

SCENARIOS

Pakistan 2020*Nine alternative futures***Between Talibanisation & de-Talibanisation**

K Subrahmanyam

THE COMING years are likely to see the crucial battle in the clash of civilisations between the West led by the United States and NATO on one side and jihadi Islam on the other side. Pakistan will be the battlefield. The departing US National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley has highlighted that Pakistan will be the central foreign policy challenge to the Obama administration. The battle has already begun with US Predator-launched missiles hitting Pakistani targets, with the connivance of Pakistani army and the government. US has already announced its plans for long-term stay in Afghanistan. Development of military infrastructure for long-term stay of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan has begun.

The outgoing American NSA points out that the Afghan problem cannot be solved without solving the Pakistan problem. De-Talibanisation of Afghanistan necessitates de-Talibanisation of Pakistan. Pakistan Army engendered the Taliban and other jihadi organisations to use them as their instruments to keep Afghanistan as their strategic depth and bleed India through a thousand cuts. But jihadi Islam developed a live organism of its own (a heretical derivative of Islam) and its own purpose. While certain elements of Pakistan Army, especially the Inter-Services Intelligence appear to be still confident that they will be able to use the jihadis for their purposes, the jihadis are spreading their cult and their control over increasing areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Though the Pakistani generals may believe in manifest Islamic destiny they are not likely to reconcile themselves to a Talibanised Caliphate, or prefer their children to be Talibanised. Therefore as the US-NATO forces intensify their operations against Taliban the Pakistani generals and civil society will have to make up their minds on which side they are going to be.

The present situation has to get worse before it can get better. Whatever blunders President George W Bush may have committed in invading Iraq he is leaving Iraq in some shape. President Obama cannot afford to accept defeat in Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The jihadis may not



wholly be under the control of the Pakistan Army as they were not while plotting various terrorist acts in Britain or within Pakistan itself. Therefore the global war against terrorism with Pakistan-Afghanistan region as its epicentre will continue. As the United States focusses attention on Pakistan as its central problem there is likely to be greater demands on the relatively effective use of Pakistani Army to counter Talibanisation. The war to determine whether Pakistan will be Talibanised or de-Talibanised is unavoidable.

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Just, prosperous and at peace within and without
Pakistan's Planning Commission report, 2006

VISION 2030: Developed, industrialised, just and prosperous Pakistan through rapid and sustainable development in a resource constrained economy by deploying knowledge inputs

Pakistan will be an interesting place to live in during the next three decades. Its people will be better fed, better educated and more skilled than in the recent past. Education at all tiers will be the prime focus so that a competitive and thinking mind will emerge while remaining uniquely Pakistani. By nurturing human potential and exploiting its geopolitical position, Pakistan

will move into a totally new environment of prosperity and productivity. It will also become more integrated in the region and the rest of the world.

Its major new arc of activity will lie in an extensive corridor for trade, transportation, energy, and industry, stretching from Gwadar at the mouth of the Persian Gulf to the northern reaches of the country and beyond to China and Central Asia. Goods, energy, and services will flow from North to South and vice versa, as also East-West to the Gulf region and South Asia. Pakistan will offer economic activities in trade, transportation, energy, and manufacturing to every group or nation that wants to invest in a rapidly growing, strategically positioned economy.

An open economy with many international stakeholders will also be an excellent incentive for peace expansion of potential influence in the region...Pakistan will be an active player in regional and international co-operation, with a competitive enabling environment for innovation and investment.

Pakistan will be a just and prosperous society, at peace with itself and the rest of the world.

Extracted from a vision document prepared during General Musharraf's regime.

Pakistan's only hope is to link in every possible way with India and China. Pakistan will favour the China part of the amazing rise, but in this future, economic growth is far more important than ideological struggles.

expense of Punjabis in Pakistan and Tajiks and others in Afghanistan.

Alternatively, the Taliban and other Islamist activists might prove able to overawe at least some tribal politics.

Extracted from *Global Trends 2025*, "a fresh look at how key global trends might develop over the next 15 years"

"Chindistan"

Sohail Inayatullah

WITH INDIA likely to move into the ranks of the G-8 by 2020, gaining a permanent UN Security Council position, Pakistan's only hope is to link in every possible way with India and China—or 'Chindia'. Certainly Pakistan will favour the China part of the amazing rise, but in any case, in this future, economic growth is far more important than ideological struggles.

To move in this direction, the East Asian model may be adopted. This model is characterised by a clear vision of the future, transparency; break up of the feudal system, limited democracy (One party rule) and creatively finding a niche role in the global economy, and then using that to spring-board to becoming a global player.

However, the India example shows that economic rise is possible outside the East Asian model. In any case, this future is hopeful but requires investment in infrastructure and a favouring of globalized capitalism. Instead of lamenting the colonial past, in this future, Pakistan creates its own transnational corporations. Politics moves from focusing on old wrongs (Kashmir, for example) to desired futures. Instead of Chindia, Chindistan is created.

Sohail Inayatullah is a professor at Tamkang University, Taiwan.

"Pashtunistan"

United States National Intelligence Council

THE FUTURE of Pakistan is a wild-card in considering the trajectory of neighbouring Afghanistan. Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province and tribal areas probably will continue to be poorly governed and the source or supporter of cross-border instability. If Pakistan is unable to hold together until 2025, a broader coalescence of Pashtun tribes is likely to emerge and act together to erase the Durand Line, maximising Pashtun space at the

Pakistan is the next Afghanistan

M D Nalapat

2020 WILL mark nearly five decades since Pakistan's rulers sought to use an extremist vision in order to reinforce a moral authority frayed because of deliberate administrative incompetence. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto sought to appease the Wahhabi fringe in his country. After Bhutto, each successor has added to the influence of the Wahhabists, with Zia ul-Haq launching a process of making the Pakistan military not a professional but a relig-

ious force, a course that has led to the replacement of the feudal elite within the higher ranks of the armed forces with graduates of the madrassas. Since Zia, it is less professional competence than a radical world-view that matters in decisions concerning promotion to higher ranks. While the feudal-commercial elite still enjoy a high degree of prosperity, it is the radical minority that controls the streets, as well as the agenda of the Pakistan army, an institution that controls the state apparatus.

In substance, the Pakistan army is an institution whose principal objective is to ensure the dominance of Wahhabi Punjabis over other segments of society in the country. This is sought to be camouflaged by playing up such red herrings as the "threat from India" or the "importance of Kashmir. After the failure of the Kashmir jihad there has been a steady decline in the affection and respect felt by Punjabis, most of whom are aware that it is the army that ensures their dominance over Pashtuns, Baloch and Sindhis who play a subversive role.

Given the control of the military over the civilian component, and because of the domination of Punjab over the other provinces, Pakistan will never enjoy stability unless the military becomes de-jihadised and becomes a professional force. This is a difficult task, given that even in 1948, the troops fought in Kashmir in the guise of irregulars, believing that they were engaged in jihad. This is necessary for genuine federalism with Sindhis, Pashtuns, Baloch and others enjoying parity with the Punjabis. Pakistan will never be stable unless Wahhabism makes way for the Sufi ethic of India or Turkey. Stability in Pakistan implies the discrediting and removal from relevance of the Wahhabi tendency, as well as a de-jihadisation of the military.

Thanks to the oxygen provided by the Militants in India, the United States, China and the European Union, rather than anchor in Sufism, Pakistan is likely to witness a ferocious battle between the jihadis and the moderate segment of Pakistan's society, that is likely to lead to an increasing focus within Sindh, Balochistan and the Pashtun lands towards a separate state. The country can be kept together only as a moderate, Sufi democracy, not as a military-ruled Wahhabist state. By 2020, Pakistan is likely to resemble Afghanistan in the early part of the 1990s, a country with different nationalities, separate in all except name. Pakistan is the next Afghanistan.

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Pakistan 2030 - A Miracle

Nadeem Ul Haque

IN 2015, the Kashmir dispute was resolved and peace with India was achieved. As part of the peace process all restrictions on the movement of goods and people were removed. The two neighbours who shared centuries of history and trade were finally able to restore those human and cultural linkages. One important aspect of this peace was the final scaling down of the defence establishment in Pakistan. However, the peace alone would not have been enough to reduce the economic and political power of the defence establishment if other factors had also not fallen into place to change the power structures of the country.

Pakistan faced many a constitutional hiatus in its first 75 years to reach a situation where a large scale consultation on a constitutional reform was adopted. This consultation involved all segments of society and was fully guided by leading intellectuals. A wide ranging process was set up

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for more than a year to develop principles of stable representative government. Then through a series of referenda, these proposals were adopted and the constitution amended. The referenda and the discussion made sure that the people understood the constitutional principles that were being adopted.

After a long ideological struggle, a consensus on a secular Pakistan was reached. It was recognised that Pakistan was a homeland for Muslims but that other faiths could live and contribute in Pakistan. Diversity was to be cherished for it made for human productivity. The result was that the state took a decision to do away with the previous attempts at Islamisation. The earlier Zia legislation was finally abandoned and syllabi made more amenable to a modern state. Spiritual education was considered important but given the sectarian divides was best left to the family.

To check the clergy which had gone overboard on fundamentalism, a set of reforms for the organisation of the clergy were put in place. Clearly the fundamentalist episode had shown the population that there was a need to set professional stan-

dards for the clergy if a high quality of service was required. The government therefore set about setting up a framework for the funding, certification and professional improvement of the clergy.

Nadeem Ul Haque was director of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics. Extracted from his draft paper published in September 2006.

Postwar Pakistan

Stephen P Cohen

THE TIMING, duration, and intensity of a future India-Pakistan war is impossible to predict, but some possible outcomes include the following:

- As in 1971, a less-than-total war might lead to the army's disgrace. This would provide an opportunity to reset Pakistan's political order. Whether



or not this would happen would depend on the availability of responsible and experienced politicians; there might also be active foreign attempts to encourage the rise of moderate groups.

- A new war could lead to a limited or even a major exchange of nuclear weapons. Japan's unconditional surrender and occupation is not a likely precedent, since Pakistan's own nuclear weapons would be available for retaliation. Unless a nuclear war was carefully limited—avoiding major urban areas and the production of large amounts of fallout—the devastation would be on the scale of World War II Japan or Germany, but without deep technical and administrative resources available for postwar reconstruction. In such an environment, the army would play an essential law-and-order role, but the reconstruction of Pakistan as a modern state, if attempted, could only be initiated from outside the country.

- A major war might cause a split in the army,

with some factions wanting to fight on, others willing to sue for peace, and a few willing to bring down the enemy with a devastating city-busting nuclear strike. Such pro-war and anti-war factions might form along ethnic, sectarian, or even ideological lines, and a civil war flowing from an international war would be a distinct possibility.

- Pakistan is now less able to handle the consequences of a major war (or significant natural disaster) than it was ten or twenty years ago. The confidence of core elites in the future of Pakistan is reduced, the economic situation more uncertain, and Pakistan's military position, despite the bomb, is less secure than it was then. Further, many of Pakistan's institutions, including the army, are weaker now. In brief, the shock of even a limited war or other major disasters might be greater than it would have been ten years ago.

In the event of another conventional war, the nuclear threat would make Pakistan's escalation policy central to its survival.

Stephen P Cohen is a senior foreign policy fellow at Brookings Institution. One of the several future scenarios from *The Idea of Pakistan*, Brookings Institution Press, 2004. Dr Cohen does not regard this scenario as very likely.

Chronic crossroads

Rohit Pradhan & Harsh Gupta

THE PAKISTAN of late 2008 looks like Pakistan of 1996. The Army is back in the barracks; democracy seems to have taken roots; and it appears that the country will finally emerge as a genuine liberal democracy. But fast-forward thirteen years: after coups and another set of democratic elections, Pakistan becomes an "international migraine". Neither the prospect of Pakistan's emergence as a liberal democracy nor its actually imploding into pieces seems strong: It remains a nation perpetually tottering on the edge without ever quite toppling over.

The underlying issue is of course the radicalisation of Pakistan—a result of the country's founding principles nurtured and strengthened by Zia's Islamisation project. How can a society enveloped by extremism and fraying at the edges—witness the state's debacle in Swat valley—remain relatively stable in the medium term?

Well, mainly due to the relative strength of a nuclear-armed army that is the pre-dominant actor capable of large-scale violence. Insurgencies and secessionist movements do control swathes of territory, but cannot take over important urban cen-

tres. However, as the events after Mumbai attack demonstrated, the jihadis and the quasi-jihadis—the Pakistani Army—are ready to unite against the common enemy: India.

Geopolitics of the region dictates the continuance of Pakistan as a nation-state. China will continue to use Pakistan to limit India's strategic imprint and contain its rival to the level of a sub-regional power. Similarly, declining American power and wariness to engage in nation-building rules out attempts at MacArthur-style reconfigurations. India is prepared to bide its time, rather than wage open warfare and risk an economic slowdown.

External forces continue to provide the oxygen to Pakistani state, so the only critical change can come from the inside. But that too is unlikely.

Lacking enduring institutions, transformational leadership is the only agent of change. But there is no strong Atatürk on the horizon while the army clamps down on idealistic Gorbachevs. And those who hold the reins of democratic chariots—the Bhuttos and the Sharifs—are too indebted to the feudal lords, the military establishment or foreign patrons to attempt fundamental reordering of the Pakistani society. And the Army—defender of Islam; entrepreneur; landowner and more—is too entrenched and too invested in the current system to even contemplate permitting the emergence of alternate power centres.

The Pakistani population growth rate has finally begun to slow; its economy has attempted to get rid of Zulfikar Bhutto's "Islamic socialism"; there is a growing middle class; and most importantly there remain minorities—from the Mohajirs to the Balochs who are not ready to cede complete control to an increasingly radicalised Punjabi establishment. But the nascent civil society will be unable to push back and compel the military-jihadi establishment, the feudal-political establishment and outside powers to allow Pakistan to break free from the chronic crossroads.

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Stable Pakistan—an Oxymoron

R Vaidyanathan

THE RECENT report of the fall of Swat valley and the Talibanisation of that area indicate what is to come. Large segments of the middle and senior level army officers have been slowly Talibanised. This will reach a head by 2020 (or even much earlier) with a result that the United States and China

will not find the Musharrafs and the Yahya Khans to play ball with. Tribal regions and provinces will be further alienated from the Punjab-centric, Army-ruled centre. One can expect civil wars between Talibanised portions of society and others. Attempts by army to broker peace often do not succeed.

US forces will become regular occupational forces and there will be smaller states or tribal areas fighting in a long drawn war. Sometimes there will be ambient conflicts and sometimes highly flared up ones. China will not be interested in sending its ground troops to fight with or against the US soldiers inside Pakistan. The civil war might create a deluge of refugees pouring across the border into India. At the same time, the increasing intolerance towards "Pakis" in UK and other countries of Europe can erupt on a large scale and create a huge exodus in to an unstable Pakistan. That will exacerbate the turmoil.

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India will not overtly try to participate in the fratricidal war. Like an oncologist, it will attempt to keep the malignancy from spreading to its side of the border. It will adopt the strategy of a simple spectator who has betted on both sides of the conflict to watch it continue so that over an extended period the auto-cannibalism will slowly devour all the participants. Americans and perhaps some enthusiastic Europeans might permanently get stationed in that region. But if the terror groups from Pakistan show their prowess in the United States homeland again, then Pakistan might be 'bombed back to the Stone Ages.'

The grim situation which may continue for ten to twenty years will not necessarily worry India since an unstable Pakistan without an army controlled centre will find it difficult to export terrorism.

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