

IMAGES OF PAKISTAN'S FUTURE

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This article explores current images of Pakistan's futures. Based on a literature review of Pakistani magazines, newspapers and journals as well as conversations with selected Pakistani scholars, five images or scenarios of the future are developed and evaluated. The article concludes with suggestions for designing alternative futures for Pakistan.

Before we articulate current images of Pakistan's futures,¹ and develop and evaluate five images based on both a literature review and interviews² a brief introduction to the 'futures approach' to the study of social reality might provide a useful context. A futures view focuses primarily on temporality. But instead of asking where we have been as in historical studies, we ask, where are we going? What are the possibilities ahead? What strategies can we use to realize our goals? How can a particular image or a range of images of the future better help us understand (in the sense of interpret) and change today? Who are the losers and winners in any particular articulation of social time and social space?

The futures perspective is initially similar to traditional political analysis in that it begins with an exploration of economic, international and social events and the choices made by actors that make these events possible. However, the futures view also attempts to place events and choices within a historical dimension; that is, the larger and deeper structures that make these discrete events intelligible, such as core-periphery, urban-rural, gender, caste, and macro patterns of social change. The futures view also takes seriously the larger meaning system or the epistemological ground plan of the real as embedded in language that constitutes events and structures. That is, the poststructural perspective.³

Unfortunately, most efforts to understand the future remain situated in the empiricist-oriented predictive mode. It is often asked, what and when will a particular event occur and how can we profit or increase our power from a specific prediction? Strategic analysts and economists claim to excel at this task. However their analysis does not aid in creating alternative futures or in understanding deep social structures or epistemic discourses. Rather these strategic efforts merely inscribe power in modern Western theories of the state and the individual. These strategic predictive efforts not only recreate the present of modernity but they also

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reinforce it with arguments centred around sovereignty and power as located in self and national interest. In this sense, strategic analyses not only tells us little about the future, especially disjunctive futures, but it situates knowledge in domains that make transformation impossible.⁴ Pakistani social science in particular privileges strategic and economic analysis largely because of the geopolitical experience of partition. This event has led to the nation-state being the one and only unit of analysis of legitimate social inquiry in Pakistani scholarship. International relations theory (security studies) and the equally conservative economic development theory (growth studies) have colonized other realms of meaningful discourse.⁵

Sensitive to the richness of layers on layers of reality, the effort of this article is to explore images or scenarios of the future. Committed to decolonizing the study of the future from narrow models of reality, our task here is not to predict a particular future and by that make this essay political fodder for technocrats so that they can further legitimate state-centred development models, but to use the future to create real possibilities for change. We thus do not intend to give a familiar reading of Pakistan's future, as might be available in a national five-year plan or other sites of official discourse, rather we enter a discussion of alternative futures, of the choices ahead as contoured by the structure of history and the modern boundaries of knowledge that frame our identities—issues of self and sovereignty. While the discourse of state power is an important variable in understanding the future, it is not our only focus. The role of the self, of deep social structures and of value systems are equally important.

In the images or scenarios that follow, remember that these images are meant as tools for discussion and dialogue. They are intended to clarify the futures ahead not to reify social reality. Our goal is insight not prediction. In addition, we do not focus on present trends⁶—rapidly expanding population, increasing GNP, increasing drug trafficking, incredibly low levels of human freedom, military build-up, decreasing levels of science education—although these are important; suffice to say, that Pakistan is an impoverished nation weak on most social indicators and apparently getting worse. As an initial caveat, an important failing of this essay is that the textural sources and conversations were entirely in English—one might obtain different images with local Pakistani languages, such as Sindhi or Baluchi. To use a poststructural grammatical strategy and transform English into a verb, we can see that this essay 'Englishes' Pakistani social space silencing other linguistic realities.

Disciplined capitalistic society

The first image of Pakistan's future has had many previous incarnations; the most recent version uses South Korea as a compelling image of the future.⁷ South Korean, now, because both countries were underdeveloped 30 years ago, but now South Korea has joined the ranks of the developed, it has become an integral part of the 'Pacific shift',⁸ and is soon to be an industrial nation. Through state-managed industrialization (through the support of a few selected corporations) with strong private spin-offs (and the economic activity caused by the Vietnam war) Korea has dramatically raised its standard of living. Along with a strong Confucian ethic (respect for hierarchy, family, hard work, and an emphasis on education) Korea has a strong national ethic.

However, given Pakistan's social structure, perhaps North Korea is a better

example of Pakistan's possible future especially since both have large militaries. However, while North Korea has a strong totalitarian ideology, Pakistan does not. Islam is in many ways a legal/social doctrine and in that sense it defies any particular authoritative interpretation; rather it is up for grabs by a variety of ideologies. While a theocratic military state is possible, so far this mixture has not occurred nor has a one-man state managed to succeed. The best way of characterizing this model of the future is as the 'disciplined capitalistic society'. The military rules directly or indirectly under the guise of 'law and order'. Not only is civil society disciplined but so is labour. Labour exists to aid capital in its national and transnational accumulation. The Islam that is preferred is one that aids in societal discipline at the individual and social level. The head of the nation is then the strict father who knows what is best for the children. The mother in this image is apolitical, remaining at home to take care of the nation's children so that they can work for the larger good of capitalist development.

However, there is an important contradiction here. Among the reasons of the rise of East Asia was women's labour. Females are essential for export-oriented strategies that lead to capital accumulation; at the same time the Islamic dimension of this model demands their continued 'home-ization'. They are to provide care for labour. This is the semi-proletarian existence which in the long run cheapens the cost of labour for capital since the informal sector helps support the formal 'monied' capitalistic sector.⁹ Females are integral to this semi-proletarian structure.

The other obvious contradiction is the role of the military who believe that they were born to rule.¹⁰ Besides the role of women, Confucianism, and the particular historical juncture in the world economy, East Asia developed because of low military expenditures and high social expenditures. Is Pakistan ready to put health and education before military expansion, that is, to redefine security? We have yet to see. In the meantime, the hope is that through discipline and privatization Pakistan can join the ranks of the rich. But while state companies are up for sale and stock markets boom, the spectre of increasing levels of inequity, of a Pakistan dominated by a few feudal families (turned industrial capitalists in the past 30 years) remains. The 1960s were dominated by an image of the future that focused on industrialism and a modernized agricultural through the green revolution, but high economic growth only led to control of Pakistan's economy by the famous 22 families.¹¹ Outrage at economic feudalism did not lead to free markets equally accessible by all, but to strong state socialism.

However, if partial employee ownership is more than mere camouflage to obtain concessions from labour, then perhaps the 'selling of Pakistan'¹² could lead to broad-based industrial growth and distributive justice.

Islamic socialism

In contrast is the image of Islamic socialism, which had made recurrent claims to Pakistan's future. However, given Pakistan's strong military and civilian bureaucracies—which have grown as a result of the particulars of partition and wars with India—it is not so much socialism but strong nationalism. While the party, especially the Pakistan People's Party, has made claims to represent the people in their struggle for equity, more often it has been the civil bureaucracy that has controlled the specifics of 'Islamic socialism'.

This image is also partially influenced by the Third World non-aligned move-

ment which has attempted to follow an alternative development path not based on multinational Western run capitalism or on Soviet party/military-run communism.

In Pakistan it was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who captured this image. While populist and egalitarian, this view is still industrial (and demanding of sacrifices from the people as with the previous model). However, it has a strong emphasis on '*roti, capra, makan*', on basic needs and distributive justice. Nehru and other Third World leaders have attempted a similar model but without the Islamic overtones.

In this model, the state softens the impact of local and transnational capital on individuals. At the macro level, import substitution and nationalization become key strategies. However, the larger problem remains: the world economic system is essentially capitalistic, and while politics is nation-state-oriented Pakistan remains near the bottom of the global division of labour. Pakistan has not managed to move up the ladder from raw commodities and cheap labour and low-end manufacturing to high-end manufacturing and service industries.

Embedded in the economic dimension are interpretations of Islam that give weight to the syncretic personal perspective of Islam; that is, an Islam that does not become the facilitator of the mullah's rise—not rote discipline but revelation. The rendering of Islam is populist, as for example in the view that the land is perceived as belonging to the tillers not to the landlords.

It is Islam that unites, it is Islam that gives direction, it is Islam that integrates individual, family and nation. And although Islam is pervasive, in this vision it remains open and committed to distributive justice and individual spiritual growth—a soft Islam, if you will. National allies in this image come from other Third World countries with collective self-reliance the long run goal—South/South cooperation on economic, cultural and political levels. Allies can also come from other Islamic nations. A recent articulation has Pakistan and Iran forming a new alliance, providing the alternative to the unipolar world of US dominance.¹³ This alliance could then extend to the newly liberated Islamic states of Central Asia.¹⁴

Among other writers, Syed Abidi¹⁵ writes that the image of capitalist development and the image of Islamic socialism have followed a cyclical pattern in dominating Pakistan's politics. Implementation of the leads first to social frustration and then to the rise of the second. The second only leads to inefficiencies and, over time, economic stagnation. However, revisionist historians, such as Ayesha Jalal,¹⁶ argue that both are unsuccessful because of the nature of the Pakistani state, moulded along authoritarian lines due to the circumstances of partition.

A third image, based on individual and national identity attempts to transcend the earlier two. It uses the ideal of the Islamic past as its gateway into the future.

Return of the ideal and the search for identity

The original image of Pakistan was that of a safe heaven and haven for Muslims, safe from both the Hindus of the east and later from the Jews of the west (in Israeli and American forms). It was derived—at least in its popular myth—as the territory in which Muslims would not be oppressed by the Hindus of India. While Jinnah's intent may have been political power (a share in the action when India was to be divided) for the Muslim League¹⁷ and later the creation of a secular state, it quickly became a state for Muslims by Muslims of Muslims.

Pakistan's self-image was and continues to be defined in its otherness to India.

India is the enemy that gives unity. Even after three devastating wars, military strategies still believe that Pakistan can defeat India. From this view, India has many gods (that is, it is culturally backward and steeped in an inequitable caste system), is bent on destroying Pakistan (the empirical evidence of the Bangladesh war), has nuclear weapons and is (was) allied with godless Russia. *But would Pakistan retain any sense of its identity without India since Pakistan knows itself through the other of India? Indeed, is Pakistan but not-India?* India has survived thousands of years with and without Muslim domination, but Pakistan is still struggling to complete a half-century, to imagine itself as a nation, to find a coherent self.

This image exists in many ways outside our earlier dimensions in that internal identity is more important than external reality. The image is that Pakistanis reside in the land of the Pure, the place where there is no threat from the outside, wherein the purity of Islam can flourish. Other variables such as the type of political-economic system, culture and geopolitics are less important. The moral dimension of Islam is central.

A question that arises from this view is: has Pakistan achieved this level of purity? Some Muslim scholars argue that each Islamic nation attempts to recover the perfect polity of the initial Islamic state,¹⁸ the ideal of the original promise of the time of the Prophet—the revolution had occurred, prophecy had been delivered, the rightly guided caliphs ruled, and there was social justice and economic growth in Arabia.¹⁹ This ideal is then the image of the future for Pakistan; this is the time of partition when there was promise in the air, through personal sacrifice a great deal had been achieved, the British and the Hindus had been thrown back, and the Quaid lived. The image of the future then is a return to a time of hope and dreams; of victory over struggles and of purity, before the politicians in the form of the military and the landlords coopted the future. In this sense this image of the future is a search for an ideal past, a mythic past.

But while this image may be glorious, revisionist historians point out that the birth of Pakistan was already steeped in power politics, in feudal domination—there never was any purity to speak of, to begin with.

If this is true then perhaps what is needed is a *re-imagination* of Pakistan—a search for a new vision, a new purpose that makes sense of the past 40 years of frustration and creates real visions of the future, not dreams based on a past that is but a lie. This re-imagination task could occur through a democratic process of collective future envisioning or it could come from the words or images of great artists or others marginal to the present established power structure. But while we await this re-imagination of the future, in the meantime the present disintegrates.

The end of sovereignty

This image is the most pervasive.²⁰ Sovereignty is threatened at four levels—(1) external territorial from India; (2) external cultural from the USA; (3) internal cultural, the self; and (4) internal territorial, the provinces.

(1) India

The first level dominates any discussion of Pakistani politics and is the natural assumption behind any forecasting of South Asian futures—conquest by India.²¹ This could occur through military means or through increased trade (wherein Pakistan could not compete against superior technology, economies of scale and

cheaper labour).²² Whether this occurs militarily and creates a greater India, or peacefully and creates a new united South Asia, it is India that is intent on dominating the other nations of South Asia, especially Pakistan. This is Pakistan's greatest dystopia, the end of territorial sovereignty devoured by mother India.

(2) *Culture*

The second is more sophisticated and deals not with military or economic imperialism but with cultural domination. The main villain is the West, especially the USA. Irrespective of US AID and other ties to Pakistan, religion and their distant locations in the world economy make Pakistan and the USA naturally antagonistic.²³ Recent desires of the USA to inspect Pakistan's nuclear development exacerbate this tension.²⁴

But cultural domination comes in many forms: technology transfer from the green revolution to the microcomputer revolution—technology is not neutral but has many cultural codes and messages embedded in its hardware (the actual physical technology) and software (the rules that make it sensible). For example, certain technologies might promote individualism at the expense of family. Others might promote mobility. Education transfer also leads to cultural penetration, the widespread emigration to the USA for education and then for work is the obvious example. Electronic technology, even in the ostensibly neutral form of CNN, can spread foreign views of what is significant and what is unimportant—even though CNN provides the important function of providing news that is not explicitly part of the Pakistani government's official ideology. That Pakistan is rarely covered is not inconsequential for cultural self-images. Travel to the West for tourism, conferences and medical reasons provides other examples. While there is a bit of cultural transfer, mostly it is one-way communication.

Sovereignty, then, is clearly violated; the idea that a nation can exist given this level of cultural penetration is highly problematic. For instance, just as there is a world division of labour, there is a world division of culture and news with some supplying modern culture and others providing exotic or traditional culture. Pakistan merely provides the data for their theories of the traditional. The responses to this form of penetration are obvious: fundamentalism in its strongest forms—a return to the historic text,²⁵ a denial of physical and mental mobility, and a critique of all things foreign, even those which increase the freedom and life chances of individual and family. This is the now famous call by the ruling elite—mullahs, feudals and military—for a local form of 'democracy' in which basic 'universal' freedoms (due process, for example) are denied so as to save local culture. Liberals, in contrast, argue that defending cultural and national sovereignty denies individual sovereignty and reaffirms the power of the state. In the name of tradition, all sorts of injustices can be committed and rationalized.

Other longer-term responses to Western penetration could be further Islamic penetration, for example by Iran. This could lead to a Pakistan–Iran partnership with an increased Shia influence in Pakistan.²⁶ It would increase the power of *ulema* in that they would have the power to define and narrate legitimate cultural and political activities. Conversely the end of sovereignty could become a positive image in that Pakistan could be forced to become an international blend of many cultures and technologies—a place where the future resides, a place where sovereignty finds itself renewed at a higher planetary or spiritual or cultural levels not at a myopic national or local level. This, then is, a reaffirmation of the idea of

the *ummah* but extended to the entire world in the form of a global community. Pakistan could then become a compelling image for other places to emulate. A receiver and sender of social technology and a creator of postmodern culture. But this direction would take much daring and courage as there are no models to follow, only vague possibilities to explore.

(3) *The internal self*

As problematic as cultural sovereignty is the loss of the sovereignty of the self. The self was previously constructed around familiar lines: heaven was above, hell below, and God all-round. One knew what one was to do with one's life: class and caste were clear. But with the world continuously being recreated by the science and technology revolution and with the problem of the West continuously staring at the Pakistani 'self', there no longer exists any clear-cut self.²⁷ Am I Sindhi first? A Woman first? A Pakistani first? A wife first? A Muslim first? A feudal first? Where do my loyalties lie? Can I integrate these often contradictory fragments of identity? And where do these categories stand in the larger scheme of things? Moreover, the problem of the self can but become increasingly problematic with the feminist movement, increased exposure to the outside world through travel and the development of an overseas Pakistani community. Instead of one mutually agreed authoritative construction of self we may see many Pakistani selves all vying for individual and national dominance. These are made increasingly problematic as national integration based on the fear of the Other is *dependent* on *one* mutually exclusive self. A future of a people whose integrated self is essentially based on fear is tenuous at best.

(4) *The provinces*

The contradictions of the Pakistan self are further exacerbated by the final layer of sovereignty, the problematic politics of internal territorial sovereignty, that is, the provinces increasingly wanting more autonomy and in some cases secession. The calls for an independent Sindh is the latest case in point. The image of this future is of the provinces going their separate ways with Pakistan finally only being Punjab. The north west might join with Afghanistan or the Phaktoons might form their own country. In addition, Baluchistan might join Iran, become its own nation, or join a loose confederation with Sindh. And in this image, Azad Kashmir would either join Punjab or unite with the rest of Kashmir to form its own nation. A loose confederation or a commonwealth is also possible.

While a weakened national centre or four different Pakistans might lead to conquest by India; the same forces that would lead to end of national integration in Pakistan would also be most likely to lead to the disintegration of India, from one India to many Indias.

Equally possible, after a period of disintegration, is reintegration into a United States of South Asia with Punjab as the most likely centre of this loose regional federation. What the Sikhs think of this possible future is quite obvious.

No change: continuation of the grand disillusionment

The last, and we would argue most pervasive, image of the future is that of the present continued, or 'no change'. This is a general malaise, a grand disillusionment

with the ideal of Pakistan, with the promises of the rulers, with the intentions of politicians.²⁸ In this view, the power structure—so obviously unjust—appears unchangeable to individuals and groups.

Given this malaise, there are then a range of strategies available. The first is individual spiritual development, an escape from the social and material worlds. The second is to flee the country to brighter horizons outside: 'Dubai Chalo'²⁹ or the fabled green card. The poor and middle class go to the Middle East and the rich and the upper middle class leave for the USA. Within the country the strategy is to find a job and then use one's personal influence to help others find work, thus allowing the family as a whole to move up the economic ladder.

Another tactic is politicization in the form of joining political parties for the purpose of social transformation. However, this strategy is often quickly abandoned once the enormous weight of the historical structures at hand are made obvious (the military, the landlords, and the interpretive power of the *ulema*, mentioned above). What remains is politics as patronage.

This regression from politics as social transformation to politics as patronage has a devastating influence on the national psyche. Individuals are forced into corruption and dishonesty (values antithetical to being a good Muslim) and must live with their own moral failues in a land where morality is central to personal and social valuation. Violence—individual, institutional and state—becomes routine and acceptable. Cities disaggregate, the rich secure themselves and the rest either form separate communities or create their own armies. What emerges is cynicism and pessimism, a breakdown in the immune system of the political and social body—a world ending with a whimper not a bang.

For those in the position of leadership or responsibility, the contradictions are even stronger, and inasmuch as the local, national and international structures are too difficult to transform others are blamed—the foreign elements, the bad local elements, or the undisciplined youth, to name a few enemies. The oppression of the present bears down on leader and follower alike; both lose their humanity, both lose hope in any collective image of the future. Worse, there is no saviour ahead: all models have failed; leaders have failed; religion has failed; capitalism has failed; socialism has failed; political parties have failed.

Conclusion: designing the future

The need for re-imagination of purpose, of identity, of vision from this dismal final vision is glaring. Part of revisioning is creating alternative structures. Among the points of departure for these new structures should be the centrality of *difference*. Pakistan has placed its strength on unity; a unity that has proved elusive. Perhaps what is needed are institutions and models of change that use difference to create strength, that celebrate our uniqueness among each other and in the world. From an embracing of difference, a unity of self, family and a larger group identity then might be possible. As important as difference is *decentralization*, the creation of local practices to solve local problems, that is, endogenous development.³⁰ Finally, we should not forget *democracy*, not in the trivial sense of voting—which has historically merely strengthened statist politics—but in the more important sense of individual empowerment and community participation in the creation of preferred futures as contextualized by the social designs of others.

In any case, *designing* the future at local and community and broader levels (through local and international social movements, for example) might be a more

promising task than waiting for a politician or some other central authority to solve the problems ahead. Imagination does not mean, however, forgetting the material world and the real interests—structural, institutional and individual—that impede attempts to transform the present. The future must then be a sight that one moves towards, as well as a site wherein the material and the creative meet. The future—like politics, economics and culture—must be decolonized and reappropriated by each one of us. Today.

While the above is an initial exploration of Pakistan's images of the future, dimensions within these images have yet to be explored—the role of the environment, structural and direct violence, the role of children, images of health, the possibilities of growth and distribution, and the relative powers of various actors, such as nation-states, political parties and social movements. We have also not developed how Pakistan's futures are perceived from the outside (most likely in one phrase: continued poverty and nuclear war³¹).

Appropriate questions for Pakistanis that emerge from this essay include: What is my image of the future for myself? For my family? For my community? For my nation? For the planet? And what am I doing to realize my personal and social image of the future?

Through this type of futures questioning, images could become the basics of further action and transformation. Pakistan's politics and social analysis could move forward from endless discussions and debates on partition to discussions about what type of Pakistan is desired tomorrow, and what can be done today to realize that vision. Otherwise, 1947 and the trends of today—poverty, malnutrition, economic inequity, gender dominance—will become the reality of tomorrow.

Whether Pakistan will succeed in joining the economic transformation of Japan, the four tigers and now Malaysia and Thailand, remains uncertain.³² Capitalist development without necessary changes in land ownership (in the feudal make-up of society) might result once again in strong statism, in a dysfunctional Islamic socialism or some other form of central government dominance. Or perhaps Pakistan might attain its ideal Islamic polity, it might fulfil the dream that made partition possible. Equally, cultural, economic, ethnic, geopolitical and technological trends all make sovereignty increasingly difficult to attain. Not only is national sovereignty increasingly nonsensical but so is the sovereignty of the self. While widespread cynicism makes the continuation of the present most likely,³³ changes in the global system as well as possible changes in the region and in the discourses that make the present intelligible, make alternative futures for Pakistan imaginable. Our own preference is towards futures that focus on difference, democracy and decentralization, on visions that dare to re-imagine self and nation; past, present and future.

Notes and references

1. This article does not engage in the more ambitious task of determining Pakistan's historical images of the future; that is, we do not attempt a critical path analysis. Suffice to say that the present images of the future have in some form or the other been around for quite a while. Issues of national identity; relationship with the superpowers, the region and the Islamic world; debates over an appropriate economic model—continued feudalism, socialism or capitalism, the role of Islam; and, confrontations with the modern and mediaeval worlds have all in some form shaped Pakistan today. Among other writers, certainly Ayesha Jalal has done an excellent job of showing the alternatives present and why some were taken and others neglected at various historical junctures.
2. *The Muslim*, *The Herald*, *Newsline* have figured prominently in this research. International news

magazines used include *The Far-Eastern Economic Review* and *Asiaweek*. Pakistan Futuristic Institute Publications by Raja Ikram Azam and Ross Masood, the pioneers of futures research in Pakistan, provided an important context. In Islamabad, Masood Ahmed, writer of the 'Roving Eye' has provided many insights over the past decade. Finally and most significantly are the perspectives and the written works of Dr Inayatullah, the author's father. His historical knowledge of South Asia and his understandings of the many ways that South Asia is constituted in contemporary discourse were invaluable. Selected interviews were random consisting of discussions with intellectuals, politicians, students, businessmen, children, and let us not forget the most important source of information for the postmodern social 'scientist' taxi drivers, shopkeepers, hawkers and the occasional beggar.

3. See Sohail Inayatullah 'Deconstructing and reconstructing the future: predictive, cultural and critical epistemologies', *Futures*, 22(2), 1990; and Richard Slaughter, 'Future vision in the nuclear age', *Futures*, 19(1), 1987. This view of futures, particularly Inayatullah's, comes from the politics-of-discourse approach developed by Michel Foucault in, for instance, *The Archeology of Knowledge*, translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York, Pantheon, 1972). See also, Michael Shapiro (editor), *Language and Politics* (New York, New York University Press, 1984).
4. The Pakistan Institute for Strategic Studies, the Pakistan Institute for Development Economics, SAARC, and the Pakistan Ministry of Planning are institutional examples of this approach. See, for example, *Regional Studies*, the quarterly journal of the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad.
5. One initial attempt to break out of this conceptual dead-end is S.H. Hashmi, *The State of Social Sciences in Pakistan* (Islamabad, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1989). With much less success but still deserving of praise and reading is Ross Masood and Ikram Azam (editor), *Pakistan 2000 A.D.* (Islamabad, Pakistan Futuristics Institute, 1991). For a bibliography of future studies in Pakistan, see Pakistan National Commission for UNESCO, 'Country monograph Pakistan: review of studies on the year 2000', in the UNESCO Bureau of Studies and Programming Series *Reflection on World Problems and Future-Oriented Studies* (Paris, UNESCO, 1988). In particular, see the excellent, *Pakistan A.D. 2001: A Report of Pakistan's Population Growth and its Impact in the Next Twenty Years on the Country's Socio-Economic Development* (Lahore, Family Planning Association of Pakistan, 1986). The scenarios presented in this book of future Pakistani families are creative and insightful, simply outstanding.
6. For some of these trends see, for example, *Perspectives on Asia's Futures I and II* (Bangkok, UNESCO, 1989), in particular, Akmal Hussain, 'Behind the veil of growth: the state of Pakistan's economy, pages 7–8. While Pakistan's growth rate has been consistently high, 7% in the 1960s and on aggregate 7% since 1977, Pakistan ranks 79th out of 88 countries on the United Nations scale of human development. See, also, UNDP, *Human Development Report 1990* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990).
7. It is humorously suggested that Pakistanis should begin drinking *ginseng* tea so that they can duplicate the Korean miracle, British and *desi* Pakistani tea having ostensibly failed to increase national productivity. The Pakistan—Korea connection has grown stronger in 1992 with Daewoo having been selected to build the \$500 million motorway between Islamabad and Lahore. The intention is that this new motorway will facilitate the transfer of goods and services within the country. What the bullock carts will do is uncertain. It appears, however, that the infrastructure of the rest of the nation will remain unimproved. See Masud Ahmed, 'A motorway for BMW's and Mercedes', *The Nation*, 28 February 1992, page 5.
8. See, for example, Sohail Inayatullah, 'The rise of the Pacific', *Euro-Asia Business Review*, April 1987; and Wolfram Hanrieder (editor), *Global Peace and Security* (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1987), particularly the essays by Johan Galtung and Immanuel Wallerstein.
9. Immanuel Wallerstein has consistently made this argument. See his *Historical Capitalism* (London, Verso, 1983). For a wonderful analysis of the application of world systems theory to Indian history, see M. P. Prabhakaran, *The Historical Origin of India's Underdevelopment: A World-System Perspective* (Boston, MA, University Press of America, 1990).
10. 'Born to rule', *The Herald*, June 1991, pages 31–33. This article begins with the following quote: 'From the very outset, the army has considered the running of the affairs of state as virtually its divinely appointed mission. This presumptuousness is what unleashed the cancer which, in time, became an inoperable part of the system' (page 31).
11. Zahid Hussain, 'Robber barons?', *Newsline*, January 1991, pages 19–31. Pakistan's 22 families controlled 66% of the industries, 70% of the insurance and 80% of the banking.
12. See 'Has anybody seen our future'. *The Economist*, 31 November 1991. And for an example of Pakistan's emerging global capitalist players, see 'Pakistan's money spinner', *Asiaweek*, 13 December 1991, pages 61–65. The Nishat group, for example, does not hire relatives, is a decentralized organization, uses a plethora of MBAs and urges increased women participation in the economy. International trade is the key for Nishat. As its founder Mohammed Mansha states, 'we have to integrate with the world or die' (page 63).
13. In this model, Pakistan gets oil, money and strategic depth (needed for defence when India

- attacks) and Iran gets access to defence weapons, particularly nuclear weapons. See the feature story in *The Herald*, March 1991, pages 24–27.
14. While the Iraq–Iran war and its outcome put back any Pan-Islamism, the emergence of the new Central Asian Islamic states has revived this vision. Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran are among the nations hoping to gain trade advantages. The Saudis have already shipped a million Qu'rans in that direction. One popular story is that General Zia slipped in a copying machine while on an official visit to the USSR. This was used to speed up the downfall of communism.
 15. See Syed Abidi, 'Social change and the politics of religion in Pakistan', (Honolulu, HI, Doctoral Dissertation, 1991). Also see, Sohail Inayatullah, 'The betrayal of dreams: the Islamic discourse in Pakistan', *Pakistan Progressive*, Summer 1990.
 16. Ayesha Jalal, *The state of Martial Law: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defense* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990). She writes: 'In the immediate aftermath of independence and partition the questions of sovereignty and state building were inextricably linked in Pakistan . . . This work examines how a state, maimed and mutilated at birth, managed to survive and how in the process of exercising Pakistan's sovereignty the bureaucratic and military institutions rose to a position of dominance . . . The political process was by no means a passive element; its complex dynamics contributed to the shaping of the Pakistani state structure . . . In other words, the answer to why the military and the bureaucracy came to assume the dominant role in decision-making within the state structure is attempted through a close and careful scrutiny of the different ways in which the interplay of regional and international factors influenced domestic politics and economy, distorting relations between the centre and the provinces in particular and the dialectic between state construction and political processes in general' (page 4). See also Hasan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (editors), *Pakistan: The Unstable State* (Lahore, Vanguard Books, 1983).
 17. See Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, The Muslim League and the Demand For Pakistan* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985).
 18. See, for example, Akbar S. Ahmed, *Discovering Islam* (London, Routledge and Kegan, 1988).
 19. As an excellent introduction to Islam and history, see Rafiq Zakaria, *The Struggle Within Islam: The Conflict Between Religion and Politics* (Delhi, Penguin, 1989).
 20. See, for example, Tariq Ali, *Can Pakistan Survive* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1983).
 21. See, for example, Benazir Bhutto, 'Neighbours, not friends', *Newsline* June 1991, pages 35–36. As Bhutto muses, 'We suspect India (and not without reason) of not really accepting the juridical and human reality of Pakistan . . . [It is believed by many that] hinduism is disabled by the mere existence of Pakistan and that it cannot be whole again as long as Pakistan exists . . . Muslims are generally feared by the Hindus as being diabolically gifted adversaries, so every move towards building an Islamic society here is seen as being the expansion of a culture highly antagonistic to their own' (page 35). For an important Indian view on the future of Pakistan, see D. H. Butani, *The Future of Pakistan* (Delhi, Promilla, 1984), who introduces his book by writing, 'Though ostensibly about Pakistan, its future and all that, the book is really concerned with India. I confess it's uncharitable to say in the beginning that the author regards Pakistan as India's major handicap, or as Nehru said in anger, a carbuncle that had settled on the back of India's body politic' (page ix). Butani's central thesis is 'They (Pakistanis) hate us because they love us. They want to fight with us because ultimately they want to be united with us. Their conscious ego is in conflict with their subconscious id'. And, 'The two governments of India and Pakistan (are) bound to be either in perpetual conflict or perpetual conference' (page 247). Butani's ideal future for the subcontinent is an India–Pakistan confederation based on joint defence capabilities and a common market. A joint research organization would begin the task of breaking the perpetual conflicts and beginning the perpetual conference.
 22. Anjum Ibrahim, 'Economic cooperation in South Asia: pros and cons', *Regional Studies* (Islamabad), 7(4), 1989.
 23. See, for example, 'Masters, not friends', *Newsline*, January 1991, pages 65–72.
 24. For an excellent analysis of nuclear futures, see Dr Inayatullah, 'The nuclear arms race between superpowers: some lessons for Pakistan and India'. Available from the author at 3, St 18, F 7/2, Islamabad. Inayatullah concludes his essay with the following remarks. 'What the above analysis suggests is that if India and Pakistan start the nuclear arms race, the circumstances are more likely to force Pakistan to drop out of the race earlier than India though India would suffer too. Therefore, it is in the interest of both the countries not to initiate a nuclear race. However, like the Soviet Union the consequences of joining and then dropping out of the race will be more serious for Pakistan than India. Therefore . . . should it [Pakistan] join a race which it is unlikely to win? Why not search for means other than nuclear weapons to ensure our security and defend our sovereignty?' (page 8).
 25. The latest example is the arrest of a partially paralysed teacher for defiling the Qu'ran or in the

- words of his defence attorney of underlining various passages of the Qu'ran. 'A Christian in Islam', *The Economist*, 5 October 1991.
26. Struggles between various Muslim factions have already reached violent heights. One group recently published a pamphlet listing 40 reasons why Shias should be declared kafirs. See the 'The literature of venom', *Newsline*, April 1991, page 50.
 27. Pakistan's recent victory in the World Cricket Championship final against England might for a short time aid in buttressing a national self. But it might take more than sports victories against England to raise self-confidence and national pride.
 28. See, for example, Talat Aslam, 'The grand illusion', *The Herald*, March 1991, pages 60–61, offers a brilliant analysis. The people of Pakistan are religious in their own manner, and deeply concerned about their place in the wider Islamic world. They are quick to side with the underdog, aware of the humiliation the West has made them suffer and desperately keen to see themselves truly independent. This, however, does not mean that they are willing to see the imposition of a theoretic way of life from above. They are utterly pragmatic about which side their bread is buttered, and a large section is increasingly conscious of moving up in the world. This dichotomy, between the world of the spirit and the material world, remains at the core of most people's emotions, in an unresolved, ambivalent state of tension. Temperamentally, the people are unwilling to buy the entire ideological package being sold to them by the long distrusted fundamentalist right. Nor are they attracted by the increasingly state and meaningless slogans of the left. Picking and choosing any scraps of ideology they come across and cobbling them together into an incoherent view of the world—based on their ambivalent instincts—the people of Pakistan are destined to continue being a constituency in search of a leadership' (page 61).
 29. Let's go to Dubai.
 30. See, for example, the inspiring works of Akhtar Hameed Khan who has empowered local groups within a non-socialistic, non-revolutionary context. Interviewed in *The Herald*, December 1988. Also see, 'Doing it with people power', *Asiaweek*, 15 February 1991, page 49. For a theoretical model, see Dr Inayatullah, 'Endogenous development: meaning, issues and dilemmas', paper for UNESCO Symposium, Paris, 1987.
 31. See, for example, Gary Milhollin, 'Asia's nuclear nightmare: the German connection', *The Washington Post*, 10 June 1990, chapter 1. Also see Richard Lamm, *Mega-Traumas: American at the Year 2000* (Boston, MA, Houghton Mifflin, 1985), where a nuclear war in South Asia leads to disarmament, and the emergence of a new society. 'Man looked into the abyss and saw an irradiated Hell and recoiled in horror. Both the head and heart came to realize that war was mutual suicide that would destroy not only nations but species' (page 242). Certainly, the latest development in Orientalism, wherein the Orient gives its life so that peace can flourish for the rest of the world.
 32. For an insightful comparative analysis of Pakistan and East Asia, see Lee Kuan Yew, 'The vision for Asia', *Muslim*, 20 March 1992, page 2. Lee Kuan Yew argues that Pakistan must finish the land owning class, get an external dynamo (Japan or Korea, for example) to get technology and growth going, focus on education and less on the hereafter, and develop consensus-oriented politics (not one man, one vote).
 33. Recent national scandals include the fall of BCCI (*Newsline*, July 1991 and *The Herald*, August 1991) and the insolvency of the Punjab Cooperative system (*The Herald*, September 1991). The President and the Prime Minister appears to have had considerable dealings with both financial institutions. Gang rape of females by thugs hired by political parties appears to be the next step in the long process of the brutalization of the people, especially women. See the December 1991 issue of *Newsline* entitled, 'Sindh's long night of terror—torture, arrests, rape . . . By Presidential sanction'. Zia might be dead but his vision continues.