Global & Strategis

Global & Strategis

Tahun 5, Nomor 2, Juli-Desember 2011 ISSN 1907-9729

terbit pertama kali
Januari 2007

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media.php?med=23

Global & Strategis adalah jurnal ilmiah yang diterbitkan oleh Cakra Studi Global Strategis (CSGS) sebagai balairung terbuka bagi debat dan diskusi tentang isu-isu global dan strategis. Berkecambah dalam nampan CSGS yang berbingkaikan visi pengembangan "pendekatan global atas persoalan strategis dan pendekatan strategis atas persoalan global", *Global & Strategis* mengusung semangat dan visi pengembangan serupa. Tidak hanya menjadi ruang tumbuh bagi pendekatan interdisipliner dan holistik terhadap selubung sempit pendekatan persoalan strategis selama ini, *Global & Strategis* juga merupakan ruang hidup bagi tumbuh dan berkembangnya sudut pandang strategis terhadap kompleksitas, kecenderungan absurditas, dan tidak terjangkarkannya pendekatan persoalan global dewasa ini. Diterbitkan dua kali setahun setiap Januari dan Juli, *Global & Strategis* mengundang diskusi, tinjauan, dan analisis kontemporer terhadap spektrum luas persoalan yang membentang dari problematika klasik hubungan luar negeri, pertahanan keamanan, dan permasalahan-permasalahan strategis kebangsaan; problematika dinamika eksternal dan isu-isu strategis ekstrateritorial; problematika regionalisme, sivilisasionalisme, dan isu-isu strategis lintas kawasan; hingga problematika transnasionalisme, universalisme, kosmopolitanisme, nasionalisme, fundamentalisme, dan persoalan-persoalan mondial globalisasi.

Redaksi *Global & Strategis*
mengucapkan terima kasih
kepada para mitra bestari yang
telah memeriksa naskah edisi Th. 5 No. 2

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PENGANTAR REDAKSI

Jurnal *Global & Strategis* Edisi Tahun 5, Nomor 2, Juli-Desember 2011, menampilkan tujuh artikel tentang isu-isu global dan strategis.

Artikel pertama, ”Islamic Civilization in Transition: Creating a Post-Western Civilization”, oleh Sohail Inayatullah, menjelaskan resistensi Islam terhadap globalisasi yang sangat kental dengan muatan nilai-nilai Barat. Menurut penulis, globalisasi tidak hanya ekspansi ekonomi kapitalis ke dalam kehidupan sosial, kultural, dan spiritual seluruh umat manusia, tetapi juga keberlanjutan dari Darwinisme sosial bahwa “the fittest – the most entrepreneurial - should lead the world”. Globalisasi tampaknya berproses untuk melenyapkan agama dan irasionalitas dari sejarah manusia. Menangkal perubahan dramatis ini, Islam tampil sebagai alternatif dengan bergabung bersama wacana tandingan lain untuk menciptakan visi moral bagi masyarakat global. Inilah masa transisi bagi peradaban Islam menuju peradaban pasca-Barat.

Artikel kedua, “Les Spécificités du Féminisme Islamique en Indonésie”, oleh Anne F. Guttinger, memaparkan keunikan wacana feminisme muslim di Indonesia karena mudah dan luasnya akses yang didapatkan perempuan dalam organisasi kemasyarakatan. Jaringan pesantren dapat menyediakan pengajaran agama kepada banyak perempuan yang di antaranya melanjutkan studi di Institut Agam Islam negeri (IAIN) dan bahkan kemudian menjadi pemimpin atau aktivis. Dua organisasi muslim terbesar, Nahdlatul Ulama dan Muhammadiyah juga berkontribusi dalam mencetak pemimpin-pemipin perempuan. Sepanjang sejarah Indonesia, peran mereka dalam setiap aktivitas sosial di negara ini telah memberikan kesempatan kepada kaum perempuan untuk berpartisipasi dalam debat tentang isu gender melalui jalan yang lebih bebas dibandingkan negara-negara muslim lain.

Artikel ketiga, “North Atlantic Treaty Organization-Europe Union Relations, Past and Present”, oleh Majid Bozorgmehri, mengulas sejarah panjang hubungan NATO dan EU sejak kedua organisasi itu terbentuk hingga perkembangannya di era kontemporer sekarang. Salah satu kemiripan NATO dan EU adalah sama-sama fokus pada masalah keamanan dan manajemen krisis. Kedekatan kedua organisasi tersebut tergolong erat karena 21 dari 28 anggota NATO merupakan anggota EU juga. Karena itu, kerjasama di antara keduanya menjadi sangat penting.

Artikel keempat, “Overcoming Challenges to Indonesian Foreign Policy towards China”, oleh Santo Darmosumarto, mendeskripsikan peluang yang perlu dimanfaatkan Indonesia dalam mencermati kebangkitan Cina. Satu dasawarsa terakhir, Cina telah tumbuh dengan sangat pesat sehingga menarik perhatian aktor-aktor global lain untuk diajak kerjasama. Merespons situasi global ini, Indonesia perlu meningkatkan upaya-upaya untuk terlibat dalam kerjasama dengan Cina. Selama ini, Indonesia telah menjalankan upaya-upaya itu. Namun, kelemahan koordinasi seringkali menghambatnya, seperti dominasi sektor swasta atau bisnis dan ego sektoral di antara lembaga-lembaga pemerintah. Kelemahan inilah yang harus dibenahi agar Indonesia mendapatkan keuntungan besar dari hubungan kerjasamanya dengan Cina.

Artikel kelima, “Energy Crisis Threat: A Challenge for the Rise of China”, oleh A. Safril Mubah, menjelaskan bahwa ancaman energi yang dihadapi Cina berpotensi besar menghambat laju kebangkitan negara ini di masa depan. Menyadari kondisi itu, Pemerintah Cina menetapkan kebijakan untuk berburu sumber-sumber energi di seluruh dunia dan membangun jalur pipa yang yang dapat menyalurkan minyak dari negara-negara tetangganya. Persoalannya, upaya ini seringkali dihambat oleh Amerika Serikat dan Jepang yang merasa terancam oleh kebangkitan Cina Karena itu, dalam pandangan penulis, jika Cina tidak dapat mengatasi masalah ini, impiannya untuk menjadi negara adikuasa di masa mendatang akan semakin sulit dicapai.

Artikel keenam, “Kondisi Keamanan Energi India: Potensi Konflik dan Perlambatan Perkembangan Ekonomi”, oleh Radityo Dharmaputra, membahas kondisi keamanan energi India dan relasinya dengan kebangkitan India sebagai kekuatan besar dunia. Penulis berargumen bahwa kebangkitan ekonomi India telah menciptakan kebutuhan energi yang semakin meningkat, baik dari industri informasi maupun rumah tangga. Peningkatan kebutuhan yang tidak diikuti ketersediaan sumber energi membuat India berpotensi berkonflik dengan Cina dan Pakistan terkait pencarian sumber energi baru. Penulis menyimpulkan bahwa kebangkitan India yang diprediksikan banyak ahli justru akan terhambat oleh krisis energi dan konflik yang ditimbulkannya.

Artikel ketujuh, “Peran Diaspora India dalam Mengembangkan Kebudayaan India di Indonesia”, oleh Jayanti Andina, menggambarkan seberapa jauh peran yang dimainkan warga negara India dalam mengembangkan kebudayaannya di Indonesia. Diaspora India sebenarnya sangat aktif dalam mendukung kegiatan-kegiatan kebudayaan India di Indonesia. Namun, peran mereka ternyata belum cukup mendukung kesuksesan diplomasi budaya karena partisipasi mereka hanya sebatas keterlibatan dalam masyarakat, tidak sampai menyentuh pemerintah. Ketidakmampuan tersebut menjadikan keberadaan diaspora India di Indonesia tidak terlalu dilibatkan dalam proses pengambilan keputusan pemerintah Indonesia atau proses penyusunan agenda diplomasi kebudayaan yang dilakukan oleh pemerintahan India.

Atas terbitnya *Global & Strategis* Tahun 5 Nomor 2, redaksi mengucapkan terima kasih kepada semua penulis yang telah menyumbangkan gagasan-gagasannya melalui tujuh artikel yang dimuat dalam jurnal ini. Redaksi meyakini rangkaian gagasan tersebut mampu mencerahkan pemikiran para pembaca sehingga dapat merangsang munculnya ide-ide baru yang segar dan berkualitas. Dalam keyakinan itu, terbersit harapan agar jurnal ini bermanfaat bagi pemerhati persoalan global dan strategis. Untuk meningkatkan nilai manfaat itu, redaksi mengundang berbagai pihak untuk menyumbangkan tulisan bagi jurnal ini dengan tetap memperhatikan persyaratan-persyaratan yang diminta. Terima kasih.

Redaksi

Islamic Civilization in Transition: Creating a Post-Western Civilization

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ABSTRACT

Islam bisa dilihat sebagai sebuah kontra-diskursus terhadap globalisasi, ekspansi ruang ekonomi, dan pemenuhan keinginan para Darwinis sosial. Namun, walaupun Islam mencoba memberikan opsi baru bagi globalisme, tetap muncul ancaman dalam konteks politik nasional yang mendorong Islam menjadi politik reaksioner sehingga mengurangi keberagaman dan inovasi. Kondisi ini berbahaya mengingat tahap lanjutan dari globalisasi justru menjanjikan akhir dari sejarah ide-ide seperti realitas, kebenaran, kehidupan, dan kedaulatan. Di tengah dunia yang terus berubah ini, Islam dapat, secara bersama-sama dengan kontra-diskursus lainnya, menciptakan visi baru yang bermoral mengenai komunitas dunia, visi alternatif, and realitas globalisasi.

Kata-Kata Kunci: *peradaban Islam, globalisasi, modernitas, peradaban pasca-Barat.*

Islam can be seen as a counter discourse to globalization, to the expansion of economic space and the fulfillment of the dreams of the social Darwinists. However, even as Islam attempts to create new possibilities for globalism, national politics doom it to a politics of reaction, of reducing diversity and innovation. This is especially perilous as the next phase of globalization promises to end historical notions of reality, truth, nature and sovereignty. In this dramatically changed world, Islam can join with other counter discourses to create a moral vision of a planetary society, an alternative vision and reality of globalization.

***Keywords**: Islamic civilization, globalization, modernity, post-western civilization.*

At one level, Islam can be seen as a counter-globalization[1] in that globalization – at least in its dominant economic face – is essentially about expanding the economic circle in our lives at the expense of the social, the spiritual and the cultural. It is the expansion of the world capitalist economy into every sphere of our lives. It is also the continuation of social Darwinism, that the fittest – the most entrepreneurial - should lead the world. Finally, globalism continues the ideal of progress, of creating the perfect society, the positivist/scientific world, of forever removing religion and irrationality from human history. The latest technology that promises to deliver this future is germ-line engineering, creating a world of flawless human beings. But in whose image of perfection will these individuals be created in? Certainly not Islamic notions of the good, rather, they will continue in technocratic and western definitions of health, beauty and intelligence.

In this move to hyper-globalization, the Islamic world stands both as an imagined past – feudal, low-tech – but also as a civilization based on an alternative distinction between the public and the private, between individual space and collective space and between the secular and the religious. However, globalization - if we ask not what globalization is but which globalization – along with the globalization of economy and the globalization of technology (its acceleration) also consists of: (1) the globalization of awareness of the human condition (of hope and fear); (2) the globalization of responses to market and state domination (the emergent global civil society of transnational organizations); (3) the globalization of governance (both below and above); (4) and, finally globalization is both the expansion of time (creating a discourse of the long term future) and its elimination (creating the immediacy of space).

In this more exhaustive definition of globalization, where stands Islam? Islam in these globalized worlds, defined more eclectically, is first about an alternative to the Western project, that is, a promise of a more spiritual society based on a the unity of thought, of an alternative epistemology, an alternative notion of science and political economy.

Islamic Paradigm

Generally this alternative paradigm as articulated by various muslim writers consists of the following:[2] "There are ten such concepts, four

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[1] Indeed, given the fear of Islam in the West, "competing globalization" may be a far better term.

[2] Muslim scientists at the Stockholm Seminar in 1981 identified a set of fundamental concepts which define the Islamic paradigm.

standing alone and three opposing pairs. *Tawheed* (unity), *khalifah* (trusteeship), *ibadah* (worship), *ilm* (knowledge), *halal* (praiseworthy) and *haram* (blameworthy), *adl* (social justice) and *zulm* (tyranny) and *istislah* (public interest) and *dhiya* (waste)" (Sardar 1995a, 39; Inayatullah 2003).

Tawheed articulates the larger Islamic unity of thought, action and value across humanity, persons, nature and God. *Khalifah* asserts that it is God who has ownership of the Earth. Humans function in a stewardship, trustee capacity, taking care of the Earth, not damaging it. The goal of the Islamic worldview is *adl*, social justice, and it is based on the larger needs of the people, *istislah*. To reach these goals, *ibadah*, worship or contemplation is a beginning and necessary step. From deep reflection, inner and outer observation, ilm or knowledge of self, other and nature will result. One's actions then are *halal*, praiseworthy and not *haram*, blameworthy. Moreover with this framework, *dhiya* (waste) of individual and collective potentials is avoided as is *zulm*, tyranny, the power of a few, or one, over many, or the power of a narrow ideology over the unity within plurality that the Islamic paradigm advocates. The science that emerges from it is not reductionist objective but synthetic and values-based, focused on an emotional commitment to understanding Allah's world.

While the above presents an alternative paradigm of Islam, it is the vision of an *ummah*; a global community of believers and non-believers that defines this alternative globalism. At heart, Islam desires to reintegrate the individual as part of the natural order. While Western civilization has come to life in the long drawn out battles against the tyranny of royalty (from the Magna Charta to the Glorious English Revolution), for muslims it has been the most recent battles against colonialism and imperialism that has unleashed a humanistic spirit. The vision of the *ummah*, said muslim leader - former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia (1993-1998) and current leader of the Malaysian opposition- Anwar Ibrahim, "must be able to transcend cultural specificity (and) inhabit the realm of universal ideas" (Ibrahim 1996 in Inayatullah 1997).

This means that the vision of the *ummah* must draw on the cultural resources from Islamic history using them to engage with other civilizations through inclusive dialogue. However, the universal must be stated within evolutionary terms, as part of the human unfolding drama, and not as fixed givens. But behind this idealism lies the current reality of Islam, that while dramatically increasing in numbers, is decreasing in conceptual unity[3], decreasing in its viability to create a new politics and

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[3] Not to mention the numerous failed Islamic revolutions of late. The causes are, of course, a mixed. They include the constraints placed by the Western globalist system but as well Islamic nation's location within patriarchal and feudal social systems. The rise of Al-Qaeda and its strategic failure in toppling

economics, and indeed, culture, that is, while muslims trust in Allah, they are not doing enough to tie their camel – to become culturally and technologically innovative.

Muslim scholar, Munawar Anees said that:

> Perpetuation of despotic rulers, such as Mahathir in Malaysia, is achieved through a systematic corruption of the civil, judicial and the police departments. The invertebrate state-controlled media serve the self-fulfilling prophecy while anti-Semitic slander with sham retractions is not uncommon for sleazy political gains. Greedy multinationals and the Western corridors of power are clearly reprehensible for propping up these client regimes as their economic and political mercenaries.
>
> Given the intellectual bondage and political and economic subservience of the muslim world to the West, prospects for the future, either programmed or desired, remain gloomy. There seems to be an inexplicable fatalism that continues to envelope the *ummah* - the global muslim community. It has ceased moving from opinion to knowledge and employing knowledge for social evolution. In the footsteps of the Prophetic Tradition - beside trust in the Divine mercy - are not muslims required to tie up their camel? (www.enlightennext.org, 12 August 2010)

Can muslims, asks Zia Sardar (1953), recover the dynamic principle of *ijtihad* – sustained and reasoned struggle for innovation and adjusting to change – that has been neglected and forgotten for centuries? Can Islamic civilization avoid the future that being programmed by globalization and create an alternative modernity? Not destroying tradition but adopting it critically, challenging feudalism and patriarchy and authoritarian knowledge politics, and creating a world, modern but different from the West?

The possibilities are mixed. With the ascension of the West, muslims have internally adopted the Orientalist codes, seeing themselves not through their own historical eyes – gaze – but through the lenses of Western categories. Indeed, through Al-Qaeda and others, in recent times they have actually become the caricatures that Europe has been warning of for centuries. What results then are imitations of the West, instead of multiculturalism or anti-West rhetoric for local power politics? The strength of globalization in terms of shaping the world economy as well as world culture – the politics of idea production, how

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the West and uniting moderate Muslims as well as it descent into terror is an example of both.

Hollywood movies shape world notions of self – do not bode well for other cultures (except in exoticized or museumized forms).[4]

Technology Transforming Modernity

But as we venture into the future, globalization is not just about expanding economy and technology as well as the dialectical responses of civil society and reflexive awareness but also about dramatic changes in the nature of reality (through digital virtualization) in truth (through challenges from postmodernism and multiculturalism) in the nature of nature (from genetics, particularly germ-line engineering, as well as from feminist/post-structural thought) as well as sovereignty (making the self and the nation-state far more porous than the legacies industrialism has given us). Within these frames can we still imagine not just a vital Islam but any Islam? Or is Islam likely to be left behind by the rest of the web (though muslims use the web, they still do not define it) and the new economy (virtualization), by genomics (the end of the natural), by the relativization of Newtonian stability and globalized economics (and international organizations and corporations spearheading the end of ideology)?

Virtualization will challenge all religions as it contests historical definitions of reality. Computer games are already a larger revenue industry than films and the trends are that this will keep on increasing (www.economist.com, 12 August 2010). But there are significant problems ahead. First, virtualization can lead to social isolation (www.smh.com.au, 12 August 2010), which can lead to depression, which in 1990 accounted for five of the ten leading causes of disability (www.sciencedaily.com, 12 August 2010). Psychiatric conditions are expected to play an even greater role in the global burden of disease in the future, becoming in 2020 the leading cause of the loss of life years (www.who.org, 12 August 2010; *The Steering Committee on Future Health Scenarios* 1992). Virtualization is likely to further fragment the Western self, creating the desolation of postmodern anomie (Sardar 1998; Inayatullah 2000a). However, social networking is creating new forms of community, and it is crucial that the Islamic world find new ways to create community via the web. Certainly, www.islamicfacebook.com is a step in the right direction. Otherwise, virtualization will further weaken social ties and community.

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[4] The movie *Aladdin* is one example. Aladdin, meaning the servant of god, by the end of the movie rediscovers himself as "just al". This, of course, represents the secularization of Islam, its defeat in shaping world epistemic space. The movie could have been an attempt at a dialogue of cultures but instead it, as expected, commodified and cannibalized.

The web and personal computer revolution may also create spaces for software that reduces the interpretive authority of mullahs and creates peer-to-peer interpretive communities. For example, by placing the Quran on-line or via CD ROM, direct access to interpretation will be possible. This expansion of knowledge democracy could be one factor in challenging the dominating feudal structures in the Islamic world. It could also help create an alternative cyber culture: modern, but differently so from the hegemonic West. This alternative culture would be one that allows group experience of virtuality, thus creating new realities, innovation without the loss of the family orientation of Islamic culture. A peer-to-peer Islamic culture that grew from the web could also challenge traditional Islamic feudalism and patriarchy. For the Islamic world, the challenge will be to – as with the adoption of all non-indigenous technologies – appropriate and use ICTs and their future developments (web-bots, the always-on wearable computers) without being used by them, that is, to use the net to unleash local innovation without succumbing to the dark side of cyber futures (Obijiofor et al. 1999; Sardar 2002).

But a greater challenge than virtuality will be the end of the natural through developments in genetics. Cloning, gene therapy and germ-line has been engineering all-contest evolutionary views of what is natural – that is, humans preselecting genetic dispositions and characteristics. The slippery slope from genetic prevention (reducing the probability of developing certain diseases) to genetic enhancement (height, 'intelligence') to new species creation will be quick and almost unstoppable within current globalized and technocratic science. While this will challenge all religions, religions of the book derived from stories of Adam and Eve will be especially made problematic. Buddhist and other Indian perspectives with far more liminal views of self, will find negotiating an artificial world far easier. The works of Indian philosopher P.R. Sarkar are especially instructive in developing a spiritual perspective of new technologies (Inayatullah 1999; Inayatullah 2002). The muslim view of gene therapy is generally best described by Munawar Anees and Abdulaziz Sachedina. Anees (1995) writes: "gene therapy (not to mention cloning) transgresses everything that Islam is about, about what is natural and what is wrong."

Adds Sachedina:

> In Islamic discussions in eugenics, there is almost a consensus among muslim scholars that it "having better rather than worse genes" does not play a part in the recognition of the good qualities of human beings; it is something that is designed by God, and therefore, it should be left to God, so there is no incentive for the improvement of the genetic composition of individuals to increase the value of that individual. Rather, the value of the individual depends on faith...

> ...There is no encouragement of any kind to improve genetic composition through any kind of surgical or any kind of medical or choices to the marriage decisions; rather, the will of God is regarded as the one that really creates human beings the way there are, and there are potential improvements within that if faith is maintained, if moral and spiritual awareness are maintained within the life. (www.research. mednet. ucla.edu, 11 April 2000)

These new technologies pose the most dramatic problems for those who consider the natural as fixed instead of as constantly changing and in the process of recreation. Strict traditionalists (those who do not take a dynamic view of knowledge) wherein ijtihad (reasoned judgement) gives way to *taqlid* (blind imitation), in particular, will find the next twenty or thirty years the best and worst times. The best because the forces of tradition will flock to them; worst because the technological imperative and humanity's struggle to constantly recreate itself and thus nature will not be easily forced back. For the Islamic world to survive, it will not only need to debate these technological developments but articulate an alternative science (Sardar 2010).

For religions in general, there are three possibilities (Inayatullah 1995a). First is the return to an imagined past with strong feudal and male structures; identity defined by in-group exclusive bonding. Second is to adapt to the future by seeing the past as metaphor, as a story to ethically guide oneself. However, the latter may become far too fluid for most leaders. Over time, a new layered religious framework may develop, that is, integration at a different level. For individuals, too, a similar choice remains: return to an integrated but exclusivist self or create a liminal constantly changing self. This postmodern self, the salad bar theory of pluralism, may lead to total fragmentation or alternatively may, as Sarkar argues, create a layered, neo-humanistic self that moves beyond ego (my way is the only way), family (concern for only my future generations), geo-sentiment (my land, territory), socio-sentiment (my religion or race) as well as humanistic sentiment (humans above all), that is, a dynamic, layered inclusive self with incorporates other humans as well as plants and animals. A neo-humanistic self thus moves through the traumas of ego, territorial nationalism, exclusivist religion, racism as well as specialism entering the universalistic transcendental. Thus, Islam can provide a useful anchor in the multiplicity of alternative futures and alternatives selves.

Sovereignty

Combined with virtualization and geneticization is the breakdown of sovereignty. While the passport office remains threatening, capital is now free to roam, as is pollution. Governance too has moved to world levels with the institutionalization of world organizations around activities of health, climate, economy, refugees, to name a few. However, while capital and state have expanded, the peoples sector has challenged its domination. Non-governmental organizations have been quick to pick up the slack when transnational refuse to observe triple bottom line accounting measures (profit plus social responsibility plus environment). The internet too has challenged national sovereignty with cyber lobbying, crowd swarming, quickly becoming a new form of local/globalist politics, forcing states to be far more transparent than they would like to be. Governments that have resisted this have found themselves losing propaganda wars. Still, the revolution from the past – of feudalism, of control and command structures, as practiced by many nations claiming themselves to be Islamic – have not disappeared. Indeed, while individuals may have transcended geo- and socio-traumas, nations use these traumas to shore up identity.

Scenarios

What then of the future. What futures will these transformations lead to? A number of scenarios are probable.

Artificial Society

The first is the artificial society where the victory of liberal ideology, the science and technology revolution make states far less potent. Islam as currently constituted would not play a role in this future, nor would most nations. It would remain a fast growing religion but only in terms of population and not in terms of defining the agenda for the next century. The population of believers would be poor and angry, searching for someone to blame. Local leaders would be quite willing to play the extremist card convincing believers that by returning to the past, they would be safe from globalization. The losers would be the most vulnerable–women and minorities as well as modernist muslims. However, there will be plenty of the poor to draw on to challenge the system.

Lydia Krueger wrote:

> While the income gap between the fifth of the world's people living in the richest countries and the fifth in the poorest was 60 to 1 in 1990, up from 30 to 1 in 1960, it has risen to 74 to 1 in 1997. The same development of global polarization can be described looking at wealth and poverty in a different way: While there are still 840 million people malnourished and 2.6 billion people have no access to basic sanitation, the world's 200 richest people more than doubled their net worth in the four years to 1998, to more than $1 trillion - with the assets of the top

> three billionaires alone surpassing the combined GNP of all Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and their 600 million people (www.eolss.net).

Is this likely to change? In 1993, only 10 countries accounted for 84 percent of global research and development expenditures and controlled 95 percent of the US patents of the past two decades. The dye is set; technocracy will further create a divided world, with the right to the net and the right to genetic therapy and modification becoming the battle cry of the next decades. Setting up walls against technology will be the easiest path for Islamic nations. Far more useful would be to develop technologies based on Islamic science – that is science and technology focused on problems in poorer areas as well as science and technology that was nature-based, what has been called nature-oriented technologies.

Dialogues of Civilizations

Instead of the artificial society, there are moves for a pluralistic dialogue of civilizations. Not a clash (as this merely transposes realistic politics on civilization theory) but a deep dialogue of ways of knowing, of understanding that we can longer export our problems to other, being they weaker nations or the environment. This holistic view of the world challenges realist notions of power and examines the future from the margins, from new models of organizational cooperation (as with Net companies that are far less patriarchal and hierarchical). An enlightened Islam that instead of projecting its own defeats on the West and instead finding compassion for all human suffering can provide a model of this alternative future.

What this means is the creation of a world community around shared ideals. In post-modernity's decentering of the world, space has been created for civilizations to articulate their own self-images. Of course, the framework remains Western and secular but the multicultural ethos now even challenges post-modernism. For the Islamic world, what in detail would such a future look like, mean?

Ummah as an Interpretive Community

First, *ummah* as an operating framework for the future challenges the three worlds thinking of first, second and third worlds (Ibrahim 1991). As a concept it means three things. First, the *ummah* is a dynamic concept, reinterpreting the past, meeting new challenges. Second, the *ummah* must meet global problems such as the environmental problem. Ibrahim (1991) said:

> The *ummah* as a community is required to acknowledge moral and practical responsibility for the Earth as a Trust and its members are trustees answerable for the condition of the Earth. This makes ecological concerns a vital element in our thinking and action, a prime arena where we must actively engage in changing things.

Third, the *ummah* should be seen a critical tool, as a process of reasoning itself.

To create a future based on the *ummah* equity and justice are prerequisites. This means a commitment to eradicating poverty. It means going beyond the development debate since development theory merely frames the issue in apolitical, a critical language. This means rethinking trade, developing south-south trade as well as "new instruments of financial accounting and transacting ... and the financing of new routes and transportation infrastructure" (Ibrahim 1991). But, perhaps most significant is a commitment to literacy for all. As Ibrahim (1991) writes: "Only with access to appropriate education can *ummah* consciousness take room and make possible the *ummah* of tomorrow as a personification of the pristine morality of Islamic endowed with creative, constructive, critical thought."

Thus, what is called for is not modernism but a critical and open traditionalism that uses the historic past to create a bright future – a post-Asian and post-western dream. But, *ummah* should not become an imperialistic concept rather it requires that muslims work with other civilizations in dialogue to find agreed upon principles. We need to recover that historically the *ummah* meant models of multiracial, multicultural, multireligious, and pluralist societies. A true *ummah* respects the rights of nonmuslims as with the original Medina state. However, as possible is a future without any name, a future of Islam but no muslims, that is, a future with continued struggles between factions in the Islamic world and between sects with the West continuing its millennium struggle against its projected other. A bright future is possible but not certain.

What will the West do? Uncertain Alternatives

While the idealist vision of an alternative more pluralistic softer Islam remain, one that is future-oriented, ecological, community-based, gender equal and electronically-linked, we are struck with not an attempt to imagine a new politics for the Islamic world but to offer imagined histories. Moreover, attempts to create alternatives remain mired in strategic politics as with the Iranian revolution – in fighting for survival space - or with creating a fortress to stop globalism as with the Taliban. But dramatic changes in the nature of reality, truth, nature and sovereignty bode not well for the West as well. Indeed, if we add the dramatically ageing population to this mix, the future of the rich nations is in peril. With an entire age-cohort of youth workers not available – with the median age moving from 20 to 40 and the ratio of worker to retiree slipping from 3-1 to 1.5, what will the West do? (Inayatullah 2000b; Inayatullah 2008, 83-94) It can dramatically enhance productivity thus eliminating the need for labor and immigration or it can create new species of humans, or at least through eugenics ensure its own genetic stock through eugenics. The seeds of eugenics are not outside of Western history but squarely with Darwin.

> We civilized men to our utmost to check the process of elimination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed and sick; we institute poor laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skills to save the life of everyone to the last moment. Thus the weak members of civilized societies propagate their kind. No-one ... will doubt that this must be highly injurious to the race of man. The relaxation of natural selection was leading to genetic deterioration, to a large number of children of the "scum". (Darwin in Lynn 1996, 5).

Alternatively it can allow the other into its shores and create multicultural societies. But authentic multiculturalism challenges the sovereignty of the nation-state at its roots, so does globalization. Once in, there is no way back. Globalization thus shows its seeds for a planetary society, or a return to brutal tribalism. At heart then the issue is not merely the future of the Islamic world, but the future of the entire world. Can we move to a Gaia of civilization, an interpenetrating dialogue of traditions where the damage of five hundred years of the victory of the West is undone and the ways of knowing suppressed to achieve hypermodernity are tamed?

Can we create a post-Western view of the future? At the very least to do so, we will need to imagine a future that integrates ideational and sensate civilizations; integrates linear notions of progress with cyclical notions of time; integrates economic growth with distribution; imagines identity not only in the postmodern sense of fluid selves but in a layered neo-humanistic sense where identity moves from the most concrete to the most expansive and subtle. Does humanity have the wherewithal to do so? The signs are mixed. Just as the expansion of human rights continues, the battle of local and national leaders to hold on to privilege strengthens. Nationalism becomes a method of reducing some of the excesses of globalization but it does so at an incredible cost, creating a politics of identity that is generally culturally violent.

The dream of a good society, a postnational world, has not gone away, however. Globalism pushes back moral space but it does not vanquish it. The hope of Islam –in dialogue with other civilizations - its offering to the future, is essentially about that, asking what is the right future for us, how can we make sure to include the ethical in all our decisions, in our magical ride to the stars, to cloning, to creating a global governance structure. In this sense the hope of Islam is the creation of a global acumen that transcends any particular religious framework; that opens up the possibility of a more just society.

From a realist view, this is impossible. The interests of the powerful will always overwhelm those of the weak. Battles within religions, between strong and soft, are far more important than a dialogue of civilizations, than moving from reality to possibility (Marti 1995). Even if a new world system develops, it is likely to be Western-based, technocratic, and based on notions that only will only appear sensible to the West. The rich will take flight in their genetically created fool proof bodies; the rest will die tortuous deaths on a planet in environmental crisis. Still, without a vision of the future, we decline – we do not battle slavery, we acquiesce to injustice. The vision pulls us forward, ennobles and enables us. It calls out the best of us. Muslims have had glorious periods in human history; these can be recovered and used to move onward. That means using history but not being used by history. It means creating new visions that acknowledge the anchor of Islam but the multiplicity of identity.

In a workshop with leading Islamic scholars, activists and technocrats, muslims called for a vision of the future with five key attributes (Inayatullah 1996; Inayatullah 1995b); (1) self-reliant ecological communities, (2) electronically linked *khalifa*, politically linked – a new global governance system, (3) gender cooperation and partnership – full participation of females, (4) an alternative non-capitalist economics that takes into account the environment and the poor – the "bottom" billion, (5) the *ummah* as world community as guiding principle based on tolerance, and (6) leadership that embodies both technical and moral knowledge. These points may or may not come about. The structures of oppression, the weight of history pulls us away from our desired futures. But our desires give us agency. The future can be door into an alternative world. If we take this door, then the policy and implementation question comes back but framed as: how can we make the ethical the rational, the easier path? What systems of support are required? What is the new narrative?

If we don't, we should take heed from this warning: "Isn't it here that you take a half step wrong and wake up a thousand miles astray." [5]

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[5] The words of Yang Chu, said, while weeping at the crossroads. From the Confucian *Hsun-tzu*

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Les Spécificités du Féminisme Islamique en Indonésie

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ABSTRAIT

Feminisme muslim merupakan bentuk dari feminisme yang memperjuangkan peran wanita dalam Islam, terutama mengenai perjuangan persamaan peran dalam Islam dan mempertanyakan kembali interpretasi yang cenderung patriakris dalam Islam. Namun, di sebagian besar wilayah mayoritas berpenduduk muslim, para wanita muslim cenderung mengalami hambatan karena keterbatasan mereka terhadap akses pengetahuan, serta hanya beberapa tokoh tertentu yang mampu melakukannya. Indonesia memiliki situasi unik karena para wanita memiliki akses yang lebih luas dan jaringan pesantren mampu menyediakan pemahaman kepada para anak didik wanitanya untuk kemudian menduduki posisi penting, bahkan pemimpin, di universitas, tokoh agama, atau aktivis. Dinamika perdebatan dan intervensi peran wanita Islam di Indonesia inilah yang menjadi fokus tulisan ini.

Kata-Kata Kunci*: feminisme muslim Indonesia, lembaga swadaya masyarakat (LSM), kesetaraan.*

Le féminisme musulman se fonde sur l'ijtihad, où l'interprétation du Coran, pour interroger la place des femmes dans l'Islam et /ou les pays musulmans. La femme doit être en mesure par l'utilisation de ses connaissances sur l'Islam que ce soit à travers le Coran, les Hadiths, le Fiqh et les Tafsir de négocier ses droits et sa place au sein de sa communauté. Pourtant cette approche n'est l'apanage que d'une élite cultivée. Ce qui rend la situation indonésienne si unique est l'accès aux connaissances qu'ont les femmes à travers les réseaux des pesantren et des universités islamiques. C'est cet accès à la connaissance et les débats qu'ils entrainent qui donnent au paysage islamique indonésien une position unique.

Mots Clés: *féminisme musulman indonésien, organisations non gouvernementales, l'égalité.*

Avant d'aborder le cœur de cet article il convient de mettre au point la terminologie de féminisme musulman. D'après Margot Badran (1995), le féminisme islamique travaille à *l'énonciation d'un islam qui re/place l'égalité des sexes et la justice sociale* au centre du système de valeur coranique.

On peut définir *le féminisme islamique* comme un discours et une pratique féministes (d'après Margot Badran) qui tirent leur compréhension et leur légitimité du Coran, et inscrivent la question des droits et de la justice dans le cadre d'un rapport égalitaire des hommes et des femmes dans la totalité de leur existence. Pour d'autres chercheurs (Latte-Abdallah 2010) le féminisme est un discours et l'activisme musulman en serait ses applications. D'après Valentine Moghadam (2006) du point de vue sociologique, le féminisme musulman n'est pas un mouvement social distinct parce que ses pratiques ont été par nature essentiellement textuelles. On se contentera pour cet article de parler de féminisme musulman suivant la définition de Margot Badran même si ses principales tenantes telles que les activistes issues de l'Islam traditionnel indonésien préfèrent le terme le Fiqh al-Nisa pour une traduction de *gender* (Madran 2005) ou plus simplement d'activistes de culture musulmane (Ciciek 2010).

L'objet de cet article est de présenter l'origine et le cheminement de la pensée féministe musulmane dans l'Islam indonésien et de montrer en quoi il se différencie du féminisme musulman dans les autres pays du monde musulman.

Débattre sur l'Islam et sur Le Genre: La Difficile Définition d'un Concept

Qu'elles que soient ses applications, ce cadre égalitaire trouve son origine dans la notion d'égalité de tous les *insan* (êtres humains). Le féminisme islamique réclame la mise en œuvre de cette égalité des sexes aussi bien au niveau de l'Etat et des institutions civiles que dans la vie quotidienne. Rejetant la dichotomie public/privé, le féminisme islamique conceptualise une *oumma* holiste dans laquelle les idéaux coraniques sont opératoires quels que soient leurs lieux d'application (Badran 2006).

La pensée féministe indonésienne a été étudiée d'abord hors Indonésie dans les universites américaines, australiennes et hollandaises mais depuis une dizaine d'années elle fait aussi l'objet de nombreuses études dans les universites islamiques et publiques indonésiennes. On peut trouver des références comme les travaux de Suzanne Brenner (n.d.), Kathryn Robinson (2001), Suzanne Blackburn (2008), Robert Cribb and

Anton Lucas (1997, 79-93) ou Andrée Feillard (1997, 83-108) chez les auteurs occidentaux et Ibu Siti Musda Mulia, Lily Zakiyah Munir, Lies Marcoes et Etin Anwar chez les auteurs indonésiens.

L'étude des mouvements dans une perspective historique se trouve chez des auteurs comme Nurliana (1986) et Ohorella (1992), Elisabeth Locher-Scholten (2000) and Ann Stohler (1995). Les années 50 sont bien détaillées avec Elysabeth Martyn (2001). Surychondro (2000) offre également un aspect intéressant des mouvements jusque dans les années 80 mais son analyse devient plus succincte quand on aborde la période des années 90. L'ordre nouveau a été étudié par Douglas (1984), Suryakusuma (1987), Lev (1995), Brenner (n.d.); Saskia Wierenga (2002). Lies Marcoes et John Hendrik Meuleman (1993) , Andrée Feillard (1999) et Pieternella Van Doorn Harder présentent des analyses très complètes de l'émergence des mouvements féminins musulmans. La liste est loin d'être exhaustive mais montre que l'histoire des femmes, de leurs mouvements et de leur pensée fait aussi l'objet d'études et de recherches.

Le nombre des étudiants rédigeant des mémoires sur la pensée féministe et l'Islam en Indonésie dans les universités islamique et publique est aussi en augmentation. Le féminisme islamique en tant que discours avait fait l'objet de nombreuses études dans les pays du Moyen-Orient mais peu en Indonésie. En outre on ne trouve pas d'intellectuelles aussi importantes sur la scène internationale qu'Amina Wahud, Ali Asghar Engineer ou Fatima Mernissi. Il fallut attendre les efforts du LKiS[1] pour traduire ces principaux auteurs en indonésien. Les leaders des grandes organisations Muhammadiyah ou Nahdlatul Ulama ou d'ONG (Rahima, Rifka) sont peu connues du grand public indonésien et interviennent peu hors Indonésie même si des échanges sont réalisés avec d'autres intellectuelles du monde arabe (Van Dorn-Harder 2006, 35-40)[2].

Evolution et Histoire des Mouvements Féminins/stes en Indonésie

Ecrire sur l'histoire des mouvements féminins en Indonésie implique d'abord de délimiter un champ lexical. Qu'est ce qu'un mouvement ? Susan Blackburn définit un mouvement féminin comme une articulation collective autour des désirs des femmes indonésiennes quelles que soient leurs revendications même si elles ne sont pas féministes par nature (Blackburn 2004, 23). Ces mouvements résultent d'une initiative

[1]LKiS : Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial, institut de la recherche islamique et social à Jogjakarta.

[2] Maria Ulfa Ansor et Lies Marcoes ont été les premières à organiser des séminaires internationaux en Indonésie en 1999 and 1991.

personnelle mais aussi sont le fruit d'organisations qui se proposent de défendre la cause des femmes de quelque manière que ce soit c'est-à-dire féministe ou non. Ces organisations sont soucieuses de rassembler sympathisants et membres afin de parler d'une seule voix de la cause des femmes.

Le féminisme indonésien et ses actions en faveur de la cause des femmes en Indonésie est l'un des plus anciens puisque son histoire remonte à il y a plus d'un siècle (Feillard and Van Doorn-Harder 2010). Kartini a déjà fondé son école en 1904 et quand Ahmad Dahlan fonde la Muhammadiyah en 1912, il pense déjà à inclure ultérieurement des femmes au mouvement, ce qui se passera en 1917 avec la création de la branche féminine Aisyiyah (Van Doorn Harder 2006, 89). On pourrait se poser la question de savoir si on ne trouve pas une action d'envergure aussi grande et surtout aussi ancienne dans les autres pays du monde musulman. Par exemple, le féminisme islamique en Egypte était d'abord l'apanage d'un petit groupe de femmes éduquées appartenant à l'élite (Ahmed 1992, 234) souvent en relations avec le monde occidental (Ahmed 1992, 178). Ce fut d'abord un discours avant de devenir plus tard un mouvement social (Latte-Abdallah 2010). Discours né dans des milieux bourgeois intellectuels de tradition sécularistе comme le souligne Leila Ahmed. La position et le rôle de la femme en Indonésie et l'éducation qu'elle reçoit donnent aux mouvements féminins un caractère particulier épousant les circonvolutions de son Histoire.

Le Rôle et La Place de la Femme dans La Société Indonésienne

Etudier l'histoire de la femme en Indonésie et ce dès la période préislamique implique d'abord de définir son rôle et sa place dans la société. De quelles femmes parle-t-on ? Étudier les différentes traditions permet d'avoir un premier aspect de la situation des femmes -du village au palais. Au sein du village, la femme occupe une fonction économique et sociale reconnue (van de Stuers 1960, 27) mais on peut néanmoins soulever le problème de savoir si elle continue son rôle dans le cadre du mariage. Son rôle et sa position au sein de groupe et en tant que épouse ou mère n'est pas le même. Dans les régions d'Ambon et du pays Minahasa elles sont libres de circuler et de donner leur avis dans les conseils.

Elles peuvent tenir tête aux chefs de villages (Nanholy 1937). Dans les sociétés traditionnelles les femmes indonésiennes issues de groupes sociaux modestes ont une tradition de liberté si l'on considère leur rôle dans le pôle économique du village. Que ce soit dans le système matriarcal du pays Minangkabau, dans le système patriarcal du pays

Batak, du sud de Sulawesi ou du nord de Bali ou dans le système bilatéral de Java, la femme n'est pas assujettie sur les plans domestique et économique même si elle ne peut pas toujours prendre la parole en public (Blackburn 2004, 20 ; Robinson 2008, 56 ; Van Stuers 1969, 22). Le débat sur la liberté de la femme en Asie du sud et spécialement en Indonésie est ouvert. L'Indonésie a fait l'objet de nombreuses recherches vu le nombre de parutions sur la position de la femme à Java (Nurmila 2009, 22–28). Ce désir de mieux connaitre le rôle des femmes en Indonésie est ancien puisque dès la fin du 19e siècle, la suffragette Aletta Jacobs (1854-1929) visite l'Indonésie et remarque la marge de manœuvre de la femme (Blackburn 1997, 12). Reid (1988, 46) ajoute qu'en Asie du sud-est, les femmes font preuve d'une assez grande marge de manœuvre. Pourtant cette vision idéale partagée par Hildred Geertz (1975) a été remise en question par d'autres chercheurs (Sullivan, 1994; Wolf, 1992).

Il faut aussi considérer avec prudence la nature de la famille nucléaire et le caractère solidaire des femmes entre elle. Les femmes font face à des difficultés (peu d'autonomie sexuelle, peu de pouvoir, pauvreté). Sullivan (1999) affirme que la relation homme/femme à Java suit le model d'une relation maitre/gestionnaire. La femme doit gérer la famille mais pas pour son propre intérêt (Brenner 1998). Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis (1992, 50) confirme aussi que ce sont les hommes qui dominent le système. Il y a donc débat sur les limites de la liberté de la femme en Indonésie et principalement à Java (où la plupart des recherches ont été réalisées). Ce débat, déjà ancien n'a jamais eu lieu avec autant d'intensité dans les autres pays du monde musulman. Pourtant c'est cette liberté, même si elle est relative qui conjuguée à l'éducation que les femmes reçoivent qui façonnera et mobilisera les mouvements féminins.

Education et Mobilisationdes Mouvements Feminins/stes

La politique éthique du gouvernement hollandais avait permis l'accès à l'éducation pour les jeunes filles et ce des les années 1910 et la première pesantren pour filles a été ouverte en 1921 (Blackburn et al 2007, 123). En outre, la fondation de la Muhammadiyah en 1912 et du Nahdlatul Ulama en 1926 ont crée un espace de discussion réservé aux femmes en 1917 pour la première et en 1950 pour la seconde. Le premier congrès des femmes en 1928 virent s'affronter les courants séculiers et religieux des associations féminines autour de questions relatives à l'âge du mariage et de la polygamie (Van Vreede 1959). La lutte pour l'indépendance a impliqué aussi bien des actrices issues d'associations musulmanes que des activistes laïques de culture musulmane et chrétienne. Ainsi le Sarekat Islam tirait ses revendications des registres nationalistes et religieux. Depuis la guerre d'Aceh, les femmes ont eu une position de leader au nom de l'indépendance mais aussi au nom de l'Islam puisque la guerre d'Aceh est aussi une guerre « pour l'Islam ». Par exemple au sein de l'organisation Permi à Sumatra (Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia) les leaders féminins devinrent très importants dès les années 30 choquant parfois les autorités hollandaises par leurs discours très directs puisqu'elles n'hésitaient pas à se rendre en personne aux autorités locales hollandaises afin de faire entendre leurs revendications concernant le rôle des femmes dans la gestion des affaires locales (Blackburn 2004).

On choisira la terminologie de « leader féminins » et non leader féministes, même si ces femmes ont la possibilité de s'exprimer en public, leurs discours sont avant tout anti-colonial et nationaliste. Des personnalités telles Rasuna Said et Rasima Ismael se sont souvent heurtés avec les autorités hollandaises mais aussi avec les membres masculins de leur groupe (Blackburn 2001, 270 - 282). Ces femmes réclamaient plus d'espace pour se faire entendre. Le Partai Sarekat Islam avait aussi des membres féminins au discours anticolonialistes et nationalistes particulièrement actifs comme la femme de Tjokroaminoto. Il ne faut toutefois pas se méprendre, ces femmes secondaient les hommes et étaient étroitement surveillées quand elles s'exprimaient. C'étaient les activistes féministes musulmanes venant de groupes prônant un Islam politique tels que le Sarekat Islam qui jouaient un rôle public dans leur lutte contre l'occupant hollandais puisque les organisations comme la Muhammadiyah ou le Nahdaltul Ulama nouvellement créée ne permettaient pas à leurs membres féminins de s'exprimer sur des sujets aussi sensibles. Seuls les sujets relatifs aux affaires familiales, à l'éducation et à l'âge du mariage pouvaient être abordés. On peut observer que les femmes du Sarekat Islam étaient des activistes très impliquées sur les plans politiques et séculiers mais que les membres des organisations religieuses avaient un discours plus féminin essentiellement tourne sur le rôle de la femme en tant qu'épouse et mère. On ne pouvait pas les considérer comme féministe si on entend par féminisme un discours revendiquant l'égalité des droits entre les hommes et les femmes. En fait il était difficile de classifier les différents groupes selon qu'ils soient communistes, nationalistes ou islamiques.

C'est pour cela qu'il est erroné d'affirmer dans le cas indonésien que le féminisme présent au moment de la lutte pour l'indépendance est un féminisme purement colonial d'inspiration occidentale pour reprendre l'expression de Leila Ahmed qui l'applique au model égyptien (Ahmed 1992, 150-155). Peut-on dire que le féminisme musulman indonésien était un féminisme purement endogène qui ne tirait pas seulement ses revendications d'un modèle occidental féministe ? Il lutte contre les influences de la présence hollandaise qui ne présente pas seulement un modèle d'égalité et qui a aussi ses pratiques patriarcales mais aussi contre le patriarcat indigène qui était incrusté au sein de la société javanaise et des institutions étatiques- aussi présent dans les interprétations de l'Islam et de leur influence sur les lois prises concernant des sujets tels que la famille ou le mariage. C'est pour cela qu'il est erroné d'affirmer que le féminisme est une notion purement venue d'occident. L'Histoire de l'Indonésie montre que le féminisme n'est ni exclusivement occidental, ni monolithique (Badran 2010) et les activistes de tous horizons collaboraient fréquemment. Ce sont pourtant les groupes prônant un Islam politique qui revendiquent une participation accrue des femmes dans la vie publique. Ce sont d'abord les membres les plus radicaux des groupes nationalistes séculiers qui suggèrent au temps de l'occupation japonaise une participation des femmes au vote. Le rejet par la suite de fonder après l'indépendance un Etat islamique basé sur la Charia a relégué les femmes des groupes radicaux au second plan puisque l'Islam radical ne pouvait plus rien leur apporter (Blackburn 2001, 3). Les membres féminins du Sarekat Islam voient leur position s'effacer de la sphère publique alors que les membres de la Muhammadiyah et du NU commencent à se faire entendre et à avoir une large audience. Il faut seulement attendre la fin des années 2000 pour voir se réorganiser des groupes féminins issus de mouvances islamistes[3]. Le féminisme islamique deviendra donc par la suite traditionaliste en Indonésie (Feillard and Van Doorn-Harder 2010). Ce fut l'occasion pour les membres de l'Aisiyiah (branche féminine de la Muhammadiyah) et de la Muslimat crée en 1946 de se faire entendre au sein d'un Etat régi par le Pancasila.

On peut donc constater que la dichotomie féminisme occidental/Orient ou féminisme/Islam n'a pas lieu d'être. Les mouvements féministes sont purement indonésiens, endogènes même si les premières féministes étaient en étroite relations avec les Hollandais, elles restent tres attachées à leurs valeurs javanaises, à leur Kodrat (leur destin). Si on le compare au féminisme en Egypte au moment de l'indépendance, le féminisme indonésien touchait tous les milieux sociaux et toutes les idéologies. Les féministes séculières et les féministes plus religieuses ont chacune leur discours et leurs propres valeurs. Elles sont rarement d'accord sur des sujets comme la polygamie mais conjuguent leurs efforts pour former une unité, une fédération des voix féminines (Blackburn 2008) s'alignant ainsi sur le discours nationaliste d'unité. Une des spécificités du féminisme indonésien est qu'il n'est pas seulement une exportation du discours occidental. Ses activistes qui n'étaient pas des figures prééminentes comme en Egypte par exemple (Ahmed 1992, 171-177) étaient présentes dans tous ces groupes. En outre il est important de constater que les activistes de culture musulmane en faveur d'un Islam féministe radicales ou traditionnelles et les activistes

[3] Le PKS, le HZT viennent de créer leurs branches féminines.

sécularistes travaillaient côte à côte (Blackburn 2008, 3-4). Certes mais d'après Andrée Feillard et Pieternella van Doorn certaines féministes de l'Islam Traditionnel critiquent les féministes sécularistes pour leur manque d'audace face a l'Islam radical et leur manque de connaissances au cœur de débats portant sur la polygamie ou le port du voile. On constaterait donc des divergences d'opinion des groupes féminins quand il s'agit d'aborder les débats impliquant de traiter avec l'Islam. Divergences déjà présentes dans les pays du Moyen-Orient où féministes islamiques et sécularistes ne se mélangent pas sauf en Iran (Kian 2010).

Ce féminisme luttera aussi contre la conception du gouvernement de Suharto de domestiquer la place de la femme dans la societe lui conférant comme valeurs premières un statut de mère et d'épouse. La mise à l'écart de la scène politique des organisations Muhammadiyah et Nahdlatul Ulama n'a pas empêché la poursuite des revendications de ses membres féminins en particulier lors de la rédaction de la nouvelle loi sur le mariage en 1974 et le débat autour du port du voile dans les années 1990. Si les membres des grandes organisations voient leur activisme s'essouffler, d'autres acteurs semblent plus actifs. Par exemple, le rôle des syndicats féminins dans les fabriques de batik comptait parmi leurs membres beaucoup de femmes du NU (Interview avec un membre de KOMNAS Perempuan, Août 2010). L'activisme toujours selon cet informant concernait surtout les femmes de la classe ouvrière et membres du NU.

L'âge d'or du Féminisme Musulman Traditionnel

En 1998 l'Histoire de l'Indonésie confère un nouveau visage au féminisme musulman indonésien. La montée des islamismes insuffle un mouvement pro-charia suscitant la réaction d'activistes issues de l'Islam traditionaliste principalement du Nahdlatul Ulama. La montée du fondamentalisme, la construction et l'essor d'autres mouvements féminins mais non féministes dans les espaces publics tels les universités d'Etat mais aussi la présence de personnalités comme Abdurrahmane Wahid qui milite entre autres en faveur du rôle des femmes sur la scène publique et politique ont donné au féminisme islamique traditionnel indonésien une place unique. Il faut noter parmi les partis radicaux la montée en puissance du PKS (parti de la justice et de la prospérité). Ce parti n'hésite pas à mettre en avant ses membres féminins. Lors de manifestations, le PKS insiste sur la présence de femmes accompagnées de leurs enfants. Il en est de même pour le Hizb-ut-tahrir ou le FPI qui viennent de créer chacun leur branche féminine.

La place des femmes devient aussi importante au sein de ces groupes aux trajectoires pourtant opposées. Particulièrement douées en matière de communication, les activistes représentent une réelle menace pour le féminisme islamique traditionnel. La montée des fondamentalismes changent aussi la trajectoire et les buts premiers du féminisme musulman puisque il se doit non seulement de servir la cause des femmes mais aussi de lutter contre la montée de groupes radicaux qui peuvent présenter une menace pour l'Islam traditionnel indonésien. On peut dire que le féminisme islamique indonésien a un parcourt évolutif. De réactif par sa lutte contre des pratiques comme la polygamie ou le mariage force, il devient éducatif par la mise en place de programmes d'action sociale en collaboration avec des acteurs sécularistes. Peut-on dire que désormais il doit devenir un féminisme de défense face aux radicalismes ?

L'Histoire de l'Indonésie et son nouveau paysage politique montre que les femmes ont une place et un rôle qui leur revient. Pour tenter de comprendre pourquoi le féminisme musulman en Indonésie occupe une place unique et aussi active dans le mode musulman, il convient de souligner sa spécificité par plusieurs faits comme l'impact de l'histoire de son système éducatif, les institutions, les organisations et les activistes mais aussi pas place dans le monde musulman.

L'exception Indonésienne?

Contrairement aux autres pays du monde musulman, ces activistes parce qu'elles ont bénéficié d'un enseignement religieux sont avant tout des theologiennes capables de mener une relecture des textes religieux et de conduire un débat avec leur homologues masculins dans les universités islamiques où elles sont soutenues (Feillard and Van Dorn-Harder 2010). En outre un réseau important d'institutions, d'ONG et d'organisations leur fournit un espace ou elles peuvent librement se faire entendre.

Education, Réseaux, Activistes

Ces institutions religieuses et éducatives ont produit de nombreuses activistes, prêcheurs (muballighat) ou professeurs d'enseignements religieux spécialistes du droit de la Sharia, du tafsir ou des hadiths. Ces activistes parfois théologiennes peuvent librement discuter avec leurs correspondants masculins. L'interprétation des textes religieux n'est pas seulement la prérogative des hommes. Le jugement indépendant (ijtihad) peut être aussi bien pratiqué par les hommes que par les femmes (Van Dorn-Harder 2006, 41). La réception du discours féministe musulman est mieux acceptée en Indonésie ou les activistes n'ont jamais été taxées de « agents de l'occident » contrairement aux féministes égyptiennes (Latte Abdallah 2010). Il faut attendre la dernière assemblée générale du NU (Muktamar) en mars 2010 pour voir les activistes taxées de colporter et de diffuser un discours occidental.

L'accès a l'éducation des jeunes filles aux enseignements religieux et ce des le début du 20e siècle, la présence de nombreuses institutions, de NGO et d'associations réservées aux femmes et le rôle des deux principales organisations musulmanes indonésiennes, la Muhammadiyah et le Nahdlatul Ulama ont été autant de récepteurs pour le féminisme islamique indonésien. Ces organisations se sont développées dans tout le pays et contribuèrent à la création de réseaux promouvant l'enseignement religieux et l'activisme social. De ce fait, elles pouvaient toucher un large spectre de la population. Le charisme et le dévouement de ses membres font qu'elles sont présentes aussi bien dans les villages que dans les grandes villes même si elles sont concentrées avant tout à Java, lieu de leur naissance. Cette large diffusion des discours tant dans l'espace que dans les strates sociales favorise le développement d'un discours et d'action qui dépassent les champs purement religieux et textuel. La tradition pour reprendre une expression de Pieternella Van Doorn Harder est « revisitée ».

La Mixité des Champs de Travail: La Tradition Revisitée

Il y a une interaction grandissante entre les féministes séculières, les féministes islamiques et les universitaires religieuses. Ces trois approches ne s'opposent pas mais se rapprochent surtout lors qu'il s'agit d'aborder la mise en place de programmes sociaux comme c'est le cas pour l'ONG[4] Pemberdayaan Perempuan Kepala Keluarga (PEKKA) qui regroupe activistes sécularistes et de tradition musulmane. On peut aussi citer en exemple l'ONG KOMNAS qui lutte contre la violence et toutes les formes de discriminations faites aux femmes. C'est une organisation non gouvernementale séculière mais inclusive de toutes les religions puisqu'elle compte parmi ses membres les plus influentes d'ancien membres du NU. L'association Rahima n'utilise pas seulement l'islam pour dénoncer les discriminations faites aux femmes mais mène aussi une politique conjointe avec des acteurs sociaux tels des médecins ou des économistes. Rahima est entre pour l'éducation et l'information sur l'islam et les droits humains des femmes, dirigé par Ciciek Farha Assegaf, recueille les plaintes des femmes se sentant victimes de ces législations locales d'inspiration islamique, jugées restrictives pour leurs libertés individuelles. On donc peut observer une interconnexion entre plusieurs courants séculiers et religieux puisque les activistes séculières n'hésitent pas à utiliser des arguments avances par le féminisme islamique même si les avis divergent quant aux débats impliquant des

[4] Cette ONG a reçu le prix Sparinah Sadli pour l'ensemble de son oeuvre en aout 2010.

sujets purement islamiques comme la polygamie ou la circoncision féminine (Feillard and Van Dorn-Harder 2010). Ces personnalités qui se définissent d'abord comme activistes bénéficient d'un réseau déjà développé tant au niveau local qu'au niveau national.

L'activisme

L'activisme est aussi le fruit de personnalités comme Siti Musda Mulia, Etin Anwar, Maria Ulfa Ansor ou Fahra Ciciek. Peu connues du grand public indonésien et de la scène internationale, elles occupent par leur charisme et leur dévouement auprès de leurs membres une place de choix parmi les organisations ou les ONG qu'elles dirigent. Enseignante et une des rares activistes à être invitée à l'étranger, Siti Musda Mulia a écrit de nombreux ouvrages destinés à sensibiliser les étudiants des pesantren aux risques encourus par les mariages précoces. Elle fut une des premières à introduire et vulgariser l'étude des droits reproductifs de la femme dans le monde des pesantren. Le Fatayat et deux de ses anciennes dirigeantes, Maria Ulfa Ansor et Masruchah élaborent et dirigent également de nombreux programmes de sensibilisation aux droits reproductifs (hak reproduksi). Fahra Ciciek se spécialise pour dénoncer les abus des lois d'inspiration islamique dans les collectivités locales. On pourrait aussi préciser le rôle des hommes auprès de ces organisations en particulier celui de Kiai Hussein qui s'est aussi exprimé contre le conservatisme en matière d'interprétation de l'Islam sur des sujets comme la polygamie, la circoncision féminine ou le voile. Masdar Mas'udi ou Lutfi Fathulah ont aussi participé aux réinterprétations du fiqh et aux hadiths (hadis en indonésien) touchant les droits de la femme.

L'activisme est aussi l'œuvre de nombreux volontaires, hommes ou femmes qui consacrent leur temps libre à travailler au sein d'ONG ou d'ORMAS[5]. Le féminisme musulman indonésien se distingue aussi par le fait qu'il concerne tout le monde. Il n'est pas seulement l'apanage d'une élite urbaine. Il touche toutes les classes sociales et tous les milieux. Du village aux grandes villes, des universités aux pesantren. De ceux qui sont diplômés à ceux qui ne le sont pas.

Des ONG, des centres dédiés à l'aide aux femmes en difficultés comme Puspita, (Pusat Perlindungan bagi Wanita), des centres féministes sont mis en place dans des pesantren et des revues sont aussi distribuées (Tantri). Plus qu'ailleurs dans le monde musulman le réseau des ONG atteint un niveau de développement unique et ses ramifications sont

[5] Les ormas sont des organisations de grande envergure comme la Muhammadiyah ou le NU. Beaucoup de ses membres contrairement aux ONG plus petites ne sont pas rémunérés.

abouties (Van Dorn-Harder 2006, 36). On compte plus de 1000 ONG dédiées à la cause des femmes en Indonesie.

Cette constatation peut s'appliquer aussi aux autres pays du monde musulman en Arabie Saoudite ou au Maroc (Le renard n.d; Eddouada and Pepicelli 2010) mais elle est particulièrement intéressante et unique en Indonésie compte tenu de son pluralisme, de son histoire et surtout de l'ancienneté de l'accès a l'éducation des jeunes filles.

Les Cadres Educatifs

L'un des autres points à développer est l'accès à l'éducation des filles. Il remonte des le début du 20e siècle suivant le souhait de la jeune Kartini de voir scolarisées les jeunes filles afin d'échapper a leur condition et à leur statut inferieur d'épouse reléguée au foyer. En 1904, Dewi kartika crée la première école pour filles (de Stuers, 1959). Avec le lancement en 1910 de la politique éthique, l'un des objectifs du gouvernement hollandais était de rendre accessible l'enseignement à un nombre croissant de jeunes filles en Indonésie. Il s'agissait dans ce cas d'un enseignement laïc supervisé par les autorités hollandaises, l'enseignement religieux pour les filles étant mal perçu par les autorités. La première école d'enseignements religieux destine aux filles a été ouverte en 1917. L'un de ses fondateurs Kiai Bisri justifiait l'ouverture de son école aux filles par le fait de les maintenir et leur éviter d'aller et venir sans rien faire (Blackburn 2001, 270 – 282). Il ne s'agissait pas au départ de les éduquer pour les émanciper. Il faut chercher du côté de Jombang avec l'histoire de la pesantren Salafiyyah Seblak pour voir une première initiative purement féminine avec l'ouverture d'un établissement par une femme pour des jeunes filles et dont la gestion restera aux mains de femmes jusqu'à présent Sri Mulyani in Blackburn (2010, 270-282). Les pesantren sont des écoles ou est diffusé un enseignement purement religieux en complément d'un enseignement laïc donné dans la Madrassah adjacente suivant les règles du programme national. Présentes surtout en milieu rural elles touchent une grande partie de la population féminine indonésienne. Leur nombre est estimé à prés de 17 000 (Ministère des religions 2010) et la proportion de jeunes filles scolarisées dépasse les 50%. De plus en plus nombreuses ces jeunes filles poursuivent leur éducation dans des UIN. La place de l'Indonésie dans le monde musulman est une autre raison qui peut aussi expliquer les spécificités du féminisme musulman.

La Place de l'Indonésie dans Le Monde Musulman

Le féminisme islamique dans d'autres pays a été celui d'un féminisme de réaction contre des pratiques ancestrales comme en Iran avec le prix du sang (diya) (Kian 2010) ou l'excision en Afrique[6]. Dans beaucoup de pays du moyen orient et de l'Afrique, les activistes ont lutte contre le poids des traditions locales, des conventions sociales ou des cultures patriarcales. Le féminisme indonésien est d'abord un féminisme d'éducation. L'Indonésie reconnait l'égalité entre l'homme et la femme dans sa constitution de 1945 et les lois relatives au mariage de 1974 imposent un âge minimal au mariage (16 ans pour les filles et 19 ans pour les hommes) enfin la liberté de la demande de divorce pour l'homme et la femme. Les textes font souvent défaut avec la réalité et c'est aux activistes de changer la donne. C'est aux activistes par exemple d'expliquer aux parents dont la fille veut contracter un mariage illégal (kawin siri) les conséquences que ce mariage aura sur son avenir et celui de ses enfants. Si le féminisme musulman en Indonésie connait peu d'intellectuelles ou de figures prééminentes, on peut en imputer la raison au fait que ses activistes sont issues de toutes les couches sociales et que leur présence est diffuse a tous les échelons de la société.

Contrairement a certaines formes du féminisme islamique que l'on peut trouver en Arabie Saoudite qui met davantage l'accent sur le développement personnel et la légitimation de l'Etat face aux poids des cultures locales, le féminisme indonésien met l'accent sur la place de la femme au sein de la communauté, sur son rôle au sein de la famille (Robinson 2009). Pour le féminisme indonésien la religion, le genre et la communauté sont liés. C'est aussi pour cela qu'elles se dénomment activistes pour donner à leurs activités une dimension sociale en prise avec la réalité. Il s'adapte à l'histoire de l'Indonésie. Il réagit face à la politique de Suharto de domestiquer la femme, face à la montée des islamismes, considérés comme des importations du Moyen-Orient, après 1998, ou face aux évolutions apportées par la globalisation.

La place de la culture javanaise reste prégnante et on peut se poser la question de savoir si c'est l'Islam ou la culture javanaise ou leur syncrétisme qui pose un défi à la position de la femme dans la société ? Il est en fait difficile de faire une nette différence entre les applications de la tradition et de la loi islamique. Parce que la tradition peut se renouveler et s'adapter ou l'Islam peut suivre les variations de la tradition. Contrairement aux autres féminismes musulmans dans des pays comme l'Arabie Saoudite ou l'Iran qui axent leur politique sur le rôle de la personne et qui lutte contre les traditions locales en légitimant le rôle de l'Etat, le féminisme indonésien promeut le développement de la femme au sein de la communauté ne bouleversant en rien le schéma javanais de la communauté où hormis pour celles issues de l'élite, elles bénéficiaient d'une grande liberté (Nurmila 2009, 22-28).

[6] Voir l'ONG Baobab qui opéra au Nigeria.

Aujourd'hui les mouvements féministes traditionnels musulmans sont bien implantes mais doivent désormais avec d'autres mouvances issues d'un Islam politique. Devant ce nouveau challenge, il doit revoir sa propre stratégie pour rester comme le dit Robert Heffner l'un des féminismes les plus développés et les mieux organisés au sein du monde musulman (Heffner 2007) ou comme Daniel Lev (ce qui place le féminisme indonésien dans une position unique est ses attentes et sa considération des femmes, l'Islam en Indonésie n'est pas diffusé par des campagnes pour voiler les femmes ou leur imposer de rester à la maison).

Conclusion

Deux caractéristiques confèrent aux mouvements féminins/stes une place particulière en Indonésie: le degré de connaissances religieuses des activistes consécutif à un accès à l'éducation déjà ancien et ouvert aussi bien aux filles qu'aux garçons[7]. Les activistes ou féministes si elles adoptent cette terminologie sont capables de débattre à égalité avec les oulémas sur des sujets aussi sensibles que la polygamie ou la loi sur la pornographie. Les mouvements féminins/stes indonésiens regroupent des membres de toutes origines sociales. Il n'est pas l'apanage d'une élite et son discours la plupart du temps n'est occidentalise ni sécularisté (Van Dorn-Harder 2006, 40). Pour reprendre les propos de Pieternella Van Doorn-Harder, le discours musulman féminin/ste est tout à fait compatible avec l'Islam. Cette compatibilité étant beaucoup plus achevée, selon elle (Van Dorn-Harder 2006, 265), si on la compare avec d'autres discours tenus dans les autres pays du monde musulman. Les femmes indonésiennes combinent l'interprétation textuelle avec l'action concrète.

Dans la plupart des Etats du monde musulman, le féminisme islamique est un féminisme de réaction face à des coutumes locales jugées dégradantes pour les femmes (Crimes d'honneur, excision, mariages temporaires) (Van Dorn-Harder 2006, 15). Depuis la constitution de 1945, hommes et femmes sont (en théorie) à égalité, la loi de 1974 rend plus difficile la polygamie et instaure un âge minimum pour le mariage. Les activistes formées dans les universites islamiques sont en mesure non plus simplement de réagir à des abus mais aussi d'expliquer par l'analyse des textes juridico-religieux les droits offerts par les lois. D'après Pieternella Van Doorn Harder (2006, 21) cette habilité à débattre et à commenter les textes religieux place le féminisme islamique indonésien dans une lutte déjà plus avancée comparée aux

[7] Aujourd'hui la proportion de filles et de garçons dans les universités islamiques est pratiquement à égalité.

pays du monde musulman. De réactionnaire, le féminisme est devenu un discours et une action éducative.

Les autres pays du monde musulman peuvent revendiquer des féministes de renom telles Huda Sha'rawi, Zaynab al-Fawwaz, Fatima Mernissi. Ces féministes d'après Pieternella van Doorn (2006, 265) Harder sont d'abord des féministes sécularistes et utilisent l'Islam comme outil pour justifier leur action alors que l'Islam chez les activistes indonésiennes constitue l'âme de leur travail.

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization-Europe Union Relations, Past and Present

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ABSTRACT

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) dan European Union (EU) sama-sama berfokus pada masalah keamanan dan manajemen krisis. 21 dari 28 anggota NATO merupakan anggota EU juga. Oleh karena itu, isu kerjasama dan komplementer di antara keduanya menjadi sangat penting. Tulisan ini ditujukan untuk mengevaluasi relasi NATO dan EU pada masa lalu dan saat ini serta mendiskusikan tantangan-tantangan pada hubungan kedua belah pihak. Tulisan ini diawali oleh telaah sejarah hubungan kedua belah pihak dan juga dibahas mengenai peran EU sebagai aktor baru dalam masyarakat internasional. Mutual divergences akan menjadi pertanyaan berikutnya yang diulas. Di bagian akhir tulisan ini, dikemukakan sejumlah rekomendasi tentang hubungan NATO dn EU.

Kata-Kata Kunci: *NATO, Uni Eropa, masyarakat internasional, keamanan kolektif, mutual divergences.*

Despite their different natures and approaches, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Europe Union (EU) both deal with matters of security and conduct crisis-management operations. 21 of the 28 NATO member states are also members of the European Union. The issue of cooperation and complementarily between the EU and NATO is therefore important. This paper intends to evaluate the past and actual NATO-EU relations and to discuss the effective challenges which affect their relationships. A historical review is firstly presented. Then the role of EU as a new actor in the International society is argued. The mutual divergences are the next question which will be explained. Some recommendations are finally suggested.

Keywords: *NATO, European Union, international society, collective security, mutual divergences.*

With the end of the cold war, the Atlantic Alliance turned towards new missions at the same time as maintaining its original purpose of collective defense of its member states. Since the 1990s the EU has also been developing its competences and activities in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in particular. The evolution of NATO and the EU, however, has generated some friction between the United States and several of its allies over the security responsibilities of the two organizations. U.S.-European differences center around threat assessment, defense institutions, and military capabilities. Successive U.S. administrations and the U.S. Congress have called for enhanced European defense capabilities to enable the allies to better share the security burden, and to ensure that NATO's post-Cold War mission embraces combating terrorism and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. U.S. policymakers, backed by Congress, support EU efforts to develop a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) provided that it remains tied to NATO and does not threaten the transatlantic relationship.

Historical Review

European NATO allies that were also members of the EC/EU have sought from 1990 to build a security apparatus able to respond to developments believed to threaten specifically the interests of Europe. In 1990, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, some European governments — led by France — concluded that they lacked the military capabilities to respond beyond the North Atlantic Treaty area to distant threats. In consultation with the United States, they sought to establish the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO, in which they would consult among themselves and with NATO over response to a threat. Both the first Bush Administration and the Clinton Administration asked that ESDI not duplicate NATO structures, such as headquarters and a planning staff, but rather "borrow" NATO structures for planning and carrying out operations. Initial reluctance of the Clinton Administration to involve the United States in the emerging conflicts accompanying the break up of Yugoslavia led some allies to redouble their efforts to enhance their political consultation, unity, and military capabilities. They saw a threat in the form of large refugee flows, autocratic regimes, and the spread of nationalist ideas emanating from the conflict-ridden Balkans (Kristin 2005, 1).

As early as 1991, the Alliance's Strategic Concept included recognition of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO, and at its Brussels summit in 1994 NATO declared itself in favor of developing a European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance (Assembly

Fact Sheet No. 14/2009). This task fell to WEU, which was authorized to take autonomous action using NATO assets. The use of Alliance assets for WEU-led crisis-management operations was officially confirmed in Berlin in 1996 by the foreign affairs ministers of the NATO member states (Final Communique 1996).

In 1994-1996, NATO endorsed steps to build an ESDI that was “separable but not separate” from NATO to give the European allies the ability to act in crises where NATO as a whole was not engaged. In 1998-1999, the EU largely adopted ESDI as its own and began to transform it into a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), given greater definition by more detailed arrangements for the Europeans to borrow NATO assets for the “Petersberg tasks” (crisis management, peace operations, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance). Britain, in a major policy reversal, joined France in moving forward discussions of these new arrangements within the EU. ESDP’s principal differences with ESDI were in the effort to secure more independence from NATO tutelage and guidance in the event that the United States expressed reluctance to become involved in a crisis, a renewed discussion of more carefully outlined EU decision-making structures, and consideration of forces appropriate for potential crises. The Kosovo conflict of 1999 further spurred this effort, when most EU members of NATO conceded that they still lacked adequately mobile and sustainable forces for crisis management (Kristin 2005, 2).

All EU members express a wish to see a strong U.S.- led NATO. However, there were disputes with the United States over how or whether to involve international institutions, such as the UN, in international crises. There were also disagreements over the weight given to political versus military instruments in resolving these crises. These disputes have fueled European desires to develop a more independent ESDP (CRS Report RL 30538). The United States maintained that ESDP should be closely tied to NATO, given the large number of states that belong to both NATO and the EU (and limited European defense resources.

The US Congress was actively engaged in the evolving NATO-EU relationship. While Congress has supported the greater political integration that marked the European Community’s evolution into the European Union, many Members have called for improved European military capabilities to share the security burden, and to ensure that NATO’s post-Cold War mission embraces combating terrorism and WMD proliferation. In 1998 and again in 2003 the US Senate approved the addition of new members to the alliance as a means to build European stability through securing democratic governments and adding states that shared concerns over emerging threats (Kristin 2005, 2). At the 1999 Helsinki European Council, the EU underlined its determination “to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army” (Presidency Conclusions, 1999). At the Santa Maria da Feira European Council in June 2000 “modalities for developing EU-NATO relations” were “identified in four areas covering security issues, capability goals, the modalities for EU access to NATO assets, and the definition of permanent consultation arrangements” (Presidency Conclusions, 2000).

The negotiation process led to a joint declaration issued on 16 December 2002 on the establishment of a 6 strategic partnership between the two organizations in crisis management (Assembly Fact Sheet No.14/2009). The permanent arrangements were finalized on 11 March 2003 and became known as the Berlin Plus arrangements after the 1996 Berlin summit which saw the official start of WEU-NATO cooperation (www.consilium.europa). The Berlin Plus arrangements in particular have provided for three main elements: (1) EU access to NATO planning, (2) NATO European command options, (3) Use of NATO assets and capabilities (EU-NATO: The Framework, 2003)

The agreement very soon found practical application on the ground. From August 2001 to March 2003 NATO ensured the safety of EU and OSCE staff and carried out peacekeeping duties in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. On 31 March 2003, the NATO operation ‘Allied Harmony’ was terminated and transferred to the EU under the codename ‘Concordia’. The first EU mission based on the Berlin Plus arrangements was born. NATO conducted the strategic, operational and tactical planning of the operation. The Operational Commander was Dsaceur, based at Shape, and an EU command element was established at the NATO regional command in Naples (currently Joint Force Command, JFC, Naples). Concordia was completed on 15 December 2003.

The second mission to be conducted under the Berlin Plus arrangements took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004. In June 2004 NATO decided to end its Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) mission and on 12 July 2004 the EU Council agreed to launch a European military operation in 10 Bosnia and Herzegovina (Eufor Althea) as part of a global policy aimed at stabilizing the country (Joint Action 2004). On 22 November 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1575 authorizing the deployment of Eufor Althea under Chapter VII. Once again Dsaceur was appointed

Operational Commander of the EU operation (Assembly Fact Sheet No. 14/2009).

Today, there are several questions marks over the Berlin Plus agreements. Firstly, only two out of all the EU's operations have been conducted under Berlin Plus. Secondly, when the EU and NATO carry out two simultaneous but separate land or sea operations in parallel, the Berlin Plus arrangements do not apply. Neither do they provide the possibility of combining civilian and military instruments. Some feel that given the EU's wide range of competences (economic, humanitarian, military, political and legal), it could make its civilian crisis-management capabilities available to the Alliance in some form of "Brussels Plus" agreement, the "civilian" counterpart to Berlin Plus. But both organizations are struggling with the twin challenges of integrating civilian and military assets on the one hand, and integrating NATO and EU assets in post-conflict operations on the other (Korski 2008, 7).

Europe Union as a New Security Actor

For decades, there has been discussion within the EU about creating a common security and defense policy. Previous EU efforts to forge a defense arm foundered on member states' national sovereignty concerns and fears that an EU defense capability would undermine NATO and the transatlantic relationship. However, U.S. hesitancy in the early 1990s to intervene in the Balkan conflicts, and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair's desire to be a leader in Europe, prompted him in December 1998 to reverse Britain's long-standing opposition to an EU defense arm. Blair joined French President Jacques Chirac in pressing the EU to develop a defense identity outside of NATO. This new British engagement, along with deficiencies in European defense capabilities exposed by NATO's 1999 Kosovo air campaign, gave 29 momentum to the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (CRS Report RS 20356).

EU leaders hope ESDP will provide a military backbone for the Union's evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a project aimed at furthering EU political integration and boosting the EU's weight in world affairs. They also hope that ESDP will give EU member states more options for dealing with future crises. The EU stresses that ESDP is not aimed at usurping NATO's collective defense role nor at weakening the transatlantic alliance.

Most EU members, led by the UK, insist that ESDP be tied to NATO -as do U.S. policymakers- and that EU efforts to build more robust defense capabilities should reinforce those of the alliance. At the NATO Washington Summit in April 1999, NATO welcomed the EU's renewed commitment to strengthen its defense capabilities, and acknowledged the EU's resolve to develop an autonomous decision-making capacity for military actions "where the Alliance as a whole is not 30 engaged." Nevertheless, France and some other countries continue to favor a more independent EU defense arm. French officials have long argued that the EU should seek to counterbalance the United States on the international stage and view ESDP as a vehicle for enhancing the EU's political credibility.

U.S. support for ESDP and for the use of NATO assets in EU-led operations has been conditioned since 1998 on three "redlines," known as the "three D's". First, no decoupling from NATO. ESDP must complement NATO and not threaten the indivisibility of European and North American security. Second, no duplication of NATO command structures or alliance-wide resources. Third, no discrimination against European NATO countries that are not members of the EU. The non-EU NATO members were concerned about being excluded from formulating and participating in the EU's ESDP, especially if they were going to be asked to approve "lending" NATO assets to the EU (Kristin 2005, 14).

At its December 1999 Helsinki summit, the EU announced its "determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises." At Helsinki, the EU decided to establish an institutional decision-making framework for ESDP and a 60,000-strong "Headline Goal" rapid reaction force to be fully operational by 2003. This force would be deployable within 60 days for at least a year and capable of undertaking the full range of "Petersberg tasks" (humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement), but it would not be a standing "EU Army". Rather, troops and assets at appropriate readiness levels would be identified from existing national forces for use by the EU. In addition, EU leaders at Helsinki welcomed efforts to restructure European defense industries, which they viewed as key to ensuring a European industrial and technological base strong enough to support ESDP military requirements.

The EU has also sought to bolster its civilian capacities for crisis management in the context of ESDP. In June 2000, the EU decided to establish a 5,000-strong civilian police force, and in June 2001, the EU set targets for developing deployable teams of experts in the rule of law, civilian administration, and civilian protection. In December 2004, EU leaders reached agreement on a Civilian Headline Goal for 2008, which aims to further improve the EU's civilian crisis management capabilities by enabling the EU to respond more rapidly to emerging crises (Kristin 2005, 15).

The demand in the outside world for aggregate European engagement is also on the rise. The role of the EU in defusing the Georgian crisis of August 2008 illustrate the point. In 2007 the EU participated in 84 ministerial meetings with third countries, one every four days. Since its first mission in 2003 the EU has engaged in 20 crisis management operations. Although many of these operations were small (the largest mission was the 3500 strong EUFOR in Chad) most of the operations have achieved their objectives. The two new missions in Kosovo where the EU has deployed 1,900 law enforcement personnel to work alongside the 16,000 strong NATO military contingent and in Chad where the 3,700 strong UU military stabilization force recently became fully operational illustrate that the EU has come to fill a niche in regional and global security (Toje 2008, 12).

The overall Atlantic Alliance is evolving today into “two-pillars”, but very different from the way that this concept was first bruited during the 1960s: the EU (along with individual European governments) now plays a growing role in overall transatlantic relations, including security relations writ large, along with NATO. And the EU, unlike NATO, is much more than a mere intergovernmental organization; rather it is a state-like actor which in numerous policy areas has supranational authority. The emergence of the EU as an actor in its own right, building up capabilities in both defense and in the field of diplomacy, is a new structural factor in the transatlantic relation- ship. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty greatly strengthens the EU’s potential in these areas (Hunter 2010, 2-3).

New Institutions and NATO-EU Links

On the institutional side, the EU has created three new defense decision-making bodies to help direct and implement ESDP. These are the Political and Security Committee (composed of senior national representatives); the Military Committee (composed of member states’ Chiefs of Defense or their representatives in Brussels); and the Military Staff (consisting of about 130 military experts seconded from member states).

The EU has also established cooperation mechanisms with NATO, intended to enable the EU to use NATO assets and meet U.S. concerns about ESDP. These include regular NATO-EU meetings at ambassadorial and ministerial level, as well as regular meetings between the EU and non-EU European NATO members. This framework allows for consultations to be intensified in the event of a crisis, and permits non-EU NATO members to contribute to EU-led operations; the EU agreed to establish ad hoc “committees of contributors” for EU-led missions to give non-EU participants a role in operational decision-making. The NATO-EU link was formalized in December 2002; this paved the way for the implementation in March 2003 of "Berlin Plus", an arrangement allowing the EU to borrow Alliance assets and capabilities for EU-led operations and thereby prevent a needless duplication of NATO structures and wasteful expenditure of scarce European defense funds. "Berlin Plus" gives the EU "assured access" to NATO operational planning capabilities and "presumed access" to NATO common assets for EU-led operations "in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged" (Kristin 2005, 15).

The most significant indicator that a paradigmatic shift in American policy towards Europe is taking place is the willingness to rethink the three Ds`. There is a new sense in America that the EU`s efforts should be nurtured rather than contained. It seems assurance that a stronger EU defence policy will complement rather than compete with NATO has gone some way towards persuading US decision-makers. The position was put in plain terms by Vicotria Nuland, the American ambassador to NATO, in a speech in Paris early in 2008 : "I am here today in Paris to say that we agree with France, She continued, Europe needs , the US needs, NATO needs, the democratic world needs a stronger, more capable European Capacity (Nuland 2008). At the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April, President Bush reportedly expressed much the same sentiments (Michel 2008). The shift is all the more important because it appears to carry a degree of bipartisan support. President Barack Obama has pointed to the EU as a likely vehicle for strengthening European military capabilities (Toje 2008, 14).

The Europe Union's Rapid Reaction Force and Capability Challenges

Enhancing European military capabilities has been and remains a key challenge for the EU as it seeks to forge a credible ESDP. As noted above, the 1999 NATO war in Kosovo demonstrated serious deficiencies in European military assets and the widening technology gap with U.S. forces. European shortfalls in strategic airlift, precision-guided munitions, command and control systems, intelligence, aerial refueling, and suppression of enemy air defenses were among the most obvious. In setting out the parameters of the EU rapid reaction force, EU leaders sought to establish goals that would require members to enhance force deploy ability and sustainability, and to reorient and ultimately increase defense spending to help fill equipment gaps. The most ambitious members envisioned the EU's rapid reaction force developing a combat capability equivalent, for example, to NATO's role in the Kosovo conflict.

In 2000 and 2001, the EU held two military capability commitment conferences to define national contributions to the rapid reaction force and address the capability shortfalls. Member states pledged in excess of 60,000 troops drawn from their existing national forces, as well as up to 400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels as support elements. In 2001, the EU also initiated a European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) to devise strategies for remedying the capability gaps. In May 2003, the EU declared that the rapid reaction force possesses "operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks," but recognized that the force would still be 32 "limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls" in certain defense capabilities. As a result, ESDP missions in the near to medium term will likely focus on lower- end Petersberg tasks rather than higher-end peace enforcement operations. EU officials maintain that enhancing European defense capabilities remains an ongoing, long-term project.

Many military analysts assert that overall levels of European defense spending are insufficient to fund all ESDP requirements. European leaders are reluctant to ask legislatures and publics for more money for defense given competing domestic priorities and tight budgets. In light of the dim prospects for increased defense spending in the near term, EU officials emphasize that they do not need to match U.S. defense capabilities exactly -which they view as increasingly impossible- and stress they can fill critical gaps by spending existing defense resources more wisely. In June 2004, EU leaders agreed to establish a European Defense Agency (EDA) devoted to improving European military capabilities and interoperability. A key focus of the EDA will be to help the EU's 25 member states to stretch their scarce defense funds farther by increasing cooperation among members in the areas of weapons research, development, and procurement (*Reuters*, June 14, 2004).

Critics, however, charge that promises to spend existing defense resources more wisely have not yet materialized in any substantial way. They doubt that EU member states will be willing to make the hard political choices that could ultimately produce more "bang for the euro" because these could infringe on national sovereignty. For example, they point out that "niche" specialization would require some member states to forego building certain national capabilities, while proposals to pool assets may require members to relinquish national controls. Some question how effective the EDA will be in promoting harmonization of equipment purchases given that many member states remain wedded to fulfilling national requirements and may be reluctant to expose their own defense industries to competition from other European weapons producers. Skeptics also criticize European leaders' continued devotion to the increasingly expensive but still non-existent Airbus' A400M military transport project, in which seven European allies are investing large portions of their procurement budgets. They argue that it would be cheaper and quicker for these countries to buy U.S.-built transporters such as the C-130 or C-17, but many European leaders resist this option because European defense industries create European jobs (Kristin 2005, 17).

The EU has also sought to play a role beyond the Balkans. In July 2004, the EU launched for the first time a small civilian rule of law mission in Georgia to help support the judicial reform process there. Additionally, from June to September 2003, the EU led an international peacekeeping force of 1,400 in the Democratic Republic of Congo that sought to stop rebel fighting and protect aid workers. The Congo mission was requested by the United Nations and headed by France in a "lead nation" capacity. This mission came as a surprise to many EU observers, NATO officials, and U.S. policymakers because it was geographically farther afield than they had thought the EU would venture, and because it was conducted without recourse to NATO assets. The Congo operation was planned by French military planners in national headquarters. Some NATO and U.S. officials were annoyed, asserting that the EU should have first formally asked NATO whether it wished to undertake the Congo operation. EU officials did consult with NATO about the mission, but maintain they were not obliged to ask NATO for its permission given 36 that the EU was not requesting to use NATO assets (Kristin 2005, 17). In December 2004, the EU announced it would deploy a modest police mission to the Congo in January 2005 to assist in setting up a Congolese police unit. In an Eurobarometer 2007 opinion poll showed 67 percent of the respondents answered that they would like to see more defence and foreign affairs decisions made jointly within the EU (Toje 2008, 11).

Mutual Divergences

Europe Union Disagreement over Threat Response

There is a consensus in NATO that terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the principal threats facing the allies today. NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept states that the allied "defense posture must have the capability to address appropriately and effectively the risks" associated with the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The document also describes terrorism as a threat, but indicates that political and diplomatic means should be the main instruments against both terrorism and proliferation. The attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States led to a refinement of the allied posture on these threats.

In a May 2002 communiqué, NATO agreed that the allies must "be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives."

The communiqué marks the moment that NATO decided to assume responsibilities around the globe should an ally be threatened.

In November 2002, at the Prague Summit, the allies made a commitment to build the capabilities necessary to go out of area. They agreed to establish a NATO Response Force (NRF) of 20,000 troops for rapid "insertion" into a theater of operations. The NRF consist of highly trained combat units from member states, and could be used to fight terrorism. In addition, the allies agreed to a scaled-down list of new capabilities, called the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), that declining European defense budgets might be able to sustain. Under the PCC, some allies have agreed to develop consortia to fund jointly such systems as strategic airlift and aerial refueling, meant to provide mobility for combat operations distant from Europe, or specialized "niche" capabilities, such as special forces or units to detect chemical or biological agents (CRS Report RS 21659).

Despite the transatlantic agreement on the new common threats, the NRF, and the PCC, there are significant differences between the United States and its allies over appropriate responses. Most allied governments contend that the US Administration places excessive emphasis on military over political means to counter a threat, and that the allies have other domestic budget priorities (such as pension plans) that compete with allocations for defense. The allies' response to the Bush Administration's doctrine of "pre-emptive attack" in the face of an imminent threat captures elements of the transatlantic debate over response to the threat. The Administration's National Security Strategy (2002) notes that the United States reserves the right to take military action "to forestall or prevent... hostile acts" by an adversary. While most allies would concede such a right, some view the doctrine as an example of U.S. unilateralism at the moment of U.S. global military pre-eminence. In general, they believe that military action must be undertaken within a multilateral framework.

The allied debate over pre-emptive attack has been affected by the U.S. decision to terminate UN weapons inspections and to go to war against Iraq in March 2003, a conflict Administration officials indicate was undertaken to prevent the Hussein regime from developing and using weapons of mass destruction against the United States and other countries. The initial refusal by France, Germany, and Belgium to approve NATO military assistance to Turkey in February 2003 in anticipation of a possible attack by Iraq sharply divided the alliance. The three allies contended that such assistance would amount to tacit approval of a U.S. belief that war with Iraq was necessary. Most allies said then, and maintain now, that a UN resolution is a requisite step, whenever possible, for NATO military action. The inability of the Bush

Administration to locate WMD in Iraq has led to renewed insistence among the European allies that their opposition was correct and that a UN imprimatur should be sought for NATO operations.

The allied debate over pre-emptive attack, out-of-area engagement, and "legitimization" of military operations has been brought to a head by the Bush Administration's frustration with cumbersome alliance decision-making procedures. The Administration believes that NATO military actions should mostly be conducted by "coalitions of the willing." In this view, the allies, of which only a small number have deployable forces capable of high-intensity conflict, should use coalitions of member states that agree upon a threat and have the means to counter it. Most European allies believe that "coalitions of the willing" would undermine the solidarity of the alliance and the consensus decision-making principle. Their support for the principle of consensus centers upon a desire to maintain political solidarity for controversial measures. In this view, the consent of 19 sovereign governments, each taking an independent decision to work with other governments, is a formidable expression of solidarity and in itself provides a measure of legitimization for an operation. Some allies believe that this view was given weight, for example, in NATO's decision to go to war against Serbia in 1999 when Russian resistance prevented passage of a UN Security Council resolution approving intervention on behalf of Kosovo (CRS Report RS 21510).

In their Responses to Terrorism, the security relationship between NATO and the EU is least developed. The Euro-Atlantic area is generally vulnerable to terrorist attack, and perhaps even to terrorist use of CBRN technology and weapons. The relative lack of co-operation between NATO and the EU in this area is more than merely inefficient, however. Since terrorists are usually proficient at identifying and exploiting political differences and divisions, the present state of affairs between NATO and the EU could invite the attention of terrorists. The NATO-EU counter-terrorism relationship requires urgent consolidation. But this, in turn, will require more detailed and more timely exchange of intelligence and information, and it is at this point that political differences and distrust within and between both organizations come into play (Cornish 2006, 23-24).

Europe Union Hesitation for Playing a Global Role

As forceful as the fight against a global role for NATO may be, those opposed to it do not need to do much. Facts, money, and time are probably working against a global role. First, the Europeans themselves are undermining NATO's global role in so far as an increasing number of them is hesitating to send troops to Afghanistan -or at least troops who will engage in combats. Actually, some, as the Dutch, do not hesitate to withdraw them. Strangely enough in the time of globalization, European societies are more than ever inward looking. Work matters more than weapons, internal security more than external security. The prevailing mood, even in France, which used to be on the forefront of external interventions, is to avoid Afghanistan -or a repeat of it.

In Germany, in France, in the Netherlands, public opinions shy away from sending troops abroad. Money is certainly not helping at a time when the budgetary crunch which results from the bail outs and money pumped into badly damaged economies, justifies at last the enduring choice between "butter or cannon": to that extent Greece is the epitome of what will follow. With the highest rate of military expenses of all NATO economies, Athens will certainly have to review its priorities. Demography is not helping either. Retirees do not send troops abroad (Kristin 2005, 4).

Weak Level of Europe Union Capabilities

Most allies lack mobile forces that can be sustained distant from the European theater. In October 2003, former NATO Secretary General George Robertson said that:

> ...out of the 1.4 million soldiers under arms, the 18 non-U.S. allies have 55,000 deployed on multinational operations..., yet they feel overstretched. If operations such as the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan are to succeed, we must generate more usable soldiers and have the political will to deploy more of them in multinational operations (Robertson 2004, 1-2).

NATO Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) General James Jones told Congress in March 2004 that only 3%-4% of European forces are "expeditionary deployable**.** The relative decline in Europe's military capabilities is accelerating. EU member-states are not sending as many forces to Afghanistan as the operation commanders have requested, and they have failed to provide enough soldiers for the NATO response force. They are equally unlikely to develop the EU's battle groups into as powerful a force as originally planned. Most of the responsibility for this lies with the European governments, and their unwillingness to raise defence budgets or to even make the case for higher defence budgets. But the competition between the EU and NATO also weakens Europe's defence capabilities (Valasek 2007, 6).

National Caveats

General Jones has been increasingly critical of NATO governments that commit forces to an allied mission, then impose restrictions on tasks those forces may undertake. Such “national caveats” have troubled operations in the Balkans, for example. In March 2004, when Albanians rioted against Serbs in Kosovo German troops refused orders to join other elements of KFOR in crowd control; only 6,000 of KFOR’s 18,000 troops were eligible to use force against the rioting crowds.

Other problems are evident as well. When some NATO governments vote in the North Atlantic Council to support a politically sensitive operation, those same governments sometimes tell their officers who are within NATO’s integrated command structure (and therefore technically not under national control) not to participate in carrying out the operation, a step General Jones has described as highly disruptive of operations.

For years, German governments have worked to place their officers and civilians on NATO’s international staff, and now have a disproportionate number of such individuals on the staff; in the view of some NATO governments (not only the view of some U.S. officials), the Germans have also tried to limit the number of U.S. citizens on the international staff. General Jones has openly expressed irritation at Germany’s refusal to allow its nationals on the international staff to assume posts in Iraq for the NATO training mission (Jones 2004).

Weak Coordination

The NATO-EU relationship is beset with problems. When the two organizations are engaged simultaneously in the same theatre of operations, the sharing of classified information poses a problem, as has been the case in Kosovo, Afghanistan and off the coast of Somalia where operations have been complicated by lack of official communication. Such operational difficulties stem from political problems and political deadlock has a detrimental effect on the ground. For example, there is no global agreement allowing NATO to provide protection to the police taking part in the European Union’s EUPOL mission in Afghanistan (Assembly Fact Sheet No. 14/2009).

NATO and the EU compete for the member-states’ defence money. For example, in 2005 they could not agree on who should support the African Union’s mission in Sudan, so each organization now runs its own operation there. Occasionally, the rivalry between the EU and NATO leads the member-states to sabotage much needed equipment purchases, like NATO’s plans to acquire a fleet of C-17 transport aircraft (Valasek 2007, 1).

This competition leaves everybody worse off. Member-states divide their already scarce defence budgets between the EU and NATO. Both institutions have given their member-states a long 'shopping list' of new equipment needed for military operations (the so-called 'capability goals') but the EU and NATO have failed to reconcile those lists. Each organization is thus asking the same cash-strapped governments for slightly different things (Valasek 2007, 1)

The United States Leadership under Challenge

The Bush Administration's effort to shift NATO's mission to combating terrorism and proliferation, with a strategic center of gravity in the Middle East, has led to uneasiness and a series of challenges by some allies. While all allies view terrorism and proliferation as serious threats, and all have embraced the need for more "expeditionary" forces, several key allies nonetheless have questions about the Administration's leadership and its commitment to NATO.

International political considerations play an important role in some allies' questioning of U.S. leadership. Most allies are members of the European Union. They place great importance on international institutions as a means of solving transnational problems, from economic dislocation to narcotics trafficking to prevention of conflict. The legacy of two world wars in Europe remains a central factor in shaping governments' policies; prevention of illegitimate violations of sovereignty was a principal reason for their support of the establishment of the UN, the EU, and NATO. This view lies behind the general European opposition to the Bush Administration's doctrine of "pre-emptive action." Some European observers today believe that there is an "absence of anything that could be called an international security architecture," in part because the United States, in this view, has avoided reliance on the UN. U.S. global leadership was once "embedded in the international rule of law that constrained the powerful as well as the weak."

However, in this view, the U.S. resort to force in Iraq, without clear support from the UN, has made the United States "a revolutionary hyperpower" (Stevens 2003, 15). Some U.S. officials counter that there is good cooperation with the allies on the use of law enforcement to combat terrorism (CRS Report RL 31509), but that there are moments when the danger of impending catastrophic developments or an imminent attack justifies the use of force without "legitimization" through the often time-consuming process of obtaining a UN resolution. The terrorist bombing in Madrid on March 11, 2004, which killed approximately 200 people, has led to severe repercussions on the opinion public. Approximately 90% of the Spanish population had opposed Prime Minister Aznar's support for the invasion of Iraq, and his subsequent decision to send forces as part of the U.S.-led coalition (*The Economist*, 2003).

Spain held scheduled elections three days after the bombing. Voters turned out the sitting government and elected a Socialist-led coalition. Some analysts attribute this result to the belief among some voters that the government's Iraq policy invited the terrorist attack. Some allies contend that the United States is seeking to use NATO as a "toolbox." They object to Ex-Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's repeated advocacy of "coalitions of the willing" to fight in conflicts as a means of using allied resources and supportive NATO governments to endorse U.S. interventions on foreign soil.

Most allies have been critical of Secretary Rumsfeld's division of Europe into "old" and "new," a formulation that chastised the former (such as France and Germany) for having opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq and lauded the latter (such as Spain under Aznar, Poland and the Baltic states) for having supported it. The criticism has come, quietly, even from countries such as Poland because Warsaw objects to any division of the continent. Central European governments view both NATO and the EU as means to unite the continent and to promote stability, and object to any attempts to divide the Europeans. Some allies believe that the United States relies too heavily upon military power to resolve issues that may have a political solution. They place the issue of proliferation in this realm, and cite the long-term economic pressure of sanctions against Libya, followed by U.S. and British negotiations with Tripoli, as evidence that a patient policy based on political initiatives can be effective (Kristin 2005, 13).

At the same time, all allies underscore the importance of their strategic relationship with the United States. While the European Union, including its nascent defense entities, is of great value to them, they nonetheless contend that the transatlantic partnership remains vital to countering global threats. But the difficulty should not be underestimated. There are traditional, cultural, constitutional and institutional obstructions. The key question is whether there is the political appetite for a more collaborative or even joint civ/mil operation under one commander, and if so whether the commander should be civilian or military (Leakey 2008, 19).

Fragile Unity of European Pillar

It is clear that the European pillar is still very much internally divided. There are two levels of concern. One is the classic differentiation between those European NATO allies that "pull their full weight" and those that clearly do not – and this is not just in terms of relative size but of defense burden shouldered as a percentage of GDP. The other is that while some EU member states welcome its evolution and are prepared to see the EU as an actor, even beyond Europe, in all dimensions of foreign relations, others resist it. The end result is that the EU does not yet live up to its potential and NATO lacks all the capabilities that are needed. Both institutions thus underperform.

Recommendations for Restructuring the Transatlantic Relationship

Restructuring the transatlantic relationship could have six main implications. First, Both NATO allies and EU member states need finally to understand that the two institutions must work together if either is to succeed in providing security for nations on the two sides of the Atlantic. Second, the EU must have the necessary margin of maneuver to interact flexibly with all global actors. Third, the primary levels of decision-making within the Atlantic relationship, including on security and defense, should be three-fold: NATO, the EU, and the U.S.-EU. Fourth, Europeans have a capability problem, caused by the fragmentation of their defense efforts, which only Europeans can solve, through increased cooperation and pooling, both within NATO and Within the EU. Fifth, precisely because in some crises not all operational frameworks (CSDP, NATO, UN) will be available or advisable, each must be a fully-fledged alternative, relevant to the level and character of military action required, so as to guarantee at least one option to deploy forces rapidly, safely and successfully in every crisis. Sixth, with regard to the EU's civilian assets, an EU-NATO cooperation agreement needs to be concluded, providing for full EU involvement from the start in planning for scenarios in which NATO would lead a military operation and the EU would lead a concurrent civilian deployment. A similar arrangement can be created with the UN (Hunter 2010, 2-3).

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Appendix:
Membership in NATO and the European Union

COUNTRY	NATO	EU
Austria		x
Belgium	x	x
Bulgaria	x	
Canada	x	
Cyprus		x
Czech Republic	x	x
Denmark	x	x
Estonia	x	x
Finland		x
France	x	x
Germany	x	x
Greece	x	x
Hungary	x	x
Iceland	x	
Ireland		x
Italy	x	x
Latvia	x	x
Lithuania	x	x
Luxembourg	x	x
Malta		x
Netherlands	x	x
Norway	x	
Poland	x	x
Portugal	x	x
Romania	x	
Slovakia	x	x
Slovenia	x	x
Spain	x	x
Sweden		x
Turkey	x	
United Kingdom	x	x
United States	x	

Overcoming Challenges to Indonesian Foreign Policy towards China[1]

Santo Darmosumarto

Pembantu Asisten Staf Khusus Presiden Republik Indonesia Bidang Hubungan Internasional

ABSTRACT

Diskursus mengenai Cina telah mengemuka selama beberapa tahun di Indonesia, terutama setelah Indonesia menjalankan kembali hubungan diplomatik dengan Cina yang selama 24 tahun sempat vakum. Secara umum, banyak pihak sepakat bahwa hubungan Indonesia-Cina harus ditingkatkan. Namun, ada permasalahan yang sering muncul terkait bagaimana Indonesia seharusnya menyikapi pertumbuhan Cina di perpolitikan internasional. Tulisan ini menganalisis tantangan yang dihadapi dalam memerkuat hubungan Indonesia-Cina. Dinamika hubungan Indonesia-Cina ditelusuri secara historis untuk memerkuat analisis. Beberapa strategi dipaparkan dalam tulisan ini sebagai proposal dalam memperkuat hubungan kedua negara.

Kata-Kata Kunci: *hubungan Indonesia-Cina, tantangan, strategi.*

The discourse on China has over the years blossomed in Indonesia. Having re-established diplomatic ties in 1990 after over 24 years of freezing, questions have since been asked with regards to how Indonesia should deal with China's growing influence on international politics. In general, most people agree that engagement with China needs to be stepped up. However, as the usual case, the trickiest questions often remain unanswered; what must be done? How can it be done? This paper analyzes the challenges of strengthening contemporary Indonesia-China relations. It must be traced back historically to realize the dynamics of Indonesia-China relations. Following the analyses, there are few strategies which proposed to overcome the challenges of strengthening Indonesia-China relations.

Keywords: *Indonesia-China relations, challenges, strategy.*

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[1] Tulisan ini pernah dimuat di *Jurnal Luar Negeri*, Volume 27, Nomor 3, September-Desember 2010 dengan judul "Making China Matter: Challenges to Indonesian Foreign Policy". Atas izin penulis dan Redaksi *Jurnal Luar Negeri*, tulisan ini kembali dipublikasikan di *Jurnal Global & Strategis*.

While Indonesia-China relations have grown since 1990, much of this has been attributed to the uncoordinated, exclusive engagement efforts of certain segments within the Indonesian Government and society. Officials carry out solo approaches towards Chinese counterparts, unaware of those conducted by others in the government. At the same time, the private sector is going about its business without sufficient recognition and guidance by the government. As a result, it is not rare that we see duplications in efforts.

China may need Indonesia as much as Indonesia needs China. However, if engagement with China continues to be carried out sparingly and with a lack of coordination, then Indonesia would unlikely be able to increase its overall leverage and ensure that its relations with China benefit the Indonesian people as a whole.

At a time when many countries are cozying up to China and trying to take advantage of China's growing power, Indonesia does not appear to be putting enough effort in strengthening its relations with China. Such a view was even expressed by the Chinese Ambassador to Indonesia during a lunch gathering with Indonesian businessmen in March 2010 (*The Jakarta Post*, March 18, 2010).

On the one hand, Indonesia sees China as a potentially beneficial partner in efforts to strengthen the national economy. On the other hand, China sees a considerable amount of significance in its relations with Indonesia, the largest and most populated country in Southeast Asia, and current Chair of ASEAN.

The rise of China is a fact; it is pure nonsense to even argue in favor of either "containing" China or not engaging it at all. As a leading Southeast Asia nation, Indonesia would do well in demonstrating its leadership in the region through a well-calibrated engagement with China. Yet, if Indonesia's understanding, approach, and effort in nursing this bilateral relationship remain lacking, sooner or later Indonesia would find itself at the short end of the relationship, unable to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with China and its growing power.

Challenges in Strengthening Indonesia-China Relations

Lingering Historical Animosities and Other Pending Issues

Trends seem to indicate that as long as Indonesia and China continue on the path towards greater economic ties, then cooperation in other fields would follow suit. When considering the two countries' historically tumultuous relations, the way in which cooperation has evolved in the last two decades is in itself an achievement that merits a pat on the back. Nevertheless, a number of issues continue to cause frictions between the two countries. One of these is the continued debacle over the Chinese Embassy's former assets in Indonesia, which had been deserted in 1966 when diplomatic relations were frozen. Now, China is demanding their return and is basing its claims on international laws protecting diplomatic premises. Efforts are at the moment being conducted to find a solution, but its progress has not satisfied either sides.

The Taiwan issue is also a thorn on the side of the two countries' relations. Indonesians have long enjoyed benefits from strong economic and social cooperation with the Taiwanese. As such, while the Indonesian Government does not recognize Taiwan's claimed statehood, there is much interaction happening at the people-to-people level. China, in general, does not have any qualms over Indonesia-Taiwan trade, particularly because China itself conducts similar types of cooperation with Taiwan. However, on some occasions, the Chinese have accused certain segments of the Indonesian Government for allowing their relations with Taiwanese counterparts to be used as a means to raise Taiwan's stature in the international scene.

In addition to the challenges posed by the asset and Taiwan issues, there are also other problems such as disputes over food safety, illegal fishing, and illegal logging. As well, China's territorial claims in the South China Sea (inches away from waters surrounding Indonesia's Natuna Islands) could have spillover effects on Indonesia-China relations. In all of these, certain efforts have been developed to prevent problems from becoming full-blown disputes. However, there remains a potential for these issues to re-surface in the future and hinder efforts at better bilateral relations.

Structural Impediments and Challenges

During the diplomatic freeze which lasted from 1967 to 1990, relations between Indonesia and China were nurtured mostly by the private sector. Of course, the development of unofficial ties needs to be nurtured as they fill in the gaps left unattended by government-to-government cooperation. Nevertheless, efforts by the private sector need to involve a greater government role because sooner or later they will have an impact on how official ties evolve.

It is no secret that China uses its economic diplomacy – carried out both by the private sector and state-owned enterprises – to engage in soft power, spreading China's influence worldwide (Kurlantzick 2006). This should not be a cause for alarm. Neither is this a reason to start being overly careful about ties between Indonesian businesses and China.

However, a closer government attention and guidance would benefit Indonesia as a whole in a way that Indonesian business penetration into the Chinese market could also be used to enhance Indonesia's leverage vis-à-vis China.

At the same time, the government's role in engaging China must be conducted systematically so as to avoid duplications. As each government agency engages China with little appreciation – let alone understanding – of what has been carried out by other related agencies, there is likelihood that many are simply missing the bigger picture. Failures in bureaucratic coordination are not something unique to the Indonesians. Nevertheless, problems of coordination and cohesion can often be embarrassing, especially when compared to how visibly coordinated China's foreign policymaking is towards Indonesia.

Overcoming the Challenges

Ensuring the Strategic Partnership Work

The Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership signed by the two countries' leaders in 2005 provides a solid framework to develop Indonesia's approach towards China. The document provides a guideline outlining the various fields of cooperation that can be explored. In a sense, built within the Joint Declaration is the "skeleton" of Indonesia-China cooperation to come as well as the ways and means to substantiate the strategic partnership ("the meat") through concrete programs.

To further concretize the strategic partnership, a Plan of Action for the implementation of the Joint Declaration of Strategic Partnership was signed in 2010 between the two countries' Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Such a Plan of Action will allow some form of control on the activities carried out by the many parties involved in Indonesia-China relations. It will also ensure that the Indonesian Government could measure the extent to which its cooperation with China has evolved.

As a blueprint for Indonesia-China relations, the Joint Declaration of Strategic Partnership and its complementing Plan of Action are foundations for a coherent, target-oriented, comprehensive, and cohesive Indonesian foreign policy towards China.

Overcoming Pending Issues

While it is understandably difficult to find solutions to all the pending issues that have caused impediments to greater relations between

Indonesia and China, there needs to be efforts to ensure that these issues are not linked one with another. In other words, matters concerning China's claims over "unreturned assets" should not cause difficulties in developing economic cooperation. As well, although it is common for the Chinese to cause tantrums over what they perceive as "official contacts" between Indonesian and Taiwanese foreign policy actors, this should somehow be kept to a minimum.

One of the ways in which this could be carried out is to have close, regular dialogues and to reach some form of agreement or codes of conduct so that "sensitive issues" do not flare up. The Joint Declaration of Strategic Partnership actually outlines numerous mechanisms for dialogue and discussion. Each technical sector such as trade, tourism, maritime, education and others have their own bilateral discussions to further efforts in promoting cooperation between the two countries.

In Indonesia's perspective, the need to develop a mechanism to deal with pending issues becomes urgent when considering that China is growing in many terms. A China that is strong would unlikely want to bend over backwards on issues which it regards to be its national interest. Trying to pretend that pending issues do not exist would be foolish because sooner or later they will re-surface and cause difficulties for both sides. At the same time, if the two countries truly believe each other's value as a "strategic partner", then serious efforts could be made to ensure that disputing issues are settled peacefully through diplomacy and with the goals of mutual benefit in mind.

Strengthening Structures, Coordination, and Attitudes within the Bureaucracy

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must act not only as the coordinator, but also spearhead for bilateral Indonesia-China cooperation development. There are now Joint Commission mechanisms at the Senior Officials and Ministerial levels that could generate coordination across the board. The meetings at the Senior Officials' level have been carried out bi-annually on schedule. However, the Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation at the Ministerial level (JCBC) was last conducted in 2000 and has since never been repeated.

Another mechanism for coordinating government agencies in Indonesia is the Joint Commission at the Coordinating Minister/State Councilor level, which in Indonesia's case is lead by the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs. Efforts could be made to turn this forum into a comprehensive and inclusive dialogue mechanism encompassing all related sectors within the Indonesian bureaucracy. Indonesia has in the past carried out similar dialogue mechanisms with Timor Leste and Australia; why then could there not be one with China?

Of course, as important as trying to optimize the existence of dialogues between the two countries, there is also a need to strengthen the capabilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in conducting the role of coordinator and initiator of Indonesia's foreign policy towards China. It needs to be reminded that unlike engagement with western countries, efforts to build relations with China will require people who are not only knowledgeable of China, but also understands the intricacies, sensitivities, and other intangible factors governing approaches towards this rising superpower (Leonard 2008, 115-117).

Moreover, the strengthening of the Ministry's capacity should also be complemented by an increase in Indonesia's representation in Mainland China. This could first start with the possible opening of a mission in Shanghai, followed possibly by missions in key places such as Nanning (China's hub for ASEAN-China cooperation) and Xi'an (China's hub for economic growth in the western parts of the country).

These structural changes should also be complemented by changes in attitude among Indonesian Government officials, the diplomats notwithstanding. For decades, the forced disappearance of Chinese culture during the New Order era has resulted in a prevalence of ignorance on China issues. However, China during the Mao period is nothing like it is today. No longer wanting to quarrel along ideological lines with other countries, today's China is as capitalist as Indonesia or even the US. To continue believing that Communist China is nothing but a threat to Indonesia has no place in today's conditions.

Indonesian Government officials (and the rest of the society as a whole) also need to stop underestimating the potential of China and the Chinese. Indeed, to some, China may not be as modern as the West. But the fact is that China is at the moment making significant strives in technological development. For a country that has been capable of indigenously developing its nuclear weapons and sending men to space, China should also be seen as burgeoning center for science and technology.

Indeed, perceptions of fear and underestimation must to be addressed properly. China needs to be seen as a power the same way the US is regarded as a power. China has the capacity to behave belligerently in international relations. But with proper engagement, Indonesia can benefit from its close relations with China the same way it has in the past benefited from close relations with Japan and the US. At the same time, our appreciation of China's growing power should not be accompanied with a sense of awe which could evolve into feelings of inferiority. Indonesia can engage China on a leveled playing field.

Involving Non-Governmental Actors

Considering that links between Indonesian and Chinese businesses are generally stronger compared to those among officials of the two countries, Indonesian diplomats would do well in developing greater engagement with the business sector. Engagement with actors in the economic sectors would shed light on certain aspects of the bilateral cooperation that often eludes Indonesian diplomats. In turn, knowing the ways and means of dealings and cooperation among businessmen would allow the Government to overcome the sense that Indonesia's relations with China is being dominated by the private sector.

In addition to engagement with the business community, there also needs to be close ties between the Government and the academia. In China, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pays close attention to the efforts of think tanks such as China Institute for International Studies (CIIS), Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA), China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) and China Academy for Social Sciences (CASS) with a view to enhancing its approach towards relations with the rest of the world. Much can be learned from the Chinese' efforts, as engagement with the academia allows a broader perspective on how bilateral ties and cooperation could be further developed.

Enhancing Indonesia's Position in ASEAN and the World

Among the Southeast Asian countries, there are indications that China's focus is increasingly targeted at ASEAN's largest country, Indonesia. As the only country with which China has a "strategic partnership" cooperation, Indonesia is increasingly being seen as China's reference for developing greater China-ASEAN cooperation. And despite enjoying greater economic relations with other ASEAN countries, Indonesia continues to be of special interest to the Chinese as it tries to solidify its sphere of cooperation in the region (Hui 2008, 37-39).

When considering Indonesia's rich resources and geo-strategic position, the conditions described above further places Indonesia as the country most likely to be regarded as having influence in the region. Following its difficulties during and after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, Indonesia has in the past few years resurged to *primer inter pares* status among ASEAN countries. To a certain extent, some observers are indicating the return of Indonesia to a leadership position in the region (Huafei 2009, 24). In this vein, as China strives to link northeast Asia and the southeast, Indonesia may be required to play a larger role in these affairs.

China's interest in stronger cooperation with Indonesia is also driven by Indonesia's growing status in global politics, particularly in key contemporary issues such as climate change, democracy, human rights, the Third World, as well as global finance and trade. Indonesia is now a member of the G-20, which has gained prominence in recent times to tackle the global economic crisis. At home, its successful domestic political reform has become a source of pride and optimism in the country's interactions abroad. In addition, by continuing to pose economic growth, Indonesia is now in a better position to confidently assert its independent status and active diplomacy in the world.

As well, as Indonesia strengthens its ties with the US with the ascendancy of President Barack Obama, the Chinese will have more reasons to step up its efforts in ensuring that Indonesia remains attentive of its status as China's strategic partner in the region. From Indonesia's perspective, there is a need to develop a dynamic equilibrium in the Asia Pacific by bringing in the US. At the same time, such efforts could also be beneficially used as a leverage to encourage China's greater involvement in regional cooperation and attention towards Indonesia's needs.

Conclusion

In the last three decades, China has evolved from a poor, backward nation into becoming one of the most influential players in international relations. Many countries are looking at this situation with a view to finding angles through which benefits could be gained out of China's rising power. Therefore, to avoid becoming the last passenger on the "China train", Indonesia needs to step up its efforts at engaging the Chinese. China is a multi-faceted power, and as such, Indonesia's engagement will also have to be multi-faceted and carried out by various actors in the government and society.

Herein lies the biggest challenge to Indonesia's China policy: a lack of coordination and cohesion. The reasons are plentiful: the dominance of the business/private sector, sectoral ego among its government agencies, old-fashioned attitudes towards the Chinese, and certain lacking within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These are to name a few. Moreover, considering the tumultuous past in Indonesia-China relations, pending issues also cause frequent hiccups in the Government's effort to enhance bilateral cooperation.

Nevertheless, to dwell on these weaknesses would amount to nothing. In fact, some of the tools to revamp Indonesia's China policy – such as the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership – are already in existence. Unfortunately, there remains considerable room for improvement in efforts to fully take advantage of these tools. Indeed, certain matters need to be changed in order for there to be some form of reinvigoration in these efforts. Some structural changes would also have to be carried out to smoothen the path towards a more coherent, target-oriented, comprehensive, and cohesive foreign policy towards China.

Yet, what matters most is the desire and commitment of all parties involved, including those in the upper echelons of Indonesia's policymaking institutions. Is Indonesia's national interest being served by closer relations with China? Other countries seem to think that their interests are either being served or are very much related to the fate of this rising power. The statistics and facts seem to concur with this trend. In view of this, it is therefore imperative that Indonesia starts to pay more attention to China and move its foreign policy agents towards taking advantage of relations with the Chinese and their growing international influence.

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Energy Crisis Threat:
A Challenge for the Rise of China

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ABSTRACT

Kebangkitan Cina sesungguhnya tidak realistis jika diamati dari produksi dan konsumsi energi negara ini. Sejak 1992, tingkat konsumsi energi Cina jauh lebih tinggi daripada produksinya dan tingkat konsumsi itu diprediksi semakin meningkat pesat di masa depan. Kondisi ini mendorong Pemerintah Cina untuk berburu sumber-sumber energi di seluruh dunia dengan membeli ladang-ladang minyak di luar negeri, terutama di Afrika dan Timur Tengah. Selain itu, mereka juga membangun jalur pipa yang menghubungkan minyak dari negara-negara tetangganya seperti Kazakhstan dan Rusia ke daratan Cina. Sayangnya, strategi ini tidak berjalan dengan mulus karena Amerika Serikat dan Jepang, dua pesaing utama Cina, sering mengganggunya. Kedua negara itu merasa terancam oleh kebangkitan Cina sehingga mereka selalu berupaya menghambat tindakan Cina. Karena itu, jika Cina tidak dapat mengatasi masalah ini, impiannya untuk menjadi negara adikuasa di masa mendatang akan semakin sulit dicapai.

Kata-Kata Kunci*: energi, kebangkitan Cina, jalur pipa minyak, investasi asing.*

The rise of China is actually unrealistic if it is viewed from its energy production and consumption. Since 1992, China's energy consumption has been much higher than its production and predicted rapidly developed in the future. This condition has driven China government to hunt energy sources around the world by buying oil fields overseas, particularly in Middle East and Africa. Beside that, China government has also constructed pipeline which transmiting oil from its neighbor countries such as Kazakhstan and Russia to China's land. Unfortunately, this strategy hasn't smoothly run because the United States and Japan, two main China's competitors, often disturbed it. Both countries feel threaten by China's rise in the globe so that they always attempted to tackle China's action. Therefore, if China wasn't able to solve this problem, its dream to be superpower country in the future will be hard to reach.

Keywords: *energy, the rise of China, oil pipeline, foreign investment.*

Many scholars' arguments that China will be the greatest economic power on the globe in the future actually forget the fact that this country is facing energy crisis. This crisis emerges because inability of China's domestic energy production to supply energy consumption for accelerating economic growth. Instead of increasing economic growth, China's need on energy has hampered the country's rise to be superpower in the world. This is the biggest challenge which China faces today.

Based on the deep analysis, some scholars such as Nicholas Kristof (1993), Odded Shankar (2006), and David Lampton (2005) believed that the China's rise nowadays would bring this country to be the most developed country on the planet. In 1990s, while the China's rise hasn't been global concern yet, Kristof (1993, 59) had viewed China's marks as a country with the most rapid economic growth in the world and had potency to tackle down the United States hegemony as the greatest world economic power in the first half of 21st century. Similar to Kristof, Shankar (2006, 13) also predicted, following with its economic growth which reached two digits, China would take over the US position as the biggest economic power in two or three decades forward. Although many developed countries feel threaten, however for Lampton (2005, 308), the China's rise was actually not a threat, but a powerful engine for global and regional economic growth.

Several fantastic achievements showed by the high economic growth rates are basic argument to measure the China's rise. Based on the World Bank report in 2003, Chia Siow Yue (2004, 51-53) described that in 1990-2001 the average of China's economic growth was 10 percent, far above Japan which stagnant on 1.3 percent. The high economic growth was stimulated by foreign direct investment (FDI) which reached $ 19.36 billion in 1990-1995 and $ 42.684 billion in 1996-2001. One of driving forces of the FDI and export-import was the amount of total population, about 1.3 billion people. This huge population makes China become the biggest market in the universe. The last development shows that China has succeded to take over Japan's position as the second biggest economic power and Germany's status as the number one exporter in the world.

However, the problem is, the China's way to be superpower in the future will not as easy as some people imagine because this country has the fundamental energy problems. Energy production in China could not fully supply energy consumption for daily industry operationalization and its people life. Whereas, in order to have an ability to increase its power, a country must have strong energy supply because energy is the most important factor to accelerate industry sector and other growth engines such as transportation and infrastructure.

Based on International Energy Outlook (2005), in 2002, the China's consumption on oil, gas, and coal were 10.6 quadrillion Btu, 1.3 quadrillion Btu, and 27.9 quadrillion Btu respectively. It was estimated, this consumption would increase to 18.9 quadrillion Btu, 3.1 quadrillion Btu, and 45.1 quadrillion Btu respectively. *Financial Express* (2005) added, in 2004, China was the second biggest oil importer in the world, reached 117 million tons. This condition were really different from 1980s era while China became the biggest oil importer in East Asia. Meantime, China's domestic production decrease 3.5 million barrels per day. At that time, oil demand from China was 31 percent of global demand. Between 1999 and 2009, oil use in China rose sharply to 93 percent, compared to global oil consumption which improve only 11 percent (Zweig & Jianhai 2005, 25). Whereas, the amount of gas consumption at 3 percent of the total primary energy consumption was forecasted to increase about 7.8 percent per year in 2025 (Barden & Martin 2005).

Figure 1

China's Oil Production and Consumption, 1991-2011*



Source: EIA International Energy Statistics;
Short-Term Energy Outlook (September 2010)

*forecasted

The new release from Energy Information Administration (EIA) International Energy Statistics (Figure 1) showed that in 1991, China's oil consumption could be still supplied by their domestic production. But, from 1993 to 2009, China's oil consumption rose dramatically from about 2.5 million barrels per day to 8 million barrels per day. Problematically, this dramatic rise was not followed by the significant increase on the amount of total production. Therefore, during 1991-2009, the amount of China's oil production tended to be stagnant, didn't change on the rate 2-3 million barrels per day on average. It was projected, this year (2011), while China would consumed 9 million barrels oil per day, its oil field would only has produced 3 million barrels oil per day. It means, China's oil production is just used to fulfill two third of its oil need. By 2030, IEA even predicted that China would import four fifth or 80 percent of its oil need.

The high level of domestic economic growth followed by the rapid urbanisation and export improvement are condition causing the rise of China's consumption energy. In this situation, oil and gas import are inevitable because of all energy sources, oil and gas supply from foreign countries are the most wanted sources rather than coal which could relatively be filled up by domestic production. Indeed, compared to oil and gas, coal reserve is the biggest in China, at 114.5 billion metric tons in the end of 2004 (Walton 2005). Therefore, China uses coal domestic production to replace oil and gas import. It was estimated, the procentage of coal as energy source would increase from 50 percent in 2005 to 55 percent in 2025 (Mellish & Kearney 2005).

Figure 2
China's Energy Sources Demand



source: International Energy Agency 2009

Figure 2 describes how from year to year, energy source demand in China always increase. Based on the figure, oil is the most demanded energy source, followed by gas and other source such as coal. Compared between 2010 and 2030, oil demand in 2030 is estimated rise almost three times rather than in 2010, whereas gas demand is likely up about doubled in the same time. Other source is relatively stable because China could produce it in abundant number. Compared to other world powers, even though the rate of China's energy demand is lower than the US and Europe OECD countries, but its increase is the highest (Figure 3).

Figure 3
Energy Demand in the Biggest Energy Consumers



source: EarthTrends 2008

China's industry contributes 71 percent of total energy demand, much higher than agriculture (19 percent) and transportation (10 percent) (Figure 4). Energy source used for industry in China is also higher than other countries. It indicates that China concentrates its economic development on industry sector .

Figure 4
Energy Demand based on Sector



source: EarthTrends 2008

Regarding the high level trend, International Energy Agency (IEA) predicted that China would waste more than one fifth of the world energy demand growth in 25 years onward. Of all development sectors,
As described before, the problem is China really lacks of oil and gas, although having huge coal. With 13 percent of global coal reserve (compared only to one percent oil and gas reserve), China depends two third of domestic energy need on coal. Indeed, coal production is forecasted always rise until 2015. However, this sharp rise is not balanced by the amount of oil, gas, hydro, and nuclear production which has been stagnant from 1980 to 2015 (Figure 5). The coal production improvement is in line with its consumption improvement. While China's coal production increased to 10.9 percent in first semester of 2006, its consumption increased to 12.8 percent. In 2009, based on World Coal Institute, China consumed coal at about 46 percent of global total consumption. The US Energy Information Administration estimated that coal consumption in China would increase almost double in 20 years forward (Lim n.d.). This condition absolutely gives disadvantage because as the dirtiest energy source, coal contributes majority of carbondioxide (CO_2), sulfurdioxide (SO_2), and nitrogenoxide (NO_x) emission. Consequently, China had the most polluted cities in the world and water pollution in these cities contributed for 3.4 percent of the death in 2001 (DCP2 2006). Thus, China attempted to prevent this bad conditio by turning to oil. It was reasonable if China's oil consumption has always increased and considered as the fastest increase on the earth (IEA 2007).

Figure 5
China's Energy Production



source: US Energy Information Admnistration n.d.

Those descriptions are proofs that behind its rapid economic growth, China is highly depended on energy source. Realizing this fact, China has attempted to solve the problem through hunting oil and gas sources around the world. This strategy is implemented through two ways. First, driving its oil companies to invest in foreign oil and gas field. Second, making cooperation with countries that have big energy capacity to build transmition line which connects China's land to energy sources in those countries. However, this strategy has not easily worked because China's competitors such as the US and Japan often trying hard to tackle it. The three countries are the biggest oil importers in the globe (Figure 6). Viewed on geoeconomy context, the fight to get energy sources versus the US and Japan is the China's biggest challenge for taking over both countries domination in order to be hegemonic country in the future. If this challenge was not solved soon, the China's rise might be just a brief phenomenon which unhappened in the long run.

Figure 6



Foreign Investment

Suisheng Zao (2008) stated that China adopted 'state-centered approach' rather than 'market-oriented approach' in saving energy by strengthening trade and political relationship with energy producer countries and investing aggresively in the oil pipeline around the world. Different from 'market-oriented approach' which integrates national and international market by limiting state intervention, 'state-centered approach' drives state to proactively increase bilateral relationship with energy producer countries through investment of state owned companies in foreign energy field and control of energy export-import. For China's leaders, saving energy supply is not only crucial for sustainable economic development, but also integral for national security (Lam 2004). Therefore, energy is too important to be freely ignored alone (Kreft 2006, 65).

By using that approach, China invests in new oil and gas field rather than buying energy in international market because this country wants to make sure that the US and other countries can not stop its oil market if the relationship between them getting worse. Since 2002, China government has been driving the state owned oil companies such as PetroChina, Sinopec, China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), and Sinochem to invest abroad. At that time, President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao declared 'go-out' strategy to support China's oil companies to buy oil fields in many regions of the world and saving exploration right they have gotten beyond borders (*AFP*, June 20, 2006).

So far, China has discussed energy assets purchase in the long term contract in Africa (Sudan, Nigeria, Gabon, Angola), Latin America (Brazil, Equador, Venezuela), Russia, Central Asia (Kazakhstan), Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Myanmar), and Australia. The Jintao and Jiabao visit reflected China's interest to get energy in those countries. As a new comer in global energy market, China finds that many potential oil and gas assets in the stable countries are not available cause they has been owned by national companies in producer countries or Western oil companies. That is why China concentrates on countries which their oil fields are forbidden for the US' corporations because of investment ban by the US government itself, such as Iran and Sudan (Shirk 2007, 294).

China believes that because energy supply in countries with good reputation in oil field have been controlled by the US, Europe, Japan, and other countries, they don't have any choice except investing in the countries which are considered by the US and its allies as global problem sources. By engaging Iran and Sudan, China actually challenge the US attempts and its allies which push them to guarantee human rights. Therefore, the China step sometimes triggers dispute with the US (Shiek 2007, 23-24).

The China fast movement does not only threat the US domination in this region, but also disturbs the US attempts to promote transparency and human rights in the developing countries as well as achieving its interest. In these countries, China is preferred than the US because

China does not care transparency and good governance on which the US always demand as the main requirement to invest.

Figure 7
China's Crude Oil Imports



accessed from www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/china/Full.html, 5 April 2011

Beyond its conflict with the US, China's concern on Iran and Sudan indicates how important the Middle East and African region for this country. The huge oil rich in the Middle East and Africa make China become the active player in both regions. In 2004, more than 45 percent of China's oil import came from Middle East and 28.7 percent was gotten from Africa. The rest came from Europe (14.3 percent), and Asia Pacific (11.5 percent) (Zweig & Jianhai 2005, 28). The next five years, Middle East still became the main oil supply source for China. Saudi Arabia was the biggest oil supplier for China, followed by Angola, Iran, and Russia (Figure 7). But, trade relationship with Saudi Arabia is often disturbed by Saudi's close relationship with the US. On the other hand, relationship with Russia is often hampered by Russia's inconsistent in implementing agreement because they view China as their regional threat. So, the biggest expectation only lays on Iran and Angola.

This expectation started to realize in March 2004 when Sinopec signed $ 100 million agreement with Iran to import 10 million ton liquefied natural gas (LNG) for 25 years in investment of oil and gas exploration and constructing pipeline infrastructure. This cooperation was continued by CNOOC which also signed memorandum of understanding to develop natural gas field North Pars in Iran in December 2006. Under the $ 16 billion agreement, COOC would cooperate with National Iranian Oil Company to develop natural gas field with the wide about 80 trillion cubic. Meanwhile, PetroChina agreed to import 3 million tons of LNG per year from Iran for 25 years. Whereas, CNPC has gotten exploration and exploitation right in South Pars oil field, Iran. Totally, value of these agreements was $ 70 billion and made China become the biggest energy importer from Iran (Berman 2007). For securing its oil transmition from Middle East, China built a port in Pakistan and looked for canals which passed Thailand because imported oil distribution must pass Malacca Strait where many threats such as terrorism, piracy, the US military attack perhaps occur.

China actually expects to make a cooperation with Iraq that has the second biggest oil reserve in the world after Saudi Arabia. However, the US invasion to this country in March 2003 had changed this plan and China's view on geopolitics of oil. China's concern didn't only focus on Middle East then, but spreaded to Africa, Latin America, and neeighbour countries in Asia. In Africa, China's oil companies were exist in Sudan, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, and Guineau-Bissau (Fisher-Thompson 2006). In Latin America, China become the important trade partner for Venezuela which provides its two oil fields to be explored by CNPC (Thompson 2005). In Asia, China moved to Central Asia, especially in ex-Sovyet countries which have direct border with China's land such as Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan (Zhao 2008, 215).

In this region, China has signed Treaty of Enhancing Military Mutual trust in the Border Areas, which is also known as 'Shanghai Five', with Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in Shanghai, April 2006. This treaty also involved Uzbekistan then and changed name become Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Talk among SCO members don't only concentrates on security issue, but also on energy. Kazakhstan is the China's main partner in this agreement. In June 2005, Jintao visited this country and made a deal to strengthen strategic partnership through CNPC investment in some Kazakhstan's oil field. CNPC now has 85.4 percent of Aktobermunaigas Corporation's stock, 100 percent Bar exploration which was previously controlled by Nimir Petroleum Bars Holding BV from British, and 50 percent of Nort Buzaci oil and gas field in Southwest Kazakhstan. Even, CNPC has acquired PetroKazakhstan with the value of transaction at $ 4.18 billion (Zhao 2008, 216-217).

By choosing to own oil field in other countries rather than buying oil in the global market, China is actually competing freely with the US and Japan which also need energy and make similar policy. Strategically, China gets into areas of some countries with bad relationship with the US. By implementing this strategy, China is actually fighting face to face with the US in hunting energy sources around the world. It is reasonable when CNOOC would take over Unocal Corp., the US oil companies based in California, the Congress opposed this plan (Zhao 2008, 212).

The US has already felt that China's attempt to buy oil assets in the oil rich countries, even buying one of its oil companies, as a threat for the US' traditional access to secure energy supply. On the other hand, China is threatened by the US on distribution of import oil from Middle East and Africa which passes some strategic sea lines such as Malacca Strait. Around the sea area, the US has placed its navy which could be an obstacle for the distribution of China's imported oil. Consequently, the China's energy supply is disturbed. Through its navy, the US controls the core international sea line which is passed by the China's ship that carries import oil. The China's leader are worried that the US and its allies cut the China's oil supply if there is crisis in Taiwan Strait or if the US-China relationship are getting worse.

Oil Pipeline

Considering the possibility of the US threat on its distribution of imported oil, China thinks to not only concentrate on investment and oil delivery by sea, but also make a strategic partnership with some Central Asia countries. This partnership is implemented by building oil pipelines that links oil fields in the energy rich areas with energy assets in the China's land. Building oil pipelines that connects oil fields in Kazakhstan and Russia with China's land is actually more strategic than expecting to get oil delivery from Middle East. Beside that, the so long China-Middle East distance adds distribution cost rather than linking oil pipelines from Russia and Kazakhstan to China.

Figure 8
Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline

source: Energy Information Administration 2010, www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/china/Full.html, 5 April 2011

In this situation, China really depends on Kazakhstan. The cooperation with Kazakhstan which has been attempted by Jintao dan Jiabao continues in constructing the 3,000 kms oil pipeline from Central Kazakhstan to Xinjian and 1,240 kms from Atasu in Northwest Kazakhstan to Xinjian (Figure 8). The construction has strengthened cooperation between both countries. However, this construction project is hampered by Xinjiang people demand on independence. Therefore, in seven years since the agreement, the constructed pipeline has just been 400 kms long (Zhao 2008, 218).

Beside Kazakhstan, China also makes coperation with Russia to construct oil pipeline from Angarsk (Russia) to Daqing (basis of China's oil production). While the negotiation between China and Russia since 1994 have not resulted an agreement soon, Japan decided to participate. This country persuaded Russian government with a promise to invest in local economy and infrastructure. Beside that, Japan is also trying to lobby other Central Asia countries to build oil pipeline to Japan area. As oil importer country, Japan seems play more aggressive. It worked when in the end of 2003, Russia followed Japan want to turn pipeline to Nahodkha which is in Japan area (Falola & Genova 2005, 218). Consequently, oil pipeline does not hub Russia-China directly, but link Angarsk to Nahodkha with substation in Daqing (Figure 9).

Figure 9
Russia-Japan-China Oil Pipeline

accessed from www.chinapage.org/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=357, 5 April 2011

In Russian strategic view, dependence on the single market is really disadvantage rather than having line to many markets. For Russia, line to Nahodkha gives opportunity to send oil not only to Japan, but also other markets in Asia Pacific, including the US. Failure in realizing Angarsk-Daqing oil pipeline triggered China to force CNPC to acquire Stimoil, one of Russian oil companies. But, before this plan is realized, in 2003, Duma (Russian parliament) revised Privatization Act to protect Stimoil from CNPC purchase. Russia viewed this plan was a part of the China's rise which threatened its national interest. By state-centered approach, China is indeed able to create cooperation opportunity with its other neighbor countries. However, before this opportunity continued to an agreement which was really implemented, conflicts with other neighbor countries that have natural resources often occured. One of coflicts happened because of areas dispute (Zhao 2008).

In example, energy cooperations between China with other energy importers such as Japan and South Korea are often worked easily because of unsimilar interests among them. Sino-Japanese relationship actually offers an example of China's priority change in international energy cooperation. But, this relationship is often disturbed by several conflicts among both countries, such as the visit of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to Yasukuni Temple, areas dispute, and oil line dispute in South China Sea. In other word, this energy agreement is hard to implement in this region because there is no mutual trust among those countries (Andrew-Speed & Xin 2005).

Conclusion

Based on the facts previously described, there are five conclusions. First, China faces a big challenge in continuing its momentum of economic rise to be superpower country in the future. This challenge is unbalance between the low production with the high consumption of energy sources. Consequently, China really depends on energy -especially oil and gas- from abroad to supply consumption needed to accelerate domestic economic growth.

Second, to solve the problem, China actively hunts oil and gas to around the world through two ways. First, driving its oil companies to invest in oil and gas fields in several countries. Second, making partnerships to construct pipeline connecting oil and gas fields in energy rich countries with China's land. Invetsment is driven to countries in Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and anti-US countries such as Iran, Venezuela, and Sudan. This partnership is concentrated on neighbor countries with the huge energy such as Kazakhstan and Russia.

Third, the challenge on investment is the threat from the US Navy Seals which controls the seas passed by the ships carrying China's imported oil. As the main competitor, the US could disturb this oil delivery whenever they want, primarily if situation in Taiwan Strait is getting worse or conflict escalation among both countries increase.

Fourth, the challenge for constructing oil pipeline is Japan's aggressiveness to find oil in the same areas as China and Russia distrust to China because this country is viewed as threat for Russia which has a dream to rise as superpower. Thus, China only depends on Kazakhstan to guarantee its energy security.

Fifth, the China's energy crisis seem to be used its competitors to hamper China's economic growth. The US and Japan as two developed countries which also need energy have interest to make China is still in crisis. If this happens, the China's way to be superpower could be stopped. Geoeconomic of oil in the future is definitely fight between the three countries. Considering energy problems China faces and the attempts of the US and Japan to fight against this country, it could be stated that the China's rise isn't actually built in so strong pillars that seem fragile in the way forward.

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Kondisi Keamanan Energi India: Potensi Konflik dan Perlambatan Perkembangan Ekonomi

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ABSTRAK

This paper addresses the question of India's potential in becoming the world's great power. Started by evaluating some literatures about India's rise, this paper focused to the discussion of the relations between energy and India's economic rise. This paper argues that although India's economy is dominated by knowledge-based economy such as information technology, but the energy demands of IT and households created the pathways to energy crisis. This paper explains the potential of conflict between India, China, and Pakistan regarding the search for energy source. As a concluding remarks, this paper concludes that India's rise to greatness will be dampen by the looming energy crisis and the conflict potential with China and Pakistan

Keywords: *India, economic rise, information technology, energy security, conflict.*

Artikel ini menjelaskan potensi India untuk menjadi kekuatan besar dunia. Diawali dengan mengevaluasi beberapa literatur utama mengenai kebangkitan India, artikel ini mengetengahkan pembahasan mengenai relasi antara kebutuhan energi dengan kebangkitan ekonomi India. Tulisan ini berargumen bahwa kebutuhan energi dari rumah tangga dan industri teknologi informasi telah membuka jalan bagi krisis energi. Krisis ini berpotensi menimbulkan konflik antara India, Cina, dan Pakistan dalam upaya mencari sumber-sumber energi lain. Tulisan ini menyimpulkan bahwa proses kebangkitan ekonomi India akan terhambat oleh krisis energi dan konflik regional yang ditimbulkan dari pencarian sumber energi tersebut.

Kata-Kata Kunci*: India, kebangkitan ekonomi, teknologi informasi, keamanan energi, konflik.*

India telah menjadi satu kekuatan ekonomi yang patut diperhitungkan dunia. Ahmed (2007) menunjukkan bahwa kemajuan ekonomi India telah membuatnya menjadi kekuatan ekonomi keempat dunia setelah Amerika Serikat, Cina, dan Jepang. *The Jakarta Post* (2010) bahkan melaporkan bahwa ekonomi India tumbuh sekitar 8,8 persen sampai tahun 2008. Bahkan ketika krisis ekonomi global melanda dunia pun ekonomi India hanya turun "sedikit" menjadi 6,7 persen. Pertanyaannya kemudian apakah perkembangan ekonomi India ini akan menjadikannya kekuatan utama ekonomi dunia di masa datang? Apa faktor yang paling mungkin menghambat kemajuan ekonomi India? Inilah yang coba dijawab oleh penulis dalam tulisan ini.

Penulis mencoba melihat isu ini dalam konteks keamanan energi di India. Penulis menemukan fakta bahwa kemampuan India untuk memenuhi kebutuhan energi yang terus meningkat amat tergantung pada impor dari negara lain. Hal ini, ditambah fakta bahwa negara lain di kawasan seperti Pakistan (yang secara historis dan kultural selalu bermasalah dengan India) dan Cina (yang dianggap sebagai ancaman terbesar bagi kemajuan India) juga mengalami potensial mengalami krisis energi, menjadikan potensi konflik terkait energi amat besar. Penulis menyimpulkan bahwa salah satu faktor utama yang bisa menghambat peningkatan posisi India sebagai kekuatan ekonomi utama dunia adalah krisis energi yang membayangi kemajuan ekonominya.

Kilas Balik Pandangan tentang Kebangkitan Ekonomi India

Beberapa artikel yang mencoba membahas mengenai kebangkitan ekonomi India biasanya kurang menekankan aspek-aspek energi. Devesh Kapur dan Ravi Ramamurti (2001) misalnya, mencoba melihat kebangkitan ekonomi India dari aspek *knowledge-based services*. Sementara artikel dari Sumit Ganguli (2006) mencoba melihat efek dari kebangkitan ekonomi India pada konflik Kashmir, dan kemudian menyimpulkan bahwa isu Kashmir kemungkinan besar tidak akan mempengaruhi kemajuan ekonomi India. Terkait isu energi, hanya artikel dari Martin Walker dan Sanjaya Baru yang sedikit membahas mengenai masalah energi. Martin Walker (2006) hanya menekankan pada aspek persaingan antara Cina dan India dalam mencari sumber-sumber energi, tanpa melihat lebih dalam mengenai kondisi ketersediaan dan kebutuhan energi India. Sementara Sanjaya Baru (2002) lebih melihat adanya kebutuhan India untuk mengamankan kondisi keamanan energinya apabila India ingin terus meningkatkan pertumbuhan ekonominya. Mengutip Baru (2002, 2592), "To sustain this growth process, however, India will have to ensure the security of energy supplies...". Ini menandakan pentingnya melihat bagaimana sebenarnya kondisi keamanan energi di India dan kemudian menelaah efek dari kondisi tersebut.

Fakta I: Basis Kebangkitan Ekonomi India

Bagian ini mencoba melihat sekilas mengenai dasar-dasar ekonomi India dan perkiraan kebutuhan energi dari industri informasi India. Kapur dan Ramamurti (2001) secara umum menyimpulkan, berdasarkan data-data yang ada, bahwa ekonomi India tidak begitu tergantung kepada investasi asing dan perdagangan internasional. Ini menyebabkan India tidak begitu terpengaruh oleh krisis finansial Asia tahun 1997-1998. Kondisi ini juga ditelaah oleh Faizal bin Yahya (2008) yang menunjukkan bahwa dibandingkan dengan Cina, bahkan dengan Singapura, India termasuk sangat kecil rasio investasi asingnya. Tabel 1 menunjukkan perbandingan tersebut, dengan fakta bahwa India hanya menyumbang sekitar 0,8 persen dari total investasi asing dunia.

Tabel 1
Investasi Asing di Cina, India, dan Singapura (2002-2004)

Country	FDI Inflows (US$ billion)			Share in World FDI Inflows (%)		
	2002	2003	2004	2002	2003	2004
China	52.74	53.51	60.63	7.36	8.46	9.35
India	3.45	4.27	5.34	0.48	0.67	0.82
Singapore	5.82	9.33	16.06	0.81	1.47	2.48

sumber: Bin Yahya 2008, 15.

Kapur dan Ramamurti adalah salah satu ahli yang menganggap kebangkitan ekonomi India didasari pola-pola *knowledge-based services* yang berkembang di sana. Hal ini didasarkan pada fakta yang menunjukkan bahwa pertumbuhan industri perangkat lunak India mencapai 50 persen per tahun (Kapur & Ramamurti 2001, p.23). Sengupta dan Neogi (2009) berargumen bahwa industri India sedang berada di persimpangan, dengan kondisi sektor teknologi informasi yang berkembang pesat di satu sisi dan industri tradisional serta pertanian yang tidak berkembang di sisi lain. Ini didukung oleh penelitian Dahlman dan Utz (2005) mengenai kondisi ekonomi India. Tabel 2 menunjukkan bagaimana kondisi ekonomi India pada periode 1997-2003.

Tabel 2
Produk Domestik Bruto India (1997-2003)

TABLE 1-1
India's Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1997–2003
(percentage share of total)

	1997–98	1998–99	1999–2000	2000–01	2001–02	2002–03
Agriculture	26.5	26.4	25.0	23.8	23.9	22.0
Industry						
Mining	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.4
Construction	5.0	5.0	5.1	5.2	5.1	5.3
Electricity, gas, and water	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4
Manufacturing	17.7	17.0	16.7	17.2	16.8	17.2
Services	45.8	46.6	48.3	48.9	49.5	50.8

sumber: Dahlman & Utz 2005, 4.

Tabel 2 memperlihatkan penurunan persentase kontribusi sektor pertanian dan manufaktur dalam ekonomi India. Peningkatan berarti justru nampak dari sektor jasa yang meningkat sekitar 5 persen. Data dari Economy Watch (http://www.economywatch.com/) menunjukkan bahwa pada tahun 2009, sektor jasa semakin menjadi faktor dominan dalam ekonomi India, dengan persentase sekitar 58,4 persen dari Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Sektor pertanian nampak terus menurun, dengan persentase menjadi 15,8 persen dari GDP pada tahun 2009. Peningkatan yang signifikan terjadi juga di sektor manufaktur, dari 17,2 persen pada tahun 2003 menjadi sekitar 25 persen tahun 2009. Walaupun begitu, kontribusi sektor jasa, terutama sektor teknologi informasi diakui menjadi tulang punggung ekonomi India, dengan menyerap sekitar 62,6 persen tenaga kerja aktif.

Beberapa fakta tersebut menunjukkan bagaimana ketergantungan India pada sektor jasa, terutama sektor jasa teknologi informasi. Pertanyaannya kemudian, apakah memang sektor ini membutuhkan banyak sumber energi? Seberapa besar kebutuhan energi India sebenarnya? Pertanyaan-pertanyaan ini dibahas lebih lanjut pada bagian selanjutnya.

Fakta II: Kondisi Keamanan Energi India

Cukup sulit untuk menemukan seberapa besar konsumsi energi dari sektor jasa dan teknologi informasi. Gambaran nyata yang didapatkan penulis hanya berkisar pada fakta bahwa pendirian pusat-pusat IT (Information Technology) membutuhkan energi listrik yang cukup besar, sekitar 110 Kilovolts dengan daya sekitar 10 MegaWatt per satu komplek IT (Bin Yahya 2008). Walaupun tanpa ada data yang cukup lengkap mengenai berapa jumlah konsumsi total listrik India dari sektor jasa, namun Shazili (2007, 138) menunjukkan bahwa India sedang gencar membangun pembangkit listrik untuk memenuhi kebutuhan listriknya. Fakta yang ditunjukkan oleh Bin Yahya (2008) mengenai krisis energi di kawasan Bangalore, karena kurangnya listrik untuk menghidupi kawasan pusat IT tersebut menunjukkan semakin pentingnya arti energi, terutama pembangkit listrik, bagi India. Analisis dari Gupta et al. (2005) menunjukkan bahwa masalah listrik potensial menjadi masalah utama energi di India, dengan fakta dan prediksi bahwa kebutuhan energi India akan meningkat dua kali lipat dari kebutuhan tahun 2005.

Data dari Kementerian Lingkungan-Kehutanan serta dari Menteri Energi India (2007) memang menunjukkan bahwa konsumsi energi di India termasuk yang cukup rendah dibandingkan dengan negara-negara ekonomi maju lainnya. Grafik 1 berikut menunjukkan perbandingan konsumsi energi India dengan beberapa negara lain.

Grafik 1
Perbandingan Konsumsi Energi per Kapita (2007)



sumber: Government of India 2007

Dari Tabel 1 bisa dilihat bahwa konsumsi energi India termasuk yang terkecil, bahkan bila dibandingkan dengan negara-negara seperti Cina, Brazil, apalagi dengan negara-negara industri maju seperti Kanada, Amerika Serikat, Jepang, Inggris, bahkan dengan Malaysia. Ini bisa berarti dua hal: Pertama, bahwa India memiliki pola hidup serta industri yang ramah lingkungan, sehingga tidak membebani kebutuhan energi; Kedua, India secara umum tidak memiliki infrastruktur yang baik terkait aspek energi ini, sehingga walaupun sebenarnya kebutuhan akan energi cukup besar, tetapi konsumsi-nya menjadi sangat sedikit. Dari fakta krisis energi yang telah dijelaskan sebelumnya maka penulis cenderung menganggap bahwa yang terjadi di India adalah pilihan kedua, yaitu infrastruktur India tidak baik sehingga kebutuhan besar terutama listrik bagi sektor IT tidak terpenuhi dan konsumsinya masih sedikit.

Pemerintah India, apabila berkaca pada laporan tahun 2007, menyatakan bahwa rendahnya konsumsi dikarenakan efisiennya pabrik-pabrik di India serta penggunaan energi terbarukan seperti angin dan air (Government of India 2007). Namun, perlu dilihat pula bahwa ternyata pemakaian energi di India justru lebih banyak berasal dari sektor rumah tangga (EarthTrends 2003). Diagram 1 menunjukkan hal tersebut.

Diagram 1
Konsumsi Energi di India Berdasarkan Sektor Ekonomi (1999)



Sumber: EarthTrends 2003

Fakta ini, disertai pula dengan argument bahwa sektor industri manufaktur di India yang belum begitu berkembang (Kapur & Ramamurti 2001, 31) semakin mencerminkan bahwa sebenarnya kebutuhan energi di India cukup tinggi. Apalagi bila diperhatikan, argumen pemerintah India didasarkan pada data konsumsi per kapita, yang tentu saja akan berbeda tergantung jumlah penduduk negara. Data dari IEA tahun 2006, yang menggambarkan konsumsi energi total suatu negara, menunjukkan hal berbeda, seperti digambarkan pada Tabel 3.

Tabel 3
Konsumsi Energi Total Negara (1990, 2000, dan 2005)
(dalam kilo tonnes of oil equivalent)

Negara	Tahun 1990	Tahun 2000	Tahun 2005	Peningkatan (1990-2005)	Peningkatan (2000-2005)
USA	1,926,258	2,302,554	2,341,883	21,57%	1.7 %
Cina	863,212	1,104,904	1,717,153	98,93%	55,41 %
Rusia	878,272	613,940	646,680	-26,37%	5,3 %
Jepang	443,917	526,622	528,384	19,03%	0,3 %

India	319,892	459,561	537,309	67,97%	16,92 %
Brazil	133,950	185,697	209,534	56,43%	12,83 %
DUNIA	8,757,734	10,029,174	11,433,918	30, 56%	14 %

sumber: IEA 2006

Dari tabel tersebut nampak jelas bahwa peningkatan kebutuhan energi India merupakan suatu hal yang nyata. Bahkan, dibandingkan peningkatan kebutuhan energi dunia, India dan Cina serta Brazil jauh melewati peningkatan tersebut. Apabila melihat peningkatan dari tahun 2000 ke tahun 2005, maka nampak bahwa hanya Cina dan India yang menjadi motor peningkatan konsumsi energi dunia. Data ini pun hanya melihat konsumsi nyata, bukan memperkirakan peningkatan konsumsi tersebut dan bukan pula mencoba melihat seberapa besar sebenarnya kebutuhan energi India. Peningkatan kondisi ekonomi, semakin maraknya industri tingkat tinggi, semakin makmur masyarakat, dan peningkatan industri manufaktur untuk kebutuhan domestik berpotensi meningkatkan kebutuhan energi India lebih besar lagi. Pertanyaannya kemudian, dari mana India akan memenuhi kebutuhan ini dan apakah kondisi ini merupakan ancaman atau peluang bagi negara lain di kawasan?

Kemampuan Domestik India dalam Pemenuhan Kebutuhan Energi

Sebelum melihat lebih lanjut mengenai program pemerintah India untuk memenuhi kebutuhan energinya, perlu melihat apakah sumber daya domestik India cukup untuk memenuhi kebutuhannya. Data yang dikumpulkan Shalizi (2007, 136) menunjukkan bahwa sampai tahun 2003, rasio antara produksi dan konsumsi energi di India justru negatif, dalam artian bahwa produksi energi India tidak mencukupi kebutuhan energinya. Grafik 2 menunjukkan kenyataan tersebut.

Grafik 2
Perbandingan Produksi dan Konsumsi Minyak India (1990-2009)



Bisa dilihat bahwa produksi minyak India jauh dibawah kebutuhan konsumsinya. Hal yang sama berlaku pada sumber energi lain seperti gas alam, kecuali batu bara. Cadangan batubara India, melihat dari statistik energi dunia yang dikeluarkan BP (2010), merupakan salah satu yang tertinggi. India berada dalam posisi keempat dunia terkait jumlah cadangan batubara dengan *share* sebesar 7,1% dari cadangan dunia, di bawah Amerika Serikat, Rusia, dan Cina. Namun, dalam soal minyak dan gas, India hanya menyumbang 0,4% dari total cadangan minyak dunia pada akhir tahun 2009 dan hanya 0,6% dari total cadangan gas dunia pada akhir tahun 2009. Tabel 4 semakin menguatkan anggapan bahwa India mengalami defisit energi yang bila dibiarkan dalam waktu lama potensial menyebabkan krisis energi.

Tabel 4
Kebutuhan dan Ketersediaan Energi India (2006)

Energy Source	Demand	Supply	Gap/Shortage
Electricity (Jan 2006) (In Million KWh)	5,21,872	4,80,242	(41,630)
Oil (In MMT)	128	33*	(95)
Gas (In Mmscmd)	162.03	81.17	(80.86)
Coal (In MT)	415 MT	378.6	(36.4)

* Domestic Production

sumber: The Energy and Resources Institute 2006.

Bagaimana dengan energi nuklir? Kepemilikan India akan nuklir membuka opsi penggunaan energi nuklir untuk memenuhi kebutuhan energinya. Namun, fakta menunjukkan bahwa pembagian pemenuhan energi India justru tidak menekankan pada energi nuklir. Shalizi (2007, 140) menuliskan bahwa batubara memenuhi sekitar 36 persen kebutuhan energi India, minyak sekitar 9 persen, gas alam sekitar 5 persen, hidroelektrik dan nuklir sekitar 1 persen, dan sisanya dipenuhi melalui sumberdaya terbarui seperti kayu dan kotoran hewan. Masalahnya kemudian, India bukanlah negara dengan jumlah cadangan batubara yang sangat besar. Data dari British Petroleum menunjukkan bahwa produksi batubara India hanya 211,5 MTOE (Millon Tonnes of Oil Equivalent) dengan konsumsi sekitar 245 MTOE.

Konsumsi nuklir India hanya sekitar 3,8 MTOE, yang jelas tidak sepadan dengan kebutuhan dan proyeksi pertumbuhan India saat ini. Nuklir, walaupun menjadi salah satu senjata India di arena politik internasional, ternyata bukan menjadi sumber energi utama di India. Fakta mengenai kurangnya relevansi nuklir dalam memproduksi energi, terutama energi listrik, nampak pada Grafik 3 di bawah ini.

Grafik 3
Kontribusi Sumber Daya Alam
terhadap Produksi Listrik India



sumber: Shukla et al. 2007, 6.

Nampak jelas dalam Grafik 3 bahwa batubara masih menjadi sumber utama penyediaan energi India, sementara nuklir, walaupun berkembang, hanya memberikan sedikit kontribusi bagi pemenuhan energi India secara umum. Dengan begitu, jelas bahwa kemampuan domestik India tidak akan mampu memenuhi proyeksi pertumbuhan kebutuhan energi India. Lantas apa yang dilakukan pemerintah India untuk memenuhi kebutuhan energinya?

Kebijakan Luar Negeri India terkait Pemenuhan Kebutuhan Energi

Pernyataan resmi Presiden India pada tahun 2005, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, mengisyaratkan bahwa India sebenarnya tidak mampu memenuhi kebutuhan energi mengandalkan sumber domestik. Kalam mengatakan bahwa:

> ...convergence of our foreign policy and our domestic needs is striking in the context of our energy security...My government will give full importance to synchronizing our diplomatic activity with our need for

> energy to fuel our development needs… (Kalam dalam Kiesow & Norling 2007, 86).

Satu poin penting yang kemudian menjadi karakter politik luar negeri India adalah Look East Policy. Ini menjadi arah kebijakan ekonomi politik luar negeri India pasca reformasi ekonomi tahun 1991 (Bin Yahya 2008, 33). Bin Yahya (2008) juga mencatat beberapa hal yang mendasari Look East Policy ini diantaranya adalah semakin menguatnya ekonomi negara-negara Asia Tenggara, adanya kedekatan kultural melalui agama Hindu dan Buddha, kurang berfungsinya organisasi regional Asia Selatan SAARC (South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation), dan keinginan India untuk meredam pengaruh Cina di kawasan Asia Tenggara. Wawancara dengan Rajiv Sikri, Special Secretary untuk masalah Look East Policy ini juga menunjukkan bahwa Look East Policy lebih ditujukan untuk menyeimbangkan kekuatan India dan Cina di kawasan Asia Tenggara dan untuk kepentingan perdagangan bebas India dan negara-negara ASEAN (Strachan et al. 2009).

Nampak bahwa Look East Policy dari pemerintah India ini tidak dalam konteks pencarian energi demi pemenuhan kebutuhan energi India, melainkan justru demi kepentingan politis (meredam Cina) dan kepentingan ekonomi (membuka perdagangan dengan negara-negara ASEAN). Demi pencarian energi, pemerintah India justru bergerak ke arah Barat, menuju negara-negara Timur Tengah, dan Utara kepada negara-negara Asia Tengah.

Kiesow dan Norling (2007) menuliskan bahwa pemerintah India telah melakukan beberapa langkah besar untuk mengamankan sumber energi demi kelangsungan pertumbuhan ekonominya. Salah satunya adalah melalui kerjasama pembangunan pipa gas dengan Qatar. Cara lain adalah dengan kerjasama Asian Development Bank untuk membangun pipa gas dari Turkmenistan melalui Afghanistan. Pembangunan pipa dari Pakistan melewati Kashmir juga sempat dikaji oleh India, selain usulan untuk membangun pipa gas melalui Iran ataupun bahkan kerjasama dengan Cina. Dari semua usulan tersebut, Kiesow dan Norling (2007) menunjukkan bahwa walaupun semuanya sampai sekarang gagal terwujud dikarenakan permasalahan politik, sebenarnya ada peluang untuk bekerjasama karena semua negara di sekitar India (seperti Pakistan dan Cina) membutuhkan energi dan hanya kerjasama yang memungkinkan *win-win solution* tercapai.

Disinilah kemudian pertanyaan mengenai ancaman ataupun peluang dari kebangkitan ekonomi India menemukan relevansinya. Penulis menganggap kebutuhan India akan energi ini justru bisa menjadi ancaman bagi negara-negara lain di sekitarnya. Walker (2006) sudah menggambarkan persaingan antara India dengan Cina untuk berebut sumber energi. Penulis kurang sependapat dengan argumen tersebut. Penulis justru menekankan bahwa isu kebutuhan akan energi ini potensial menjadi ancaman bagi negara-negara sekitarnya. Terlebih, ada persoalan kedekatan India dengan Amerika Serikat yang juga menghambat terciptanya kerjasama. India, secara kultural, selalu bermasalah ketika pipa gas ingin dibuat melalui Pakistan. Ini berarti mencoret semua upaya kerjasama dengan Pakistan dalam mengatasi masalah energi. Terkait kerjasama dengan Iran, Amerika Serikat selalu berusaha menghalangi, dan India pun kesulitan bekerjasama dengan Iran di bawah Ahmadinejad. Kerjasama dengan Cina sebenarnya memungkinkan, namun sulit dilakukan mengingat kebutuhan Cina akan sumber daya pun begitu besar. Ini diperparah dengan anggapan India bahwa Cina merupakan ancaman bagi kemajuan India, seperti tercermin dalam pernyataan Menteri Pertahanan India tahun 1998 tentang posisi Cina sebagai ancaman terbesar bagi India (Walker 2006, 24).

Yang terjadi kemudian, India mencoba “bermain” di level global dengan membeli saham-saham perusahaan minyak ataupun gas asing. Perusahaan minyak negara milik India, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) misalnya, membeli seperlima dari lading minyak Iran di Yadavaran, membeli saham dari raksasa minyak Rusia Yukos, membeli saham ExxonMobil di Siberia (Walker 2006, 25) dan juga di negara-negara lain seperti Myanmar, Venezuela, Sudan, Irak, Vietnam, dan Libya (Kiesow & Norling 2007, 86). Walaupun terlihat seperti peluang bagi negara-negara lain, namun di kawasan Asia Selatan dan sekitarnya, kondisi ini sebenarnya berpotensi menimbulkan konflik, terutama dengan Cina dan Pakistan. Anggapan mantan Menteri Perdagangan India, Shankar Ayar, bahwa “...where an Indian goes in quest of energy, chances are that he will run into a Chinese engaged in the same hunt...” (Walker 2006, 26) justru menunjukkan tingginya kemungkinan konflik di antara keduanya.

Secara umum, kebijakan luar negeri India terkait pencarian energi ini cukup berbeda dengan konsep Look East Policy yang menjadi salah satu dasar politik luar negeri India. Walaupun begitu, Look East Policy sebenarnya berkontribusi pada kemungkinan konflik yang bisa terjadi antara India dengan Cina. Fakta bahwa secara ekonomis kebijakan Look East Policy amat penting bagi India justru memberikan justifikasi bahwa India memang ingin bersaing dengan Cina. Look East Policy memang tidak terkait langsung dengan upaya India bekerjasama dengan Vietnam dan Myanmar terkait energi, karena salah satu fokus utama pencarian energi India adalah Iran. Namun, Look East Policy bisa juga dipandang sebagai upaya India untuk menggarisbawahi keinginannya, sesuai anggapan Menteri Shankar Ayar, untuk terus mengikuti Cina kemanapun Cina pergi.

Simpulan

Ada beberapa hal yang bisa disimpulkan dari keseluruhan tulisan ini. Pertama, bahwa ekonomi India memang amat bergantung pada sektor jasa dan informasi teknologi. Ini, mengikuti argumen Modelski, merupakan pola penguasaan terhadap sektor utama perekonomian global. Fakta-fakta yang menunjukkan bahwa komposisi ekonomi India, baik dari GDP maupun penyerapan tenaga kerja, di atas 50 persen bergantung pada sektor jasa dan teknologi informasi.

Kedua, kebutuhan energi India diproyeksikan akan semakin tinggi di masa datang, terutama dari sektor rumah tangga. Sektor jasa dan teknologi informasi, walaupun tidak ada data yang cukup jelas, bisa dilihat potensial mengonsumsi energi listrik negara dengan cukup besar.

Ketiga, fakta bahwa kemampuan India secara domestik untuk memenuhi kebutuhan energinya amat kurang. Bahkan sektor nuklir, yang dianggap menjadi masa depan energi India, juga tidak berkontribusi banyak terhadap pemenuhan energi India. Impor dan kerjasama dengan negara lain menjadi salah satu kunci pemenuhan energi India kedepannya.

Keempat, bahwa kebijakan Look East Policy, yang mewarnai politik luar negeri India pasca reformasi ekonomi 1991, ternyata bukan menjadi dasar pencarian energi India. India justru lebih menekankan pada kawasan di Barat, seperti Timur Tengah dan Asia Tengah serta Afrika. Kelima, semakin tingginya potensi konflik antara India dengan Cina ataupun dengan Pakistan dikarenakan semakin agresifnya India mencari sumber energi lain demi pemenuhan kebutuhan energinya yang semakin tinggi.

Di akhir tulisan ini, penulis ingin kembali kepada pertanyaan awal, mengenai kemajuan ekonomi India sebagai ancaman atau peluang. Terkait isu energi, penulis melihat banyaknya peluang konflik karena negara-negara besar di kawasan seperti Pakistan dan Cina juga mengalami kekurangan sumber energi, sama dengan India. Konflik perebutan energi, baik dari Asia Tengah maupun dari Iran, potensial menghambat laju ekonomi India. Walaupun demikian, mengingat karakteristik ekonomi India yang tidak tergantung dari industri manufaktur, bisa jadi krisis yang akan dialami akibat kekurangan energi tidak sebesar krisis energi yang akan dialami Cina. Tetapi tidak bisa dipungkiri bahwa ketiadaan sumber energi domestik, dan ketergantungan pada impor energi akan berpotensi mempengaruhi perkembangan ekonomi India di masa datang.

Apakah kemudian permasalahan energi ini akan menghambat kemajuan ekonomi India? Mengingat keterkaitan antara industri teknologi informasi dengan kebutuhan akan energi listrik yang cukup besar, penulis menganggap isu keamanan energi ini menjadi salah satu faktor yang menghambat peningkatan posisi India menjadi kekuatan ekonomi global di masa depan. Kondisi ini juga potensial memicu konflik antara India dengan Cina, sebagai dua kekuatan ekonomi Asia yang sama-sama mengalami masalah soal energi. Konflik dengan Cina jelas akan menghambat kemajuan ekonomi dan politik India di arena internasional, namun sejarha menunjukkan bahwa sebuah negara bisa menjadi kekuatan dunia setelah melalui tahapan ini. Apabila India mampu menyelesaikan masalah energinya, penulis yakin bahwa India akan lebih mampu bertahan menjadi kekuatan ekonomi global daripada Cina.

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Peran Diaspora India dalam Mendukung Diplomasi Kebudayaan India di Indonesia

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ABSTRAK

The phenomena of India's rise became one of the most interesting topics in the history. India's rise couldn't be separated from the migration in the 1960s and 1970s. Based on that fact, the Indian government promoted the image-building of India to the international community in their goals to reach the Incredible India 2011. This image-building efforts was illuminated by the creation of the Public Diplomacy's Division in India's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ability of Indian diaspora to keep the relations with their home country and to keep their culture intact outside Indian territory forced the government to realize that the diasporic community is an important element to reach their national interest through the cultural diplomacy. In this paper, I describe to what extent the role of the Indian diaspora in supporting India's cultural diplomacy in Indonesia.

Keywords: *Indian diaspora, culture, cultural diplomacy, diasporic role.*

Fenomena kebangkitan India menjadi salah satu topik menarik yang tidak bisa dilupakan dari catatan sejarah. Kebangkitan India tidak lepas dari migrasi yang banyak dilakukan warga negara ini pada 1960-an dan 1970-an. Sejalan dengan hal tersebut, pemerintah India sedang menggalakkan upaya pembentukan citra India di mata masyarakat Internasional dalam tujuannya untuk mencapai The Incredible India 2011. *Upaya pembentukan citra ini ditunjukkan dengan dibentuknya Divisi Diplomasi Publik pada Kementerian Luar Negeri India. Kemampuan diaspora India untuk tetap menjaga hubungan dengan negara asal mereka dan tetap mempertahankan kebudayaan India di luar batas India memberi kesadaran tersendiri bagi pemerintah India bahwa kedudukan diaspora ini penting untuk menunjang pencapaian kepentingan nasional negara India melalui diplomasi kebudayaan. Dalam tulisan ini, digambarkan sejauh mana ruang lingkup peranan diaspora India dalam upaya mendukung diplomasi kebudayaan India di Indonesia.*

Kata-Kata Kunci*: diaspora India, kebudayaan, diplomasi kebudayaan, peranan diaspora.*

Diaspora India sudah ada di Indonesia sejak berabad-abad lalu. Tidak ada sumber yang jelas menyebutkan sebenarnya sejak tahun berapakah orang-orang India berada di Indonesia. Banyaknya situs sejarah membuktikan jejak dan keberadaan hubungan antara India dengan Indonesia memang sudah lama. Jika dilihat dari situs sejarahnya, beberapa sumber mengatakan bahwa kebudayaan India sudah ada di Indonesia sekitar tahun 1-5 M (Munandar 2005). Karena itu, sulit memastikan sejak tahun berapa diaspora India masuk ke Indonesia.

Diaspora dahulunya lebih digunakan untuk menggambarkan seseorang yang melakukan perpindahan ke luar dari daerah asalnya. Seiring dengan perkembangan zaman, arti diaspora juga semakin meluas. Saat ini, diaspora juga dapat diartikan sebagai imigran, pekerja tamu, pengungsi, ekspatriat, pengasingan, komunitas luar negeri, bahkan komunitas etnis. Definisi lain bahkan mengatakan bahwa diaspora merupakan penduduk yang merupakan bagian dari suatu negara yang tinggal di luar tanah airnya (Connor 1986, dalam Levi, Multanis, dan Shikarpuris 2007, 16).

Apabila merujuk pada pengertian diaspora di atas, maka diaspora India dalam istilah umum dapat diartikan sebagai orang-orang yang bermigrasi dari wilayah yang masih berada dalam batas-batas Republik India ke luar negara India. Diaspora terbagi dalam dua komunitas besar yang dikenal oleh masyarakat India dan dunia selama ini, yakni NRIs yang merupakan warga negara asli India namun bertempat tinggal tidak di India, dan PIOs yang merupakan warga negara asli India tapi juga telah memperoleh kewarganegaraan dari beberapa negara lain tempat mereka berdomisili sementara saat itu (The Indian Diaspora 2004).

Selama tiga dekade terakhir, India mengalami kemajuan yang sangat pesat. India bahkan menjadi fokus utama diplomasi publik Amerika Serikat di kawasan Asia Selatan, terlepas dari program pengembangan nuklirnya. Banyak diaspora India yang tersebar di seluruh dunia memiliki peran tersendiri (Faiz 2007). Di Indonesia, ada ikatan cukup erat antara kebudayaan India dengan Indonesia. India dan Indonesia sama-sama memiliki kebudayaan Hindu Kuno yang kuat, dibuktikan dengan banyaknya pendirian candi-candi jejak peninggalan Hindu Kuno. Situs-situs sejarah ini memperlihatkan adanya inter-relasi yang terkait di antara dua negara. Masuknya budaya Islam ke Indonesia juga tidak bisa dilepaskan dari peranan pedagang Gujarat India yang berdagang di Selat Malaka.

Diaspora India di Indonesia sendiri sebenarnya merupakan hal yang unik. Kedatangan masyarakat India ke Indonesia sebenarnya merupakan suatu ketidaksengajaan. Masyarakat India masuk melalui Medan, Sumatra Utara, atas permintaan perkebunan Belanda saat itu yang membutuhkan banyak tenaga kerja dari Penang, Malaysia. Kebetulan, di Penang saat itu, banyak imigran yang datang dari India untuk mencari pekerjaan. Penerimaan masyarakat Medan saat itu terhadap kehadiran masyarakat India di Medan dan Sumatra Utara sangat baik. Mereka saling berbaur tanpa ada masalah. Kondisi ini pula yang menjadikan sebagian besar diaspora India saat itu merasa nyaman sehingga memutuskan untuk tinggal dan merintis usaha baru di Indonesia.

Beberapa kuil India dan sekolah India yang dibangun di Medan tanpa masalah merupakan pertanda keberadaan diaspora ini sangat dihormati di Medan (*Media Indonesia*, 2010). Usaha-usaha yang dirintis oleh masyarakat India di Medan juga tidak pernah mengalami kendala berarti. Bahkan, sebagian besar masyarakat India yang tinggal di Indonesia telah mendapat kewarganegaraan penuh dari pemerintah Indonesia. Berawal dari Medan inilah kemudian masyarakat India mulai menyebar ke daerah Sumatra yang lain, termasuk ke luar pulau seperti Jawa dan Bali.

Ikatan yang kuat antara diaspora India dengan Indonesia menjadikan langkah pemerintah lebih mudah untuk melaksanakan diplomasi kebudayaannya. Diplomasi kebudayaan merupakan suatu kegiatan diplomasi yang menggunakan unsur kebudayaan sebagai sarana untuk membentuk citra suatu negara di mata negara lain dalam dunia internasional. Diplomasi kebudayaan ini memiliki fokus yang lebih dalam daripada diplomasi publik. Diplomasi kebudayaan harus menggerakkan masyarakat untuk mendapat respon yang baik dari masyarakat pula. Selain pameran kebudayaan, diplomasi kebudayaan dapat dikatakan berhasil apabila kebudayaan yang disampaikan itu sendiri dapat diterima dengan baik di kalangan masyarakat lainnya.

Diplomasi kebudayaan India untuk Indonesia sejauh ini meliputi kegiatan berupa program pertukaran lintas budaya, program pertukaran pelajar, program kunjungan budaya, konferensi dan workshop budaya internasional, dan program beasiswa (www.diplomacy.edu, 2002). Diplomasi kebudayaan tersebut merupakan kegiatan resmi yang dilakukan oleh perwakilan pemerintah India di Indonesia untuk mencapai tujuan diplomasinya. Dalam pelaksanaan diplomasi kebudayaan ini, perwakilan pemerintah India tentu saja sangat membutuhkan peran serta dan partisipasi aktif dari diaspora India yang berada di Indonesia. Terkait perwujudan The Incredible India 2011, pemerintah India semakin perlu untuk benar-benar membentuk citra yang baik tentang negaranya di mata Indonesia. Seperti yang dikatakan Evan Barker dalam film *Evan Almighty*: “Saat kau disorot publik, citra adalah segalanya.” (Shadyac 2007).

Seiring dengan perkembangan zaman, intensitas publik ke dalam lingkup pemerintahan semakin luas. Memasuki era globalisasi dan informasi, segala kegiatan pemerintah dan masyarakatnya dapat terpantau melalui ruang semu yang bernama internet. Pergerakan *network society* dalam situs-situs pertemanan seperti Friendster, Facebook, dan Twitter memberikan dampak baik dan buruk bagi pemerintahan. Dampak baiknya dirasakan apabila pemerintah mampu mengontrol pergerakan tersebut. Dampak buruknya adalah ketika pemerintah tidak bisa lagi mengontrol dan pergerakan *network society* malah justru akan membahayakan keamanan negara. Sadar dengan kondisi ini, pemerintah India pun menyadari arti pentingnya keberadaan diaspora India untuk mencapai diplomasi kebudayaannya di Indonesia. Peran dan partisipasi aktif masyarakat diaspora India menjadi kunci keberhasilan India dalam melaksanakan diplomasi tersebut. Dalam berbagai sektor (seperti pendidikan, perekonomian, hiburan, dan olah raga), masyarakat India mendapat tempat yang setara dengan masyarakat Indonesia. Tidak jarang masyarakat Indonesia juga berperan serta dalam kegiatan-kegiatan kebudayaan yang dilakukan oleh masyarakat India di Indonesia, seperti pameran kebudayaan dan seni dari India.

Diplomasi kebudayaan yang merupakan akar diplomasi publik merupakan kegiatan diplomasi yang tidak hanya berlaku pada *government-to-government* (*G to G*) melainkan langsung pada *people-to-people* (*P to P*). Dalam pelaksanaannya, diplomasi kebudayaan sangat membutuhkan peran masyarakat untuk memperoleh hasil seperti yang diharapkan. Kedua diplomasi ini sebenarnya sama-sama bertujuan untuk meraih citra yang lebih baik. Berbeda dengan diplomasi publik yang masih melibatkan pemerintah untuk turun langsung ke masyarakat, dalam diplomasi kebudayaan, masyarakat memegang peranan sejak awal. Unsur-unsur kebudayaan yang sangat lekat dengan kehidupan dan kebiasaan sehari-hari menjadi kunci terlaksananya diplomasi kebudayaan ini. Asimilasi budaya tidak akan menjadi sempurna apabila masih ada mediasi pemerintah di dalamnya. Membiarkan masyarakat melaksanakan budaya seperti yang seharusnya dengan kontrol dari pemerintah di belakangnya akan mempermudah pelaksanaan diplomasi kebudayaan ini selanjutnya.

Berbicara mengenai diplomasi, tidak bisa dilepaskan dari unsur kepentingan nasional di dalamnya. India menerapkan diplomasi kebudayaan di Indonesia juga untuk mencapai kepentingan nasional bagi negaranya. Kerjasama ekonomi dan hubungan bilateral yang lebih baik, pendukung pencapaian The Incredible India 2011, termasuk pembentukan dan perbaikan citra bangsa, merupakan tujuan utama India dalam diplomasi kebudayaannya. Sehingga, sejauh mana kemudian kepentingan nasional India tersebut dapat terwujud melalui diplomasi kebudayaan akan menjadi sangat tergantung pada bagaimana peran serta masyarakat diaspora India dilibatkan oleh perwakilan pemerintah India di Indonesia.

Aktivitas Diaspora India di Indonesia dalam Sektor Budaya

Populasi masyarakat India di Indonesia mencapai 500.000 orang. Jumlah ini sudah termasuk NRIs dan PIOs, yakni India keturunan dan India asli yang menetap di Indonesia. Di Surabaya, total populasi masyarakat India sekitar 500-600 jiwa. Jumlah masyarakat India yang paling banyak berdomisili di Sumatra Utara, tepatnya di Medan. Masyarakat India juga banyak yang berdomisili di Jawa dan Bali. Sisanya, sekitar 15%, terpencar di bagian Indonesia lain.

Sebagai negara dengan tingkat kebudayaan tinggi, masyarakat India di manapun mereka berada tidak pernah lupa untuk melestarikan kebudayaannya. Banyak diaspora India yang tetap memakaia pakaian tradisional sari dalam berbagai pertemuan. Dekorasi-dekorasi rumah ibadah dan tempat sembahyang sederhana ditemukan di setiap tempat tinggal masyarakat India di Indonesia. Logat bahasa India-British yang sangat kental juga sering dijumpai.

Diaspora India di Indonesia mewadahi keberadaan mereka dengan membentuk Indian Association. Selanjutnya, di tiap-tiap kota di Indonesia, Indian Association of Indonesia tersebut bercabang membentuk komunitas sesuai dengan kota tempat mereka tinggal. Salah satu contohnya adalah Indian Association of Surabaya dan Indian Club Jakarta. Setiap tahunnya, Indian Association of Surabaya, seperti halnya Indian Association di kota lain di Indonesia, memiliki tujuh kegiatan kebudayaan yang rutin mereka laksanakan. Rata-rata kegiatan kebudayaan ini berupa perayaan hari-hari kebudayaan India. Komunitas India ini tidak menutup masyarakat Indonesia di sekitar mereka untuk hadir dan berpartisipasi dalam pelaksanaannya.

Salah satu peranan Indian Association of Surabaya (IAS) yang dapat tercatat sebagai dukungan dalam diplomasi kebudayaan India di Indonesia adalah bantuan mereka terhadap pelaksanaan beasiswa yang diadakan oleh Kedutaan Besar India di Indonesia. Keberadaan Kedubes India yang hanya berdomisili di Jakarta, menyulitkan pelajar dari daerah di luar ibukota negara ini untuk menggali informasi lebih jauh dalam mencari beasiswa ke India. Keberadaan IAS di sini dapat dimanfaatkan untuk memberikan rekomendasi, yang nantinya akan diteruskan ke Kedubes India di Jakarta. Rekomendasi IAS sangat dipertimbangkan karena lembaga ini adalah komunitas India di Surabaya yang seringkali diandalkan untuk membantu program-

program kerja yang diselenggarakan oleh Kedubes dan Pusat Kebudayaan India di Jakarta. Di Jakarta, Indian Club Jakarta juga memiliki berbagai kegiatan kebudayaan setiap tahunnya. Pada 2010 mereka mengadakan lima kegiatan, yakni Laavani Darshan, Diwali Nite 2010, Young India's Leading Jam Rock Band, Talen Nite 2010, dan Gubbare 2010 (Indian Club Jakarta 2010).

Dalam usahanya untuk mengikat hubungan kebudayaan antara komunitas India yang tersebar di seluruh Indonesia, masyarakat India di Indonesia tidak selalu melakukan kegiatan berupa kebudayaan murni. Kegiatan selain budaya antara lain pertandingan olah raga untuk mempersatukan tali persaudaraan yang ada di antara mereka. Kegiatan-kegiatan yang mereka lakukan ini tidak hanya terbatas untuk kalangan tersendiri saja, tetapi juga untuk masyarakat Indonesia yang berada di sekitar mereka. Contohnya, bermain golf. Beberapa dari masyarakat India ini menyukai olah raga golf. Mereka sering ikut berpartisipasi dalam turnamen lokal Indonesia dan internasional. Mereka rutin menggelar turnamen golf se-Asia Pasifik yang mempertemukan masyarakat diaspora dari negara-negara Asia Pasifik lainnya. Turnamen ini bernama Asia Pasific Sikh Golf Championship (APSGC) yang digelar berpindah-pindah tempat dari satu negara ke negara lain di Asia Pasifik sebagai cara untuk mempererat ikatan antara diaspora India yang tersebar di Asia Pasifik (Singapore Khalsa Association 2010). Hingga saat ini, turnamen golf tersebut sudah terlaksana untuk tahun ketujuh, yang juga membuktikan bahwa penerimaan dan interaksi masyarakat diaspora oleh masyarakat lokal di masing-masing negara Asia Pasifik sangat baik. Dalam pelaksanaan turnamen golf ini, tak jarang masyarakat diaspora India juga mengajak serta tandem-tandem golf andalan mereka yang merupakan masyarakat lokal.

Berbicara mengenai tersebarnya diaspora India tidak akan bisa dilepaskan dari peran kuil India. Seperti yang telah dijabarkan di awal kedatangannya, peran kuil India bagi diaspora India sangat besar. Kuil-kuil India tersebut dengan sukarela membantu masyarakat imigran India dalam hal mencari pekerjaan sebelum akhirnya menetap di suatu negara. Hingga menjadi suatu masyarakat India yang sukses di negara lain, kuil menjadi tumpuan kebanyakan masyarakat India yang bermigrasi. Kondisi yang demikian menjadikan diaspora India memiliki ikatan yang sangat kuat dengan kuil-kuil India tempat mereka bernaung sebelumnya. Ikatan tersebut tetap terjalin hingga masyarakat India meraih sukses di negeri orang. Tak terkecuali di Indonesia, ikatan antara diaspora India di Indonesia dengan beberapa kuil India baik yang berada di Indonesia ataupun di negara lain, tetap kuat. Salah satu contoh kuil India yang ada di Indonesia adalah Kuil Shri Mariamman yang terletak di darah Kampung Madras, atau yang sering dikenal dengan Kampung Keling (Media Indonesia 2010). Kuil Shri Mariamman sering juga mengadakan kegiatan perayaan yang terbuka bagi masyarakat sekitarnya. Kuil ini juga membantu para korban bencana dalam menyalurkan donasi dan tenaga ke Aceh (2004), Padang (2009), dan Kepulauan Mentawai (2010). Kegiatan-kegiatan yang dilakukan masyarakat diaspora India ini secara tidak langsung membantu pendekatan diplomasi kebudayaan India di Indonesia. Dengan ini Kedubes India memperoleh citra yang baik atas kepedulian masyarakat diasporanya terhadap kondisi kehidupan sosial di Indonesia.

Kegiatan Diplomasi Kebudayaan India di Indonesia

India mulai menaruh perhatian lebih pada diplomasi publik sejak kampanye menuju The Incredible India 2011 (India Future of Change 2010) digalakkan pada 2002. Perhatian tersebut ditunjukkan pada 2006 dengan membentuk divisi khusus yang mengurusi masalah diplomasi publik pada Kementerian Luar Negeri (www.indiatimes.com, 2006). Dalam usaha memperkuat hubungannya dengan negara-negara di Asia Tenggara, termasuk Indonesia, India menggunakan kebudayaan (implementasi dari diplomasi publik) sebagai sarana penting dalam kebijakan luar negerinya dengan didukung oleh keunikan kebudayaan kuno India yang telah tersohor sejak zaman dahulu. Tidak seperti di masa lalu ketika diplomasi kebudayaan masih dipandang sebagai sarana yang kurang signifikan untuk mendominasi secara kultural, saat ini diplomasi kebudayaan berhasi mendapatkan kepercayaan dari negara-negara di dunia untuk menempatkan posisinya sebagai alat tawar penting yang tidak kalah dengan unsur lain yang sebelumnya lebih penting (Solomonidis 2009). Pada saat ini, diplomasi kebudayaan India terlihat sebagai upaya untuk mencapai harmonisasi budaya yang dilakukan India dengan tujuan dari kebijakan luar negeri India secara garis besar, yang juga diperkuat dengan kebudayaan India modern seperti penyebaran film-film India (Library Thinkquest, t.t.).

Pendirian pusat-pusat kebudayaan di berbagai negara merupakan implementasi dari pelaksanaan kegiatan diplomasi kebudayaan. Karena itu, kegiatan apapun yang dilaksanakan oleh pusat kebudayaan tersebut secara langsung merupakan implementasi langsung dari pelaksanaan diplomasi kebudayaan. Secara garis besar, diplomasi kebudayaan India di Asia Tenggara dan termasuk Indonesia memiliki beberapa tujuan. Yang pertama antara lain aspek penting dari diplomasi kebudayaan India adalah mengelola sekitar 6,4 juta diaspora India yang tersebar atau yang tinggal di Asia Tenggara. Selain di Indocina, semua negara di Asia Tenggara memiliki jumlah populasi India dalam jumlah cukup besar. Rata-rata diaspora India yang tersebar di negara-negara Asia Tenggara ini tidak hanya merupakan investor, namun juga memiliki peran penting dalam proses pembuatan keputusan di negara masing-

masing. Beberapa dari mereka bahkan memegang posisi penting di lembaga-lembanga pemerintahan dan non-pemerintahan. Dalam tujuannya untuk mengontrol perkembangan diaspora di negara-negara Asia Tenggara, pemerintah India telah mengeluarkan beberapa kebijakan. Sikap pemerintah India tersebut menegaskan kembali bahwa pemerintah India memiliki kepentingan yang ingin dipertahankan kepada diaspora yang menetap di Asia Tenggara, termasuk di Indonesia, yang telah memiliki hubungan baik dengan India (Photius 1995). Bahkan, pemerintah India juga berniat untuk mendirikan PIOs University (universitas yang nantinya dikhususkan bagi warga India yang tinggal di luar negeri, bukan tidak mungkin menjadi tempat belajar bagi warga asli di sana) dan yayasan seperti lembaga sosial yang bertujuan untuk mengembangkan keberadaan diaspora India sekaligus dapat memfasilitasi perkembangan sumber daya manusia India di luar (Kerala Education 2008).

Di Indonesia, pelaksanaan diplomasi kebudayaan India meliputi pameran kesenian, budaya, musik, tari, dan lain sebagainya. Sedikit yang membedakan adalah bahwa di Indonesia, pusat kebudayaan ini juga memberikan fasilitas perpustakaan yang cukup baik, supaya baik masyarakat Indonesia ataupun masyarakat India yang berada di Indonesia sendiri tidak kesulitan dalam mencari data atau sekadar ingin tahu lebih jauh mengenai India dan seluk-beluknya. Ada pula pelaksanaan diplomasi kebudayaan India juga termasuk melakukan kolaborasi antara pengajar-pengajar dari India asli dengan pengajar dari Indonesia untuk mendapatkan informasi yang lebih dalam dan saling sinkronisasi antara satu dengan lainnya dalam pelaksanaan kegiatan belajar dan mengajar supaya tidak melenceng jauh dari kurikulum yang sudah tersedia.

Pelaksanaan diplomasi kebudayaan India di Indonesia tidak bisa dilepaskan dari peran aktif diaspora India yang tinggal di Indonesia. Awalnya, diaspora ini memang memberikan arti penting di sektor perekonomian. Dalam perkembangannya, interaksi yang terjadi antara diaspora India dengan masyarakat Indonesia ternyata memiliki hubungan timbal-balik yang sangat baik dan tidak jarang malah saling menguntungkan. Interaksi diaspora India yang diterima dengan baik oleh masyarakat Indonesia ini mengindikasikan bahwa kerjasama antara kedua negara akan berjalan dengan baik dan penerapan kebijakan luar negeri India melalui diplomasi kebudayaannya akan dengan mudah tercapai di Indonesia, mengingat tidak sedikit dari masyarakat Indonesia yang memiliki inisiatif tinggi untuk mengenal lebih jauh kebudayaan India.

Salah satu contoh kegiatan kebudayaan yang resmi diadakan oleh pemerintah India di Indonesia adalah Pertunjukan Budaya yang merupakan kerjasama antara Kedutaan India melalui Pusat Kebudayaan di New Delhi (Bation Centre of Art and Ministry of Culture) dengan Dinas Pariwisata Propinsi Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta pada 1 November-12 Desember 2009 (www.krjogja.com, 2009). Pertunjukan budaya ini mempersembahkan sembilan grup yang menampilkan pertunjukan tradisi rakyat India yang sudah jarang ditemukan. Pertunjukan dilakukan di Taman Budaya Yogyakarta. Pertunjukan ini bertajuk Festival of India untuk menunjukkan kekayaan India dengan keanekaragamannya yang mengangkat tema "Friendship Through Culture". Diaspora India di Indonesia berperan penting dalam suksesnya penyelenggaraan kegiatan ini.

Banyaknya masyarakat yang tertarik dan menghadiri Festival of India menjadi bukti bahwa kegiatan kebudayaan India ini diapresiasi dengan baik oleh masyarakat Indonesia. Selain di Yogyakarta, pertunjukan budaya ini juga *roadshow* ke kota besar lain di Indonesia seperti Jakarta, Bandung, Medan, Surabaya, dan Bali (*Lintas Berita*, 2009). Ini merupakan salah satu wujud diplomasi kebudayaan India di Indonesia yang berusaha menampilkan kekayaan budaya rakyat dan pertunjukan seni klasik India. Kegiatan ini memberikan gambaran bagi masyarakat Indonesia secara umum agar menyadari kesamaan antara kedua negara dalam dunia seni dan budaya. Apresiasi positif ini dapat membantu India untuk mewujudkan citra dan indikasi kerjasama bilateral yang baik di mata pemerintah Indonesia (www.krjogja.com 2009).

Contoh-contoh lain seperti pernikahan antarnegara antara masyarakat India dengan Indonesia, festival budaya, pertukaran informasi di ranah akademis, investor dalam bidang ekonomi dan perdagangan, dan klub diskusi, menandakan bahwa hubungan antara masyarakat Indonesia dengan diaspora India di Indonesia sangat baik. Tidak jarang masyarakat diaspora India sangat intens untuk saling bertukar informasi dan bertukar kabar dengan masyarakat Indonesia. Jumlah beasiswa yang disediakan pemerintah India (ICCR) untuk Indonesia juga merupakan jumlah yang besar di antara negara-negara Asia Tenggara lainnya (Kumar 2008). Hal ini memberikan jalan positif bagi pemerintahan India untuk menerapkan diplomasi kebudayaannya di Indonesia dengan terbuka dan ramah tamah. Keberadaan diaspora di Indonesia selanjutnya menjadi penting bagi kepanjangan tangan pemerintah India dalam melaksanakan diplomasi kebudayaannya. MK Singh, Direktur Jawaharalal Nehru Indian Cultural Centre (JNICC), mengatakan bahwa diaspora India di Indonesia sudah menjadi lebih dari sekadar warga negara India yang berada di luar negeri, melainkan masing-masing dari mereka menjadi duta besar bagi India sendiri (Singh 2010).

Respon Diaspora India dalam Pelaksanaan Diplomasi India di Indonesia

Sejauh ini, diaspora India sangat aktif dalam merespon kegiatan-kegiatan kebudayaan pusat yang disponsori oleh Kedubes India. Buktinya, hampir semua kegiatan kebudayaan India terselenggara dengan baik dan mendapat respon yang positif dari masyarakat sekitar. Tidak dapat dipungkiri bahwa masyarakat Indonesia memang sangat dekat dengan kebudayaan India. Wajar jika pelaksanaan kegiatan kebudayaan India di Indonesia yang didukung oleh diaspora India menjadi sangat mudah dengan penerimaan dari masyarakat Indonesia itu sendiri.

Salah satu contohnya adalah seperti partisipasi diaspora India dalam mengikuti kegiatan lintas budaya bertajuk Indonesia Channel 2010 di Surabaya yang diikuti oleh 59 peserta dari 31 negara. Kegiatan lintas budaya ini dilaksanakan setiap tahun sejak 2006. Sebelumnya, kegiatan ini diselenggarakan di Solo (2009), Yogyakarta (2008), Jakarta (2007), dan Bandung (2006). Tema kegiatan BSBI tahun 2010 adalah "Building Friendships around the World through Arts and Culture". Seluruh peserta yang mengikuti dan berpartisipasi dalam kegiatan tersebut dapat saling mengenal dan membangun jaringan persahabatan yang baik di antara mereka termasuk dengan masyarakat Indonesia sendiri khususnya (*Tabloid Diplomasi*, 2010). Dengan mengikuti kegiatan ini, perwakilan pemerintah India melalui diasporanya menaruh harapan besar dalam sektor kebudayaan yang dapat menjadi pengaruh positif sebagai timbal balik dari kegiatan diplomasi kebudayaan yang diadakan oleh perwakilan pemerintah India di Indonesia.

Sementara itu, di Jakarta, respon diaspora India dapat dilihat dari aktifnya masyarakat diaspora dalam program-program kebudayaan yang diadakan rutin oleh JNICC di Jakarta (Wardani, 2010). Di sini, masyarakat bisa berkunjung kapan saja sesuai jam kerja, dan diundang untuk kebanyakan kegiatan jamuan makan yang diadakan oleh JNICC. Program berupa kelas bahasa, kelas tari, dan yang sedang sangat diminati belakangan ini adalah kelas yoga, diprakarsai dan didukung sepenuhnya oleh masyarakat diaspora India yang ada di Jakarta dengan memberikan sumbangan untuk buku-buku sumber perpustakaan India dan aktif menjadi pengajar di beberapa kelas kebudayaan.

Kunjungan SD Islam Al Syukro Jakarta ke JNICC pada 2010 menunjukkan bagaimana pusat kebudayaan ini dibantu oleh peran dari diasporanya berusaha untuk mencapai tujuan dari diplomasi kebudayaan India, yakni mewujudkan citra yang positif bagi masyarakat Indonesia di segala tingkatan. Siswa-siswa SD Islam Al Syukro ini diperkenalkan lebih jauh terhadap kebudayaan India. Siswa-siswa tersebut dapat langsung mempelajari seluk-beluk tari yang menggunakan aksesoris bunyi-bunyian di pergelangan kaki. Selain itu, siswa juga bisa mempelajari alat musik khas India yang disebut Tabla, semacam kendang-kempul di Indonesia. Mereka juga diajari senam meditasi, seperti yoga, yang banyak berakar dari India. Pengetahuan mengenai tari-tarian meliputi jenis-jenis tari klasik dan tari rakyat juga diberikan oleh JNICC. Para siswa ini juga menyaksikan film dokumenter tentang seni dan kebudayaan yang mengakar serta berkembang di Republik India. Dengan gaya pakaian tradisional khas India yang terlihat dalam film dokumenter tersebut, otomatis para siswa mendapat penjelasan lebih banyak mengenai pakaian tradisional India yang beraneka warna ini, bagaimana pakaian-pakaian tersebut dipilih dan digunakan untuk dipakai sesuai dengan musimnya.

Respon baik dan aktif yang diberikan oleh diaspora India ini terlihat dari mayoritas kesuksesan pelaksanaan kegiatan-kegiatan kebudayaan yang diadakan oleh Pusat Kebudayaan dan Kedutaan India di Indonesia, termasuk besarnya minat dan respon positif balik dari masyarakat Indonesia yang mengikuti kegiatan-kegiatan tersebut. Karena itu, program-program kebudayaan dari pemerintahan India banyak yang dipercayakan kepada diaspora India sebagai timbal balik atas respon aktif yang selama ini mereka perlihatkan.

Peran Diaspora India dalam Pelaksanaan Diplomasi Kebudayaan India di Indonesia

Tingginya tingkat inisiatif masyarakat diaspora India di Indonesia dalam mengadakan kegiatan seputar kebudayaan membuktikan bahwa diplomasi kebudayaan membutuhkan peranan diaspora ini dalam melaksanaan kegiatan kebudayaan selanjutnya. Dapat dikatakan, kegiatan diplomasi kebudayaan akan sangat bergantung pada partisipasi aktif yang diberikan masyarakat diaspora di setiap jenis kegiatan yang diadakan.

Walaupun demikian, diaspora India di Indonesia belum memiliki peran besar dalam memengaruhi agenda politik pemerintah Indonesia melalui kekuatan kebudayaan yang telah mereka lakukan tersebut. Sehubungan dengan pencapaian The Incredible India 2011 yang menuntut pencitraan baik negara India di mata internasional, termasuk di Indonesia, pemerintah India perlu untuk memberikan peran yang lebih signifikan atas keberadaan diaspora India demi mencapai kepentingan nasional India. Peranan diaspora India ini ke depannya juga akan membantu hubungan bilateral yang terjalin antara India dengan Indonesia di bidang lainnya. Dengan memperhatikan peran dan keberadaan diaspora, maka kebudayaan akan menjadi pintu masuk yang kuat bagi

India untuk kemudian menjalin hubungan dan kerjasama penting dengan Indonesia jika pemerintah juga berperan aktif dalam menggerakkan keberadaan diaspora India dalam proses penyusunan agenda pemerintahannya di Indonesia.

Pemerintah India perlu mempertimbangkan pentingnya keberadaan masyarakat diaspora dalam pelaksanaan diplomasi kebudayaan India di Indonesia ini. Kedubes India di Indonesia perlu lebih jauh lagi melakukan kegiatan-kegiatan persuasif yang nantinya dapat meningkatkan peranan diaspora lebih tinggi lagi di Indonesia. Hingga saat ini, belum terlihat adanya kerjasama langsung antara diaspora India di Indonesia dengan perwakilan pemerintah India di Indonesia dalam penyusunan kebijakan luar negeri atau agenda kegiatan yang berkaitan dengan kebudayaan secara langsung. Peranan diaspora India masih terlalu pasif dalam pemerintahan Indonesia sehingga membuat kedudukan mereka tidak lebih dari masyarakat Indonesia biasa.

Sejauh ini dalam kegiatan diplomasi kebudayaan India, pemerintah India dan pusat-pusat kebudayaan masih memegang peranan penuh sebagai penyusun kegiatan resmi diplomasi kebudayaan. Di sisi lain, peran diaspora India masih sebagai pelaksana dan pendukungnya saja. Padahal, dengan banyaknya kegiatan kebudayaan yang telah dilakukan oleh masyarakat diaspora India di Indonesia, semestinya mereka mampu mendukung *soft power* India jika dilibatkan lebih jauh dalam pelaksanaan dan proses penyusunan diplomasi kebudayaan India. Lebih dari itu, dengan kedudukan yang sudah dimiliki oleh masyarakat diaspora India di Indonesia, mereka seharusnya juga mampu memperjuangkan kesetaraan sebagai sesama warga negara Indonesia dalam kancah perpolitikan Indonesia.

Kesimpulan

Kebudayaan sebagai salah satu pendukung utama *soft power* belakangan ini menjadi sebuah isu penting yang sangat dipertimbangkan di dunia internasional. Pertunjukan budaya, pameran lintas budaya, dan pertukaran pelajar menjadi cara ampuh bagi sebuah negara untuk menjadikannya sebagai pintu masuk untuk mencapai kepentingan-kepentingan nasionalnya yang lain. Munculnya gagasan diplomasi kebudayaan sebagai turunan dari diplomasi publik menjadikan kedudukan kebudayaan menjadi sangat signifikan dalam mendukung pencapaian tujuan nasional suatu negara.

India muncul sebagai suatu negara dengan tingkat pertumbuhan yang tinggi selama tiga dekade terakhir. Negara yang awalnya hanya sebagai negara jajahan, negara berkembang, bahkan sempat dianggap negara gagal, kini tumbuh dan berkembang dengan pesat sebagai salah satu negara yang mendukung perekonomian India. Keberhasilan India ini tidak lepas dari peranan sejumlah besar diaspora India yang tersebar di seluruh belahan dunia yang setiap tahunnya memengaruhi perekonomian India dengan jumlah *remittance* yang diterima India dari masyarakat diasporanya ini.

Selain sektor ekonomi, diaspora India juga memiliki kedudukan penting dalam menyebarkan budaya India ke luar batas India. Interaksi antara masyarakat diaspora satu dengan masyarakat diaspora India lainnya dapat membantu memengaruhi kebudayaan yang ada. Sejalan dengan itu, diplomasi yang sudah menyesuaikan diri dan muncul dengan bentuk barunya, diplomasi publik, semakin mementingkan keterlibatan publik dalam sarana pelaksanaan dan pencapaiannya. Lepas dari itu, diplomasi tidak lagi sebatas apa yang dilakukan oleh negara dan aktor-aktor atau diplomat yang ditunjuk oleh negara tersebut. Masyarakat di era globalisasi kini memiliki peran sangat penting dalam melaksanakan diplomasi publik karena kedudukannya setara dan sangat dekat dengan masyarakat lain, sehingga tidak memerlukan pendekatan awal untuk memulai suatu interaksi.

Diplomasi kebudayaan merupakan implementasi dan turunan dari diplomasi publik memiliki kemungkinan paling signifikan dalam membantu pencapaian kepentingan luar negeri suatu negara. Keberadaan diaspora India di berbagai belahan dunia dapat berperan penting dalam mendukung pelaksanaan diplomasi kebudayaan India. Diplomasi kebudayaan ini akan lebih mudah tercapai apabila ada ikatan kebudayaan yang kuat antara dua negara sebelum adanya wacana diplomasi kebudayaan, seperti India dan Indonesia.

Bila dilihat dari catatan kebudayaannya, maka peran diaspora India akan sangat aktif dalam mendukung pelaksanaan diplomasi kebudayaan India di Indonesia. Kegiatan-kegaitan yang berhubungan dengan kebudayaan seperti pertukaran pelajar, peringatan hari besar India, pelajaran seni India, dan pameran kebudayaan banyak diminati oleh masyarakat Indonesia.

Namun, peran diaspora India di Indonesia ini belum cukup untuk mendukung diplomasi kebudayaan India di Indonesia karena partisipasi dan kegiatan yang dilakukan di sektor budaya hanya berhenti pada ruang lingkup masyarakat dan tidak sampai menyentuh tingkat pemerintah. Ketidakmampuan tersebut menjadikan keberadaan diaspora India di Indonesia tidak terlalu dilibatkan dalam proses pengambilan keputusan pemerintah Indonesia atau proses penyusunan agenda diplomasi kebudayaan yang dilakukan oleh pemerintahan India di Indonesia. Keadaan ini juga dipicu karena perasaan nyaman dan setara yang sudah ada dalam masyarakat diaspora India di Indonesia.

Karena itu, dapat disimpulkan bahwa keaktifan diaspora India dalam melakukan kegiatan-kegiatan yang bersifat kebudayaan belum mampu menunjukkan peran diaspora India secara efektif dalam mendukung diplomasi kebudayaan India di Indonesia. Peran yang dilakukan oleh diaspora India tersebut belum mampu memberikan kontribusi secara langsung dalam memengaruhi kebijakan pemerintah Indonesia ataupun India. Diaspora India di Indonesia belum sampai pada tahap Bollystan seperti yang dijelaskan oleh Parag Khanna (2005) di Amerika Serikat, sehingga upaya pencapaian kekuasaan melalui kebudayaan sebagai unsur *soft power* seperti yang dijelaskan oleh Joseph Nye belum maksimal.

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INDEKS

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     Wade (2007) berpendapat bahwa....
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     .... (Kaldor 2006).
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     Martin (2006) dan Johnson (2008) memiliki pandangan sama. Keduanya menganggap....
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.... (Martin 2006; Johnson 2008).

- Apabila mengutip sebuah pendapat yang disampaikan lebih dari satu pengarang, cantumkan nama pengarang secara berurutan dan diikuti tahun terbit yang dimasukkan dalam kurung.
  Falola dan Genova (2005) menyatakan....
  .... (Falola dan Genova 2005).
- Apabila mengutip sebuah pendapat lebih dari dua pengarang, cantumkan hanya pengarang pertama dan diikuti ”et al.”.
  Eizenstat et al. (2005) berargumen bahwa....
  .... (Eizenstat et al. 2005).
- Apabila nama pengarangnya tidak diketahui, cantumkan judul artikel dan tahun terbit. Judul artikel diapit tanda kutip.
  Dalam artikel “Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction” (2006), dinyatakan bahwa....
- Apabila tahun terbit tidak diketahui, cantumkan “t.t.” yang berarti “tanpa tahun”.
  Sieuw (t.t.) menuliskan....
  .... (Sieuw t.t.).
- Apabila mencantumkan nomor halaman
  Acharya (2004, 58) mengatakan....
  .... (Acharya 2004, 58).
- Apabila mengutip pendapat dari satu pengarang dan diterbitkan pada tahun yang berbeda, cantumkan nama pengarang disertai tahun ketika dipublikasikan pertama kali.
  Laquer (1987 & 1999) mengajukan tesis bahwa ....
  .... (Laquer, 1987 & 1999).
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  .... (Sageman 2004 dalam Dempsey 2006).
  Dalam penelitiannya, Sageman (2004 dalam Dempsey 2006) menemukan bukti bahwa....
  Sageman (2004), seperti dikutip oleh Dempsey (2006), menyarankan....

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