 1984), pp. 283‑290.  This excellent bibiliography includes a wide range of entries ranging from articles on Searchable Data Bases to articles on computer decisionmaking.  Particularly useful is L. T. McCarty, ­”Reflection on TAXMAN: An Experiment in Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasonry,” 90 Harvard Law Review, 837‑93 (March 1977).

52. Howard Bedlin and Paul Nejelski, “Unsettling Issues About Settling Civil Litigation,” Judicature (June‑July 1984), p. 10.

53. Lehman‑Wilzeg, “Frankenstein Unbound,” p. 447

54. S. M. Waddams, Product Liability (Toronto: Carswell, 1974) quoted in Ibid.

55. Lehman‑Wilzeg, “Frankenstein Unbound,” pp. 448‑449.

56. Ibid, p. 450.

57.  Ibid, p. 451.

58.  S.J. Stoljar, The Law of Agency (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1961) quoted in Ibid.

59. W.A. Seavey, Handbook of the Law of Agency (St. Paul: West Publishing Co, 1974) quoted in Ibid.

60. Seavey Handbook of the Law of Agency quoted in Ibid.

61.  Seavey Handbook of the Law of Agency quoted in Ibid.

62.  Brad Lemley, “Other Voices Other Futures,” P.C. Magazine (Jan. 8, 1985), p. 135.

The Futures of Culture (1988)

By Sohail Inayatullah

Present Images, Past Visions, and Future Hopes
Presented at the World Futures Studies Federation Conference, Beijing China,
September 1988

Present and Past: 

Like a running stream of water, Culture is ever changing, ever moving. This is not to say that cultural change is one continuous motion. Rather, like almost everything else in this universe, it moves in cycles, it pulsates. There are times of rapid cultural change and there are times when the speed and the resultant shock of the future force various pasts to return. This return for some is a desire for a permanent home, for others it is the hope of including some features of the past in the present, and finally for some it is a short pause in the stream’s onward movement.

This tension between the present and the desire to recreate alternative pasts is a major unifying theme among the many development oriented social, political and economic discourses of today. In general, it is groups who have found that their choices have been narrowed by the onrush of modernity, of dominant hegemonic cultural forms, that yearn for the past. These groups are often those in the periphery, the third world; as well as, women, the poor, the elderly and ethnic cultures within the first world.

However, although sympathetic, I find attempts to recreate the past, reactionary, as the ancient polities and economies that individuals yearn for are no longer relevant, and, in fact, are incredibly romanticized. I am sympathetic because their, our, choices for the future have been robbed, because their values have been cannibalized by the dominant civilization and culture such that all that is left is the past. Hawaiians, for example, long for the days of their beloved Queen Liliokalani or their King Kalakaua. The image is of a time when hula was preformed to the Gods of nature, where agriculture satisfied basic needs, and where all in all people were believed to be happy. It is a time before the forces of modernity created a division of labor, before natives lost their dignity and eroticism, and finally before they lost their lands.

But things did not always go so well in ancient cultures. As in the present world, then too there was hierarchy, poverty, disease, violence, and then too there were the rightless and the weak. Of course, the wielders of power were different. Instead of present day national and transnational capitalists (and intellectuals to legitimize their world) in previous eras they were the kings and warriors; that is, those who dominated others through force and the ideology of valor. Some in this world did very well, others not so well.

Continued Growth:

This discourse between the vision of modernity and the vision of a calmer, quieter and more simple past has been elegantly captured in the alternative futures work of James Dator. For Dator, there are a variety of cultural, political and economic future images that present themselves to us. The dominant global vision is that of “Continued Growth”; the goal is more goods and services and a better material life for all, especially the wealthy. In the US, the latest form has been trickle down theory, where the poor have been told that it does not matter if they lose their jobs, as corporate America must restructure itself so it can profitably compete in the world economy. That “modernity” has robbed these same unemployed of the cushions of the past, namely, the family, a local community, connection with nature, and a sense of the cosmos–is not relevant to the trickle down theorists. The blame of failure is laid on the individual, thus hiding the dark side of modernity, of capitalist development.

On the Pacific Rim front, the Continued Growth vision is ever present, but as Johan Galtung has written, a twist has occurred. Instead of America doing the growing, it is the Pacific Rim that is rapidly growing and changing. Thus, the global division of labor is now shifting in favor of the Rim region, particularly Japan, and creating the possibility of a new global culture (perhaps an Earth Inc. similar to Japan Inc.) within the context of capitalism a new formula for government/business, labor/capital, individual/collective, and religion/life. Yet the goal in this Pacific Shift, this Pacific Era, remain the same: the production of goods to satisfy the eternal hunger of the mind and heart.

But what will their culture be like once they are on the top of the world, once they see the rest of the world emulating the way they walk, the way they talk; once Chinese and Japanese females become the sexual fantasies of men all over the world (when the blond has become part of an old era, not bad, but not the real thing). Once (can we remember?) the dream was to walk the golden streets of London or New York–streets paved with gold, lined with opportunity and freedom: money and sex. How will the “Pacific Rim” react once Tokyo, Beijing or Singapore evoke dreams of gold? Will movements develop there that long for the good old days before the Japan and other assumed responsibility for the maintenance of the world system, before they believed it was their duty to educate the world as to the East Asia system? What will be the available visions of the future for those groups who no longer accept the vision, the legitimacy of the Pacific Century? Most likely the emergent antithesis to this future will be structurally similar to the present attempts of Americans searching for their past, although the content may be vastly different. Certainly, we can expect a rerun of militarism, fundamentalism, “back to nature” and a fear of technology. In addition, there will be a longing for a fixed past, one of discipline, hard work, and primary concern for the collective good, that is, to values that were believed to have been central in the economic and cultural rise of the Pacific Rim in the first place.

In the West, this desire for a predictable past has already emerged; it is still nascent in the East. Specifically, this vision evokes a time and space when the family was important, when there was a sense of community, before air travel took away one’s friends who one had hoped to know forever (death of course has perennially destroyed that hope!) and before capital from the core nations destroyed local economies.

Traditional Power Structures:

Of course, this image forgets the landlords. Pakistanis in their new cities, with their new wealth from the Middle-East, do not want to return to the village. They remember village culture very well. I, having spend most of my life in American, European and Asian cities, see village life differently, romantically. It is my 90 year old grandmother telling me about the love of Allah. It is she blessing me. It is fried bread in the morning, tea with milk in the evening, the sun gently setting, the stars rising, sleeping on the roof, and waking up together in the early morning, and feeling quietly, gently, unified with all other villagers, with the environment, with my people. And it is my cousins who still live there telling me: but you have luxury; you have sewage-free streets; you have air-conditioners; you have food in abundance; and you have travel, a life ripe with choices. It is also my father reminding me that when they grew up in the village, they had no doctors nor food. They idid have a landlord who routinely would go into the fields and rape any female he wanted. The police, judge and local council were all in the landlord’s pockets. This was the village culture that I knew little of; for me, the village was simply a symbol of the womb. For the rest, who have lived there village, life is something to leave behind, albeit hopefully without the loss of Allah and family.

Thus the tension between the present, the Continued Growth vision and the search for the past. Yet there is a possibility of a future that dialectically transcends the image of modernity and of the village past; it would have to be a dialectical development of those two cultural myths: the myth of continued growth, of technological progress, of travel, of choice–oral choice, in who one speaks to, who one kisses, what one eats–of a life with physical needs met. And the myth of a time when things were peaceful, when peripheries still had their own culture, their own categories of thought, before they were robbed in every way by the up and coming capitalists, when families still worked together and when God provided a certainty over the future. To me, both are incomplete stories, they both have their dark sides, neither one has been successful in creating a just world; neither the city nor village has sufficed.

Creating New Cultures:

So far we have looked at the vision of modernity and its various contradictions; exploitation of nature, workers, women, minority cultures, in general, the exploitation of the periphery within and without. We have also looked at its reactions: the search for a predictable past, with its dark side of fundamentalism and its light side of community and interconnectedness.

What then are the possibilities of a new future? It is not clear yet, but there are numerous movements and groups working to create just and authentic futures. These movements are not fixated in the past, nor are they solely concerned with capturing state power at the national level, rather they are primarily concerned with creating new discourses embedded in the values of ecological, spiritual and gender balance.

To become new stories, mythologies, these new movements must be able to deal with the desire for community and the need for personal choice and freedom of movement; with the desire for material goods and with the need to be connected to the infinite, an infinity that like the Zen moon is ever ancient and ever future utopian. The new mythologies must include the need to connect to nature and the need to be around the conveniences of modernity, the quick, the clean, and the efficient–bathrooms and computers! Moreover, these new visions of the future must also recognize the need to contribute to others and the need to be left alone, to not participate. New visions of the future must empower without power becoming oppressive. And finally new visions must articulate their own dark side, must construct polities that incorporate their own contradictions, that is, they must develop structures to counter what cultural historian William Irwin Thompson calls enantiodromia, the tendency for institutions and structures to become their opposite, to become what they are fighting against. To do this, these movements need to be aware that oppression exists in every age, and that while intellectual knowledge expands in every generation, wisdom often does not and each generation must learn the painful experiences of previous generations. This is the idea that revolutionary and reform movements have emerged before with mixed results and at times they have become the new oppressors.

The context for these new cultural forms is already in the creation process. We are witnessing a reconnection of science and mysticism such that the objective truth through the senses has been delegitimized as has the objective sense of personal truth as used by the priests of religion (from Christian television ministers in US, hindu Rajneesh from India, and to muslim ayatollahs in Iran). Mysticism must be accountable, it must be freely shared and it must have a criteria for evaluation, such as service to the poor, the hungry, the uneducated, the preturbed and disturbed, it must be a spirituality in society. Concommitantly, science must deal with the sacred, with awe and with the consequences of economic development and with epistemologies that forget, mythically speaking, the heart, and the feminine. Science must deal with its own intolerance for dissent, its own power structure.
Concretely, these movements include various self-reliant bioregional movements such as the Green movement as well as a comprehensive third world based movement called PROUT (the Progressive Utilization Theory).

This is a new vision developed by Indian philosopher, Sarkar. He envisions a world federation consisting of diverse cultures, where people are technologically advanced and spiritually developed. For him, the vision of technological development does not mean a loss of past cultures, rather it can free time for intellectual and spiritual development, that is, for the creation of new cultures and the dialectical synthesis of past and present. This technological development must be, however, in the context of a self-reliant cooperative economy (where workers are owners, where there exist income ceilings and floors, where contradictions between local and export production have been solved; an economy where the goal is equity and balance). PROUT evokes the ancient stories of the mystical, yet it does not fear the technological, the move to space or the genetic engineering creation abilities of humanity. However, Sarkar sees the key in the development of a spiritual culture; one that has a respect for nature, devotion to the Infinite; intuitional disciplines, a universal outlook and a desire to selflessly serve the poor and the oppressed. True development from this perspective is individual self-realization and the creation of society wherein individuals have their basic needs met so they can develop their potential.

Moreover, this potential must be met along side with the rights of animals nd the environment. In his Neo-Humanism: the liberation of Intellect, Sarkar develops a new model of development ethics that argues for a spiritual humanism that includes the environment and other forms of life. For Sarkar, the unnecessary slaughter of animals throughout the world is as irrational as the irrationality of the arms race.
But PROUT is more than simply a preferred future, a possible vision of tommorrow, it is also a viable strategy to transform the capitalist system. Throughout the world, PROUT people’s movements based on localism (local ties to the economy, culture, bioregion) have been initiated, as have numerous associations of intellectuals, workers, and peasants. Thus, PROUT is neither capitalist nor communistic, its economic structure is cooperative, its ethics are spiritual humanistic, its development model is global and local, and through its people’s movements, its vision is potentially attainable.

PROUT, of course, is only one effort, there are others who are creating new cultural futures. In the West, there exist the new age, feminist, environmental and peace movements. Even in established, historical civilizations, like Islam, we find the possibility of new cultures emerging. Ziauddin Sardar, a Muslim and a futurist, is attempting create a dialog among Muslims so as to reconstruct Islam and make it relevant and compelling for the postindustrial world of the 21st century. Sardar in his The Future of Muslim Civilization and Information and the Muslim World is excavating the richness of muslim scholarship. That he is a muslim, and not an infidel, gives him greater legitimacy, such that the mullahs will have to deal with this broadening of the Islamic discourse. Without this type of project, Islam will remain a tool for the holders of State power, the landlords and the military, without this dialog, a cultural renaissance in the muslim world will remain unlikely.

However, a spiritual socialism such as PROUT, a revisioned Islam, or a Green movement, is not what the post-industrial futurists had in mind when they spoke of the coming age of prosperity. The believers and deliverers of modernity had hoped that the new electronics technology would resolve the the problems of the present and the universal need for the intimate past; however, instead of the hoped for global electronic village wherein poverty had vanished, we have the alienation of the global city, or the Los Angelization of the planet. Instead of unity through humanity, we have unity through the logos of “Coca-Cola” and finally we have unity through our collective fear, that of nuclear war.

But let us hope for other futures. Let a thousand flowers blossom. I hope for a future where those in the periphery, Asians for instance, are not clamoring for a return to the good old days, rather they and others become the creators of new cultural myths, stories, such as PROUT and other individual and global projects.
However, the task of creating new cultures is difficult and lonely, for the the world system remains materialistic and capitalistic. To identify with no culture, nation-state and ever be awaiting the creation of new cultures means one is homeless, ever in dissent. Moreover, these new movements and individuals who are active in them tend to unsettle those of other cultures for they challenge the social order and make bare the empty slogans of nationalism, patriotism, and cultural superiority in the first, second and third worlds. Those in dissent include American and European yogis in Southeast Asia who through their sincerity, humility and wisdom challenge the notion of Asians that they have a monopoly of spiritual wisdom. Or of the Asian who has mastered the game of individuality yet remains a critic of the continued growth vision. Those in the Core, in the imperium, become particularly incensed when those of the periphery partake in the economic fruits of capitalism yet refuse to give it divine status.

Beyond Humans:

However, my hope is that these new cultural carriers, these new stories will be more than simply committed to a better world for humans, rather I envision new cultures emerging that see plants, animals and even robots as alive. Plants and animals must gain rights not for our sake as humans, or our future on this Earth, but for their sake, for their value, for they too are life. Robots as well will one day become alive, either through artificial intelligence or through the creation of new categories of perception once they live with us, help us make decisions, and become our friends.
Robotic technology as well as other high-tech technologies such as artificial procreation, collective run baby factories, new forms of genetic engineering will certainly create new cultural forms. The new stories of the future will have to include them in their holograms. At the same time, the spiritual technologies such as telepathy, mind travel will also have to be included. Their acceptance will, however, not come from the language of science, for spiritual technologies are based on the mind being at peace, open and spontaneous; the new spiritual technologies are not ones that the rational mind can control;, it is an outpouring, perhaps from the deeper levels of each individual mind, or from a greater intelligence, or from other beings and entities that we are unaware of yet. And neither outpourings nor extrasensory beings lend themselves easily to scientific proof.

These new cultural forms will certainly be severely challenged by the present dominant vision of Continued Growth as well as by various images of the past. They will not emerge, gain acceptance without a great deal of individual and group anguish–where is one’s place if one is not longing for streets of gold, nor books created by priests attempting to recreate eras when they were the guardians of epistemology. Too, the guardians of the Wall Street and other markets do not look kindly on efforts that will challenge the accumulation of capital. Nor do state bureaucracies like movements that do not fit into the logic of the five year development plan. Thus, the new cultures will be labeled escapist by some, simplistic by others, and as destroying Western and Eastern culture by most. But in the new emerging world, the future, for me at least, will be in the infinite and wherever my friends are, humans, plants, animals and robots, future and past, on earth and in space. I hope that new cultures will truly be like running streams, ever fresh, ever renewing themselves, and like river water, ever changing yet resilient, and ever aware of their own murkiness.