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Five Futures for Muslims (2004)

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By Sohail Inayatullah

“Five Futures for Muslims,” http://www. futurebrief. com/Sohail. asp. August 11, 2004. Refereed Web Journal.

Abstract  

Five alternative futures for Muslims are explored in this essay. In the first, the Islamic world attempts to return to its historical memory of grandeur. As this return is not a contextual return but a reiteration of the conditions of the 7th century, a medieval feudal Islam gains supremacy. For most Muslims, this is decline. In the second possible future, divisions within the Islamic world heighten. War with the West, among Islamic nations, and among sects in Islam is primary. This is a slow, but potentially dramatic decline. In the third, Islam follows a linear trajectory, becoming part of the modern secular world. In the fourth, Islam and the West undergo pendulum shifts, as one declines and the other rises. The final future is a “virtuous spiral” that imagines not only an alternative modernity for the Islamic world, but an alternative global future. Pluralism within Islam and within the world system is fundamental. As a result, Islam becomes part of a planetary ethic of ecology, gender partnership and global governance – the solution to the global crisis of meaning, sovereignty, and politics.

The Perfection of the Past

When the future of Muslims is discussed,2 whether by mullah, political leader, or believer, most tend to resort to the historical memory of the time of the rightly guided caliphs, when the Prophet’s principles of moral leadership and shura (deep consultation with the believers) were practiced.

It is this past – a living prophet with a geographically bounded state – that remains the vision of the future for many Muslims. In this sense, one can paradoxically argue that Christians were more fortunate that Jesus did not succeed (during his time) in creating a Christian state.³ The fact that a utopian Christian state never existed allowed room for ideas of future state systems, a notion of progress, and a movement toward a better future. Of course, the religious dimension of this has become the search for the savior – the return of Christ. But by and large, it has been capital coupled with technology in the context of freedom of the individual that has been the driving force in the West.

For Muslims, the past attainment of a perfect or near perfect Islamic state and society may not have been the blessing it is often assumed to have been. Social and political “progress” has focused on returning to the ideal-perfect era. As well, social and technological innovations have become limited as many Muslims have tended to make the fundamental error of “misplaced concretism.” That is, the details of the earlier epoch are re-engineered – the strong warrior male leader, the hijab for women, the battle of good and evil, tribal politics, and other particulars of 7th century life. This period is taken out of history and decontextualized. Instead of focusing on a productive future, concrete dimensions of the past are re-imagined. They are brought back and used as tools for social control, particularly against the most vulnerable. Traditionally this memory of an idealized past was used for nation-building, but now it is used as part of the larger quest to create a modern Khalifate – an integrated empire.4

Divided Islam, Divided World

While the first future is driven by the desire to return to tradition, the next plausible future is based on the playing out of various contradictions – these include civilization and nation, and civilizations5 in conflict.

The first tension is between Islam as a civilization and Islam within the nation-state; that is, one cannot have, by definition, an Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Islam must be free of all national shackles. It is this contradiction that worries leaders throughout the Islamic world – in a true Islamic Khalifate they would no longer have power. This is the same fear that American leaders have of the United Nations. Super-ordinate power is a threat to local power, even if it is more appropriate for economies of scale, policy implementation, the environmental challenges facing the planet, and for global peace keeping.

Can a “Pan-Islam” be created, or will the tensions between civilization and nation-state always exist? Or is it possible that there is a way out of this dichotomy? The last scenario at the conclusion of this essay, that of the virtuous spiral, explores a way out.

The second tension is between Islam as a civilization in conflict (and for many historical periods in harmony) with the Judea-Christian world. By most measures, the Islamic world falls short on most economic and social indicators.6 Yet, Muslims and Westerners offer very different explanations for these shortfalls. From the Western perspective, the Islamic world has failed to modernize, secularize, and innovate. Nations are like individuals, and Muslims have not followed the dictates of Adam Smith et al. The Islamic response, however, is focused less on internal issues and more on external ones – principally, how the West has intervened in the Islamic world’s natural development. From this perspective, colonialism has created an economic and social straitjacket, reducing the pathways possible, often with violent results. Thus, the grand and often polemical calls for justice from the Islamic world. But the shadow dimension of this broad definition of justice (the righting of endless historical structural wrongs) is conspiracy. In the minds of some, there are always malevolent actors from evil civilizations at play. For many, this is what explains the decline of Muslims. Not just amoral economic patterns but actors actively plotting the decline of Islam (since it represents the fundamental threat to the Western world, similar to communism in the 20th century). And there are collaborators within as well – the overly westernized Muslims, women and corrupt leaders (and the less than true believers).

The future of Islam cannot be divorced from that of the rest of the world. If the world remains unfair in Islamic eyes – war on Iraq but not on other violators of human rights, on other despots in Russia or China as examples – then the sense of injustice and powerlessness remain. Moreover, as C. Inayatullah of the Council of Social Sciences in Pakistan argues, this injustice serves as a vehicle to unite Muslims.

With the assumption that the current world order based on culture of conflict, violence and war persist, Muslims will act within it and respond to its violent aspects with greater violence. [In this future], Muslims will become more fundamentalist and develop greater unity among them to face the rest of the world and fight their battle under the banner of orthodox Islam [the past-based future].7

In this violent future, the Islamic world will certainly lose in the short term. Any violence committed against the USA and European nations will be met with further violence, not with calls for dialogue. Mediation between Bin Laden and Bush and their respective successors simply is not in the cards. Violence will lead to more violence, and the hard side of Islam (an eye for an eye, the world divided clearly into good and evil with violence justified) will be dramatically defeated, given the asymmetry of wealth, technology and aspirations (the desire of those in the Islamic world for a predictable and safe middle class existence).

After the defeat (and even perhaps simultaneously), the medium term – 50-100 years – will see the rise of the softer syncretic Sufi side. However, deeper issues will still not be resolved since it was violence instead of productive peace building (internal and external) that drove the changes within Islam. As a result, the cycles of poverty, alienation, and despair will continue within the Muslim World.

Thus, in the long term, future generations will remember their defeat and the calls for justice will spring up again. Just as the Crusades remain ever alive for Muslims, 9/11 will be lived out every few hundred years – with even more violence.

For the West, the short term victory will only make matters worse (once the virtual ticker tape parades are over). This is because it is partly in conflict with its own self-image and the cost of victory will be the rejection of its softer multicultural self. Victory will create a security-surveillance state that will limit its capacity to innovate.8 Its claim for moral legitimacy will be challenged. Just as the Abu Ghraib prison crisis is explained by those in the Islamic world, not as managerial errors – a few bad eggs – but as a combination of Empire (expansion of power), Orientalism (Iraqis are genetically and culturally inferior) and the Prison discourse (prisoners should not have rights – the world is dangerous). Attempts to create far more effective and efficient prisons will not solve the problem (nor will attempts to reduce access to digital cameras) as the solution to cultural crisis is rarely technocracy.

This second alternative future does not bode well for Muslims or the rest of the world. It too ends up focusing on the past – idealized perfection and historical injustices on one side, and blindness to cultural hegemony on the other.

So far we have explored two futures: The first attempts to return to the imagined past, wherein medieval feudal Islam gains supremacy. However, as this future swims against the modernist and dominant Western stream, conflicts worsen with the West. The second possible future entails continued war with the West, and within Islam as well (the inner pluralist soft and extremist hard), leading to decline and degeneration. In effect, the outcome of these two futures is the same: conflict and decline.

The Linear Ascent

The third potential course for Islam is the linear trajectory. Islam, with fits and convolutions, and minor reversals, will follow the Western trajectory. After all, Muslims like Christians and Jews are the children of Abraham. Islam’s temporal future is predictable. Muslims will emerge from the medieval era and enter a modernist one. At the level of the nation-state, Turkey or Malaysia serve as models of the likely future. Of course, there will be Iranian-style backslides, but eventually the power of the ayatollahs will diminish. This is the American vision – that Jeffersonian democracy along with its invisible hand will triumph, individual human rights will be recognized as universal, and all cultures will eventually discover what is authentically good for them. The European version is similar, but based more on enforceable global institutional regulatory regimes.

The Islamic world will thus leave its medieval paradigm behind and join the European enlightenment (or create its own similar version). Just as the West went from

from ancient to classical to feudal to modern and now is entering a period of unlimited choice and the boundary-lessness of postmodernism (challenging stable notions of truth, nature, reality and self through robotics, genetics, space travel, feminism, multiculturalism), the Islamic world will also leave the feudal and enter the modern. The current crises, seen from a long term macroview, are minor reactions to this predestined trajectory.9

However, seen with far less of a grand vision, the march into a linear shared global future continues to have major setbacks. First is despotism within the Islamic world, even in Malaysia with the arrest and torture of Anwar Ibrahim, the former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia . Second are the events of 9/11. Third has been the continued violence in Palestine/Israel.10 Fourth, are the divisions of class and gender, and the urban patterns of poverty, alienation and disempowerment found in the Islamic world.

Outside of the Islamic world, equally relevant are the following factors: First is uneven globalization, with few immediate and mid-term benefits to poorer nations. Second is the continued perceived hypocrisy among the Western powers. When they are not walking the walk, as with the Abu Ghraib crisis (where hypocrisy was hidden behind managerialism instead of the apology of honor, so fundamental in feudal and indigenous cultures). Third is Orientalism, the cultural construction of the non-West as inferior – that is, direct, structural and epistemological violence. And, fourth is hyper-technological advancement via robotics, genetics (from gene therapy to germ line intervention), and nanotechnology that make catch-up practically impossible.11

In this vision, the Islamic world’s future is contoured by the Rise of the West, from colonial empire to developmentalism and now to globalization (with hints of Empire next). The Islamic world’s trajectory is defined and limited by the West’s technological, economic, political and definitional dominance,

Along with restricted parameters, there is temporal contagion within this trajectory and thus we see Bin Laden and his cohorts simultaneously as feudal warriors – a clear leader, clan, relationships, honor – and as globalists and even “netizens.” As well, these forces live in conflict with modernist leaders and bureaucrats focused on a secular rational institutionalized industrial state formations who are in tension with citizens living in multiple worlds – the scientific, the feudal, the secular, the modernism and indeed the postmodernist. New technologies exacerbate the possibility of enhanced multiplicities – CDROM, the web – all remove the power of interpretation from mullah to individual, allowing for far more individualized religiousity.12 This possibility of more individualism is unsympathetically understood by Bin Laden type traditionalists (even while they use the tools of global technocratism) and national bureaucrats, who paint all attempts of individualistic and syncretic Islam as unpatriotic. He who owns the means of knowledge, the right to define, is at the heart of the battle within Islam, and indeed, the world. And it remains the West, particularly the USA, that is the defining agent.

Thus, the linear trajectory is far more difficult when there can be only one “king of the hill.”

A fourth future is the replacement of the King of the Hill. Instead of linearity, the shape of the future may be swing of the pendulum.

A Pendulum Shift

A pendulum swing is the fourth possible future for Islam. If the West enters into decline, caused partly by aging (witness the demographic destiny with Caucasians moving from 50% of the world’s population in the 1850s to less than 5% by 2150), Islam will be on the rise (especially if it can move away from conspiracy to innovation). In this formulation, both West and Islam are in the same field, facing each other with antagonism and fear, but still part of the same unitary relationship. If the West declines (perhaps due to imperial over-reach, global warming, failed genetic experiments, or an inward looking security state), it may be Islam that rises to fill the world vacuum, as macrohistorian Johan Galtung has argued.13 While China, and possibly India, are the most likely candidates for world hegemony, Muslims could use the current crisis to move away from extremism and recover the spirit of tradition without its negative details. Thus, they could step into a vacuum and provide the ethical anchor to the relativism of postmodernism.

A Virtuous Spiral?

This recovery of the past in the context of future-oriented progress – the virtuous spiral – becomes the final scenario. This future is the most hopeful for Islam and the rest of the world. In this alternative trajectory, after a brief foray into postmodernism – endless consumer choices but no ground of reality – a new global ethics may emerge. This is a soft, multicultural Islam engaged in dialogue with the West and East Asia, confident of its dignity, creating an alternative science like that imagined by leaders such as Anwar Ibrahim.14 Many of Islam’s ideas – environmental protection, concern for poverty, Islamic economics, Islamic science (far less cruel to animals, focused on research on the issues of poor and the needy, not just on the issues of the rich) will become part of the global agenda.

Islam’s spiritual history, far less challenged by modernity – coming after the West’s entry into it – will be far less problematic (secularism will no longer be the benchmark of the good society) and will help in the creation of a post-postmodern era, a post-scarcity, spiritually balanced society with deep sustainability.15 This is progress with history, an alternative modernity that offers multiple trajectories leading to sustainable development. To create this future a creative minority is needed. The current hijacking of Islam is the shadow response to the paucity of a creative minority. The creative minority offers a new image of the future and practices it. Groups in the USA (Progressive Muslims) and in the UK are working on this and, hopefully, this can become part of a reformed Islam. Indeed, this was a desired image of the future at an international meeting of Muslim scholars16.

Five points were fundamental:17

  1. An alternative economics to world capitalism
  2. Cooperation between the genders based on dignity and fairness
  3. Self-reliant ecological communities
  4. Use of advanced technologies to link these communities
  5. A world governance system that is fair, just, representational and guided by wise leadership

This virtuous spiral model, using aspects of the past to invent an alternative future, is something to be aspired to. The pivotal here, as Zia Sardar argues, is that a reformed Islam can not only transform Muslim society and Islamic thought, it can also provide a genuine alternative to the dominant mode of doing things globally.18

A Dream?

Can Muslims create a new future? Do they have a choice? Can a creative minority envision it? If not, I fear a civilizational, national and local bloodbath which will only create calls for more justice, Israel-Palestine writ large on the world. While many Muslims hope that demography is destiny (and some in the West fear this) 19– Muslim birthrates continue upwards, with some forecasters even predicting that a majority of US Marines will be Muslim by the end of this century20– numbers without qualitative change only lead to even grander decline.

I dream of the virtuous spiral vision of the future. Transformed Muslims and a transformed West, beyond the uni- and the multi- to a transcultural. This future is certainly not probable, but it is still possible.21 And while it is a dream for now, is there really any choice?

Notes

  1. I would like to thank Bob Adams, Lewis Grow and Ivana Milojevic for extensive comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
  2. Here seeing the world within the lens of Islam, that is, Islam is eternal and thus not open to discussion on its future, but Muslims, their faith, their behavior, can be analysed, openly discussed.
  3. See Abdelwahab El-Affendi, Who Needs an Islamic State?. London , Grey Seal Books, 1991, 37.
  4. In this, both neo-conservatives and the majority of Muslims focus on Empire. The former imagines a USA empire, while Muslims imagine an Islamic empire.
  5. This piece is fraught with the problems of essentialism: civilizations, nations, and even terms such as Muslims and Christians can be problematic. Identity is not merely given but made in context: whether an archetypal “civilizational” context, or a local identity context (one gains an identity through interaction with another). However, civilizations too can challenge post-structural constructivism, asserting that identity is given and notions of choice privilege certain epistemological perspectives. Finally civilizations are lived; defining them freezes them.
  6. UNDP Human Development Indicators (created by the Pakistani muslim Mahbub al Haq) is the best report on this.
  7. Email, April 5, 2004. Dr. C. Inayatullah.
  8. Not to mention challenge the “melting pot” story.
  9. For more on this, see “Islamic Responses to Emerging Scientific, Technological and Epistemological Transformations,” Social Epistemologies (Vol. 10, No. 3/4, 1996), 331-349; and earlier in Islamic Thought and Scientific Creativity (Vol. 6, No. 2, 1995), 47-68. Also: “Global Transformations,” Development (Vol. 40, No. 2, 1997), 31-37.
  10. Justified or not justified (Kashmir, Chechnya)
  11. In 1993 just 10 countries accounted for 84 percent of global research and development expenditures and controlled 95 percent of the US patents of the past two decades. The die is cast, technocracy will further create a divided world, with the right to the Net and the right to genetic therapy and modification becoming the battle cry of coming decades.
  12. Sohail Inayatullah and Gail Boxwell, eds., Islam, Postmodernism and Other Futures., 89-106.
  13. Johan Galtung, “On the Last 2,500 years in Western History, and some remarks on the Coming 500,” in The New Cambridge Modern History, Companion Volume, ed. Peter Burke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). See as well: Johan Galtung and Sohail Inayatullah, Macrohistory and Macrohistorians. Wesport,Ct, Praeger, 1997.
  14. See special issue of Futures. Anwar Ibrahim, “The Ummah and Tomorrow’s World,” Futures (Vol. 23, No. 3, April 1991), 302-310. Also see: Anwar Ibrahim, The Asian Renaissance. Singapore, Time Books, 1996.
  15. See www.islamicconcern.com/fatwas.asp for a site on Islam and vegetarianism.
  16. Organization of Islamic Conference.
  17. Sohail Inayatullah, “Leaders envision the future of the Islamic Ummah,” World Futures Studies Federation Bulletin (July 1996), Coverpage.. See, Sohail Inayatullah, “Futures Visions of Southeast Asia: Some Early Warning Signals,” Futures (Vol. 27, No. 6, July/August, 1995), 681-688;
  18. Email . April 2, 2004 . Ziauddin Sardar.
  19. Recent headlines of Welsh actor, John Rhys-Davies, fearing that the demographic rise of Muslims will lead to a catastrophe for Western civilization, are indicators of much more to come. However, a voice of sanity has prevailed in this discussion. In response to Rhy-Davies comments of Muslim growth in Holland, were the comments Chief executive of the All Wales Ethnic Minority Association (Awema) Naz Malik. He said: “I do not know why he has said these things. If 50 per cent of people in Holland under 18 are Muslims in 16 years time, so what? In Britain the fastest growing race is mixed race, people of dual heritage. It is a cause for great celebration that our cultures are mixed. We live in a global society – we celebrate what is good in cultures and challenge what is bad in civilisations.” But this appears to be a lone voice. For a site taking a strong anti-multiculturalism view.
  20. Ayeda Husain Naqvi writes in “The Rise of the Muslim Marine” (NewsLine, July 1996, 75-77) that while hate crimes against Muslims rise all over the world, surprisingly the US military is one of the safest places to be a Muslim. Indeed, Qasem Ali Uda forecasts that in 20 years, 25% of all US marines will be Muslim. Given the incredible influence that former military personnel have on US policies (i.e., a look at Who’s Who in America shows that military background and law school education are the two common denominators on the resumes of America ‘s most influential people), inclusion is the wisest policy. The data is far from certain though. Todd Johnson, in his article, “Religious Projections for the next 200 Years” along with scenarios titled “non-religious growth” and Asians opt for secularization while certainly having one scenario as “Muslim revival.” Indeed, with postmodernism on the rise, individuals could choose alternative identities, being far less focused on the traditional, like father, like son. i.e., religion becomes one choice among many. (http://www.wnrf.org/cms/print_next200.shtml)
  21. For an excellent articulation of this, see Johan Galtung, Globalization for Peace and Development. www.transcend.org. August 2004.

A Review of Ivana Milojević’s Educational Futures (2006)

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By Marcus Anthony

The West, The East and Milojevic’s Educational Futures 

The purpose of this paper is to critically review Milojevic’s Educational Futures. Firstly I outline the contents of the text and some of its strengths and weaknesses. Secondly I take to task some of the features of the text that represent typically problematic aspects of critical futures, in particular the concept of “The West.” I compare and contrast certain aspects of Eastern and Western education, with a particular emphasis on Chinese education. A seminal point is that the portrayal of these concepts in Milojevic’s text is simplistic, reflecting the need for an updating of postcolonial, poststructural and critical futures thought.

 

Text name: Educational Futures: Dominant and Contesting Visions
Author: Ivana Milojevic
Subject: Educational futures
Publication details: Oxon: Routledge

Reviewer: Marcus Anthony

What distinguishes hegemonic futures narratives from other, counter or alternative, ones is their capacity to convince others of the inevitability of a particular future. (Milojevic 2006 65)

In Educational Futures: Dominant and Contesting Visionseducational futurist Ivana Milojevic has written a compelling and readable volume. Here I shall provide a brief description of the contents, while giving an overall evaluation of the volume. There is not space here to offer a complete examination of all parts of the volume, so I shall focus upon what I consider to be the most salient points. The text is particularly useful in that it highlights some of the strengths and typical problems with critical futures. The problem that I shall focus upon in the latter part of this paper is Milojevic’s representation of East and West.

The text

The title is a good indication of what lies within the covers. This is a critical futures text, where ideas and images about “possible, probable and preferred futures” (p. 2) are examined. It “provides an overview and detailed analysis of arguments about where education, particularly state-based education systems, is and should be going” (p. 4). Yet as Milojevic states, it is neither about prediction nor prescription. Instead she sets out to destabilise the dominant narratives and offer alternative perspectives from other largely silenced discourses.

The book is divided into four parts. In part one Milojevic outlines historical futures discourses in education. This includes an analysis of how constructs of time and the future have been used to colonise and educate “the other.” Several alternative histories are outlined with indigenous and Eastern concepts featuring heavily.

In part two Milojevic highlights the two most dominant narratives in contemporary state education – globalisation and “cyberia” (“WebNet”). These are two closely related discourses according to Milojevic. Modern education – and particularly globalised education – is criticised as being “essentially practical training for a globalised market place” (p.57). The central issue with these images of the future is that they tend to be seen as “the future” (p.64) rather than as one of many possible futures.

Milojevic’s approach is not simply to criticise the dominant discourses and highlight the benefits of alternatives. Rather she outlines the strengths and weakness of all the dominant and contesting visions. This approach gives the text balance. The weakness of such an approach is that the detached perspective often leaves the reader in a space of uncertainty. Which of these discourses, and in what combination, represents the best way to take us forward? Typical of critical futures, Milojevic chooses not to take a definite stance. A related problem is that the text at times becomes descriptive, as Milojevic outlines numerous theorists regarding the particular subject matter at hand. Nonetheless it does provide a sound review of related literature. The text will therefore prove valuable for researchers and educators looking to gain an overview of the relevant discourses.

In the third part of the book Milojevic posits three alternative approaches to education – the indigenous, the feminist, and the spiritual. These represent important perspectives which are still largely absent from cotemporary public education. The final section then attempts to weave all the visions together and looks to the possible future of an expanded discussion of state education in The West.

The feminist vision, according to Milojevic, challenges the patriarchal presuppositions of the dominant educational discourses, highlighting the importance of emotional connection, nurturing, and internal transformation (pp. 146-147).

Milojevic remains critical of utopian thinking, but maintains that is it nonetheless important. She believes in the importance of “eupsychia” – “a prescriptive and improved imagined state of not only collective but also individual being” (p. 50). This includes the psychic and spiritual unfolding of the individual (p. 54).

However the text clearly privileges certain religious perspectives. For example Milojevic’s discussion of spiritual alternatives focuses upon Eastern (especially Indian) and new age perspectives. The role of traditional religious approaches is left unclear. Milojevic leans away from conventional religion. Quoting O’Sullivan (1999) she writes:

Religion does not only attempt to institutionalize spirituality; in many instances this is done ‘for the perpetuation of the institution rather than for the explicit welfare of the individual’ (p.191).

The three alternative education approaches are in many ways related, as Milojevic herself states. They remind us that the future is not inevitable, that there are other options available to educators in the present age. This I feel is the greatest value of this book. Let us not forget that – as Milojevic states bluntly – all education is informed by cultural values.

West, East and stereotypes

One point that I would like to take up with the text is its representation of ‘The West’. For example Milojevic finds that The West has forgotten indigenous, feminist and spiritual education. Yet as one who has lived and traveled widely throughout East Asia, such a criticism is not exclusively relevant to modern Western education systems. It may come as a surprise to those filled with romantic images of the Far East, but in Beijing, Shanghai, Tokyo, Seoul and Hong Kong, Milojevic’s educational alternatives are even more distanced from mainstream education than they are in the West. These Eastern cultures seem all but completely possessed by cyber culture, materialism and the push for greater globalisation. Schools are dominated by rote learning, are heavily text-book based, teacher-centred, and there is an almost-obsession with “the test.”

There may be a temptation to (once again) blame the West for the increasing materialism and left-brained, linear ways of knowing that now dominate state education in East Asia. We might suggest that Asia is simply copying Western-style society and education. The issue here – and with postcolonial interpretations in general – is whether the West is itself being stereotyped and partially misrepresented in these depictions. Consider the following statements made by Milojevic:

Lawlor argues that it is thus western logical habits that cause us to fall into static, uniform, quantitative interpretation and make us fail to see qualitative process-related differences (p.480).

Milojevic also points out that indigenous critiques of contemporary education find a central focus upon “western knowledge and education” (p. 174). Further, as with so many other critiques of Western ways of knowing, Milojevic finds unfeeling Cartesian rationalism as the defining thrust of Western cognition (p. 147). Finally she follows Griffiths as she concludes:

The current hegemonic approach to time can be described as western, Christian, linear, abstract, clock-dominated, work orientated, coercive, capitalist, masculine and anti-natural. (p. 223)

Yet is such an approach to history and time – and these preferred way of knowing – predominantly and peculiarly Western at all? Chinese ways of knowing are often seen as being based on holistic concepts such as the Taoist yin and yang, and Lao Tzu’s fluid water metaphors (e.g. Capra 200; Jiyu 1998; Talbot 2000). But there is a tendency to romanticise this. My experiences (having taught in schools in Taiwan, urban and rural mainland China and in Hong Kong) have led me to conclude that such ways of knowing are (sadly) largely extinct in modern public education in the greater China region. Text books, rote learning and cramming for exams dominate pedagogy.

The key is that in Chinese culture at least, the linear, patriarchal, verbal/linguistic and mathematical approach to education has a long tradition which precedes Western influence. Within Confucian education, the copying and memorization of the classics formed the basis of an education system that was literally designed to create products that would fit neatly into an “harmonious” society. In particular the emphasis was on producing public servants for the state (Fairbank & Goldman, 2006). Passing the examination for the public service could lead one into the higher strata of Chinese society, and scholars were revered. Candidates were literally placed in neatly arranged box-like cubicles to do the public service exams (Gardner, Kornhaber, & Wake 1996), epitomising the conformist, linear and boxed-in ways of knowing. The examination system was seen to be of greatest importance, and able students put themselves to the task of memorizing vast amounts of information for a purpose no greater than regurgitating it in the public service exams (Fairbank & Goleman 2006).

To this day a virtual obsession with examinations stifles Far Eastern public education to a degree difficult to contemplate in The West. Finally, it should be noted that the proportion of Chinese tertiary students presently majoring in maths and science is several times greater than that of developed Western nations such as the United States (Friedman, 2006). From my experience, pantheistic, mystical and indigenous ways of knowing are totally absent. Further the Chinese degradation of the environment and subjugation of Tibetans and indigenous peoples proceeds at breakneck speed.

Of further consideration in being more accurate to the concept of “The West” is that if we look at the history of Western civilisation we find a long tradition of mystical and intuitive ways of knowing that have spanned numerous cultures from the time of the ancient Greeks to the present day (Anthony 2006; Tarnas 2000). Even the fathers of modern science such as Newton, Galileo and Kepler held deeply mystical conceptions. According to Kepler himself, astronomers were not mere observers:

… in all acquisition of knowledge it happens that, starting out from the things which impinge upon the senses, we are carried by the operation of the mind to higher things which cannot be grasped by any sharpness of the senses (quoted in Huff 2003 p 353).

The irony is that even as Milojevic (following Krishnamurti) critiques dominant Western education because its focus upon “information and knowledge” does not lead to “intelligence”, “goodness” or “flowering” (p.201), the same critique is now even more relevant to education in China and East Asia, where the spiritual has been leached from the curriculum. The discrepancy arises because Milojevic draws heavily upon Indian thinkers such as Krishnamurti, Sri Aurobindo, Tagore, Gandhi and Sarkar. These men taught and wrote much of their work before the economic explosion of East Asia in the latter decades of the twentieth century.

I therefore see the need to make a clear distinction between the Indian episteme and the current East Asian episteme, and especially to acknowledge the social and economic developments of Asia in recent years. This in no way illegitimates Milojevic’s essential argument that spiritual, feminist and indigenous perspectives may be enormously beneficial in modern education. It simply means that (ironically) hyper-capitalistic East Asian cultures themselves are the ones that are in most need of such perspectives.

The issues highlighted here are equally relevant to an emerging domain of futures studies – integral futures. This field tends to valorise the spiritual and The East, drawing heavily from the work of Ken Wilber. Such figures as Sohail Inayatullah, Richard Slaughter, Chris Reidy, Marcus Bussey and myself can be said to be influenced by, or actively involved in this field (see the Journal of Futures Studies May 2006 to read all these theorists). Ivana Milojevic has also been influenced by this movement, and uses the term “integral education” to describe a curriculum more deeply imbued with holistic and spiritual perspectives. The key point I wish to make here is whether such a movement (and critical futures literature in general) is tending to romanticize and champion the exotic and alternative – in Milojevic’s case The East, indigenous cultures and feminist perspectives? I find Friedman’s (2005) critique of transpersonal psychology for these very same issues to be relevant here. It must be noted that Wilber (2000) himself has drawn great inspiration from the transpersonalists and Eastern philosophy – and his followers have been accused of being a “cult” (Bauwens, n.d.).

In conclusion to these concerns I would like to state that from my direct experience in working in education in The East and also in Australia, New Zealand, and visiting schools in the United States, I strongly believe that our terms of cultural reference need clarifying and upgrading in the twenty-first century. The world can no longer simply be dichotomised into West and East. With the increasing prosperity of Asia, the power shift that has begun may continue to a point where Asia will drive the world’s economy within a few short decades (Friedman 2006). The dramatic social shifts in Asia which are accompanying these changes mean that references to The East as a culture founded upon spiritual and mystical precepts is now more stereotype than actuality. It would be something of an irony if Integral Futures were to take greater influence in The West in years to come even as Asia continues to “Westernise.” We may find at some point that futures conferences are filled with “Eastern” mystics from Western countries and “Western” theorists from Asia.

Final remarks

Despite these significant issues, Milojevic’s work is recommended. It highlights the important role of critical futures studies. Without the identification of the hegemonic and contesting discourses in education those hegemonic discourses will tend to remain implicit, invisible and viewed as inevitable.

Milojevic stops short of offering a definite prescription for our educational ills. Instead she concludes with a list of questions. She believes that an engagement with the central questions she posits and a deeper reflection upon “the full diversity of worldviews” and ways of knowing will lead to the greatest beneficial changes in education and society (p.257). This leaves the reader less than certain about where she stands. Yet such an uncertainty may well be a necessity for any revision or shift in perspective and paradigm. It may be that the didacticism that tends to be inherent in dominant social, political and educational narratives is what prevents us from broadening our visions. Discomfort and unease may be the price we have to pay as we challenge our imagined futures.

Milojevic has made a solid contribution to pedagogical theory here. Personally I would like to see such a text form part of teacher training in B. ed, Dip. ed and masters courses. Future teachers and educational administrators should be engaging with these issues. As Milojevic indicates (p.45), our images of the future guide our current actions. Finally, according to Milojevic a paradigm shift is beginning whereby indigenous and Eastern conceptions of education are becoming more accepted (ibid.) As Kuhn (1970) so aptly pointed out, paradigms delimit not only particular domains of enquiry, but also the kinds of questions that are permissible. Milojevic broadens both the domains of knowledge and the range of possible questions. The possibilities might be uncomfortable to consider and the choices destabilising – but this is by necessity.

Selected References

Bauwens, M., n.d., ‘The cult of Ken Wilber. Available from: www.kheper.net/topics/Wilber/Cult_of_Ken_Wilber.html.  [Accessed 13 January 2006].

Capra, F., 2000. The Tao of Physics (25th anniversary edition). Boston: Shambhala.

Inayatullah, S., 2004. Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Future: Predictive, Cultural and Critical Epistemologies. In: Inayatullah S., (Ed). The Causal Layered Analysis Reader. Taipei: Tamkang University Press, 55-82.

Fairbank, J., and Goldman, M. 2006. China: A New History. Cambridge: Belknap.

Friedman, H., 2005. Towards Developing Transpersonal Psychology As a Scientific Field. Available from: www.Westga.edu/~psydept/os2/papers/friedman.htm. [Accessed  6 July 2005].

Friedman, T., 2006. The World is Flat. London: Allen Lane.

Gardner, H., Kornhaber, M.L., & Wake, W.K., 1996. Intelligence: Multiple Perspectives. New York: Harcourt Brace College.

Huff, T., 2003. The Rise of Early Modern Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Jiyu, R., (ed.) 1998. The Book of Lao Zi. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.

Kuhn, T., 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

O’Sullivan, E., 1999. Transformative Learning: Educational Vision for the 21st Century, Toronto: OISE, University of Toronto Press.

Talbot, M., 1992. Mysticism and the New Physics. New York: Arkana.

Tarnas, R. 2000. The Passion of the Western Mind.

Wilber, K., 2000c. Sex, Ecology, Spirituality. Boston: Shambhala.

Futures Studies and Women’s Visions (2000)

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[Entry by Ivana Milojević, 2000, Routledge International Encyclopedia of Women: Global Women’s Issues and Knowledge, pp.894-895]

 

Future studies – the systematic study of the preferred, possible and probable versions of the future – is a relatively new field. In its modern history it has moved from being focused on utopianism to making empirical predictions. Currently, futures studies in government and business is dominated by strategic planning, technology impact assessment and risk analysis. In academia, following the social sciences in general, futures studies has taken a more critical perspective, focused less on what the future will be like, or even on the range of alternative futures, to what is missing in particular visions of the future. The quest for a more balanced study of the future is being driven by futurists who are far less committed to corporatist and scientific interests and far more sympathetic to multicultural concerns as to who is likely to be excluded if a certain future comes about. There is thus a slow but significant shift toward future studies as a management tool to control the future to future studies as a framework for social emancipation.

Still, future studies remains largely male dominated in terms of practitioners and in terms of the epistemological assumptions that underlie theory, methodology and content. Women remain excluded from both the history and the future of the future. At the same time, the evidence of women’s one-time importance when it comes to understanding and creating the future can be easily found in the realm of old and long memories, for example, as expressed in Slav, Greek, Roman, Nordic, Saxon and Indian mythology. In most archaic traditions, one of the important functions of a goddess was the deciding men’s fates. In Slav tradition, sudjenice are three women in charge of deciding everyone’s personal destiny. One of the rare deities, and possibly the only deity, specifically in charge of the future was in fact not a male deity but a female deity, Skuld, one of the Norns from the Nordic tradition.

Even during the times when patriarchy was at its peak, there were always individual women who challenged prescribed gender relationships and gender roles. But in most societies, men have been in charge of controlling the public future and women have had little say about it. Women’s encounter with the future was confined to better care for future generations and present households.

Elise Boulding, a peace theorist and futurists, explains this ambiguity – that is, women simultaneously being and not being “in charge” of the future. According to Boulding, one important historical role of women was as conservers of resources and as nurturers to fend off “the effects of change as much as possible in order to preserve a space of tranquility for those in their care”. At the same time, “every woman with responsibility for a household is a practicing futurist,” and women have always been the “womb of the future in every society” (Boulding, 1983: 9).

The appearance of the feminist movement was crucial in redefining what issues are “important” and “global”. The feminist dictum that the personal is political gave women long needed legitimization to bring what they considered extremely important to the discussion about the creation of the future. The old and traditional women’s activities directed towards influencing the future (for example, through the roles of witches or fates), which were primarily local, personal, family- and community-oriented, got legitimization to be brought to the societal level. Even more important, the legitimization of “women’s issues” has created the possibility for many women futurists to write about both local and (redefined) global directions for the future.

Many women futurists have envisioned radically different future societies and suggested feminist alternatives to patriarchy. As a movement for social change, feminism is concerned with offering alternative visions of the future. Women futurists concentrate particularly on the study of the future in order to both redefine the present and articulate an alternative vision.

Women’s Visions

Women’s visions of the future are usually somewhat different from those of men. While both genders are concerned with the betterment of humankind in the future, most men tend to concentrate on “grand” historical analyses and issues, concentrating especially on realist discussions of emerging political powers as well as on new technologies. The predominance of power-oriented forecasting is evidenced by the focus on nation-oriented “Year 2000” or “Year 2020” studies (strategic in orientation) and the predominance of technological forecasting is evident in the images of the future that are circulated – for example, production of babies in factories and other types of mediation of human relationships through genetic and other new technologies. The methodologies used still rely heavily on “expert” opinion and on development of powerful mathematics “formulas” to forecast and develop accurate trend analysis. Most women futurists do not reject new technologies, nor do they refuse to acknowledge the obvious impact of technology on the lives of present and future generations. But the focus is often rather on human relationships and is more inclusive of the perspective of the powerless.

In terms of methodology, trend analysis is not a preferred method of future studies, as many trends are quite discouraging for the future of women or the speed of change is extremely slow. While this method is useful in revealing the likely future if current trends do not change, it offers no alternatives. On the other hand, methods such as visioning, in which preferred futures are articulated, and backcasting, in which the preferable future is developed and then the path toward it is “remembered”, are more relevant for women, and other similarly disadvantaged members of (global) society.

Visions of future societies are developed everywhere, but those developed in the West are the best known and most influential. Examples include the “win-win world” in which the escape route from the prison of gender as well as economism is through the path of cooperation, community and caring (Hazel Henderson 1996); the “gentle (androgynous) society” (Boulding 1977); and the “partnership society (gylany)” (Eisler, 1996). In South Asia, Nandini Joshi envisions the future of the world community “not in the huge, crowded, cumbersome, crime-threatened cities, overridden with unemployment and inflation” but in “lustrous, flourishing, free villages overflowing with useful goods, professions, intelligence and arts” (Joshi, 1992, 935). Many other women as well imagine preferable futures, for example, through feminist fiction and through global grassroots movements. These preferable futures are usually along the lines of decentralized, non-hierarchical, ecologically and economically sustainable societies where communal life, family life, parenting and education are highly valued, institutions are human-scaled and diversity is celebrated.

Futurists also develop scenarios for the future. Scenarios are useful in that they can empower individuals and communities, as a range of preferable futures can be chosen and actions developed in order to achieve them. They are also important because they articulate futures that can help women develop strategies to try to avoid certain futures or at least diminish their impact. Scenarios also distance us from the present, creating alternative futures that contest traditional gender roles.

Senarios for women’s futures usually include (1) continued female-male polarity (in the form of male backlash, continued growth/patriarchy, or status quo) (2) (lesbian) separatism and (3) partnership or a golden age of equality (imagined in the form of unisex androgyny or in the form of multiple gender diversities). In the “continued female-male polarity” scenario, gender is fixed and there is little escape from socially constructed gender roles. Societies either stay the same, with patriarchy changing only form and not substance; or the patriarchy increases, either through slow growth or dramatically in the form of male backlash against recent women’s gains in the society. Women’s separatism is one response to such futures, as women form women only groupings. The “partnership” scenario imagines societies where there is equal cooperation of genders, where women increasingly adopt virtues traditionally seen as masculine and vice versa, or where gender becomes even more fluid and essentialist categories such as “man” or “woman” abandoned altogether.

No matter which scenario dominates, it is imperative that women continue to address the future in public, private, and epistemological spaces.

References and Further Reading

Aburdene, Patricia and Naisbitt, John. 1992. Megatrends for women, New York: Villard Books.

Boulding Elise. 1977. The underside of history: A view of women through time, Boulder, Col.: Westview.

Boulding Elise. 1983.Women’s visions of the future, in Eleonora Masini, ed., Visions of desirable societies, Pergamon,

Eisler Riane. 1987. The chalice and the blade: Our history, our future, San Francisco: HarperCollins.

Eisler Riane. 1996. Sacred pleasure, San Francisco: HarperCollins.

Gender and change. 1989. Futures 21(1).

Henderson, Hazel. 1996..Building a win-win world: Life beyond global economic warfare. San Francisco: Berret-Koehler.

Jones, Christopher. 1996. Women of the future: Alternative scenarios. Futurist 30 (3: May-June).

Joshi, Nandini. 1992. Women can change the future. Futures (9: November)

Special report on women’s preferred futures, Futurist. 1997. (3: May-June).

Women and the future. 1994. The Manoa Journal of Fried and Half-Fried Ideas, Hawaii Research Center for Futures Studies. Honolulu: University of Hawaii.

McCorduck, Pamela and Ramsey, Nancy. 1996. The futures of women: Scenarios for the 21st century, New York: Warner.

Milojević, Ivana. Feminising futures studies. 1999. In Ziauddin Sardar, ed., Rescuing all our futures: The future of futures studies. Twickenham,U.K.: Adamantine.

 

* NB: While the original text written by Ivana Milojević used the term ‘futures studies’ this was changed by the editors of the Encyclopedia to ‘future studies’

Gender Issues: Futures and Implications for Global Humanity (2008)

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By Ivana Milojević

Written for Berkshire Encyclopedia of the 21st Century (2008). Encyclopedia was not published.

Gender refers to the social construction of humans physiologically and biologically identified as women and men. Because gender is a socially constructed category, we are ‘doing’ rather than being men or women. That is, we (humans) engage in the cultural behaviours of practicing femininity and masculinity. However, gender categories are much more fluid than simply those of women/men; they exist on a continuum between these two ‘ideal types’ (of females and males). Most people exhibit a combination of what are believed to be binary opposing female and male traits such as, for example: intuition/instinct versus rationality; receptive/passive versus active; protective/nourishing versus forceful/assertive; moon- versus sun-like. This symbolism – binarism between two genders – exists in most world cultures but the actual manifestation/description of these traits differs through space and time. Contemporary global culture is significantly based on this dualism, which is, however, being challenged by some significant future trends.

In addition to developments in science, technology and medicine, various cultural changes have also destabilised the common sense approach to how we ‘do’ gender. One of the most significant cultural forces of the twentieth century has been feminism. This social movement – as well as ideology, worldview, theory, practice and way of life – has insisted that gender identities need to become both more fluid and socially accepted. There are many feminisms and women’s movements globally and so the issues of gender differences and identities are seen/defined/theorised in a multitude of ways. What is common to all these feminist’s and women’s orientations is that they wish to change the situation in which femaleness is seen as a disease, an aberration from the norm, and replace it with acknowledgment that this category is an asset with intrinsic value.

These various women’s movements also share a belief that many of our contemporary challenges are a result of the domination of one gender – male – and of the priorities given to values traditionally assigned to masculinity. For example, spiritual eco feminists assert that the environmental challenges we are facing today partially arise from the binarism of civilisation versus nature, and the higher value attached to the former. Such binary thinking is in turn premised on the male versus female division and the overall patriarchal worldview. This worldview envisions and promotes certain (successful, powerful, dominating) males to be at the top of the social hierarchy and over other (weaker) males, and women, other species and nature in general. Gender issues are thus not simply side issues, to be relegated to the spheres of gender identities, sexuality and family. Rather, they are embedded in all that our human species believes and practices. This includes how we commonly perceive our futures and how we engage with social innovation and change.

The futures of gender

To further describe contemporary processes and trends in relation to gender issues it is useful to outline three main scenarios for gender futures. Each will have radically different implications for the future of our local communities and global society.

Continued female–male polarity

Female–male polarity represents the traditional model, where differences between (only two) genders are potentiated and exaggerated. These two genders are seen as fixed, biologically determined and ahistorical/unchangeable. Most commonly, it is perceived that these two genders are distinct, having separate spheres of influence and very different attributes; at the same time, it is the male side that is more highly valued. This male side or masculinity is expressed through attributes of strength, courage, assertiveness, action, creation and self-confidence, all seen as being in-born to any human that is recognised as a male in a biological/ physiological sense. Sometimes, it is perceived that these two spheres of female/male influence are different but are/should be valued equally. This orientation exists in both more traditional social settings as well as in contemporary ones, albeit taking different forms.

To further enhance polarity between various genders, humans have engaged in certain bodily and spatial practices. Bodily modification as a mark of feminine/masculine identity has deep and ancient tribal roots. Some of the older practices (i.e. corset wearing, foot binding) have mostly been abandoned, while others (i.e. genital mutilation, piercing, tattooing, scarification, circumcision) are continuing. And of course new means of enhancing ones femininity or masculinity through various forms of body art are constantly being invented. Modern medicine and health science have allowed for physical manipulation of both female and male bodies towards (place- and time-specific) perceived ideals of femaleness and maleness. Reproductive organs are thus manipulated and/or enhanced – as is overall body appearance – through nutritional supplements, medicines, exercises and plastic surgery. The rates of plastic surgery in the western world – mostly to enhance one’s desirability and appeal to the other sex – have been continuously on the rise. These practices are most commonly entered into in order to fit the norm of perceived feminine/masculine beauty and thus affirm the female–male polarity. Other cultural practices of affirming this polarity incorporate division between private and public spheres and the segregation of females and males within each respective sphere. The male backlash in ‘post-feminist’ times and the continuation/revival of religious and political fundamentalism also heavily rely on the bi-polarity of genders.

Rarely, female–male polarity is used to imagine/work towards the creation of radically different societies. For example, in some feminist/women’s and moralist discourses, ‘feminine’ qualities of nurturing, caring, compassion, emotional sensitivity, vulnerability and intuition are seen as core strengths essential to the development of a better society. This is diametrically opposite to the values of patriarchal societies that award a second grade status to anything womanly or feminine. Radical forms of celebrating everything feminine are rare but do occur; at the more extreme and less common end are woman-centered heterosexual and lesbian separatism, female suprematism, matriarchy and gynarchy. These latter forms most commonly exist as an idea only, rather than finding their way into past/present reality.

Even though female–male polarity has been the dominant model for organising gender so far, and although its residues are going to follow us into the future, this model is, in general, most likely to remain a product of past and contemporary times.

Unisex androgyny

One of the earliest and most persistent goals of feminist and women’s movements has been to abolish sex roles and distinctions between feminine and masculine behaviour/attributes. The ideal of an androgynous future was thus propagated among these groups but also in the context of a wider society. Some twentieth century socialist societies promoted an androgynous ideal of dress and behaviour not only in practice but also as an ideal future wherein sexual equality manifests. Unisex androgyny is also imagined as a psychological condition or characteristic, where men increasingly adopt traditional ‘women’s virtues’ while women increasingly adopt virtues traditionally seen as masculine. Futurists Aburdene and Naisbett (1992: 262) have argued that in the future successful human beings will have to possess a combination of masculine and feminine traits. They also argued that as a group, women have better absorbed positive masculine traits, mostly because those were valued for centuries by male-dominated societies.

Scenarios in which women and men become physically more similar (as in the case of hermaphroditism, where the individual has primary and secondary sexual characteristics of both genders) are highly unlikely, although some claim that in the future it will be more difficult to establish the ‘natural’ gender of some individuals. Developments in medical science would enable mutations such that we would be able to change gender as we wish, and alternate the procreative functions that we today associate only with one gender or the other. won’t need men (sperm banks) and men won’t need women (artificial wombs), or reproduction won’t need either women or men (reproduction of babies in factories). If seen as a means to eliminate sexual stereotyping of human virtues, androgyny would be very close to some feminist ideals. Since division by gender is one of the oldest and most established divisions between humans, movement towards androgyny might be potentially liberating and revolutionary. But some feminists, for example Gloria Steinem, reject the concept of androgyny as it can lean towards conformist and unisex visions which are the opposite to the individuality and uniqueness envisaged in their understanding of feminism.

On the other hand, an ideal society would be one in which all differences would have freedom of expression. If the next centuries bring into reality reproduction external to the human body, the main reason for maintaining different social functions and roles for women and men would disappear, thus contributing to the formation of androgynous societies. Androgynous societies might be also formed as a by-product of removing socially prescribed qualities for each gender, and we might see future societies consisting of humans, rather than of men and women.

Multiple gender diversities

This vision/scenario/model proposes that it is not an androgyny of sameness that is the answer to sexual politics but rather freedom from repression and dominance as well as freedom of choice (Harris, 1980). The underlying assumption here is that physiologically, anatomically, neurologically, psychologically and culturally there exists a vast diversity among humans and to organise this diversity along one or two dimensions is unrealistic and detrimental. This scenario thus challenges the idea of heteronormativity in which female genitalia = female identity = feminine behaviour = desiring male partner. Or alternatively, for males, male genitalia = male identity = masculine behaviour = desiring female partner (Wikipedia, entry on third gender). There are many names given to a combination of sexual and gender identities, depending on whether one feels/behaves simultaneously like both genders, neither or something completely different. Terms such as third (fourth, fifth) gender, transgender, genderqueer, gender-bender, transsexual, intersexual, pangender and bigender are introduced (Wikipedia). Such scenarios of multiple gendered identities are not a recent invention and can be found through much of human history. As well, what exactly is considered ideal female or male identity/behaviour has also varied through space and time.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the general trend is towards this type of recognized multiplicity rather than towards forced uniformity. This scenario is most likely for the future since there is no longer a simple answer to the question “Who is woman (man)?”. Positions which describe sexes as ultimately biological categories are now considered simplistic naturalism and essentialism. The development of medical science has further destabilized essentialist views of gender. If we accept that ‘women’ and ‘men’ are mostly socially constructed categories, it is obvious that we cannot have only one construction and that those constructions would change over time. The creation of a society in which every difference is able to find expression would be dear to the heart of liberals and most feminists. A society which accepted multiple gender diversity would definitely create the greatest space for individual freedom and non-conformist persons. Ultimately, this will be another way of destabilizing the importance of gender in defying personal roles and functions within society. This appears to be the most likely – of the three scenarios – to gain recognition in the twenty-first century. This recognition is likely to be further enhanced by an overall shift towards individualism. As well, our contemporary frames of reference are global rather than being contained within particular societies and communities, therefore awareness of different ways of doing gender globally are only going to increase. In turn, this awareness is likely to further the diversification of genders, gender roles and identities.

Implications for the future of our global human society

During times of female–male polarity the division of labour among the two genders promoted unbalanced societies. For example, women were primarily in charge of child rearing, housekeeping, health care and education. Their work has thus mostly been relegated to the private sphere of the non-monetised ‘love economy’. On the other hand, men have been in charge of higher socially desired positions, dominating decision making and the monetised, professional public sphere. Unisex androgyny has challenged this division; however, it is mostly women that have entered the traditional male sphere and not vice versa. Likewise, the sameness of unisex androgyny is predominantly modelled upon a male norm.

The emergence of multiple gender diversities fundamentally challenges the societies we inherited. Once people become free to express themselves along the male–female continuum depending on internal and external circumstances – without fear of reprisal – more democratic and fairer societies will result. These societies will have flattened hierarchies, be more integrated and diverse and exhibit qualitatively different human–nature and human–human relatedness. New information and communication technologies are also going to be helpful in creating these societies of wider freedom and choice. This does not imply that future societies based on multiple gender diversities are to be/come perfect, utopian. But they may well become eutopian, that is, become a better option than our present and past conditions. None of this is to be taken for granted, as any future is premised on the action of present humans.

Bibliography

Aburdene, P., & Naisbitt, J. (1992). Megatrends for Women. New York: Villard Books.

Harris, S. (1980), quoted in Kramarae C., & Treichler P.A. (1985). A Feminist Dictionary. London: Pandora Press, p. 50.

Steinem, G. (1983), quoted in Kramarae C., & Treichler, P.A. (1985). A Feminist Dictionary. London: Pandora Press, p. 50.

Milojević, I. (1998). Learning from feminist futures. In D. Hicks & R. A. Slaughter (Eds.), 1998 World Yearbook for Education (pp. 83–95). London: Kogan Page.

Wikipedia, on-line encyclopaedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page

Mapping Futures Studies and Risk Analysis, Management and Communication (2010)

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Sohail Inayatullah

Professor, Tamkang University, Sunshine Coast University, Queensland University of Technology
www.metafuture.org

“I agree that it would be pleasant to walk on streets free of animal waste products. But can we be sure that the waste products of the automobile will be an improvement?”
Herman Cohn, The Social and Political Consequences of the Internal Combustion Engine. 1916.

Clearly no technology, social or material, spiritual or of this world, is without risk. Even though the Hare Krishna claim that they provide “After Life Insurance”, we cannot know until the time comes. And then it may be too late to transform. As the Buddha said on whether there was life after death, “First die, then see”. Of course, cryogenics and life extension from genetic engineering changes risk assessment.

Risk and Futures

This presentation will link approaches to risk with approaches to the study of the future. It concludes with comments on contending images of the future, and the risks associated with each.

To begin with, risk is central to thinking about the future; it is implicit in any statement about the future, however banal. This is especially so for risk defined as probability, i.e., what will happen – what is known as futuribles – the study of probablistics.

But it is also true for risk defined as consequences, what will happen if x occurs – that is, impact analysis.

But perhaps futures studies is best known for the warnings it gives – whether this is the Club of Rome’s classic Limits to Growth, Ravi Batra’s forecasts of economic depressions, or Alvin Toffler’s forecasts of the breakdown of industrial society – the ‘Second Wave’. These warnings are not just confined to the socio-economic but hark back to warnings and prophecies of the physical world as well. For example, writes Bill McGuire in A Guide to the End of the World, there are numerous dangers ahead of us. These include giant tsunamis, asteroid collisions (a 1km asteroid will cause a cosmic winter and kill a billion people), great quakes, volcanic super eruption (part of earth’s natural cycle) and global warming (which would mean some 5 billion people would be without adequate drinking water, and the death of the Great Barrier Reef by 2050 ). It is intriguing that vulcanologists die at the rate of almost one a year, peering into volcanoes.

Types of Futures Studies

Of course, futures studies is not just about prediction. However, that is clearly one dimension of it, and unfortunately, the dimension most well known.

This essentially assumes that:

  • The future can be predicted.
  • The universe is a closed system.
  • Current trends are generally problematic to change.
  • And that essentially, the issue is to better manage and thus control the future.

The real issue is the accuracy and precision of the prediction; less dominant is the validity of the assumptions upon which the predictions are based , or the reasons that those issues are the subject of predictions – that is, the issue of relevance.

In this mode of the future, risk is to be consumed. Risk becomes associated with fear.

The issue becomes how to understand the many codes of fear coming at us. Who to believe? Who to trust? And certainly, as pointed out by Paul Slovic, the experts and the ‘public’ disagree on these things. Experts rate the car the most dangerous and the people nuclear power plants. This of course raises the issue of risk communication and the worldview in which we enter conversations on the future.

Thus, predictions should not be seen outside the context of who makes them, when they are made, whom they are made to, why they are made, and the institutional relationships in which they are rendered intelligible.

Indeed, remembering Kafka, risk and fear and their future essentially force us into a postmodern burrow. As Mike Shapiro argues, our consciousness can be more of an enemy rather than an ally. We are no longer sure which forecasts can help us maneuver in this world, which forecasts will hurt our chances. Like the creature who digs a burrow to avoid a predator but who over time can no longer distinguish which sounds are simply its own digging and which the sounds of the predator, we can become lost. The problem of intelligibility does not go away.

But we are soothed by the media: fear is a big business. The fear of fat (fat as a risk criteria for heath disease and cancer) and now the fear of being stupid (with the rise of the smart state, the smart economy and smart nutraceuticals) makes fear essentially the way we know the world.

We thus need to move away from the surface of prediction to an analysis of meanings.

In this sense, a second dimension of futures studies is less an attempt to forecast the future and more an ethnographic understanding of the image of the future. What is desired? Does the way we imagine the future vary according to our gender or culture?

Perhaps such an approach is spreading risk, a means by which the future is not seen in univocal terms but rather as segmented. We live in different worlds and imagine different futures. We cannot know what is true, real and beautiful – and as genetics, postmodernism, multicultural, globalization, virtualism, feminism challenge these essentials, we are less sure of what we know and even what we don’t know (see Table 1). But we can inquire into difference and, understanding how the many see the future, we can move toward a map of what will be and what can be.

The future is thus less of a managerial predictive enterprise and more of a humanist one, searching for the good society, the eutopia, developing the social capacity for civilizational innovation. Using the future to transform today as opposed to using the future to reduce risk and thus gain strategic and competitive advantage.

This moves us to the third approach to the study of the future. This is the critical. In this approach, the future is contested, its categories made problematic. The future is seen in historical terms, as the victory of one way of seeing the world over others. The future that is hegemonic does need to be so. Forecasts are questioned, not for accuracy, but for validity. Why is nation-state risk assessment required, what is it about our world that we need to know which nations are ‘risky’. Isn’t the issue the transformation of the nation-state itself?

Scenarios, for example, are not constructed to be more robust or flexible but they are of use because they distance us from the present. The present is seen as impossible to change. By moving forward and backward in time, the present can be made problematic, remarkable, open to transformation, constructed by particular frameworks and choices.

The notion of choice brings us to the fourth approach: anticipatory action learning. The way to reduce risk is to create desired futures. This is done not in the bravado of world.com or Enron but in the slow and deliberative action of community consultation, of engaging others in how they see the world, what is of importance to them. The details of a scenario, often categorised into society, technology, economy, environment and politics (STEEP) are not assumed, rather the y–axis is developed by those creating the future. They contour within their own categories. The future is not given but made.

The future is created through doing. Mistakes in forecasts are not seen as disasters but as feedback loops. Learning develops by being sensitive and responsive to initial and future conditions – what we discover from complexity and chaos.

Essentially this is a plea for participation and a recognition that common sense is necessary for understanding the future. Experts are needed but they should be contextualized in the worldview they arrive in. All knowledge is, if not biased, then textured. However, this texture is not to be controlled for (as in the predictive), or made distant (as in the critical), but, like the interpretive, to be used to create a better future – texture is a necessary ingredient.

While this is a philosophical typology, it relates as well to the more practical task of how should one engage in thinking about the future.

From Forecasting to Depth

Single Point Forecasting:
As mentioned earlier, forecasting intends to get it right. The future is feared and thus the forecast must be accurate. Vertical organizations tend to use this approach.

And, of course, one may get it right from time to time, but over the long run, this is impossible, since human agency is an ingredient. Our forecasts should assume agency; that is, humans act to avoid certain futures and work diligently to create desired ones.

Alternative Futures

Since single point forecasting may not reduce risk, scenario planning has become the latest corporate flavour. Scenarios reduce uncertainty by clarifying alternatives, by clarifying assumptions, by clarifying probabilities. By describing alternative worlds, risk can be reduced. However, more often than not, corporations tend to desire scenarios that only differ marginally from ‘business as usual’. Alternatives are generally considered a waste of time.

However, one can develop scenarios and use them to test strategies, and, for example, use the strategy that is the most robust, that occurs as preferred or logical in each scenario.

The Australian Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Association (APMA) and the Insurers Manufacturing Association (IMA) have both used this approach. It can also be used for contingency planning or for developing divergence. As well, IMA has used it to develop products. Within each scenario, products can be teased out. These can then be tested in the market place.

However, merely having scenarios is not enough. In the APMA project, while the scenarios were presented to the government agency spearheading Australia’s role in developing the pharmaceutical industry, they were not seen as useful, since they provided alternatives while the Ministry responsible desired specific realizable results. The goals of the scenario project were to anticipate futures and prepare for unknown worlds and to use scenarios to become more adaptable. The government vision was that of developing a series of shared goals so that implementation could be made easier. Clearly this lack of shared methodology and final goal was crucial in the scenarios not being really used.

There are other crucial issues as well. In 1985, Charlie Schnabolk developed four scenarios for the risk associated with the World Trade Center:

(1) Predictable – bomb threats;
(2) Probable – bombing attempts, computer crime;
(3) Possible – hostage taking; and
(4) Catastrophic – aerial bombing, chemical agents in water supply or air-conditioning.

When asked in 2000 what the greatest threat to the WTC was, he responded: “Someone flying a plane into the building”.

The issue, then, is not just the development of scenarios, but how well they are communicated and how well understood.

Depth analysis

What scenarios also miss is the levels of analysis. Scenarios are excellent in reducing and mapping risk, and in extending breadth, but they miss depth.

For example, one could develop scenarios of the futures of quality and safety in health care. At a litany or superficial level, one can develop criteria for different types of medical experts who are more likely to commit mistakes. One can, however, go deeper and focus on the systemic issues; that is, move to the actor-invariant level. Does the system design lead to loss of life, resulting in a medical system that is https://www.chem-ecol.com/valium/ the third biggest cause of death? Is it the long hours, or lack of communication between personnel the crucial variable that leads to risks?

We can also go to a deeper level and begin to question not just the person or the system but the worldview underneath the enterprise – in what ways is allopathy itself the problem?. How does the vertical relations embedded in allopathy, with doctors unwilling to listen (they are the experts), create conditions that lead to increased patient risk? One can then examine quality and safety in other worldviews: alternative medicine, Chinese, or homeopathic, for example. But it would be a mistake to leave it at that. Risk reduction requires a conversation of worldviews, of questioning each worldview in the light of the others. Allopathy asking tough questions of homeopathy, and Chinese of Western. Bringing in divergence allows difference to create safety and health. Difference reduces risk by acknowledging the other, by seeing that each system has areas that it does not know, indeed, areas that it does not even know it does not know.

It is these assumptions that must be challenged.

For example, take Cisco. Cisco developed a brilliant real-time forecasting method. Ram Charan and Jerry Useem in their article for the May issue of Fortune magazine, ”Why companies fail” write:

Cisco, more than any other company, was supposed to be able to see into the future. The basis of this belief was the much vaunted IT system that enabled Cisco managers to track supply and demand in ‘real time’, allowing them to make pinpoint forecasts. This technology, by all accounts, worked great. The forecasts, however, did not. Cisco’s managers, it turned out, never bothered to model what would happen if a key assumption – growth – disappeared from the equation. (p. 50)

Even when things were looking bad, CEO John Chambers was still projecting 50% growth. He said: “I have never been more optimistic about the future of our industry as a whole or of Cisco”(ibid.).

Growth as a factor was not challenged because the deepest level of reality is unconscious and unavailable to us. Fish cannot see water and we cannot see the story we are living.
Stories and competing visions of the future
To see the story, either we need to move to other planets (and thus develop true comparative sociology and macrohistory) or we need to travel to the future, and thus imagine societies and worlds different from today. However, this is not science fiction as currently constituted. Current science fiction merely extrapolates the technological and the economic and thus imagines the Global-cyber world.

Social movements express what that story hides. They imagine a world of sustainability and sharing, planetary consciousness and spirituality. Each in effect becomes a mirror of the other. Of course, there are truly competing visions of the future, coming out in education (global-cyber versus green gender multicultural partnershp) or in transport (telecommuting versus public zero-emissions transport) or in governance (cyber anticipatory democracy or social movements and world governance) or in time (hyper and real time versus slow and spiritual time) and as foundational myths (Spaceship Earth versus Gaia). These images pull us to the future, much as trends such as ageing, genomics, multiculturalism, and ozone layer depletion push us to the future. As well, the weight of history arrests the possibility of system transformation.

Realist, Spaceship and Gaian Images of the Future

What does not compete, but what dominates remains the reality; that is, the nation-state oriented, strategic focused, male based, profit as bottom line world. It is, the Bush-Howard view of the future, where risk is collectively managed but the depth questions are not entered.

When alternative worlds are offered, they are seen as utopian (meaning unrealistic). But, if we take a critical and a depth view, every reality was once a utopia, an imagined world. And every utopia has a dark side, a dystopia. Of course, writes Ivana Milojeivc, having a dystopia is part of making a utopia real. Once both are present then the image has begun to gain credibility, credence. It has the possibility of supplanting the dominant vision of the future.

But returning to the main point, the foundational story is not accessible to those living it. They are in greatest risk if reality does change. This risk is not just financial but existential. Those who lived in former socialism, and believed in notions of quality, international brother- and sister-hood, and safe pensions, now live in emotional tatters. They have no image of the future. Their past has been denounced. Capitalism is a ghost, spirituality a ruse. There is nothing in the past or future. Agency is impossible for them.

What this means is that if one desires to enter and engage in the understandings of risk, merely seeing the exercise as risk management or even risk communication is likely to be unsatisfactory. Certainly writers like Mark Slovic who explore worldviews and risk are, I believe, on the right track since risk in their model is constructed by people’s wordviews and practices.

As he writes: “Risk management decisions will finally be a matter not of mathematics, but of judgement”. This means taking account of scientific and social information and applying what Slovic calls “reasoned thinking”:
Using our human faculties to the best effect. Risk decision makers must continually attend to building trust with stakeholders. They need to demonstrate the care, thoughtfulness and fairness of their decisions. It will not be enough to demonstrate that a decision is ‘scientific’- it also has to be shown that all values were considered.

I would go a step further and assert that: Risk is not out there in the real world, it is created by our imaginations. We constitute risk by who we are. Far more than reasoned thinking is needed; indeed, post-rational depth analysis is required.

What then to do?

While there are no easy solutions, I would take the anticipatory action approach and question reality at all levels: Question the litany, question the system, question the worldview and find ways to question the foundational myth that supports the entire system.

When forecasting the futures of risk, I would do my best to move beyond single point forecasts to scenarios, but then go much further, unpacking the levels underneath scenarios. That said, there are patterns to reality.

Macrohistory

One of the pillars of futures studies is macrohistory – the study of grand patterns of social change. Civilizations do have a linear trajectory – increased rights over the last 500 years or so, for example – but there are also cyclical dimensions. Driving a car is individually tailored; the opposite of course is the community, public transport. Perhaps we have erred on the side of the individual and earth’s limitations now call into question the realist Bush-Howard world we have created. There may be limits. Or there may be spiral solutions that bring out the best of each, perhaps creating boutique public transport wherein the public remains but is reinvented, where public transport is less drab, more tailored for communities. New technologies also may even dramatically further individualize the car, for example, by testing for alcohol, testosterone, the number of passengers (all risk criteria) and perhaps even genes. This further individualization may lead to safety for the public, turning cars off if risk factors are sensed.

In this sense, the grand question is: Do the new technologies promise a transformation of the world we have had for the last five hundred years? Can they transform the obvious risks industrializiation, materialism, the western way of life have generated? Or are the genetic, nano and other technologies mere continuations, now extending risk far beyond our capacity to imagine the futures being created, as with germ-line intervention and xeno-transplants.

Is then the solution the alternative softer Gaian society, organic, gender partnership, led by social movements, far more concerned with distribution than with growth, committed to community relationships and not necessarily to nation, but to planet. But we should not assume this Gaian future is risk free. As Michio Kaku argues, we need to move from Type 0 civilization (focused on using using non-renewable fossil fuels and nuclear energy) to a Type 1 civilization that uses the sun for energy, sending huge space ships to collect the vast resources of the sun, allowing us to modify the planet, weather, and begin to prepare our departure from this planet if need be (and eventually we will need somewhere else to live as our solar system will die one day). The soft Gaian future, focused on our inner lives and social justice is unlikely to have the capacity to save our species.

But the Bush-Howard model is clearly wrecking us and the Spaceship models poses more risks than we can imagine.

Perhaps it is time to imagine another vision of the future, moving toward but beyond the nation, or earth as spaceship or Gaia.

Shall we take the risk?

Table 1: Knowledge and Ignorance

CERTAINITY
KNOW DON’T KNOW

Type 1

 

What you know

 

  • Day to day given reality
  • Uncontested – Accepted
  • Forecasts – Data
 Type 4

 

What you don’t know

 

  • Knowledge outside one’s field, locale, area of expertise
  • Study – emerging issues analysis
  • Learning from others
  • Being conscious
Type 2

 

What you know you know

 

  • Reflection
  • Science especially testing of hypothesis
  • High degree of certainty – Information
 Type 5

 

What you don’t know you know

 

  • Unconscious Understanding
  • Super-consciousness
  • Intuitive Foresight
  • Wisdom
Type 3

 

What you know you don’t know

 

  • Scenarios are the most useful tool as they help contour uncertainty – frame areas of ignorance
  • Emerging issues analysis
  • Knowledge through questioning

 

 Type 6

 

What you don’t know you don’t know

 

  • Only way to approach this is by entering other ways of knowing, moving outside comfortable paradigms
  • Epistemic futures
  • The Problem of Consciousness – Enemy, Friend or Transcendence

UNCERTAINTY

References

[1] Bill McGuire, A Guide to the End of the World: Everything you never wanted to know. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.

[1] Sohail Inayatullah, Questioning the Future: Futures Studies, Action Learning and Organizational Transformation. Tamsui, Tamkang University Press, 2002.

[1] Paul Slovic and Elke Weber, “Perception of Risks Posed by extreme events.” Paper prepared for Conference, Risk Management Strategies in an Uncertain World. New York, April 12-13, 2002.)

[1] Michael Shapiro. , Reading the Postmodern Polity: Political Theory as Textual Practice. Oxford and Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1992.

[1] Sohail Inayatullah, Questioning the Future, 118. From, Richard Reeves, “Mission Impossible: Securing Tall Buildings Against Terrorists.” The International Herald Tribune. (October 20-21, 2001), 6.

[1] Ram Charan and Jerry Useem, “Why companies fail,” Fortune (May 27, 47-58)

[1] Ivana Milojevic. The futures of Education: Feminist and Post-western critiques of the Global Cyber hegemonic vision of education. Brisbane, the University of Queensland, 2002. Doctoral Dissertation.

[1] http://www.ermanz.govt.nz/Publications/pdfs/pe029801.pdf.

[1] Johan Galtung and Sohail Inayatullah, eds. Macrohistory and Macrohistorians. Praeger, Westport, Ct., 1997.

[1] Sohail Inayatullah, Situating Sarkar: Tantra, Macrohistory and Alternative Futures. Maleny, Gurukul, 1999. Understanding Sarkar: The Indian Episteme, Macrohistory and Transformative Knowledge. Leidin, Brill, 2002.

[1] Michio Kaka, Visions. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998.

Making Peace: Kosovo/a and Serbia: Conflict Resolution Scenarios (2008)

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By Dr. Ivana Milojević

This essay explores the futures of Kosovo/a and Serbia. It uses methods from scenarios and peace theory to articulate a different possible future for the region. The current trajectory promises hardship for all parties especially in the medium and long term.

Keywords: International conflict resolution, peace futures, transcend method, scenarios, Serbia, Kosovo/a

When there is a conflict between two ethnic groups, be it over territory, resources or values, there is also always a one sided take on the past and present. The one sided perspective Kosovars and Serbs have been using for decades, if not centuries, is akin to two deaf persons talking, without the ability to hear each other or lip read. It also reminds one of the ancient tale of blind men who attempted to describe an elephant via touching different parts of its body. The elephant is like a pot! asserts the one touching the head. No, like a, winnowing basket! says the one who touches the ear. Ploughshare! Says one touching the tusk. And so they went, describing the elephant as a plough (trunk), granary (body), pillar (foot), mortar (back), pestle (tail), or brush (tip of the tail). In a similar vain, Serbs exclaim: Kosovo is ours! This is where our nation was born, where our ancestral bones are buried and where our churches were built. No, Kosova is ours! exclaim Albanian Kosovars. We’ve lived here even longer and are now a vast majority. Oh well, they are all irrational barbarians, Balkan cavemen, exclaim the ‘civilised’. If it was not in Europe, no one would care, exclaim the postcolonial theorists. It is a result of a militaristic warrior culture, so assert peace theorists. No, a result of patriarchy, say the feminists. Unfinished nation state building process, is the discourse of the nationalists. One must respect international laws of national sovereignty, say the legalists. But the laws change when reality on the ground changes, say the realists. Change is the only constant, remind social change theorists.

The examples in the previous paragraph suggest that it is possible to theorise conflicts within and around Kosovo/a and Serbia in many different ways and via using many different discourses. Yet only some of the discourses are seen as legitimate and dominate. Both locally and internationally it is discourses of nationalism, realism and legalism that are most commonly used. Some are virtually unknown to the majority of the population, such as the feminist, postcolonial or peace movement ones. Some are stated explicitly (i.e. legalist discourse) and some are hidden, existing more at the myth/metaphor level (i.e. ‘Balkan’ identity discourse).

Another set of extremely powerful discourses are those of history, justice and righteousness. Most commonly it is these discourses that are used to propose ‘a solution’ to the current and long-term conflict over Kosova/o. And yet, paradoxically it is these very discourses that are also part of the problem.

History

History can be a fantastic resource to understand the present but when it comes to conflict situations it is too often used for further entrenchment. Coupled with discourse of nationalism, history can not be but about ‘cherry picking’ – i.e. selective use of dates that confirm ‘our’ victimisation and ‘their’ viciousness/violence/unfairness. Prior to the 1999 NATO bombing of both Kosova and Serbia there was a debate open to BBC listeners in terms of potential NATO intervention and also wider issues in relation to the conflict between Serbs and Albanians. One does not need to be a futurist to predict which dates which side was going to pick from history. Participants only talked about their own victimisation and only of some periods from history and not the others. To simplify, the debate went like this:

Albanian side

1999: 90% Albanians in Kosova. Serbs care “about mines not the shrines”.

1988: Revoked autonomous status. All rights abolished, police state introduced.

1945-1948:
Albanians sought refuge in Turkey, during the reign of Vasa Čubrilović, the head of Serbian Regime that prosecuted them.

1912-1941: expulsion of Albanians and Colonisation of Kosova took place by Serbian monarchy/army/government.

Expulsion of Albanians in the 19th century (e.g. 1877-1878).

Albanians originally Illyrians, lived in Balkan since ancient times, more then
2 000 years before Serbs “even set a foot in the Balkans”.

Serbian side

1999: Albanians represent 20% in Serbia; used to be 16% in former Yugoslavia.

Autonomous status only given in 1974. Demonstration for independence in 1981.

1968-1988: Expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo and ‘demographic warfare’ (emigration of Serbs + illegal immigration + high birth rate of Albanian population).

1941-1945: Italian occupation of Kosovo and creation of Greater Albania, expulsion of Serbian population.

1389: Battle of Kosovo, the beginning of 500 years of colonisation by Ottoman Empire.

Historical evidence that Albanians lived in Kosovo for only the last 600 years.
Serbs came many centuries before that.

Thus the question of ‘whom does the Kosovo righteously and historically belong to’ cannot possibly be answered using this type of discourse. For a solution that is fair to all sides involved, for an outcome that is acceptable and sustainable a range of futures rather than history oriented discourses needs to be applied. So instead of only asking ‘who was there first’, ‘who is the rightful owner’ and ‘what are the legal issues and implications’ questions themselves need to be reframed. But before doing so lets look at some possible futures scenarios.

Conflict resolution scenarios

In this section I employ four main approaches: power based methods, rights based methods, randomness/chance based methods and interest-based methods.

1. Power based methods ask the question of “who is the most powerful?”. It uses the rule of man, that is ‘fight it out, might is right’, overt violence (war, terrorism, individual and group attacks), and non-physical sanctions (alternative systems of governing, ultimatums, sanctions, psychological abuse, boycott and so on).
2. Rights based methods ask the question of “who has the best case?”. It relies on the rule of law, religious code or community norms. The resolution ultimately is through authority’s order, course of law or arbitrations.
3. Randomness/chance based methods asks the question of “who is ‘the luckiest’?”. These methods rely on the rule of chance, are random and ad hoc.
4. Interest-based methods ask the question of “what are the needs and concerns?”. It thus focuses on problem solving approaches, on ‘our way’ (collaboration) instead of ‘my way’ (forcing), ‘your way’ (accommodating), ‘no way’ (avoiding) or ‘half way’ (compromising).

Many of these conflict resolution methods have already been tried. In particular, power and rights based methods, by all sides involved, and also by the international community. This part of the world has had its share of wars, sanctions and group directed abuses, that is, its share of direct, structural and psychological violence. In 1999, power based methods were taken to a new high, with Milošević’s government attempt to the ‘ultimate solution’ of ‘not giving Kosovo away’.

So the world witnessed the expulsion of ethnic Albanians from their homes by Serbian military and para-military forces. Since in power based methods the game is not over ‘until the fat lady sings’ [“I nad popom ima pop”] the next stage involved NATO bombing of both Serbia and Kosova, effectively changing Serbian ‘my way’ to the ‘my way’ of ethnic Albanians. While this is difficult for Serbian nationalists to hear Kosovo has since 1999 effectively and de factol not been part of the Serbian territory. And yet, no long term, sustainable and acceptable solutions to all parties involved has been created either.

While currently, in 2008, there is a push for complete Independence by Kosovars (ethnic Albanians) have been successful in becoming independent, this independence is and a complete non acceptance of this solution by the minority of Serbs still living in Kosovo and also by the Serbian state. Most likely, if power based politics prevails, Serbs will eventually be forced to de facto accept a one-sided, one way solution that favours ethnic Albanians even if Russia and China continue to support the Serbian perspective.. But the negative consequences of this enforced solution may be too many, including the potential for nationalist, pro-militaristic and conservative Radical party to eventually seize the power in Serbia, even though they were unsuccessful in the recent election. . Its current leader Tomislav Nikolić explicitly stated that military intervention in Kosovo – if he is to have his way – would be a desired outcome should Kosovars proclaim full Independence. While this has not occurred, it is too soon to judge how history will play itself out, given the last decades or so of war. As stated by one Serb in a blog debating Independence of Kosovo: “Serbs waited for 500 years to free Kosovo and Metohija from Turks, we can wait again”. As well, even without military intervention and new war in the region consequences to both Serbian and Kosovar society will be many – from further focus on ‘ethnic cleansing’ to the creation of closed, conservative, xenophobic and totalitarian societies.

Another potential solution is of a compromise or a ‘half way’ approach. This approach involves some sort of a division and is currently (and after secession) preferred option of Serbians living in the northern part of Kosovo. This too is possible, although at this stage very unlikely. As well, this outcome too albeit it would fall short of the most desirable solution that focuses on the needs and concerns of all involved, that is future oriented and that has the potential to bring outcomes that are sustainable in the long term.

The following table summarises five possible scenarios: of one side prevailing (A1 or A2), gaining exclusive right to the territory through the rule of man, law or chance, or via being compensated for the loss (my way, your way); of no-one winning (sides taking turns to block the positive outcome for the other, ‘freezing of the issue’ as in during the last decade or via occurrence of various destructive violent based realities, killings, war, non-violent sanctions, or any other ‘no way’); of a compromise (some sort of a division of a territory, ‘half way’) and of a ‘win-win’ solution for all involved (collaborative, ‘transcendence’, ‘our way’ scenario).

Styles of Conflict Management

(based on Ron Kraybill’s work, Thomas-Kilman and Conflict Mode Instrument, David Ausburger’s and also Johan Galtung’s Transcend method)

In terms of these five potential scenarios for conflict management there is currently a formidable focus on ‘my way’ and power and rights based approaches. History in this context is not used as a ‘teacher’ but an additional tool to state one’s case.

Randomness/chance based methods, ‘no way’ and ‘your way’ approaches are, on the other hand, most commonly not seen as a solution and indeed, they are very unlikely to create one. This is because there is a high concern for goals (‘my’ Kosova/o) and ideals (it is ‘ours’) by both (all) sides involved. In addition to this goals and ideals axis, relationship axis can also be used to provide some explanations, specifically to also help explain overwhelming focus on ‘my way’ approaches. The sad reality is that neither the majority of ethnic Albanians living in Kosova and elsewhere nor the majority of Serbs (living in Kosovo, Serbia and elsewhere) currently care much about establishing quality relationships with the other group. Rather, the full on process of ‘othering’ has been going on for many years now, and also periodically throughout the history. This means that ‘the other’ is portrayed as ‘less’, ‘violent’, ‘wrong’, ‘evil’, ‘wild’, even ‘dirty’ and ‘disgusting’. And it doesn’t matter which side is using it, either explicitly or implicitly when talking and thinking about the other, the outcome is always the same: “‘We’ really do not want to deal with the other and it is the unfortunate fact that they live in our close proximity”.

To summarise these are the potential outcomes:

• Scenario 1 (My way, A1 wins) Kosovars proclaim secession. Most if not all states recognise independent Kosova. EU EU and the UN Security Council eventually recognised Kosova as a new state. Serbia in the end eventually accepts the defeat.

• Scenario 2 (Half way, compromise) Kosovo gets somehow divided, i.e. between North and South or between Serbian controlled enclaves where Serbian ‘minority’ lives and where Serbian monasteries are situated and the rest of Kosova.

• Scenario 3 (No way, withdrawal) The issue is frozen for another several decades. Kosova’s full ars decide to wait or they proclaim independence but this is stalled by international legal processes. Serbia uses its limited power to make life difficult for Kosovars, so that they too do not fully ‘win’. China and Russia continue to veto attempts by others to grant Kosovo full international recognition.

• Scenario 4 (Your way, A2 wins) Countries like Russia and, China and Spain pressure UN Security Council and EU Union proclaim to reject secession. International legal processes end up in ruling that Independence was an illegal act. that Kosovo officially becomes again a part of Serbian state and confirms and the full national sovereignty of Serbia and its territories is confirmed.

• Scenario 5 (Our way, transcendence) Kosovo/a and Serbia join a larger political entity i.e. European Union simultaneously. In this scenario Kosovo would officially remain part of Serbia but yet would be given de facto autonomy of a state. Whether certain territories are officially in Serbia or Kosovo becomes less important than good quality relations and high standard of living. Municipalities are also allowed self-determination rights. This is thus simultaneously globalising/unifying and localising/self-determination based scenario. Both Kosovo and Serbia agree to the treatment of minorities to be of highest standard and allow for the free movement of people, goods and services between these two territories, again based on EU standards. Kosovo/a becomes ‘an independent’ region within a broader association, a Truth and Reconciliation type process begins, refuges are brought back, local groups engage in various peace building processes, peace education initiatives are applied, psychological trauma counselling workshops take place, ecumenical peace work gets intensified and a sense of a common future based on positive neighbourly relationships starts to develop.

The most preferred scenario for Kosova Albanians is Scenario 1. The most preferred scenario for Serbian (identity, state) side overall is Scenario 4. For Serbian (now) left as minority in Independent Kosova scenario that is currently vocalised as the most preferred is Scenario 2. The most likely scenario at this stage is Scenario 3, or some version of it. This would mean that Scenario 1 has already partially occurred, that is, there is recognition by some states but certainly not by the UN security council. The most likely scenario is currently Scenario 1 or some version of it, i.e. However, Serbia and some other countries continued to not recognize an independent Kosova and to freeze relationships (through, for example, boycotts, sanctions, legal initiatives). This likely scenario may turn very costly in the end as the potential ground for further conflict(s) develops. These may include further and potentially violent conflicts between two political options in Serbia, between Serbian minority and Albanian majority in independent Kosova, between Kosova and Serbia and between other secessionist movements within states across Europe. As well, as further conflicts and division between members of the UN Security Council may also occur.

Futures

The purpose of designing futures scenarios is to make more informed choices in the present. Futures thinking is ultimately about inquiry into probable, possible and preferable futures, which we are creating today. For example, had various former Yugoslav ethnic, religious and ideological communities as well as politicians, journalists and other professionals gone through a process of envisioning different scenarios and its many intended and unintended consequences, would they still had made the same decisions they did back in the 1980s and 1990s? Had the international community anticipated how much the war in the former Yugoslavia was to eventually cost them (not to mention the human and environmental cost to the region itself) could things have been different? Most pre and post conflict nations do not engage in this process and thus behave reactively rather then proactively and constructively. We can see similar occurrences happening at the global level also – thus the short-sightedness, destructiveness and even plain stupidity of all sides involved in so call ‘war against terror’. And yet this short-sightedness and reactive ness has nothing to do with ‘human nature’ or inevitability of action-reaction-reaction… or trauma-further trauma-further trauma… mechanisms. This is because even though most societies do not currently engage in the long term thinking – non-action at the global level in regard to the climate change is but one example – some have done and continue to do so. History teaches us that it could be otherwise and that different choices with very different future outcomes could be made. While the former Yugoslav ethnic groups haven’t learned alternative lessons from history (such as that ‘violence breads violence’, ‘unjust solutions do not last’) South Africans it seems did. Thus the former Yugoslavia collapsed and in the process created hundreds of thousands dead people, millions of exiles, damaged the psychological makeup of those that remained and militarily polluted environment, to name but a few negative outcomes. South Africans who used the scenario planning process, on the other hand, created a Truth and Reconciliation commission. This is but one example. There would be many others, beyond the scope of this paper. The literature on peaceful societies, social movement and communication practices (i.e.research by B. Bonta, E. Boulding, G. Kemp, D. Fry, P. Ackerman, J. DuVall, D. Barash, J. Galtung, G. Paige, E.Jones, R. Haenfler, B. Johnson, M. Rosenberg, W. Glasser and many many others …) gives multitude of concrete examples of how historical and contemporary peaceful societies, groups and individuals dealt/deal with conflict in a positive and constructive manner. The whole field of Peace and conflict studies does the same. Other various individuals and groups engaged in the nonviolent social and political efforts also.

Crucial in these efforts is to move away from ‘the problem’ (detrimental historical stories, unmet expectations, violence that happened in the past) and to future alternatives that are positive, imaginative, creative and doable. The main questions should be: how to respond to the crisis/conflict in a way that is honest (acknowledges what is going on for all involved, beyond delusions and misconceptions) and compassionate (cares about all involved, about relationships with the other and about ‘our way’, ‘win-win’ solutions)? (For this approach see: www.transcend.com). What are some of the basic needs of all involved? What do Kosovars need? What do Serbs? What does the international community? How many future based solutions accommodating to those needs (rather than ‘wants’ and ‘shoulds’) can be created? Out of the multitude of these creative, positive and doable alternatives which ones are the most preferable for all involved? Who are the actors that are to be involved in this planning and visioning process? How many stakeholders beyond government officials, politicians and bureaucrats can be found? Who are the most marginalised groups – can they provide out of box thinking and solutions? Can representatives of various yet marginalised discourses, including peace oriented ones, feminist, futurists and representative of other ethnic groups also be included? Why leave it only to nationalists, lawyers and governments? Why not engage in truly democratic practice wherein voices of all involved are to be heard and given space?

For some of these questions to be engaged with, extensive community collaborative processes of envisioning desired, preferable futures are needed. Given the financial difficulties of both Serbia and Kosovo financial support by international community is also needed. Even though such processes would be by far the least costly than any other alternative there needs to be a will to start these processes + the means to achieve them. And while all that seems like a hard work it is necessary if future generations in this area are to live harmoniously, fruitfully and optimistically. Even if (or when) after Kosovo does secede, ethnic Albanians, Serbs and others still will need to continue living there, next to each other. Put simply, the neighbours are not going to go away, miraculously disappear or somehow get completely silenced. So it is the best bet for all involved to learn how to live together without hate, resentment and ‘othering’. Those living today do have a responsibility at the very least to leave to their children and grandchildren a world somewhat better to the one they inherited.

So why not inquiry of both sides into:
1. The positive aspects of the other group. Is their something, anything positive about the other? As there must be, no matter how small, lets build on that. How do we do so?
2. What do I (we) really want? What are our needs here? How do we distinguish those needs from what we were told our needs have to be or from the “unrealistic, wishful thinking”?
3. Can my trauma be heard by others? Can they recognise it without going into blaming and shaming?
4. What are some of the commonalities in our futures visions? Living in peace, harmony and abundance perhaps? How is this best to be achieved? Is the conflict between us helping our vision or hindering it?
5. What are some best strategies that we can implement here and now to bring forward preferable futures for all involved?

If not only the long-term but also immediate future are to be better than the past and present, different strategies, different thoughts, different discourses and different futures visions need to be chosen. For, as the saying goes, if one usually does what one has usually done; one is going to get what one has usually so far got. It would be nice if, for a change, things did change and positive, safe, healthy, inclusive, purposeful, imaginative, fun and abundant presents and futures were created. And even though at this stage this does not seem very likely such alternative futures too are possible.

Article by Ivana Milojević, Research Director www.metafuture.org, Lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies, University of the Sunshine Coast, Australia. Emails: info@metafuture.org and imilojev@usc.edu.au

Published version: for the PDF click here

Futures of Pakistan (2008)

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Essay on the Future of Pakistan: Possible Scenarios

Beyond the pendulum of the general and the landlord-politician: Understanding and creating alternative futures  and scenarios for Pakistan

By Sohail Inayatullah
Professor, Tamkang University, University of the Sunshine Coast, and Prout College.

In this essay, I outline Five futures for Pakistan: (1) the Pendulum continues forever, (2) Collapse, (3) Joining Chindia, (4) the Great Game, and (5) a South Asian Confederation. The most familiar and likely are based on the pendulum of rule by the military and rule by landlord/politicians. However, what is needed is to move from the more likely and less desirable futures to a process of anticipatory democracy where the citizens of Pakistan consider, create and commit to building their preferred future.

DEEP STRUCTURES

While the assassination of Benazir Bhutto certainly plunged Pakistan into one of its works crisis in decades, the recent successful elections appear to have brought hope back again. The extremist parties did poorly, and even with a low turn out and election violence, it appears that the latest cycle of military rule is over.

Yes, much remains unresolved. Certainly as Nathan Gardels argues in his article, “Bhutto’s elimination a big boost for al-Qa’ida,” the West did lose track of the prize, focusing on Iraq instead of on Islamabad. It is in Pakistan where the future of the Islamic world lies. In addition to the Afghanistan Taliban, there is now a Pakistani Taliban. Nuclearization continues. Civil society is still vulnerable to internal and external shocks. Can politicians create a secular democratic Pakistan? Or will the politics of Jihadism continue, with Kashmir returning as the battle front?

While these issues are important in understanding Pakistan’s future, we often forget the deep archetypes and structures (inner symbols and external patterns) in Pakistani politics. These delimit what is possible.

Syed Abidi’s Doctoral dissertation at the University of Hawaii, titled Social change and the Politics of Religion in Pakistan made the observation that Pakistan’s political system can best be understood as a pendulum between civilian rule and military rule.

The first stage was from 1947-1958 and was characterized by the Parliamentary system with the dominant class interest being the feudal land owners. The second stage was from 1958-1968. This was martial law with an American presidential system and saw the rise of the capitalist class. The third stage – from 1968-1977 – saw the end of Martial law (with a presidential and parliamentary system) and the beginning of the Bhutto era and the return of feudalism.

With the coup by General Zia in 1977, military rule returned and the capitalist class was back in power. The fourth stage had begun. This ended with his assassination in 1988.

The fifth stage was characterized by civilian rule (Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Shariff) until Pervez Musharraf conducted his own coup in 1999 and began the sixth stage. With the events of 9/11, globalization and the rise of the internet, this phase has seen the return of the capitalist class.

In 2008 the seventh stage of Pakistan’s politics appears to have begun. The military era is about to end and the civilians will be back in power – either in the guise of Musharraf the democrat, the PPP, or Nawaz Shariff – or some power sharing formula. While the death of Benazir Bhutto is destabilizing, it does not challenge the deeper structure of Pakistan’s politics. Pakistan thus swings back and forth between military and civilian rule one side and feudal and capitalist economies on the other. The archetypes are the general and politician/landlord.

But why has Pakistan been dominated by the poles of military and civilian power – and why the pendulum between these two poles? Noted political scientist and human rights advocate, Dr. C. Inayatullah in his classic State and Democracy in Pakistan argues that one creates the conditions for the other: “As the military became more independent and powerful controlling national politics, its top brass developed an ideology and a set of perceptions to justify their political role. Politics was projected as an irrational, disorderly, inefficient and corrupt method of running the affairs of society compared with the rational, efficient, quick and clean way the military runs itself.” They believed they were morally bound to overthrow politicians if the politicians threatened the independence of the nation or if they meddled in the internal affairs of the military. As guardians of the nation, they believe they have the right to rule the nation. Once the civilians come into power, feeling threatened by the military, they attempt to control them. As well, with their feudal roots, a pattern of patronage and corruption sets in. This invites protests from other political parties, often leading to violence. Eventually to stop the violence and decay, – when there is weakness, public contempt of the political party – the military rises up and takes over. Weaknesses emerge from various factors – internal politics, feudal politics, corruption, external threats with the particular causes changing historically.

Following Pitirim Sorokin’s theory of social change, each system overreaches, becomes more corrupt, focuses on its own survival or makes long term decisions that may prove unpopular in domestic politics (peace in Kashmir, dismantling of extremist Islam), and then the other group comes in. Both have created a pendulum that only benefits their own strategies and worldview.

ARCHETYPES

Moving away from structural analysis and towards archetypes, these two poles represent different selves of Pakistan. The first is orderly, rational and in control – the general. The second is land-based, social and can be chaotic. While it challenges military rule, it has its own structure of authority, even as it claims the story of people’s power.

At the level of archetypes, the back and forth works because in this sense one is the British adult and the second is the “Indian” adolescent challenging British rule. However, and this is the key, once the political challenger takes over the mantle of power, he or she has been unable to escape the shadow of the general – thus, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became authoritarian himself, as have others. They move quickly from the teenager challenging power and authority to the feudal lord. The lord is also very male and foundationally hierarchical.

But there are two other roles in this field of power. What has stayed stable in Pakistan history is a third archetype – the bureaucrat in his suit and tie. The bureaucracy has remained strong throughout Pakistan’s history, as it is the trusted and stable servant of the powerful adult. Thus the executive has prospered while other political institutions – courts, for example – and the rest of civil society have remained weak. When politicians have ruled, the system has remained tied to its feudal past, i.e. strong lines of hierarchy, strong patronage to supporters. Thus, the citizen as archetype has remained out of power – or expressed himself via chaotic power- while other structures have taken their places in power. The bureaucrat has been tied to red tape, using rules to privilege himself, instead of green tape, using rules to create a better and innovative society.

There are thus four positions –military rule, chaotic people’s power that overthrows the ruler, the politician qua feudal lord, and the bureaucrat who ensures smooth transitions between all these types. Of course, it is arguable that political leaders have been far more democratic and the military creates the conditions for chaos (and thus justifies its dictatorial rule), since political rulers maintain their power through their feudal ties. Thus we see the dynastic nature of the PPP.

When the general stays too long, he invites the shadow self, equally violent. This is the mujheddin fighter, the jihadist, for example. They use military force but as power is asymmetrical, chaos works best for them. The jihadis do not need the bureaucrat; rather it is mullah who inspires them. Of course, if the extremists did come into power, then they, to implement their policies, would rely on the bureaucrats. The mullah, afraid that his story has become totally undervalued in the modernized and globalized world, instead of moving toward wisdom and creating a novel future, has returned to past caliphate glories. He links with the jihadist to take over the entire system.

Each one of these archetypes has two sides – the general can be protective and moral (the enlightened despot) or can be amoral, staying too long, clinging to power, assaulting human rights and using religion or strategy to stay in power. The feudal lord can equally be protective or can stay too long, and use his or her power for personal gain. The citizen can be chaotic or can bring social capital to the nation.

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

What then are Pakistan’s alternative futures?

1. The pendulum continues forever. This would mean that after this particular civilian cycle, there will be another military coup in 7-10 years. Politicians will have some luck in ridding Pakistan of extremist fundamentalists, but old scores between the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League or between the PPP and the military will still need to be settled. Issues of justice and revenge will continue and just as Pakistan’s economy is about to take off, another crisis will set in. Citizens will rally but then when they see no real change will become despondent. “Nothing is possible here,” or a similar catch-phrase will be the inner story. Globalization will not go away but the politics would swing between growth and equity.

2. Collapse – this is the most feared scenario for all, particularly in the West. Civil war in Pakistan (the provinces going their own way), the inability to stop jihadism, Al Qa’ida or their friends finding some nukes, not to mention the global challenges of climate change, all lead to a slow decline destined for collapse. And if the challenge from the Pakistani and Afghani Taliban is resolved, the frontline will switch to half-century old war in. Capital flies away, economic development slows down and Pakistan becomes a nation of competing tribes. Women in this future are particularly vulnerable as the battle between religious and secularists throughout the Islamic (Arab influenced world) is fought over the “body” of the female. Is she a person unto herself or does the strong male (feudal lord, ruler, mullah) need to protect and control. In the collapse, chaos would reign. Over time, and perhaps even quite quickly, a strong military leader is likely to rise (the Napoleon scenario), but can the great leader unite all the tribes (the challenge facing Afghanistan today)?

3. Joining Chindia. With India likely to move into the ranks of the G-8 by 2020, gaining a permanent UN Security Council Position, Pakistan’s only hope is to link in every possible way with India and China – or Chindia. Certainly Pakistan will favor the China part of the amazing rise, but in any case, in this future, economic growth is far more important than ideological struggles. To move in this direction, the Singapore or Malaysian model may be adopted. This model is characterized by a clear vision of the future, transparency; break up of the feudal system, limited democracy (One party rule) and creatively finding a niche role in the global economy, and then using that to springboard to becoming a global player. However, the India example shows that economic rise is possible outside the East Asian model. In any case, this future is hopeful but requires investment in infrastructure and a favoring of globalized capitalism. Instead of lamenting the colonial past, in this Chindia future, Pakistan creates its own transnational corporations. Politics moves from focusing on old wrongs (Kashmir, for example) to desired futures. Instead of Chindia, Chindistan is created.

4. The fourth scenario is the Great Game. Pakistan remains a pawn, moved around for the strategic and ideological purposes of the great powers. Whether in proxy wars against the Russians or against 9/11 jihadis or whoever may be next, Pakistan’s capacity to influence its future is low or non-existent. At best, it can only rent out its military, or territory, for others’ battles. In this future (as in the current present), the rental receipts do not lead to even development –they merely enrich those getting the rent, generally the military. The national game becomes not how to transform the great game but how to get a piece of the action, legitimately or illegitimately. Those not part of the money game sing songs of grand conspiracies. These songs take away agency. While Pakistan has a dependency relationship with the rest of the world, citizens have a dependency – child/adult – relationship with the government, expecting it to solve each and every problem, without taking responsibility for their own actions and blaming the government when it fails. At the collective level, Pakistan remains rudderless, evoking the words of the founder, but unable to follow through with action.

5. A wiser South-Asian confederation. The challenges Pakistan faces are similar to what other countries in the region face – religious extremism, climate change, poverty, corruption, deep inequity, used futures and less than helpful archetypes – the only way forward is towards an EU model of slow but inevitable integration. While this may seem too positive and far away, it is not impossible. Each country needs the help of others to solve their problems. None can go it alone, and each can learn from the Other. This requires learning, peace and mediation skills in all schools; moving toward the sustainability development agenda; developing agreements in security, water, and energy to begin with; and a focus on the desired future and not on past injustices. Gender equity and systemic and deep cultural levels is foundational for this future. This future also requires an archetype that is neither the male general nor feudal lord nor the rebellious teenager, but the wise person, perhaps the Globo sapiens. Fortunately, the south Asian tradition is steeped with wisdom. Can this imagination be drawn on to create a different future? Already in Pakistan, there are hundreds of groups and thousands of individuals working on this vision. What is needed is systemic support for this future, and a move away from focusing on past injustices.

Moreover, can the mullah who is focused on religion for tribal power become the wise sage, the Sufi or pir focused on transformative power? Can other roles as well be transformed: can the consumer become the producer, the client the citizen, the child the adult? And perhaps, as in East Asia, can new myths be created through grounded realities such as the economic miracle, which has now created new stories of social capacity and new identities. Pakistan was on the verge of this future in the early 1960s, it is possible to rediscover this pathway.

THE PLANETARY CHALLENGE

If an alternative future for Pakistan is not created, the pendulum will continue with collapse always being in the background. Moreover, in the world we now live in, a weakness or pathology in any part of the planetary system threatens us all. Pakistan’s futures are part of the planet’s futures – we all need to transform.

This transformation in Pakistan needs to be part of a multi-leveled futures visioning process – true citizen anticipatory democracy. Given the illiteracy in the nation, using television, radio, DVDs would be best. Possible scenarios of Pakistan’s futures could be shown. Citizens could critique them and offer their own preferred futures (in some detail, not the grand ideas approach) as to how they wish their lives to look like in 2020 and what needs to be done today to move in that direction. Along with a citizen participatory process, a rigorous academic process needs to be undertaken. This would collect data; provide evidence of preferred, feared and alternative Pakistani futures. Finally, leaders would need to be consulted, helping provide inspiration. The process thus must move toward an anticipatory democracy that includes electoral and participatory democracy. If not, then foresight will be merely another activity of the planning commission or be part of military and political strategy. It will become part of the pendulum. Too much is at stake to allow the current trajectory to continue. An alternative future is needed, and, I believe, can be created.

Expert Predicts Virtual Future for Queenslanders (2008)

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Alex Dickinson
August 29, 2008 http://www.news.com.au/couriermail/story/0,23739,24255674-3102,00.html

QUEENSLANDERS in 2083 will be moving in virtual worlds, living up to 100 years of age and may have done away with the state government.
That is the opinion of leading Queensland futurist Sohail Inayatullah, who says the state’s future hinges on our decisions over the next few years.

“Where we are headed can be broken down to the challenges facing the world and Queensland, and the trends that have already begun,” he said.

While he maintains the future is always uncertain, Mr Inayatullah agreed with most scientists that Queensland’s future would be shaped by climate change.

“Will the Gold Coast be Australia’s Venice? This is a possibility,” he said.

“We know the water level is going to rise so people with inland houses may own beachfront property by then.”

In a scenario Mr Inayatullah terms a “green, healthy Queensland”, the state’s resources boom eventually will transform into an energy boom.

“There will be a transition from coal to solar and wind energy which some experts believe will be the cheapest, assuming a global carbon emission regime is in place,” he said.

On the political stage, our state government could disappear if Australia eventually joins an Asia/Australian Pacific union.

“There will be very little need for one as our ties become stronger with China and India, which have already began to become Asian powers,” Mr Inayatullah said.

“There will be a strong local community and if trends continue we might see the phasing out of local representatives altogether.”

“E-government” is a distinct possibility with every citizen able to take part in day-to-day law making.

“There is every indication that a new form of direct democracy comes in where everyone would all get an SMS asking them to vote yes or no for a law. Everyone votes and the law is made.”

What about the day-to-day lives of every Queenslander?

Mr Inayatullah said the ideal scenario would see a redesign of cities and other environments into ones that were “healthier, greener, and more spiritual”.

“The trend is heading away from the nuclear family so we’ll see a lot more single, denser-living arrangements with greener rooftops and lots of robotics,” he said.

“But by then we won’t mind because we’ll be able to step into virtual worlds.”

Mr Inayatullah said Artificial Intelligence would penetrate every aspect of our lives by 2083.

By that year, we will not be able to tell the difference between the physical world and the world in cyber space.

“This is 75 years we’re talking about,” he said. “We’ll be able to transport from our dingy unit to a sunlit beach in the blink of an eye.

“We will physically live inside those virtual worlds.”

But these are just the positive scenarios.

Mr Inayatullah also warned the state could crumble into oblivion if we failed to adapt to the world around us.

“If we begin to build highrises and highways wherever we want, then Brisbane will just become another Los Angeles,” he said.

“Crime will go up, social equality will go down and all the things that make Queensland special will disappear.

“At the moment we are seeing trends that mean we will most likely live to be 100 years of age. So let’s continue it.”

And the question on everyone’s lips: Will The Courier-Mail celebrate its 150th birthday?

“In one form or another.”

Iraq, Lebanon, The Middle East: In Search of a Rational Foreign Policy (2007)

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Foresight and connecting the Dots: The politics of worldviews and disowned selves/collectivities

By Sohail Inayatullah

For the foresight practitioner, what is most stunning about the war in Iraq, the recent war in Lebanon and the war on terror is the lack of capacity of Western governments to connect the dots.

While surveillance continues to heighten, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair appears to have forgotten part two of his formula, that is, tough on crime/terror and tough on the causes of crime/ terror. The links between recent foiled terror attacks in England and the war against Lebanon (or Hezbollah) are not noticed. While radio stations take calls by Muslims asking for a fairer more balanced – reasonable and rational – policy and strategy from England, Blair continues to tow the American line.

Taking the future into account, the American response appears neither reasonable nor rational. That is, we have seen that sanctions and wars do not isolate particular groups – Serbs have not become more democratic since they were bombed (the extreme right remains ever alive), and Iraq certainly is far from having become democratic; rather it is in a midst of a civil war and may have become a haven for terrorists –the exact opposite of USA strategy and planning goals. Bombing people into democracy does not appear to be a viable strategy; in fact, the violence becomes internalized, and is considered by those bombed as the rational strategy.

However, the memory of World War II remains – total destruction followed by rebuilding. Generals appear to continue to fight today’s wars with the memory of previous wars. What made the German experience different was near total annihilation followed by a real hearts and minds rebuilding. The war in Lebanon has weakened if not destroyed any possibility of hearts and minds changing. Indeed, conspiracy theories, already the dominant currency in the Arab world, have become even more inflated.

Irrespective of one’s views toward Al-Qaeda – their demand of withdrawal of western armies from the Arabian Peninsula appear reasonable. Earlier, they offered a ceasefire in Iraq, and yet, most reasonable and rational parties would look toward dialogue. Of course, the trauma of 9/11 in the USA – the pain of the families who lost loved ones along with the shock of an attack on the world’s imperial power removes any chance of a dialogue.

Or is there some other worldview that is so forceful that rationality is lost, something deeper than trauma as well. We know that after the USA initial victory in Iraq, the entire Iraqi army was disbanded: 400,000 solders fired. Certainly a bit of foresight could see that unemployed, angry, dishonored men would provide a reserve army for outside recruiters. Iraq, once authoritarian and totalitarian, is now the Wild West – the site of the terrorism and Sunni-Shia fault lines. But it was not the rational that was victorious but a desire for revenge and the deep Orientalism of the victors, i.e. Iraqis are inferior. Subsequent rapes and prisoner abuse point this out. Orientalism creates the framework wherein others are reduced to sub-humanity. In short: war others all.

OTHER DISCOURSES

What are other discourses that explain the irrationality of today’s geo-politics?

First, as mentioned above is Orientalism – they are barbaric, evil, to be destroyed. A “new” form of this is extreme evangelism, the hope for a united Israel, leading to Armageddon – with two billion to die – followed by the return of Jesus, and heaven on Earth. It appears that the President of the USA, Bush supports this view. Secondly, the inverse holds true also. The extreme Islamic version of this appears to be supported by the President of Iran, who too waits for the 12th Imam to come back and save the world.

A third related discourse is that of the triumph of democracy – eventually a new middle east will emerge once Iraqis, Hezbollah, and others discover the joys of Westernism. In the Iranian case, however, it is the CIA disposal of the Iranian prime-minister Mohammad Mossadegh in1953 that is a more recent memory, not to the mention the Iranian’s own desire for Empire.

At another level, this is merely the paradigm of good versus evil being played out in the body politic. American society lives out this drama and cannot rest unless this struggle is played on CNN nightly and now far more disturbingly on Fox News. That is, the USA needs an enemy to exist – with the fall of Russia; Islam has taken its place. Next will be China and East Asia in general. Islam, as part of the Judaeo-Christian- tradition (the three brothers), is also part of the good-evil field.

Perhaps far saner discourses are the feminist and the environmentalist. War itself is the problem – it is inequitable, killing the most vulnerable on each side. War is not an equal opportunity killer, as we have seen in Lebanon and in Israel. The environment too suffers – mountains are destroyed, and now with the Oil spill in Lebanon, water too is destroyed. Nature is the victim of patriarchy. Democracies do not attack democracies because they are busy attacking ‘lesser forms of governance’, ‘more vulnerable humans,’ and ‘nature herself,’ as Ivana Milojevic has argued (www.metafuture.org)

Equally valuable is the work of Hal and Sidra Stone (http://www.enotalone.com/authors.php?aid=14) [1] with their focus on disowned selves. The self disowned is the problem; it is seen as ‘out there’, objective and in need of colonization, conversion or destruction. However, this objective external reality is created by the evolution of the dominant self – thus extreme Islam is the disowned self of the West.

Less internal is classic political-economy. We know that who gains from conflict are the arms merchants underwritten by the usual suspects: USA, Britain, Israel, China and France.

These discourses help explain the irrationality – why the USA would support a war that will only create more terrorism, i.e. dysfunctionality will be met by more dysfunctionality. With a youth boom predicted to continue for the next 20 years in the Arabian Peninsula, we can see that more rather than less war is likely.

Solving Israel-Palestine on terms of dignity for the Palestinians remains the issue. It is absolutely stunning that there are still refugee camps in Lebanon – these are now permanent camps. Generations of pathology have been created and will continue to be created. The neural pathways of Palestinians and Israelis remain focused on fear and war – that is what is now normal. They may not even be able to find a solution themselves – it may require a super-ordinate power, i.e. no more funding to either group until they find systemic solutions. We know that worldview/cultural solutions will take much longer – i.e. creating identities not based on fear and revenge but on forgiveness.

GLOBAL LEVEL – MOVING FORWARD

While there are certainly excellent ways forward, as for example developed by Johan Galtung through his Transcend conflict resolution method (www.transcend.org)[2], at the global level, I believe we cannot move forward in our human evolution until this problem is solved. Hoping that a massive war will solve it forgets that war creates more memories, more stories of revenge and hate – healing does not occur. For Israel to succeed, or for the Israeli haters to succeed, every last person must die. Who has the stomach for that, not to mention morality? Yet, without transformation we face more irrational bleeding, fighting with no solutions in sight, only temporary winners and losers. Arab populations remain lost in conspiracy theories, on the problem of Israel, or when that is solved (on the problem of the Kurd, or Shia, or…)

Most leaders cannot see this – their worldview does not allow it. Perhaps this is just our evolutionary stage – we remain locked in vicious lock-ins – but if we are to survive, certainly more robust global governance is needed, as well as ways to move past our worldviews of co-dependency, of good and evil, and Armageddon. Until then, our disowned selves keep coming back to kill. Can we listen and change?

If not, perhaps this poem by Patricia Kelly will remind us why we must!

Bomblet meditation
The let of the past was a dainty diminutive.
Anklets jingled on chubby legs
Circlets of flowers crowned gods and brides
Ringlets flounced on moppets’ heads.
‘Bomblets’ are a lethal present.
Metal shards shatter
anklets and circlets
ringlets and moppets
brides and gods
and language
alike.

[1] Essential here is the work of Hal and Sidra Stone. They focus on the disowned selves – selves that we push away as we focus on particular identities. For academics, in the search for the purity of truth, the business self is pushed away. Classically for the corporate world, the ethical self is pushed away in the drive for profits. Integrating these various selves may be the most important challenge for academics. See http://www.enotalone.com/authors.php?aid=14

[2] See Johan Galtung, The Middle East: Building Blocks for Peace. Journal of Futures Studies. Vol 11, No2, November 2006.

Questions for Busy Managers (2007)

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By Sohail Inayatullah
A chapter from Questioning the Future

I am too busy to think about the future!

There is no question that thinking about the future takes away time from other activities. However, the current present was once a future, and was either created from planned activities, or from things that you wanted to do but never got around to, because you were too busy. The default future.

Also, unless you think about the future, someone else who makes time for the future will, if not control, then certainly define the future for you.

Just tell me then the strategic aspects of the future I need to know—which parts of my company are likely to grow. Where the opportunities are and what events or trends I should watch out for.

This is not too difficult to do. However, you are asking for someone to predict the future for you. Sometimes one can be correct in getting a single-point forecast right. But there are so many factors that could impinge upon the forecast. It is wiser to develop alternative scenarios about the future or map the future based on the likely trajectory of trends.

Each scenario should be driven by a different factor. Technology. Demographics. Economic cycles. Changing consumer expectations. And it is important to have a contingency scenario that describes a dramatic system collapse. That is, where everything goes back to zero, where we all have to relearn everything.

But can’t we reasonably say something about the future?

Of course, this does not mean we shouldn’t discern trends that are creating the future. But it is important to see trends not as fixed structures but as directional, as changeable. Certainly, we can make an entire range of sensible statements about the future. We know that the population in OECD nations is dramatically ageing, that the worker/retiree ratio is going from 3 to 1 to 1.5 to 1. Globalization, the Internet, Multiculturalism, democratization are all forces that will change the future. However, what these trends mean, what counter trends might emerge, how events might impact them, and how long they will take to actualize is far more difficult, and important, to ascertain.

For example, recently a colleague asked whether anyone had accurately predicted the fall of the Berlin Wall. While there were a few macrohistorians who got it pretty much right (using the hypothesis that totalitarian systems are more likely to explode while democratic systems change more slowly), the question can be framed differently. It could be: what are the Berlin walls in our life, in the world, in our organizations that need to be broken down? One approach leads to prediction, the other to questioning.

Returning to the issue of prediction, we can actually say a great deal about the short-term future—what you might call the known future (technologies under development, government policies to be enacted). However, and this is crucial, the future cannot be precisely predicted. The universe is not closed but open. One’s image of the future and the resultant actions (not to mention the collective unconscious) influence the future that will be.

In this sense, the role of anticipatory action learning is not so much to figure out the exact future to but to work with the client to determine unconscious and conscious images of the future. It is moving even beyond scenario planning to actually creating an action learning (and healing) organization.

Yes, but are there certain methods that can help me in my need for strategic thinking?

The best way to think about this is the s-curve. Most of our planning efforts focus on current problems, the end of the s-curve. Trend analysis is a bit better as it is concerned with the middle part, where there is some data. Figuring out the trends that might impact your work, community, life allows one some lead-time. It also gives one time to consider opportunities that may have not been there before.

But perhaps the most exciting method is emerging issues analysis. These are issues that are unlikely to occur but if they do could have dramatic, often dire, consequences. New technologies, dramatic changes in population flows, revolutions are some examples of these. They also force us to rethink the present. Indeed, the best use of the future is as a vehicle to question the present. Utopian studies have rarely been about the future but rather about the peculiar nature of the present.

When I worked for the courts many years ago, we identified issues that would dramatically change caseload, the business of the courts, or how courts resolved conflicts (computer judges, neighborhood justice centers, culturally appropriate dispute resolution). This allowed the courts to better meet the changing needs of citizens. It was also a lot of fun and played an important educational role in training young administrators and judges. They saw that their role was not just to be efficient, effective and economical but also to challenge the basic assumptions of what courts do.

Sounds like a lot of work.

In the beginning it is. One strategy is to outsource to a futures scanning firm. They scan the environment and look for trends and issues that might influence your organization.

Another tack is always to be looking for the new idea, the alternative approach to something, the outlier, the event or trend that does quite make sense. This is more than thinking differently, it is being different. I remember one colleague—Jordi Serra—who said: you can’t just search for emerging issues, you have to become an emerging issue.

But at a deeper level, it is scary since the ground of what one is doing is questioned. Of course, paralysis by critique is a grave danger, and thus, it is important to engage in a pilot project to test one’s hypothesis, insights about the future. For example, in the courts this was about setting up an alternative dispute mediation system to test if citizens wanted less formal adjudication.

Isn’t there safety in following the pack?

This is true and not true. Certainly, nations like Japan and later Taiwan have risen in the world economy by copying. But there is a certain point where such a strategy won’t get you anywhere except middle-income status. You have to move up the value-added chain. This is true for business, and for one’s own life as well.

A study found that corporations that have lasted over one hundred years all had one shared variable: tolerance for ideas from the edge. Clearly, this is not about copying, but about leading.

What is the role of action learning in futures thinking?

First, while forecasting the future gives one information about the future, it does not provide the context of the future. This comes through action learning where the entire process is created by those involved in the process.

So, the notion of the future, of strategy, is created by the partners in the process.

Futures thinking transforms action learning by injecting an anticipatory notion. Action learning is no longer just about the questioning the product or the process or the factors of production but about questioning the future. It is asking:

Whose future is being created?

Is the future being lived explicit or implicit?

How can the future become more explicit?

How can questioning the future lead to shared futures?

For the consultant, this means asking the client what metaphors her or his organization uses to think about the future.

I am still confused about strategy and futures.

While being strategic has its rewards, strategy remains means-end focused. It does not include different ways individuals know the world—through authority, intuition, reason, empiricism and even love. Strategy is useful in a world that is flat, where difference is minimized.

But when there is a great deal of difference—of cultures, languages, perspectives—then strategy is far more difficult. A post-strategic approach is needed. This means using forecasting and scenarios but trying to move beyond rational planning to develop an evolutionary-organic feel of the future. This is partly about one’s gut feeling but also about having an inner guidance system as to which future one might want. My own futures approach is precisely the organic unfolding of the future. The future grows out from within in the context of a changing external environment.

This means seeing the future not just in terms of expanding our horizon, having more and different types of data and information but moving to a knowledge framework where there is depth.

This means seeing the future in terms of levels of the future. Strategy is generally short term oriented as it changes the most visible part of our worlds. Deeper levels accessible by metaphor and story are not so easily available to strategy. One has to enter different personal and cultural frames to begin to enter this deeper view of the future.

Why is difference so important?

By understanding difference we can understand others’ needs better. We can make better products, better design. Having a diversity of representation allows for difference. Difference can lead to synergies unexpected outcomes. Indeed, even misunderstandings can lead to positive outcomes.

Difference can also create unexpected futures.

And unexpected headaches!

The other part of the futures toolbox that is useful is creating a shared vision. Emerging issues, scenario planning, ways of knowing and depth approaches to the future create a diversity of information. This enriches the planning context. However, the other crucial dimension of planning for the future is created shared spaces.

To do this, engaging in a visioning process is crucial. The vision has to be detailed, though. Not just motherhood statements that all can agree to. Specific statements about how you want the future to be like. You wake up in the morning, say 2010, what does the world look like. Are you working? What is your income level? Are you married? Is there still marriage? Is there still work? What technologies are you using to communicate with others? Is communication important? Is there even a you (the modern notion of an integrated autonomous self)?

If one engages in this process with a group of people, it is likely that a shared vision can result.

This shared vision can remove many organizational headaches.

So there are different types of planning for the future?

At least four: the first is concerned with the mission of the organization. This is about being clear on the core business and identity of the organization. The second is the social, technological and environmental context. This means constantly being on the lookout for how the future is changing. The third is problem-oriented planning. Questioning is the most useful at this level as one questions current problems, finds new problems and discovers innovative solutions. The fourth is the vision of the organization, where is the organization headed toward, how will the basic mission, the identity change as the future changes.

There is a fifth, though that is not often mentioned in the literature. The fifth is the organic evolutionary future, which emerges from a mixture of data about the world, gut feelings about what to do next, individual ethics and dialogue with others (self, nature, colleagues, customers, and the mysterious beyond). Sensitivity to changing conditions, inner and outer, is far more important than the plan.

What are the usual approaches to the future?

The first approach is determining the probable future. That is, given economic, technological, consumer, demographic trends, how will the world (or nation, community, organization) look in a few years. Of course, as you go further out in time things get a bit hazier (unless you believe the universe is foundationally patterned and a science of forecasting is possible).

The second approach is focused on possible futures. The full range of what can happen—all the alternatives.

The third approach is the preferred. What do we want the future to be like? There is usually quite a marked difference between the preferred for oneself and for the world. Most studies show that we expect our own futures to be good and the world’s futures to be quickly going to hell.

The fourth approach is the gut level/intuitive future. This is the organic future that emerges from our life choices, our patterns of behavior, our expectation of others, our deep-set beliefs and worldview. It is our karmic future to some extent. For some this means trusting that there is a divine pattern guiding them, for others this means that the universe is intelligent, for others that the Gods favor (or disfavor) them, and for still others, it means leading a good moral life.

The future in this latter approach is a process of learning about self, family, community and world. It is a co-evolutionary pattern. Essentially it is about having a deep sensitivity toward the world.

What use is futures planning to a typical manager, consultant?

If one is a consultant—providing knowledge solutions to government, community and business—then futures can add to your toolbox. Scenario planning can help an organization determine the effectiveness of current decisions.

Futures thinking can also help determine what trends are creating the future university. How, for example, how new technologies, corporatization (the end of monopoly accreditation by the Academy), multicultural content and virtualization are transforming the University. This can assist in determining what niche markets are possible.

In general, futures thinking provides new types of insight as to what the world might be like, what the dominant images of the future are, and how to create alternative futures.

How does this relate to the famous axiom, Learning = questioning + programmed knowledge?

What is often forgotten is that in most of our questions there are assumptions about reality, about culture, about the right way to do things. So, we need to question the cultural basis of our questions, seeing them not as universal but as problematic as well. That is, our questions are actually congealed knowledge. Thus questioning has to be questioned.

The same goes with programmed knowledge. Programmed knowledge is actually answered questions.

So questioning and programmed knowledge are subsets of each other. Look for the hidden content in questioning and the answered and un-asked questions in programmed knowledge.

If we can do that, we can really create alternative futures.

What of ways of knowing and learning?

Learning, then, is questioning plus programmed knowledge plus ways of knowing. Without challenging the epistemic content of the questions asked and programmed knowledge, only instrumental changes will result. Ways of knowing move us into areas where we don’t know what we don’t know.

I am still too busy to think about the future, especially since I don’t know what I don’t know.

You are already going toward a future. The question is: Is that the future you want? How do you know? If yes, wonderful, how can you be more explicit about your vision? If no, then how can you change your direction?

Remember: there is the pull of the future (the vision, the image) and the push to the future (technology, demographics, changing economic ideologies). There is also structure—that which is difficult to change. These are worldviews, patterns of behavior, dominator relationships. One can spend all one’s life fighting them or create a new vision and focus on living that.

The exciting part of anticipatory action learning is that the future is co-created. There is certainly some programmed knowledge involved in questioning the future. There is data on trends, information on scenarios, knowledge of different types of futures approaches, methods and hopefully some wisdom on when it is appropriate to use which method, to focus on which trend. But the questioning part makes the future real instead of a one-way lecture about the future. As with other professions, expertise can be a gift and a danger. Action learning means a back and forth reflection on probable and preferred futures. It means asking questions of the scenarios we desire to happen and the scenarios we believe are probable. Why this scenario, we can ask? What will the impact of x scenario be on a strategic plan, a product line, a marketing campaign?

Being too busy now means huge costs later. Remember that in 1985 Charlie Schnabolk developed four scenarios for the World Trade Center: (1) Predictable—bomb threats; (2) Probable—bombing attempts, computer crime; (3) Hostage Taking; and (4) Catastrophic—aerial bombing, chemical agents in water supply or air conditioning.

And when asked in 2000 what the greatest terrorist threat to the WTC was, he responded: “Someone flying a plane into the building.”

Well, why didn’t they listen?

Accurate forecasting is one issue but implementation is another. For that, the planner/futurist has to work with the organization in question, finding ways to not just get the future right but ensure that those that can do something about the future are involved. That they have an interest in the future, that they have something to say as well. If they remain simply consumers of information, then the chance of implementation decreases dramatically.

Then a conversation about the future is most appropriate?

A conversation enhances programmed knowledge—it deepens it, brings in alternatives. A conversation—especially a layered conversation that explores not just the words being uttered but the meanings they represent to each participant and the structures of knowledge that create the categories of intelligibility—can be foundational in creating a more satisfying future.
Otherwise, what is learned is simply one expert’s view of the future, with all its natural limitations.

So back to you: Why is questioning the future important?